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Health 2020

Health
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Service delivery

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Health cluster for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Financial reporting

Unqualified financial audit opinions

The financial statements of NSW Health and its 25 controlled entities received unqualified opinions.

The number of corrected and uncorrected misstatements increased from the prior year. Misstatements related predominantly to the implementation of new accounting standards, asset revaluations and accounting for new revenue streams to cover the cost of HSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Qualified compliance audit opinion

We issued a qualified audit opinion for the Ministry of Health’s Annual Prudential Compliance Statement for aged care facilities operated by NSW Health. We identified 18 instances of material non-compliance with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) in 2019–20 (30 in 2018–19).

Financial performance

NSW Health received an additional $3.3 billion in funding to cover costs associated with its response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the cluster were significant for health entities and included changes to operations, increased revenues, expenditure, assets and liabilities. Cancellation of elective surgery and decreased emergency department presentations meant that despite the pandemic, activity levels at many health entities decreased. Health Pathology and HealthShare were notable exceptions.

In the period to the 30 June 2020, NSW Health reported that over 900,000 COVID-19 tests were conducted. Health Pathology conducted over 500,000 of these tests. Health Pathology's surge requirements were enhanced through arrangements with 13 private sector providers. HealthShare purchased $864.2 million of personal protective equipment.

Overall, NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $3.1 billion in 2019–20, an increase of $2.0 billion from 2018–19. As in previous years, the surplus largely resulted from additional revenue received to fund capital projects including the construction of new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments. In 2019–20 additional Commonwealth and State funding for the purchase and stockpiling of personal protective equipment also contributed to the operating surplus.

Overtime payments The Ambulance Service of NSW’s (NSW Ambulance) reduced their overtime payments to $79.7 million in 2019–20 ($83.1 million in 2018–19). Overtime payments in 2019–20 included $6.8 million related to the response to the 2019–20 bushfire season. NSW Ambulance overtime payments represent 16.8 per cent of total overtime payments in the cluster.

2. Audit observations

Internal control deficiencies

We identified more internal control deficiencies in 2019–20. The number of repeat issues from prior years also remains high.

NSW Health addressed 18 out of the 25 information system control deficiencies during the year.

Several key agreements lacked formal documentation. This included agreements between the Ministry and health entities, between health entities and agencies in other clusters and between the Ministry and health departments in other jurisdictions.

Infrastructure delivery NSW Health had 44 ongoing major capital projects at 30 June 2020 with a total revised budget of $12.3 billion. The revised total budget of $12.3 billion is $2.0 billion more than the original budget. NSW Health revises budgets when it combines project stages.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the cluster were significant and included changes to the operations of the health entities and increased revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities.

As a part of this year's audits of health entities, we have considered:

  • financial implications of the COVID-19 emergency at both health entity and cluster levels
  • changes to agencies' operating models
  • agencies' access to technology and the maturity of systems and controls to prevent unauthorised and fraudulent access to data.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

The response to the COVID-19 pandemic primarily impacted the financial reporting of NSW Health through:

  • additional revenue from the State government in the form of grants and stimulus payments
  • additional revenue from the Commonwealth government under the National Partnership Agreement for COVID-19 to cover part of the cost of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic
  • increased expenses, largely due to increased payments to private health operators to maintain their viability during the COVID-19 pandemic and later to assist with public patient elective surgery waitlists and increased cleaning costs
  • increased purchases of personal protective equipment.

Chapter one outlines the impacts of NSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This chapter outlines our other audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster for 2020.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all health entities’ financial statements, although more misstatements were identified than last year.
  • NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $3.1 billion, an increase of $2.0 billion from 2018–19. This is largely due to additional capital grants for new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments and additional Commonwealth and State funding for the purchase of personal protective equipment.
  • NSW Health’s expenses increased by 5.5 per cent in 2019–20 (7.0 per cent in 2018–19) despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The primary causes for the growth in expenses are increases in:
    • employee related expenses due to higher employee numbers, increased overtime and a 2.5 per cent award increase
    • payments to private health operators to maintain their viability during the COVID-19 pandemic and later to assist with public patient elective surgery waitlists
    • payments to private health operators due to the first full year of operation of the Northern Beaches hospital.
  • The Ambulance Service of NSW (NSW Ambulance) continued to report higher overtime payments than other health entities. However, despite the response to the 2019–20 bushfire season, their overtime payments were lower than last year. NSW Ambulance paid $79.7 million in overtime payments in 2019–20 ($83.1 million in 2018–19).
  • A qualified audit opinion was issued for the Ministry of Health’s Annual Prudential Compliance Statement for aged care facilities operated by NSW Health. There were 18 instances of material non-compliance with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) in 2019–20 (30 in 2018–19)

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

The primary impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the effectiveness of the internal controls of NSW Health and health entities relates to the effectiveness of controls implemented by HealthShare relating to the stocktake of personal protective equipment inventories. Inventory managed by HealthShare increased by 2,746 per cent during 2019–20. HealthShare’s inventory controls did not maintain pace with the sudden, significant increase.

The impacts of NSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic are outlined in chapter one. This chapter outlines other observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of internal control deficiencies has increased since 2018–19. More than a third of control deficiencies are repeat issues.
  • Control deficiencies that relate to managing employees’ leave and employee’s time recording continue to be difficult for entities to resolve, particularly during the ongoing response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Several key agreements were undocumented. These included agreements between the Ministry and the health entities, between health entities, and between the Ministry and entities in other clusters and jurisdictions. These related to:
    • a loan arrangement between the Ministry and HealthShare for $319 million.
    • Northern Sydney Local Health District's use of land and buildings owned by the Graythwaite Charitable Trust
    • agreements for the treatment of New South Wales residents while they are interstate, and interstate residents receiving treatment while they are in New South Wales from Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and the ACT for both 2019–20 and 2018–19.
  • NSW Health reported that they completed nine major capital projects during 2019–20. As at 30 June 2020 there were 44 ongoing major capital health projects in NSW. The revised capital budget for these projects in total was $2.0 billion more than the original budget of $10.3 billion. NSW Health reported the budget revisions are largely the result of combining project stages.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations 

Appendix two – Status of 2019 recommendations 

Appendix three – Financial data

Appendix four – Analysis of financial indicators 

Appendix five – Analysis of performance against budget

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament

Health 2020

11 December 2020

This corrigendum has been prepared to amend the following text within the Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Health 2020, dated 10 December 2020.

NSW Health emergency department treatment times

On page five the original text was as follows:

NSW Health also measures the percentage of patients whose clinical care in emergency departments is completed within four hours. The measure is used as an indicator of accessibility to public hospital services.

NSW Health aims to complete clinical care in the emergency department for 81 per cent of patients within four hours. In 2019–20 NSW Health reports it completed clinical care within four hours for 72.1 per cent of patients (a 7.3 per cent decrease from 2018–19).

At Western Sydney Local Health District, 59 per cent of patients were treated within the targeted timeframe. NSW Health attribute this to the profile of patients presenting in emergency departments and additional time taken processing COVID-19 patients to ensure staff safety.

The original text has now been changed to:

NSW Health also measures the percentage of patients with total time in the emergency department of four hours or less for each local health district. The measure is used as an indicator of accessibility to public hospital services.

Local Health Districts Target % (2019–20) Actual % (2019–20)
Central Coast 77.0 59.9
Far West 90.2 86.6
Hunter New England 81.0 72.5
Illawarra Shoalhaven 79.0 60.2
Mid North Coast 82.0 76.7
Murrumbidgee 85.3 81.9
Nepean Blue Mountains 79.0 65.5
Northern NSW 81.0 78.2
Northern Sydney 79.0 73.9
South Eastern Sydney 78.0 70.3
South Western Sydney 78.0 61.2
Southern NSW 85.0 83.0
Sydney 76.0 70.9
Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network 80.0 72.1
Western NSW 85.9 81.0
Western Sydney 78.0 59.0
St Vincent's Health Network* 75.0 65.4
* St Vincent’s Health Network Sydney (SVHNS) comprises of St Vincent’s Hospital Sydney Limited as the affiliated health organisation in respect of four recognised establishments under the Health Services Act 1997 (NSW) (Health Services Act). Under the Health Services Act, St Vincent’s Hospital Sydney Limited, is treated as a Network for the purposes of the National Health Reform Agreement in respect of the three recognised establishments: St Vincent’s Hospital, Darlinghurst; Sacred Heart Health Service, Darlinghurst; St Joseph’s Hospital, Auburn; and St Vincent's Correctional Health, Parklea.
Source: NSW Health (unaudited)

The above changes will be reflected in the version of the report published on the Audit Office website and should be considered the true and accurate version.

Published

Actions for Managing the health, safety and wellbeing of nurses and junior doctors in high demand hospital environments

Managing the health, safety and wellbeing of nurses and junior doctors in high demand hospital environments

Health
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining NSW Health’s management of health and safety risks to nurses and junior doctors in high demand hospital wards over the past five years, including during the first six months of the 2020 COVID-19 health emergency.

The Auditor-General found that while NSW Health effectively managed most incidents and risks to the physical health and safety of hospital staff during ‘business as usual’ activities, systems and resources are not fully effective to manage staff psychological and wellbeing risks, particularly for nurses.

The Auditor-General found that NSW Health was effective in managing most COVID-19 health and safety risks to hospital staff. Overall effectiveness could have been improved had pandemic preparedness training been delivered across all Local Health Districts. Additionally, state-wide communication systems could have been improved to provide hospital clinicians with access to a ‘single source of truth’ with the latest advice from NSW Health authorities.

NSW Health’s planning and preparation for the supply of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) was partially effective. At various times, some PPE items could not be sourced from established suppliers. Face masks, goggles and protective gowns were substituted with products that differed in shape, size and fitting from usual items, and in some hospitals, substituted masks were used without being locally fit tested by hospital staff.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations aimed at enhancing hospital health and safety risk reporting practices, along with a recommendation that NSW Health conduct a post pandemic 'lessons learned' review and make policy and operational recommendations for future pandemic responses.

Over the past decade, there have been increases in the numbers of health and safety incidents affecting nurses and junior doctors in NSW hospitals. These increases have been associated with higher numbers of patients with acute mental health conditions, age-related cognitive impairments, and patients presenting in emergency departments under the influence of drugs and alcohol.  

This audit commenced in August 2019, with a focus on the health, safety and wellbeing of nurses and junior doctors in high demand hospital wards. Our audit focused on emergency departments, mental health wards and aged care wards during 'business as usual’ periods of hospital operations. 

In the early months of 2020, the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) brought new health and safety risks to hospital staff. These risks included the potential for infection amongst health workers, increased staff workloads, and impacts on staff wellbeing.  

In May 2020, we expanded the focus of the audit to assess the effectiveness of NSW Health’s management of the health and safety risks to staff during the COVID-19 health emergency. We assessed the impacts on emergency departments and intensive care units, as these were the wards where staff were most likely to come into contact with COVID-19.  

The Audit Office acknowledges the ongoing health and safety challenges that the pandemic has brought to NSW Health staff – in particular to hospital clinicians and the managers who support them.  

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Health’s:

  • systems, forums and workplace cultures to support reporting and generate data about risk
  • initiatives to support safe workplaces and effectively respond to health and safety incidents
  • actions to continuously improve staff health, safety and wellbeing in hospital environments.

The first three chapters of this report describe the effectiveness of NSW Health’s ‘business as usual’ health and safety risk management. The fourth and fifth chapters describe the effectiveness of NSW Health’s health and safety risk management during the COVID-19 pandemic.  

Conclusion
NSW Health’s management of health and safety risks in NSW hospitals

NSW Health is effectively monitoring and managing most incidents and risks to the physical health and safety of nurses and junior doctors in NSW hospitals. However, systems and resources are not fully effective across all Local Health Districts for monitoring or managing psychological and wellbeing risks - particularly in relation to nurses.

NSW Health’s incident management system is effective for recording health and safety incidents in hospital wards where incidents occur infrequently, and staff have time to log incident details during shift hours. However, in high demand wards where incidents and risks are common, staff report that they are unable to log all incidents due to the frequency of events, and the time it takes to record incidents in the system.

NSW Health is taking reasonable steps to manage and respond to physical health and safety incidents in NSW hospitals, but psychological and wellbeing risks and incidents are not routinely recorded or escalated to managers. Stress debriefing is not consistently available to staff after difficult or traumatic workplace incidents.

The Ministry of Health could improve its information sharing and data reporting on state-wide health and safety risks in NSW hospitals, and communicate risk trends to the wider NSW health system. This would assist managers to identify common health and safety issues, and target their responses. The Ministry has not set up systems or strategies to identify or support the expansion of successful health and safety initiatives across the NSW health system.

NSW Health’s management of health and safety risks associated with COVID-19

To date, NSW Health has effectively managed most COVID-19 related health and safety risks to hospital staff. The overall effectiveness of NSW Health's preparations and responses to COVID-19 could have been improved in the early phases of the health emergency - from January to early April 2020 - by ensuring that hospital staff in all Local Health Districts had access to pandemic training, that all emergency response policies had been updated and circulated, that state-wide communication systems were able to be rapidly upscaled to deliver consistent messages to hospital staff across the health system, and that PPE supply lines could provide sufficient stock to meet requirements during all pandemic response phases.

Local Health District executives and hospital managers effectively guided and supported nurses and junior doctors to manage and minimise most COVID-19 health and safety risks in hospital environments. However, communication with frontline staff could have been improved in the early stages of the pandemic. The Ministry did not set up a centralised communication channel to communicate consistent messages and advice to hospital clinicians until April 2020. This finding is consistent with a finding from the 2009 review into NSW Health’s response to the H1N1 influenza outbreak. Clinical staff advised that the lack of a centralised communication channel, substantially increased their workloads as they checked numerous sources for the latest and most authoritative advice.

Prior to COVID-19, pandemic response training was limited across the NSW Health system. Nurse managers of emergency departments and intensive care units reported that there was limited training or familiarisation with the NSW Pandemic Plan. Key policies describing infection control principles for emergency departments and intensive care units were outdated and had not been revised within required timelines.

NSW Health's planning and preparation for the supply and management of personal protective equipment (PPE) has been partially effective, with PPE available to hospital staff at all times. However, at various intervals, some PPE could not be sourced from established suppliers. Face masks, goggles and protective gowns were substituted with products that differed in shape, size and fitting, from the usual PPE stock. Staff reported that in the early stages of the pandemic, substituted masks were not locally fit tested by hospital staff in some emergency departments.

1. Audit recommendations

By December 2021, NSW Health should:

  1. Evaluate the effectiveness of the new incident management system to enable full reporting of health and safety incidents and risks in all hospital wards, including those where incidents and risks are common, and monitor for consistency of reporting over time
  2. Expand the categories of hospital incident data reported to Ministry executives in the Work Health and Safety Dashboard reports, including by linking injury data to incident types by hospital ward category, and monitor in conjunction with Local Health Districts for emerging trends and improvement over time
  3. Ensure that nurses and junior doctors have regular opportunities to report on risks to their psychological health and wellbeing, and that system managers have access to aggregate data to guide responses to mitigate these risks
  4. Develop and implement an evidence-based guiding framework and strategy to support hospital staff in the aftermath of traumatic or unexpected workplace incidents, and monitor implementation
  5. At regular intervals, publicly report aggregate Root Cause Analysis data detailing the hospital system factors that contribute to clinical incidents
  6. Develop and implement a systemwide platform for sharing research and information about hospital health and safety initiatives across the health system
  7. Conduct a post-pandemic 'lessons learned' review focusing on the effectiveness of key strategies deployed in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic and make policy and operational recommendations for future pandemic responses. In particular, ensure:
    • regular scenario-based pandemic training for hospital staff
    • updated policies and protocols for hospital infection controls
    • capability to upscale authoritative communication with frontline health workers at the earliest notification of a health emergency and for the duration of the emergency
    • systems and safeguards to ensure the supply and availability of clinically appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) during all phases of a pandemic.

Local Health Districts were effective in leading health and safety infection control activity

According the NSW Health Influenza Pandemic Plan (Pandemic Plan), the Chief Executives of Local Health Districts have ultimate responsibility for public health unit preparations during health emergencies. If necessary, they can ‘draw on the support of the State Pandemic Management Team and local emergency management resources’.

During the preparations and early response phases to the COVID-19 pandemic, Local Health Districts were at the forefront of most NSW hospital activity. They took the lead role in developing hospital infection control protocols and guidance about the appropriate uses of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Each Local Health District established its own responses to the health emergency, based on the best clinical advice available to them. The localised approach meant that there were some minor differences in infection control practices across the NSW health system.

Throughout February and March 2020, there was limited centralised policy or guidance from the Ministry and its Pillar Health agencies about COVID-19 infection control practices. It was not possible to mandate practices at a time when information about the virus was evolving. Clinical responses were changing as more became known about COVID-19, especially about its patterns of transmission and its impacts on people with the disease.

During February and March 2020, Local Health District executives communicated with hospital staff via a range of methods. Some sent daily e-memos with the latest updates. Some scheduled more regular meetings with hospital clinicians. Some Districts set up extensive staff training sessions and information briefings to keep all personnel updated with the latest advice. Physical distancing made it difficult to bring staff together in large groups, so a range of communications measures were implemented.

Clinical staff also utilised their clinical training and expertise to prepare their wards and train frontline staff in infection control procedures. Some sourced information from national and international colleagues to add to localised knowledge of the virus.

When the first evidence of COVID-19 community transmission was identified in the Northern Sydney Local Health District, hospital staff followed infection control protocols that were based on local guidance and information. With the support from the District executive team and infectious diseases experts, hospital clinicians set up their own infection control protocols and PPE protections. Within a week the District had produced a matrix to guide staff in the uses of PPE during COVID-19 procedures, and had circulated the guidance to all hospital clinicians.

At the end of March 2020, a version of the Northern Sydney PPE matrix was published on the Clinical Excellence Commission’s website and it has now become NSW Health’s standard guideline for PPE during COVID-19 procedures. Once this guideline was published centrally, infection control practices were standardised across NSW hospitals.

