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Actions for Ensuring contract management capability in government - Department of Education

Ensuring contract management capability in government - Department of Education

Education
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Workforce and capability

This report examines whether the Department of Education has the required contract management capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts (over $250,000). In 2017–18, the department managed high-value goods and services contracts worth $3.08 billion, with most of the contracts running over multiple years.

NSW government agencies are increasingly delivering services and projects through contracts with third parties. These contracts can be complex and governments face challenges in negotiating and implementing them effectively.

Contract management capability is a broad term, which can include aspects of individual staff capability as well as organisational capability (such as policies, frameworks and processes).

In 2017–18, the Department of Education (the Department) managed high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts worth $3.08 billion, with most of the contracts running over multiple years. The Department delivers, funds and regulates education services for NSW students from early childhood to secondary school.

This audit examined whether the Department has the required capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts.

We did not examine infrastructure, construction or information communication and technology contracts. We assessed the Department against the following criteria:

  1. The Department’s policies and procedures support effective contract management and are consistent with relevant frameworks, policies and guidelines.
  2. The Department has capable personnel to effectively conduct the monitoring activities throughout the life of the contract.

The NSW Public Service Commission and the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation are included as auditees as they administer policies which directly affect contract management capability, including:

  • NSW Procurement Board Directions and policies
  • NSW Procurement Agency Accreditation Scheme
  • NSW Public Sector Capability Framework.

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation's responsibility for NSW Procurement will transfer to NSW Treasury on 1 July 2019 as part of changes to government administrative arrangements announced on 2 April 2019 and amended on 1 May 2019.

Conclusion

The Department of Education's procedures and policies for goods and services contract management are consistent with relevant guidance. It also has a systemic approach to defining the capability required for contract management roles. That said, there are gaps in how well the Department uses this capability to ensure its contracts are performing. We also found one program (comprising 645 contracts) that was not compliant with the Department's policies.

The Department has up-to-date policies and procedures that are consistent with relevant guidance. The Department also communicates changes to procurement related policies, monitors compliance with policies and conducts regular reviews aiming to identify non-compliance.

The Department uses the NSW Public Service Commission's capability framework to support its workforce management and development. The capability framework includes general contract management capability for all staff and occupation specific capabilities for contract managers. The Department also provides learning and development for staff who manage contracts to improve their capability.

The Department provides some guidance on different ways that contract managers can validate performance information provided by suppliers. However, the Department does not provide guidance to assist contract managers to choose the best validation strategy according to contract risk. This could lead to inconsistent practice and contracts not delivering what they are supposed to.

We found that none of the 645 contracts associated with the Assisted Schools Travel Program (estimated value of $182 million in 2018–19) have contract management plans. This is contrary to the Department's policies and increases the risk that contract managers are not effectively reviewing performance and resolving disputes.

Appendix one - Response from agencies

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #325 - released 28 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Managing native vegetation

Managing native vegetation

Environment
Management and administration
Project management
Regulation
Service delivery

The report found the clearing of native vegetation on rural land is not effectively regulated and managed. The processes supporting the regulatory framework are weak and there is no evidence-based assurance that clearing of native vegetation is carried out in accordance with approvals. 

In 2014 an expert panel completed a review of biodiversity legislation in NSW. The panel’s recommendations included repealing the Native Vegetation Act 2003, proposing a new Act with the goal of maintaining a healthy, productive and resilient environment for the greatest wellbeing of the community, and recommending that management of native vegetation in the context of existing agricultural management would be assisted and supervised by Local Land Services (LLS).

Following the panel report, the NSW Government undertook major biodiversity conservation and land management reforms which saw the introduction of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (NSW) and the Local Land Services Amendment Act 2016 (NSW). The reforms commenced in August 2017. The Native Vegetation Act 2003, the Threatened Species Conservation Act 1995, the Nature Conservation Trust Act 2001, and parts of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 were repealed.

Under the legislative reforms, the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 and Local Land Services Amendment Act 2016, which amended the Local Land Services Act 2013, aim to ensure a balanced approach to land management and biodiversity conservation in NSW.

A core objective of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 is to conserve biodiversity at bioregional and state scales. A core objective of the Local Land Service Act 2013 is to ensure the proper management of natural resources in the social, economic and environmental interests of the state, consistently with the principles of ecologically sustainable development.

The integrated package of reforms included:

  • new arrangements that allow land owners to improve productivity while responding to environmental risks
  • new ways to assess and manage the biodiversity impacts of development
  • a new state Environmental Planning Policy for managing impacts on native vegetation in urban areas
  • significant investment in conservation of private land
  • a risk-based system for regulating human and business interactions with native plants and animals
  • streamlined approvals and dedicated resources to help reduce the regulatory burden.

