Reports
Actions for Planning and Environment 2017
Planning and Environment 2017
The following report highlights results of financial audits of agencies in the Planning and Environment cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of these agencies.
The audits were completed for most agencies in the cluster and unqualified audit opinions issued. Issues identified during the financial statement audits of seven small agencies delayed their finalisation beyond the statutory deadline, and six of these remain incomplete. Apart from these small agencies, the quality of financial reporting across the cluster remained at a high standard.
This report provides Parliament and others with the audit results, observations and recommendations for Planning and Environment cluster agencies. The report has been structured into two chapters focussing on financial reporting and controls and service delivery.
The Planning and Environment cluster plays a role in ensuring each community across New South Wales receives the services and infrastructure it needs.
This chapter outlines our audit observations and recommendations related to financial reporting and controls of Planning and Environment cluster agencies for 2016–17.
Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
2.1 Quality of financial reporting |
|
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 39 of the 45 cluster agencies' financial statements. |
Issues identified during the financial statement audits of seven smaller agencies delayed their completion. Six audits remain incomplete at the date of this report. Apart from these seven small agency audits, the quality of financial reporting across the cluster remained at a high standard. |
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting |
|
Seven agencies' financial statement audits were not completed by the statutory deadline with six audits incomplete at the date of this report. |
Issues identified during the financial statement audits of seven smaller agencies delayed their finalisation beyond the statutory deadline. These agencies would benefit from performing additional early close procedures in future reporting periods. |
2.3 Financial and sustainability analysis |
|
Water and Electricity utility agencies continue to operate with low liquidity ratios. |
A liquidity ratio below one is an indicator that an entity may not be able to pay its debts as and when they fall due. Whilst liquidity ratios were below one, utility agencies demonstrated they can continue to support ongoing operations due to:
|
2.5 Internal controls |
|
One in six internal control weaknesses reported in 2016–17 were repeat issues. |
Delays in implementing audit recommendations can prolong the risk of fraud and error. Recommendation (repeat issue): anagement letter recommendations to address internal control weaknesses should be actioned promptly, with a focus on addressing repeat issues. |
Nine of these internal control weaknesses related to the creation, modification, deletion and review of user access to financial systems. |
These control weaknesses may compromise the integrity and security of financial data. Recommendation (repeat issue): Management of user administration over financial systems should be strengthened to prevent inappropriate access to financial information. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations relating to service delivery for 2016–17.
Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
3.1 Premier's and State priorities |
|
The Planning and Environment cluster is responsible for delivering five Premier's and State priorities. |
One priority target was achieved in 2016–17, two targets are on track to be achieved and progress towards one target slowed. Progress against one target cannot be determined. |
3.2 Planning |
|
Housing Completion |
|
There were 63,506 housing completions in 2016–17. This was 4.1 per cent above the Premier’s priority target of delivering 61,000 housing completions per year. |
The Australian Bureau of Statistics data shows the housing completions target was achieved in 2016–17. |
Housing supply |
|
The number of approvals for new houses in 2016–17 was 72,472 against the State priority target of more than 50,000 approvals per year. |
The Australian Bureau of Statistics data indicates the housing approvals target was achieved in 2016–17. |
Major project assessment |
|
State significant developments are not clearly defined for the purposes of reporting against the State priority target. | The Department of Planning and Environment will clarify with the Department of Premier and Cabinet which developments are captured by the State priority target. |
The Department of Planning and Environment’s data shows the time taken to assess complex State significant developments increased by 16 per cent in 2016–17 while the time taken to assess less complex developments reduced by 20 per cent. | The Department of Planning and Environment considers it is on track to meet the State priority target of halving the time taken to assess State significant developments, despite uncertainty over the target measure. |
Housing acceleration fund |
|
Program business cases were not developed for projects in Housing Acceleration Fund Rounds 1 to 4. The Department advised a program business case will be developed for Housing Acceleration Fund Round 5 projects. |
A program business case is necessary to ensure related projects are evaluated, managed and coordinated effectively. |
A benefit realisation review process has not yet been approved for Housing Acceleration Fund projects. The Department of Planning and Environment advised it is developing a benefit realisation review process. |
A benefit realisation review process is necessary to determine whether funded projects achieved intended outcomes. |
Greater Sydney Commission |
|
The Greater Sydney Commission forecasts a further 725,000 dwellings in the greater Sydney region will be required up to 2036 to meet housing demand. | In response to population growth, the Commission has set a five-year housing supply target of 189,100 houses across the five Greater Sydney Commission districts. |
ePlanning system |
|
The Department of Planning and Environment did not perform a benefit realisation review for phase one of the ePlanning project. It has committed to performing a benefit realisation review after completion of phase two in 2018. | It cannot be determined if phase one of the project delivered expected outcomes as a benefit realisation review was not performed. |
3.3. Environment and Heritage |
|
Litter volume in New South Wales was 6.6 litres per 1,000 square metres in 2016–17, an increase of 16 per cent from the prior year. This is above the Premier's priority litter volume target of 4.2 litres per 1,000 square metres by 2020. | The Environment Protection Authority's data indicates the progress towards the target of reducing the volume of litter by 40 per cent by 2020 has slowed. |
The NSW Government plans to invest $240 million to facilitate strategic biodiversity conservation on private land. | Performance measures have not yet been developed for the private land conservation program. |
3.4 Water |
|
IPART reduced water usage charges for most Sydney Water Corporation customers in 2016–17. | Water usage prices in New South Wales compare favourably to larger water utilities in other jurisdictions. |
Hunter Water Corporation's water recycling and water conservation performance has been stable over recent years. The volume of Sydney Water Corporation’s recycled water reduced by 12 per cent in 2016–17 compared to the previous year. |
Sydney Water Corporation experienced reduced industry demand for recycled water. Several large industrial customers relocated away from Sydney. |
3.5 Arts and culture |
|
A State priority target is to increase overall attendance at cultural venues and events in New South Wales by 15 per cent from 2014–15 levels by 2019. | The Department of Planning and Environment's data indicates overall attendance increased by 16 per cent in 2015–16, although attendance fluctuated across individual venues and events. This indicates progress towards achieving the overall target by 2019. |
Actions for Report on Education 2017
Report on Education 2017
The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford released her report on the results of the financial audits of agencies in the Education cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of these agencies.
