Refine search Expand filter

Reports

Published

Actions for Regional NSW 2023

Regional NSW 2023

Industry
Environment
Planning
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Procurement
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What this report is about

Results of the Regional NSW financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed audits in the Regional NSW portfolio agencies.

The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits increased from 28 in 2021–22 to 30 in 2022–23.

What the key issues were

Effective 1 July 2023, staff employed in the Northern Rivers Reconstruction Corporation Division of the Department of Regional NSW transferred to the NSW Reconstruction Authority Staff Agency.

The Regional NSW portfolio agencies were migrated into a new government wide enterprise resourcing planning system.

The total number of audit management letter findings across the portfolio of agencies decreased from 36 to 23.

A high risk matter was raised for the NSW Food Authority to improve the internal controls in the information technology environment including monitoring and managing privilege user access.

What we recommended

Local Land Services should prioritise completing all mandatory early close procedures.

Portfolio agencies should:

  • ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards
  • prioritise and address internal control deficiencies identified in audit management letters.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Regional NSW portfolio of agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Regional NSW portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed 30 June 2023 financial statements audits of the portfolio agencies. Two audits are ongoing.
  • The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased compared to the prior year.
  • Portfolio agencies met the statutory deadline for submitting their 2022–23 early close financial statements and other mandatory procedures.
  • Portfolio agencies continue to provide financial assistance to communities affected by natural disasters.
  • A change to the NSW paid parental leave scheme, effective October 2023, created a new legal obligation that needed to be recognised by impacted government agencies. Impact to the agencies' financial statements were not material. 

 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Regional NSW portfolio.

Section highlights

  • The 2022–23 audits identified one high risk and nine moderate risk issues across the portfolio. Of these, one was a moderate risk repeat issue.
  • The total number of findings decreased from 36 to 23 which mainly related to deficiencies in internal controls.
  • The high risk matter relates to the monitoring and managing of privilege user access at NSW Food Authority. 

 

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Regional, rural and remote education

Regional, rural and remote education

Education
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery

What this report is about

Students in rural and remote areas of NSW face greater challenges compared to their metropolitan peers.

This report examined how the NSW Department of Education (the department) is ensuring that rural and remote students have access to the same quality of early childhood, school education, and skills pathways as metropolitan students.

What we found

A decade since the previous (2013) strategy to address educational disadvantage, there remain considerable gaps in access and outcomes between rural and remote students and metropolitan students.

The Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–24) is unlikely to address these longstanding and known issues of educational disadvantage in rural and remote areas.

Key enabling factors such as resourcing a dedicated team, setting performance measures, and establishing suitable governance arrangements were not put in place to support effective implementation of the 2021 strategy.

The department has programs aimed at addressing remoteness challenges, but does not know if these initiatives improve access or outcomes.

The department does not monitor or report on student access or outcomes according to geographic location.

What we recommended

The Department of Education should:

  • develop a new strategy that addresses disadvantage in regional, rural and remote education
  • establish and report publicly on regional, rural and remote key performance indicators
  • improve data collection by using a standard remoteness classification
  • improve governance arrangements for regional, rural and remote education
  • review the resources provided for regional, rural and remote areas that recognises the additional costs
  • develop an approach that ensures all students can access best practice modes of delivery.

In February 2021, the department of Education (the department) released the ‘Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–2024)’. The strategy sets a vision that ‘every child in regional New South Wales has access to the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers’. It recognises that students in rural and remote areas of New South Wales face greater challenges compared to students in metropolitan locations. These challenges contribute to regional, rural and remote students underperforming on major educational indicators compared to their metropolitan peers.

In recent years, regional, rural and remote communities experienced a series of natural disasters as well as the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the pandemic and subsequent school closures, the department introduced new initiatives aimed at minimising the disruption to children including online learning and small group tuition.

The department established a regional, rural and remote education policy unit in 2021 to support delivery of the strategy and its vision.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the department’s activities to ensure that regional, rural and remote students have access to the same quality of early childhood, school education, and skills pathways as their metropolitan peers.

In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

  • The department developed and implemented a strategy that enables regional, rural and remote students to access the same quality of early childhood education, school education, and skills pathways as students in metropolitan New South Wales.
  • The department has been addressing the complexities and needs of regional, rural and remote early childhood education, school education, and skills pathways.
Conclusion

The department's rural and remote education strategy is unlikely to achieve its vision that every child in regional New South Wales has access to the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers. Shortcomings in the design and implementation of the strategy have meant there is little to report on its impact after more than two years since its release.

The department did not take on board lessons learned from the previous strategy. The department did not provide additional resources to meet the strategy aims, establish strong central coordination, set timeframes, set measures of success, or identify new programs to address gaps in regional and remote access and outcomes. Instead, the department relied on matching existing programs and activities across its business areas to meet the stated actions and goals of the strategy.

There was not enough work put in to plan for successful implementation. A changeover in staff responsible for coordinating implementation of the strategy and lack of fit-for-purpose governance arrangements slowed its momentum. The department took one year to recruit a central team and almost two years to set up governance that gives relevant department executives oversight of the strategy. This was not fast enough to support a four-year strategy with an ambitious vision.

The department did not establish a program logic model, set baseline measures or develop an evaluation plan to assess the impact of the strategy. Consequently, it has not adequately monitored changes in access or outcomes for regional, rural and remote students. Two years after its release, there has not been any public reporting against the actions or outcomes of the strategy.

The department is not addressing the complexities of delivering regional, rural and remote early childhood, school education and skills pathways. There are a range of programs targeted to overcoming challenges of remoteness, but the department does not monitor data to determine whether these programs are sufficient to close the persistent gaps in access and outcomes for regional, rural and remote students.

A decade after the Rural and Remote Education Blueprint was launched in 2013, there remain considerable gaps in access and outcomes between metropolitan and regional, rural and remote areas. The department identifies 'equity' as a key value in its strategic plan but does not monitor or report on performance against key indicators according to geographic location. Data produced in response to our requests for this report demonstrate that previously identified gaps in access and outcomes remain.

Different areas of the department recognise the challenges of delivering services in regional, rural and remote locations and have developed specific programs or approaches aimed at addressing these challenges. The department does not know whether these interventions are sufficient to close the gaps in access or outcomes. Schools we spoke with as part of the audit reported significant ongoing challenges with attracting and retaining staff, providing a full curriculum and accessing support services when needed. 

This chapter examines the process to develop the Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–2024). It considers whether there was a comprehensive program of stakeholder consultation, whether relevant research and evidence was incorporated and whether an effective performance monitoring system was established.

The department made genuine efforts to consult with stakeholders on the new strategy

The department had a clear process to engage and obtain feedback from key stakeholders during the development of the new strategy. It developed a range of documents to support the consultation process including a stakeholder engagement plan, communications plan, and presentation. The department used the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) Spectrum of Public Participation principles to help ensure that relevant stakeholders were included in the planning and decision-making process.

In late 2019, the department began its first phase of consultations with internal and external stakeholders to get their views on rural and remote education. It consulted internally with department directors, advisory groups, and learning communities, and externally with government agencies, service providers, non-government schools, and universities.

In March 2020, the department developed a stakeholder engagement paper to test the key issues from stakeholder consultations. Four focus areas were identified and included in a consultation paper that went out to key stakeholders for the second round of consultations in May 2020.

In the third consultation phase, the department conducted a workshop with stakeholders to review the earlier feedback, prioritise issues, identify gaps, and provide further input.

This consultation process enabled the department to identify issues and challenges to inform the new strategy. However, it was already aware that the blueprint was having limited success, and had already identified potential focus areas, following the evaluation of the blueprint in 2019.

The department did not consider recent research when developing the new strategy

The department's guidance materials promote the importance of considering research during policymaking. The guidelines describe the need to understand a topic, consult with stakeholders, identify gaps in existing knowledge, and ensure future work is informed by current literature.