Transition to this land management framework began on 25 August 2017 with the commencement of the Land Management (Native Vegetation) Code.

The overall objectives of the reforms are:

  • to arrest and ultimately reverse the current decline in the state’s biodiversity while facilitating ecologically sustainable development, in particular efficient and sustainable agricultural development
  • enable landholders to improve the efficiency of their agricultural systems and take a more active role in providing incentive and supporting landholders to improve the condition and function of their ecological systems. 

The objective of this audit is to assess whether the clearing of native vegetation in rural areas is effectively regulated and managed by the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) and LLS under these legislative frameworks. The audit also examined the progress of the Biodiversity Conservation Trust in implementing the Biodiversity Conservation Investment Strategy as a counterbalance to rural land clearing. 

At the time of this audit OEH was responsible for preparing the Native Vegetation Regulatory map and for compliance enforcement in relation to unlawful land clearing. Post 1 July 2019, under machinery of government changes, OEH will be abolished and its activities relevant to this audit will be moved to the new Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. For the purposes of this audit we will continue to refer to it as OEH. 

Conclusion
The clearing of native vegetation on rural land is not effectively regulated and managed because the processes in place to support the regulatory framework are weak. There is no evidence-based assurance that clearing of native vegetation is being carried out in accordance with approvals. Responses to incidents of unlawful clearing are slow, with few tangible outcomes. Enforcement action is rarely taken against landholders who unlawfully clear native vegetation. 

There are processes in place for approving land clearing but there is limited follow-up to ensure approvals are complied with.
Procedures and systems are in place for assessing applications and issuing approvals for land clearing. Approvals contain conditions for managing clearing and setting aside land for conservation as a counterbalance to permitted clearing. 
There is limited follow-up or capacity to gauge whether landholders are complying with the conditions of approvals and effectively managing areas of their land that have been set aside for conservation (i.e. 'set asides'). 
Certificate assessments are used to grant landholders permission to clear. All assessments we reviewed generally complied with the Land Management (Native Vegetation) Code 2018 (the Code). 
The rules around land clearing may not be responding adequately to environmental risks.
The Code, which contains conditions under which the thinning or clearing of native vegetation can be approved on regulated land, is intended to allow landholders to improve productivity while responding to environmental risks. That said, it may not be achieving this balance. For example, the Code allows some native species to be treated as ‘invasive’ when they may not be invading an area, provides little protection for groundcover and limited management requirements for set asides. There is also limited ability under the Code to reject applications for higher risk clearing proposals.
The release of the Native Vegetation Regulatory (NVR) map has been delayed, limiting landholders' ability to determine if their plans for clearing are lawful.
OEH has applied significant effort in developing a native vegetation regulatory map to guide landholders on which land they can and can’t clear without approval. However, in November 2016 the then Minister for Primary Industries advised Parliament that the two largest land categories of the NVR map will not come into effect until the relevant Ministers are satisfied stakeholders have sufficient confidence in the maps’ accuracy. Not releasing the map has made it harder for landholders to identify the portions of their land that are regulated and ensure they comply with land clearing rules. It has also limited OEH’s ability to consult on and improve the accuracy of the map.
There are significant delays in identifying unlawful clearing and few penalties imposed.
Unexplained land clearing can take over two years to identify and analyse, making it difficult to minimise environmental harm or gather evidence to prosecute unlawful clearing. Despite around 1,000 instances of unexplained clearing identified by OEH and over 500 reports to the environmental hotline each year, with around 300 investigations in progress at any one time, there are only two to three prosecutions, three to five remediation orders and around ten penalty notices issued each year for unlawful clearing. Further, OEH is yet to commence any prosecutions under the current legislation which commenced in August 2017.
Land clearing and private land conservation investment have both increased.
Clearing of native vegetation has increased in recent years. At the same time, the government is also investing in properties with high environmental value with a focus on improving the mix of endangered ecological communities conserved in perpetuity. Processes are in place for identifying and prioritising areas of land for investment but the funding provided to each region is not always consistent with these priorities. 

Local Land Services (LLS) is responsible for processing notifications and issuing certificates to landholders for managing the thinning or clearing of native vegetation on rural land through the ‘Land Management (Native Vegetation) Code 2018’ (the Code). This work includes monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the Code, including the establishment and management of set asides.

OEH is responsible for compliance and enforcement in relation to unlawful land clearing. It is also responsible for producing the NVR map, designed to show landholders where land clearing can occur without approval, where approval is required, and where land clearing is not permitted. Post 1 July 2019, under machinery of government changes, OEH will be abolished and its activities relevant to this audit will be moved to the new Department of Planning, Industry and Environment.

