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Actions for Support for regional town water infrastructure

Support for regional town water infrastructure

Industry
Environment
Local Government
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has effectively supported the planning for, and funding of, town water infrastructure in regional NSW.

The audit found that the department has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning since at least 2014. It does not have a clear regulatory approach and lacks internal procedures and data to guide its support for local water utilities that service around 1.85 million people in regional NSW.

The audit also found that the department has not had a strategy in place to target investments in town water infrastructure to the areas of greatest priority. A state-wide plan is now in development.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to the department, aimed at improving the administration and transparency of its oversight, support and funding for town water infrastructure, and at strengthening its sector engagement and interagency coordination on town water planning issues and investments.

According to the Auditor-General, ‘A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and to work with local water utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities.’ 

This report is part of a multi-volume series on the theme of water. Refer to ‘Water conservation in Greater Sydney’ and ‘Water management and regulation – undertaking in 2020-21’.

Read full report (PDF)

Safe and reliable water and sewer services are essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. In 2019, during intense drought, around ten regional New South Wales (NSW) cities or towns were close to ‘zero’ water and others had six to 12 months of supply. In some towns, water quality was declared unsafe.

Ensuring the right water and sewer infrastructure in regional NSW to deliver these services (known as 'town water infrastructure') involves a strategic, integrated approach to water management. The NSW Government committed to ‘secure long-term potable water supplies for towns and cities’ in 2011. In 2019, it reiterated a commitment to invest in water security by funding town water infrastructure projects.

The New South Wales’ Water Management Act 2000 (WM Act) aims to promote the sustainable, integrated and best practice management of the State’s water resources, and establishes the priority of town water for meeting critical human needs.

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) is the lead agency for water resource policy, regulation and planning in NSW. It is also responsible for ensuring water management is consistent with the shared commitments of the Australian, State and Territory Governments under the National Water Initiative. This includes the provision of healthy, safe and reliable water supplies, and reporting on the performance of water utilities.

Ninety-two Local Water Utilities (LWUs) plan for, price and deliver town water services in regional NSW. Eighty-nine are operated by local councils under the New South Wales’ Local Government Act 1993, and other LWUs exercise their functions under the WM Act. The Minister for Water, Property and Housing is the responsible minister for water supply functions under both acts.

The department is the primary regulator of LWUs. NSW Health, the NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and the Natural Access Resource Regulator (NRAR) also regulate aspects of LWUs' operations. The department’s legislative powers with respect to LWUs cover approving infrastructure developments and intervening where there are town water risks, or in emergencies. In this context, the department administers the Best Practice Management of Water Supply and Sewerage Guidelines (BPM Guidelines) to support its regulation and to assist LWUs to strategically plan and price their services, including their planning for town water infrastructure.

Under the BPM Guidelines, the department supports LWU’s town water infrastructure planning with the Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) Checklist. The Checklist outlines steps for LWUs to prepare an IWCM strategy: a long-term planning document that sets out town water priorities, including infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments, water conservation and drought measures. The department's objective is to review and approve (i.e. give ‘concurrence to’) an IWCM strategy before the LWU implements it. In turn, these documents should provide the department with evidence of town water risks, issues and infrastructure priorities.

The department also assesses and co-funds LWU's town water infrastructure projects. In 2017, the department launched the $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program to ensure town water infrastructure in regional NSW is secure and meets current health and environmental standards. The program was initially established under the Restart NSW Fund.

This audit examined whether the department has effectively supported the planning for and funding of town water infrastructure in regional NSW. It focused on the department’s activities since 2014. This audit follows a previous Audit Office of NSW report which found that the department had helped to promote better management practices in the LWU sector, up to 2012–13.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning in regional NSW since at least 2014. It has also lacked a strategic, evidence-based approach to target investments in town water infrastructure.

A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and work with Local Water Utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities.

The department has had limited impact on facilitating Local Water Utilities’ (LWU) strategic town water planning. Its lack of internal procedures, records and data mean that the department cannot demonstrate it has effectively engaged, guided or supported the LWU sector in Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning over the past six years. Today, less than ten per cent of the 92 LWUs have an IWCM strategy approved by the department.

The department did not design or implement a strategic approach for targeting town water infrastructure investment through its $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP). Most projects in the program were reviewed by a technical panel but there was limited evidence available about regional and local priorities to inform strategic project assessments. About a third of funded SSWP projects were recommended via various alternative processes that were not transparent. The department also lacks systems for integrated project monitoring and program evaluation to determine the contribution of its investments to improved town water outcomes for communities. The department has recently developed a risk-based framework to inform future town water infrastructure funding priorities.

The department does not have strategic water plans in place at state and regional levels: a key objective of these is to improve town water for regional communities. The department started a program of regional water planning in 2018, following the NSW Government’s commitment to this in 2014. It also started developing a state water strategy in 2020, as part of an integrated water planning framework to align local, regional and state priorities. One of 12 regional water strategies has been completed and the remaining strategies are being developed to an accelerated timeframe: this has limited the department’s engagement with some LWUs on town water risks and priorities.

Regional New South Wales (NSW) is home to about a third of the state's population. Infrastructure that provides safe and reliable water and sewer services (also known simply as 'town water infrastructure') is essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. Planning for and meeting these infrastructure needs, as well as identifying when non-infrastructure options may be a better solution, involves a strategic and integrated approach to water resource management in regional NSW.

We examined whether the department has effectively supported planning for town water infrastructure since 2014. This assessment was made in the context of its current approach to LWU sector regulation. The findings below focus on whether the department has an effective framework including governance arrangements for town water issues to inform state-wide strategic water planning, and whether (at the local level) the department has effectively overseen and facilitated town water infrastructure planning through its Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning guidance to LWUs.

We examined whether the department has effectively targeted town water infrastructure funding to policy objectives, with a focus on the design and implementation of the Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP) since its commencement in 2017. The program’s aim was to fund town water infrastructure projects that would deliver health, social and environmental benefits, and support economic growth and productivity. We also assessed the department’s capacity to demonstrate the outcomes of the SSWP funding and the contributions of its town water infrastructure investments more broadly. Finally, we identified risks to the effectiveness of the department’s work underway since 2018–19, which is intended to enhance its strategic water planning and approach to prioritising investments in reducing town water risks.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Key terms

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #341 - released 24 September 2020

Published

Actions for Credit card management in Local Government

Credit card management in Local Government

Local Government
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining credit card management in Local Government.

The audit was in response to a letter from the then Minister for Local Government in November 2018. The audit assessed the effectiveness of credit card management practices in six councils, including in the areas of policies, procedures, compliance and monitoring.

The audit found that all six councils had gaps in their credit card policies and procedures. The Auditor-General recommended that the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment publish guidelines on credit card management for the Local Government sector. The report also generated insights for the Local Government sector with respect to credit card management.