In 2013, the department published a literature review on rural and remote education to inform the blueprint. The literature review found that students in rural and remote schools were not performing as well as their metropolitan peers, and that this performance gap was widening. The review attributed this to the higher number of children from low socio-economic backgrounds attending rural and remote schools. The review also identified several other factors that could negatively impact performance outcomes for rural and remote students. The department used the findings of the literature review to develop the key focus areas in the 2013 blueprint.

When the department began developing the new rural and remote education strategy in 2019, it recognised the need to review the literature on recent international initiatives. However, it has not yet released this review. This means that the department could have missed important new developments since it last examined the literature in 2013. Incorporating up-to-date research is important where past strategies have not met all their intended outcomes.

A national review into rural and remote education in 2018 examined Australian and international literature to inform its findings. The review made 11 recommendations to the Australian and state governments. While the NSW Government was not required to formally respond to the review, it could have considered the work done by that review when developing the new strategy. Several review recommendations are addressed in the strategy, while several others are only partly addressed. Gaps between review recommendations and specific strategy actions include improving the availability of quality accommodation, substantially reducing the waiting times for specialist assessments of students with learning difficulties and disabilities and increasing access to high quality distance education.

In 2019, the department commissioned a rural and remote project to contribute a research and evidence base to the new strategy. The main aim of the project was to help the department understand how it could better support rural and remote schools to increase educational outcomes. There was not enough time for this review to be completed prior to the release of the strategy. As of June 2023, the research project had not yet been released.

The strategy did not address all findings and recommendations from a recent evaluation

In 2020, the department's Centre for Education Statistics and Evaluation (CESE) published an evaluation of the blueprint. The evaluation examined how the actions in the blueprint were implemented. It recommended that a new strategy be developed, and made recommendations for things that should be incorporated into the strategy.

The blueprint aimed to ensure students in rural and remote areas could access the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers. The blueprint identified four focus areas to meet that aim:

  • quality early childhood education
  • great teachers and school leaders
  • curriculum access for all
  • effective partnerships and connections.

The department developed several initiatives to help meet the objectives of each of the four focus areas. These initiatives are described in Exhibit 5 below.

Exhibit 5: Key initiatives in the Rural and Remote Education Blueprint (2013)
Key focus area Initiative
Quality early childhood education
  • Funding model to help vulnerable and disadvantaged children access preschool.
Great teachers and school leaders
  • Rental subsidy to help attract and retain teachers.
Curriculum access for all
  • Virtual school to provide a varied curriculum for high potential and gifted students.
Effective partnerships and connections
  • Education networks for teachers and school leaders to access expert advice to support student learning.
  • Networked specialist centres to bring together services to support student health and wellbeing.

Source: Department of Education, Rural and remote education: A blueprint for action 2013.

The evaluation found that initiatives in two of the four focus areas – Quality early childhood education and Curriculum access for all – had performed well. However, the evaluation found that initiatives in the other two focus areas – Great teachers and school leaders and Effective partnerships and connections – did not achieve intended outcomes.

On the whole, the evaluation found that the 'remoteness gap' between rural and remote students and metropolitan students had not reduced since the blueprint was introduced. It recommended that the department continue its focus on rural and remote education by developing a new evidence-based strategy that focused on student outcomes and clear measures of success.

Objectives and actions in the new strategy were similar to those in the blueprint

The 2021 strategy sets an overall vision that 'every child in regional New South Wales has access to the same quality of education as their metropolitan peers'. It also states that the department 'is committed to ensuring all rural and remote students have equitable access to educational opportunities'.

Exhibit 6: Comparison of objectives in the blueprint and the new strategy
Rural and Remote Education Blueprint (2013) Rural and Remote Education Strategy (2021–24)
Provide more children with access to quality early child education in the year before school. Ensure all students have access to quality preschool in the year before school.
Ensure rural and remote schools have greater capacity to attract and retain quality teachers and leaders. Increase supply of high-quality educators in rural and remote communities.
Build the capacity of teachers and leaders in rural and remote schools. Better develop rural and remote teachers to deliver quality learning opportunities.
Address wellbeing needs through effective partnerships and connections. Address wellbeing needs through connections with local communities.
Develop partnerships so that rural and remote students have access to quality pathways into further education, training, or employment. Build partnerships to increase student access to post-school opportunities.

Source: Audit Office summary of Department of Education information.

Four areas in the blueprint remained a focus in the new strategy – early childhood education, teacher recruitment and retention, curriculum, and student wellbeing support services. Each focus area identifies a goal, as well as the aims and actions that contribute to those goals.

While this shows the department identified that these areas required continued attention, most actions were to 'increase', 'expand' or 'improve' existing programs and resources. The new strategy did not propose any new ideas or solutions, despite the blueprint achieving limited success in improving outcomes for rural and remote students.

There were no baseline or target measures set to monitor progress of the new strategy

The blueprint evaluation recommended that the department develop a new evidence-based strategy which focused on improving student outcomes. It also recommended the department use a program logic methodology to ensure there was a clear definition of success, adequate measures of success, and continual monitoring to ensure success.

Program logic models are a visual representation of the various components of a program. They can be used to illustrate program priorities, inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and assumptions. Logic models are used to explain how a proposed solution will address a specific problem. They are important because they can help test assumptions, build business cases, and identify potential enablers or barriers that could impact the project.

The department did not complete a program logic model during development of the new strategy, nor did it define measures to monitor whether the strategy's overall vision for quality education or the commitment to equitable access was on track to be achieved.

The department has not comprehensively monitored changes in educational outcomes in regional, rural and remote areas since the evaluation of the blueprint in 2020. This evaluation had seven indicators of educational outcomes by remoteness. The measures used in the evaluation could have provided a starting point given the similarity in focus areas between the blueprint and the new strategy. Not addressing past review recommendations increases risks that issues will be repeated.

The policy unit advised it has plans to set up a dashboard to monitor performance across the department's business plan measures by remoteness. This is intended to identify areas where system-wide improvements are required. This is not a comprehensive account of the strategy outcomes because the business plan measures don't capture all the goals of the strategy.

There were no timeframes or resources identified for implementing new strategy actions

The strategy has an overall timeframe of 2021–2024 but does not clarify when it expects the vision, goals, or aims to be achieved, or actions to be implemented.

The department's guidance on policymaking sets out how projects should be transitioned between the policy and implementation teams. This guidance is intended to help ensure the policy intent and scope of the project are not lost during the delivery of the project. The guidance highlights that the policy team should establish clear project implementation timeframes. It is important to have clear timeframes because it enables teams to measure progress, manage resources, and prioritise actions to ensure project outcomes are achieved.

The strategy states that there is a further $1 billion of investment planned over the next three years for rural and remote education but does not identify how this is allocated across its focus areas. It is important to identify the resources required to support the implementation of a program so that program objectives are met in a timely and cost-effective manner. The previous blueprint identified much lower funding of $80 million but more clearly showed how it would be allocated for identified actions across the four focus areas.

In response to our requests, the department separately identified $1.286 billion in expenditure for regional, rural and remote schools referenced in the strategy. Most of this expenditure related to existing department programs and activities rather than new initiatives. The total amount included:

  • $576.9 million for new and upgraded schools
  • $365.8 million for upgraded information technology equipment and resources
  • $120 million for school facility upgrades to be co-funded by schools
  • $60 million to replace school roofs
  • $60 million for the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program
  • $32 million for the Early Action for Success program
  • $29.7 million for staffing incentives
  • $21.7 million for literacy and numeracy interventions
  • $18.8 million in school location allowances
  • $1.45 million for the Rural Learning Exchange Pilot
  • $0.4 million for Rural and Remote Network initiatives.

This chapter examines the arrangements in place to implement the strategy. It considers whether effective governance arrangements are in place and how progress is monitored and reported.

This chapter considers the effectiveness of arrangements to ensure regional, rural and remote students have access to quality early childhood education, school education, and post‑school transitions.