'I am pleased to report that unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements for all agencies in the Education cluster', the Auditor-General said. 'The quality and timeliness of financial reporting remains strong'.
Actions for Managing demand for ambulance services 2017
Managing demand for ambulance services 2017
NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives over the past decade to better manage the number of unnecessary ambulance responses and transports to hospital emergency departments. However, there is no overall strategy to guide the development of these initiatives nor do NSW Ambulance's data systems properly monitor their impact. As a result, the Audit Office was unable to assess whether NSW Ambulance's approach to managing demand is improving the efficiency of ambulance services.
NSW Ambulance uses a telephone referral system to manage triple zero calls from people with medical issues that do not require an ambulance. This has the potential to achieve efficiency improvements but there are weaknesses in NSW Ambulance's use and monitoring of this system. Paramedics are now able to make decisions about whether patients need transport to a hospital emergency department. NSW Ambulance does not routinely measure or monitor the decisions paramedics make, so it does not know whether these decisions are improving efficiency. Extended Care Paramedics who have additional skills in diagnosing and treating patients with less urgent medical issues were introduced in 2007. NSW Ambulance analysis indicates that these paramedics have the potential to improve efficiency, but have not been used as effectively as possible.
Our 2013 audit of NSW Ambulance found that accurate monitoring of activity and performance was not being conducted. More than four years later, this remains the case.
NSW Ambulance has recognised the need to change the way it manages demand and has developed initiatives that have the potential to improve efficiency. However, there are significant weaknesses in the strategy for and implementation of its demand management initiatives.
NSW Ambulance has identified the goal of moving from an emergency transport provider to a mobile health service and developed several initiatives to support this. Its demand management initiatives have the potential to contribute to the broader policy directions for the health system in New South Wales. However, there is no clear overall strategy guiding these initiatives and their implementation has been poor.
NSW Ambulance's reasons for changing its approach to demand management have not been communicated proactively to the community. Demand management initiatives that have been operating for over a decade still do not have clear performance measures or targets. Project management of new initiatives has been inadequate, with insufficient organisational resources to oversee them and inadequate engagement with other healthcare providers.
NSW Ambulance uses an in-house Vocational Education and Training course to recruit some paramedics, as well as recruiting paramedics who have completed a university degree. No other Australian ambulance services continue to provide their own Vocational Education and Training qualifications. Paramedics will need more support in several key areas to be able to fulfil their expanded roles in providing a mobile health service. Performance and development systems for paramedics are not used effectively. Up to date technology would help paramedics make better decisions and improve NSW Ambulance's ability to monitor demand management activity.
There are gaps in NSW Ambulance's oversight of the risks of some of the initiatives it has introduced, particularly its lack of information on the outcomes for patients who are not transported to hospital. Weaknesses in the way NSW Ambulance uses its data limit its ability to properly assess the risks of the demand management initiatives it has introduced.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #295 - released 13 December 2017
Actions for Health 2017
Health 2017
The following report highlights results of the financial audits of entities in the NSW health cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of these entities.
The report also includes a range of findings on service delivery. Overall, NSW Health is achieving most of their targets. Some local health districts are continuing to experience increased demand for their services and are finding it more difficult to meet their targets. For example, three local health districts had not achieved some emergency department response time targets for three consecutive years.
1. Financial reporting and controls
Financial Reporting |
All health cluster entities received unqualified audit opinions and the quality of financial reporting remains high across the cluster. Early close procedures were largely completed and all financial statements were submitted by the deadlines. |
Financial performance |
Overall, NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $407 million in 2016–17. Eleven local health districts/specialty networks recorded operating deficits in 2016–17, four more than 2015–16. Expenses across NSW Health increased by 4.4 per cent in 2016–17 (6.0 per cent in 2015–16), lower than the expected long term annual expense growth rate. |
Excess annual leave | Managing excess annual leave is a continual challenge for NSW Health, with thirty–five per cent of the workforce having excess balances. |
Overtime payments | NSW Health entities are generally managing overtime well; however NSW Ambulance’s overtime payments, $74.6 million in 2016–17, remain significantly higher than other health entities. |
Time and leave recording practices | Unapproved employee timesheets continue to be a problem for health entities. Weak timesheet approval controls increase the risk of staff claiming and being paid for hours they have not worked. There is also an increased risk of high volumes of roster adjustments, manual pays, salary overpayments and leave not being recorded accurately. |
2. Service Delivery
Service Agreements | Most of the service agreements between the Secretary of NSW Health and health entities were signed earlier than prior years. |
Performance monitoring | Five NSW Health entities are not meeting the Ministry of Health’s performance expectations at 30 June 2017. |
Emergency department performance | Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Health, on average, met emergency department triage response time targets across all triage categories for the fourth consecutive year. |
Ambulance response times | Data provided by the Ministry shows NSW Ambulance response times for imminently life‑threatening incidents of 7.5 minutes in 2016–17 was within the Ministry’s target of 10.0 minutes. Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Ambulance response times for potentially life‑threatening incidents did not improve in 2016–17. The median response time of 11.1 minutes in 2016–17 was similar to 2015–16 (11.0 minutes). This is despite the number of Priority 1 responses reducing by 4.3 per cent. |
Unplanned hospital re-admissions | Data provided by the Ministry shows eight local health districts achieved the Ministry of Health’s unplanned hospital re‑admissions target in 2016–17. The target is for local health districts to reduce re‑admission rates from the previous financial year. |
This report sets out the results of the 30 June 2017 financial statement audits of Health cluster entities.
The report has been structured into two chapters focusing on:
- Financial reporting and controls
- Service delivery.
