The Audit Office is of the opinion that:

• the sale was delivered with reasonable efficiency and effectiveness

• the sale yielded a satisfactory return to the NSW Government. The possibility for a higher return was limited to about 2% to 4% on gross proceeds of $936m. It would have required setting a higher share price for all investors and adopting a more flexible approach to share allocation

• the Government’s objective to promote community and investor support was achieved. The scale of the demand for script added to costs and was not fully translated into higher proceeds  

• generally satisfactory accountability frameworks were put in place for the sale and no probity concerns were identified

• the frameworks to achieve the Government’s wider reforms of the racing and wagering industries have substantially been implemented.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #61 - released 23 December 1998

Guidelines for staff are available for each of the three schemes, but they do not yet provide staff with sufficient information on how to attract proposals, undertake assessments, negotiate agreements and monitor assistance. Some training of staff responsible for assessing proposals, negotiating agreements and monitoring outcomes has been provided, but needs to be enhanced. In particular, The Audit Office believes that there is insufficient guidance for staff in undertaking economic assessment of proposals. 

There is a prevailing view amongst Department of State and Regional Development staff that guidelines are just that, and need not be followed. It was apparent, however, that assumptions made in assessments were not always appropriate and may lead to poor decisions. Flexibility need not be impaired by requiring greater adherence to guidelines. This would help ensure minimum standards of process and rigour in all cases.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #60 - released 21 December 1998

The Audit Office is of the opinion that there are several features of the current Senior Executive Service (SES) model, or its application, which hinder the capacity of the SES to operate effectively in line with the Government’s stated objectives. The ultimate effect of these features is to reduce the capacity or perceived capacity of the SES to meet the Government’s objectives for the operation of the SES.

Taken overall, difficulties in the SES identified by the audit included: uncertainty caused by the way some contracts have been applied in practice, removal for reasons other than poor performance, informal strategies such as using restructuring to “terminate contracts and to move people in and out of positions regardless of their formal reported performance” (Section 5.4), inconsistently applied rules about selection/recruitment, appointment and removal of the SES, an imbalance between CES responsibility to the Minister as the employer/reviewer with their responsibility not to act in a political or partial manner, apparent lack of rigour in, value of and Ministerial accountability for CES performance review processes and failure to implement an adequate system of rewards and sanctions related to performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.1 - released 17 December 1998

This Performance Audit Report, prepared by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) on behalf of The Audit Office of New South Wales (NSW), is a study of the NSW Senior Executive Service (SES).

It found the dissonance between where optimal executive performance might take place on a performance spectrum, encompassing the formal SES and less formal political arenas, is canvassed. The critical point here is that this arena, between the informal political actions and the application of formal SES structures, where much of the important decision making takes place, will always be difficult to manage. Transparency in decision making processes where non partisan and partisan actions are clearly defined seems a primary essential element of performance if the integrity of the NSW SES is to be maintained.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.2 - released 17 December 1998

The decision to seek development of Walsh Bay without a Master Plan and/or detailed study as to the state of the precinct presented significant problems throughout the life of the project. Now, four years later, negotiations still continue on the details of the final scheme. Based on the latest estimates, it will not provide a financial return as was originally expected. The audit found no evidence to indicate why the former Government wished to expedite Walsh Bay, but it is aware that there was an election due. Many of the problems which have been encountered could have been avoided with more careful and more extensive consideration at the start, particularly in the light of Property Services Group's recommendations.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #58 - released 17 December 1998

The NSW model of rural fire fighting is complex, and requires an extensive amount of coordination and cooperation to function properly. This has inherent risks. In general, the model has been made to work quite well and much improvement in rural fire fighting has been achieved over the past decade. The efforts of all concerned should be recognised and applauded especially since any change must be developed cooperatively between a number of agencies and groups.

Nevertheless, past tensions and difficulties have left pockets of disagreement and resistance. The rural fire fighting culture which was developed over the course of a century has always been highly dedicated, as it is today. However, changed organisational, technical, legal, financial and environmental factors have necessitated major and continuing changes.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #57 - released 2 December 1998

NSW Health has progressed in identifying and addressing key R&D issues in a complex and difficult environment. The Infrastructure Grants Program (IGP) is an innovative program and reflects a commitment by Government to support research infrastructure. The IGP has as its aims the provision of significant funding accompanied by clear research objectives and criteria for accountability and introduces a rational basis for the allocation of infrastructure grants.

While NSW Health has progressed, there is an opportunity to make the IGP more efficient and effective. These opportunities are in the areas of addressing longer term planning issues in health, streamlining and clarifying eligibility and selection criteria, improving decision-making structures and processes and improving accountability.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #56 - released 25 November 1998

The Audit Office is of the view that:

• there is no system wide plan for the location of emergency departments. This function is undertaken by each Area Health Service

• coordination between the Department and the NSW Ambulance Service could be improved in aspects such as the collocation of facilities and direct communications between ambulances and emergency departments

• there is no policy framework that recognises the increasing role and impact of private providers

• the Department’s guidelines do not take into account demographic factors, the number of patients treated or the acuity of presentations as criteria for determining the size of an emergency department or the level and scope of emergency services that should be available at that location.

• the Department has introduced a range of initiatives over a period of time to improve the performance of emergency departments such as the establishment of the Integrated Bed Management Committee. Some have been quite effective, whilst others have had mixed success. There has been an overall improvement in emergency department waiting times for urgent cases. However, there has been little improvement in waiting times for less urgent cases and a decline in performance for access block (the time taken to be admitted to a hospital ward from the emergency department after a decision has been made that this is required).

Parliamentary reference - Report number #54 - released 21 October 1998

This audit was initiated following concerns expressed by the Department of Agriculture about the Police’s handling of a suspected fraud that it had first reported in 1996. The Department’s main concern related to the long delays before a full Police investigation took place.

Nevertheless, the current review highlighted a number of areas that, in the opinion of The Audit Office, require closer examination and resolution by the Police Service in implementing their changes. This report highlights those areas and provides recommendations for the Police to consider in its implementation of its reforms. Key areas requiring attention include: service standards are not clearly defined for the police response to fraud, without which it is difficult to ensure that police objectives and public expectations are met; restrictive employment arrangements which limit management’s ability to obtain the appropriate mix of people with skills to investigate fraud and inadequate information systems to support operational, tactical and strategic decision-making.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #53 - released 14 October 1998

At the request of the Department of Gaming and Racing, the audit reviewed the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation and management of casino surveillance undertaken pursuant to the Casino Control Act, 1992 (the Act).

Implicitly the Act requires an effective level of cooperation and coordination between the agencies to achieve their statutory roles and responsibilities. However, The Audit Office is of the opinion that this has not been achieved. As a consequence, the efficiency and effectiveness of the surveillance roles and processes carried out under the Act can be improved.

Revision is required to the surveillance methodology and its implementation, to the skills base within Director of Casino Surveillance (DCS) and the underlying working and to organisational arrangements between and within DCS and the New South Wales Casino Control Authority. Until such revision has been finalised, it is not possible to determine the level of resources or type of surveillance that needs to be undertaken and funded.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #50 - released 10 June 1998