This chapter considers the department's arrangements to monitor educational and wellbeing outcomes of students by remoteness. It reports on differences in outcomes between students in metropolitan areas and those in regional, rural and remote areas.

Those living in regional, rural and remote areas can have greater difficulty in accessing government services, often needing to travel long distances, or facing lower service levels than provided in major cities. This context is important when considering educational and wellbeing outcomes, given the disruptive effects of waiting or missing out on important services.

The rest of this chapter details key measures in the department's outcome and business plan.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #385 - released 10 August 2023

Published

Actions for Bushfire recovery grants

Bushfire recovery grants

Environment
Industry
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

What the report is about

The Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program was created after the 2019–20 bushfires, and commits $541.8 million to bushfire affected areas in New South Wales. It is co-funded by the Commonwealth and NSW governments.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Regional NSW (the department) and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the BLER program. These rounds were:

  • Round one: early co-funding, split between two streams:
    • ­Fast-Tracked projects 
    • ­Sector Development Grants (SDG)
  • Round two: open round.

What we found

The Department of Regional NSW did not effectively administer the Fast-Tracked stream of the BLER. 

The administration process lacked integrity, given it did not have sufficiently detailed guidelines and the assessment process for projects lacked transparency and consistency. 

At the request of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million threshold was applied, below which projects were not approved for funding. The department advises that some of the projects excluded were subsequently funded from other programs. 

This threshold resulted in a number of shortlisted projects in areas highly impacted by the bushfires being excluded, including all shortlisted projects located in Labor Party-held electorates.

The department's administration of the SDG stream had a detailed and transparent assessment process. However, conflicts of interest were not effectively managed. 

The department's administration of the open round included a clearly documented, detailed and transparent assessment framework. Some weaknesses in the approach to conflicts of interest remained.

What we recommended

The Department of Regional NSW should ensure that for all future grant programs it:

  1. establishes and follows guidelines that align with relevant good practice guidance 
  2. ensures a communications plan is in place, including the communication of guidelines to potential applicants
  3. ensures staff declare conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of a grants stream, and that these conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
  4. ensures regular monitoring is in place as part of funding deeds 
  5. documents all key decisions and approvals in line with record keeping obligations.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Regional NSW and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program.

As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was involved in the set-up and ongoing administration and monitoring of the BLER program. During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with working with the Department of Regional NSW to create program objectives, guidelines and criteria. Their role also involved liaising with the Commonwealth Government, which provided co-funding for the program. Resilience NSW also had an ongoing role in quality assurance and compliance to ensure agencies administering disaster assistance did so in accordance with relevant guidelines. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.

Our work for this performance audit was completed on 3 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the two audited agencies. The audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW. On 24 November 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.

During the 2019–20 bushfire season, New South Wales experienced 11,774 fire incidents, burning 5.5 million hectares of the state. There were 26 fatalities and 2,476 homes destroyed. The agriculture sector was heavily impacted with 601,858 hectares of pasture damaged.

Due to the widespread impacts of these fires on the state, the NSW and Commonwealth governments committed $4.4 billion toward bushfire response, recovery, and preparedness. This included the establishment of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program, with $541.8 million committed to support job retention and creation in areas impacted by bushfires. The program also aims to strengthen community resilience and reduce the impact of future natural disasters. The BLER program is co-funded, with the Commonwealth and NSW governments funding 50% each.

The BLER program is comprised of three funding rounds:

  • round one early co-funding, split between
    • Fast-Tracked projects
    • Sector Development Grants (SDG)
  • round two: open round
  • round three: final projects and initiatives.

Resilience NSW was involved in setting up the BLER program and the Department of Regional NSW (the department) is responsible for administering it. The Commonwealth National Recovery and Resilience Agency must also endorse any projects proposed by the NSW Government for funding as part of the funding agreement between the State and Commonwealth governments.

Successful projects under the SDG stream were announced in September 2020 and projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream were announced in October 2020. Round two (the open round) was administered after these two streams and successful projects were announced in June 2021.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet established the 'Good Practice Guide to Grants Administration' (the Good Practice Guide) in 2010 to assist the NSW Government in ensuring grants administration was performed consistently across all NSW Government grants programs. Compliance with the Good Practice Guide was not compulsory, but provided an outline of best practice covering the entire lifecycle of a grants program. This guide was in place at the time these grants were designed and administered.

The design and delivery of round one of the program occurred quickly, as part of the response to the 2019–20 bushfires, and was responding to a request from the Commonwealth Government for rapid project identification.

The objective of this audit was to assess how effectively the Department of Regional NSW and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the BLER program. Round three was excluded from this audit because it had not been announced at the time of the audit.

We addressed this objective by examining whether the audited agencies:

  • effectively planned administration of the BLER program and established appropriate guidelines
  • implemented an effective assessment process for the BLER program
  • are effectively monitoring implementation of projects and program outcomes.

Conclusion

The Department of Regional NSW did not effectively administer the Fast-Tracked stream of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery program. The administration process lacked integrity, given it did not have sufficiently detailed guidelines, and the assessment process for projects lacked transparency and consistency.

There were significant gaps in the documentation of decision-making throughout this funding stream. At the request of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million threshold was applied, below which projects were not approved for funding. This threshold was applied without a documented reason and was not part of the program guidelines. The department advises that some of the projects excluded through application of the threshold were subsequently funded from other programs.

The department's administration of the Sector Development Grants stream had a detailed and transparent assessment process. That said, conflicts of interest were not effectively managed, and the department did not effectively engage with stakeholders during the grants process.

The department's administration of the open round included a clearly documented, detailed and transparent assessment framework that it followed throughout. The department also implemented probity arrangements in the open round, although some weaknesses in the department's approach to conflicts of interest remained.

Fast-Tracked stream

Following requests from the Commonwealth Government in May and June 2020 to identify projects rapidly and as soon as practical, the department used an expedited process to identify relevant projects that had applied for other grants programs but had not received funding or which were identified as local priority projects. The department developed a set of guidelines for the Fast-Tracked stream based on draft Commonwealth funding criteria, but the department's guidelines lacked sufficient detail to ensure transparent and consistent decision-making. The guidelines also did not contain detailed information on how the assessment and approval processes would work. The department did not implement conflict of interest declarations for staff involved in the assessment process.

The assessment process implemented for the Fast-Tracked stream deviated from the guidelines. For example, the guidelines did not set out a role for the then Deputy Premier or his office in the assessment process, but the Deputy Premier's office played a key role in project selection. At the direction of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million minimum threshold, not mentioned in the guidelines, was applied to projects, below which, projects would not be funded. This resulted in a number of shortlisted projects in areas highly impacted by the bushfires, including all shortlisted projects located in Labor Party-held electorates, being excluded without a rationale being documented at the time. The department advised that some of these projects were subsequently funded through other funding streams.

The department's assessment process was inconsistent, poorly documented and lacked transparency. The department initially identified 445 potential projects through consultation with councils and through identifying projects that had been unsuccessful for other grant programs. The department only assessed 164 of these 445 projects for funding against the criteria in the guidelines. The department did not document the rationale for not assessing the remaining 281 projects against the criteria. The department also sought advice from Public Works Advisory (PWA) on whether projects could commence within six months, which was an eligibility criterion for the Fast-Tracked stream. PWA were only asked to assess 25 of the 445 projects, of which 19 were funded through the Fast-Tracked stream. The department also did not consistently follow PWA's advice and funded projects which PWA had advised were unable to commence within six months, which was not in line with the guidelines.

The department monitors 21 of the 22 Fast-Tracked projects on a quarterly basis to ensure projects are on track. Resilience NSW is responsible for the remaining project and does not monitor this on a quarterly basis but has established a project control group that performs a similar function. The agencies advised that this project is being transitioned to the department's management.

Sector Development Grants (SDG)

The department designed and published guidelines for the SDG stream. The guidelines largely align with the Department of Premier and Cabinet's 'Good Practice Guide to Grants Administration', although they could have been strengthened by including more detail on the eligibility of projects and the role of cost benefit analyses in the assessment process. The guidelines included a detailed and transparent assessment process which the department largely followed.

