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Actions for Planning and Environment 2018

Planning and Environment 2018

Planning
Environment
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the NSW Planning and Environment cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of these agencies. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, some cultural institutions had challenges valuing collection assets in 2017–18. These issues were resolved before the financial statements were finalised.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Planning and Environment cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning and Environment cluster agencies' financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • service delivery.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning and Environment cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. The quality of financial reporting remains high across the cluster.
2.2 Key accounting issues
There were errors in some cultural institutions' collection asset valuations. Recommendation: Collection asset valuations could be improved by:
  • early engagement with key stakeholders regarding the valuation method and approach
  • completing revaluations, including quality review processes earlier 
  • improving the quality of asset data by registering all items in an electronic database. 
2.3 Timeliness of financial reporting
Except for two agencies, the audits of cluster agencies’ financial statements were completed within the statutory timeframe.  Issues with asset revaluations delayed the finalisation of two environment and heritage agencies' financial statement audits. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Planning and Environment cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office annual work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
One in five internal control weaknesses reported in 2017–18 were repeat issues. Delays in implementing audit recommendations can prolong the risk of fraud and error.
Recommendation (repeat issue): Management letter recommendations to address internal control weaknesses should be actioned promptly, with a focus on addressing repeat issues.
One extreme risk was identified relating to the National Art School. The School does not have an occupancy agreement for the Darlinghurst campus. Lack of formal agreement creates uncertainty over the School's continued occupancy of the Darlinghurst site.

The School should continue to liaise with stakeholders to formalise the occupancy arrangement. 
 
3.2 Information technology controls
The controls and governance arrangements when migrating payroll data from the Aurion system to SAP HR system were effective. Data migration from the Aurion system to SAP HR system had no significant issues.
The Department can improve controls over user access to SAP system. The Department needs to ensure the SAP user access controls are appropriate, including investigation of excess access rights and resolving segregation of duties issues. 
3.3 Annual work program
Agencies used different benchmarks to monitor their maintenance expenditure. The cluster agencies under review operate in different industries. As a result, they do not use the same benchmarks to assess the adequacy of their maintenance spend. 

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Planning and Environment cluster, and to collate and present service information for different segments of the cluster in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, ‘Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities’, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all relevant agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Finance
Health
Justice
Treasury
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Workforce and capability

The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.

We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.

Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.

Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.

This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:

  • agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
  • information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
  • agencies are building risk management capabilities.

The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.

Conclusion
All four agencies examined in the audit are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture. In these agencies, senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff. They have risk management policies and funded central functions to oversee risk management. We also found many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities.
That said, three of the four case study agencies could do more to understand their existing risk culture. As good practice, agencies should monitor their employees’ attitude to risk. Without a clear understanding of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult to tell whether the 'tone' set by the executive and management is aligned with employee behaviours.
Our survey of risk culture found that three agencies could strengthen a culture of open communication, so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Some agencies are performing better than others in building their risk capabilities. Three case study agencies have reviewed the risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps the review identified. In three agencies, staff also need more practical guidance on how to manage risks that are relevant to their day-to-day responsibilities.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. Its principles-based approach to risk management is consistent with better practice. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to develop additional practical guidance and tools to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector. NSW Treasury should encourage agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes. 

In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:

Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)

In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.

That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.

For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.

Employee perceptions of risk management

Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.

Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making

We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.

Support and guidance to help staff manage risks

Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.

NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.

Recommendation

By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:

  • Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.

Published

Actions for Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents

Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents

Finance
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Workforce and capability

A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, found there is no whole-of-government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is very limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some agencies have poor detection and response practices and procedures.

The NSW Government relies on digital technology to deliver services, organise and store information, manage business processes, and control critical infrastructure. The increasing global interconnectivity between computer networks has dramatically increased the risk of cyber security incidents. Such incidents can harm government service delivery and may include the theft of information, denial of access to critical technology, or even the hijacking of systems for profit or malicious intent.

This audit examined cyber security incident detection and response in the NSW public sector. It focused on the role of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation (DFSI), which oversees the Information Security Community of Practice, the Information Security Event Reporting Protocol, and the Digital Information Security Policy (the Policy).

The audit also examined ten case study agencies to develop a perspective on how they detect and respond to incidents. We chose agencies that are collectively responsible for personal data, critical infrastructure, financial information and intellectual property.

Conclusion
There is no whole‑of‑government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some of the agencies we reviewed have poor detection and response practices and procedures. There is a risk that incidents will go undetected longer than they should, and opportunities to contain and restrict the damage may be lost.
Given current weaknesses, the NSW public sector’s ability to detect and respond to incidents needs to improve significantly and quickly. DFSI has started to address this by appointing a Government Chief Information Security Officer (GCISO) to improve cyber security capability across the public sector. Her role includes coordinating efforts to increase the NSW Government’s ability to respond to and recover from whole‑of‑government threats and attacks.

Some of our case study agencies had strong processes for detection and response to cyber security incidents but others had a low capability to detect and respond in a timely way.

Most agencies have access to an automated tool for analysing logs generated by their IT systems. However, coverage of these tools varies. Some agencies do not have an automated tool and only review logs periodically or on an ad hoc basis, meaning they are less likely to detect incidents.

Few agencies have contractual arrangements in place for IT service providers to report incidents to them. If a service provider elects to not report an incident, it will delay the agency’s response and may result in increased damage.

Most case study agencies had procedures for responding to incidents, although some lack guidance on who to notify and when. Some agencies do not have response procedures, limiting their ability to minimise the business damage that may flow from a cyber security incident. Few agencies could demonstrate that they have trained their staff on either incident detection or response procedures and could provide little information on the role requirements and responsibilities of their staff in doing so.