Appendix one - Response from agencies

Appendix two - Authorisations for thinning and clearing, and restoration initiatives under the Native Vegetation Act 2003

Appendix three - About the audit

Appendix four - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #324 - released 27 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Contracting non-government organisations

Contracting non-government organisations

Community Services
Compliance
Fraud
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Service delivery

This report found the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) needs to do more to demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services in the Permanency Support Program (a component of out-of-home-care services) and Specialist Homelessness Services. It notes that FACS is moving to an outcomes-based commissioning model and recommends this be escalated consistent with government policy.

Government agencies, such as the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), are increasingly contracting non-government organisations (NGOs) to deliver human services in New South Wales. In doing so, agencies are responsible for ensuring these services are achieving expected outcomes. Since the introduction of the Commissioning and Contestability Policy in 2016, all NSW Government agencies are expected to include plans for customer and community outcomes and look for ways to use contestability to raise standards.

Two of the areas receiving the greatest funding from FACS are the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services. In the financial year 2017–18, nearly 500 organisations received $784 million for out-of-home care programs, including the Permanency Support Program. Across New South Wales, specialist homelessness providers assist more than 54,000 people each year and in the financial year 2017–18, 145 organisations received $243 million for providing short term accommodation and homelessness support, including Specialist Homelessness Services.

In the financial year 2017–18, FACS entered into 230 contracts for out-of-home care, of which 49 were for the Permanency Support Program, representing $322 million. FACS also entered into 157 contracts for the provision of Specialist Homelessness Services which totalled $170 million. We reviewed the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services for this audit.

This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently FACS contracts NGOs to deliver community services. The audit could not assess how NGOs used the funds they received from FACS as the Audit Office does not have a mandate that could provide direct assurance that NGOs are using government funds effectively.

Conclusion
FACS cannot demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services because it does not always use open tenders to test the market when contracting NGOs, and does not collect adequate performance data to ensure safe and quality services are being provided. While there are some valid reasons for using restricted tenders, it means that new service providers are excluded from consideration - limiting contestability. In the service delivery areas we assessed, FACS does not measure client outcomes as it has not yet moved to outcomes-based contracts. 
FACS' procurement approach sometimes restricts the selection of NGOs for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has a procurement policy and plan which it follows when contracting NGOs for the provision of human services. This includes the option to use restricted tenders, which FACS sometimes uses rather than opening the process to the market. The use of restricted tenders is consistent with its procurement plan where there is a limited number of possible providers and the services are highly specialised. However, this approach perpetuates existing arrangements and makes it very difficult for new service providers to enter the market. The recontracting of existing providers means FACS may miss the opportunity to benchmark existing providers against the whole market. 
FACS does not effectively use client data to monitor the performance of NGOs funded under the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS' contract management staff monitor individual NGO performance including safety, quality of services and compliance with contract requirements. Although FACS does provide training materials on its intranet, FACS does not provide these staff with sufficient training, support or guidance to monitor NGO performance efficiently or effectively. FACS also requires NGOs to self-report their financial performance and contract compliance annually. FACS verifies the accuracy of the financial data but conducts limited validation of client data reported by NGOs to verify its accuracy. Instead, FACS relies on contract management staff to identify errors or inaccurate reporting by NGOs.
FACS' ongoing monitoring of the performance of providers under the Permanency Support Program is particularly limited due to problems with timely data collection at the program level. This reduces FACS' ability to monitor and analyse NGO performance at the program level as it does not have access to ongoing performance data for monitoring service quality.
In the Specialist Homelessness Services program, FACS and NGOs both provide the data required for the National Minimum Data Set on homelessness and provide it to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, as they are required to do. However, this data is not used for NGO performance monitoring or management.
FACS does not yet track outcomes for clients of NGOs
FACS began to develop an approach to outcomes-based contracting in 2015. Despite this, none of the contracts we reviewed are using outcomes as a measure of success. Currently, NGOs are required to demonstrate their performance is consistent with the measures stipulated in their contracts as part of an annual check of their contract compliance and financial accounts. NGOs report against activity-based measures (Key Performance Indicators) and not outcomes.
FACS advises that the transition to outcomes-based contracting will be made with the new rounds of funding which will take place in 2020–2021 for Specialist Homelessness Services and 2023 for the Permanency Support Program. Once these contracts are in place, FACS can transition NGOs to outcomes based reporting.
Incomplete data limits FACS' effectiveness in continuous improvement for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has policies and procedures in place to learn from past experiences and use this to inform future contracting decisions. However, FACS has limited client data related to the Permanency Support Program which restricts the amount of continuous improvement it can undertake. In the Specialist Homelessness Support Program data is collected to inform routine contract management discussions with service providers but FACS is not using this data for continuous improvement. 