There were gaps in the administration of the SDG stream assessment process. The department did not effectively manage conflicts of interest as it did not ensure all required conflict of interest forms were completed and some forms were completed after the assessment process was finalised. The department also advised that the final version of the conflict of interest register, which contained the declarations for the SDG stream, was lost during a record management system change. The department did not develop guidance for communicating with stakeholders for the SDG stream. Feedback was received from industries which had been excluded from the SDG stream, relaying their concerns, and requesting a broader range of agribusiness sectors be considered for eligibility. A communications plan or strategy could have incorporated guidance on engaging agribusiness stakeholders during the planning stages of the stream, ensuring they were aware of the rationale for the eligible industries selected.

The majority of SDG funding went to areas highly impacted by the bushfires, although some highly impacted areas received less funding than lower impacted areas, and there is no clear reason for this.

The department does not monitor SDG projects on a quarterly basis to ensure that they remain on track but it ensures it has sufficient evidence that milestones have been completed before making funding payments.

Open round

The department designed and implemented a clearly documented and detailed assessment process for the open round. There were some areas where the process could have been improved, for example, the published guidelines did not set out the role of the former Deputy Premier or include reference to consultation with members of Parliament (MP) as part of the process, despite the fact that MPs were consulted as part of this round.

The department improved its management of conflicts of interest compared to the Fast-Tracked and SDG streams by maintaining a conflict of interest register, though not all conflict of interest declarations were collected. The department also developed a communications plan which led to improvements in stakeholder engagement.

One of the purposes of the open round was to distribute funding to local government areas (LGA) which did not receive funding through the Fast-Tracked stream. This intention was not outlined in the guidelines for this funding stream. The majority of funding from the open round went to LGAs which had been highly impacted by the bushfires.

The department monitors the open round projects on a quarterly basis to ensure that they are on track.

1. Recommendations

To promote integrity and transparency, the Department of Regional NSW should ensure that for all future grant programs it:

  1. establishes and follows guidelines that align with relevant good practice guidance including accountabilities, key assessment steps and clear assessment criteria
  2. ensures a communications plan is in place, including the communication of guidelines to potential applicants
  3. ensures staff declare conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of a grants stream, and that these conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
  4. ensures regular monitoring is in place as part of funding deeds
  5. documents all key decisions and approvals in line with record keeping obligations.

Stage one of the BLER program consisted of early co-funded projects valued at a total of $180 million. This included 22 Fast-Tracked priority projects valued at a total of $107.8 million. The purpose of these projects was to deliver immediate and significant economic impacts to high and moderate bushfire-impacted areas.

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 5.

Fifty-two projects worth a total of $73.2 million were funded through the SDG stream. One grantee withdrew their project from the stream in early 2021, leaving a total of 51 projects (of which 49 are co-funded with the Commonwealth Government).

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 9.

The department distributed $283 million to 195 successful projects as part of the open round of the BLER program.

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 11.

The department entered into funding deeds with successful applicants

The Good Practice Guide advises that the agency administering a grant should enter into a formal agreement with each grant recipient which sets out the arrangements under which a grant is provided, received, managed and acquitted. Across all three streams, the department sent out a letter of offer to successful project managers to let them know that they had been successful in receiving funding, and then entered into funding deeds with grantees. The one exception was the project that RNSW managed, discussed below.

The reviewed funding deeds were signed by department staff with the appropriate level of delegation. They contained an appropriate level of information and key clauses that would allow the department to monitor the progress of the grant to ensure its completion as agreed with the grantee. The reviewed funding deeds contained key information, including:

  • total value of the grant
  • key deliverables at each milestone
  • expected completion date of both the overall project and each milestone
  • reporting requirements, including provisions to allow the department to request relevant information
  • variation procedures.

The department only makes payments after confirming that milestones have been reached

The department has provided payments to grantees only after they could demonstrate that they had completed the agreed milestone. To ensure each milestone has been completed, the department requires grantees to provide evidence that they have fulfilled the milestone. Types of evidence provided includes photographs and invoices. Where the grantee provides insufficient evidence to the department, the department follows-up with the grantee to ensure that enough information is provided to justify the milestone payment.

The department also plans to undertake site visits of projects at select milestones and at the completion of most projects. The department has undertaken a risk assessment of each SDG and open round project, and uses this risk assessment to determine the number of milestones for the project, as well as the number of site visits that the department will undertake. Fast-Tracked projects all had PWA providing either project management or assurance and as such oversight is being provided through that mechanism. The milestones and site visits at each level of risk can be seen in Exhibit 15 for SDG and Exhibit 16 for open round.

Exhibit 15: Milestones and site visits for each level of risk - SDG
Risk rating Milestones Site visits
Low Two Zero
Medium Three One
High Four Two
Source: Department of Regional NSW.
 
Exhibit 16: Milestones and site visits for each level of risk - open round
Risk rating Milestones Site visits
Low Three One
Medium Four Two
High Five Three
 Source: Department of Regional NSW.

The department does not monitor quarterly progress for SDG grants

As part of the LER framework, the department reports to the Commonwealth every quarter on the status and financials of each project, including whether there are any risks to project delivery and the mitigations in place for those risks. For projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream and the open round, the department collects quarterly progress reports from the grantees. These progress reports allow the department to determine if there are project risks, which can then be reported to the Commonwealth. The progress reports also allow the department to determine if a milestone is likely to be met within the next quarter or whether a project variation may be needed.

While the department monitors projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream and the open round on a quarterly basis, there is no quarterly monitoring of progress for projects funded through the SDG stream. The SDG funding deeds do not include a provision to require quarterly reporting to the department. The department only collects progress reports from grantees when the grantee reports that it has completed a milestone. Quarterly monitoring of the SDG stream would allow the department to determine if projects require corrective action.

Resilience NSW is not collecting quarterly reports for the Fast-Tracked grant it is responsible for administering

One of the projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream was the rebuilding of three local halls across two LGAs, for a total value of $3 million. RNSW is responsible for managing this grant and entered into funding deeds with the relevant councils. It is not documented why RNSW is responsible for these funding deeds rather than the department, which is the signatory for all of the other Fast-Tracked stream funding deeds. RNSW advised it was due to the responsible RNSW Director having a strong working relationship with the relevant councils.

The funding deeds which RNSW signed with the relevant councils set out a requirement that the councils would report on this project to RNSW every quarter. The second milestone of each of these projects involved the submission of a quarterly report. However, RNSW was unable to provide evidence that it carried out this monitoring of the project. At the time of the audit, no second milestone payment had been made. Undertaking quarterly monitoring would provide RNSW with assurance that the money is being expended for the proper purpose and whether the projects will be completed by the target date.

RNSW and the relevant councils developed project control groups for each project, which allows it to monitor the implementation of the projects. PWA is also represented on these project control groups and provides an advisory role in the implementation of the projects.

RNSW and the department advised that responsibility for this project will be transitioned to the department and it will be monitored on a quarterly basis, in line with the other Fast-Tracked projects.

The department has a consistent approach to validating variations

The department's funding deeds with grantees allow for the variation of contracts at the department's discretion after the grantee has written to the department. It is important for the department to consider the impact of any project variation request on the overall program objectives, because a project which costs more than was originally planned or which takes additional time may put at risk the objectives of the BLER program. To ensure that requests for variation are handled consistently and appropriately, the department's Grants Management Office (GMO) has developed a process document which applies to variation requests across the BLER program.

For the grants reviewed as part of this audit, the GMO applied this variation process consistently and has documented the outcomes. Larger variations are reviewed at a higher level of delegation and sign-off. To determine whether a variation is accepted, the GMO considers the following factors:

  • consistency with BLER program objectives
  • delivery within the timeframes of the BLER program
  • eligibility under the BLER program guidelines
  • financial viability to deliver within the requested budget.

