Refine search Expand filter

Reports

Published

Actions for Government Advertising: Campaigns for 2015–16 and 2016–17

Government Advertising: Campaigns for 2015–16 and 2016–17

Premier and Cabinet
Justice
Local Government
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' and the 'Dogs deserve better' government advertising campaigns complied with the Government Advertising Act and most elements of the Government Advertising Guidelines.

However, some advertisements were designed to build support for government policy and used subjective or emotive messages. This is inconsistent with the requirement in the Government Advertising Guidelines for 'objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner'.

Advertisements in the 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' campaign used subjective statements such as 'the system is broken' and 'brighter future'. While advertisements in the 'Dogs deserve better' campaign used confronting imagery such as gun targets, blood smears and gravestones.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit in relation to at least one government advertising campaign in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether advertising campaigns were carried out effectively, economically and efficiently and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines). In this audit, we examined two campaigns:

  • the ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ campaign run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet
  • the ‘Dogs deserve better’ campaign run by the Department of Justice.    

Section 6 of the Act details the specific prohibitions on political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed so as to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.

The ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ government advertising campaign was run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet in four phases from August 2015 to May 2016. The total cost of the campaign was over $4.5 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.

The ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ advertising campaign has not breached the specific provisions of Section 6 of the Act which prohibits political advertising.

Two factors potentially compromised value for money for the campaign. The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work to be undertaken, which was substantially greater than initially quoted. Further, the department did not meet all recommended timeframes to minimise media booking costs for all phases of the campaign.

The campaign did not comply with all administrative requirements in all phases. Advertising for Phase 1 commenced before the compliance certificate was signed. There was no evidence that a compliance certificate was signed for Phase 2 extension. The cost benefit analyses for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension did not sufficiently consider alternatives to advertising, as is required by the Government Advertising Guidelines.

Advertisements adopted subjective messages designed to build public support for council mergers and directed audiences to websites for more detailed information. Campaign research identified statements that were most likely to reduce resistance to mergers. Some advertising content used subjective language, which we consider inconsistent with the requirement for ‘objective presentation’. Evaluations of advertising effectiveness also measured the success of the advertisements in increasing public support for council mergers.

No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:

  • be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
  • contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
  • contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.

We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.

Request for quotes to design advertisement did not reflect the full scope required

The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work that was to be undertaken, and this created a risk to achieving value for money. The Office of Local Government sought quotes for design of a television advertisement only. It did not request an estimate for radio, online advertisements, or translation for linguistically diverse audiences, which were ultimately required for the campaign.
 

A full and fair assessment of which supplier could provide the best value for money could not be made given that the quotes obtained did not reflect the full scope of work. The final amount paid for the design of Phase 1 was 2.7 times the original quote. It is possible that another supplier that provided a quote could have provided overall better value for money.

The Office of Local Government continued to use the Phase 1 supplier for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension (Exhibit 4). Where there are other suppliers that could feasibly compete for a contract, direct negotiation increases the risk the agency has not obtained the best value for money. The department advised that it continued with the same agency to avoid costs involved in briefing a new agency on the campaign.

The ‘Dogs deserve better’ government advertising campaign was run by the Department of Justice from August 2016, after the government announced its decision to prohibit greyhound racing, and was terminated in October 2016 after a change of government policy. The campaign had a budget of $1.6 million, with an actual spend of $1.3 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.

The ‘Dogs deserve better’ advertising campaign has not breached the specific provisions of Section 6 of the Act which prohibits political advertising.

The Secretary of the department determined that urgent circumstances existed that required advertising to commence prior to completing a cost benefit analysis and peer review. There was a concern that industry participants may make impulse decisions to destroy greyhounds without further information on support services; there was also an identified need to promote public greyhound adoptions.

Phase 1 advertisements focused on explaining the reasons for the prohibition on greyhound racing with a reference to a website for further information. While industry participants were identified as the primary audience, media expenditure was not specifically targeted to this group. Phase 2 advertisements more effectively addressed the originally identified ‘urgent needs’ of providing information on support services for greyhound owners and information on how the public could adopt a greyhound.

The urgency to advertise potentially compromised value for money. The department did not use price competition when selecting a creative supplier due to a concern this would add to timeframes. Further, the department did not meet recommended timeframes to minimise media booking costs.