Most agencies’ incident procedures contain limited information on how to report an incident, who to report it to, when this should occur and what information should be provided. None of our case study agencies’ procedures mentioned reporting to DFSI, highlighting that even though reporting is mandatory for most agencies their procedures do not require it.

Case study agencies provided little evidence to indicate they are learning from incidents, meaning that opportunities to better manage future incidents may be lost.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • assist agencies by providing:
    • better practice guidelines for incident detection, response and reporting to help agencies develop their own practices and procedures
    • training and awareness programs, including tailored programs for a range of audiences such as cyber professionals, finance staff, and audit and risk committees
    • role requirements and responsibilities for cyber security across government, relevant to size and complexity of each agency
    • a support model for agencies that have limited detection and response capabilities
       
  • revise the Digital Information Security Policy and Information Security Event Reporting Protocol by
    • clarifying what security incidents must be reported to DFSI and when
    • extending mandatory reporting requirements to those NSW Government agencies not currently covered by the policy and protocol, including State owned corporations.

DFSI lacks a clear mandate or capability to provide effective detection and response support to agencies, and there is limited sharing of information on cyber security incidents.

DFSI does not currently have a clear mandate and the necessary resources and systems to detect, receive, share and respond to cyber security incidents across the NSW public sector. It does not have a clear mandate to assess whether agencies have an acceptable detection and response capability. It is aware of deficiencies in agencies and across whole‑of‑government, and has begun to conduct research into this capability.

Intelligence gathering across the public sector is also limited, meaning agencies may not respond to threats in a timely manner. DFSI has not allocated resources for gathering of threat intelligence and communicating it across government, although it has begun to build this capacity.

Incident reporting to DFSI is mandatory for most agencies, however, most of our case study agencies do not report incidents to DFSI, reducing the likelihood of containing an incident if it spreads to other agencies. When incidents have been reported, DFSI has not provided dedicated resources to assess them and coordinate the public sector’s response. There are currently no formal requirements for DFSI to respond to incidents and no guidance on what it is meant to do if an incident is reported. The lack of central coordination in incident response risks delays and increased damage to multiple agencies.

DFSI's reporting protocol is weak and does not clearly specify what agencies should report and when. This makes agencies less likely to report incidents. The lack of a standard format for incident reporting and a consistent method for assessing an incident, including the level of risk associated with it, also make it difficult for DFSI to determine an appropriate response.

There are limited avenues for sharing information amongst agencies after incidents have been resolved, meaning the public sector may be losing valuable opportunities to improve its protection and response.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • develop whole‑of‑government procedure, protocol and supporting systems to effectively share reported threats and respond to cyber security incidents impacting multiple agencies, including follow-up and communicating lessons learnt
  • develop a means by which agencies can report incidents in a more effective manner, such as a secure online template, that allows for early warnings and standardised details of incidents and remedial advice
  • enhance NSW public sector threat intelligence gathering and sharing including formal links with Australian Government security agencies, other states and the private sector
  • direct agencies to include standard clauses in contracts requiring IT service providers report all cyber security incidents within a reasonable timeframe
  • provide assurance that agencies have appropriate reporting procedures and report to DFSI as required by the policy and protocol by:
    • extending the attestation requirement within the DISP to cover procedures and reporting
    • reviewing a sample of agencies' incident reporting procedures each year.

Published

Actions for Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative

Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative

Industry
Justice
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Environment
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The NSW Government’s ‘program evaluation initiative’, introduced to assess whether service delivery programs achieve expected outcomes and value for money, is largely ineffective according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.

Government services, in areas such as public order and safety, health and education, are delivered by agencies through a variety of programs. In 2016–17, the NSW Government estimates that it will spend over $73 billion on programs to deliver services.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #277 - released 3 November 2016

Published

Actions for Public sector management reforms

Public sector management reforms

Finance
Industry
Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Whole of Government
Environment
Management and administration
Workforce and capability

The Public Service Commission is making good progress with leading the implementation of public sector management reforms, according to a report released today by the Acting New South Wales Auditor-General, Tony Whitfield.

'The Commission developed a sound evidence base for the reforms and gained wide public sector support by engaging with agency heads and using public sector working groups to develop options', said the Acting Auditor-General. 'They developed good guidance for government agencies and have improved the senior executive structure in the NSW public sector', he added.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #264 - released 28 January 2016

Published

Actions for Planning for Sydney's Water Needs

Planning for Sydney's Water Needs

Planning
Environment
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery

Reliably supplying water to our State’s principal city, Sydney, is a major responsibility for the Government.

The community has been made keenly aware in recent years that inflows have been decreasing, and that Sydney has been using more water than is available. In April 2005 the water in Sydney’s storages dropped to 41.5 per cent of their capacity – the lowest level since the construction of Warragamba dam in 1960.

As Sydney continues to develop, it is expected that the demand for water will increase. The way that we use it will need to be sustainable, as it has a direct impact on our economy, our lifestyle and our environment.

In planning for the future the State’s water agencies face a range of uncertainties. But the task is vital.

This report informs Parliament and the community on the progress made - and what remains to be done - to ensure a reliable water supply for Sydney.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #135 - released 4 May 2005

Published

Actions for Follow-up of Performance Audit: Collecting Outstanding Fines and Penalties

Follow-up of Performance Audit: Collecting Outstanding Fines and Penalties

Finance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

Periodically we review the extent to which agencies have implemented the recommendations they accept from our earlier audits. This gives Parliament and the public an update on the extent of progress made.

In this follow-up audit, we examine changes following our April 2002 report on how well the State Debt Recovery Office (under the Office of State Revenue) was collecting outstanding fines and penalties.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #132 - released 17 March 2005