The department is preparing multiple evaluations, but it has delayed its process evaluation

When developing round one of the BLER program, the department developed an evaluation plan. A total of $1.1 million has been reserved for conducting process, outcome, and economic evaluations of the BLER program and two other bushfire recovery grant programs.

To assist with evaluating program outcomes and economic impact, the department is planning a post-completion survey in 2023–24. This timeline will allow most projects to be completed and enough time for project outcomes to be realised. The department advised that the data collected through this survey would allow the department to determine whether the BLER program has achieved its objectives, as it includes information such as the number of jobs created through each project.

The process evaluation was initially planned for March to June 2021. This would have aligned with the announcement of the open round funding and would have allowed for the learnings from rounds one and two of the BLER program to be applied to the development of round three. However, the department did not conduct this evaluation in a timely way. The department advised that this was because funding deed negotiations were still ongoing, and the department was waiting for 50% of funding deeds to be signed. Given this, the department was not in a position to commence its process evaluation. In December 2021, the department revised its evaluation plan and advised that it commenced its process evaluation in April 2022. It is unlikely that this will allow time for the department to apply learnings to round three, which is currently underway.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – BLER program distribution

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #373 - released 2 February 2023

Published

Actions for Student attendance

Student attendance

Education
Management and administration
Service delivery

What the report is about

Poor attendance at school is related to poor student outcomes, particularly once patterns of non-attendance have been established.

This report examined how the NSW Department of Education (the department) is managing student attendance in NSW government schools.

What we found

Around a third of students in Years 1–10 attended school less than 90% of the time in semester one, 2021. Missing more than 10% of school may put a student's educational outcomes at risk.

Since 2018, the department has improved the quality of student attendance data, analysis and reporting. However, there are still gaps in understanding the reasons for absence at a system level.

The department set state-wide and school-level targets to increase the proportion of students attending school at least 90% of the time. This emphasis risks diverting attention away from students with very low attendance rates.

There are gaps in central programs to support schools in lifting student attendance. Schools are taking a variety of approaches to this work.

There is a large gap in attendance between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal students, which has increased since 2018.

What we recommended

The Department of Education should:

  • set new state-wide and school level attendance targets
  • evaluate its attendance support programs
  • update its attendance strategies and programs
  • publish the attendance level for each school in their annual reports
  • improve internal analysis and reporting of attendance data
  • finalise the review of the attendance policy, procedure and codes
  • review programs supporting Aboriginal student attendance and address any gaps
  • review the approach to enforcing compulsory school attendance.

Fast facts

  • 90% - attending school less than 90% of the time can put a student's educational outcomes at risk
  • 67.9% of Year 1–10 students in NSW government schools attended at least 90% of the time in semester one, 2021
  • 42.7% of Aboriginal Year 1–10 students in NSW government schools attended school at least 90% of the time in semester one, 2021.

Regular attendance at school is important for academic and other long-term outcomes. Students who do not attend regularly are less likely to complete school and more likely to experience poorer long-term health and social outcomes. A range of factors influence student attendance including student engagement and wellbeing, family and community factors and the school environment.

The NSW Department of Education's (the department's) Strategic Plan for 2018–2022 identifies improving student attendance as a priority. It has identified 95% as its expected level of attendance. It set targets to increase the proportion of students attending school at least 90% of the time, from 79.4% to 82% in primary schools and 64.5% to 70% for secondary schools.

This report focuses on attendance data for semester one of 2018, 2019 and 2021. Unless otherwise noted, attendance data refers to Years 1–10 in alignment with national reporting conventions. Changes in recording systems and definitions mean attendance data prior to 2018 is not comparable. Attendance data for semester one of 2020 and 2022 was significantly affected by COVID-related disruptions, which prevented many students across the State from attending school. Data for semester one of 2021 is considered relatively less affected by COVID-related disruptions.

The Education Act 1990 (the Act) sets out the responsibilities of students, parents and the department for ensuring students receive compulsory schooling. The department has developed policies, procedures and guidance to assist schools in managing their responsibilities to promote regular attendance. In this report, we define 'regular' attendance as at least 90% of the time. This is equivalent to missing one day of school each fortnight or four weeks of school across a school year.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether student attendance is effectively managed in NSW government schools for students from kindergarten to Year 10. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:

  • there are effective systems and policies for managing student attendance
  • the department effectively supports schools to manage student attendance
  • schools are effectively managing student attendance.

Conclusion

There are too many students in NSW Government schools who regularly miss school. In semester one of 2021, around a third of students in Years 1–10 attended school less than 90% of the time — a level that puts their educational outcomes at risk. Attendance problems are widespread. 775 of 2,200 schools in NSW had an average attendance rate below 90% in 2021. Aboriginal student attendance is significantly below non-Aboriginal students and there is no specific strategy to address this gap. The department needs to place greater attention on supporting schools to lift student attendance.

Good quality data on attendance patterns is critical to developing strategies to address the underlying reasons for absence. The quality of the department's data on student attendance has improved from 2018. This has allowed it to monitor attendance more closely throughout the year, rather than relying on a yearly collection. However, there are still gaps in capturing and analysing the reasons for absence.

The improved data collection allowed the department to begin reporting on the 'attendance level' for the first time in 2018. This measures the proportion of students attending more than 90% of the time. The department has set state-wide and school-level targets to improve the attendance level. The new targets have influenced the focus of strategies to lift attendance. There is now a greater focus on lifting students above the reportable benchmark of 90% rather than addressing more serious attendance concerns.

The School Success Model formalises the focus on achieving school-level targets. When introduced, the department stated that schools would receive targeted support as part of the rollout of the model. Targeted support for attendance was initially planned to be delivered in late 2021 but was delayed due to the impact of COVID. The two main attendance support programs do not cater to schools with fewer than 100 students and there are gaps in support due to two different methodologies being used to select schools.

The Home School Liaison Program is a longstanding program to support students with low attendance. Requests for support are rationed pending availability of case officers, which leads to younger students being prioritised. Older students are not supported because there is a lower chance of prosecution in the legal system if attendance is not restored by the program. There is insufficient monitoring of the adequacy of resources, activities and long-term outcomes of this program.

The department's Aboriginal Education Policy aims to have Aboriginal students matching or exceeding outcomes of non-Aboriginal students. In semester one, 2021 42.7% of Aboriginal students attended school regularly (at least 90% of the time) compared with 70.3% of non-Aboriginal students. The gap in attendance between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal students has grown since 2018. There are relatively new programs supporting Aboriginal students in secondary school to attain their Higher School Certificate, but greater attention should be placed on supporting attendance for Aboriginal students in primary schools.

Schools are using a wide range of strategies to improve student attendance depending on their local contexts. Schools we spoke with told us of allocating responsibility to key staff members, closer monitoring of data, community engagement, rewards and incentives, before school sporting and breakfast programs, and partnerships with external agencies. The school planning and annual reporting process prompts schools to evaluate the impact of their strategies on progress towards their targets. The department could do more to promote evidence-based programs, showcase better practice examples from schools in NSW and identify the circumstances where these approaches are most effective. 

This chapter considers the effectiveness of systems to accurately collect, analyse and report student attendance data. It also considers the effectiveness of policies and procedures to support attendance and central oversight of attendance issues.

This chapter considers the effectiveness of the department's strategies to improve student attendance and the support it provides to schools to achieve this. It also considers the effectiveness of school-level strategies and actions for students with low attendance.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #368 - released 27 September 2022

Published

Actions for Audit Insights 2018-2022

Audit Insights 2018-2022

Community Services
Education
Environment
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Cross-agency collaboration
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.

This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.

The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.

The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.

What we found

Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:

  • Integrity and transparency
  • Performance and monitoring
  • Governance and oversight
  • Cyber security and data
  • System planning for disruption
  • Resource management.

The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.

In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.

The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

Fast facts

  • 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
  • 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
  • 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.

picture of Margaret Crawford Auditor-General for New South Wales in black dress with city skyline as backgroundI am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.