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #323 - released 26 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Development assessment: pre-lodgement and lodgement in Camden Council and Randwick City Council

Development assessment: pre-lodgement and lodgement in Camden Council and Randwick City Council

Local Government
Management and administration
Service delivery

The report found that both councils could do more to monitor and assess the effectiveness of their pre-lodgement and lodgement stages. The audit highlighted that Randwick City Council closely follows guidance designed to encourage good practice in these initial stages of its development assessments. It also demonstrated it was timely when processing lodgements. Camden Council is partially following the guidance and could not demonstrate that its lodgement stage was timely.

A development application is a formal application for development that requires consent under the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. It is usually lodged with the local council for processing and determination, and consists of standard application forms, supporting technical reports and plans. 

In March 2017, the NSW Department of Planning and Environment (DPE)1 released the ‘Development Assessment Best Practice Guide' designed to help councils assess development applications in a timely manner and provide a better experience for applicants. 

DPE's guide describes the development assessment process in five stages. 

According to the Guidance, councils should systematically measure, monitor and review development assessment outcomes and timeframes against performance targets to ensure the process is transparent, accountable and outcome-focused.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Council's alignment with the guidance

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #322 - released 20 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Domestic waste management in Campbelltown City Council and Fairfield City Council

Domestic waste management in Campbelltown City Council and Fairfield City Council

Local Government
Management and administration
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, today released a report on Domestic waste management in Campbelltown City Council and Fairfield City Council.The report found that both Councils collect and transport domestic kerbside waste effectively and process it at a low cost. The Councils also effectively process waste placed in green-lid and yellow-lid bins, but neither Council has been able to enforce their contracts for processing red-lid bin waste. As a result, almost all such waste goes straight to landfill. 

Local councils provide waste management services to their residents. They collect domestic waste primarily through kerbside services, but also at council drop off facilities. Waste management is one of the major services local councils deliver. Each year, councils collectively manage an estimated 3.5 million tonnes of waste generated by New South Wales residents.

Waste disposed of in landfills attracts a NSW Government waste levy. Councils’ kerbside services help residents to separate recyclable and non recyclable waste. This reduces the cost of waste disposed to landfill. These services typically provide yellow-lid bins for dry recyclables, green-lid bins for garden organics and red-lid bins for residual waste. To increase the level of recycling, some councils deliver residual waste to alternative waste treatment facilities for processing. This can involve composting and the recovery of resources, including plastics and metals, which can be recycled.

Appendix one - Responses from local councils

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #320 - released 5 June 2019

Published

Actions for Universities 2018 audits

Universities 2018 audits

Universities
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance

The Acting Auditor General of New South Wales, Ian Goodwin, released a report today on the results of financial audits of NSW universities for the year ended 31 December 2018.

All ten NSW universities received unqualified audit opinions.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the ten NSW universities for the year ended 31 December 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides Parliament with the results of our financial audits of New South Wales universities and their controlled entities in 2018, including our analysis, observations and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • internal controls and governance
  • teaching and research.

Financial reporting is an important element of governance. Confidence and transparency in university sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of NSW universities for 2018.

Appropriate and robust internal controls help reduce risks associated with managing finances, compliance and administration of NSW universities.

This chapter outlines the internal controls related observations and insights across NSW universities for 2018, including overall trends in findings, level of risk and implications.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. The more significant issues and risks are included in this chapter. These along with the less significant ones are reported to universities for them to address.

Universities' primary objectives are teaching and research. They invest most of their resources to achieve quality outcomes in academia and student experience. Universities have committed to achieving certain government targets and compete to advance their reputation and international and Australian rankings.

This chapter outlines teaching and research outcomes for NSW universities for 2018.

Published

Actions for Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors

Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors

Transport
Education
Health
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Project management
Workforce and capability

Three key agencies are not fully complying with the NSW Procurement Board’s Direction for engaging probity practitioners, according to a report released today by the Acting Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin. They also do not have effective processes to achieve compliance or assure that probity engagements achieved value for money.

Probity is defined as the quality of having strong moral principles, honesty and decency. Probity is important for NSW Government agencies as it helps ensure decisions are made with integrity, fairness and accountability, while attaining value for money.

Probity advisers provide guidance on issues concerning integrity, fairness and accountability that may arise throughout asset procurement and disposal processes. Probity auditors verify that agencies' processes are consistent with government laws and legislation, guidelines and best practice principles. 

According to the NSW State Infrastructure Strategy 2018-2038, New South Wales has more infrastructure projects underway than any state or territory in Australia. The scale of the spend on procuring and constructing new public transport networks, roads, schools and hospitals, the complexity of these projects and public scrutiny of aspects of their delivery has increased the focus on probity in the public sector. 