We identified three other areas in Phase 1 advertisements that were inconsistent with government advertising requirements. Advertisements used provocative language and confronting imagery, which we consider to be inconsistent with the requirement for ‘objective presentation’. Two statements presented as fact based on the Special Commission’s Inquiry report were inaccurate; one of these was due to a calculation error. Radio advertisements did not clearly identify that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government for the first few days of the campaign.

No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:

  • be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
  • contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
  • contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.

We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.
 

Animal welfare concerns were identified as the reason for urgent advertising

A brief prepared by the department in July 2016 raised concerns about the welfare of greyhounds following the NSW Premier’s announcement that the government would prohibit greyhound racing. The brief raised the risk that industry members may make impulse decisions to destroy their greyhounds without information on support that was being offered.

The department used the provisions in Sections 7(4) and 8(3) of the Act to expedite the release of advertising due to ‘other urgent circumstances’. This provision allows advertising to commence prior to completing the peer review process and cost benefit analysis.

In introducing the Government Advertising Bill to parliament in 2011, the then Premier noted that exceptional circumstances would cover situations ‘such as a civil emergency or sudden health epidemic’. There is no other guidance on when it is appropriate to use this section. It is at the discretion of a government agency head to determine whether a campaign is urgent.
 

Phase 1 advertisements did not focus on the urgent needs

This advertising campaign had three overarching objectives:

  • to increase public awareness of the animal welfare reasons for the closure of the greyhound racing industry
  • to change the behaviour of dog owners from potentially harming their greyhounds to treating them humanely, by accessing the support options and packages available
  • to promote greyhound adoptions by the public.

Alongside advertising, the department took other steps to engage with the greyhound racing industry. This included direct mail, face to face meetings around the State, setting up a call centre and community consultation through an online survey. Other government agencies and animal welfare agencies were also engaged to reach out to affected stakeholders.

Phase 1 advertising content focused on providing information about the reasons for the closure of the industry. The department’s radio and television advertisements did not refer to support packages or encourage the public to adopt a greyhound. While print advertisements did mention these things, this was only presented in fine print. In all advertisements, audiences were referred to a website for further information.

The focus of advertisements on the reasons for industry closure was not consistent with the identified needs to urgently commence advertising to influence the behaviour of dog owners and encourage the public to adopt a greyhound.

The content in Phase 2 advertisements, which began around four weeks after the first phase, was more explicit in highlighting the services and support for industry members such as offering business and retraining advice. These advertisements also referred audiences to a call centre number as well as the website.

Peer review process limited to influencing second phase of advertisements

In urgent circumstances, the Act allows for peer review to be completed after advertising has commenced. For this campaign, the peer review process was completed on 19 August 2016, two weeks after advertising had commenced. Where advertising commences before the peer review process is completed, the usefulness of peer reviewers’ recommendations is limited to informing subsequent phases of advertising and the post-campaign evaluation.

The peer review report found the messages in Phase 1 advertisements were not clearly defined, and the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst other campaign activities. These recommendations informed the second phase of advertising, which ran from 27 August 2016 until the campaign was terminated in October 2016.
 

The department could not demonstrate value for money was achieved for creative work

The department provided a fixed budget for creative work when requesting quotes from creative agencies to develop advertising material. This is not consistent with the quotation requirements in the government’s Guidelines for Advertising and Digital Communication Services. This approach creates risks to achieving value for money as creative agencies are not required to compete on price for their services. The department advised that it had pre-set the creative costs based on a comparative government campaign of a similar size. This was done due to a concern that requiring agencies to compete on price would affect the short timeframe given to develop creative material.

Three creative agencies accepted the opportunity to present design ideas for the campaign. The department was unable to provide evidence of how it chose the preferred supplier out of these three agencies. Records are important for accountability and allow a procurement decision to be audited after an urgent decision.     
 

Short notice did not allow for cost-efficient media booking for all phases

Placement of advertisements in various media channels was done through the State’s Media Agency Services contract. This contract achieves savings as the government can use its aggregated media spend to gain discounts from the media supplier.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet provides guidance to ensure cost efficient media booking. For example, media time for a television advertisement should be booked at least 6 to 12 weeks in advance. Radio advertisements should be booked at least 2 to 8 weeks in advance.

The peer review report noted that the department did not have adequate time to look for the most cost-efficient way to advertise. In its response to the peer reviewers, the department acknowledged this to be due to the urgency to start advertising. The media booking authority was signed by the department one day before the campaign commenced.
 