The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.

While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales

Integrity and transparency Performance and monitoring Governance and oversight Cyber security and data System planning Resource management
Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest.
Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds.
Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office.
Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues.     Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need.
Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes.          
Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more

 

This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.

  • Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
  • Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
  • Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.

This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.

The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.

This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.

Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022

Appendix two – About this report

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

Community Services
Education
Health
Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Financial reporting
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

This report draws together the financial impact of COVID-19 on the agencies integral to responses across the state government sector of New South Wales.

What we found

Since the COVID-19 pandemic hit NSW in January 2020, and until 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion was spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus. The response was largely funded by borrowings.

The key areas of spending since the start of COVID-19 in NSW to 30 June 2021 were:

  • direct health response measures – $2.2 billion
  • personal protective equipment – $1.4 billion
  • small business grants – $795 million
  • quarantine costs – $613 million
  • increases in employee expenses and cleaning costs across most agencies
  • vaccine distribution, including vaccination hubs – $71 million.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the financial performance and position of state government agencies.

Decreases in revenue from providing goods and services were offset by increases in appropriations, grants and contributions, for health and economic stimulus funding in response to the pandemic.

Most agencies had expense growth, due to additional operating requirements to manage and respond to the pandemic along with implementing new or expanded stimulus programs and initiatives.

Response measures for COVID-19 have meant the NSW Government is unlikely to meet targets in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 being:

  • annual expense growth kept below long-term average revenue growth
  • elimination of State’s unfunded superannuation liability by 2030.

 Fast facts

  • First COVID-19 case in NSW on 25 January 2020
  • COVID-19 vaccinations commenced on 21 February 2021
  • By 31 December 2021, 25.2 million PCR tests had been performed in NSW and 13.6 million vaccines administered, with 93.6% of the 16 and over population receiving two doses
  • During 2020–21, NSW Health employed an extra 4,893 full-time staff and incurred $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19
  • During 2020–21, $1.2 billion was spent on direct health COVID-19 response measures and $532 million was spent on quarantine for incoming international travellers

Section highlights

  • Up to 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion has been spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus.
  • Revenue increased for most agencies as falling revenue from providing goods and services was offset by additional funding from appropriations, grants and contributions.
  • Expenses increased as most agencies incurred additional costs to manage and respond to the pandemic along with delivering stimulus and support programs.
  • Borrowings of $7.5 billion over the last two years helped to fund the response to COVID-19.

Section highlights

  • NSW Government unlikely to meet targets in Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012.

Published

Actions for COVID Intensive Learning Support Program

COVID Intensive Learning Support Program

Education
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

This audit examined a state-wide program to provide small-group tuition to students disadvantaged by the move to learning from home during 2020.

The audit assessed the design and implementation of the program.

What we found

The program design was based on research and data showing learning loss during 2020. 

The department rapidly planned and developed the policy design and guidelines for schools. 

Governance arrangements matured during program delivery.

The department changed the models for funding schools but did not clearly explain the reasons for doing so.

Government schools with over 900 students were disadvantaged by the funding model compared to smaller schools. 

Guidelines, resources and professional learning helped schools implement the program.

Staff eligibility for the program was expanded after reported difficulties in recruiting qualified teachers in some areas. 

Online tuition and third-party provider options were developed throughout the program.

There were issues with the quality and timeliness of data used to monitor school progress. 

Evaluation arrangements were developed early in the program.

Data limitations mean the evaluation will not be able to fully assess all program objectives.

What we recommended

  1. Distributing funds between schools more equitably and improving communication of the funding methods. 
  2. Clearer communication about the intended targeted group of students.
  3. Reviewing the time needed to administer the program.
  4. Improve support for educators other than qualified teachers.
  5. Offer the online tuition program to more schools.
  6. Analysis of the effects of learning from home during 2021 across equity groups and geographic areas.
  7. Working with universities to increase use of pre-service teachers in the program.

The report also identifies lessons learned for future programs.
 

Fast facts

  • $337m in total program funding. $289 million for government schools and $31 million for non government schools
  • 12 days to develop the policy and provide costings to Treasury 
  • 290,000 targeted students in government schools and 31,000 in non government schools
  • 80% of schools were providing small group tuition by the target start date of Week 6, Term 1
  • 2–4 months was the estimated student learning loss from the move to learning from home during 2020
  • 7,600 tutors engaged in the program as at September 2021.

The NSW Government announced the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program on 10 November 2020, as part of the 2020–21 NSW Budget. The primary goal of the $337 million program was to deliver intensive small group tuition for students who were disadvantaged by the move to remote and/or flexible learning, helping to close the equity gap. It included:

  • $306 million to provide small-group tuition for eligible students across every NSW Government primary, secondary and special purpose school
  • $31.0 million for around 400 non-government schools to provide small-group tuition to students with the greatest levels of need.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program). To address this objective, the audit assessed whether the Department of Education (the department):

  • effectively designed the program and supporting governance arrangements
  • is effectively implementing the program.

This audit focuses on activities between October 2020 and August 2021, which aimed to address the first session of learning from home in New South Wales. From August to October 2021, students in many areas of New South Wales were learning from home again, but this second period has not been a focus of this audit. On 18 October 2021, the NSW Government announced the program would be extended into 2022.

Conclusion

The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was effectively designed to help students catch up on learning loss due to the interruptions to schooling caused by COVID-19. The department rapidly stood up a taskforce to implement the program and then developed supporting governance arrangements during implementation.

Most students in New South Wales were required to learn from home for at least seven weeks during 2020 due to the impact of the Novel-Coronavirus (COVID-19). The department researched, analysed and advised government on several options to address the learning loss that resulted. It recommended small group tuition as the preferred option as it was supported by available evidence and could be rolled out at scale with speed. It identified risks of ensuring an adequate supply of educators and options to address those risks. Consistent with its analysis of where the impact of the learning loss was most severe, the department proposed to direct funding to schools with higher concentrations of students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds.

The department established a cross-functional taskforce to conduct detailed planning and support program implementation. Short timeframes meant the taskforce initially sought approval for key decisions from the program sponsor and existing oversight bodies on an as-needed basis before dedicated program governance arrangements were formalised. Once established, the governance body met regularly to oversee program delivery.

The COVID Intensive Learning Support Program is being effectively implemented. The department has refined the program during rollout to respond to risks, issues and feedback from schools. Issues with how schools enter data into department systems have affected the timeliness and accuracy of program monitoring information.

The department provided schools with guidelines, example models of delivery, systems to record student progress and professional learning. Around 80 per cent of schools had begun delivering tuition under the program by the target date. Schools reported issues with sourcing qualified teachers as a key reason they were unable to start the program by the expected date. In response, the department expanded the type of staff schools could employ, developed an online tuition program, and allowed schools to engage third-party providers to help schools that had difficulty finding qualified teachers for the program.

The department used existing systems to monitor school progress in implementing the program. This reduced the administrative burden on schools, but there were several issues with data quality and timeliness. The program included a mid-year review point to check whether schools were on track to spend their funding. This helped focus schools on ensuring funding would be spent and allowed for redistribution between schools.

The department considered program evaluation early in policy design and planning. It embedded an evaluator on the taskforce and expanded a key assessment program to help provide evidence of impact. A process and outcome evaluation is underway which will help inform future delivery. The evaluation will examine educational impacts for students participating in the program but it has not established methods to reliably assess the extent to which the program has met a goal to help 'close the equity gap' for students.

This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program (the program) was designed and planned for implementation.

This chapter considers how effectively the COVID Intensive Learning Support Program was implemented over our period of review (Terms 1 and 2, 2021).

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #358 - released (15 December 2021).

Published

Actions for Regional NSW 2021

Regional NSW 2021

Environment
Industry
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Regional NSW cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Regional NSW cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Regional NSW cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statement audits of cluster agencies. Four audits are ongoing.