A Procurement Board Direction, 'PBD-2013-05 Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors' (the Direction), sets out the requirements for NSW Government agencies' use and engagement of probity practitioners. It confirms agencies should routinely take into account probity considerations in their procurement. The Direction also specifies that NSW Government agencies can use probity advisers and probity auditors (probity practitioners) when making decisions on procuring and disposing of assets, but that agencies:

  • should use external probity practitioners as the exception rather than the rule
  • should not use external probity practitioners as an 'insurance policy'
  • must be accountable for decisions made
  • cannot substitute the use of probity practitioners for good management practices
  • not engage the same probity practitioner on an ongoing basis, and ensure the relationship remains robustly independent. 

The scale of probity spend may be small in the context of the NSW Government's spend on projects. However, government agencies remain responsible for probity considerations whether they engage external probity practitioners or not.

The audit assessed whether Transport for NSW, the Department of Education and the Ministry of Health:

  • complied with the requirements of ‘PBD-2013-05 Engagement of Probity Advisers and Probity Auditors’
  • effectively ensured they achieved value for money when they used probity practitioners.

These entities are referred to as 'participating agencies' in this report.

We also surveyed 40 NSW Government agencies with the largest total expenditures (top 40 agencies) to get a cross sector view of their use of probity practitioners. These agencies are listed in Appendix two.

Conclusion

We found instances where each of the three participating agencies had not fully complied with the requirements of the NSW Procurement Board Direction ‘PBD-2013-05 Engagement of Probity Advisers and Probity Auditors’ when they engaged probity practitioners. We also found they did not have effective processes to achieve compliance or assure the engagements achieved value for money.

In the sample of engagements we selected, we found instances where the participating agencies did not always:

  • document detailed terms of reference
  • ensure the practitioner was sufficiently independent
  • manage probity practitioners' independence and conflict of interest issues transparently
  • provide practitioners with full access to records, people and meetings
  • establish independent reporting lines   reporting was limited to project managers
  • evaluate whether value for money was achieved.

We also found:

  • agencies tend to rely on only a limited number of probity service providers, sometimes using them on a continuous basis, which may threaten the actual or perceived independence of probity practitioners
  • the NSW Procurement Board does not effectively monitor agencies' compliance with the Direction's requirements. Our enquiries revealed that the Board has not asked any agency to report on its use of probity practitioners since the Direction's inception in 2013. 

There are no professional standards and capability requirements for probity practitioners

NSW Government agencies use probity practitioners to independently verify that their procurement and asset disposal processes are transparent, fair and accountable in the pursuit of value for money. 

Probity practitioners are not subject to regulations that require them to have professional qualifications, experience and capability. Government agencies in New South Wales have difficulty finding probity standards, regulations or best practice guides to reference, which may diminish the degree of reliance stakeholders can place on practitioners’ work.

The NSW Procurement Board provides direction for the use of probity practitioners

The NSW Procurement Board Direction 'PBD-2013-15 for engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors' outlines the requirements for agencies' use of probity practitioners in the New South Wales public sector. All NSW Government agencies, except local government, state owned corporations and universities, must comply with the Direction when engaging probity practitioners. This is illustrated in Exhibit 1 below.

Published

Actions for Managing growth in the NSW prison population

Managing growth in the NSW prison population

Justice
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Department of Justice has relied heavily on temporary responses to accommodate growing prisoner numbers according to a report released today by the Acting Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin.

At the time of this audit, the NSW Department of Justice (DOJ) was responsible for delivering custodial corrections services in New South Wales through its Corrective Services NSW division (Corrective Services NSW). From 1 July 2019, the Department of Family and Community Services and Justice will be responsible for these functions. 

Within DOJ, Corrective Services NSW is responsible for administering sentences and legal orders through custodial and community-based management of adult offenders. Its key priorities are:

  • providing safe, secure and humane management of prisoners
  • reducing reoffending
  • improving community safety and confidence in the justice system. 

The prison population in New South Wales grew by around 40 per cent between 2012 to 2018, from 9,602 to 13,630 inmates. This rate of growth was higher than experienced prior to 2012. DOJ forecasts growth to continue over the short and longer-term. 

DOJ has responded to inmate population growth by doubling-up and tripling-up the number of prison beds in cells, reactivating previously closed prisons, and a $3.8 billion program of new prison capacity. DOJ has also developed a long-term prison infrastructure strategy that projects long-term needs and recommended investments to meet these needs. 

This audit assessed how efficiently and effectively DOJ is responding to growth in the NSW prison population. In this report, we have not analysed the sources of demand or recommended ways that custody may be avoided. These are largely government policy issues. 