This form of District-led policy making is not ‘business as usual’ practice for NSW Health. Policy making processes were somewhat reversed during the early response phases to COVID-19. This flexible policy approach supports the governance arrangements described in the Pandemic Plan, which assigns responsibility for ‘supporting and maintaining quality care across health services and implementing infection control measures as appropriate’ to Local Health Districts.

In non-health emergency situations, clinical policy and protocols are usually initiated and developed by the Ministry and the Clinical Excellence Commission and are subsequently shared across the health system after a quality control process. The localised approach adopted in the months from February to March 2020, allowed for rapid and flexible responses to changing information – to protect the health and safety of the hospital workforce and the wider community.

Hospital staff across NSW would have been better prepared for COVID-19 if pandemic training had been delivered across all Local Health Districts in the past decade

Local Health Districts are responsible for training hospital staff in preparation for public health emergencies. NSW’s policy describing Public Health Emergency Response Preparedness Minimum Standards requires that clinical staff participate in at least one annual emergency training exercise if they hold a position where they are likely to be called upon in an emergency. Staff must participate in an actual response exercise or a relevant training session. The training must also include re-familiarisation with PPE.

Available evidence about emergency response training in NSW indicates that at least two Local Health Districts have delivered pandemic focussed training in the past decade. Our interviews with managers of emergency departments and intensive care units indicates that most other Districts have focused their emergency training on mass patient trauma incidents such as plane crashes, train crashes and terrorist attacks. While the potential for these types of mass trauma events is real, and warrants training and preparation, significant global outbreaks of diseases have also had potential to threaten NSW communities. In previous decades, global health communities have been at risk of diseases such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS).

In the two Districts where pandemic training was provided in NSW, staff participated in community influenza vaccination exercises. These were focused on upskilling staff to follow emergency command structures, manage high volume patient flows, and organise sanitisation logistics during a hospital-based training exercise.

Our interviews with nurse managers in emergency departments and intensive care units indicate that in the majority of other Local Health Districts, key personnel were unaware of the NSW Pandemic Plan. Interviewed staff also reported insufficient scenario-based training in pandemic responses over the last ten years.

The Ministry, the Clinical Excellence Commission and the Health Education and Training Institute (HETI) are responsible for online training and 'state-wide strategies and resources to maintain high levels of compliance with infection control and patient safety recommendations'. The HETI website contains online training modules in infection control and PPE donning and doffing procedures. Other infection control information and research is available on the websites of the Clinical Excellence Commission and the Agency for Clinical Innovation.

Online training modules are effective for upskilling staff in a range of skills, but are not a substitute for real-time, rapid incident response training. Face-to-face training provides opportunities for first responders to test procedures in hospital environments. Incident response training provides opportunities for staff to assess their levels of compliance with protocols and their competence with equipment in scenario situations. It is the responsibility of Local Health Districts to provide this form of training to the health staff in their District.

Two NSW Health policies that govern clinical arrangements during pandemics are outdated

The Ministry had not updated two policies that had the potential to assist emergency departments and intensive care units in aspects of their ward preparation for the COVID-19 pandemic. Both policies were on the NSW Health website, but neither were shared with hospital staff in the planning phases for the pandemic. Both policies are out of date and have not been revised within required timeframes.

The 2010 Influenza Pandemic - Providing Critical Care policy was due for review in May 2015 and was not updated at the time of the COVID-19 health emergency. Similarly, the 2007 policy Hospital Response to Pandemic Influenza Part 1: Emergency Department Response was due for review in June 2012 and has not been updated.

These policies were designed to assist clinical staff to make necessary ward arrangements for infection control. They set out the steps for rapid identification of contingent workforces, isolation procedures, and management of patient flows to separate those with suspected infection from other patient cohorts. They were a potential addendum to the NSW Pandemic Plan which describes the command and control responsibilities of health agencies in health emergencies.

Our interviews with nurse managers from emergency departments and intensive care units indicate that in the absence of pandemic policy, they sought clinical guidance from external sources and Local Health District experts. Interviewees told us that a lack of policy guidance about ward arrangements and infection control practices in a pandemic increased their workloads and hours of overtime in the early response phases to COVID-19. With the support of Local Health Districts, clinical staff made rapid adjustments in order to respond to changing testing requirements and ward arrangements.

The Ministry was slow to establish a centralised communication channel to communicate with frontline staff

NSW Health’s governance and communication arrangements during a pandemic are set out in the Pandemic Plan. The Plan requires that government agencies ‘commence enhanced arrangements, establish communications measures’ and confirm ‘governance arrangements’ when there is evidence of person to person transmission during an influenza outbreak. NSW Health received the first notifications of the novel coronavirus risks in January 2020.

During the preparation and early response phases to COVID-19, the Ministry and its central agencies were slow in establishing a single, authoritative channel through which to communicate consistent messages to frontline staff. Clinical staff required up-to-date information about COVID-19 testing criteria as requirements were changing rapidly, sometimes daily. While there was no expectation for fixed policy at this time, hospital staff required the latest instructions about treatment requirements, and updates on the numbers of COVID-19 infections in their region.

As information about COVID-19 was evolving, information was communicated across the health system via ‘multiple channels and sources’. While the Ministry and its central agencies communicated extensively with Local Health Districts during March 2020, hospital staff reported to us that they weren’t always sure where they could find the latest advice about testing protocols or infection controls.

Frontline staff told audit office staff that they were checking multiple sources and time-stamping advice to ensure they had the most up to date information on a daily basis. While some Local Health Districts managed clear communication links with frontline staff, nurse managers told us that communication was ‘chaotic’ during the early phases of pandemic preparation. Key personnel were not always available outside business hours and nurse managers advise that they spent hours at the end of shifts, seeking and printing the latest advice for weekend and night shift personnel. By the end of March 2020, the Ministry and the Clinical Excellence Commission websites became better organised to communicate with frontline clinicians.

A recommendation to the Ministry of Health after H1N1 swine flu could be equally applied in the COVID-19 context. The NSW Government’s report: Key Recommendations on Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza recommended the establishment of ‘clear pathways of communication … so that all employees have confidence in where their information will come from and who they should approach if they need additional information.’

NSW Health acknowledges the challenges and the lessons from the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, a strategy released in August 2020, sets out NSW Health’s own recommendation for the future management of PPE including: ‘Aligning a single source of truth for PPE education and evidence-based guidance to ensure clarity of information on appropriate use, supported by an influential network of Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) practitioners at the forefront.

Ministry executives advise that communication with health staff has improved since the early phases of the pandemic. The Ministry now sends weekly COVID-19 updates to over 130,000 health staff via email. In addition, NSW Health now has two COVID-19 tabs on its website with current information, including COVID-19 testing advice. According to Ministry executives, these communication channels could be used or replicated if needed for future health emergencies. The Ministry also provides health information and updates via a phone application called Med App. This App is preferred by doctors and is less likely to be used by nurses. As at October 2020, there are 13,000 users of Med App. Push notifications can be made on Med App through SMS alerts.

Personal protective equipment (PPE) was not always available in required sizes and some hospital masks and gowns were substituted with products that differed from the usual items

Since the emergence of COVID-19 in Australia, all clinicians in NSW hospitals have had access to some form of PPE for their clinical requirements. If staff did not have appropriate equipment for each COVID-19 related procedure, they were guided by the formal advice issued to the NSW Health workforce on 11 March 2020 stating that: ‘The safety of NSW Health staff is a priority at all times, especially during COVID-19. Where safe working practices confirm specific PPE (e.g. face shields/masks or other equipment) are required for the protection of staff due to COVID-19, in all circumstances:

  • staff are to wear prescribed PPE as instructed
  • staff are not to undertake or be required to undertake tasks requiring PPE if the PPE is not available for use. Any such tasks are not to proceed until required PPE is available
  • any staff member who is concerned about their safety must raise their concerns immediately to their manager.’

At periods during March and April 2020, some PPE items were not available in the required sizes or the regular brands to which staff were accustomed. HealthShare NSW was not able to source PPE from usual suppliers. HealthShare NSW sourced PPE including N95 masks from non-traditional suppliers. Some PPE items differed in shape and size from the usual hospital equipment. While senior executives from HealthShare NSW advise that all products were approved by the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), in some hospitals, nurse managers advise that staff were not able to ‘fit test’ substituted masks. Fit testing determines the type and the size of the respirator mask that achieves an adequate seal on an individual’s face.

In March and April 2020, ‘duck bill’ (N95) masks were not available in some hospitals. According to stock managers and clinical managers in Local Health Districts, duck bills are the preferred mask for staff with smaller faces, particularly female staff members. The duck bill mask is a standard PPE product, and as such, is fit tested during mandatory PPE training. During the early response phases to COVID-19, most Local Health Districts were provided with substitute N95 masks. Fit testing of the substituted N95 masks was not able to be conducted in all NSW hospitals during the early phases of COVID-19. During the first wave of COVID-19 in March and April 2020, hospital staff told audit staff that there was no time and a lack of equipment to appropriately fit test substituted N95 masks.

Nurse managers in emergency departments advise that in some instances, staff made adaptations to PPE to improve protections, such as doubling masks, adding elastics or bringing their own equipment. These adaptations were not consistent with guidelines. Nurse managers advise that in some cases, adaptations to PPE or ill-fitting masks created pressure sores and contact dermatitis. Just over half of the stock managers of Local Health Districts advised that PPE stock was procured from outside the HealthShare NSW system. Stock managers in some Districts advise that facial shields and goggles sourced from non-traditional suppliers by HealthShare NSW were of a lesser quality than standard equipment. Stock managers and nurse managers reported that the changes in PPE products caused confusion and stress amongst staff.

Local Health Districts were proactive in assisting hospital staff to mitigate risks of COVID-19 infections. Some Local Health Districts assigned ‘tiger teams’ to assist staff with their PPE practices. Tiger teams provide clinical expertise and advice to staff, answer questions about infection control and provide training on PPE practice in hospital ward environments. They assist and support PPE donning and doffing practices to ensure the appropriate sequencing of applying and removing PPE for effective infection control. They provide mask fit checking guidance to assist staff in correct PPE practices.

Districts ran extensive refresher PPE training sessions for clinical staff. Some hospitals ran regular PPE demonstrations so that staff could observe correct PPE procedures at set times during the day. These activities assisted staff to implement appropriate infection control in the period before the Clinical Excellence Commission’s web-based materials and videos became available in late March and early April 2020. These online resources now provide comprehensive guidance to hospital staff in PPE practices.

HealthShare NSW placed limits or caps on some high-demand PPE items that were too low to meet requirements in some Local Health Districts and had to be adjusted to meet actual demand

The NSW Pandemic Plan describes the responsibilities of the Ministry and its central agencies to manage and maintain the State Medical Stockpile of essential PPE supplies and antiviral medications. During a pandemic, HealthShare NSW has responsibility for warehousing, monitoring and distributing health supplies to the health workforce.

Due to a reported global shortage of PPE and limits to the NSW stockpile, HealthShare NSW placed limits on the provision of approximately 100 high-demand items to NSW hospitals. HealthShare NSW advise that the PPE order capping ceilings were implemented ‘to ensure local stockpiling does not occur’. A centralised ordering process was established with Local Health Districts so that PPE product ordering occurred through single hospital locations (214 across the State), rather than at the ward level. Escalation processes were established to allow Districts to request one-off increases to supply, and a process was set up to permanently increase the order cap limit for any PPE item by facility.

According to HealthShare NSW, ‘as incoming central supply has improved, order caps have subsequently increased in line with strong engagement and governance with the Local Health Districts to ensure the appropriate levels of supply are provided’. The original capped levels were determined by assessing PPE usage in wards during the flu season of 2019. As the flu season case numbers of 2019 were relatively low, some Local Health District managers advised that the levels of PPE during 2019 were not comparable to the level of PPE required for the COVID-19 pandemic.

After advocacy from hospital stock managers and clinicians, HealthShare NSW increased capped PPE levels in many Local Health Districts.

Executive members of the State Health Emergency Operations Centre (SHEOC) advise that its PPE supply strategy needs to be carefully developed as there are vast differences in PPE usage rates during 'business as usual' periods and pandemic periods. If NSW Health kept the level of PPE required in planning for a worst-case scenario, this would equate to an extensive surplus of PPE that could not be utilised during business as usual periods. The SHEOC Executive advise that it is not feasible or economical to store this level of PPE. They advise that given the costs of PPE, and the fact that the products have a shelf life, a diversified supply line is a more reliable method for ensuring PPE during surge and non-surge periods.

Early data modelling showed ICU patient numbers at levels not manageable with levels of ventilators and equipment

Early projections of patient numbers requiring acute care for COVID-19, were at levels that would not have been manageable with the equipment and resources of NSW hospitals. Throughout March through to May 2020, government data modelling indicated significant surges of community infections and surges in intensive care patients.

Early estimates were based on overseas trends, and if actual cases had matched projections, NSW hospitals would not have had sufficient ventilators to meet demand. The knowledge of this shortfall caused high levels of anxiety among nursing and medical staff.

While the data was based on the best available information, it had negative implications for the health and safety of the nurse and junior doctor workforce. Managers of intensive care wards and emergency departments reported stress amongst the workforce. Staff concerns were primarily about being faced with ‘the unmanageable’, along with heightened fears about contracting the virus with the knowledge that there was insufficient equipment to treat acute patients.

As it transpired, overall numbers of COVID-19 infections were lower than projected during the early months of the pandemic. The lower infection rates in the general population have meant fewer instances of patients requiring intensive care in NSW hospitals. In addition, HealthShare NSW has been able to increase the numbers of ventilators in NSW hospitals to prepare for future surges in patients requiring acute respiratory care.

SHEOC Executive advise that NSW Health undertook an accelerated procurement strategy in early 2020 to increase its stock of ventilators, and that ventilator capacity has always far-exceeded actual requirements.

NSW Health has developed a strategy to improve the management of PPE for the NSW health workforce

In August 2020, NSW Health released a strategy that sets out its future management and planning approaches to the provision of PPE for the NSW Health workforce. NSW Health’s Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Strategy describes the learnings and challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic in sourcing and distributing PPE. It sets out the systems and methods for distributing PPE to staff and patients and focuses on how staff are kept informed on the appropriate use of PPE at all times. A supporting communications strategy has been developed to support its implementation.

The strategy contains enhanced transparency measures to regularly inform staff about PPE stock levels and to provide data about PPE usage rates by item types in wards in NSW hospitals. The NSW Health PPE strategy describes a changed approach to ordering, storing and allocating PPE. This includes diversifying the supply lines for PPE products to increase supply options in circumstances where supply lines become disrupted. It includes a centralised system for coordinating the supply of hospital PPE through Local Heath District coordination points and centralised distribution points in large hospitals.

Our interviews with hospital PPE stock managers and nurse managers indicate that staff find the new ordering system to be an improvement upon the previous stock ordering method.

According to the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Strategy, NSW health is upgrading its models for monitoring and benchmarking PPE usage across the health system. Systems are being improved for forecasting demand volumes during business as usual periods and during health emergency surges.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Audit methodology

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #344 - released 9 December 2020

Published

Actions for Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure

Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure

Planning
Environment
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today that examined the effectiveness of the waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure in minimising the amount of waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates.  

The audit found that the waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, while the levy rates increase each year in line with the consumer price index, the EPA has not conducted a review since 2009 to confirm whether they are set at the optimal level. The audit also found that there were no objective and transparent criteria for which local government areas should pay the levy, and the list of levied local government areas has not been reviewed since 2014. 

Grant funding programs for waste infrastructure administered by the EPA and the Environmental Trust have supported increases in recycling capacity. However, these grant programs are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure. 

The Auditor-General made six recommendations aimed at ensuring the waste levy is as effective as possible at meeting its objectives and ensuring funding for waste infrastructure is contributing effectively to recycling and waste diversion targets.

 

Overall, waste generation in New South Wales (NSW) is increasing. This leads to an increasing need to manage waste in ways that reduce the environmental impact of waste and promote the efficient use of resources. In 2014, the NSW Government set targets relating to recycling rates and diversion of waste from landfill, to be achieved by 2021–22. The NSW Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 identifies the waste levy, a strong compliance regime, and investment in recycling infrastructure as key tools for achieving these waste targets.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Government in minimising waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates. The audit focused on the waste levy, which is paid by waste facility operators when waste is sent to landfill, and grant programs that fund infrastructure for waste reuse and recycling.

The waste levy is regulated by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and is generally paid when waste is disposed in landfill. The waste levy rates are set by the NSW Government and prescribed in the Protection of Environment Operations (Waste) Regulation 2014. As part of its broader role in reviewing the regulatory framework for managing waste and recycling, the EPA can provide advice to the government on the operation of the waste levy.

The purpose of the waste levy is to act as an incentive for waste generators to reduce, re-use or recycle waste by increasing the cost of sending waste to landfill. In 2019–20, around $750 million was collected through the waste levy in NSW. The government spends approximately one third of the revenue raised through the waste levy on waste and environmental programs.

One of the waste programs funded through the one third allocation of the waste levy is Waste Less, Recycle More (WLRM). This initiative funds smaller grant programs that focus on specific aspects of waste management. This audit focused on five grant programs that fund projects that provide new or enhanced waste infrastructure such as recycling facilities. Four of these programs were administered by the Environmental Trust and one by the EPA.

Conclusion

The waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, aspects of the EPA's administration of the waste levy could be improved, including the frequency of its modelling of the waste levy impact and coverage, and the timeliness of reporting. Grant funding programs have supported increases in recycling capacity but are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure which would help effectively target them to where waste infrastructure is most needed. Data published by the EPA indicates that the NSW Government is on track to meet the recycling target for construction and demolition waste, but recycling targets for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste are unlikely to be met.