The department used a wide public campaign for a narrow target audience

The campaign identified greyhound industry participants as the primary target audience. In 201516 there were 1,342 greyhound trainers, 1,695 owner/trainers, 983 attendants and 1,247 breeders in New South Wales. The department’s advertising submission identified ‘concerns that industry members could make impulsive decisions, potentially jeopardising the welfare of a large number of dogs, prior to the shutdown of the industry’.

The submission’s evidence of advertising effectiveness focused on increasing the level of wider community support for the ban rather than stopping industry members from making impulse decisions. It used an early opinion poll to show that total support for the ban on greyhound racing rises by 17 points and opposition drops by four points following explanation of the findings of the Special Commission of Inquiry report.

The peer review report noted that the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst the department’s range of other direct and targeted communications and consultations held with industry members.

No demonstrated basis for use of confronting imagery and provocative language

The Guidelines require ‘objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner’. Neither the Guidelines or Handbook further explain what objective presentation means. We have used an ordinary definition of this term as ‘not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts’. This is synonymous with terms like ‘impartial’, ‘neutral’, and ‘dispassionate’ and opposite to ‘subjective’. We consider that to meet the current requirements in the Guidelines for objectivity, advertising content should contain accurate statements or facts, and avoid subjective language.

Phase 1 focussed on the ongoing consequences if no action was taken to close the industry. The advertisements used provocative language, for example ‘Up to 70 per cent of dogs are deemed wastage by their own industry. Wastage! Slaughtered just for being slow’. Advertisements used confronting imagery like gravestones, blood smears and gun targets.

Our literature review into this area highlighted mixed findings on the effectiveness of confrontational advertising materials. In some cases, shock campaigns may cause an audience to reject or ignore the message, and may even encourage people to do the opposite of the intended behaviour. In other cases, such as in road safety campaigns, this style of advertising can be successful. This shows the importance of conducting pre-campaign research before adopting a confrontational or emotive approach in advertising.

The Government Advertising Handbook recommends that an agency explain the rationale and the evidence for their chosen advertising approach. There was no evidence that the department researched the effectiveness of its advertising approach with its target audience. The department had planned to undertake creative concept testing as part of a strategy to ensure the creative material was understood by its audience. The department advised that due to the urgency of the campaign, it did not have time to conduct this testing.

Not all Phase 1 radio advertisements clearly identified that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government

For the first few days on air, Phase 1 radio advertisements ended by referring the audience to a government website, instead of clearly identifying that it had been authorised by the New South Wales Government. Government authorisations and logos ensure the work and the programs of the NSW Government are easily identifiable by the community.    

The department’s cost benefit analysis did not consider alternatives to advertising

For government advertising campaigns that cost over $1.0 million, the Act requires the advertising agency to carry out a cost benefit analysis and obtain approval from the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communications, prior to commencing the campaign.

The department engaged with audiences through direct mail, face to face forums, and a telephone helpline in addition to advertising. However, the department’s cost benefit analysis did not meet the requirements in the Guidelines to specify the extent to which expected benefits could be achieved without advertising, and to compare costs of options other than advertising that could be used to successfully implement the program (see Exhibit 6).

The cost benefit analysis made optimistic assumptions about the impact of the campaign on greyhound adoptions. It estimated that 2,360 greyhounds would be adopted if the campaign was run. This is significantly higher than the ‘most optimistic outcome’ of re-homing in the Special Commission Inquiry report (we calculated this to be 1,467 greyhounds). There was insufficient evidence to support the higher number of adoptions in the cost benefit analysis.

The sensitivity analysis shows that using the Special Commission’s ‘most optimistic outcome’ figure of re-homing would reduce the net present value of advertising to be negative. Further, the cost benefit analysis also assumed that increased government funding would be made available to animal welfare and rehoming organisations to support more adoptions, but did not estimate or include this cost when calculating the net present value of advertising.
 

There were two factual inaccuracies in key messages used for Phase 1 advertisements

Section 8(2) of the Act requires the head of a government agency to certify that the proposed campaign ‘contains accurate information’. The Secretary of the Department of Justice signed the compliance certificate on 29 July 2016, before advertisements commenced.