Conclusion
The DOJ has relied heavily on temporary responses to accommodate growth in the NSW prison population. Sustained reliance on these responses is inefficient and creates risks to safety, and timely access to prisoner support services.
DOJ has experienced significant growth in the prison population since 2012. To meet demand, it has relied on temporary responses that are not designed to be sustained, including doubling-up or tripling-up the number of beds in cells, reopening previously closed facilities and using obsolete facilities. DOJ has also regularly moved inmates between its facilities to accommodate the increasing need for beds in metropolitan Sydney. 
Relying on temporary approaches over a long period contributes to prison crowding and has affected DOJ's ability to manage inmates in line with its correctional principles. It has increased risks to staff and prisoner safety, and timely inmate access to prisoner support services and programs. In addition, the cost per prisoner per day increased over the past two years.
DOJ is progressively delivering new capacity to address the growing prison population.
In response to continuing and projected growth in the prison population, the NSW Government announced a one-off $3.8 billion program to deliver around 6,100 beds by May 2021. Under the program, DOJ developed and delivered two rapid build dormitory style prisons within 18 months. DOJ’s capability to deliver the program, including implementation of new beds and new prisons, governance, project management, risk assessment and commissioning has improved over time. Most new capacity will be delivered on existing DOJ sites, mainly in regional New South Wales. 
DOJ has developed a strategy to respond to long-term projected growth in the prison population, but it has yet to be funded. 
The Corrective Services NSW Infrastructure Strategy (CSIS) sets out challenges, strategic priorities, and planned actions to respond to projected growth over the next 20 years and improve overall system efficiency and effectiveness. But, proposed actions are subject to individual business cases and funding decisions. Three versions of the CSIS have been provided to, and endorsed by, the NSW Government. The key challenge identified in the CSIS is to overcome demand for prison beds in the Sydney metropolitan region. DOJ advised that it is developing a final business case to address metropolitan capacity needs, but this is subject to government approval and funding. DOJ should continue to highlight the urgency of this issue until it is addressed, as it prevents planned actions to improve system efficiency and effectiveness.
 

The Productivity Commission’s Report on Government Services outlines the performance indicator framework for corrective services in Australia (Appendix three). We have used measures from this framework to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of DOJ’s responses to prison bed capacity needs. 

In this section, we analyse system-wide indicators as DOJ has not consistently published or reported data for individual correctional centres over the period of review.
 

Published

Actions for Wellbeing of secondary school students

Wellbeing of secondary school students

Education
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The Department of Education has a strong focus on supporting secondary school students’ wellbeing. However, it is difficult to assess how well the Department is progressing as it is yet to measure or report on the outcomes of this work at a whole-of-state level.

The Department of Education’s (the Department) purpose is to prepare young people for rewarding lives as engaged citizens in a complex and dynamic society. The Department commits to creating quality learning opportunities for children and young people, including a commitment to student wellbeing, which is seen as directly linked to positive learning outcomes. Wellbeing is defined broadly by the Department as “the quality of a person’s life…It is more than the absence of physical or psychological illness”. Student wellbeing can be supported by everything a school does to enhance a student's learning—from curriculum to teacher quality to targeted policies and programs to whole-school approaches to wellbeing.

Several reforms have aimed to support student wellbeing in recent years. 'Local Schools, Local Decisions' gave NSW schools more local authority to make decisions, including schools' approaches to support student wellbeing. In 2016, the 'Supported Students, Successful Students' initiative provided $167 million over four years to support the wellbeing of students. From 2018, the 'Every Student is Known, Valued and Cared For' initiative provides a principal led mentoring program, and a website with policies, procedures and resources to support student wellbeing.

This audit assessed how well the Department of Education supports secondary schools to promote and support the wellbeing of their students and how well secondary schools are promoting and supporting the wellbeing of their students.

Conclusion

The Department has implemented a range of programs and reforms aimed at supporting student wellbeing. However, the outcomes of this work have yet to be measured or reported on at a system level, making it difficult to assess the Department's progress in improving student wellbeing.

Secondary schools have generally adopted a structured approach to deliver wellbeing support and programs, using both Department and localised resources. The approaches have been tailored to meet the needs of their school community. That said, public reporting on wellbeing improvement measures via annual school reports is of variable quality and needs to improve.

The Department’s wellbeing initiatives are supported by research and consultation, but outcomes have not been reported on

The Department’s development of wellbeing policy, guidance, tools and resources has been transparent, consultative and well researched. It has drawn on international and domestic evidence to support its aim to deliver a fundamental shift from welfare to wellbeing at the school and system level.

However, the key performance indicator to monitor and track progress in wellbeing has yet to be reported on despite the strategic plan including this as a priority for the period 2018 to 2022. This includes not yet reporting a baseline for the target, nor how it will be measured.