The number of misstatements identified in the financial statements of cluster agencies decreased from 27 in 2019–20 to seven in 2020–21.

The Department corrected an understatement of $82.2 million in prepaid income related to the Bushfire Clean-up Program.

What the key issues were

Local Land Services (LLS) undertook a comprehensive revaluation of asset improvements on land reserves used for moving stock (travelling stock reserves).

The revaluation process identified that improvements on land reserves, with a value of $93.0 million, had not been previously recognised in the financial statements. LLS corrected this error by restating the 2019–20 comparative balances in its 2020–21 financial statements.

The Forestry Corporation of NSW revalued its biological assets that comprise approximately 225,000 hectares of softwood plantations and 34,000 hectares of hardwood forests. The current year valuation resulted in $71.4 million decrement in the total biological assets from $824.9 million in 2019–20 to $753.5 million in 2020–21.

The number of matters reported to management decreased from 36 in 2019–20 to 19 in 2020–21. Twelve moderate risk issues were identified and 47 per cent of reported issues were repeat issues.

What we recommended

Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.

 

Fast facts

The Regional NSW cluster plans and delivers regional programs and infrastructure to respond to regional issues, creating and preserving regional jobs, driving regional economy, growing existing and supporting emerging industries. There are 31 agencies in the cluster.

  • $2.3b of regional land and buildings as at 30 June 2021.

  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits.

  • monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21.

  • $603m of grants and subsidies administered to the regional community in 2020–21.

  • 12 moderate risk management letter findings were identified and reported to management.

  • 47% of reported issues were repeat issues. 

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Regional NSW cluster agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Regional NSW cluster for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Four audits are ongoing.
  • The number of monetary misstatements identified during the audit decreased from 27 in 2019–20 to seven in 2020–21.
  • Three cluster agencies could improve their early close process by completing all required procedures.
  • Local Land Services disclosed a prior period error relating to the completeness of asset improvements on travelling stock reserves.

 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Regional NSW cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management decreased from 36 in 2019–20 to 19 in 2020–21, and 47 per cent were repeat findings.
  • The 2020–21 audits identified 12 moderate risk and seven low risk issues across the cluster.
  • Four moderate risk issues and five low risk issues were repeat findings from
    2019–20.

 

Appendix one - Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two - Early close procedures

Appendix three - Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Managing climate risks to assets and services

Managing climate risks to assets and services

Planning
Environment
Treasury
Industry
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

This report assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and NSW Treasury have supported state agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services.

Climate risks that can impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. Impacts can include damage to transport, communications and energy infrastructure, increases in hospital admissions, and making social housing or school buildings unsuitable.

NSW Treasury estimates these risks could have significant costs.

What we found

DPIE and NSW Treasury’s support to agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services has been insufficient.

In 2021, key agencies with critical assets and services have not conducted climate risk assessments, and most lack adaptation plans.

DPIE has not delivered on the NSW Government commitment to develop a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan. This was to be complete in 2017.

There is also no adaptation strategy for the state. These have been released in all other Australian jurisdictions. The NSW Government’s draft strategic plan for its Climate Change Fund was also never finalised.

DPIE’s approach to developing climate projections is robust, but it hasn’t effectively educated agencies in how to use this information to assess climate risk.

NSW Treasury did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019.

In March 2021, DPIE and NSW Treasury released the Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course. These are designed to improve support to agencies.

What we recommended

DPIE and NSW Treasury should, in partnership:

  • enhance the coordination of climate risk management across agencies
  • implement climate risk management across their clusters.

DPIE should:

  • update information and strengthen education to agencies, and monitor progress
  • review relevant land-use planning, development and building guidance
  • deliver a climate change adaptation action plan for the state.

NSW Treasury should:

  • strengthen climate risk-related guidance to agencies
  • coordinate guidance on resilience in infrastructure planning
  • review how climate risks have been assured in agencies’ asset management plans.

Fast facts

4 years

between commitments in the NSW Climate Change Policy Framework, and DPIE and NSW Treasury producing key supports to agencies for climate risk management.

$120bn

Value of physical assets held by nine NSW Government entities we examined that have not completed climate risk assessments.

Low capability to do climate risk assessment has been found across state agencies. The total value of NSW Government physical assets is $365 billion, as at 30 June 2020.

x3

NSW Treasury’s estimates of the annual fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters will triple by 2060–61.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2021, each of the last four decades has been successively warmer and surface temperatures will continue to increase until at least the mid-century. The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) have reported that extreme weather across Australia is more frequent and intense, and there have been longer-term changes to weather patterns. They also report sea levels are rising around Australia increasing the risk of inundation and damage to coastal infrastructure and communities.

According to the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department), in New South Wales the impacts of a changing climate, and the risks associated with it, will be felt differently across regions, populations and economic sectors. The department's climate projections indicate the number of hot days will increase, rainfall will vary across the state, and the number of severe fire days will increase.

The NSW Government is a provider of essential services, such as health care, education and public transport. It also owns and manages around $365 billion in physical assets (as at June 2020). More than $180 billion of its assets are in major infrastructure such as roads and railway lines.

In NSW, climate risks that could directly impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. In recent years, natural hazards exacerbated by climate change have damaged and disrupted government transport, communications and energy infrastructure. As climate risks eventuate, they can also increase hospital admissions when people are affected by poorer air quality, and make social housing dwellings or schools unsafe and unusable during heatwaves. The physical impacts of a changing climate also have significant financial costs. Taking into account projected economic growth, NSW Treasury has estimated that the fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters due to climate change will more than triple per year by 2061.

The department and NSW Treasury advise that leading practice in climate risk management includes a process that explicitly identifies climate risks and integrates these into existing risk management, monitoring and reporting systems. This is in line with international risk management and climate adaptation standards. For agencies to manage the physical risks of climate change to their assets and services, leading practice identified by the department means that they need to:

  • use robust climate projection information to understand the potential climate impacts
  • undertake sound climate risk assessments, within an enterprise risk management framework
  • implement adaptation plans that reduce these risks, and harness opportunities.

Adaptation responses that could be planned for include: controlling development in flood-prone locations; ensuring demand for health services can be met during heatwaves; improving thermal comfort in schools to support student engagement; proactive asset maintenance to reduce disruption of essential services, and safeguarding infrastructure from more frequent and intense natural disasters.

According to NSW Treasury policy, agencies are individually responsible for risk management systems appropriate to their context. The department and NSW Treasury have key roles in ensuring that agencies are supported with robust information and timely, relevant guidance to help manage risks to assets and services effectively, especially for emerging risks that require coordinated responses, such as those posed by climate change.

This audit assessed whether the department and NSW Treasury are effectively supporting NSW Government agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services. It focused on the management of physical risks to assets and services associated with climate change.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) has made climate projections available to agencies since 2014, but provided limited guidance to assist agencies to identify and manage climate risks. NSW Treasury first noted climate change as a contextual factor in its 2012 guidance on risk management. NSW Treasury only clarified requirements for agencies to integrate climate considerations into their risk management processes in December 2020.
The department has not delivered on a NSW Government commitment for a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan, which was meant to be completed in 2017. Currently many state agencies that own or manage assets and provide services do not have climate risk management in place.
Since 2019, the department and NSW Treasury have worked in partnership to develop a coordinated approach to supporting agencies to manage these risks. This includes guidance to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaptation planning published in 2021.
More work is needed to embed, sustain and lead effective climate risk management across the NSW public sector, especially for the state's critical infrastructure and essential services that may be exposed to climate change impacts.

The NSW Government set directions in the 2016 NSW Climate Change Policy Framework to 'manage the impact of climate change on its assets and services by embedding climate change considerations into asset and risk management’ and more broadly into 'government decision-making'.

The department released climate projections and has made information on projected climate change impacts available since 2014, but this has not been effectively communicated to agencies. The absence of a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan has limited the department's implementation of a coordinated, well-communicated program of support to agencies for their climate risk management.