We examined the accuracy of factual claims in this advertising campaign, by comparing the key statements to the report of Special Commission of Inquiry into the Greyhound Racing Industry (the Commissioner report). The Commissioner report was quoted by the NSW Government as the basis for its policy to transition the greyhound racing industry to closure.

We identified that two of the key statements used in Phase 1 advertisements to support the animal welfare reasons for industry closure were inaccurate (Exhibit 7).    

Published

Actions for NorthConnex

NorthConnex

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Transport
Compliance
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The processes used to assess NorthConnex adequately considered value for money for taxpayers.This report also found that the impact of tolling concessions on road users and the motorway network was consistent with policy objectives described in the 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan.

NorthConnex is a nine-kilometre tolled motorway tunnel between the M1 Pacific motorway at Wahroonga and the M2 Hills motorway at West Pennant Hills. The total cost for the project is $3.1 billion. NorthConnex will be funded through toll charges, and contributions from the NSW and Australian Governments of up to $405 million each. In January 2015, the NSW Roads Minister signed the final contracts for NorthConnex.

By December 2017, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

1. publish an updated ‘Unsolicited Proposals – Guide for Submission and Assessment’ which clarifies obligations with requirements in other NSW Government policies such as the NSW PPP guideline and Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework. The update should require:

a) a business case to be prepared, and a business case gateway review completed, as part of the assessment of the detailed proposal (currently stage 2)

b) probity reports must be completed and considered before the decision to proceed to the next stage.
 

The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Treasury should immediately:

2. improve record keeping to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998 and the NSW Government Standard on Records Management.

 

Published

Actions for Therapeutic programs in prisons

Therapeutic programs in prisons

Justice
Management and administration
Service delivery

Corrective Services NSW should ensure eligible prisoners receive timely programs to reduce the risk they will reoffend on release.

This report found that in 2015−16, 75 per cent of prisoners who needed a prison-based therapeutic program did not receive one before the earliest date they could be released. Timely access to prison-based therapeutic programs can be a factor in parole refusal and can potentially exacerbate overcrowding in the prison system. The audit looked at a selection of moderate and high intensity programs that aim to reduce reoffending by addressing addiction, violence, domestic abuse, sex offending and general offending.

When a prisoner enters custody in New South Wales, there is an expectation that they will be offered therapeutic programs that reduce their risk of reoffending. Relative to the costs of providing them, these programs have wide-ranging benefits for prisoners and the broader community, and provide significant savings to the justice system. Corrective Services NSW has lead responsibility for ensuring relevant and effective programs are provided, and for the Premier’s Priority of reducing reoffending by five per cent by 2019.

In New South Wales, a significant majority of people convicted of an offence will eventually be reconvicted. Of those convicted of an offence in 2004, 79 per cent had been reconvicted of another offence by 2014 – half within the first year of their initial offence. The total cost to the community of reoffending is difficult to fully quantify. However, the potential to reduce costs to the prisons system alone by reducing reoffending is significant given the average costs of a prison stay is $167 per prisoner per day over an average 218 day sentence. Total prison system costs in New South Wales were $720 million in 2016.  

To help achieve its mandate to reduce reoffending, Corrective Services NSW delivers therapeutic programs in prison and the community, along with a range of vocational, education, supervision, case management and health and wellbeing general services. These programs and services contribute to the central goal of reducing the likelihood that prisoners will return to prison. This audit assessed whether selected therapeutic programs are available, accessible and effective in reducing the risk of reoffending. More detailed information on the programs selected is in Appendix 3.

Conclusion

Corrective Services NSW does not ensure that eligible prisoners receive timely programs to reduce the risk they will reoffend on release. Most prisoners who need programs do not receive one before their earliest release date. These prisoners can be released with no intervention or held in prison longer awaiting a program. Additionally, programs have not been systematically evaluated to confirm they are helping to reduce reoffending in NSW.


In 2015–16, 75 per cent of prisoners who needed programs reached their earliest release date without receiving one. These prisoners are often released with incomplete or no intervention in prison, or are refused parole and held in custody for longer than their minimum term. Corrective Services NSW prioritises prisoners for programs based on their risk of reoffending. However, the 20 per cent increase in the prison population between 2011–12 and 2015–16 has put a significant strain on program resources. While program staffing has increased by 20 per cent over the past two years, the overall proportion of prisoners receiving programs before release has not.  