This chapter outlines audit observations, conclusions and recommendations related to financial reporting and internal controls of entities for 2016-17.
Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
2.1 Quality of financial reporting |
|
All cluster entities received unqualified audit opinions and misstatements identified in financial statements fell. | The quality of financial reporting remains high across the cluster. |
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting |
|
Early close procedures were largely completed and all financial statements were submitted by the deadlines. | Health entities controlled by the Ministry of Health continued submitting their financial statements well ahead of the statutory deadlines. |
2.4 Financial and sustainability analysis |
|
NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $407 million in 2016–17.
|
The statewide operating surplus was $84 million higher than 2015–16. Net surpluses contribute to NSW Health’s ability to invest in new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments. The 2016–17 financial results were once again impacted by the NSW Government initiative to improve cash management across the sector. |
2.5 Performance against budget | |
Ten local health districts/specialty networks’ expense budget variance was outside performance expectations agreed with the Ministry at the beginning of 2016–17. | The Ministry continues to manage performance across NSW Health to improve the accuracy of budgeting practices. |
2.7 Human Resources | |
Thirty-five per cent of NSW Health’s workforce have excess annual leave balances.
NSW Ambulance had the highest average sick leave rate in NSW Health of 85.2 hours per FTE in 2016–17 (78.7 hours in 2015–16). This was higher than the statewide average of 62.1 hours (62.0 hours in 2015–16).
Unapproved employee timesheets continue to be a problem for health entities. Weak timesheet approval controls increase the risk of staff claiming and being paid for hours they have not worked.
|
Managing excess annual leave is a continual challenge for health entities.
Recommendation: NSW Ambulance should further review the effectiveness of its rostering practices to identify strategies to reduce excessive overtime payments. Recommendation: Health entities should conduct a risk‑based review of time and leave recording practices to ensure control weaknesses are identified and fixed. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations relating to service delivery for 2016–17.
Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
3.1 Service agreements in NSW Health | |
Most of the service agreements between the Secretary of NSW Health and health entities were signed earlier than prior years. Thirteen local health districts/specialty networks signed their service agreements by the 31 July 2017 due date. This is a significant improvement with only seven local health districts/specialty networks meeting the date in 2015–16. |
Having service agreements signed as close as possible to the start of each year provides the Ministry and NSW Health entities with clarity around roles, responsibilities, performance measures, budgets, and service volumes and levels. |
3.2 Performance of NSW Health entities | |
Five NSW Health entities were not meeting the Ministry’s performance expectations at 30 June 2017. | The Ministry is managing the five entities in accordance with its performance review process. |
3.4 Emergency department response times | |
Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Health again, on average, met emergency department triage response time targets across all triage categories for the fourth consecutive year. The Ministry manages performance across NSW Health to ensure patients presenting at emergency departments receive care in a clinically appropriate timeframe. |
Based on the Ministry’s data, local health districts/specialty networks are, on average, meeting triage targets despite increasing emergency department attendances. The data shows eleven local health districts met all triage targets in 2016–17, compared to eight in |
3.5 Emergency treatment performance | |
The Ministry manages public patient access to emergency services in public hospitals. It has an emergency treatment performance target of 81 per cent of patients leaving emergency departments within four hours. |
Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Health maintained its overall emergency treatment performance in 2016–17, but did not achieve its target. The State average emergency treatment performance was 74.2 per cent (74.2 per cent in 2015–16). Based on the Ministry’s data, only four local health districts achieved the target in 2016–17, five in |
3.6 Ambulance response times | |
NSW Ambulance has a response time target of 10.0 minutes for imminently life‑threatening incidents in New South Wales. | Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Ambulance response times for imminently life-threatening incidents of 7.5 minutes in 2016–17 was within the Ministry’s target. |
3.7 Transfer of care | |
The Ministry has a target of 90 per cent for the number of ambulance arrivals within a 30 minute ‘transfer of care’ timeframe. | Data provided by the Ministry indicates the rate of ambulance arrivals within a 30 minute 'transfer of care' timeframe improved from 87.6 per cent in 2015–16 to 91.7 per cent in 2016–17, exceeding the Ministry’s target. |
3.8 Average length of stay in hospital | |
Based on the Ministry’s 2016–17 data, the average length of stay for acute episodes was 3.0 days. The average length of stay in New South Wales hospitals is lower than the national average of 3.2 days (in 2015–16). | The Ministry’s data shows the average length of stay by patients for acute episodes has remained stable in New South Wales hospitals for four years. |
3.9 Elective surgery access performance | |
Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Health continues to manage waiting times for elective surgery in public hospitals. | The Ministry’s data shows NSW Health improved on‑time admission of patients for elective surgery in 2016–17 despite a 1.8 per cent increase in admissions. While the result improved, only one of the three targets for elective surgery waiting times was met in 2016–17. |
3.10 Unplanned hospital re-admissions | |
Data provided by the Ministry indicates NSW Health, on average, did not reduce the rate of unplanned hospital re‑admissions in 2016–17. The Ministry has a target of reducing unplanned hospital re‑admissions compared to the previous financial year. Low re‑admission rates may indicate good patient management practices and post-discharge care. |
The Ministry’s data shows eight local health district met the target to reduce the rate of re‑admissions compared to the previous financial year. The statewide average rate increased from 6.3 per cent to 6.4 per cent. |
3.11 Post discharge care for acute mental health patients | |
NSW Health has a goal to increase community-based care to acute mental health patients after they are discharged. Continuity of care in the community can lead to reduced symptom severity, lower re‑admission rates, and improved quality of life. | The Ministry’s 2016–17 data shows the statewide average for post discharge follow-up of acute mental health patients within seven days was 70.0 per cent (66.0 per cent in 2015–16). The statewide average improved and met the NSW Health target of 70 per cent. Nine local health districts exceeded the NSW Health target. |
3.12 Mental health acute re-admissions | |
NSW Health has a goal to reduce acute public sector mental health re-admissions. High re‑admission rates may indicate deficiencies in inpatient treatment and follow up care. | The Ministry’s data shows twelve local health districts did not achieve the NSW Health target of 13 per cent mental health acute re‑admissions in 2016–17. |
3.13 Unplanned and emergency re‑presentations | |
NSW Health aims to reduce the number of unplanned and emergency re‑presentations to emergency departments. The Ministry’s 2016–17 data shows the State average of emergency department re‑presentations decreased marginally from 5.0 per cent in 2015–16 to 4.9 per cent. |
Patients attending rural emergency departments are more likely to re‑present within 48 hours of being discharged than those in regional or metropolitan emergency departments. |
3.14 Healthcare associated infection | |
The national target for the rate of Staphylococcus aureus (golden staph) bloodstream infection is two cases per 10,000 bed days. | Data provided by the Ministry indicates the rate of golden staph bloodstream infection in New South Wales hospitals continues to be well below the target and national benchmark at 0.72 cases per 10,000 bed days in 2016–17 (0.75 in 2015–16). |
3.15 Patient experience and satisfaction | |
The Bureau of Health Information analyses and reports on the results of patient surveys. The Bureau’s survey shows 65 per cent of adult admitted patients rated the care they received in hospital as ‘very good’ and 29 per cent rated it as ‘good’. |
NSW Health recognises that patient surveys are an important feedback mechanism on the health care system that can only come from personal experiences. |
Actions for Government Advertising: Campaigns for 2015–16 and 2016–17
Government Advertising: Campaigns for 2015–16 and 2016–17
The 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' and the 'Dogs deserve better' government advertising campaigns complied with the Government Advertising Act and most elements of the Government Advertising Guidelines.
