The Audit Office is of the opinion that:

• the sale was delivered with reasonable efficiency and effectiveness

• the sale yielded a satisfactory return to the NSW Government. The possibility for a higher return was limited to about 2% to 4% on gross proceeds of $936m. It would have required setting a higher share price for all investors and adopting a more flexible approach to share allocation

• the Government’s objective to promote community and investor support was achieved. The scale of the demand for script added to costs and was not fully translated into higher proceeds  

• generally satisfactory accountability frameworks were put in place for the sale and no probity concerns were identified

• the frameworks to achieve the Government’s wider reforms of the racing and wagering industries have substantially been implemented.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #61 - released 23 December 1998

Guidelines for staff are available for each of the three schemes, but they do not yet provide staff with sufficient information on how to attract proposals, undertake assessments, negotiate agreements and monitor assistance. Some training of staff responsible for assessing proposals, negotiating agreements and monitoring outcomes has been provided, but needs to be enhanced. In particular, The Audit Office believes that there is insufficient guidance for staff in undertaking economic assessment of proposals. 

There is a prevailing view amongst Department of State and Regional Development staff that guidelines are just that, and need not be followed. It was apparent, however, that assumptions made in assessments were not always appropriate and may lead to poor decisions. Flexibility need not be impaired by requiring greater adherence to guidelines. This would help ensure minimum standards of process and rigour in all cases.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #60 - released 21 December 1998

The Audit Office is of the opinion that there are several features of the current Senior Executive Service (SES) model, or its application, which hinder the capacity of the SES to operate effectively in line with the Government’s stated objectives. The ultimate effect of these features is to reduce the capacity or perceived capacity of the SES to meet the Government’s objectives for the operation of the SES.

Taken overall, difficulties in the SES identified by the audit included: uncertainty caused by the way some contracts have been applied in practice, removal for reasons other than poor performance, informal strategies such as using restructuring to “terminate contracts and to move people in and out of positions regardless of their formal reported performance” (Section 5.4), inconsistently applied rules about selection/recruitment, appointment and removal of the SES, an imbalance between CES responsibility to the Minister as the employer/reviewer with their responsibility not to act in a political or partial manner, apparent lack of rigour in, value of and Ministerial accountability for CES performance review processes and failure to implement an adequate system of rewards and sanctions related to performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.1 - released 17 December 1998

This Performance Audit Report, prepared by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) on behalf of The Audit Office of New South Wales (NSW), is a study of the NSW Senior Executive Service (SES).

It found the dissonance between where optimal executive performance might take place on a performance spectrum, encompassing the formal SES and less formal political arenas, is canvassed. The critical point here is that this arena, between the informal political actions and the application of formal SES structures, where much of the important decision making takes place, will always be difficult to manage. Transparency in decision making processes where non partisan and partisan actions are clearly defined seems a primary essential element of performance if the integrity of the NSW SES is to be maintained.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.2 - released 17 December 1998

The decision to seek development of Walsh Bay without a Master Plan and/or detailed study as to the state of the precinct presented significant problems throughout the life of the project. Now, four years later, negotiations still continue on the details of the final scheme. Based on the latest estimates, it will not provide a financial return as was originally expected. The audit found no evidence to indicate why the former Government wished to expedite Walsh Bay, but it is aware that there was an election due. Many of the problems which have been encountered could have been avoided with more careful and more extensive consideration at the start, particularly in the light of Property Services Group's recommendations.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #58 - released 17 December 1998

NSW Health has progressed in identifying and addressing key R&D issues in a complex and difficult environment. The Infrastructure Grants Program (IGP) is an innovative program and reflects a commitment by Government to support research infrastructure. The IGP has as its aims the provision of significant funding accompanied by clear research objectives and criteria for accountability and introduces a rational basis for the allocation of infrastructure grants.

While NSW Health has progressed, there is an opportunity to make the IGP more efficient and effective. These opportunities are in the areas of addressing longer term planning issues in health, streamlining and clarifying eligibility and selection criteria, improving decision-making structures and processes and improving accountability.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #56 - released 25 November 1998

At the request of the Department of Gaming and Racing, the audit reviewed the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation and management of casino surveillance undertaken pursuant to the Casino Control Act, 1992 (the Act).

Implicitly the Act requires an effective level of cooperation and coordination between the agencies to achieve their statutory roles and responsibilities. However, The Audit Office is of the opinion that this has not been achieved. As a consequence, the efficiency and effectiveness of the surveillance roles and processes carried out under the Act can be improved.

Revision is required to the surveillance methodology and its implementation, to the skills base within Director of Casino Surveillance (DCS) and the underlying working and to organisational arrangements between and within DCS and the New South Wales Casino Control Authority. Until such revision has been finalised, it is not possible to determine the level of resources or type of surveillance that needs to be undertaken and funded.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #50 - released 10 June 1998

In most organisations with a board or committee, there was confusion about the respective roles, powers, responsibilities and accountabilities of the Minister/s, the board and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). There are a wide variety of governance arrangements in operation across the spectrum of boards and committees. This is partly due to differing arrangements set out in relevant legislation and gaps in legislative detail which have been addressed in a variety of ways.

Under current arrangements, governing boards of SOCs have accountabilities to Shareholding Ministers and Portfolio Ministers, as well as to Ministers who are responsible for industry-wide regulation. Non-corporatised Government businesses have different accountability and control arrangements. The large number of statutory and nonstatutory bodies and authorities have a wide array of governance arrangements. As a result of uncertainty and confusion on governance aspects, The Audit Office observed that many governing boards operate as high level advisory management committees. The audit also found that board and committee practices fell short of standards expected in a professional boardroom culture.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #49 - released 7 April 1998

While central communications units are responsible for broadcasting calls from the public for assistance to police cars; these units have no authority over those police cars. And while local police commands are responsible for police deployment, they have no ready capability to communicate with their police cars. The report also found that Local police management have limited contemporaneous knowledge of what their response resources are doing, and little useful management information that can tell them what they have done over prior periods. Current systems of response fail to distinguish adequately between calls of various types. All tend to be allocated for response by a police car, even where the caller’s needs may be equally well met by alternatives which are less resource intensive.

The NSW Police Service has begun to address these limitations. But it understands that more needs to be done before the service can realise improvements in response performance, and evidence levels of efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the NSW Police Service should: formulate a strategy for improving response overall, before it commits itself to major new investments in this area and, as part of this strategy it should clarify accountabilities throughout the response “system” and develop a framework of indicators and standards to help it (and the public) monitor response performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #47 - released 10 March 1998

This audit examines the processes which led to the Government’s decision to demolish and sell the East Fairfield (Villawood) housing estate at a cost of nearly $32m gross ($17m net). In doing so, the audit focuses on whether the decision process demonstrates that it is an efficient and effective use of government funds.

The audit raises a number of concerns about the decision-making process. Although demolition and redevelopment may have been the most efficient and effective outcome, The Audit Office is not able to confirm this from the evidence presented. Audit found that the process used to arrive at this decision was not transparent, nor was it adequately justified by available evidence.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #46 - released 29 January 1998