The Department’s wellbeing resources are mostly well targeted but there is room for improvement

The Department’s allocation of resources to deliver wellbeing initiatives in schools is mostly well targeted, reflects a needs basis and supports current strategic directions. This could be improved with some changes to formula allocations and clearer definitions of the resourcing required for identified wellbeing positions in schools. The workforce modelling for forecasting supply and demand, specifically for school counsellors and psychologists, needs to separately identify these positions as they are currently subsumed in general teacher numbers.

Schools' reporting on wellbeing improvement measures is of variable quality and needs to improve

Schools we visited demonstrated a variety of approaches to wellbeing depending on their local circumstances and student populations. They make use of Department policies, guidelines, and resources, particularly mandatory policies and data collections, which have good compliance and take-up at school level. Professional learning supports specific wellbeing initiatives and online systems for monitoring and reporting have contributed to schools’ capacity and capabilities.

Schools report publicly on wellbeing improvement measures through annual school reports but this reporting is of variable quality. The Department plans to improve the capability of schools in data analysis and we recommend that this include the setting and evaluation of improvement targets for wellbeing.

The implementation of the 2015 Wellbeing Framework in schools is incomplete and the Department has not effectively prioritised and consolidated tools, systems and reporting for wellbeing

Schools' take up of the 2015 Wellbeing Framework is hindered by it not being linked to the school planning and reporting policy and tools—the School Excellence Framework. At some schools we visited, this disconnect has led to a lack of knowledge and confidence in using it in schools. The Department has identified the need to improve alignment of policies, frameworks and plans and has commenced work on this.

We found evidence of overburdening in schools for addressing student wellbeing—in the number of tools, online systems for information collection, and duplication in reporting. Following the significant reforms of recent years, the Department should consolidate its efforts by reinforcing existing effective programs and systems and addressing identified gaps and equity issues, rather than introducing further change for schools. In particular, methods and processes for complex case coordination need improvement.

The NSW Department of Education commits to creating quality learning opportunities for students. This includes strengthening students’ physical, social, emotional and spiritual development. The Department sets out to enable students to be healthy, happy, engaged and successful.

Welfare and wellbeing

The Department’s approach has significantly shifted from student welfare to wellbeing of the whole child and young person. Wellbeing is defined in departmental policy and strategy documents broadly, and as directly linked to learning and positive learning outcomes. “Wellbeing can be described as the quality of a person’s life…It is more than the absence of physical or psychological illness…Wellbeing, or the lack of it, can affect a student’s engagement and success in learning…”

Student wellbeing can be supported by everything a school does to enhance a student's learning—from curriculum to teacher quality to targeted policies and programs to whole-school approaches to wellbeing. Distinctions between wellbeing and welfare in the school context are outlined below.

Exhibit 1: Welfare and wellbeing
Welfare Wellbeing
Operates from a basis of student need and doesn't always take into account a whole child view. For all students.
Rather than building on the strengths of students, operates from a deficit model of individual student problems or negative behaviours. Goes beyond just welfare needs of a few students and aims for all students to be healthy, happy, successful and productive individuals who are active and positive contributors to the school and society in which they live.

Source: Department of Education 2018 'Wellbeing is here' presentation.

Published

Actions for Governance of Local Health Districts

Governance of Local Health Districts

Health
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

The main roles, responsibilities and relationships between Local Health Districts (LHDs), their Boards and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. However, there are opportunities to achieve further maturity in the system of governance and the audit report recommended a series of actions to further strengthen governance arrangements.

Fifteen Local Health Districts (LHDs) are responsible for providing public hospital and related health services in NSW. LHDs are:

  • established as statutory corporations under the Health Services Act 1997 to manage public hospitals and provide health services within defined geographical areas
  • governed by boards of between six and 13 people appointed by the Minister for Health
  • managed by a chief executive who is appointed by the board with the concurrence of the Secretary of NSW Health
  • accountable for meeting commitments made in annual service agreements with the NSW Ministry of Health.

The NSW Ministry of Health (the Ministry) is the policy agency for the NSW public health system, providing regulatory functions, public health policy, as well as managing the health system, including monitoring the performance of hospitals and health services.

The current roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry, along with other agencies in NSW Health, were established in 2011 following a series of reforms to the structure and governance of the system. These reforms began with the report of the 'Special Commission of Inquiry into Acute Care Services in NSW Public Hospitals' ('the Garling Inquiry'), which was released in 2008, and were followed by reforms announced by the incoming coalition government in 2011.

These reforms were intended to deliver greater local decision making, including better engagement with clinicians, consumers, local communities, and other stakeholders in the primary care (such as general practitioners) and non-government sectors.

The reforms empowered LHDs by devolving some management and accountability from the Ministry for the delivery of health services in their area. LHDs were made accountable for meeting annual obligations under service agreements.