Waste levy

The waste levy rate, including a schedule of annual increases to 2016, was set by the NSW Government in 2009. Since 2016, the waste levy rate has increased in line with the consumer price index (CPI). The EPA has not conducted recent modelling to test whether the waste levy is set at the optimal level to achieve its objectives. The waste levy operation was last reviewed in 2012, although some specific aspects of the waste levy have been reviewed more recently, including reviews of waste levy rates for two types of waste. The waste levy is applied at different rates across the state. Decisions about which local government areas (LGAs) are subject to the levy, and which rate each LGA pays, were made in 2009 and potential changes were considered but not implemented in 2014. Currently, there are no objective and transparent criteria for determining which LGAs pay the levy. The EPA collects waste data from waste operators. This data has improved since 2015, but published data is at least one year out of date which limits its usefulness to stakeholders when making decisions relating to waste management.

Grants for waste infrastructure

All state funding for new and enhanced waste infrastructure in NSW is administered through grants to councils and commercial waste operators. The government's Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 includes few priorities for waste infrastructure and there is no other waste infrastructure strategy in place to guide investment. The absence of a formal strategy to guide infrastructure investment in NSW limits the ability of the State Government to develop a shared understanding between planners, councils and the waste industry about waste infrastructure requirements and priorities. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment is currently developing a 20-year waste strategy and there is an opportunity for the government to take a more direct role in planning the type, location and timing of waste infrastructure needed in NSW.

The grants administration procedures used for the grant programs reviewed in this audit were well designed. However, we identified some gaps in risk management, record-keeping and consistency of information provided to applicants and assessment teams. In four of the five programs we examined, there was no direct alignment between program objectives and the NSW Government's overall waste targets.

Achievement of the 2014–21 state targets for waste and resource recovery (WARR targets) is reliant in part on the availability of infrastructure that supports waste diversion and recycling. The state WARR targets dependent on waste infrastructure are:

  • Increase recycling rates to 70 per cent for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste, and 80 per cent for construction and demolition waste.
  • Increase waste diverted from landfill to 75 per cent.

A further target — manage problem waste better by establishing or upgrading 86 drop-off facilities or services for managing household problem wastes state-wide — is dependent on accessible community waste drop-off facilities across NSW.

Exhibit 7 identifies the five grant programs that provide funding for new or enhanced waste infrastructure to increase capacity for reuse or recycling of waste. All five of these programs were examined in the audit.
In addition to the grant programs shown in Exhibit 7, other programs provide funding for infrastructure, but at a smaller scale. Examples of these include:

  • Bin Trim which provides rebates to small businesses for small scale recycling equipment such as cardboard and soft plastic balers.
  • Litter grants which provide funding for litter bins.
  • Weighbridges grants for installation of a weighbridge at waste facilities.
  • Landfill consolidation and environmental improvement grants for rural councils to replace old landfills with transfer stations or to improve the infrastructure at landfill sites.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #343 - released 26 November 2020

Published

Actions for Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions

Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions

Local Government
Planning
Environment
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on how well four councils managed their local infrastructure contributions during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 financial years. 

Local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, are collected from developers to pay for local infrastructure such as drainage, local roads, open space and community facilities. Controls over local infrastructure contributions help to ensure that all contributions owed are collected, funds are spent as intended, and any contributions paid in the form of works-in-kind or dedicated land are correctly valued.

The audit found that Blacktown City Council and City of Sydney Council provided effective governance over their local infrastructure contributions whereas Central Coast and Liverpool City Councils’ governance arrangements require improvement.

The audit found that three councils had spent local infrastructure contributions in accordance with approved contributions plans. Central Coast Council and the former Gosford City Council had spent $13.2 million on administration costs in breach of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. These funds were repaid into the council’s local infrastructure fund during the course of the audit.

The Auditor-General made a number of recommendations for each council relating to improving controls over contributions and increasing transparency. 

Read full report (PDF)
 

This audit examined the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, held by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years.

This performance audit was conducted with reference to the legislative and regulatory planning framework that was in place during that period.

Our work for this performance audit was completed at the end of March 2020 when we issued the final report to the four audited councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. We received their respective formal responses to the report’s recommendations during April and May 2020.

Concurrently to this audit, we sought Crown Solicitor’s advice (the ‘Advice’) regarding the use of local infrastructure contributions collected by local councils under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘the EPA Act’) for our financial audit work. The Advice clarified the applicable legislative requirements with reference to the application, investment and pooling of local infrastructure contributions. The Advice is included in Appendix 2 of this report. The Advice has not impacted on the findings and recommendations of this report.

Councils collect Local Infrastructure Contributions (LICs) from developers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (1979), the Local Government Act (1993) and the City of Sydney Act (2000) (EP&A Act, LG Act and City of Sydney Act) to fund infrastructure required to service and support new development. At 30 June 2018, councils across NSW collectively held more than $3.0 billion in LICs collected from developers. Just over $1.37 billion in total was held by ten councils. Councils collecting LICs must prepare a contributions plan, which outlines how LICs will be calculated and apportioned across different types of infrastructure. Councils that deliver water and sewer services prepare a development servicing plan (DSP) which allows them to collect contributions for water and sewer infrastructure.

Development timeframes are such that there is often several years between when LICs are collected and the infrastructure is required. Good governance and internal controls are needed over these funds to ensure they are available when needed and spent appropriately.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over LICs collected by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years: Blacktown City Council, Central Coast Council, City of Sydney Council and Liverpool City Council. As at June 2018 these councils held the four highest LIC balances, each in excess of $140 million.

Audit Conclusion

Three of the four councils audited were currently compliant with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions regarding LICs. All had gaps in governance and controls over LICs which limited effective oversight.

Three of the councils included in the audit complied with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions relating to LICs. Central Coast Council breached the EP&A Act between 2001 and 2019 when it used LICs for administration costs. These funds were repaid in late 2019.

While controls over the receipt and expenditure of contributions funds were largely in place at all councils, there were some exceptions relating to valuing work and land delivered in lieu of cash. Three councils do not provide probity guidance in policies relating to LICs delivered through works-in-kind. Three of the councils had contributions plans that were more than five years old.

Staff at all four councils are knowledgeable about LICs but not all councils keep procedures up to date. Three councils' governance frameworks operate effectively with senior officers from across the council involved in decisions about spending LICs, entering into voluntary planning agreements (VPAs) and reviewing contributions plans.

Transparency over key information relating to LICs is important for senior management so they can make informed decisions, and for the community who pay LICs and expect infrastructure to be provided. During the period of the audit, none of the councils included in the audit provided sufficient information to senior management or their councillors about the projected financial status of contributions plans. This information would be valuable when making broader strategic and financial decisions. Information about LIC levies and intended infrastructure is available to the community but not always easy to find.

A strong governance framework is important at each council to ensure that the funds are managed well, available when needed and spent as intended. The audit examined the following features of each council's governance framework as they apply to LICs:

  • decision-making by councillors and council officers relating to LICs
  • monitoring delivery of contributions plans and DSPs including:
    • reviewing assumptions underlying the plans
    • monitoring projected status of plans.

Internal controls over LICs are important to promote accountability, prevent fraud and deliver infrastructure to the required standard at the best possible price. If financial controls are weak or are not implemented well, there is a risk that LICs are misspent or that councils pay too much for infrastructure.

Not all councils' internal controls adequately addressed risks associated with the administration of LICs

The audit examined a number of internal controls that manage risks related to LICs. These included:

  • financial controls over receipt and expenditure of LIC funds
  • management of conflicts-of-interest when dealing with developers
  • independent valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
  • ensuring delivery and quality of works-in-kind, and obtaining security from developers in the event of non-delivery or poor quality work
  • management of variations to VPAs and works-in-kind agreements.

We reviewed controls included in policies and procedures and then checked samples of work to ensure that controls were implemented. We found variation in the controls that councils implemented, and some weaknesses in controls. It is a matter for each council to assess their financial risk and develop internal controls that support the collection, management, and expenditure of LICs. However, councils must be able to assure their communities and developers that they are doing everything possible to collect all LICs owing and that work conducted by developers in lieu of cash payments is properly valued and carried out to the required standard.

Further information about audit findings in relation to internal controls for each council are included in chapters five to eight. The exhibit below demonstrates variation in several controls implemented in the audited councils.

In a 2018 report, the Independent Commission Against Corruption noted that 'the appetite for transparency is expanding in both the public and private sectors'.

The Practice Note and S64 Guidance refer to transparency, including the importance of transparency over:

  • calculation and apportionment of LICs
  • funding of infrastructure, including where and when infrastructure is delivered
  • arrangements made with developers through VPAs.

The LIC system is largely transparent for community members who know where to look

Contributions plans and DSPs are public documents, exhibited to the public before being adopted by council. Councils included in the audit publish their contributions plans and DSPs on their websites and meet statutory requirements with regard to reporting and accessibility of information.

However, other public information relating to the LIC system is fragmented across different websites and reports and varies in detail across councils.

Exhibit 10: Published information about LICs at the four audited councils
  Blacktown City Council Central Coast Council City of Sydney Council Liverpool City Council
Financial details about contributions collected and spent Financial statements Financial statements Financial statements Financial statements
Implementation plans for spending LICs Contribution plans S64 implementation plans in DSPs. S7.11 & S7.12 implementation plans developed annually within capital works plan Contribution plans Developed annually within capital works plan
Capital works underway or completed, funded by LICs Capital works plan and annual report Not published Not published Capital works plan
Source: Audit Office analysis.

The Practice Note states that councils are accountable for providing the infrastructure for which contributions are collected. Demonstrating that infrastructure has been provided is difficult with fragmented information. As an example of transparent reporting, Blacktown City Council's 2018–19 annual report includes information about infrastructure that has been delivered for every contributions plan, providing transparency over how LICs have been spent.

Use of LICs collected under VPAs is not always transparent

Contributions collected under VPAs are not required to demonstrate the same relationship to a development as LICs collected under section 7.11 of the EP&A Act. VPAs are often negotiated because a developer requests a change to a planning instrument, and it is important that these arrangements, and their outcomes, are transparent to the community.

The EP&A Regulation includes mechanisms to ensure that VPAs are partially transparent. VPAs are exhibited to the public and approved by the elected council. Councils must maintain a VPA Register and make the VPA Deeds of Agreement available on request. However, there is no obligation on council to report on the outcomes or delivery of developers' obligations under VPAs. The four audited councils vary in transparency and accessibility of information available about VPAs.

Exhibit 11: Published information about VPAs at the four audited councils
  Blacktown City Council Central Coast Council City of Sydney Council Liverpool City Council
VPA Register Council website and annual report Annual report Annual report Council website and annual report
VPA Deeds of Agreement Council website Available on request Available on request Council website
Intended use of LICs collected under VPAs In Deeds of Agreement In Deeds of Agreement In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement
Completion of work funded by cash collected under VPAs Not published Not published Not published Not published
Delivery of works-in-kind or land negotiated under VPAs Not published Not published In VPA Register Not published
Source: Audit Office analysis.

The Practice Note suggests that councils incorporate the intended use of LICs collected under VPAs in the Deed of Agreement, but there is no guidance relating to transparency over where and when funds have actually been spent. There is merit in councils providing greater transparency over public benefits delivered through VPAs to give communities confidence in VPAs as a planning tool.

Credit arrangements with developers are not always well documented or monitored

When levying LICs, section 7.11(6) of the EP&A Act requires councils to take into account land, money, or works-in-kind that the developer has contributed on other development sites over and above their LIC obligations. This section of the EP&A Act allows a developer to offset a LIC owed on one site against land or works contributed on another. This leads to some developers carrying 'credits' for work delivered to councils, to be paid back by reduced LICs on a future development. Blacktown City Council and Central Coast Council allow developers to carry credits. Liverpool City Council and City of Sydney Council do not permit credits and instead pay the developers for any additional work undertaken.

Councils should formally document credit arrangements and have a robust process to validate and keep track of credit balances and report on them. Central Coast Council does not keep good track of credit arrangements and neither Blacktown City Council or Central Coast Council aggregate or report on outstanding credit balances.

Blacktown City Council manages the largest LIC fund in NSW and negotiates more VPAs than any other council. Overall, Blacktown City Council demonstrates effective governance over the LIC funds but there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Blacktown City Council also needs to update its operating procedures relating to LICs and improve security over key information.

Blacktown City Council is managing areas with high growth. There is a risk that Blacktown City Council will be unable to collect sufficient LICs to fund the infrastructure required to support that growth. However, Blacktown City Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.

Blacktown City Council has policies in place to guide the management of LICs although management of credit arrangements with developers requires greater oversight. Policies relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers and valuations of works-in-kind are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. Blacktown City Council's S7.11 committee structure could act as a model for other councils. Blacktown City Council is spending LICs according to its contributions plans. Staff managing LICs demonstrate good knowledge of the regulatory environment. However, a number of administrative processes need attention such as outdated procedures, lack of security over key spreadsheets, and inappropriate retention of sensitive personal data.

Recommendations

By December 2020, Blacktown City Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. update council's works-in-kind policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
  3. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind
  4. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  5. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers
  6. update procedures for managing LICs
  7. implement security measures over critical or personal information and spreadsheets. 

Central Coast Council's governance and internal controls over LICs were not fully effective. Between 2001 and 2019, more than $13.0 million in LICs was misspent on administration costs in breach of the EP&A Act. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Policies and procedures from the two former councils are not aligned.

In May 2016, the newly amalgamated Central Coast Council inherited 53 contributions plans from the former Gosford City and Wyong Shire Councils. Managing this number of contributions plans fragments the available funds and increases complexity. Central Coast Council is currently working on consolidating these plans. Between June 2016 and June 2019, its LIC balance doubled from $90.0 million to $196 million. Central Coast Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans. Central Coast Council has a LIC committee but it has no formal charter and senior officers do not regularly attend meetings. This limits the committee's effectiveness as a decision-making body. A draft policy relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers. Valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer.

Central Coast Council has adjusted its accounts in 2018–19 by $13.2 million to repay the LIC fund for administration expenses that were not provided for in 40 contributions plans.

Recommendations

By June 2020, Central Coast Council should:

1. obtain independent validation of the adjustment made to the restricted asset accounts and general fund to repay LICs spent on administration, and adjustments made to each infrastructure category within the contributions plans

2. publish current contributions plans from the former Gosford City Council on the Central Coast Council website.

By December 2020, Central Coast Council should:

3. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans

4. increase transparency of information available to the public about LIC works planned and underway, including intended use of contributions collected under VPAs

5. consolidate existing plans, ensuring the new contributions plans includes a regular review cycle

6. develop a formal charter for the developer contributions committee and increase the seniority of membership

7. complete and adopt council's works-in-kind policy currently under development, ensuring it addresses probity risks during negotiations with developers

8. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land

9. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs

10. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers

11. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs

12. align policies and procedures relating to LICs across the amalgamated council including developing policies and procedures for the management of S64 LICs

13. update council's VPA policy to address increased or indexed bank guarantees to accommodate cost increases.

City of Sydney Council manages a complex development environment across the Sydney CBD and inner suburbs. Overall, governance and internal controls over LICs are effective although there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.

City of Sydney Council maintains a large balance of LICs, although not excessive relative to the annual level of LIC expenditure. Unspent contributions are largely associated with open space infrastructure that cannot be delivered until suitable land is available. Thirty per cent of cash contributions are collected under VPAs and there is limited transparency over how these funds are spent. City of Sydney Council does not assess and report to management or its Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.

In 2017–18 and 2018–19, LICs were spent in accordance with the corresponding contributions plans. City of Sydney Council staff are knowledgeable about the regulatory environment and are supported by up-to-date policies and procedures.

Recommendations

By December 2020, City of Sydney Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  3. periodically review the risk of unpaid LICs associated with complying development certificates and assess whether additional controls are required
  4. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs. 

During the audit period 2017–18 and 2018–19, Liverpool City Council did not have effective governance and internal controls over LICs. Liverpool City Council is addressing deficiencies and risks identified through an internal audit published in December 2018 although further work is required. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.

In the two years to 30 June 2019, the balance of unspent LICs increased by more than 60 per cent against a relatively low pattern of expenditure. Prior to an internal audit completed in late 2018, there was no regular reporting on the status of LICs and a lack of transparency when prioritising the expenditure of LIC funds. During 2019, and following the internal audit, Liverpool City Council engaged additional skilled resources to improve focus and accountability for LICs. A LIC committee has been established to manage contributions plans and support business units to initiate relevant infrastructure projects, although it is too early to assess whether this committee is operating effectively. From February 2019, Liverpool City Council commenced monthly reporting to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) about the point-in-time status of LIC funds, and to its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about risks associated with LICs and the implementation of internal audit recommendations. There is limited reporting to senior management about the projected financial status of some contributions plans. Our audit found no evidence of misuse of funds during the audited period. Methods for valuing work and land are not aligned with policies and procedures and are implemented inconsistently. In addition, valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. The policy relating to works-in-kind provides no guidance about managing probity risks when negotiating with developers.

Recommendations

By December 2020, Liverpool City Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. update council's policies and procedures to provide consistent guidance about how works and land offered by developers should be valued
  3. update council's Works-in-Kind and Land Acquisition Policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
  4. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  5. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
  6. implement security measures over critical or private information. 

Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – Advice from the Crown Solicitor

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #339 - released 17 August 2020

Published

Actions for Managing demand for ambulance services 2017

Managing demand for ambulance services 2017

Health
Information technology
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives over the past decade to better manage the number of unnecessary ambulance responses and transports to hospital emergency departments. However, there is no overall strategy to guide the development of these initiatives nor do NSW Ambulance's data systems properly monitor their impact. As a result, the Audit Office was unable to assess whether NSW Ambulance's approach to managing demand is improving the efficiency of ambulance services.

Demand for ambulance services is increasing. Demographic factors including population growth and ageing have contributed to this and ongoing growth in demand is likely. It is important that NSW Ambulance finds ways to respond to this demand more efficiently, while maintaining patient safety standards and meeting community expectations.

Most triple zero calls to NSW Ambulance do not involve medical issues that require an emergency response. NSW Ambulance has introduced a range of initiatives to change the way it manages these less urgent requests for assistance. Its major demand management initiatives include using a telephone advice line, referring some patients to services other than hospital emergency departments and using specialist paramedics to respond to less urgent cases.