However, some advertisements were designed to build support for government policy and used subjective or emotive messages. This is inconsistent with the requirement in the Government Advertising Guidelines for 'objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner'.
Advertisements in the 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' campaign used subjective statements such as 'the system is broken' and 'brighter future'. While advertisements in the 'Dogs deserve better' campaign used confronting imagery such as gun targets, blood smears and gravestones.
The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit in relation to at least one government advertising campaign in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether advertising campaigns were carried out effectively, economically and efficiently and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines). In this audit, we examined two campaigns:
- the ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ campaign run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet
- the ‘Dogs deserve better’ campaign run by the Department of Justice.
Section 6 of the Act details the specific prohibitions on political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed so as to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.
The ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ government advertising campaign was run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet in four phases from August 2015 to May 2016. The total cost of the campaign was over $4.5 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.
Two factors potentially compromised value for money for the campaign. The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work to be undertaken, which was substantially greater than initially quoted. Further, the department did not meet all recommended timeframes to minimise media booking costs for all phases of the campaign.
The campaign did not comply with all administrative requirements in all phases. Advertising for Phase 1 commenced before the compliance certificate was signed. There was no evidence that a compliance certificate was signed for Phase 2 extension. The cost benefit analyses for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension did not sufficiently consider alternatives to advertising, as is required by the Government Advertising Guidelines.
Advertisements adopted subjective messages designed to build public support for council mergers and directed audiences to websites for more detailed information. Campaign research identified statements that were most likely to reduce resistance to mergers. Some advertising content used subjective language, which we consider inconsistent with the requirement for ‘objective presentation’. Evaluations of advertising effectiveness also measured the success of the advertisements in increasing public support for council mergers.
No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act
Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:
- be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
- contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
- contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.
We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.
Request for quotes to design advertisement did not reflect the full scope required
The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work that was to be undertaken, and this created a risk to achieving value for money. The Office of Local Government sought quotes for design of a television advertisement only. It did not request an estimate for radio, online advertisements, or translation for linguistically diverse audiences, which were ultimately required for the campaign.
A full and fair assessment of which supplier could provide the best value for money could not be made given that the quotes obtained did not reflect the full scope of work. The final amount paid for the design of Phase 1 was 2.7 times the original quote. It is possible that another supplier that provided a quote could have provided overall better value for money.
The Office of Local Government continued to use the Phase 1 supplier for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension (Exhibit 4). Where there are other suppliers that could feasibly compete for a contract, direct negotiation increases the risk the agency has not obtained the best value for money. The department advised that it continued with the same agency to avoid costs involved in briefing a new agency on the campaign.
The ‘Dogs deserve better’ government advertising campaign was run by the Department of Justice from August 2016, after the government announced its decision to prohibit greyhound racing, and was terminated in October 2016 after a change of government policy. The campaign had a budget of $1.6 million, with an actual spend of $1.3 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.
The Secretary of the department determined that urgent circumstances existed that required advertising to commence prior to completing a cost benefit analysis and peer review. There was a concern that industry participants may make impulse decisions to destroy greyhounds without further information on support services; there was also an identified need to promote public greyhound adoptions.
Phase 1 advertisements focused on explaining the reasons for the prohibition on greyhound racing with a reference to a website for further information. While industry participants were identified as the primary audience, media expenditure was not specifically targeted to this group. Phase 2 advertisements more effectively addressed the originally identified ‘urgent needs’ of providing information on support services for greyhound owners and information on how the public could adopt a greyhound.
The urgency to advertise potentially compromised value for money. The department did not use price competition when selecting a creative supplier due to a concern this would add to timeframes. Further, the department did not meet recommended timeframes to minimise media booking costs.
We identified three other areas in Phase 1 advertisements that were inconsistent with government advertising requirements. Advertisements used provocative language and confronting imagery, which we consider to be inconsistent with the requirement for ‘objective presentation’. Two statements presented as fact based on the Special Commission’s Inquiry report were inaccurate; one of these was due to a calculation error. Radio advertisements did not clearly identify that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government for the first few days of the campaign.
No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act
Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:
- be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
- contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
- contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.
We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.