Read full report (PDF)

In 2018–19, all councils responding to an Audit Office survey (representing over 90 per cent of the sector) indicated they issued credit cards to staff members to make work-related purchases. As there are no sector-wide requirements or policies for credit card use and management in Local Government, councils have developed their credit card management frameworks to suit their own needs. The quality of credit card policies and procedures may therefore vary across the sector.

Credit cards are an efficient means of payment, especially for low-value purchases. Compared to the use of petty cash, credit card transactions provide better transparency and accountability for expenditure. By using credit cards, councils only need to make one payment each month, which can reduce the time spent on paying separate vendors, as in the case of purchase orders.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of credit card management practices in six councils: Dubbo Regional Council, Junee Shire Council, Lane Cove Council, Nambucca Valley Council, Penrith City Council and Shellharbour City Council. The councils selected represent a mix of rural, regional and metropolitan councils. They were also among the top ten users of credit cards within their geographical classification, in terms of the number of credit cards issued or the number of transactions per credit card.

This audit referenced the NSW Treasury's Policy and Guidelines Paper TPP17–09 'Use and Management of NSW Government Purchasing Cards', as its principles and recommendations for NSW Government agencies are relevant for councils.

The Audit Office of New South Wales Report on Local Government 2019 provided a high-level overview of credit card management across the sector. While over 90 per cent of councils reported that they had a credit card policy and a credit card acquittal process, the quality of these policies and procedures may vary across the sector as there is no standardised or recommended approach to credit card management for Local Government. This audit complements the Report on Local Government 2019 by providing a detailed discussion of the effectiveness of credit card management practices in councils.

Audit conclusion

All six audited councils had important gaps in their credit card policies and procedures. Their reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud.
 
The audit found important gaps in each of the six audited councils' credit card management practices. Their policies and procedures covered the essential aspects of credit card use and management, but a lack of coverage or clarity in some areas could lead to inconsistent and inappropriate use of credit cards. These areas included: eligibility to hold a credit card, aligning credit card limits with financial delegations, and the reconciliation procedures.
 
While all six councils conducted reconciliations of credit card transactions, the processes need to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. Reconciliations had focused solely on verifying receipts, and did not require evidence of business-related purposes, even for transactions such as alcohol purchases or spending at entertainment venues. Five of the six councils also did not include compliance checks in their reconciliation process, such as checking that purchases were not for restricted items.
 
The level of senior management involvement in monitoring credit card use varied across the six councils. Three of the six councils did not generate regular reports for management oversight. Five of the six councils had no plans for internal audits or targeted reviews of credit card management and use.

Council staff provided with a credit card can purchase from a wide range of businesses, including online transactions with overseas vendors. However, councils may limit the types of purchases that staff can make through their policies and procedures or by setting controls that block certain transaction types such as cash advances. To examine credit card usage, the audit obtained credit card transaction data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2019 for the six councils in this review. The data included:

  • transaction date
  • amount
  • merchant category code (MCC)
  • merchant name.

The audit analysed the number and value of transactions by each council, and the types of purchases made using credit cards.

The existence of a documented approach to managing credit cards ensures transparency and consistency of use within the council. A credit card management framework that contains preventative and detective controls can also minimise risks of fraud, misuse and wastage.

There is no prescribed credit card management framework for Local Government, but typical components of a credit card management framework include:

  • policies and procedures
  • guidance for staff
  • monitoring and reporting.

With no detailed guidance notes similar to those in TPP17–09 for NSW Government, councils have developed their own credit card management framework based on their size, structure, resources and intended credit card usage. For instance, the size of a council has implications for the number of credit cards issued, which in turn influences the arrangements for training and guidance provided to cardholders and approvers.

The intended level of credit card usage may determine whether a council adopts a manual or electronic credit card management system and councils should identify the system that best meets their needs. For instance, a council with few credit cards may not be able to justify investment in an electronic system. On the other hand, a manual system may only be viable for councils with a low number of credit cards and a low number of transactions.

Among the six councils audited, the three councils with fewer cards and a lower number of transactions had a manual credit card management system, while the three councils with more cards and a higher number of transactions used an electronic system.

Exhibit 10 summarises the six councils' policies on use of credit cards.

Exhibit 10: Overview of the six councils' policies on credit card use
Council Audit Office classification Number of staff (full-time equivalent) Number of credit cards issued (current at August 2019) Policy on credit card use
Dubbo Regional Council Regional 453 77 Purchase cards are used for official council business up to $5,000 and the policy allows cardholders to delegate the use of their purchase cards to other staff members.
Junee Shire Council Rural 71 1 Corporate credit cards are for council business activities and minor purchases where a purchase order is not accepted. Items that can be purchased via a purchase order should not be purchased on a corporate credit card.
Lane Cove Council Metropolitan 192 6 Corporate credit cards are for official council business, but should not be used when there is an alternative form of payment that aligns with the council's purchasing process.
Nambucca Valley Council Rural 110 37 Purchase cards are used for the payment of goods and services associated with council businesses.
Penrith City Council Metropolitan 1,031 167 Purchase cards are used for ‘low value and low risk procurement of goods and services’, while corporate cards are held by senior staff for ‘non-routine low value work related purchases’.
Shellharbour City Council Regional 372 65 Credit cards are for purchases up to $9,999 and the preferred payment method for transactions under $1,000.
Source: Audit Office of New South Wales analysis of council credit card registers, policies and procedures 2020; staff numbers from Office of Local Government's 'Your Council' website, except for Junee Shire Council which comes from their Workforce Plan 2020–24.

While it is important for councils to have an established credit card management framework, it is equally important that they ensure compliance in practice. This chapter examines councils' credit card management practices – how well staff members were complying with policies and procedures, and how effective their credit card controls were. The chapter is structured to cover:

  • preventative controls (embedded in the issuance, use and cancellation of cards) that prevent fraud and misuse
  • detective controls (embedded in reconciliation and record keeping) that assist in detecting fraud and misuse.

Where ineffective credit card management practices are identified, councils should reflect on whether they need to more closely monitor compliance, or whether there are fundamental deficiencies in their policies and procedures that need to be refined.

Dubbo Regional Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. It allowed cardholders to share their credit card with other staff members, which complicated credit card management, increased the risk of misuse and fraud, and breached its agreement with the credit card issuer. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.

Dubbo Regional Council had 77 credit cards at the time of the audit. The council's policy on credit card sharing violated its agreement with the card issuer that each credit card should be for the respective cardholder's use only. Credit card sharing also increases the risk of misuse and fraud.