The role of NSW Ambulance has changed in recent years. It is aiming to become a ‘mobile health service’ that identifies the needs of patients and provides or refers them to the most appropriate type of care. This change involves a significant expansion of the clinical decision-making role of paramedics. Considerable strategic and organisational efforts are required to make this work. The successful implementation of demand management initiatives is important to NSW Ambulance's ability to continue to meet demand for its services.

This audit assessed NSW Ambulance's major demand management initiatives that aim to reduce unnecessary demand for ambulance responses and unnecessary transport to hospital emergency departments. It aimed to assess the extent to which these initiatives have improved the efficiency of its services.

Conclusion

NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives that aim to manage demand for its services from less urgent cases more efficiently. There is no overall strategy for these initiatives and NSW Ambulance’s data systems do not measure their outputs or outcomes. As a result, we are unable to assess the impact of NSW Ambulance's demand management initiatives on the efficiency of ambulance services. More focus is needed to ensure these initiatives achieve the efficiency improvements necessary to help NSW Ambulance meet future increases in demand.

Increasing demand for ambulance services is a key issue for NSW Ambulance. Demand has increased at a faster rate than population growth in recent years and continued growth is expected. NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives that aim to manage demand for its services from people with less urgent medical issues more efficiently and align its approach with the rest of the health system in New South Wales.

These individual initiatives lack a broader strategy to guide their development. NSW Ambulance’s demand management initiatives also lack clear goals and performance targets, with insufficient organisational resources allocated to support their implementation. NSW Ambulance does not have a data system that allows it to conduct accurate routine monitoring of the activity and performance of these initiatives.

More effort is required to make demand management initiatives a core part of NSW Ambulance's work. Key relationships with other health services to support demand management initiatives have only recently been established. NSW Ambulance has not communicated proactively with the public about its demand management initiatives. To ensure paramedics are as well prepared as possible for their expanded roles, they need better professional development and up to date technology.

Demand for ambulance services in New South Wales is increasing steadily. Forecast future increases in demand due to population growth and ageing mean that NSW Ambulance must improve its efficiency to maintain its performance.

Demand for ambulance services is growing at a rate higher than population growth. The increase in demand is likely to continue as the population continues to grow and age. NSW Ambulance has made several recent changes to remove large parts of demand for its services, including moving non-emergency patient transport to a separate government agency and changing the way triple zero calls are categorised.

These changes were expected to improve emergency response time performance, but the anticipated improvements have not been achieved. If demand continues to increase as forecast, NSW Ambulance will need to find more efficient ways to manage demand to maintain its performance.

NSW Ambulance has introduced initiatives to change the way it manages demand from patients who have less urgent medical issues. These have the potential to achieve positive results, but we were unable to fully assess their impact because of weaknesses in data systems and monitoring. More needs to be done to demonstrate progress toward the efficiency improvements required.

NSW Ambulance uses a telephone referral system to manage triple zero calls from people with medical issues that do not require an ambulance. This has the potential to achieve efficiency improvements but there are weaknesses in NSW Ambulance's use and monitoring of this system. Paramedics are now able to make decisions about whether patients need transport to a hospital emergency department. NSW Ambulance does not routinely measure or monitor the decisions paramedics make, so it does not know whether these decisions are improving efficiency. Extended Care Paramedics who have additional skills in diagnosing and treating patients with less urgent medical issues were introduced in 2007. NSW Ambulance analysis indicates that these paramedics have the potential to improve efficiency, but have not been used as effectively as possible.

Our 2013 audit of NSW Ambulance found that accurate monitoring of activity and performance was not being conducted. More than four years later, this remains the case. 

NSW Ambulance has recognised the need to change the way it manages demand and has developed initiatives that have the potential to improve efficiency. However, there are significant weaknesses in the strategy for and implementation of its demand management initiatives.

NSW Ambulance has identified the goal of moving from an emergency transport provider to a mobile health service and developed several initiatives to support this. Its demand management initiatives have the potential to contribute to the broader policy directions for the health system in New South Wales. However, there is no clear overall strategy guiding these initiatives and their implementation has been poor.

NSW Ambulance's reasons for changing its approach to demand management have not been communicated proactively to the community. Demand management initiatives that have been operating for over a decade still do not have clear performance measures or targets. Project management of new initiatives has been inadequate, with insufficient organisational resources to oversee them and inadequate engagement with other healthcare providers.

NSW Ambulance uses an in-house Vocational Education and Training course to recruit some paramedics, as well as recruiting paramedics who have completed a university degree. No other Australian ambulance services continue to provide their own Vocational Education and Training qualifications. Paramedics will need more support in several key areas to be able to fulfil their expanded roles in providing a mobile health service. Performance and development systems for paramedics are not used effectively. Up to date technology would help paramedics make better decisions and improve NSW Ambulance's ability to monitor demand management activity.

There are gaps in NSW Ambulance's oversight of the risks of some of the initiatives it has introduced, particularly its lack of information on the outcomes for patients who are not transported to hospital. Weaknesses in the way NSW Ambulance uses its data limit its ability to properly assess the risks of the demand management initiatives it has introduced.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #295 - released 13 December 2017

Published

Actions for Planning and evaluating palliative care services in NSW

Planning and evaluating palliative care services in NSW

Health
Management and administration
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

NSW Health’s approach to planning and evaluating palliative care is not effectively coordinated. There is no overall policy framework for palliative and end-of-life care, nor is there comprehensive monitoring and reporting on services and outcomes.

Palliative care is an essential component of modern health care services and an increasingly important part of the wider health and social care systems. Palliative care is healthcare and support for people with a life-limiting illness, their families and carers. It is provided by, or informed by, professionals who specialise in palliative care. ‘End of life’ care is provided to people approaching the end of life by health professionals, who may work in the health, community or aged care systems. Not everyone receiving end of life care needs palliative care.

NSW Health has a policy and planning role in palliative and end-of-life care, and it coordinates a wide range of service providers. Local Health Districts (LHDs) provide care services in settings such as homes, hospitals and clinics to patients with varying needs. There are several care providers that can be involved.

Due to this shared nature of palliative care — where many people, services and settings are involved in delivering care to the patient — availability and communication of information is critical. For service planning, data and evidence must be drawn from various sources in a timely and efficient way.

This audit assessed whether NSW Health is effectively planning and evaluating palliative care services, in the context of rising demand, increasingly complex needs, and the diversity of service providers.

Conclusion 

NSW Health’s approach to planning and evaluating palliative care is not effectively coordinated. There is no overall policy framework for palliative and end-of-life care, nor is there comprehensive monitoring and reporting on services and outcomes.  

NSW Health has a limited understanding of the quantity and quality of palliative care services across the state, which reduces its ability to plan for future demand and the workforce needed to deliver it. At the district level, planning is sometimes ad hoc and accountability for performance is unclear.

The capacity of LHDs to use accurate and complete data to plan and deliver services is hindered by multiple disjointed information systems and manual data collections. Further, a data collection on patient outcomes, for benchmarking and quality improvement, is not used universally. This limits the ability of districts to plan, benchmark and improve services based on outcomes data.

NSW Health's engagement with stakeholders is not systematic. The lack of an overall stakeholder engagement strategy puts at risk the sustainability and value of stakeholder input in planning and limits transparency.

Over the last two years, NSW Health has taken steps to improve its planning and support for districts. The Agency for Clinical Innovation has produced an online resource which will assist LHDs in constructing their own, localised models of care. eHealth, which coordinates information communication technology for the state’s healthcare, aims to invest in integrating and improving information systems. These initiatives should help to address many of the issues now inhibiting integrated service delivery, reporting on activity and outcomes, and planning for the future.

1. By July 2018, NSW Health should develop an integrated palliative and end-of-life care policy framework that:

  • clearly articulates the interface between palliative and end of life care and outlines the priorities for the respective areas
  • defines policy goals and objectives, and a performance and evaluation framework for palliative care service planning and delivery
  • informs a related workforce plan which supports the policy framework and is linked to the Health Professional Workforce Plan 2012–2022
  • reviews the funding allocation model to ensure future enhancement funds are distributed equitably and transparently based on the need and population of districts.

By December 2018, NSW Health should:

2. assess how the functionality provided in data collection programs such as the Palliative Care Outcomes Collaboration program can be provided across all palliative care services in NSW

3. complete its statewide review of systems and reporting for end of life management including specialist palliative care, and develop a business case to implement a more integrated set of solutions to:

  • support providers delivering end of life and palliative care
  • help monitor service quality and quantity
  • provide comprehensive data for service planning

4. improve stakeholder engagement by:

  • developing a statewide stakeholder engagement strategy that brings together current activity and good practice, and is transparent and publicly available
  • defining accountability for overseeing and implementing the strategy at state and district levels.

1. Performance monitoring is inadequate

NSW Government policy on palliative care is outlined in the NSW Government Plan to Increase Access to Palliative Care 2012–2016 (the Plan). Under the Plan, the overarching policy is ‘to ensure that everyone has access to quality palliative care regardless of their economic or social circumstances, their geographical location or their medical condition.’ Some initiatives under the Plan are still being implemented.

NSW Health only has measures in place to assess some processes and activities for individual initiatives under the Plan. There is no tracking of outcomes relating to the policy goals set out in the Plan, such as increased choice to die at home or the location of the patient’s choice, and improved access to specialist palliative care services. NSW Health has not conducted an overall assessment of the Plan’s outcomes to guide future priorities.

Further, there is no overall performance and reporting framework for palliative and end of life care, meaning there is no monitoring of performance of palliative care services for NSW as a whole. This lack of evaluation and performance measurement impacts on NSW Health's ability to monitor progress and achievements, address gaps in service, and plan for future service enhancement. 

2. Statewide planning and evaluation lacks coordination

Currently, palliative care services are complex to plan and evaluate. Many policies, strategies, guidelines, directives and data collections currently inform services. Even definitions of services vary. The split of policy functions for palliative care and end-of-life care between different branches within NSW Health adds further complexity. These arrangements create the risk of confusion, gaps in advice and support for LHDs.

Consistency is needed in the use of terminology and planning to achieve an integrated approach at all levels, including:

  • standard definitions of palliative care and end-of-life care
  • planning within a single structured policy framework to help clarify what services are to be delivered, who is accountable for delivering them and how to measure their outcomes.

Workforce planning is also affected. While NSW Health has identified significant gaps in the specialist palliative care workforce (especially in regional and remote areas) and it previously made workforce capacity one of its priorities, limited work has been undertaken in producing a statewide strategy to reduce these gaps.

3. District planning is not systematic and some external providers are poorly managed

An integrated approach would inform district-level service planning for palliative care. Planning in the districts we visited was sometimes ad hoc and accountability for performance unclear. Districts would benefit from:

  • better integrating data collection systems with planning
  • clearer guidelines, easy-to-use tools, monitoring and accountability systems.

The recently developed guide – A Blueprint for Improvement, from the Agency for Clinical Innovation – should help districts plan more effectively and consistently as it rolls out more widely in 2017. This takes an integrated approach to palliative and end-of-life care. Only one district we visited has finalised a comprehensive plan using the Blueprint.

Issues with district planning extend to external agreements with service providers, as these are sometimes poorly managed and do not support improved patient outcomes. Examples we reviewed showed a significant reporting burden with process-focused reporting. We also found little evidence of monitoring or action as a result of these reports.

4. Diverse information systems mean data collection and use are inconsistent

NSW Health gathers a broad range of data from many collection points and systems to inform palliative care services at hospital, ward or unit level, and community teams. However, the current data is limited because: 

  • activity is under-reported, particularly in community-based services
  • collection is not universal across districts and services.

Districts also struggle with evidence-based planning and service delivery because multiple information systems mean data may be incomplete or inaccurate. Too often, clinicians and service managers rely on manual collection and paper-based systems. 

eHealth, which coordinates information communication technology (ICT) for the state’s healthcare, is planning a statewide approach to capture information and report on all palliative care activity. The current plans of eHealth to review and improve systems should make data more complete, robust and accessible for quality improvement and planning.

5. An overarching stakeholder strategy would strengthen engagement

Just as data is central to effective planning and evaluation, so too is stakeholder engagement. However, there is currently no explicit stakeholder strategy, which means consultation is inconsistent across the state and not systematic at a district level.

While NSW Health uses a range of platforms to consult, the purpose and value is often not clear to stakeholders. Individual districts have some good practices, but there are limited mechanisms to identify and share these with other areas. A state-wide strategy would improve the quality and consistency of engagement, which will in turn inform service planning and delivery.

A stakeholder engagement strategy would integrate current initiatives, such as the two major networks that consult with health planning staff and clinicians. But it will also need to extend the feedback gathered from families, carers and volunteers, and from the peak bodies that represent them. 

Published

Actions for 2016 - An overview

2016 - An overview

Education
Community Services
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Environment
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

This report focuses on key observations and findings from 2016 audits and highlights key areas of focus for financial and performance audits in 2017.

The quality and timeliness of financial reporting continued to improve across the NSW public sector in 2016. Only one qualified audit opinion was issued and most agencies signed their financial statements on time.

We found the Government’s cluster governance arrangements were unclear and inconsistently implemented across the sector in 2016. Clearer arrangements would improve cooperation and coordination amongst cluster agencies and help deliver government priorities that cut across agencies.

This report focuses on key observations and common issues identified from our financial, performance and compliance audits in 2016, and identifies examples of good practice. It also looks forward to where we will focus our efforts in 2017.

We have summarised our observations and findings for 2016 in four chapters:

  • Financial Performance and Reporting
  • Financial Controls
  • Governance
  • Service Delivery.

Key observations and common issues identified across several agencies will often apply more broadly across the NSW public sector. For this reason, we hope this report is a useful tool for agency management and Audit and Risk Committees to assess our observations and common issues and consider the impact on their agencies. The report provides links to other reports and refers to other useful reference material.

Our financial audits provide independent opinions on NSW agencies’ financial statements. They consider whether agencies have complied with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations and government directions. They also identify and report internal control weaknesses and matters of governance interest, and make recommendations to address deficiencies.

Our performance and compliance audits build on the financial audits by reviewing and concluding on whether taxpayers’ money is being spent efficiently, effectively, economically and in accordance with the law.

Financial Reporting
Financial Reporting The quality and timeliness of financial reporting
continued to improve across the NSW public sector.
NSW Treasury’s early close procedures helped
facilitate this.
Financial Controls
Internal Controls More needs to be done to implement audit
recommendations on a timely basis.
Information Technology Agencies continue to face challenges in managing information security.
Internal controls at shared service providers Clients of ServiceFirst and GovConnect were unable to rely on the service providers’ internal controls increasing the risks of fraud, error and inappropriate access to data.
Governance
Cluster governance Cluster governance arrangements that support cluster accountability, performance monitoring, risk and compliance management are unclear.
Management oversight We identified deficiencies in the oversight and management of Crown Land, specifically sale and lease transactions.
Project governance Project cost and time overruns continue to occur.
Service Delivery
Premiers and State Priorities

According to agency data, which we have not audited, some Premier's and State Priorities are at risk of not being achieved.

A comprehensive report of performance against the State Priorities is not published.

Delivering Government Services The NSW Government's program evaluation initiative has been largely ineffective. We found government decision makers are not always receiving enough information to make evidence based decisions.
Reporting on Performance We found agencies’ performance was not routinely measured, evaluated or publicly reported.

Financial performance and reporting

The quality and timeliness of financial reporting continues to improve

Only one qualified opinion was issued on the 2015–16 financial statements of NSW public sector agencies, compared to two in 2014–15. The audit opinion for the Office of the NSW State Emergency Service was qualified because effective controls over fundraising activities did not operate for the entire year.

Since NSW Treasury introduced its ‘early close procedures’ initiative in 2011–12, the number of reported misstatements and significant matters have fallen considerably across the NSW public sector. The number of misstatements has fallen from 1,077 in 2011–12 to 298 in  2015–16.

Most agencies submitted and signed their financial statements on time, which enabled more audits to be completed within three months of year end. In 2015–16, 204 of 286 agencies’ financial statements and audit opinions were signed within three months of the year end, compared to only 67 in 2010–11.  

NSW Treasury has narrowed the scope of mandatory early close procedures 

NSW Treasury’s early close procedures in 2015–16 were again successful in improving the quality and timeliness of financial reporting, largely facilitated by the early resolution of accounting issues. For 2016–17, NSW Treasury has narrowed the scope of mandatory early close procedures, which may diminish the good performance achieved in recent years.   

To mitigate this risk, NSW Treasury has mandated that agencies perform non-financial asset valuations and prepare proforma financial statements in their early close procedures. It also encourages them to continue with the good practices embedded in recent years. These include:

  • resolving all past audit issues
  • performing key account reconciliations
  • agreeing and confirming inter and intra (cluster) agency balances and transactions
  • identifying material, complex and one-off transactions
  • preparing quality workpapers to support balances with variance analysis and meaningful explanations for movements
  • adequate review by management and Audit and Risk Committees.

Financial controls

More needs to be done to implement audit recommendations

More needs to be done to implement audit recommendations on a timely basis. Internal control issues were identified in previous audits, but had not been adequately addressed. Delays in implementing audit recommendations can impact the quality of financial information and the effectiveness of decision making. Agencies need to ensure they have action plans, timeframes and assigned responsibilities to address recommendations in a timely manner.

Agencies continue to face challenges managing information security

Our financial audits identified opportunities to improve IT control environments, with most information technology issues relating to information security. We also found service level arrangements with IT service providers did not always adequately address information security risks.

Agencies should ensure information security controls and contractual arrangements with IT service providers adequately protect their data.

Internal controls at GovConnect were ineffective in 2015–16

GovConnect provides information technology and transactional services to agencies within the NSW Public Sector. Service levels fell during the transition of shared services from ServiceFirst to GovConnect and NSW public sector agencies using these services were unable to rely on controls over financial transactions and information. We found mitigating actions taken to manage transition risks from ServiceFirst to GovConnect did not ensure effective control over client transactions and data. This increased the risk of fraud and error, and inappropriate access to information.

Governance

Cluster governance arrangements are unclear

Currently, cluster governance arrangements are unclear and inconsistently implemented across the NSW public sector. Implementing cluster governance frameworks is complex because clusters bring together entities with different enabling legislation, organisational and legal structures, information systems and processes, risk profiles and governance frameworks.  