Animal welfare concerns were identified as the reason for urgent advertising
A brief prepared by the department in July 2016 raised concerns about the welfare of greyhounds following the NSW Premier’s announcement that the government would prohibit greyhound racing. The brief raised the risk that industry members may make impulse decisions to destroy their greyhounds without information on support that was being offered.
The department used the provisions in Sections 7(4) and 8(3) of the Act to expedite the release of advertising due to ‘other urgent circumstances’. This provision allows advertising to commence prior to completing the peer review process and cost benefit analysis.
In introducing the Government Advertising Bill to parliament in 2011, the then Premier noted that exceptional circumstances would cover situations ‘such as a civil emergency or sudden health epidemic’. There is no other guidance on when it is appropriate to use this section. It is at the discretion of a government agency head to determine whether a campaign is urgent.
Phase 1 advertisements did not focus on the urgent needs
This advertising campaign had three overarching objectives:
- to increase public awareness of the animal welfare reasons for the closure of the greyhound racing industry
- to change the behaviour of dog owners from potentially harming their greyhounds to treating them humanely, by accessing the support options and packages available
- to promote greyhound adoptions by the public.
Alongside advertising, the department took other steps to engage with the greyhound racing industry. This included direct mail, face to face meetings around the State, setting up a call centre and community consultation through an online survey. Other government agencies and animal welfare agencies were also engaged to reach out to affected stakeholders.
Phase 1 advertising content focused on providing information about the reasons for the closure of the industry. The department’s radio and television advertisements did not refer to support packages or encourage the public to adopt a greyhound. While print advertisements did mention these things, this was only presented in fine print. In all advertisements, audiences were referred to a website for further information.
The focus of advertisements on the reasons for industry closure was not consistent with the identified needs to urgently commence advertising to influence the behaviour of dog owners and encourage the public to adopt a greyhound.
The content in Phase 2 advertisements, which began around four weeks after the first phase, was more explicit in highlighting the services and support for industry members such as offering business and retraining advice. These advertisements also referred audiences to a call centre number as well as the website.
Peer review process limited to influencing second phase of advertisements
In urgent circumstances, the Act allows for peer review to be completed after advertising has commenced. For this campaign, the peer review process was completed on 19 August 2016, two weeks after advertising had commenced. Where advertising commences before the peer review process is completed, the usefulness of peer reviewers’ recommendations is limited to informing subsequent phases of advertising and the post-campaign evaluation.
The peer review report found the messages in Phase 1 advertisements were not clearly defined, and the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst other campaign activities. These recommendations informed the second phase of advertising, which ran from 27 August 2016 until the campaign was terminated in October 2016.
The department could not demonstrate value for money was achieved for creative work
The department provided a fixed budget for creative work when requesting quotes from creative agencies to develop advertising material. This is not consistent with the quotation requirements in the government’s Guidelines for Advertising and Digital Communication Services. This approach creates risks to achieving value for money as creative agencies are not required to compete on price for their services. The department advised that it had pre-set the creative costs based on a comparative government campaign of a similar size. This was done due to a concern that requiring agencies to compete on price would affect the short timeframe given to develop creative material.
Three creative agencies accepted the opportunity to present design ideas for the campaign. The department was unable to provide evidence of how it chose the preferred supplier out of these three agencies. Records are important for accountability and allow a procurement decision to be audited after an urgent decision.
Short notice did not allow for cost-efficient media booking for all phases
Placement of advertisements in various media channels was done through the State’s Media Agency Services contract. This contract achieves savings as the government can use its aggregated media spend to gain discounts from the media supplier.
The Department of Premier and Cabinet provides guidance to ensure cost efficient media booking. For example, media time for a television advertisement should be booked at least 6 to 12 weeks in advance. Radio advertisements should be booked at least 2 to 8 weeks in advance.
The peer review report noted that the department did not have adequate time to look for the most cost-efficient way to advertise. In its response to the peer reviewers, the department acknowledged this to be due to the urgency to start advertising. The media booking authority was signed by the department one day before the campaign commenced.
The department used a wide public campaign for a narrow target audience
The campaign identified greyhound industry participants as the primary target audience. In 201516 there were 1,342 greyhound trainers, 1,695 owner/trainers, 983 attendants and 1,247 breeders in New South Wales. The department’s advertising submission identified ‘concerns that industry members could make impulsive decisions, potentially jeopardising the welfare of a large number of dogs, prior to the shutdown of the industry’.
The submission’s evidence of advertising effectiveness focused on increasing the level of wider community support for the ban rather than stopping industry members from making impulse decisions. It used an early opinion poll to show that total support for the ban on greyhound racing rises by 17 points and opposition drops by four points following explanation of the findings of the Special Commission of Inquiry report.
The peer review report noted that the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst the department’s range of other direct and targeted communications and consultations held with industry members.
No demonstrated basis for use of confronting imagery and provocative language
The Guidelines require ‘objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner’. Neither the Guidelines or Handbook further explain what objective presentation means. We have used an ordinary definition of this term as ‘not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts’. This is synonymous with terms like ‘impartial’, ‘neutral’, and ‘dispassionate’ and opposite to ‘subjective’. We consider that to meet the current requirements in the Guidelines for objectivity, advertising content should contain accurate statements or facts, and avoid subjective language.
Phase 1 focussed on the ongoing consequences if no action was taken to close the industry. The advertisements used provocative language, for example ‘Up to 70 per cent of dogs are deemed wastage by their own industry. Wastage! Slaughtered just for being slow’. Advertisements used confronting imagery like gravestones, blood smears and gun targets.
Our literature review into this area highlighted mixed findings on the effectiveness of confrontational advertising materials. In some cases, shock campaigns may cause an audience to reject or ignore the message, and may even encourage people to do the opposite of the intended behaviour. In other cases, such as in road safety campaigns, this style of advertising can be successful. This shows the importance of conducting pre-campaign research before adopting a confrontational or emotive approach in advertising.