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the governance arrangements for LHDs. We answered two questions:

  • Are there clear roles, responsibilities and relationships between the Ministry of Health and LHDs and within LHDs?
  • Does the NSW Health Performance Framework establish and maintain accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs?
Conclusion
Main roles, responsibilities and relationships between LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, though there is opportunity to achieve further maturity in the system of governance for LHDs.
Main roles and responsibilities are clear and understood by local health district (LHD) board members and staff, Ministry of Health executive staff, and key stakeholders. However, there is some ambiguity for more complex and nuanced functions. A statement of principles to support decision making in a devolved system would help to ensuring that neither LHDs or the Ministry 'over-reach' into areas that are more appropriately the other's responsibility.
Better clinician engagement in LHD decision making was a key driver for devolution. This engagement has not met the expectations of devolution and requires attention as a priority.
Relationships between system participants are collaborative, though the opportunity should be taken to further embed this in the system structures and processes and complement existing interpersonal relationships and leadership styles.
Accountability and oversight mechanisms, including the Health Performance Framework and Service Agreements, have been effective in establishing accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs.
The Health Performance Framework and Service Agreements have underpinned a cultural shift toward greater accountability and oversight. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.
There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:
  • continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome, and quality and safety measures
  • improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
  • greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
  • including governance-related performance measures
  • more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, including consumer and community engagement
  • ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution. 
There is clear understanding of the main roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry of Health under the structural and governance reforms introduced in 2011. Strongly collaborative relationships provide a good foundation on which governance arrangements can continue to mature, though there is a need to better ensure that clinicians are involved in LHD decision making.

NSW Health is large and complex system, operating in a dynamic environment. The governance reforms introduced in 2011 were significant and it is reasonable that they take time to mature.

The main roles of LHDs and the Ministry are clear and well-understood, and there is good collaboration between different parts of the system. This provides a sound foundation on which to further mature the governance arrangements of LHDs.

While the broad roles of LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry are well understood by stakeholders in the system, there are matters of detail and complexity that create ambiguity and uncertainty, including:

  • the roles and relationships between the LHDs and the Pillars
  • to what extent LHDs have discretion to pursue innovation
  • individual responsibility and obligations between chairs, boards, executive staff, and the Ministry.

These should be addressed collaboratively between boards, their executives, and the Ministry, and should be informed by a statement of principles that guides how devolved decision making should be implemented.

Better clinician engagement in health service decision making was a key policy driver for devolution. Priority should be given by LHDs and the Ministry to ensuring that clinicians are adequately engaged in LHD decision making. It appears that in many cases they are not, and this needs to be addressed.

The quality of board decision making depends on the information they are provided and their capacity to absorb and analyse that information. More can be done to promote good decision making by improving the papers that go to boards, and by ensuring that board members are well positioned to absorb the information provided. This includes ensuring that the right type and volume of information are provided to boards, and that members and executive managers have adequate data literacy skills to understand the information.

Recommendations

  1. By December 2019, the Ministry of Health should:
     
    1. work with LHDs to identify and overcome barriers that are limiting the appropriate engagement of clinicians in decision making in LHDs
    2. develop a statement of principles to guide decision making in a devolved system
    3. provide clarity on the relationship of the Agency for Clinical Innovation and the Clinical Excellence Commission to the roles and responsibilities of LHDs.
       
  2. By June 2020, LHDs boards, supported where appropriate by the Ministry of Health, should address the findings of this performance audit to ensure that local practices and processes support good governance, including:
     
    1. providing timely and consistent induction; training; and reviews of boards, members and charters
    2. ensuring that each board's governance and oversight of service agreements is consistent with their legislative functions
    3. improving the use of performance information to support decision making by boards and executive managers.
Accountability and oversight mechanisms, including the Health Performance Framework and service agreements, have been effective in establishing accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs. They have done this by driving a cultural shift that supports LHDs being accountable for meeting their obligations. These accountablity and oversight mechanisms must continue to evolve and be improved.

This cultural shift has achieved greater recognition of the importance of transparency in how well LHDs perform. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.

There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:

  • continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome and value-based measures
  • improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
  • greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
  • by adding governance-related performance measures to service agreements
  • more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, such as consumer and community engagement
  • ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution.

Recommendations

3.    By June 2020, the Ministry of Health should improve accountability and oversight mechanisms by:

a)    revising the Health Performance Framework so that it is a cohesive and comprehensive document
b)    clarifying processes and decision making for managing performance concerns
c)    developing a mechanism to adequately hold LHDs accountable for non-service activity functions
d)    reconciling performance monitoring and intervention with the policy intent of devolution.