Clear cluster governance arrangements would improve cooperation and coordination amongst cluster agencies, help deliver government priorities that cut across agencies and improve service delivery outcomes.  

We recommended the Department of Premier and Cabinet release a revised NSW Public Sector Governance Framework that clearly articulates cluster governance arrangements, the role of the cluster Secretary, Chief Finance Officer, Chief Information Officer and Chief Risk Officer. The Department of Premier and Cabinet has indicated the framework will be updated to provide guidance on cluster governance, and how accountability and performance information are monitored and reported.  

The sale and lease of Crown land is not being managed effectively

Our 2016 performance audit found limited oversight of sales and leases of Crown land by the Department of Industry - Lands. The Department has only just started monitoring whether tenants are complying with lease conditions, and does not have a clear view of what is happening on most leased Crown land.  

Most guidance to staff had not been updated for a decade, contributing to staff sometimes incorrectly implementing policies on rental rebates, unpaid rent, rent redeterminations and the direct negotiation of sales and leases on Crown land. Between 2012 and 2015, 97 per cent of leases and 50 per cent of sales were negotiated directly between the Department and individuals, without a public expression of interest process.  

Project cost and time overruns continue to occur

Our audits continue to highlight project management, cost and time issues. The Government’s 2016–17 Infrastructure Statement forecasts a $73.3 billion investment program to 2019–20. Good governance of individual projects is critical to ensure the investment program delivers the intended outcomes to the desired quality, on time and on budget.   

A strong risk culture is fundamental to successful risk management

Our assessment of a sample of 33 agencies found that while agencies have risk management governance structures in place, they need to focus on developing stronger risk cultures and fit-for-purpose systems to capture risks and incidents.

Agencies are not fully complying with the GIPA Act

Our review of 13 agencies from across each cluster found varying degrees of non-compliance with recording and disclosure aspects of the GIPA Act by each agency. Our 2016 Special Report 'Compliance with the GIPA Act' details our findings and makes recommendations to help agencies comply with the requirements of the Act.

Service delivery

Some Premier's and State Priorities at risk of not being achieved

Agency data, which we have not audited, indicates some Premier's and State Priorities are at risk of not being achieved. We found that although performance reporting against the Premier’s Priorities is publicly reported, comprehensive performance reporting against the 18 State Priorities is not.  

We will continue to report on performance against the targets to assess whether agency initiatives are delivering intended outcomes.

Government does not always get enough information for evidence-based decisions 

The NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative has been largely ineffective. A performance audit looked at the Justice, Industry, Skills and Regional Development, Planning and Environment, Premier and Cabinet and Treasury clusters and made recommendations for improvements to program evaluation.

Performance is not always measured, evaluated or publicly reported

Inadequate performance measures and reporting that is primarily internal reduces the transparency of agency performance and makes it hard for the public to assess if the agencies are doing a good job. Our audits found instances where performance outcomes were not being measured, evaluated or publicly reported.  

Agencies need to consider whether their performance measurement frameworks adequately measure performance and outcomes so they can make evidence-based decisions and be publicly accountable.

Commissioning and contestability continues to increase

New ways of delivering services across NSW Government are being developed and implemented, including commissioning and contestability arrangements. Commissioning services and introducing new systems can be challenging and it is important for this to be managed well. The learnings from decommissioning ServiceFirst and commissioning GovConnect should be applied to future commissioning arrangements.

NSW Treasury has developed a 'Government Commissioning and Contestability Policy', which is supported by the 'NSW Government Commissioning and Contestability Practice Guide'.

In 2017, we will build on our 2016 financial audits and continue to report our observations and findings as they relate to financial performance and reporting, financial controls, governance and service delivery. We also plan to review agencies' compliance with government travel policies at key agencies in each cluster.

In 2017, we will restructure our financial audit volumes to report our observations and findings on agencies’ financial controls and governance in one cross-sector report to Parliament in September. This will provide the Parliament with more timely reporting on these aspects of our audits. Our observations and findings on agencies’ financial performance and reporting, and service delivery will continue to be reported on a cluster by cluster basis through November and early December.

Our 2017 performance audits will have regard to what we see as key risks and opportunities for the NSW Government, and the Premier's and State Priorities. The program will aim to cover each NSW Government cluster, and focus on how efficiently, effectively and economically they deliver services and other outcomes.

Legislative reforms in the Local Government Amendment (Governance and Planning) Act 2016 have extended the Auditor-General's mandate to the Local Government sector. The expanded mandate includes auditing all NSW local council financial statements and conducting performance audits across the local government sector. The reforms generally bring NSW in line with most other Australian States.

We will report financial audit outcomes and our observations after the 30 June 2017 council audits are completed. Most are expected to complete by the end of October 2017. Our 2017 performance audits will examine and report on whether councils are operating efficiently, effectively, economically and in accordance with the law. In 2017–18, our performance audits will consider how councils are reporting on service delivery, managing shared services and the risk of fraud.

2017 – Issues, risks and opportunities impacting the NSW Government

Our 2017 audits will consider some of the following issues, risks and opportunities impacting the NSW Government.

In mid-2017, we will publish our rolling three-year performance audit program. This will include the performance audits we expect to perform in 2017–18 and the next two financial years. The program can be located at http://www.audit.nsw.gov.au/audit-program

Area of focus  Considerations Audit Office response
Ensuring services meet citizen needs The primary role of state and local government is to provide services to citizens. Today's society is less satisfied with one-size-fits-all services and its citizens want to have a say on the services they need and how they are delivered. This challenges governments to improve engagement with citizens, design services with them and support them in selecting the services that best meet their needs. At the same time, governments have to provide the services within constrained financial environments, and cater for ageing populations and strong population growth, particularly in metropolitan areas.

We will:

  • focus our work on services that are important to citizens
  • keep abreast of best practice and strategies used elsewhere to create more citizen centric services
  • develop our understanding of the key trends putting pressure on government service delivery
  • seek opportunities to engage with citizens in undertaking our work.
Leveraging digital opportunities We live in a digital world, and government is no exception. Digital technologies and the mass of data now available to governments presents opportunities to deliver better services more efficiently and economically. Services can be delivered through digital channels, and data analytics can inform demand, the supply of services and identify potential efficiencies. These opportunities come with risks, including cyber-attacks and privacy breaches.

We will:

  • examine how well state agencies and councils are taking advantage of digital opportunities and managing risks
  • use data analytics to enhance the quality of our audit work
  • use technology to improve how we communicate our key messages.
Having good checks and balances Citizens put faith in government agencies to make decisions in their best interests. It is imperative for government agencies to be clear about what they are trying to achieve and inform citizens on how they are meeting these objectives. While ethics, transparency, and effective governance and stewardship are critical, it is important for the checks and balances not to be so directive or cumbersome they hamper innovation, efficiency and agility.

We will consider the usual issues in our financial audits of agencies and councils. New areas and areas of focus will include:

  • asset management processes,including quality and timeliness of asset valuations and the management of surplus land and property assets
  • oversight and administration of significant grant programs
  • standby assets, the cost to maintain them and their readiness for use
  • benefits realisation for major projects and programs
  • the financial and administrative impact of machinery of government changes
  • engaging with state agencies and councils through workshops and seminars to promote good practices
  • examining governance and internal controls
  • publishing better practice guidance and promoting our Governance Lighthouse.
Getting value from commissioning

Governments, including the NSW Government, are increasingly outsourcing to or partnering with private and non-government organisations to deliver government services. Because outsourced service providers are not directly accountable to the NSW Parliament for their use of public resources, independent assurance that they are using tax payers’ funds efficiently and effectively would improve accountability. In other jurisdictions Auditors-General have been given powers to ‘go beyond’ the boundaries of agencies commissioning services and into the entities providing the services (‘follow the dollar’ powers). This is not the case in New South Wales.

Commissioning brings with it new challenges needing different skills, such as developing and nurturing markets, and transitioning services into and out of government. The NSW Government's recently released Commissioning and Contestability Policy supports agencies entering into commissioning arrangements.

We will:

  • audit agency and council commissioning arrangements and assess whether they are delivering the intended outcomes
  • assess the capability of agencies entering into commissioning arrangements to manage them effectively.
  • report the impact of not being able to provide assurance on the use of taxpayers’ dollars by non-government organisations
  • identify and communicate lessons identified in our audits
  • apply commissioning to our own activities.
Breaking down the silos Government agencies working in silos can diminish service quality through inefficient duplication and overlap. Silos also increase the risk of people falling through the cracks. To achieve best value, silos can be broken down through a clear focus on outcomes and better collaboration, coordination, partnerships, shared services and joined-up government. This has been recognised for many years, but now with both the commitment and tools, inroads can be made to improve citizens' experiences. Governance arrangements, incentives and culture are critical to success.

We will:

  • focus our efforts on areas where there are opportunities to break down silos
  • identify barriers and enablers to joined-up-government, partnerships and collaboration
  • promote good practice and publicise the benefits, both potential and realised
  • work collaboratively and constructively with those we audit
  • partner with and learn from private sector organisations we engage to provide audit services on our behalf.
Looking after future generations and the vulnerable Governments need to plan for the long-term and consider future generations. They have an important stewardship role. Their decisions need to ensure inter-generational equity and prevent environmental degradation.
A core role of government is to look after the vulnerable. Governments intervene in various ways to provide a social safety net. When they do so, it is critical that these interventions are equitable and deliver desired outcomes at a reasonable cost. Increasingly, it is about giving vulnerable people a bigger say in the services they receive.

We will:

  • review the efficacy of projections upon which services are planned
  • adopt a future focus in our work to identify emerging risks and encourage action before they materialise
  • examine the effectiveness and efficiency of interventions designed to address disadvantage and improve equity
  • identify emerging trends and good practice in designing and delivering services to the vulnerable.
A capable and diverse public sector The public sector's lifeblood is its workforce. The effectiveness and efficiency of organisations comes directly from the good ideas, effort, commitment and ethics of the people they employ. Workforce management and succession planning, constructive and respected leaders, and diverse backgrounds and thoughts can enhance agency and council performance and customers' experiences. These attributes require good frameworks to develop key capabilities, manage staff performance and clarify responsibilities and accountabilities.

We will:

  • monitor progress in delivering the NSW Government’s priority to have a diverse workforce
  • examine strategies and programs designed to enhance key capabilities in councils and agencies
  • identify areas where capability and diversity are lagging or are at risk,and offer practical improvement opportunities
  • promote diversity in our own organisation through our diversity and inclusion plan, which includes strategies to increase female representation at all levels and participation in an Aboriginal internship program.
Investing in infrastructure to meet the needs of a growing population

The Government’s 2016–17 Infrastructure Statement forecasts a $73.3 billion investment program to 2019–20. Infrastructure investments of this magnitude carry significant risks. In light of weaknesses we identified in the past with the management of significant infrastructure projects, the Government needs to ensure it has the capability to manage project risks effectively.

Governments also need to make sure infrastructure built today will meet future needs without creating an ongoing burden for future generations.

We will:

  • review infrastructure planning and approval processes
  • examine alternative financing and partnership models, including philanthropic and private sector involvement through vehicles such as social benefit bonds
  • assess risk frameworks and project governance arrangements
  • monitor maintenance spending and asset management practices
  • identify and promote good practice and innovation.
Improving performance through transparency and accountability

NSW Treasury is implementing its Financial Management Transformation (FMT) program to replace ‘service group’ budgeting and reporting with program based budgeting and reporting. A project of this scale and complexity has many risks, which need to be carefully managed if the desired benefits are to be realised.

The NSW Government's move to program budgeting and performance measurement will require appropriate key performance measures and indicators to track whether the programs are delivering the intended outcomes.

Independent assurance over the appropriateness and accuracy of agency key performance measures and indicators would improve confidence in the reliability of the NSW Government performance data.

We will:

  • review and assess the implementation and report on the impact of NSW Treasury's Financial Management Transformation program
  • encourage transparency in reporting,and be transparent in our own practices, performance and reporting.
Preparing for changes to Australian Accounting Standards

For the first time, not-for-profit entities in the NSW public sector need to make disclosures about related parties in their 2017 financial statements. Identifying who the related parties are, and collecting and collating relevant information will be challenging.

Other imminent changes to accounting standards have significant financial reporting implications for Government entities. Entities will need to plan and implement changes to systems and processes well in advance of the new requirements becoming effective.

We will:

  • review and assess policies, systems and processes entities use to identify related parties and transactions, and the completeness and accuracy of the disclosures in the financial statements of agencies and councils
  • work with NSW Treasury, the Office of Local Government, agencies and councils to determine the implications of the accounting standard changes and assess entities’ preparedness to implement them
  • work with the Office of Local Government to streamline the Code of Accounting Practice.
Working together with local councils Legislative reforms have resulted in significant changes to the Local Government sector. These include merging certain councils and extending the Auditor-General's mandate to audit all NSW local council financial statements and conduct performance audits across the Local Government sector.

We will:

  • use our mandate to encourage consistency and promote learnings that enhance financial management,fiscal responsibility and public accountability across the local government sector
  • use findings from our financial audits to inform our performance audit program
  • work alongside councils and their audit committees as they implement changes to governance structures and business planning processes
  • build our internal capacity, capability and knowledge of the Local Government sector to deliver a valuable and cost-effective service.

Financial performance and reporting are important elements of good governance. Confidence in public sector decision making and transparency is enhanced when financial and performance reporting are accurate and timely.  

The preparation of accurate and timely financial statements by agencies is an important tool to ensure accountability and transparency in the use of public resources. As the NSW Government moves to program budgeting with a greater focus on performance and outcomes it will need to ensure the key performance indicators and data used to measure the outcomes are relevant, accurate and reliable. The NSW Government’s Financial Management Transformation (FMT) program aims to address this.

In 2015–16, our audit teams made the following key observations on the financial reporting of NSW public sector agencies.

 

Financial reporting
Observation Conclusion
Only one qualified audit opinion was issued on the 2015–16 financial statements of NSW public sector agencies, compared to two in 2014–15. The quality of financial reporting continued to improve across the NSW public sector.
More 2015–16 financial statements and audit opinions were signed within three months of the year end. Timely financial reporting was facilitated by more agencies resolving significant accounting issues early, completing asset valuations on time and compiling sufficient evidence to support financial statement balances.

NSW Treasury’s early close procedures in 2015–16 were again successful in improving the quality and timeliness of financial reporting, largely facilitated by the early resolution of accounting issues.

For 2016–17, NSW Treasury has narrowed the scope of mandatory early close procedures.

The narrowed scope of mandatory early close procedures may diminish the good performance in ensuring the quality and timeliness of financial reporting achieved in recent years.

To mitigate this risk, NSW Treasury has mandated that agencies perform non-financial asset valuations and prepare proforma financial statements in their early close procedures. It also encourages them to continue with the good practices embedded in recent years.

Although most agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s early close asset revaluation procedures we identified areas where they can improve. Asset revaluations need to commence early enough to ensure all assets are identified and the results are analysed, recorded and reflected accurately in the early close financial statements.

Financial reporting

The quality and timeliness of financial reporting continues to improve across the NSW public sector.

Quality of financial reporting

Only one qualified audit opinion was issued on 2015–16 financial statements

Only one qualified opinion was issued on the 2015–16 financial statements of NSW public sector agencies, down from two in 2014–15. The audit opinion for the Office of the NSW State Emergency Service was qualified because effective controls over fundraising activities did not operate for the entire year. For further details, refer to page 16 in our Report on Law and Order, Emergency Services and the Arts.

Unqualified audit opinion issued for TAFE NSW after remediation

TAFE NSW’s audit opinion on its financial statements was qualified in 2014–15 due to system limitations, which prevented it from providing sufficient evidence to support its student revenue, student receivables, accrued income and unearned revenue balances. TAFE NSW dedicated considerable resources to address this issue in the short term.

Management resolved over 250,000 data exceptions and found revenue had been understated by $138 million in 2014–15. This was recorded as a prior-period error in the 2015–16 financial statements. For further details, refer to pages 17–18 in our Report on Industry, Skills, Electricity and Water.

The quality of financial reporting continues to improve

Since NSW Treasury introduced its mandatory ‘early close procedures’ initiative in 2011–12, the number of reported misstatements and significant matters in agency financial statements submitted for audit have fallen considerably across the NSW public sector. This is largely attributed to the early resolution of accounting issues, which helps agencies meet earlier reporting deadlines and improve the quality and accuracy of financial reporting. Whilst the quality and timeliness of financial reporting has continued to improve, the NSW Government will need to continue focusing on strong financial management across the NSW public sector to maximise performance and effectively manage assets and liabilities.

The table below shows the fall in misstatements over five years across NSW public sector agencies since mandatory early close procedures were introduced in 2011–12.

Number of misstatements
Year ended 30 June 2015-16 2014-15 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12
Total reported misstatements 298 396 459 661 1,077

All material misstatements identified by agencies and audit teams were corrected before the financial statements and audit opinions were signed. A material misstatement relates to an incorrect amount, classification, presentation or disclosure in the financial statements that could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users.  

Significant matters reported to the portfolio Minister, Treasurer and Agency Head

In 2015–16, we reported the following significant matters to the portfolio Minister, Treasurer and agency head in our Statutory Audit Reports:

  • Transport for NSW needs to assess whether a $179 million fall in the carrying value of the bus fleet leased from the State Transit Authority has similar implications for the value of the bus fleet leased from private operators
  •  issues were identified with how the Northern NSW Local Health District implemented its new rostering system, including rosters being 'force approved' by the system administrator, users having inappropriate access, no review of payroll exceptions and inadequate project governance over the system’s rollout
  • the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Practice Council of New South Wales’ financial statements were not prepared on a ‘going concern’ basis because it had insufficient funding to continue operating
  • the Department of Industry, Skills and Regional Development needs to improve the recording and accounting for Crown Land (repeat issue)
  • the financial reporting requirements for Local Land Services local boards, established under the Local Land Service Act 2013, need to be clarified (repeat issue)
  • significant limitations exist in TAFE NSW’s student administration system (repeat issue)
  • Hunter Water Corporation contracted to sell Kooragang Island Advanced Water Treatment Plant, which is conditional on the purchaser obtaining a water licence for use of the plant, for $35.5 million. This resulted in a $20.5 million decrease in the revaluation reserve
  • Hunter Water Corporation received $28.1 million from the sale of land impacted by the NSW Government’s decision not to construct Tillegra Dam. This was $62.4 million less than the carrying value of the land
  • Sydney Water Corporation needs to ensure it has robust governance over the development and implementation of a new customer billing system and an integrated enterprise resource planning system, budgeted to cost $184 million and $54.5 million respectively.