The Government Advertising Handbook recommends that an agency explain the rationale and the evidence for their chosen advertising approach. There was no evidence that the department researched the effectiveness of its advertising approach with its target audience. The department had planned to undertake creative concept testing as part of a strategy to ensure the creative material was understood by its audience. The department advised that due to the urgency of the campaign, it did not have time to conduct this testing.
Not all Phase 1 radio advertisements clearly identified that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government
For the first few days on air, Phase 1 radio advertisements ended by referring the audience to a government website, instead of clearly identifying that it had been authorised by the New South Wales Government. Government authorisations and logos ensure the work and the programs of the NSW Government are easily identifiable by the community.
The department’s cost benefit analysis did not consider alternatives to advertising
For government advertising campaigns that cost over $1.0 million, the Act requires the advertising agency to carry out a cost benefit analysis and obtain approval from the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communications, prior to commencing the campaign.
The department engaged with audiences through direct mail, face to face forums, and a telephone helpline in addition to advertising. However, the department’s cost benefit analysis did not meet the requirements in the Guidelines to specify the extent to which expected benefits could be achieved without advertising, and to compare costs of options other than advertising that could be used to successfully implement the program (see Exhibit 6).
The cost benefit analysis made optimistic assumptions about the impact of the campaign on greyhound adoptions. It estimated that 2,360 greyhounds would be adopted if the campaign was run. This is significantly higher than the ‘most optimistic outcome’ of re-homing in the Special Commission Inquiry report (we calculated this to be 1,467 greyhounds). There was insufficient evidence to support the higher number of adoptions in the cost benefit analysis.
The sensitivity analysis shows that using the Special Commission’s ‘most optimistic outcome’ figure of re-homing would reduce the net present value of advertising to be negative. Further, the cost benefit analysis also assumed that increased government funding would be made available to animal welfare and rehoming organisations to support more adoptions, but did not estimate or include this cost when calculating the net present value of advertising.
There were two factual inaccuracies in key messages used for Phase 1 advertisements
Section 8(2) of the Act requires the head of a government agency to certify that the proposed campaign ‘contains accurate information’. The Secretary of the Department of Justice signed the compliance certificate on 29 July 2016, before advertisements commenced.
We examined the accuracy of factual claims in this advertising campaign, by comparing the key statements to the report of Special Commission of Inquiry into the Greyhound Racing Industry (the Commissioner report). The Commissioner report was quoted by the NSW Government as the basis for its policy to transition the greyhound racing industry to closure.
We identified that two of the key statements used in Phase 1 advertisements to support the animal welfare reasons for industry closure were inaccurate (Exhibit 7).
Appendix one - Responses from agencies
Appendix two - About the campaigns
Appendix three - About the Audit
Appendix four - Performance Auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #294 - released 2 November 2017
Actions for Sharing school and community facilities
Sharing school and community facilities
Schools and the community would benefit if school facilities were shared more often.
The Department of Education’s ‘Community Use of School Facilities Policy’ encourages but does not require schools to share facilities. Sharing depends heavily on the willingness of school principals and there are few incentives. There are many challenges in developing agreements with community users and there is only limited support available from the Department.
There are strategies and plans to support the sharing of facilities between schools and the wider community, but none are backed up with budgets, specific plans or timeframes.
Governments should strive for the best use of assets. This is particularly important in the context of a growing New South Wales population, fiscal constraints and increasing demand for services.
Lack of available land, rising land costs and population growth highlighted in our April 2017 'Planning for school infrastructure' performance audit report mean that new and existing schools will need to share their facilities with communities more than is currently the case.
This audit assessed how effectively schools share facilities with each other, local councils and community groups. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether the Department of Education (Department):
- has a clear policy to encourage and support facilities sharing
- is implementing evidence-based strategies and procedures for facilities sharing
- can show it is realising an increasing proportion of sharing opportunities.
Facilities sharing is the use of a physical asset, such as a building, rooms, or open spaces, by more than one group for a range of activities at the same time or at different times. For the purposes of this audit, we have divided sharing arrangements into two types: shared use and joint use.
Shared use refers to arrangements where existing school assets are hired out for non-school purposes, usually for a limited time. The assets remain under the control of the school. Generally, there is little alteration or enhancement to the asset required to enable shared use. Shared use can also refer to schools using external facilities, such as council pools, but these arrangements are not included within the scope of this audit.
Joint use refers to arrangements where new or upgraded school and non-school facilities or community hubs are planned, funded, built and jointly shared between a school and other parties, usually involving significant investment.
Both shared use and joint use agreements are governed by contractual obligations.
The sharing of school facilities with the community is not fully effective. The Department of Education is implementing strategies to increase shared and joint use but several barriers, some outside the Department’s direct control, must be addressed to fully realise benefits to students and the community of sharing school facilities. In addition, the Department needs to do more to encourage individual schools to share facilities with the community.
A collaborative, multi-agency approach is needed to overcome barriers to the joint use of facilities, otherwise, the Department may need significantly more funds than planned to deliver sufficient fit-for-purpose school facilities where and when needed.
Since the early 2000’s, several reviews in NSW and other jurisdictions have commented on the benefits of and need to increase the sharing of school facilities.
Several NSW Government strategies and plans support shared and joint use of facilities between schools and the wider community, but none are backed up with financial incentives, or specific plans with implementation timeframes. In Victoria and Queensland whole-of-government processes are in place to support a more coordinated approach to planning, building and sharing community facilities. For example, Victoria has a comprehensive policy framework encompassing both existing and future use of community facilities and a $50 million program to seed the development of community facilities on school sites over the next four years.
There are examples of successful shared use, but more can be done. Information about the available facilities is not readily available to potential community users. Schools should work more closely with councils and other stakeholders to leverage shared use.
Currently, the administrative burden, costs and risks associated with shared use can exceed the perceived benefits to schools, leading to reluctance amongst some Principals to share. In addition, a substantial backlog of school-initiated infrastructure proposals awaiting Departmental approval means that schools that raise money from sharing their facilities find it difficult to use the funds they raise on improved infrastructure. Some of these proposals have been waiting for approval for more than 12 months.