Since 2015, there has been increased roll out of moderate-intensity EQUIPS programs, which reach greater numbers of prisoners. However, over the same period, the number of programs to meet the higher-intensity therapeutic needs of sex offenders and serious violent offenders has decreased or remained the same despite increased numbers of prisoners entering custody that may benefit from them. Corrective Services NSW does not collect and act on information to ensure that coverage of specific program needs among sex offenders and serious violent offenders is sufficient given the increases in these prisoner types.

Corrective Services NSW bases its programs on international evidence and has worked in partnership with independent evaluators to evaluate some programs. However, these evaluations have mostly been inconclusive due to small sample sizes and data quality issues. Further evaluations are proposed, including as a result of an additional $237 million investment in reducing reoffending, which will also see the role out of additional programs and case management initiatives.  

75 per cent of prisoners who needed programs did not complete them before the earliest date they could have been released for parole 

In 2015–16, 75 per cent of prisoners with an identified program need did not complete a program prior to the earliest date they could have been paroled. If prisoners do not complete programs before their earliest parole date, they can be released having had no, or incomplete, interventions while in prison to address their offending. They can also be refused parole by the State Parole Authority, adding unnecessary length to the time spent in jail and exacerbating overcrowding. Parole refusal data from the State Parole Authority indicates that non-completion of programs was a factor in 84 per cent of 302 parole refusals in 2015. 

Program resourcing at the prison level is inadequate to meet increased demand

Lack of availability of programs to meet demand is a key factor preventing prisoners from completing programs in time for release. The 20 per cent increase in the prison population between 2011–12 and 2015–16 has placed a significant strain on resources. While more programs are being delivered, the overall proportion of prisoners receiving them before release has not. Prisoner case management is not performed in a timely and consistent way, resulting in prisoners missing opportunities to be referred to programs, particularly if they have shorter sentences. For example, 27 per cent of prisoners with more than six months to serve had not completed an assessment required to determine eligibility for an EQUIPS program in the past four years.

The mix of available programs may be out of step with the needs of some prisoners

Since 2012, Corrective Services NSW has increased the number of moderate-intensity EQUIPS domestic violence and aggression programs provided and more prisoners overall are now able to participate in programs. Over the same period, the number of intensive programs delivered for sex offenders has decreased and the number of intensive programs for serious violent offenders has remained the same. This is despite increasing proportions of prisoners sentenced for sexual assault and related offences, and serious violent offences.

Corrective Services NSW uses a risk-assessment model to determine which prisoners are eligible for existing programs, but does not regularly review whether there are gaps or insufficient program coverage of some therapeutic needs.

Corrective Services NSW does not collect robust and comparable information on program quality and outcomes 

Program performance reporting at the prison level focuses on program throughput, such as the number of programs delivered and the number of prisoners participating. Corrective Services NSW does not routinely collect information on program implementation that would provide insights at the prison level into whether programs are being run effectively, and are achieving their intended goals.

Corrective Services NSW has not systematically evaluated its therapeutic programs to confirm they are effective in reducing reoffending

Programs being delivered in New South Wales prisons are based on international evidence about the success of the specific methods and approaches used. This is a good foundation, but Corrective Services NSW is unable to show that its programs are effective in the New South Wales context, and that they are having an impact in achieving the Premier’s target of reducing reoffending by five per cent. Evaluations of some programs have been conducted, but these were mostly inconclusive because of challenges with data collection, such as developing significant enough sample sizes. A lack of consistent forward planning has also affected the rigour of some evaluations.  

With the roll out of an additional $237 million investment in reducing reoffending, Corrective Services NSW proposes to focus efforts on evaluating the effectiveness of its programs by engaging external experts and increasing resourcing in its own evaluation unit. A systematic forward program for independent evaluation, which identifies solutions to existing data gaps and builds on past studies, is needed to support this.  

Challenges for Corrective Services NSW

Corrective Services NSW, a division of the Department of Justice, operates 34 custodial correctional centres across New South Wales, including two that are managed by private companies. It is responsible for delivering correctional services and programs that reduce reoffending and enhance community safety. Corrective Services NSW has lead responsibility for the Premier’s Priority of reducing adult reoffending by five per cent by 2019. To assist in achieving this target, Corrective Services NSW delivers therapeutic programs in prisons that aim to reduce the likelihood that prisoners will reoffend once released.  