Timeliness of financial reporting

More financial statements and audit opinions signed within three months of year end

Most agencies submitted and signed their financial statements on time, which enabled more audits to be completed within three months of year end.

In 2015–16, 204 of 286 agencies’ financial statements and audit opinions were signed within three months of the year end. This compares to only 67 in 2010–11, the year before NSW Treasury introduced mandatory early close procedures.

Early close procedures improved the timeliness of financial reporting

Agencies were broadly successful in performing early close procedures in 2015–16. However, we did identify opportunities for improvement across the NSW public sector.  

The timeliness of financial reporting can be improved further if agencies:

  • resolve all significant accounting issues during the early close process, or document a clear path towards timely resolution
  • establish internal timetables and work with their service providers to ensure supporting work papers are prepared on time
  • assess and document the impact of new and revised accounting standards effective in the current or future years
  • prepare reconciliations, which are properly supported and reviewed
  • analyse and clear suspense accounts on a timely basis
  • complete asset valuations on time (also refer below).

Agencies will not always be able to fully resolve significant and complex accounting issues as part of the early close process. If this is the case, it is important they document a clear path towards timely resolution and ensure relevant stakeholders, including NSW Treasury, are kept informed. The documentation should set out the issue, status, key aspects needing resolution, and who is responsible for the expected deliverables.

Changes in accounting standards can materially impact agencies’ financial statements. Agencies will need to ensure they review the impact of, and have appropriate systems and processes in place to address these changes. Because of the lead time required, agencies need to start preparing for imminent changes now. The more significant changes that will come into effect over the next two years include:

  • service concession arrangements - where private sector entities design, build, finance and/or operate infrastructure to provide public services, such as toll roads, utilities, prisons and hospitals
  • the classification, measurement, recognition and de-recognition of financial instruments
  • leasing arrangements - lessees will no longer classify leases as operating or finance leases; leases will be ‘capitalised’ with financial liabilities being recognised for future lease payments.

NSW Treasury has narrowed the scope of mandatory early close procedures

NSW Treasury Circular 16-13 'Agency guidelines for the 2016–17 Mandatory Early Close' has narrowed the scope of mandatory early close procedures to non-financial asset valuations and proforma financial statements. Early close procedures that are no longer mandatory, but considered to be good practice by NSW Treasury, include:

  • resolving all past audit issues
  • performing key account reconciliations
  • agreeing and confirming inter and intra (cluster) agency balances and transactions
  • identifying material, complex and one-off transactions
  • preparing quality workpapers to support balances with variance analysis and meaningful explanations for movements
  • adequate review by management and Audit and Risk Committees.

If agencies do not perform the good practice procedures, the early close process may not be as effective in ensuring the quality and timeliness of financial reporting. We will monitor and report on the impact of this change on the timeliness and quality of the 2016–17 financial statements.

NSW Treasury piloted a hard-close initiative

NSW Treasury conducted a ‘hard-close pilot’ with nine agencies in 2015–16 to assess the benefits, and whether they should be applied more widely across the NSW public sector. While NSW Treasury has evaluated the results of the pilot, it has not mandated agencies complete hard close procedures in 2016–17. NSW Treasury Circular 16–13 gives agencies the option to complete hard close procedures.  

Hard close procedures involve applying year-end procedures to the fullest extent practicable at a preliminary month end date to further improve the quality and timeliness of financial reporting.

Processes for asset valuations can be improved

Although most agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s early close asset revaluation procedures, we identified areas where they can be improved.  

Asset valuations can be complex. They can involve the valuation of a large, geographically dispersed asset base, require significant judgement to estimate fair value and require substantial resources to complete.

Asset revaluations are successful when:

  • revaluation projects commence early enough to obtain the results and to reflect this in the early close pro forma financial statements, fixed asset register and general ledger
  • all assets are identified, recorded and reconciled before being provided to the valuer and the valuation methodology is agreed and documented
  • quality work papers are prepared setting out management’s proposed accounting treatments, judgements and assumptions
  • management engages with the valuers and interrogates the valuation results with scepticism
  • valuation issues are resolved before preparing the year-end financial statements.

NSW Treasury Policy Paper TPP14-01 also provides guidance to agencies to help manage the revaluation process.

Performance reporting

In 2017 and 2018, NSW Treasury is implementing its Financial Management Transformation (FMT) program. The program will replace the current ‘service group’ budgeting and reporting structure with program based budgeting and reporting. The program expects to have the legislation, policy framework and financial reporting system rolled out for the 2017–18 financial year.  

The program will implement a modern IT system, PRIME, as NSW Treasury's key tool to support whole-of-government budgeting and reporting. PRIME is expected to give the NSW Government strategic, relevant and timely information to plan and deliver its policy priorities and the Budget. It is expected to capture and monitor financial and non-financial performance data, and provide business intelligence and analytics. The roll-out of PRIME commenced in November 2016 and the 2017–18 Budget will be delivered using PRIME.

A project of this scale and complexity has many risks, which need to be carefully managed if the desired benefits are to be realised. To manage the risks, NSW Treasury is running PRIME in parallel with the existing IT systems for an extended period that covers preparation of the 2017–18 budget.

Independent assurance over the appropriateness and accuracy of agency key performance measures and indicators would improve confidence in the reliability of the NSW Government performance data.

Monitoring and guiding program performance will mean:

  • developing and implementing high level frameworks, policies and guidance
  • establishing measures and setting targets for performance
  • ensuring the availability of and access to high quality data and other information
  • obtaining independent assurance over the quality of the data.

The FMT program aims to achieve:

  • better performance and outcomes management
  • improved management of the State’s balance sheet, revenues and expenditures
  • stronger interagency collaboration
  • clearer accountabilities
  • better reporting of performance and outcomes.

This should give the NSW Government greater visibility on whether programs are delivering value for money, with emphasis not just on whether they are meeting compliance requirements, but whether they are also meeting performance expectations. This will require agencies to have the expertise they need to analyse how programs are performing and meeting expected outcomes.

 Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and the implementation and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.  

In 2015–16, our audit teams made the following key observations on the financial controls of NSW public sector agencies.

Financial controls
Observation Conclusion
More needs to be done to implement audit recommendations on a timely basis. We found 212 internal control issues identified in previous audits had not been adequately addressed by 30 June 2016.

Delays in implementing audit recommendations can impact the quality of financial information and the effectiveness of decision making.

Agencies need to ensure they have action plans, timeframes and assigned responsibilities to address recommendations in a timely manner.

Agencies continue to face challenges managing information security. Most information technology issues we identified related to poor IT user administration in areas like password controls and inappropriate access. Agencies should review the design and effectiveness of information security controls to ensure data is adequately protected.

We found shared service provider agreements did not always adequately address information security requirements.

Where agencies use shared service providers they should consider whether the service level arrangements adequately address information security.

Thirteen of 108 agencies required to attest to having a minimum set of information security controls did not do so in their 2015 annual reports. The 'NSW Government Digital Information Security Policy' recognises the growing need for effective information security. With cyber security threats continuing to increase as digital services expand we plan to look at cyber security as part of our 2017–18 performance audit program.
We identified instances where service level agreements with shared service providers were outdated, signed too late or did not exist. Corporate and shared service arrangements are more effective when service level arrangements are negotiated and signed in time, clearly detail rights and responsibilities and include meaningful KPIs, fee arrangements and dispute resolution processes.
Internal controls at GovConnect, the private sector provider of transactional and information technology services to many NSW public sector agencies were ineffective in 2015–16. We found mitigating actions taken to manage transition risks from ServiceFirst to GovConnect were ineffective in ensuring effective control over client transactions and data. The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should ensure GovConnect addresses the control deficiencies. It should also examine the breakdowns in the transition of the shared service arrangements and apply the learnings to other services being transitioned to the private sector.
Maintenance backlogs exist in several NSW public sector agencies, including Roads and Maritime Services, Sydney Trains, NSW Health, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice. To address backlog maintenance it is important for agencies to have asset lifecycle planning strategies that ensure newly built and existing assets are funded and maintained to a desired service level.

Internal controls

Agency internal controls

We report deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues identified during our audits to management and those charged with governance of the agencies. We do this through management letters, which include our observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

We identified and reported 837 issues during our 30 June 2016 audits. Common internal control weaknesses identified during these audits included: 

  • non-compliance with processes and legislation
  • incomplete and inaccurate central registers, such as those for managing conflicts of interest, legislative compliance and contract management
  • weaknesses in information technology controls (see further details below)
  • financial performance and reporting issues, such as inadequate review of manual journals and poor quality and review of general ledger account reconciliations
  • deficiencies in purchasing and payables processes, such as poor review of vendor master file changes, limited use of purchase orders and inadequate payment approval processes.

Fewer internal control weaknesses were assessed as being high risk than in previous years. High risk internal control deficiencies should be addressed by the relevant agencies as a matter of urgency.

More needs to be done to implement audit recommendations

More needs to be done to implement audit recommendations on a timely basis. We found 212 internal control issues identified in previous audits had not been adequately addressed by 30 June 2016. The highest proportion of these issues were in the following clusters:

  • Family and Community Services cluster - 11 of 31 issues were repeat issues.
  • Planning and Environment cluster - 26 of 88 issues were repeat issues
  • Finance, Services and Innovation cluster - 31 of 111 issues were repeat issues
  • Justice cluster - 33 of 124 issues were repeat issues
  • Transport cluster - 18 of 68 issues were repeat issues
  • Health cluster - 33 of 126 issues were repeat issues.

Two of the 212 issues were classified as high risk and related to:

  • an agency’s lack of effective controls over fundraising activities
  • recognition of a loan and the agency’s capacity to repay the loan

Of the remainder, 126 were classified as moderate risk and 84 as low risk. Delays in implementing audit recommendations can impact the quality of financial information and the effectiveness of decision making. They expose agencies to reputational risks and financial loss.

Some issues can take longer to address due to resource constraints and/or the complexity of the issue. Agencies need to ensure they have action plans, timeframes and assigned responsibilities to address recommendations in a timely manner. Audit and Risk Committees play an important role in monitoring and advising agency heads on how agencies are implementing measures to address audit findings and recommendations.

Internal controls at shared service providers

Cluster corporate and shared service models are common across NSW Government

Corporate and shared service models are common across NSW Government, with most clusters having moved to or planning to move to some form of shared service arrangement. Shared service arrangements are designed to achieve efficiencies and reduce costs by centralising service delivery in areas such as human resources, governance and risk, procurement, finance and information technology. Corporate and shared service models can:

  • consolidate information systems and standardise processes through common policies and procedures. This should provide greater transparency to the cluster lead agency of agencies' and cluster-wide performance
  • deliver better information management and decision support services
  • increase efficiencies and reduce costs.

Agencies need to carefully manage the risks associated with these arrangements, such as:

  • failing to deliver integrated systems and processes across the cluster
  • limiting flexibility, which may hinder agencies from implementing fit for purpose frameworks, such as those for governance and risk
  • sub-optimal performance by service providers and/or ineffective controls at the service provider
  • poor governance, strategic leadership and direction over shared service arrangements.

The NSW Commission of Audit, in its May 2012 report on ‘Government Expenditure’, recommended improvements in the delivery of corporate and shared services across the NSW Government sector.

Service level arrangements are not always in place or are signed too late

We found instances where service level agreements with shared service providers were outdated, signed too late or did not exist. For example:

  • service agreements, which include performance requirements for safety and quality, service access and patient flow, finance and activity, population health and people between the Secretary of NSW Health and local health districts/specialty networks, need to be signed earlier to clarify roles, responsibilities, performance measures, budgets and service volumes and levels
  •  the NSW Department of Industry, Skills and Regional Development and the Department of Justice did not always have service agreements in place with agencies to which they provide financial and corporate services.

Corporate and shared service agreements are more effective when:

  • Service level agreements are negotiated and signed on time
  • the services provided and the rights and responsibilities of each party are clear
  • meaningful KPIs are agreed and there is a process to monitor performance against the KPIs
  • security over data and information is maintained and rights of access to information are established
  • fee arrangements are agreed
  • dispute resolution processes are in place

Agencies need to seek internal control certifications from service providers

NSW Treasury Policy TPP 14–05 'Certifying the Effectiveness of Internal Controls Over Financial Information' requires agencies to obtain certification on the effectiveness of internal controls from outsourced service providers. We found:

  • agencies using the services of GovConnect were unable to rely on controls over financial transactions and information (further details below), which negated the certification process over controls at the service provider. This required the impacted agencies to implement controls to mitigate the control deficiencies at the service provider
  • the Department of Justice did not always provide written certifications on the design and effectiveness of internal controls to client agencies
  • some private sector service providers do not provide independent certifications on the effectiveness of their controls to agencies.

The NSW Treasury Policy notes that, in some instances, client agencies may consider it appropriate to seek additional assurance in the form of an independent opinion on the design and operating effectiveness of controls in the service organisation. Agencies should consider the nature and extent of the services provided by their service provider when determining whether independent assurance is required.

Internal controls at GovConnect were ineffective in 2015–16

GovConnect provides information technology and transactional services to agencies within the NSW Public Sector. Service levels fell during the transition of shared services from ServiceFirst to GovConnect and NSW public sector agencies using these services were unable to rely on controls over financial transactions and information.  

We found mitigating actions taken to manage transition risks from ServiceFirst to GovConnect were ineffective in ensuring effective control over client transactions and data. This increased the risk of fraud and error, and inappropriate access to information.  

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should ensure GovConnect addresses the control deficiencies identified in GovConnect’s Independent Auditor’s Assurance reports. It should also examine the breakdowns in the transition of the shared service arrangements and apply the learnings to other services being transitioned to the private sector. Refer to pages 19-20 in our Report on Finance, Services and Innovation for further details.

Information technology

Digital Information Security

Agencies continue to face challenges managing information security

We audited the information systems of 72 agencies in 2016. The audits focused on the information technology (IT) processes and controls supporting the integrity, availability and security of financial data used to prepare the financial statements.

The audits identified opportunities to improve IT control environments, with a large proportion of our findings relating to information security. We recommended agencies review and strengthen information security controls. The key control weaknesses we found related to user administration, password parameters and privileged access.

Over the last three years the number of information systems issues we identified has improved, as shown below: 

  • 2015–16: 72 audits - 121 issues reported
  • 2014–15: 73 audits - 169 issues reported
  • 2013–14: 77 audits - 198 issues reported.

Of the 121 issues reported in 2015–16, two were classified as high risk, 80 as moderate risk and 39 as low risk. The two high risk issues related to:

  • poor password configuration management
  • inappropriate user access accounts and inadequate review of users’ access to the agency’s network, finance applications, database and servers.

Twenty-three per cent of the issues reported in 2014–15 were repeated in 2015–16. The percentage of repeat issues has fallen compared to 2013–14. 

Governance refers to the high-level frameworks, processes and behaviours established to ensure an entity meets its intended purpose, conforms with legislative and other requirements, and meets the expectations of probity, accountability and transparency.  

Governance models need to be adapted for the specific goals and outcomes required for different situations; one size does not fit all. High standards of public sector governance and accountability enable effective and efficient use of public resources. They also help to ensure agencies act impartially and lawfully, deliver program/project benefits within expected costs and timeframes and provide useful information about their activities and achievements.

In 2015–16, our audit teams made the following key observations on governance in NSW public sector agencies

Governance
Observation Conclusion
Cluster governance arrangements that support cluster accountability, performance monitoring, risk and compliance management are unclear.

Currently, cluster governance arrangements are unclear and inconsistently implemented across the NSW public sector. Implementing cluster governance frameworks is complex.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) has indicated the NSW Public Sector Governance Framework will be updated to give guidance on cluster governance and how accountability and performance are monitored and reported.

The ‘whole-of-government’ does not have a dedicated audit and risk committee. NSW Government agencies would benefit from a dedicated independent audit and risk committee for the ‘whole-of-government’ that focuses on common issues and risks across the NSW public sector, and recommends and oversights coordinated responses to sector wide issues.

We identified many deficiencies in the oversight and management of Crown Land, including the sale and lease of such land.

We recommended the Department of Industry-Lands improve its processes for the sale and lease of Crown Land.

Our assessment of a sample of 33 agencies found that agencies have risk management governance structures in place, but need to focus on developing stronger risk cultures and fit-for-purpose systems to capture risks and incidents. Agencies need to focus on developing strong risk cultures and fit-for-purpose systems to capture risks and incidents.
We found project cost and time overruns continue to occur. In 2016–17, we will assess risk management maturity and processes focusing on effective risk management in project governance.
Our 2015–16 fraud survey indicates fraud controls are improving, but highlighted areas where agencies can do more. Agencies can review their fraud control measures against our Fraud Control Improvement Kit.
Our review of 13 agencies’ compliance with reporting and disclosure aspects of the GIPA Act found varying degrees of non-compliance at each. Our 2016 Special Report 'Compliance with the GIPA Act' makes recommendations to help agencies comply with the requirements of the Act.

Governance and Accountability

With the NSW public sector changing and becoming more complex, good governance becomes more important so the public's confidence in government and its agencies is maintained. Governance across the NSW public sector is complex and needs to accommodate risks arising from:

  • the Government’s cluster arrangements having no legal basis
  • many agencies not having conventional board structures
  • agencies only being able to do what their enabling legislation allows
  • agencies having for profit or not-for-profit objectives, and/or only being established to achieve a particular purpose
  • capability limitations that may exist in governing bodies
  • stakeholders having high expectations around accountability, transparency and conflicts of interest in public sector agencies.