The council's credit card policy and procedures lacked clarity in several areas. The eligibility criteria were broad and there was a risk of inconsistency in granting approvals, especially since the council gave approval delegations to multiple senior staff members. The policy and procedures also lacked guidance on the reconciliation of the general manager's credit card and the management of Cabcharge.

The audit identified gaps in the council's credit card management practices. While the council had a clear policy on financial delegations, there was no evidence that credit card limits were monitored in line with financial delegations. The credit card register contained inaccurate information, and the council was also unable to provide records of certain transactions requested for review by the audit.

The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. It did not include compliance checks or reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. Purchases of restricted items such as fuel, meals and entertainment were not accompanied by evidence of need or exemption. Travel expenses were not checked against travel pre-approval forms. The audit also identified instances of split transactions. The council provided no evidence of the finance team's involvement in the reconciliation of credit card transactions.

Senior management oversight of credit card use was lacking, as the council did not produce reports on credit card use. There was also no evidence that the internal auditor had undertaken monitoring activities as required in the credit card policy.

Recommendations

Dubbo Regional Council should immediately:

1. amend its credit card policy to prevent cardholders from sharing their credit card with other staff.

By December 2020, Dubbo Regional Council should:

2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures:

  • eligibility criteria for a credit card
  • reconciliation arrangements for the general manager’s credit card
  • Cabcharge management policy and procedures

3. ensure that credit card management practices include:

  • monitoring credit card limits in line with financial delegations
  • considering the use of credit card blocks
  • keeping the credit card register are up-to-date, accurate and complete
  • maintaining complete and accurate records

4. ensure reconciliation involves:

  • scrutinising business-related purposes and incident details of transactions
  • keeping a record of the finance team's review of transactions
  • reviewing transactions against travel pre-approval forms (where applicable)
  • recording vehicle details and mileage when credit cards are used in place of fuel cards
  • checking that there are no split transactions

5. ensure there is ongoing senior management oversight of credit card use

6. ensure the internal auditor undertakes monitoring activities as specified in the credit card policy.

 

Junee Shire Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.

Junee Shire Council had only one credit card, held by the general manager, at the time of the audit. Staff members could seek approval from the general manager to purchase using the credit card. This raises concerns of credit card sharing, which would be a violation of the council's agreement with its credit card issuer. Credit card sharing also increases the risk of misuse and fraud.

The council had fuel cards and store cards for use by staff members. However, its credit card policy and procedures did not cover the management of these types of cards. The lack of documented rules and guidance increases the risk of misuse and fraud.

The audit identified other gaps in the council's credit card management practices:

  • the credit card limit was not monitored in line with financial delegation
  • there was a lack of targeted guidance for the approver (the mayor) in reconciliation
  • the council was unable to provide records of certain transactions requested for review by the audit
  • the council did not review its credit card policy according to schedule.

The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. It did not include reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. The council also provided no evidence of the finance team's involvement in the reconciliation of credit card transactions.

As the cardholder, the general manager reviewed all transactions every month. As the approver, the mayor (or deputy mayor) had to sign off on these transactions. Hence, there was sufficient management oversight of the council's credit card use. However, there was a lack of periodic review of the council's credit card use, as it was not included in the council's forward program of internal audits.

Recommendations

Junee Shire Council should immediately:

1. amend its credit card policy to prevent cardholders from sharing their credit card with other staff.

By December 2020, Junee Shire Council should:

2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures:

  • fuel card management policy and procedures
  • store card management policy and procedures

3. ensure that credit card management practices include:

  • monitoring credit card limits in line with financial delegations
  • considering the use of credit card blocks
  • providing approvers with targeted guidance
  • maintaining complete and accurate records

4. ensure reconciliation involves:

  • scrutinising business-related purposes and incident details of transactions
  • keeping a record of the finance team's review of transactions
  • checking travel pre-approval forms (where applicable)
  • recording vehicle details and mileage when credit cards are used in place of fuel cards
  • checking that there are no split transactions

5. develop a plan for periodic reviews (e.g. internal audit) of credit card use and management

6. ensure its credit card policy and procedures are reviewed according to schedule.

 

Lane Cove Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.

Lane Cove Council had six credit cards, held by the most senior staff members, at the time of the audit. During our interviews, cardholders advised that they had shared their credit card with reporting staff. Credit card sharing is a violation of the council's agreement with its credit card issuer, and it also increases the risk of misuse and fraud.

The council's credit card policy lacked clarity in several areas. While the general manager had delegation to authorise the issue of credit cards, the policy did not specify any eligibility criteria. The policy and procedures also lacked guidance on the reconciliation of the general manager's credit card and the management of fuel cards and store cards.

The audit identified gaps in the council's credit card management practices. There was no evidence that credit card limits were monitored in line with financial delegations. The credit card register contained inaccurate information, and the council was also unable to provide records of certain transactions requested for review by the audit.

The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. The process also did not include compliance checks or reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. Purchases of restricted items such as fuel and fine payments were not accompanied by adequate justification. There was a lack of targeted guidance for approvers in reconciliation, and the council only evidenced the finance team's involvement in an administrative capacity (i.e. entering data into the journals).

Senior management oversight of credit card use was lacking. Although the credit card policy referred to management reporting, the council had not been producing such reports at the time of the audit. Management reporting was implemented in December 2019 following our discussions. There was a lack of periodic review of the council's credit card use, as it was not included in the council's forward program of internal audits.

The council has adopted a new Management Directive in January 2020, which has clarified the eligibility criteria for credit cards.

Recommendations

Lane Cove Council should immediately:

1. amend its credit card policy to prevent cardholders from sharing their credit card with other staff.

By December 2020, Lane Cove Council should:

2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures:

  • reconciliation arrangements for the general manager’s credit card
  • fuel card management policy and procedures
  • store card management policy and procedures

3. ensure that credit card management practices include:

  • monitoring credit card limits in line with financial delegations
  • considering the use of credit card blocks
  • providing approvers with targeted guidance
  • keeping the credit card register up-to-date, accurate and complete
  • maintaining complete and accurate records

4. ensure reconciliation involves:

  • scrutinising business-related purposes and incident details of transactions
  • keeping a record of the finance team's review of transactions
  • checking travel pre-approval forms (where applicable)
  • recording vehicle details and mileage when credit cards are used in place of fuel cards

5. develop a plan for periodic reviews (e.g. internal audit) of credit card use and management.

 

Nambucca Valley Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.

Nambucca Valley Council had 37 credit cards at the time of the audit. During our interviews, cardholders described instances of credit card sharing within the council. Credit card sharing is a violation of the council's agreement with its credit card issuer, and it also increases the risk of misuse and fraud.