The Department could do more to support Principals by ensuring the fees charged for facilities cover the costs incurred by schools, that Principals can access help with negotiating and managing contracts, and that infrastructure proposals initiated and funded by schools are approved in a timely manner.
The Department is not monitoring shared use across the State, and does not evaluate different approaches as evidence to influence policies and procedures.
Recommendations
By December, 2018, the Department should:
- increase incentives and reduce impediments for school Principals to share school facilities, including:
- review the methodology for calculating fees charged for facilities to ensure that shared use of school facilities does not result in a financial burden to schools or the Department
- improve support provided to Principals by School Infrastructure NSW, including reducing the backlog of school-initiated infrastructure proposals awaiting approval
- develop service standards, including timeframes, for assessing and approving school-initiated infrastructure proposals.
- provide readily-accessible information about available school facilities to community groups and local councils
- implement processes to monitor and regularly evaluate the implementation of the shared use policy and promote better practice to drive improvements.
As discussed in our 2017 audit report on ‘Planning for school infrastructure’, joint use agreements are a key direction of the School Assets Strategic Plan. Joint use of school facilities will be necessary to ensure that there will be enough fit-for-purpose learning spaces for students when and where needed. Under the ‘Community Use of School Facilities Policy’ Principals play the leading role in identifying opportunities, and developing and managing agreements for sharing school facilities. This is impractical for joint use projects which involve substantial investment in new or refurbished assets, in particular for joint use projects in schools that are yet to be built. In addition, the policy does not address joint-use facilities built on land not owned by the Department. For these reasons, the Department is developing a new policy.
The Department is planning to develop joint use agreements in a more systematic way as part of school community planning, previously known as cluster planning, with a special focus on local councils. Several agreements are currently being piloted, and will be evaluated to provide an evidence-based foundation for this new approach.
To develop or refurbish school facilities for joint use, the Department, councils and other key stakeholders must work together and prioritise joint use from the earliest stages of any project. A collaborative, multi-agency approach is needed to ensure sufficient fit-for-purpose facilities are available for school students within the funding framework proposed in the School Assets Strategic Plan.
To increase shared and joint use, the Department is recruiting specialist staff in its Asset Division to assist with the brokerage, community engagement and development of agreements, but these staff are not dedicated to joint use projects and their available time may not be sufficient to provide the necessary support in the timeframes required.
Recommendations
By December, 2018, the Department of Education should:
- ensure that the implementation of the new ‘Joint Use of School Facilities and Land Policy’ is adequately resourced, and has the support of Principals
- implement processes to monitor and regularly evaluate the implementation of joint use policy and promote better practice to drive improvements.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Victoria's 30-Year Infrastructure Strategy
Appendix four - Not-for-profit hire changes
Appendix five - Performance Auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #293 - released 1 November 2017
Actions for Energy rebates for low income households
Energy rebates for low income households
The Department of Planning and Environment provides more than $245 million in energy rebates to around 27 percent of NSW households. This report highlights that the department is not monitoring the rebate schemes to understand whether they are delivering the best outcomes.
Most rebates are ongoing payments applied directly to energy bills reducing the amount payable by the householder. The structure of these rebates is complex and can be inequitable. Some households are eligible for four different rebates, each with its own eligibility criteria. Also, some households in very similar circumstances receive different levels of support depending on what type of energy is used in their home or which adult in the house is the energy account holder. For example, a household using both electricity and gas receives more assistance than a household with electricity alone even if total energy bills are the same.
By September 2018, the Department of Planning and Environment should:
- Ensure effective strategies are in place to make information about rebates available to all eligible, low-income households
- Evaluate alternative models and develop advice for government to reduce complexity and improve equity of ongoing rebates
- Establish measurable objectives for schemes that provide ongoing support, and monitor and measure performance of all schemes against objectives and outcome measures
- Assess the impacts of the forecast increase in embedded networks and develop strategies to manage any increased administrative risk
- Strengthen assurance that EAPA is being provided in accordance with its objectives and guidelines by implementing accreditation and compliance programs
- Ensure those eligible for EAPA financial support are not disadvantaged by inflexible payments, inconsistent provider practices, or inability to access an EAPA provider in a timely manner. Options include:
- moving from a fixed-value voucher to a flexible payment based on need irrespective of energy type
- establishing a ‘Provider of Last Resort’ facility for households that cannot access an EAPA Provider.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #292 - released 19 September 2017
Actions for Planning and evaluating palliative care services in NSW
Planning and evaluating palliative care services in NSW
NSW Health’s approach to planning and evaluating palliative care is not effectively coordinated. There is no overall policy framework for palliative and end-of-life care, nor is there comprehensive monitoring and reporting on services and outcomes.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #291 - released 17 August 2017
Actions for Office of Strategic Lands
Office of Strategic Lands
The Office of Strategic Lands effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, however, it could do more to support strategic land planning by identifying and acquiring land for future public use proactively rather than waiting for agencies or landholders to approach it. It may also have greater impact if it expanded its activities beyond greater Sydney.
The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for long-term planning by the NSW Government, particularly for open space and public purposes.
OSL is a Corporation Sole acting on behalf of the Minister for Planning and is run within the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE). OSL is a self-funding entity, and is responsible for administering the Sydney Region Development Fund (SRDF), a statutory fund used for ongoing land acquisition and management. OSL currently only operates within greater Sydney and holds over a billion dollars in land assets in this region.
This audit assessed whether OSL effectively fulfils its role to identify, acquire, manage and dispose of land, and whether OSL ensures it is sustainable over the long-term to meet its objectives.
Conclusion:
OSL effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, but is not supporting strategic land planning through proactive identification and acquisition of land for future public use. OSL is diligent in its financial management over the short and medium terms. However, it has identified that relying on the sale of surplus land to continue funding its ongoing operations is not sustainable, and it is yet to finalise a strategy to address this.