Prison overcrowding

Prior to 2011, the prison population had been decreasing, which resulted in the closure of Berrima, Parramatta and Kirkconnell Correctional Centres, the downsizing of Grafton Correctional Centre, and a reduction in total capacity of 900 beds. However, since 2011–12 the prison population has increased by approximately 30 per cent, reaching a record of around 12,900 prisoners in March 2017 (latest available data).  

Corrective Services NSW should by December 2017:

1.  Implement a systematic approach to the use of convictions, sentencing and case management data to ensure that gaps in program offerings can be identified and addressed.

By June 2018:

2.  Clearly establish program delivery staff resourcing benchmarks, based on individual prison profiles, that would meet demand and ensure prisoners receive timely assessments, comprehensive case management and relevant programs before the earliest date they can be released.

3.  Establish consistent program quality and outcomes performance indicators at the prison-level, and monitor and respond to these quarterly.

4.  Develop and implement a detailed forward program of independent evaluations for all prison-based therapeutic programs, that includes identified data requirements for prisons to collect and provide.

Published

Actions for Severance Payments to Special Temporary Employees

Severance Payments to Special Temporary Employees

Premier and Cabinet
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Workforce and capability

In reviewing both the severance pay guidelines and a sample of payments, we found the guidelines to be clear and all except two payments were made in accordance with them. In these two cases the severance payment was stipulated in the employment contract guaranteeing the STE a minimum of six months pay on termination, irrespective of the length of service.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #201 - released 16 June 2010

Published

Actions for Managing Forensic Analysis: Fingerprints and DNA

Managing Forensic Analysis: Fingerprints and DNA

Justice
Health
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

Fingerprints and DNA play a critical role in solving crime and serving justice, but DNA evidence can result in more arrests, more prosecutions and more convictions. We found that while police effectively prioritise fingerprint evidence, it could better manage the screening and analysis of both fingerprint and DNA evidence to reduce delays.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #195 - released 10 February 2010

Published

Actions for Police Rostering

Police Rostering

Justice
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

Overall, the NSW Police Force (the Force) is not meeting its target for responding to urgent calls for assistance. Today, one in four complaints is about customer service. Victims of crime report issues including difficulties in contacting an officer and frustration at having to wait for an officer to return to duty to find out about their case. The timeliness of investigations is also at risk when follow-up is delayed. Seventy per cent of commanders surveyed indicated that rosters did not support continuity of investigations or victims’ needs.

We are also concerned that the current roster pattern may not be in the best interest of the health and safety of officers. Sick and injury leave is higher in NSW than other states and the Force is yet to assess the extent to which rosters may contribute to this. The Force also needs to do more to protect its general duties officers from fatigue in line with contemporary practice for managing shiftwork.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #173 - released 5 December 2007

Published

Actions for Government Advertising 2007

Government Advertising 2007

Premier and Cabinet
Finance
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation

Since our performance audit in 1995 the government has improved guidance for agencies and introduced a more robust framework for approving advertising campaigns. Greater rigour has been introduced into the process by requiring campaigns to be peer reviewed and approved by Cabinet. This new approach aims to improve the effectiveness and value for money of government advertising. We found however that the current guidelines are not adequate to prevent the use of public funds for party political purposes. We also found it difficult to obtain information on the total amount spent on advertising campaigns. This is because there is no central record of the total expenditure, only the cost of placing advertisements in the media. Greater transparency around what is spent would support more accurate and informed debate.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #171 - released 29 August 2007

Published

Actions for Dealing with household burglaries

Dealing with household burglaries

Justice
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The NSW Police Force has done well to maintain a downward trend in household burglaries in NSW since 2001. Police recognise the impact this crime has on the community’s perception of security and safety. Success has come from a continued focus on prevention and enforcement. However, there are other factors which have influenced this result. These include a rise in the rate and length of imprisonment, the heroin drought in 2001, increases in the number of heroin users entering treatment, low levels of unemployment, and increases in the average weekly earnings of young males.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #169 - released 27 June 2007

Published

Actions for Addressing the needs of young offenders

Addressing the needs of young offenders

Justice
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The Department of Juvenile Justice and the NSW Police Force generally work together and with other agencies to identify and address the needs of young offenders. We found that this is done particularly well for young offenders who end up in detention and under community supervision. Both the Department of Juvenile Justice and the NSW Police Force have put some practices in place to identify and address the needs of young offenders diverted from the Children’s Court. However, we found that they are not doing this systematically.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #164 - released 28 March 2007