NSW Treasury is responsible for managing the state's finances and providing stewardship to the public sector on financial and risk management, but it did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019. NSW Treasury estimates the financial costs of climate-related physical risks are significant and will continue to grow.

The partnership between the department and NSW Treasury has produced the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which aim to help agencies understand their exposure to climate risks and develop adaptation responses. The Guide maps out a process for climate risk assessment and adaptation planning and is referenced in NSW Treasury policy on internal audit and risk management. It is also referenced in NSW Treasury guidance to agencies on how to reflect the effects of climate-related matters in financial statements.

There is more work to be done by the department on maintaining robust, accessible climate information and educating agencies in its use. NSW Treasury will need to continue to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to managing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

The effectiveness of the department and NSW Treasury's support involves the proactive and sustained take-up of climate risk management by state agencies. There is a key role for the department and NSW Treasury in monitoring this progress and its results.

Prior to 2021, support provided by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) to agencies for managing physical climate risks to their assets and services has been limited. NSW Treasury has a stewardship role in public sector performance, including risk management, but has not had a defined role in working with the department on climate risk matters until mid-2019. The low capacity of agencies to undertake this work has been known to NSW Government through agency surveys by the department in 2015 and by the department and NSW Treasury in 2018.

The support delivered to agencies around climate risk management, including risk assessment and adaptation planning, has been slow to start and of limited impact. The department's capacity to implement a coordinated approach to supporting agencies has also been limited by the absence of a state-wide adaptation strategy and related action plan.

In 2021, products were released by the department and NSW Treasury with potential to improve support to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaption planning (that this, Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which provides links to key NSW Treasury polices). The department and NSW Treasury are now leading work to develop a more coordinated approach to climate risk management for agencies' assets and services, and building the resilience of the state to climate risk more broadly.

Climate projections are a key means of understanding the potential impacts of climate change, which is an important step in the climate risk assessment process. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) used a robust approach to develop its climate projections (NARCliM). The full version of NARCliM (v1.0) is based on 2007 models11 and while still relevant, this has limited its perceived usefulness and uptake. The process of updating these projections requires significant resourcing. The department has made recent updates to enhance the currency and usefulness of its climate projections. NARCliM (v2.0) should be available in 2022.

While climate projections have been available to agencies and the community more broadly since 2013–14, the department has not been effective in educating the relevant data users within agencies in how to use the information for climate risk assessments and adaptation planning.

The absence of a strategy focused on this is significant and has contributed to the current low levels of climate risk assessment uptake across agencies (see section 2). Agencies are required to use the climate projections developed by the department when developing long term plans and strategies as part of the NSW Government Common Planning Assumptions.


11 The department advises the 2007 global climate models were released to users by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2010.
It is too soon to determine the impact of the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW (CRR) Guide and Course, produced by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) and NSW Treasury. But there are opportunities for these agencies to progress these developments in partnership: especially with the establishment of senior executive steering and oversight committees related to climate risk.

For the department, key opportunities to embed climate risk management include leveraging land use planning policies and guidance to drive adaptation, which has potential to better protect the state's assets and services. NSW Treasury has a role in continuing to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate change considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to addressing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

There is currently no plan on how the department and NSW Treasury intend to routinely monitor the progress of agencies with implementing the CRR Guide or developing climate risk 'maturity' more broadly. As agencies are responsible for implementing risk management systems that meet NSW Treasury standards, which now clearly includes consideration of climate risk (TPP20-08), establishing effective monitoring, reporting and accountability around this progress should be a priority for the department and NSW Treasury.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Timeline of key activities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #355 - released (7 September 2021).

Published

Actions for Fast-tracked Assessment Program

Fast-tracked Assessment Program

Planning
Industry
Environment
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

What the report is about

This report examines the effectiveness of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, administered by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) between April 2020 and October 2020. 

The program aimed to support the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis by accelerating the final assessment stages for planning proposals and development applications. 

DPIE selected projects and planning proposals for fast tracked assessment that demonstrated the potential to:

  • deliver jobs
  • progress to the next stage of development within six months of determination
  • deliver public benefit.

The audit assessed whether the Fast-tracked Assessment Program achieved its objectives while complying with planning controls.

What we found

Through tranches three to six of the program, DPIE successfully accelerated the final stages of 53 assessments. DPIE reported that 89 per cent of these proceeded to the next stage of development within six months.

Assessment of projects and planning proposals was compliant with legislation and other requirements. However, the audit found gaps in DPIE's management of conflicts of interest.

DPIE has not evaluated or costed the program and is not able to demonstrate the extent to which it provided support to the construction industry during COVID-19. 

Aspects of the program have been incorporated into longer term reforms to create a new level of transparency over the progress and status of planning assessments. 

What we recommended

DPIE should:

  • strengthen controls over conflicts of interest 
  • evaluate the Fast-tracked Assessment Program.

Fast facts

Construction industry support 
  • The program aimed at providing immediate support to the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis
59 fast-tracked projects 
  • 59 projects and 42 planning proposals projects were assessed in six tranches
89% of all fast-tracked assessments in tranches three to six progressed to the next stage of the planning process within six months of determination

In April 2020, the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) introduced programs aimed at providing immediate support to the construction industry during the COVID-19 crisis. One of these was the Fast-tracked Assessment Program. This program identified planning proposals and development applications (DAs), across six tranches, that were partially-assessed and could be accelerated to determination.

In accordance with the program objectives, the planning proposals and DAs selected for fast-tracked assessment had to:

  • deliver jobs – particularly in the construction industry
  • be capable of progressing to the next stage of development within six months of determination
  • deliver public benefit.

At the same time, the Fast-tracked Assessment Program was to lay a foundation for future reform of the planning system by piloting changes in the assessment process that could be adopted in the medium to long term.

This audit assessed whether the Fast-tracked Assessment Program achieved its objectives while complying with planning controls. The audit focused on tranches three to six of the program, which were determined between July 2020 and October 2020. The rationale for focusing on these four tranches was that the program design had been slightly modified after the first two tranches to address identified risks.

Conclusion

Through tranches three to six of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, DPIE successfully accelerated the final stages of 53 assessments. DPIE’s internal monitoring indicates that 31 DAs and 16 planning proposals selected in these tranches proceeded to the next stage of development within six months of determination. DPIE achieved this while also successfully managing the risk of non-compliance with planning controls arising from the accelerated process. While DPIE has incorporated components of the Fast-tracked Assessment Program into other longer-term reforms, it has not evaluated the program and is not able to demonstrate the extent to which the program provided support to the construction industry during COVID-19.

Between April and October 2020, DPIE adopted a case management approach to accelerate the final stages of assessment for 42 planning proposals and 59 DAs in six tranches. Tranches three to six were the focus of this audit and included 22 planning proposals and 31 DAs. Applicants involved in the program were expected to progress their projects to the next stage of development within six months of determination. While DPIE had no way of compelling applicants to do this and relied on non-binding commitments obtained from applicants, DPIE’s internal monitoring indicates that 47 of the 53 applicants selected in tranches three to six honoured this commitment.

Fast-tracked assessment only applied to the final stages of assessment and required DPIE staff and other stakeholders to work towards a determination deadline. DPIE effectively used a case management approach to manage the risk that the accelerated timeframe could result in planning controls not being fully compliant with legislation. There is some room for improvement in the process, as four of 28 staff assessing planning proposals and DAs had not lodged current conflict of interest declarations.

Based on the results of and learnings from the Fast-tracked Assessment Program, DPIE has incorporated some elements of the program into other longer-term reforms. There is now increased transparency about when applicants can expect to receive a planning determination and DPIE has also introduced a case management approach for strategic and high priority planning applications. Applicants benefiting from case-managed assessment are now required to commit to a formal service charter that specifies the obligations of both DPIE and the applicant.

DPIE has not evaluated the Fast-tracked Assessment Program to understand the costs and benefits of the program, nor which aspects of the program were most effective as a basis for future reform.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Planning determination pathways

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #354 - released (27 July 2021).