The Audit Office is of the opinion that the arrangements for the enforcement of parking are not as efficient and effective as they could be and should be reviewed. Accountability of the enforcement role needs to be improved. Currently there is minimal monitoring of the success or otherwise of the enforcement function.

There is a need to address and assign more closely the current responsibilities for enforcement arrangements between the Police Service and councils. There is also a need to articulate more clearly the objectives to be achieved from the legislation and their relative priorities.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #68 - released 24 November 1999

The Audit Office is of the opinion that cost of administration at the University of Western Sydney is unnecessarily high and could be reduced. In addition, its approach to administration can place barriers in the way of potential students and other users of the University. To its credit, the University has recognised that administrative costs are high and is developing plans to reduce those costs. The Audit Office considers that there is now an urgent need to accelerate those activities and to move from planning to implementation. Further delays will be costly and will affect the service the University provides to its customers, the students and other users.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #67 - released 17 November 1999

The Audit Office found no evidence that the Office of the Protective Commissioner (OPC) or the Office of the Public Guardian (OPG) decisions in respect of cases reviewed were flawed, but areas needing improvement were identified. 

Currently there is no simple, inexpensive external appeal mechanism available to challenge or review decisions of OPC/OPG. Appeals are available to the Supreme Court. However, this seems to be widely regarded as intimidating, inappropriate to the nature of the matters involved, time consuming and expensive. The need for a simpler, quicker and more accessible external review mechanism is the most crucial issue identified by The Audit Office in this audit.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #66 - released 28 September 1999

The audit found that the court system in NSW does not possess a comprehensive management framework and, with some exception in relation to the District Court, there is a distinct lack of any reporting system in a management sense. There is little evidence of realistic objectives, forward plans, or clear definition of responsibilities for performance, and there have been few reviews of performance. There is no assessment of waiting time performance in relation to other measures of court performance.

Whilst it is recognised that the Attorney General’s Department and the courts have taken positive steps to improve court waiting times, The Audit Office considers that a more systematic approach is needed.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #65 - released 3 September 1999

A lot of groundwork has been done in NSW to move towards improved performance accountability through the use of key performance indicators (KPIs). Recent initiatives have focussed attention on improving the quality and consistency of performance measurement. This audit concludes that, taken overall, NSW has a considerable array of performance information publicly reported. However, there are two substantial deficiencies with present arrangements, these being what individual agencies report, and how they measure what they choose to report, varies across the NSW public sector.

Although there are efforts towards establishing a Government-wide approach, currently, no overall approach nor any overall guiding framework, standards or methodology have been introduced to engender consistency in the types of KPIs reported by agencies or the methods used to produce such information. NSW performance reporting systems also lack independent assessment and validation of reported information. As a result, whatever information is reported has not been subject to the rigour of independent review. This would not be tolerated for financial information and it is anomalous that performance information goes unvalidated.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #64 - released 31 August 1999

The Audit Office is of the view that the intention to achieve greater accountability for, and transparency in, public school performance is highly commendable. To date, these provisions have not been imposed by the Government on private schools even where public funds are provided to such schools.

The model however has fallen short of its potential because the reporting protocols allow principals and self-evaluation committees the scope to determine what, in their view, is ‘significant’ for their school and how they will report on it. Although the Department has set out a common reporting format to be used, and schools have been given specific directions on what information should be reported, in the reports reviewed by The Audit Office it was apparent that the definition of ‘significant’ and the clarity of reporting varied between schools.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #63 - released 12 May 1999

The Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) has made a concerted and commendable effort in preparing the Games Budget within the definition of expenditure for the Games approved by the Government. OCA has also effectively used the definition of cost to control claims made by government agencies against the estimates to host the Games.

However, because the Games Budget was prepared in accordance with that definition, the Games Budget arguably does not capture the overall expenditure associated with the Games, as required by the Olympic Co-Ordination Authority Act. Accordingly, the taxpayers of NSW do not have a complete picture of the costs for hosting the Games.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #62 - released 14 January 1999

The Audit Office is of the opinion that:

• the sale was delivered with reasonable efficiency and effectiveness

• the sale yielded a satisfactory return to the NSW Government. The possibility for a higher return was limited to about 2% to 4% on gross proceeds of $936m. It would have required setting a higher share price for all investors and adopting a more flexible approach to share allocation

• the Government’s objective to promote community and investor support was achieved. The scale of the demand for script added to costs and was not fully translated into higher proceeds  

• generally satisfactory accountability frameworks were put in place for the sale and no probity concerns were identified

• the frameworks to achieve the Government’s wider reforms of the racing and wagering industries have substantially been implemented.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #61 - released 23 December 1998

Guidelines for staff are available for each of the three schemes, but they do not yet provide staff with sufficient information on how to attract proposals, undertake assessments, negotiate agreements and monitor assistance. Some training of staff responsible for assessing proposals, negotiating agreements and monitoring outcomes has been provided, but needs to be enhanced. In particular, The Audit Office believes that there is insufficient guidance for staff in undertaking economic assessment of proposals. 

There is a prevailing view amongst Department of State and Regional Development staff that guidelines are just that, and need not be followed. It was apparent, however, that assumptions made in assessments were not always appropriate and may lead to poor decisions. Flexibility need not be impaired by requiring greater adherence to guidelines. This would help ensure minimum standards of process and rigour in all cases.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #60 - released 21 December 1998

The Audit Office is of the opinion that there are several features of the current Senior Executive Service (SES) model, or its application, which hinder the capacity of the SES to operate effectively in line with the Government’s stated objectives. The ultimate effect of these features is to reduce the capacity or perceived capacity of the SES to meet the Government’s objectives for the operation of the SES.

Taken overall, difficulties in the SES identified by the audit included: uncertainty caused by the way some contracts have been applied in practice, removal for reasons other than poor performance, informal strategies such as using restructuring to “terminate contracts and to move people in and out of positions regardless of their formal reported performance” (Section 5.4), inconsistently applied rules about selection/recruitment, appointment and removal of the SES, an imbalance between CES responsibility to the Minister as the employer/reviewer with their responsibility not to act in a political or partial manner, apparent lack of rigour in, value of and Ministerial accountability for CES performance review processes and failure to implement an adequate system of rewards and sanctions related to performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.1 - released 17 December 1998