Adding to this complexity is the continually changing nature of the public sector and the way it delivers services. Often, governance arrangements are impacted by:

  • changes in service delivery models, such as commissioning and contestability arrangements
  • machinery of government changes, leading to agencies being formed, amalgamated or abolished
  • complex financing and other contractual arrangements, such as public private partnerships impacting the structure and risks agencies face.

Those charged with governance are accountable for the decisions they make and need relevant, accurate and up-to-date information on which to base their decisions. Consequently, they need to satisfy themselves the governance frameworks, and the design and effectiveness of internal systems and controls provides sufficient assurance the agency’s activities are in line with expectations and comply with standards and legal requirements.  

Our audits identified deficiencies in some agencies’ governance frameworks, including:

  • not having frameworks to manage and ensure compliance with legislation
  • outdated policies and procedures, including those for fraud and corruption
  • inconsistent risk management frameworks
  • not having effective internal audit functions
  • some smaller agencies not having an Audit and Risk Committee
  • poor frameworks for identifying and managing conflicts of interest and gifts and benefits.

Agencies can assess their governance frameworks against our Governance Lighthouse.

Effective cluster/agency and program/project governance is characterised by:

  • leaders who set the right tone from the top, that shapes the culture and demonstrates the desired values and ethics through the behaviours they model when working with management and external stakeholders
  • a clear strategic purpose and direction, based on a clear understanding of stakeholder expectations, realistic medium and long-term outcomes, short-term priorities and expenditure/investment choices and budgets
  • a shared and strong understanding of the strategy to inform decisions
    strong oversight of progress against the strategy, significant deviations from it, emerging risks and planned benefits from change programs
  • regular reviews of and updates to the strategy to adapt to changing circumstances
    a clear purpose at specific project/program levels
  • charters with structures that include clearly distinct governance and management roles, principles, and processes
  • clearly defined roles and responsibilities that make differing interests transparent and improve decision-making – these should be revisited periodically
  • visible leadership when agencies/projects/programs face difficult issues
    clearly allocated and delegated decision-making for governance and management
  • different people in the roles of chair, project sponsor, manager of the division responsible for delivering a project, the line manager of the project director
  • the right mix of people with different perspectives and skills, who robustly debate issues, but support agreed decisions
  • independent quality assurance 
  • effective risk management that identifies, analyses, mitigates, monitors and communicates risks
  • a defined risk management framework and register that is widely understood and aligned to the agency’s strategy, risk appetite, objectives, business plan and stakeholder expectations
  • a mature risk management culture and reporting structure that is built into the agency or project governance framework
  • clear roles for Audit and Risk Committees, with competent and independent members who have a clear purpose
  • governance arrangements and practices that continually evolve to manage risk and conflicts of interest.

Cluster governance

Cluster governance arrangements, including accountability, are unclear

Currently, cluster governance arrangements are unclear and inconsistently implemented across the NSW public sector. Implementing cluster governance frameworks is complex because clusters bring together entities with different enabling legislation, organisational and legal structures, information systems and processes, risk profiles and governance frameworks. They require Ministers, boards, department Secretaries, agency heads and management to work together to ensure effective cluster governance and accountability arrangements are in place.

Clear cluster governance arrangements would improve cooperation and coordination amongst cluster agencies, help deliver government priorities that cut across agencies and improve service delivery outcomes. We recommended DPC release a revised NSW Public Sector Governance Framework that clearly articulates cluster governance arrangements, the role of the cluster Secretary, Chief Finance Officer, Chief Information Officer and Chief Risk Officer.

DPC has indicated the framework will be updated shortly to provide guidance on governance at a cluster level, including how cluster-level accountability and performance information is monitored and reported. We understand DPC will work with NSW Treasury to revise the framework by mid-2017. It is important for these agencies to collaborate and ensure the outcomes of NSW Treasury's Financial Management Transformation (FMT) program are considered when updating the framework.

The FMT program aims to revise financial governance, budgeting and reporting arrangements in the NSW public sector, and clarify the administrative and accountability arrangements for cluster operations. Further information on FMT is included in the Financial Performance and Reporting and Service Delivery chapters.  

Management oversight and capability

Those charged with governance are ultimately responsible for establishing an appropriate governance framework and system of internal control. However, management is accountable to those charged with governance and their oversight plays an important role in ensuring appropriate policies, procedures and internal controls are designed and working properly.

Sale and lease of Crown land is not being managed effectively

Our 2016 performance audit found limited oversight of sales and leases of Crown land by the Department of Industry - Lands. The Department has only just started monitoring whether tenants were complying with lease conditions, and does not have a clear view of what is happening on most leased Crown land. Most guidance to staff had not been updated for a decade, contributing to staff sometimes incorrectly implementing policies on rental rebates, unpaid rent, rent redeterminations and the direct negotiation of sales and leases on Crown land.  

Decisions on the sale and lease of Crown land were not transparent to the public and the Department has not provided consistent opportunities for the public and interested parties to participate in decisions about Crown land. Between 2012 and 2015, 97 per cent of leases and 50 per cent of sales were negotiated directly between the Department and individuals, without a public expression of interest process.  

Adding to this, our financial audit findings have identified significant deficiencies for several years in recording and accounting for Crown land assets in the Crown Land Information Database and the Department’s general ledger.

A key objective of the Department of Industry - Lands is for Crown land to be occupied, used, sold, leased, licensed or otherwise dealt with in the best interests of the State. A major part of the State’s land holding is Crown land, which had an estimated value of $12 billion in  2015–16. Crown land comprises approximately 42 per cent of all land in New South Wales and supports a wide range of important environmental, economic, social and community activities.  

The Crown Land Management Act 2016 (the Act) received assent from Parliament on 14 November 2016. The Act consolidated eight pieces of legislation. Most of the Act is expected to commence in early 2018. It is expected to reduce complexity and duplication, deliver better social, environmental and economic outcomes and facilitate community involvement in Crown land.

Good progress is being made on implementing public sector management reforms

Our performance audit on ‘Public Sector Management Reforms' found the Public Service Commission was making good progress leading the implementation of public sector management reforms. The Commission developed a sound evidence base for the reforms and gained wide public sector support by engaging with agency heads and using public sector working groups to develop options.  

The Commission needs to do more to report on how the reforms are contributing to better public services and to issue its guidance material to agencies promptly. The audit noted that the capacity and capability of human resource units in some agencies remains an impediment to the successful implementation of the reforms.

In early 2012, the NSW Commission of Audit Interim report identified a range of issues with workforce management in New South Wales. The Public Service Commission (PSC), which was established in late 2011, was tasked to address some of these issues and build the capability of the public sector. The Government Sector Employment Act 2013 (GSE Act), which provides the legislative basis for reforms, commenced in February 2014.

The public sector management reforms are ambitious, covering a substantial workforce and requiring a lot to be done in a short time. To achieve the intended outcomes, the reforms needed to be supported by sound evidence, have clear objectives and performance indicators, and be evaluated at appropriate stages.

Risk Management

The increasing complexity of government business transactions reinforces the need for whole of government approaches to deal with inter-related and inter-dependent risks across government agencies. It is important that safeguards in place to manage these risks are commensurate to the risk posed.

Findings from some of our 2016 performance audits, which looked at how areas of high risk are managed across NSW Government, are detailed below:

Our performance audit on managing unsolicited proposals in New South Wales concluded that governance arrangements for unsolicited proposals were adequate, but greater transparency and public reporting is needed. Unsolicited proposals warrant greater scrutiny and disclosure as they pose a greater risk to value for money than open, competitive and transparent tender processes.

 

Our performance audit on government advertising concluded the peer review process provides sufficient assurance that government advertising programs are needed and are cost effective. Government advertising is an activity that is high risk because of the potential for it to be used for political purposes. In NSW, the Government Advertising Act 2011 requires government advertising campaigns estimated to cost over $50,000 to be independently peer reviewed before launch.  

Cluster-wide risk management

Cluster wide risk management is inconsistent

Agencies within clusters have their own risk profiles and risk management frameworks. We found varying approaches and levels of maturity on how agency risks are captured and escalated to a cluster level so cluster heads can assess how they are being managed, treated and reported. We recommended some clusters review how agency level risks are escalated and reported at a cluster level.

Enterprise-wide risk management

Agency enterprise-wide risk management across the public sector is improving

In 2016, we assessed risk management processes at 33 agencies across the NSW public sector against the criteria in our Risk Assessment Tool. In 2015, we asked 77 agencies to perform a self-assessment of their risk management maturity. The table below compares the overall results of our assessment against the agencies self-assessments. The comparison indicates that risk management is improving.

Our assessments found that agencies have risk management governance structures in place, but need to focus on developing stronger risk cultures and fit-for-purpose systems to capture risks and incidents.

The environment in which services are delivered to the people of NSW is constantly changing. Services need to remain relevant and support the public's changing needs and expectations. People expect high quality services to be delivered in cost effective ways. To do this, agencies need to determine how best to deliver the services. Governments can deliver their services through agencies or through commissioning the right mix of services from public, private and not for profit sector providers.  

Agencies also need to consider how they collaborate with each other to improve the quality of their services and help drive down costs. Changes in innovation and technology can help agencies adapt to changing circumstances and to deliver better services in different ways.

In 2015–16, our audit teams made the following key observations on service delivery by NSW public sector agencies.

Service delivery
Observation Conclusion
New ways of delivering services across NSW Government are being identified, with commissioning and contestability arrangements being introduced or considered.

It is important for accountability to be maintained when services are outsourced.

Commissioning services and introducing new systems can be challenging. It is important for this to be managed well through:

  • strong project governance and leadership to manage risks
  • entering into binding commitments with clear accountabilities
  • good preparation, including adequate training and support for staff
  • sound financial management to control costs.
We found government decision makers are not always receiving enough information to make evidence-based investment decisions. The NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative has been largely ineffective. A performance audit looked at the Justice, Industry, Skills and Regional Development, Planning and Environment, Premier and Cabinet and Treasury clusters and recommended improvements to program evaluation.
We found agencies' performance is not routinely measured, evaluated or publicly reported. Agencies can improve transparency over their performance with a stronger focus on measuring performance and outcomes so they can make evidence-based decisions and maintain public accountability.
According to unaudited agency data, some Premier's and State Priorities are at risk of not being achieved. Independent assurance over the reliability and accuracy of the data would increase confidence in the performance indicators used to measure achievement of the Government’s priorities.
A comprehensive report of performance against the State Priorities is not published. We understand the NSW Government is considering public reporting against the State Priorities and developing reporting options.

Commissioning and Contesting the Delivery of Services

The publics' rising expectations, and rapidly changing and increasingly complex needs mean agencies cannot be complacent even when they deliver good services. To meet changing expectations and needs, agencies need to build on their strengths and leverage opportunities a modern, technology driven and information rich environment provides.

Government outcomes can be achieved through the effective commissioning of the right mix of services from the public, private and not-for-profit sectors. Commissioning involves agencies assessing citizens’ needs, determining priorities, designing and sourcing appropriate services, and monitoring and evaluating performance. NSW Treasury's 'Government Commissioning and Contestability Policy', published in November 2016, aims to provide a clear and consistent policy direction, definition and set of principles to guide NSW Government agencies when commissioning and contesting services.

It is important for agencies to understand the Government's strategic direction and objectives when partnering with others or commissioning the delivery of services. They must be prepared and able to work together and with others in different ways to deliver the best quality public services possible. Agencies face challenges and opportunities when commissioning services. These include:
 
  • determining the size, variety and location of services needed to meet customer needs and expectations
  • doing things differently to ensure public services are delivered efficiently and effectively
  • developing and nurturing markets, and transitioning services into and out of government
  • partnering with other public and private sector entities, and non-government organisations (NGOs)
  • establishing and maintaining clear accountabilities for jointly delivered services
  • using new approaches that leverage improvements in technology
  • involving the people of NSW in designing, planning, and delivering services
  • using, sharing and communicating information about service delivery
  • building agencies' capacity and capability
  • measuring and benchmarking service performance.

Effective commissioning can be achieved through:

  • strong governance and leadership to manage relationships and risks effectively within risk appetite levels
  • good information systems and tools 
  • being well prepared with the right capability and number of employees who are well trained and supported
  • adopting approaches that best fit the circumstances
  • regularly monitoring and assessing if expected outcomes are being achieved 
  • having a common purpose with clear outcomes
  •  being flexible and prepared to make trade-offs
  •  binding commitments with clear accountabilities
  •  sound financial management to control costs
  •  adequate development and testing of new systems before going live.

Commissioning and contestability continues to increase

We continue to see new ways of delivering services across NSW Government agencies. Some examples of commissioning and contestability include:

  • commissioning of GovConnect to provide information technology and transactional services to several agencies within the NSW Public Sector (refer Financial Controls chapter for further detail)
  • contestability testing within NSW Health, including linen services, non-emergency patient transport, warehousing, hospital support services, pathology and radiology
  • commissioning NGOs to provide some services traditionally provided by the Department of Family and Community Services ($2.8 billion received by NGOs in 2015–16 for the delivery of these services).

Our performance audit on franchising of the Sydney Ferries network found the decision to do so was justified and Transport for NSW’s management of the franchise was largely effective. The franchising has resulted in cost savings, good service performance and effective risk transfer from Government to the private sector operator. Scheduled ferry services are now provided under a seven-year contract managed by Transport for NSW.

Our 2016–17 performance audit program includes a review of Roads and Maritime Services' (RMS) Sydney region road maintenance contracts to assess whether RMS has realised the expected benefits of outsourcing road maintenance for the Sydney Region West and South zones under its Stewardship Maintenance Contracts. We also recently tabled a performance audit report, which focused on the Department of Family and Community Services work to build the readiness of the non-government sector for the National Disability Insurance Scheme.

Accountability needs to be maintained when services are outsourced

Generally, contractual arrangements allow an agency that is outsourcing services to review and assess the performance of the service provider. However, outsourced service providers are not directly accountable to the NSW Parliament for their use of public resources.

Governments are increasingly outsourcing to or partnering with private and NGO providers to deliver government services. Consequently, many parliaments now have legislation that enables Auditors-General to ‘go beyond’ the boundaries of the agencies commissioning services and into the entities providing the services to examine how effectively and efficiently they are providing the services (‘follow the money’ powers). New South Wales legislation does not currently provide the Auditor–General with such powers.

Delivering Government Services

Evidence-based decision making

Government services are being delivered by agencies through a variety of programs

To do this effectively agencies need to be able to make evidence based decisions. In August 2013, the NSW Government commenced a program evaluation initiative, which required agencies to periodically evaluate their programs. Since then, NSW Treasury and DPC have worked with agencies to implement the initiative. Agencies are required to prioritise programs for evaluation based on size, strategic significance and degree of risk, recognising their available capability and resources to conduct evaluations.

Our performance audit on 'Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative' showed the initiative was largely ineffective and government decision makers were not receiving enough information to make evidence-based investment decisions. The audit looked at the Justice, Industry, Skills and Regional Development, Planning and Environment, Premier and Cabinet and Treasury clusters.

Our performance audit also recommended NSW Treasury develop an evaluation framework to support the program budgeting and reporting component of the Financial Management Transformation (FMT) program, and ensure the program evaluation initiative is integrated into the new framework.

The FMT program budgeting, reporting and evaluation initiative aims to provide evidence-based information to inform investment decisions on programs. Adopting program budgeting and reporting as a key component of the FMT program requires a proven and systematic evidence-based methodology for measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the programs.

Service delivery performance

Our performance audits found mixed service delivery performance

Performance audits build on our financial audits by reviewing whether taxpayers' money is spent efficiently, effectively, economically and in accordance with the law. Many of our performance audits focus on whether agencies are delivering good services to citizens at a reasonable cost. Findings from some of our 2016 audits, which focused on service delivery performance, are outlined below:

New South Wales has a lower rate of foodborne illness than the national average. This reflects some good practices in the NSW Food Authority’s approach to monitoring food safety standards. To ensure foodborne illnesses remain low, the Authority needs to better monitor its arrangements with local councils that inspect retail food businesses on its behalf, and receive additional and more timely information from them on compliance with food safety standards.

 

The Department of Education is doing a reasonable job of managing how well students with a disability transition to new schools and in supporting teachers to improve the students’ educational outcomes. We found enrolments in quality early childhood education were increasing, but were still below benchmark and funding could be better targeted to disadvantaged children in long day care.

 

Juvenile Justice NSW prepares and helps young people reintegrate into the community reasonably well after detention, given their complex needs, but access to post-release services is problematic.

 

Citizens will benefit if red tape is reduced. Overall, NSW Government initiatives and processes to prevent and reduce red tape have not been effective. In the absence of an accurate red tape savings figure and a stocktake of regulation, the NSW Government does not have a clear view of the impact its reported savings had on the overall net burden of red tape in New South Wales. Its ‘one-on, two-off’ initiative to reduce legislative regulatory burden achieved its numerical target, but the cost of the total legislative burden increased by $16.1 million over the same period.

Reporting on Service Delivery Performance

As agencies partner and collaborate more, measuring performance becomes more important. Sharing, using and making information available enables agencies to collectively understand and improve their service performance. This also gives agencies an opportunity to achieve efficiencies in collating and using research and performance data within privacy and legislative constraints. Where appropriate, agencies should consider obtaining independent assurance over the reliability and accuracy of the performance data they use.

Complaints are an important and free source of information that can provide valuable insights into poor service, systemic errors or problems with specific processes. How agencies manage and respond to complaints demonstrates their commitment to high standards of service delivery. Complaints also give agencies an opportunity to understand the expectations and experiences of people using their services. Government agencies need to ensure complaints are easy to make, consistently recorded and analysed, and openly reported and actioned.