The council's credit card policy lacked clarity in several areas. While the general manager had delegation to authorise the issue of credit cards, the policy did not specify any eligibility criteria. The policy and procedures lacked guidance on the management of fuel cards, store cards and Cabcharge. The policy also lacked coverage of the reconciliation arrangements for the general manager's credit card as the general manager did not hold a credit card. While the policy did not preclude the mayor and the general manager from holding a credit card, both opted not to do so.

The audit identified gaps in the council's credit card management practices. There was no evidence that credit card limits were monitored in line with financial delegations. The credit card register contained inaccurate information, and there was insufficient control in handling staff departures, as the audit identified one incident where a credit card was returned after the staff member's last day.

The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. The process also did not include adequate compliance checks or reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. Purchases of restricted items such as fuel and the use of third-party travel websites were not accompanied by adequate justification. Travel expenses were not checked against travel pre-approval forms. The audit also identified instances of split transactions.

Senior management oversight of credit card use was insufficient, as the council had been producing reports for only one manager for his department at the time of the audit. Management reporting for the Chief Finance Officer was implemented following our discussions. There was a lack of periodic review of the council's credit card use, as it was not included in the council's forward program of internal audits.

The audit acknowledges that the council had revised its credit card procedures following our discussions to address our preliminary findings. The council has also set additional credit card blocks in response to this audit. The recommendations below contain only the outstanding items.

Recommendations

Nambucca Valley Council should immediately:

1. ensure cardholders stop sharing their credit card with other staff.

By December 2020, Nambucca Valley Council should:

2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures:

  • reconciliation arrangements for the general manager’s credit card (should the policy continue to allow the general manager to have one)
  • fuel card management policy and procedures

3. ensure that credit card management practices include:

  • monitoring credit card limits in line with financial delegations
  • keeping the credit card register up-to-date, accurate and complete

4. ensure reconciliation involves:

  • scrutinising business-related purposes and incident details of transactions
  • checking travel pre-approval forms (where applicable)
  • recording vehicle details and mileage when credit cards are used in place of fuel cards
  • checking that there are no split transactions

5. develop a plan for periodic reviews (e.g. internal audit) of credit card use and management.

 

Penrith City Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.

Penrith City Council had 167 credit cards at the time of the audit. During our interviews, cardholders described instances of credit card sharing within the council. Credit card sharing is a violation of the council's agreement with its credit card issuer, and it also increases the risk of misuse and fraud.

The audit identified gaps in the council's credit card policy and procedures. There was no documented arrangement for the reconciliation of the general manager's credit card. There was also no guidance on the management of Cabcharge. The credit card register contained inaccurate information, and the council was also unable to provide records of certain transactions requested for review by the audit.

The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. The process did not include adequate compliance checks or reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. The council's policy required prior approval for conferences, accommodation or meal expenses. However, there was no evidence that such approvals were checked during credit card reconciliation. The audit also identified instances of split transactions.

The council implemented monthly reporting for managers in July 2019.

There was a lack of periodic review of the council's credit card use, as it was not included in the council's forward program of internal audits.

Recommendations

Penrith City Council should immediately:

1. ensure cardholders stop sharing their credit card with other staff.

By December 2020, Penrith City Council should:

2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures

  • reconciliation arrangements for the general manager’s credit card
  • Cabcharge management policy and procedures

3. ensure that credit card management practices include:

  • considering the use of credit card blocks
  • keeping the credit card register up-to-date, accurate and complete
  • maintaining complete and accurate records

4. ensure reconciliation involves:

  • scrutinising business-related purposes and incident details of transactions
  • keeping a record of the finance team's review of transactions
  • checking travel pre-approval forms (where applicable)
  • recording vehicle details and mileage when credit cards are used in place of fuel cards
  • checking that there are no split transactions

5. develop a plan for periodic reviews (e.g. internal audit) of credit card use and management.

 

Shellharbour City Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.

Shellharbour City Council had 65 credit cards at the time of the audit. During our interviews, cardholders described instances of credit card sharing within the council. Credit card sharing is a violation of the council's agreement with its credit card issuer, and it also increases the risk of misuse and fraud.

The council's credit card policy lacked clarity in several areas. While the general manager had delegation to authorise the issue of credit cards, the policy did not specify any eligibility criteria. The council did not align credit card limits with financial delegations, and while blocking codes were used, there was no explanation in the policy or procedures. Although the mayor and general manager's credit card transactions were reviewed during the council's monthly Executive Leadership Team meetings, the policy and procedures lacked guidance on the reconciliation of their credit cards. The council also did not have sufficiently detailed documentation for the management of fuel cards.

The audit identified gaps in the council's credit card management practices:

  • The council's training material had not been updated following the review of its credit card policy and procedures.
  • The credit card register contained inaccurate information.
  • The council was unable to provide records of certain transactions requested for review by the audit.
  • The council did not review its credit card policy according to schedule.

The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. The process did not include compliance checks or reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. Purchases of restricted items, such as fuel and fine payments, were not accompanied by adequate justification. The audit identified instances of split transactions, and travel or conference approval forms were also not checked during reconciliation. There was a lack of targeted guidance for approvers in reconciliation, and the council also provided no evidence of the finance team's involvement in the reconciliation of credit card transactions.

The council's Executive Leadership Team was involved in the monthly review of credit card transactions, hence there was management oversight of credit card use. However, there was a lack of periodic review of the council's credit card use, as it was not included in the council's forward program of internal audits.

Recommendations

Shellharbour City Council should immediately:

1. ensure cardholders stop sharing their credit card with other staff.

By December 2020, Shellharbour City Council should:

2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures:

  • eligibility criteria for a credit card
  • the use of blocking codes
  • reconciliation arrangements for the general manager’s credit card
  • fuel card management policy and procedures (with more details)

3. ensure that credit card management practices include:

  • monitoring credit card limits in line with financial delegations
  • providing approvers with targeted guidance
  • keeping the credit card register up-to-date, accurate and complete
  • maintaining complete and accurate records
  • updating the training material to reflect the latest policy and procedures

4. ensure reconciliation involves:

  • scrutinising business-related purposes and incident details of transactions
  • keeping a record of the finance team's review of transactions
  • checking travel pre-approval forms (where applicable)
  • recording vehicle details and mileage when credit cards are used in place of fuel cards
  • ensuring no split transactions

5. develop a plan for periodic reviews (e.g. internal audit) of credit card use and management

6. ensure its credit card policy and procedures are reviewed according to schedule.

Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #340 - released 3 September 2020

Published

Actions for Water conservation in Greater Sydney

Water conservation in Greater Sydney

Environment
Industry
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

This report examines whether the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment, and Sydney Water have effectively progressed water conservation initiatives in Greater Sydney.

The report found that the department and Sydney Water have not effectively investigated, implemented or supported water conservation initiatives in Greater Sydney. The agencies have not met key requirements of the current Metropolitan Water Plan and Sydney Water has not met all its operating licence requirements for water conservation. There has been little policy or regulatory reform, little focus on identifying new options and investments, and limited planning and implementation of water conservation initiatives.