OSL does not currently have a strategic or proactive focus to improve land planning outcomes. This is primarily due to the lack of a clear strategy and business plan to direct its work which defines OSL’s purpose, objectives, goals and performance targets.
OSL expects to finalise and implement a Strategic Business Plan to guide its future direction and long-term sustainability, in late 2017.
OSL has three primary sources of funding. The largest source is Treasury loans which it needs to repay. The next most significant source of funding is from sales of land no longer required for government’s long-term needs. OSL has identified that it is likely to run out of surplus land within ten years. This is a significant financial risk for OSL, which should be addressed through a long-term financial strategy.
Contributions by Sydney councils into the SRDF are OSL’s only regular and consistent income stream. The formula to calculate these contributions has not been reviewed for over 25 years, and recent council mergers and border changes have increased the need to review the formula.
OSL is not used as extensively as it could be by other NSW Government agencies. It has the potential to play a much bigger role in assisting NSW Government agencies with longer term planning by partnering with them to identify, acquire, hold and manage land for future needs. For example, it could acquire land in future residential growth areas for needed public services such as schools, hospitals and transport corridors. There is also potential for OSL to expand its operations beyond the greater Sydney region into other parts of NSW to provide a statewide benefit from its unique role in government.
OSL has a unique role amongst government agencies, and could be used across NSW
NSW Government agencies we spoke with consider OSL fulfils an important role for the state that no other government agency performs. As a self-funding long-term land holder and manager, OSL can acquire and manage land beyond the four-year budget cycle that other government agencies face. Consideration should be given to expanding to other growth areas in NSW, where its unique role could assist in longer term land planning.
OSL has established good processes and procedures for most aspects of its role. This includes governance processes that we found to have been applied effectively. There was also adequate oversight and approvals for land transactions.
OSL has yet to finalise a business strategy to ensure long-term sustainability
OSL has shown that it is financially and operationally viable in the short to medium term. However, it does not have an overarching business strategy to guide its operations and ensure it is financially sustainable for the long-term. With a unique role in government, it is important for OSL to clarify its direction and implement a strategic business plan to drive its progress.
While there is no overarching long-term strategy, OSL has documented operating plans which guide its land acquisition and land divestment activities over the short to medium term. It has not developed a plan for its ongoing land management activities.
OSL advised that its Strategic Business Plan will be finalised and implemented in late 2017. This Plan should clarify OSL’s long-term direction, and guide its business to ensure it is financially sustainable.
OSL does not have adequate performance targets and measures
OSL has four key deliverables as part of DPE’s business plan. These deliverables cover land management, working with other agencies, and ensuring the SRDF is sustainable. There was no evidence that OSL or DPE monitor whether OSL achieves all key deliverables.
Currently, OSL’s performance targets are limited to meeting dollar values. OSL does not have any measures to demonstrate the achievement of outcomes that align with its core business, such as its success in land management or in working with other agencies. OSL staff also said that dollar targets were not always adequate or appropriate to measure its business performance.
With the development of its Strategic Business Plan, OSL has the opportunity to clarify its future business direction. This includes ensuring it has a range of relevant goals and performance measures that will support it becoming a strategic land planning partner with NSW Government agencies and local councils, and a land holder for the long-term.
OSL’s current financial management approach may impact long-term sustainability
OSL has valued the land that it needs to purchase on behalf of government to meet long-term strategic land needs in the Greater Sydney region, at $1.2 billion. However, OSLs annual budget for purchasing land is only between $40 million and $50 million until 2021. Also, in each of the last four years, OSL has not spent more than $30 million on land purchases because it relies on landowners to initiate contact when they are ready to sell their land.
Without a more proactive approach, it is not possible for OSL to make needed purchases in a timely manner. OSL acknowledges the substantial gap between these values, but has not established a budget or plan for how it will purchase all the identified land.
OSL has developed a Divestment Strategy which provides a five-year schedule of planned divestments. This is land OSL owns which has been identified as no longer required for government purposes. OSL has established an approach to generate the best and highest price for these sales. While funds are generated through the sale of surplus land, it also means that OSL holds fewer land assets to sell. OSL has identified it will run out of surplus land within ten years.
OSL needs to finalise and implement a business model to ensure it is financially and operationally capable to sustain and grow its business for the long-term.
OSL is working to improve transparency and engagement with key stakeholders
To deliver on its role, OSL needs to be able to effectively engage and work with its stakeholders, including NSW Government agencies, local councils, and people selling or buying land.
NSW Government agencies we spoke with are generally satisfied with OSL’s level of engagement and consultation. However, it would be beneficial for all parties to clarify and document their expectations of each other through a formal arrangement. OSL could also be more proactive in promoting its services, and working with additional NSW Government agencies to identify strategic lands.
The local councils in the Sydney region we spoke with are not as satisfied with OSL’s engagement and communication. The councils advised that they do not consider they are well-informed of OSL’s plans for their area, or how their contributions to the SRDF are spent.
More broadly, the activities of OSL are not reported transparently to stakeholders or the general public. OSL is developing a communication package for local councils and the community. This is an opportunity for OSL to improve the transparency of its role, operations, projects, and the SRDF, as well as promote its services and achievements.
The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established in 1951 to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for the NSW Government's long term planning purposes. OSL acts on behalf of the Minister for Planning, as a Corporation Sole, under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act).
OSL acquires and manages land identified for long-term strategic needs, and then transfers or sells it to other government agencies for ultimate use. It also sells land identified as surplus to government’s long term strategic requirements. Surplus land can also be transferred to local councils. OSL operates only in the greater Sydney region (from Wyong in the north, to the base of the Blue Mountains in the west, and south to Wollondilly). OSL has 20 staff who manage over 6,000 parcels of land.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #290 - released 10 August 2017
Actions for Information and Communication Technologies in schools for teaching and learning
Information and Communication Technologies in schools for teaching and learning
Several factors are reducing effective use of information and communication technology (ICT) in the classroom.
These are primarily:
Parliamentary reference - Report number #289 - released 6 July 2017