Transparency over performance

Performance is not always measured, evaluated or publicly reported

A key objective of public sector reform is to improve performance and create a culture of accountability. Inadequate performance measures and primarily internal reporting, reduces transparency of agency performance and makes it hard for the public to assess if agencies are doing a good job. A sample of our audits found:
 
  • the effectiveness of Corrective Services NSWs performance framework was limited because performance information was not readily available to correctional centres to make more informed decisions on how best to manage their centres
  • red tape savings figures were not accurate and there was no central oversight of red tape reduction strategies
  • a lack of detailed costings meant we could not be sure regulation of early childhood education was efficient even though processes appeared to be good
  • while the Department of Family and Community Services has transparent performance reporting which is regularly published, the use and reporting of targets and benchmarks is limited
  • while icare collects performance information it does not use this information to assess the success of the return to work program. The return to work rate has increased from 85.5 per cent to 88.3 per cent since the workers’ compensation reforms were introduced in 2012, but there was no benchmark to assess if this result is meeting the desired objectives of the reforms
  •  the Environment Protection Authority has not developed measures and targets to assess achievement of outcomes associated with illegal dumping initiatives.

Agencies should consider whether their performance measurement frameworks:

  • measure the right things, focus on outcomes and integrate with decision making processes
  • set baselines and establish targets and timeframes for key performance indicators
  • require the use of reliable, up to date and accurate information
  • require information to be publicly reported to increase transparency.

The Government will not get the same level of reliance on performance information as it does for financial statements if that information is not independently assured. We will continue to focus on how well agencies assess and report the performance of their initiatives in achieving desired outcomes.

Premier's and State Priorities

The NSW Government released State Priorities 'NSW: Making it Happen' in September 2015. It includes 12 Premier's Priorities and 18 State Priorities with measures and targets to track the Government's performance in key priority areas.

The Premier's Priorities are detailed below.

  • Protecting our kids
  • Improving service levels in hospitals
  • Improving education results
  • Driving public sector diversity
  • Keeping our environment clear
  • Faster housing approvals
  • Reducing domestic violence
  • Tackling childhood obesity
  • Reducing youth homelessness
  • Improving government services
  • Creating jobs
  • Building infrastructure

Performance against the Premier's and State Priorities is not audited

The Premier's and State Priorities have not been independently audited to provide assurance the performance information is accurate. The Commonwealth, Victorian and Western Australian Auditors-General have varying powers that provide for auditing the appropriateness of agency key performance indicators and determine whether they fairly represent actual performance. NSW legislation does not currently provide the Auditor-General with such powers.

Premier's Priorities

Some Premier's Priorities are at risk of not being achieved

Our 2015–16 reports commented on the Government's performance against some of the Premier’s and State Priorities. Published data, which we have not audited, indicates the following Premier's Priorities may be at risk of not being achieved:

  • the proportion of domestic violence perpetrators re-offending within 12 months was 15.9 per cent, which is 6.7 percentage points higher than the target of 9.2 per cent (refer page 52–53 in Report on Law and Order, Emergency Services and the Arts for further details)
  • the percentage of children and young people re-reported at risk of significant harm was 40 per cent, which is 5.6 percentage points higher than the target of 34.4 per cent (refer page 31–32 in Report on Family and Community Services)
  • in 2015–16, 32.5 per cent of students achieved results in in the top two NAPLAN bands for reading and numeracy, marginally below the baseline of 32.7 per cent and below the 2019 target of 35.2 per cent (refer page 40–41 in Report on Education for further details)
  • the rate of patients leaving emergency departments within four hours was 74.2 per cent, 6.8 percentage points below the target of 81 per cent (refer page 53 in Report on Health for further details).

Published data, which we have not audited, indicates the following Premiers Priorities have been achieved or are on track to be achieved:

Progress against all 12 priorities can be found at https://www.nsw.gov.au/improving-nsw/premiers-priorities.

State Priorities

Some State Priorities at risk of not being achieved

Data, which we have not audited, indicates the following State Priorities may be at risk of not being achieved:

  • journey time reliability was 86 per cent in 2015–16, four percentage points below the 90 per cent target for peak travel on key routes being on time (refer page 48 in Report on Transport for further details)
  • in 2015–16, 9.1 per cent of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students achieved results in the top two NAPLAN bands for reading and numeracy, which shows no improvement on the baseline of 9.1 per cent and is below the 2019 target of 11.6 per cent (refer page 42–43 in Report on Education for further details)
  • reducing the rate of adult re-offending by five per cent by 2019 – the rate increased 2.3 percentage points over the five years since 2010 to 36.7 per cent for the year ended 31 December 2014 (refer page 53–54 in Report on Law and Order, Emergency Services and the Arts for further details).

Data, which we have not audited, indicates the following State Priorities have been achieved or are on track to be achieved:

  • the State maintained its AAA credit rating (refer page 25 in Report on State Finances for further details)
  • general government expenditure growth was 4.4 per cent in 2015–16 and continued to be below long term revenue growth of 5.6 per cent (refer page 25 in Report on State Finances for further details)
  • 70,077 new dwelling approvals were granted in 2015–16, higher than the target of 50,000 approvals (refer page 35 in Report on Planning and Environment for further details)
  • the time taken to assess planning applications for complex state significant developments fell 46 per cent in 2015–16 from the 2013–14 baseline. A further four percentage point reduction is required to meet the target of halving the time to perform these assessments (refer page 35 in Report on Planning and Environment for further details)

A comprehensive report of performance against the State Priorities is not published

The Department of Premier and Cabinet has defined targets and measures in ‘NSW: Making it Happen’ so Ministers and individual agencies know which targets they are accountable for and how they will be measured. While some measures are publicly reported through agency annual reports or other sources, a comprehensive report of performance against the 18 State priorities is not published. We understand the NSW Government is considering this matter and developing reporting options.

Agencies are responsible for the priorities and they report progress at least bi-annually to the Department of Premier and Cabinet for reporting to the Premier. We will continue to report performance against the targets set in the Premier's and State Priorities.

Contract Management

Our audits identified deficiencies in contract management processes

Our audits continue to identify deficiencies in contract management processes, including:

  • agencies not having central contract registers detailing key contractual obligations and commitments
  • incomplete and inaccurate contract registers and/or no policy or procedures to update and maintain contract registers
  • no monitoring of contract performance.

We recommended agencies in the Family and Community Services and Planning and Environment clusters improve contract management processes. A robust contract management framework helps ensure all parties meet their obligations, contractual relationships are well managed, value for money is achieved and deliverables meet the required standards and agreed timeframes.

A 2014 performance audit ‘'Making the most of government purchasing power – telecommunications' developed a Better Practice Contract Management Framework (Framework) with nine key elements. Agencies can refer to this framework when assessing the adequacy of their contract management framework.

Benefits realisation

Benefits realisation approach for the Service NSW initiative is not as effective as it could be

Effective benefits realisation is critical to achieving intended outcomes expected from investments.  

Our performance audit on 'Realising the benefits of the Service NSW initiative' found the benefits realisation approach for the Service NSW initiative is not as effective as it could be. While customers think Service NSW provides a convenient and practical way to access all government transaction services:  

  • it was unclear who should monitor and report on the achievement of whole-of-government benefits and savings anticipated from the initiative
  • there was insufficient data to fully value or identify individual agency and whole-of-government savings and benefits.

This makes it difficult for the NSW Government to demonstrate the expected economic benefits of Service NSW will outweigh costs by the estimated five to one, and that savings will accrue after 2016–17.

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation has developed a benefits realisation management framework, which can be found at www.finance.nsw.gov.au/publication-and-resources/benefits-realisation-management-framework. The Department of Education has established a benefits realisation plan for the Learning Management and Business Reform Program (LMBR) following our performance audit on the LMBR program. The Department of Planning and Environment is planning a benefits realisation review on the implementation of stage one of the ePlanning system.  

We will continue to review whether agencies have implemented effective benefit realisation frameworks for major projects and programs and examine the outcomes of benefit realisation reviews.

Published

Actions for Assessing major development applications

Assessing major development applications

Planning
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Shared services and collaboration

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) has improved its decision-making processes for major development applications in recent years. The Commission has improved how it consults the public and manages conflicts of interest, and now also publishes records of its meetings with applicants and stakeholders.

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is an independent body established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). It makes decisions on major development applications in New South Wales. Along with the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Land and Environment Court, it is one of three bodies that have a role in making decisions on these applications.

The Department refers development applications to the Commission where 25 or more objections have been received from the community, a local council objects to the proposal, or the applicant has donated to a political party.

These applications are often complex and controversial, and can attract a high level of public interest. This may mean that, regardless of the process, not all stakeholders are satisfied with the outcome.

The Commission is required to take into account section 79C of the EP&A Act when making decisions. Section 79C includes consideration of the likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development.

This audit assessed the extent to which the Commission’s decisions on major development applications are made in a consistent and transparent manner. To assist us in making this assessment, we asked whether the Commission:

  • has sound processes in place to help it make decisions on major development applications that are informed and made in a consistent manner
  • ensures its decisions are free from bias and transparent to stakeholders and the public.

Conclusion

Over the last two years, the Commission has improved its decision-making process. It has improved how it consults the public and manages conflicts of interest, and now also publishes records of its meetings with applicants and stakeholders.

However, there are still some vital issues to be addressed to ensure it makes decisions in a consistent and transparent manner. Most importantly, the Commission was not able to show in every decision we reviewed how it met its statutory obligation to consider the matters in section 79C of the EP&A Act.

Despite improved probity measures put in place by the Commission, there is a perception among some stakeholders that it is not independent of the Department. The reasons for some of these concerns are outside of the Commission’s control. For example, the Commission becomes involved after the Department has prepared an assessment report which recommends whether a development should proceed. This creates the perception that the Commission is acting on the recommendation of the Department. The Department’s assessment report should state whether an application meets relevant legislative and policy requirements, but not recommend whether a development should be approved or not.

More can also be done to improve transparency in decision-making and the public’s perception of the independence of Commissioners. The Commission should continue to improve how it communicates the reasons for its decisions and also publish on its website a summary of Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations for each development application.

Decision-making processes have improved but some key aspects need to be addressed

Although not articulated in one document, there is a framework in place to assist Commissioners make decisions on major development applications. This includes setting out the information to be considered, who to consult, and that a report is to be prepared. The Commission has recently improved how it conducts public meetings and the level of support provided to Commissioners to ensure they understand the decision-making process. The Commissioners we interviewed all showed a good understanding of their role.

As a consent authority, the Commission is required to consider the matters in section 79C of the EP&A Act when making a decision. However, it was not able to show how it met this requirement in every decision we reviewed. We found some evidence of these considerations in six of the nine cases we reviewed, for example in meeting notes or in its report on a decision. Of these six cases, the degree to which the Commission considered all matters under section 79C varied considerably. The larger, more complex applications were more likely to address these considerations. To demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act, the Commission must be able to show how it considers all matters in section 79C for each decision it makes.

We found that the Commission has access to relevant information to make a decision and consults stakeholders for their views of the development. The level of consultation depends on the size and complexity of an application. If Commissioners decide they need more information to make a decision, they consult local councils, the community, other government agencies and experts as needed.

The Commission’s public meetings are a valuable part of the decision-making process, where new perspectives or issues are often raised. However, some aspects could be improved. For example, many stakeholders thought the five minutes allowed for individual speakers was insufficient. The Commission could be more flexible with this timeframe. Identifying new ways to notify the public of its meetings, other than advertisements on its website and in newspapers, would also ensure it reaches as many interested parties as possible.

Improved transparency and probity but the Commission is not seen by some as impartial

The Commission has sound processes in place to ensure that its decisions are impartial and transparent to the community. It has improved its probity measures over the last two years, following a review by the NSW Ombudsman in 2014. We found that the Commission:

  • has probity policies and procedures which are available on its website
  • has improved its record keeping of some processes, such as meetings with applicants and stakeholders
  • publishes its decision and supporting documentation, such as meeting notes, on its website.

Conflicts of interest are a significant risk for the Commission because they could lead to corruption, abuse of public office, and affect the public’s view of its independence. The Commission manages this risk well. It has a policy in place to address potential, perceived or actual conflicts. Commissioners update their conflicts of interest records annually, and declare any conflicts when the Commission assigns them to a development application. Unlike the Commission’s probity polices, Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations are not available on its website. Providing a summary of this information on its website when Commissioners are allocated to a development application would further improve transparency around conflicts of interest.

The Commission has been improving how it communicates its decisions to the public. It now produces fact sheets for its decisions on matters that attract a high level of public interest. Its reports on decisions for complex applications also discuss issues raised by the community. However, the level of detail varied in the decisions we reviewed, and it was not always clear how conditions placed on a development would resolve identified issues. Similarly, the reports did not clearly address the matters under section 79C of the EP&A Act. Reporting this would further improve the transparency of its decisions, and clearly demonstrate compliance with the EP&A Act.

While we did not find any issues that would make us question the integrity or independence of Commissioners, there remains a perception among some stakeholders that the Commission is not impartial. Some of these concerns are within the Commission’s control to fix, such as allowing individual speakers at public meetings extra time to discuss their issues, therefore avoiding perceptions of bias.

Other perceptions, such as the Commission being part of the Department and not an independent decision making authority, are outside the Commission’s immediate control. For example, the Commission receives applications at the end of the assessment process, after the Department has prepared an assessment report recommending whether the application should be approved. This means there are effectively two reports on an application; the Department’s assessment report and the Commission’s report on its decision. However, there is only one decision-maker: the Commission. This may cause community confusion about the roles of the Department and the Commission in the decision-making process. Clearer separation of their roles in assessing applications and preparing reports is needed.

To minimise the perception that the Commission is simply ‘rubber stamping’ the Department’s recommendations, assessment reports should not recommend whether or not a project be approved. Instead, they should provide the Department’s views on whether a project meets relevant legislative and policy requirements. The Commission should also be involved earlier in the process, so it can establish key facts and identify relevant issues sooner. It should request that the Department’s assessment report covers matters Commissioners consider particularly important when assessing projects under section 79C. Earlier referral of applications should also help the Commission to plan its work in assessing applications, and may reduce the time taken to reach a decision.

Unless these issues are addressed, stakeholders will continue to believe the Commission does not act in a transparent and impartial manner, which could erode public confidence in the Commission.

The Planning Assessment Commission

The Planning Assessment Commission (the Commission) is a planning authority established in 2008 under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (the EP&A Act). One of its functions is to make decisions on major development applications.

The Commission is independent of the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department) and the Minister for Planning. This means its decisions are not subject to the direction or control of the Department or the Minister.

The Department refers applications for major development to the Commission, including state significant development and infrastructure applications. These projects are generally initiated by the private sector. Applications are referred to the Commission when one or more of the following criteria are met:

  • more than 25 objections are received about the proposal
  • the local council objects to the proposal
  • the applicant has donated $1,000 or more to a political party or member of parliament.

These applications are often controversial and may attract a high level of public interest. Of the 29 development applications the Commission received in 2015–16, almost 40 per cent were in the mining and energy sectors, and another 40 per cent related to urban development.

Section 79C of the EP&A Act outlines the matters the Commission must consider when making decisions about major development applications. These include:

  • any relevant environmental and planning instruments
  • likely environmental, social and economic impacts of the development
  • suitability of the site for the development
  • submissions received about the application
  • the public interest.

In addition to making decisions about major development applications, the Commission also reviews major developments as part of the planning process, and provides independent expert advice to the government on planning and development matters. Since the Commission’s inception, it has provided advice on 76 matters, conducted 39 reviews, and made 444 decisions on development applications.

Process for approving major development applications

The Commission is one of three bodies that have a role in the planning and approval process for major development applications in New South Wales, as seen in Exhibit 1. The other two bodies are the Department of Planning and Environment, and the Land and Environment Court.

The Department determines the outcomes of major development applications. When an application meets one of the criteria listed above, it refers these to the Commission to make the decision. In certain circumstances, the Land and Environment Court hears appeals against decisions made by either the Department or the Commission.

A Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the Department sets out timeframes the Commission must meet when making a decision, specifically:

  • two weeks where no stakeholder meetings are required
  • three weeks where stakeholder meetings are required
  • six weeks when a public meeting is required.

The Planning Assessment Commission should:

By July 2017:

  1. improve transparency by publishing on its website a summary of the Commissioners’ conflict of interest declarations for each development application referred to the Commission for determination, and how any conflicts were handled
     
  2. keep better records of how it considers each matter under section 79C of the EP&A Act for all decisions it makes on major development applications
     
  3. improve the public’s involvement in public meetings by:
    1. identifying and implementing additional mechanisms to notify the community of public meetings to ensure as many interested parties are advised as possible
    2. allowing the chair of decision-making panels discretion to extend the time allowed for individual speakers beyond five minutes
  1. continue to improve how it communicates the reasons for its decisions to the public by:
    1. including a summary in its reports of the issues raised during the consultation process and how they were considered by the Commission
    2. clearly outlining in its reports how any conditions placed on a development will address the issues raised
    3. detailing in its reports how section 79C of the EP&A Act has been addressed
    4. issuing fact sheets to accompany its reports for all decisions where public meetings were held
  1. work with the Department of Planning and Environment to:
    1. develop an agreed approach to presenting the Department’s views in its assessment reports on whether the project meets relevant legislative and policy requirements, reflecting the Commission’s status as an independent decision-maker
    2. refer applications to the Commission earlier in the process to ensure the Department’s assessment report covers matters that Commissioners consider important when assessing projects under section 79C of the EP&A Act.

Published

Actions for Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative

Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative

Industry
Justice
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Environment
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The NSW Government’s ‘program evaluation initiative’, introduced to assess whether service delivery programs achieve expected outcomes and value for money, is largely ineffective according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.

Government services, in areas such as public order and safety, health and education, are delivered by agencies through a variety of programs. In 2016–17, the NSW Government estimates that it will spend over $73 billion on programs to deliver services.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #277 - released 3 November 2016

Published

Actions for Monitoring food safety practices in retail food businesses

Monitoring food safety practices in retail food businesses

Health
Local Government
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Shared services and collaboration

New South Wales has a lower rate of foodborne illness than the national average. This reflects some good practices in the NSW Food Authority’s approach to monitoring food safety standards. It also is a factor of the long-standing commitment by local councils’ to ensuring retail food businesses meet these standards.

To ensure foodborne illness remains low, the Authority needs to better monitor its arrangements with councils which inspect retail food businesses on its behalf, and receive additional and more timely information from councils on compliance with food safety standards.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #274 - released 15 September 2016