As a result, Greater Sydney's water supply may be less resilient to population growth and climate variability, including drought.

The Metropolitan Water Plan states that water conservation, including recycling water, makes the drinking water supply go further. The plan also states that increasing water conservation efforts may be cheaper than building new large-scale supply options and can delay the timing of investment in new supply infrastructure.

The Auditor-General recommends the department develop a clear policy and regulatory position on water conservation options, improve governance and funding for water conservation, and work with Sydney Water to assess the viability of water conservation initiatives. The report also recommends improvements to Sydney Water’s planning for and reporting on water conservation, including the transparency of this information.

This report is part of a multi-volume series on the theme of water. Refer to ‘Support for regional town water infrastructure’ and ‘Water management and regulation – undertaking in 2020-21’.

Read full report (PDF)

The current, 2017 Metropolitan Water Plan states that water conservation, including recycling water, makes the drinking water supply go further. The plan also states that increasing water conservation efforts may be cheaper than building new large-scale supply options and can delay the timing of investment in new supply infrastructure.

Water conservation refers to water recycling, leakage management and programs to enhance water efficiency. Water recycling refers to both harvesting stormwater for beneficial use and reusing wastewater.

This audit examined whether water conservation initiatives for the Greater Sydney Metropolitan area are effectively investigated, implemented and supported. We audited the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the Department) and the Sydney Water Corporation (Sydney Water), with a focus on activities since 2016.

The Department is responsible for the integrated and sustainable management of the state’s water resources under the Water Management Act 2000, which includes encouraging ‘best practice in the management and use of water’ as an objective. The Department is also responsible for strategic water policy and planning for Greater Sydney, including implementing the Metropolitan Water Plan.

Sydney Water is a state-owned corporation and the supplier of water, wastewater, recycled water and some stormwater services to more than five million people in Greater Sydney. It is regulated by an operating licence that is issued by the Governor on the recommendation of the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART). The Tribunal determines Sydney Water’s maximum prices, reviews its operating licence and monitors compliance. Sydney Water's operating licence and reporting manual set out requirements for its planning, implementing and reporting of water conservation.

From 2007 to 2012, the Climate Change Fund was a source of funds for water conservation activities to be undertaken by the Department and Sydney Water. The Climate Change Fund was established under the Energy and Utilities Administration Act 1987. Four of its six objectives relate to water savings. Water distributors such as Sydney Water can be issued with orders to contribute funds for water-related programs. The Fund is administered by the Department.

In 2016, Sydney Water developed a method for determining whether and how much to invest in water conservation. Known as the ‘Economic Level of Water Conservation’ (ELWC), the method identifies whether it costs less to implement a water conservation initiative than the value of the water saved, in which case the initiative should be implemented.

Conclusion

The Department and Sydney Water have not effectively investigated, implemented or supported water conservation initiatives in Greater Sydney.

The agencies have not met key requirements of the Metropolitan Water Plan and Sydney Water has not met all its operating licence requirements for water conservation. There has been little policy or regulatory reform, little focus on identifying new options and investments, and limited planning and implementation of water conservation initiatives.

As a result, Greater Sydney's water supply may be less resilient to population growth and climate variability, including drought.

The Department has not undertaken an annual assessment of Sydney Water’s level of investment in water conservation against water security risks and the capacity to respond when drought conditions return, as required by the Metropolitan Water Plan. It did not complete identified research and planning activities to support the plan, such as developing and using a framework for assessing the potential for water conservation initiatives for Greater Sydney, and developing a long-term strategy for water conservation and water recycling. It also did not finalise a monitoring, evaluation, reporting and improvement strategy to support the plan.

Sydney Water has been ineffective in driving water conservation initiatives, delivering detailed planning and resourcing for ongoing initiatives, and in increasing its investment in water conservation during drought. These were requirements of the Metropolitan Water Plan. Sydney Water's reporting on water conservation has not met all its operating licence requirements and lacked transparency with limited information on key aspects such as planning for leakage management, how the viability of potential initiatives were assessed, and how adopted initiatives are tracking.

The Department and Sydney Water did not put in place sufficient governance arrangements, including clarifying and agreeing responsibilities for key water conservation planning, delivery and reporting activities. There has also been limited collaboration, capacity building and community engagement to support water conservation, particularly outside times of drought.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Glossary

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #336 - released 23 June 2020

Published

Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

Read full report (PDF)

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.

Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.

Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.

From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.

TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

Published

Actions for Train station crowding

Train station crowding

Transport
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Read full report (PDF)

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

  • patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
  • service disruptions
  • special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans.

Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions.

Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management.

Conclusion

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

 

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

 

Published

Actions for Central Agencies 2019

Central Agencies 2019

Treasury
Premier and Cabinet
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies, namely the Premier and Cabinet, Treasury and Customer Service clusters. There are 191 agencies in these clusters, including government financial, superannuation and insurance entities.

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements for all agencies in the clusters. There were two high risk and 99 moderate risk audit findings on internal controls. Of these, 31 percent were repeat issues, and most related to weaknesses in information technology access controls.

The report notes a number of audit observations including:

  • a qualified opinion on information technology internal controls at an outsourced service provider
  • self-insurance losses of $1.4 billion partly due to unfavourable movements in the risk free discount rate, and increases in workers compensation claims, including psychological injury claims
  • a shortfall (unfunded liability) of $637 million at 30 June 2019 in the Home Building Compensation Fund, due to premiums not being sufficient to meet costs of the scheme
  • agencies self-assessed against the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s ‘Essential 8’ cyber risk mitigation strategies for the first time in 2018-19. Based on their own self assessments, more work needs to be done to improve cyber security resilience.

This report analyses the results of our financial statement audits of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Customer Service clusters for the year ended 30 June 2019. Our key observations are summarised below.

This report provides parliament and other users of the NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • government financial services.

Central agency clusters were significantly impacted by Machinery of Government changes which took effect on 1 July 2019. This report is focussed on agencies now in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Customer Service clusters. Some of these agencies may have been in another cluster during 2018–19. Please refer to the section on Machinery of Government changes for more details.

Central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.

Machinery of Government (MoG) refers to how the government organises the structures and functions of the public service. MoG changes are where the government reorganises these structures and functions and they are given effect by Administrative orders.

The MoG changes announced following the NSW State election on 23 March 2019 significantly impacted Central Agencies’ clusters through Administrative Changes Orders issued on 2 April 2019 and 1 May 2019. These orders took effect on 1 July 2019.

Section highlights

Significant impacts of the 2019 MoG changes included:

  • abolishing the former Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, and creating the Department of Customer Service as the principal agency within the newly established Customer Service cluster
  • transferring Jobs for NSW, Destination NSW and the Western City and Aerotropolis Authority into the Treasury cluster
  • transferring Arts and Culture entities and Aboriginal Affairs NSW into the Premier and Cabinet cluster
  • new responsibilities, risks and challenges for each cluster

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the 2019 financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Customer Service clusters.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 30 June 2019 financial statements of all agencies within the three clusters, and the Legislature.
  • The NSW Self Insurance Corporation (Corporation) 2018–19 financial statements did not include an estimate of the liability for unreported incidents of abuse that have occurred within NSW Government institutions. This is because the Corporation’s financial exposure could not be reliably measured at 30 June 2019. The exposure was instead disclosed as an unquantified contingent liability in the financial statement notes. This liability may be material to the Corporation and the Total State Sector financial statements.
  • We recommend management and those charged with governance review instructions provided to management experts each year, along with other significant accounting judgements.
  • Agencies will be implementing the requirements of new accounting standards shortly. These could significantly impact their financial positions and operating results. We noted instances where agencies need to do more work on their impact assessments to minimise the risk of errors in the 2019–20 financial statements. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Customer Service clusters.

Section highlights

  • The 2018–19 audits found two high risk and 99 moderate risk issues across the agencies. Of these, 31 per cent were repeat issues. The most common repeat issue related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration.
  • NSW Government agency self-assessment results show that the NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs urgent attention.
  • GovConnect received a qualified opinion from the auditor of their service provider, Unisys, over weaknesses in information technology controls.
  • Crown revenues from taxes, fines and fees continued to increase, but this was offset by decreases in stamp duty on property sales.
  • The CTP reform resulted in green slip refunds of $198 million to vehicle owners. Unclaimed refunds are to be returned to motorists through a reduction in green slip premiums.

Background

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.

Section highlights

  • Last year's Auditor-General's Report to Parliament recommended Treasury consult with STC Pooled Fund and PCS Fund Trustees to prescribe prudential standards and requirements. Treasury has not taken specific action to address this recommendation.
    We recommend Treasury formally assess the merits of implementing prudential standards and supervision arrangements, after considering the risks, benefits and costs to scheme members.
  • The NSW Self Insurance Corporation did not include an estimate of the liability for unreported incidents of abuse that have occurred within NSW Government institutions because it could not be reliably measured at 30 June 2019. The amounts involved could be material to the Corporation's and Total State Sector's financial statements.
  • Insurance scheme liabilities were significantly impacted by unfavourable movements in economic assumptions, including a decrease in the risk free discount rate, and adverse changes in non-economic assumptions, such as higher medical costs. 

Appendix one – Timeliness of financial reporting by agency

Appendix two – Management letter findings by agency

Appendix three – Status of 2018 recommendations

Appendix four – Cluster agencies

Appendix five – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Biosecurity risk management

Biosecurity risk management

Industry
Risk

The report focuses on the Department of Primary Industries’ (DPI) as the lead agency for biosecurity in New South Wales. It examines how well the department responds to biosecurity emergencies and manages compliance activities. DPI’s state partners include NSW Health, the NSW Environment Protection Authority, Local Land Services, and Local Control Authorities to manage biosecurity risks in New South Wales.

Biosecurity is the protection of the economy, environment, and community from the negative impacts of pests, diseases, weeds, and contaminants.

National and State governments have defined roles and responsibilities for biosecurity in Australia, reflecting the allocation of powers in the Australian Constitution. The Australian Government has direct responsibility for biosecurity (quarantine) at the international border, and works jointly with the states and territories to set the legislative framework and policy direction for managing biosecurity nationally. It also works with state and territory governments to ensure there is a national approach to biosecurity. State governments manage their biosecurity activities within the national framework.

The Department of Primary Industries (DPI), within the Department of Industry, is the lead agency for biosecurity in NSW. This audit was conducted with the Department of Industry as the auditee. On 2 April 2019 the NSW Government announced it will abolish the Department of Industry. From 1 July 2019 the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment, will have responsibility for biosecurity activities described in this report.

The NSW Biosecurity Strategy 2013–2021 (the Strategy) articulates the NSW Government’s responsibilities for biosecurity within the national legislative framework. Achieving the outcomes of the strategy relies on DPI fulfilling two key responsibilities. Firstly, undertaking direct actions, such as implementing strong regulatory compliance and licensing activities, and managing biosecurity emergency responses. Secondly, leading the response to biosecurity risks by fostering effective collaboration with stakeholders across government, industry, and the wider community.

In NSW, 11 regional Local Land Services (LLS) are the key partners for DPI in meeting its biosecurity responsibilities. Each LLS develops and implements strategies to manage invasive pests and diseases within their regions. They also investigate new reports of pests or diseases in their regions and staff local emergency control centres when an emergency response is triggered.

Local Control Authorities (LCAs) also have a role in biosecurity management. LCAs include local councils and a small number of specialist regional agencies. Their role focuses on strategies to manage weeds within their local areas.

This audit assessed the effectiveness and economy of DPI’s biosecurity emergency response and prevention activities. It looks at DPI’s emergency response practice and its compliance program as a key prevention activity for which DPI has primary responsibility. DPI sets policy and procedural compliance standards for management of biosecurity risks in NSW and also conducts an annual program of property inspections and investigations that ensure that its compliance policies and procedures are being applied effectively.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - Location of selected biosecurity emergency responses

Appendix three - About the audit

Appendix four - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #321 - released 18 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Banner image: ‘Yellow crazy ant’, supplied and permitted for use by NSW Department of Primary Industries under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Licence. Full terms.

Published

Actions for Family and Community Services 2018

Family and Community Services 2018

Community Services
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on the Family and Community Services cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of agencies in the cluster. Cluster entities received unqualified audit opinions for their 30 June 2018 financial statements. Opportunities to improve the quality of financial reporting were identified and reported to management.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Family and Community Services cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides NSW Parliament and other users of the financial statements of Family and Community Services' agencies with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • service delivery.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies' financial statements. Conclusion: Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
Agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s mandatory early close requirements.

Completing other early close procedures was inconsistent and not always supported by adequate evidence.
Conclusion: There are opportunities for agencies to improve the quality of financial reporting by:
  • documenting all significant judgements and assumptions used when preparing the financial statements
  • regularly reconciling inter-agency balances and transactions
  • reconciling key account balances on a timely basis
  • quantifying the impact of new and revised accounting standards.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Agencies completed revaluations of property, plant and equipment and submitted 31 March 2018 financial statements by the due date as required by NSW Treasury.

Agencies submitted year-end financial statements by the statutory deadline.
Conclusion: Early revaluations of property, plant and equipment contributes to agencies meeting the year-end statutory reporting deadline.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Family and Community Services cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each NSW Government cluster.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
The 2017–18 audits reported 47 internal control weaknesses. While none were high risk, there were 15 repeat issues.

Conclusion: Management accepted audit findings and advised they are actioning recommendations. Timely action is important to ensure internal controls operate effectively.

Twenty-two of these internal control weaknesses related to information technology processes and control environment. Conclusion: Control weaknesses in information systems may compromise the integrity and security of financial data used for decision making and financial reporting.

Recommendation: Agencies should strengthen user access administration to prevent inappropriate access to key IT systems by:
  • ensuring privileged user access is limited to those requiring access to maintain the IT systems
  • monitoring privileged user access to address risks from unauthorised activity
  • ensuring IT password settings comply with password policies
  • ensuring timely removal of access to business systems for terminated and casual employees.
The Department, NSW Land and Housing Corporation (LAHC) and three other cluster agencies’ contract registers are incomplete and/or inaccurate. Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their contract registers are complete and accurate so they can more effectively govern contracts and manage compliance obligations.
3.2 Audit Office annual work program
Financial impact of the commissioning approach.

The transfer of disability services to the National Disability Insurance Scheme and other commissioning of service delivery has contributed to a 36 per cent decrease in frontline employee numbers since 2015–16. Similarly, corporate services’ employee numbers reduced by 34 per cent.

The Department’s salary costs have reduced by $232 million or 18 per cent from 2016–17.
Conclusion: The ratio of corporate services employee numbers to support frontline and support services has remained at 1:10 since 2015–16, which indicates restructures have been planned to align with the transfer of disability services.
Impact of the new social housing maintenance contract

Maintenance expenses have increased by about 40 per cent since the new maintenance contract commenced in April 2016. LAHC measures the benefits of the new maintenance contract such as improved tenant satisfaction.
Conclusion: The new maintenance contract has contributed to some positive social outcomes such as tenants being employed by the contractors to conduct maintenance, as call centre operators and in administration. However, more can be done to ensure value for money is being achieved.
ChildStory IT Project

Whilst phase one of the ChildStory IT project went 'live' in 2017–18, the planned timetable has not been met and the revised date for full implementation is end of 2018.

According to the 2014–15 NSW Budget, the budget for ChildStory was $100 million over a four-year period. During the design and implementation stage, this amount was revised to $128 million, with approval of the Expenditure Review Committee. The actual cost incurred over the four years until 30 June 2018, is approximately $131 million.

We identified issues with the data migration from the legacy systems to ChildStory.
Conclusion: To inform future IT projects, we understand the Department is capturing our findings, along with the findings from the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation’s ‘Healthchecks’.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited.

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Central Agencies 2018

Central Agencies 2018

Treasury
Premier and Cabinet
Finance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters. While clear audit opinions were issued on all agency financial statements, the report notes that some complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in agency financial statements submitted for audit, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved. 

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • liquidity risk management
  • government financial services.

The central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.

Central agencies Key central agency responsibilities Cluster responsibilities
The Treasury
  • Financial and economic advisor to NSW Government
  • Manages the NSW Government’s financial resources.

The cluster:

  • provides investment and debt management services though TCorp
  • manages residual business arising from privatisation of government businesses
  • provides insurance and compensation cover, including workers compensation insurance
  • includes NSW Government superannuation funds.
Department of Premier and Cabinet
  • Drives NSW Government’s objectives and sets targets
  • Works with clusters to coordinate policy and achieve NSW Government priorities.

The cluster:

  • includes integrity agencies, such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption, Audit Office of NSW and Ombudsman’s Office
  • other agencies, such as Barangaroo Delivery Authority and Infrastructure NSW.
Department of Finance, Services and Innovation
  • Supports agency service delivery in relation to the key enabling functions of NSW Government, including procurement, property and asset management, ICT and digital innovation.

The cluster:

  • is responsible for state revenue and rental bond administration
  • regulates statutory insurance schemes, workplace safety and consumer protection
  • provides access to a range of NSW Government services via Service NSW
  • manages the NSW Government communications network.
Public Service Commission
  • Works to promote and maintain a strong ethical culture across the government sector and improve the capabilities, performance and configuration of the sector’s workforce to deliver better services to the public.
  • The Public Service Commission is an independent agency within the Premier and Cabinet cluster.

Note: The Audit Office of NSW is an independent agency included in the Premier and Cabinet cluster for administrative purposes, but not commented on in this report.


A full list of agencies that this report covers by relevant cluster is included in Appendix three.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements submitted to the Audit Office.

Complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in some agency financial statements, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved.
Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
Recommendation: Agencies should respond to key accounting issues when they are identified by preparing accounting papers and engaging with Treasury, the Audit Office and their Audit and Risk Committee when these matters are identified.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Most agencies complied with the statutory timeframe for completion of early close procedures, 48 agencies in the Treasury cluster did not comply with the statutory requirement to prepare financial statements, and the audits of nine agencies in the Treasury cluster were not completed within the statutory timeframe.
All financial statement information of the 48 agencies that did not prepare financial statements has been captured in the consolidated financial statements of their parent entity, which was subject to audit.
Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the audit process. The timeliness of financial reporting can be improved by performing more robust early close procedures.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
The 2017–18 audits found one high risk issue and 83 moderate risk issues across the agencies. Nineteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues. Agencies should focus on rectifying repeat issues.
The high risk issue at Service NSW related to several deficiencies in procurement and contract management processes. Service NSW may not be achieving value-for-money
from their procurement and contract management activities. The high risk issue should be rectified as a matter of priority. This includes updating and implementing its procurement, vendor and contract management frameworks and delivering training to key staff involved in procurement and contract management activities.
Property NSW has implemented several controls during the year to rectify the high risk issue identified last year related to its transition to a new property and facility management service provider. However, the service providers performance remains below expectations and there are further opportunities to improve oversight and lift performance. Property NSW can better define roles and accountabilities with the service provider and formalise policies and processes associated with its monitoring and oversight of the service provider.

Implementing relevant KPIs, receiving timely reports and providing timely review and feedback to the service provider may help to lift performance.
GovConnect received unqualified opinions from their service auditor on all business process controls, except for information technology controls provided by Unisys, where a qualified opinion was received from the service auditor. A qualified opinion was received because of several deficiencies in user access controls. These internal control deficiencies increase the risk of unauthorised access to key business systems, and increase audit effort and costs associated with addressing the risks arising from the deficiencies.
3.2 Audit Office annual work program

Remediation of the Barangaroo site is now estimated to cost the Barangaroo Delivery Authority in excess of net $400 million.
 
The increase in the estimate over the last five years is mainly due to the extent of remediation required, as more evidence of contamination has become known.

Measuring the remaining costs to remediate requires the use of estimation techniques and judgements, making the actual outcome inherently uncertain. We reviewed evidence to support the provision for remediation, including future costs estimates and this evidence supported management’s estimate.
The State Insurance Regulatory Authority have administered the refund of $138 million in Green slip refunds to policy holders through Service NSW during 2017–18. At 30 June 2018, $112 million in refunds are yet to be claimed.
 
We reviewed the systems and processes supporting the refund process. While we found that this supports the disbursement of refunds to policyholders there were some deficiencies in Service NSW’s project controls when the program was being developed.

 
Service NSW should apply the lessons learnt from this program to other programs it is delivering or will be delivering for agencies.
Revenue NSW recorded $30.4 billion from taxes, fines and fees in 2017–18 ($30.0 billion in 2016–17) to support the State’s finances. 
 
Crown revenue has steadily increased over the last five years predominately driven by rises in payroll tax and land tax and responsibility for collection of the Emergency Services Levy transferring to Revenue NSW under the Emergency Services Levy Act 2017 effective from July 2017. 
3.3 Managing maintenance
Place Management NSW manages significant commercial and retail leases and maintains public domain spaces and other assets around the harbour foreshore. It has consistently underspent its asset maintenance budget. In 2017–18, asset maintenance expenses were only 34 per cent of budgeted maintenance expense.

Currently, Place Management NSW does not use any ratios or benchmarks to determine the adequacy of its maintenance spend or to monitor whether it is achieving its budgeted maintenance program. 
This may be contributing to a high proportion of unplanned maintenance, which Place Management NSW reports was 38 per cent of total maintenance expense in 2017–18.

Place Management NSW is outsourcing its property and facilities management function from 1 December 2018 to an external service provider. 
 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.

Observation Conclusions and recommendation
5.1 Superannuation funds
The SAS Trustee Corporation (STC) Pooled Fund and the Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation (PCS) Fund are not required to comply with the prudential and reporting standards issued by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). 
However, legislation allows the responsible Minister to prescribe prudential standards, reporting and audit requirements. 
Structured and comprehensive prudential oversight of these Funds is important as they operate in a volatile financial sector, have 103,000 members and manage investments of $43.3 billion.
Recommendation: Treasury should consult with the Trustees of the STC Pooled Fund and PCS Fund to prescribe appropriate prudential standards and requirements, including oversight arrangements.
5.2 Insurance and compensation
Nominal Insurer and NSW Self Insurance Corporation investment performance marginally exceeded benchmark over the past five years. Investment returns can impact on the premiums required to maintain an adequate funding ratio in addition to other factors such as claims experience and discount rates.
The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (Nominal Insurer) and NSW Self Insurance Corporation's net collected premiums and contributions decreased over the past five years.  The insurance schemes' investment performance and stable claim payments have enabled less reliance on net collected premiums and contributions as a source of funding, over the past five years. 
Reforms were introduced to manage the Home Warranty Scheme's financial sustainability risks.  The Home Warranty Scheme has not collected sufficient premiums to fund expected claims costs, since commencing operations in 2011. In 2017–18, the Crown contributed $181 million for historical shortfalls. New reforms started on 1 January 2018 enabling the Scheme to price premiums based on risk. 

Published

Actions for Transport 2018

Transport 2018

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on key observations and findings from the 30 June 2018 financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of the broad range of transport related assets creates challenges.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
2.2 Key accounting issues
Valuation of assets continues to create challenges. Although agencies complied with the requirements of the accounting standards and Treasury policies on valuations, we identified some opportunities for improvements at RMS.

RMS incorporated data from its asset condition assessments for the first time in the valuation methodology which improved the valuation outcome. Overall, we were satisfied with the valuation methodology and key assumptions, but we noted some deficiencies in the asset data in relation to asset component unit rates and old condition data for some components of assets. 

Also, a bypass and tunnel were incorrectly excluded from RMS records and valuation process since 2013. This resulted in an increase for these assets’ value by $133 million.

The valuation inputs for Wetlands and Moorings were revised this year to better reflect the assets' characteristics resulting in a $98.0 million increase.

2.3 Timeliness of financial reporting
Residual Transport Corporation did not submit its financial statements by the statutory reporting deadline. Residual Transport Corporation remained a dormant entity with no transactions for the year ended 30 June 2018.
With the exception of Residual Transport Corporation, all agencies completed early close procedures and submitted financial statements within statutory timeframes. Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the reporting and audit process.
2.4 Financial sustainability
NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations reported negative net assets of $75.7 million and $89,000 respectively at 30 June 2018.  NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations continue to require letters of financial support to confirm their ability to pay liabilities as they fall due. 
2.5 Passenger revenue and patronage
Transport agencies revenue growth increased at a higher rate than patronage. Public transport passenger revenue increased by $114 million (8.3 per cent) in 2017–18, and patronage increased by 37.1 million (5.1 per cent) across all modes of transport based on data provided by TfNSW. 
Negative balance Opal Cards resulted in $3.8 million in revenue not collected in 2017–18 and $7.8 million since the introduction of Opal. A total of 1.1 million Opal cards issued since its introduction have negative balances. Transport for NSW advised it is liaising with the ticketing vendor to implement system changes and are investigating other ways to reduce the occurrences.
2.6 Cost recovery from public transport users
Overall cost recovery from users has decreased. Overall cost recovery from public transport users (on rail and bus services by STA) decreased from 23.2 per cent to 22.4 per cent between 2016–17 and 2017–18. The main reason for the decrease is due to expenditure increasing at a faster rate than revenue in 2017–18.


 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters. 

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls 
There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes related to information technology, employee leave entitlements and asset management. Eighteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues.
3.2 Audit Office Annual work program
The Transport cluster wrote-off over $200 million of assets which were replaced by new assets or technology.

Majority of this write-off was recognised by RMS, with $199 million relating to the write-off of existing assets which have been replaced during the year. 

RailCorp is expected to convert to TAHE from 1 July 2019. Several working groups are considering different aspects of the TAHE transition including its status as a for-profit Public Trading Enterprise and which assets to transfer to TAHE. We will continue to monitor developments on TAHE for any impact to the financial statements.
RMS' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 of $3.4 billion is lower than last year. Sydney Trains' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 increased by 20.6 per cent to $434 million. TfNSW does not quantify its backlog maintenance. TfNSW advised it is liaising with Infrastructure NSW to develop a consistent definition of maintenance backlog across all transport service providers. 
Not all agencies monitor unplanned maintenance across the Transport cluster. Unplanned maintenance can be more expensive than planned maintenance. TfNSW should develop a consistent approach to define, monitor and track unplanned maintenance across the cluster.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Transport cluster and to collate and present service information for different modes of transport in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.