Reports
Ensuring contract management capability in government - HealthShare NSW
This report examined whether HealthShare NSW, a part of NSW Health, has the required contract management capability to effectively manage goods and services contracts valued over $250,000.
The report found that HealthShare has a procurement framework that should support effective contract management, but it is not applying it consistently. In particular, the audit found that HealthShare was not applying key contract management elements to over 80 per cent of the high-value contracts it manages. The audit also found that HealthShare’s contract management practices were limited by inadequate performance monitoring.
'Effective contract management is essential to ensure the contracts HealthShare enters into are delivering as expected and ensuring value for money,' said the Auditor-General. 'Without this, the value for money or savings HealthShare achieves when it negotiates these contracts is at risk of being eroded over the life of the contract.'
The report recommends that NSW Health develop a performance improvement plan to ensure HealthShare is fully compliant with procurement policies and that NSW Health meets its obligations under the Government's Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement.
HealthShare is a NSW Health entity responsible for providing shared services, including procurement, to support the delivery of patient care within the NSW health system. In 2018, HealthShare procured high value goods and services contracts with an annual estimated total spend of around $1.8 billion, with most of the contracts of long duration.
NSW Government agencies are increasingly delivering services and projects through contracts with third parties. These contracts can be complex and governments face challenges in negotiating and implementing them effectively. A robust contract management framework helps ensure all parties meet their obligations, contractual relationships are well managed, agencies achieve value for money, and deliverables meet the required standards and agreed timeframes.
Contract management capability is a broad term, which can include aspects of individual staff capability (such as staff knowledge, skills and experience) as well as organisational capability (such as policies, frameworks and processes).
The NSW Procurement Board is responsible for overseeing the Government's procurement system, setting policy and ensuring compliance. It has accredited the Health Administration Corporation (HAC) to procure goods and services with no upper financial limit. Under the terms of this accreditation, the Secretary, NSW Health (as head of HAC) has delegated the procurement of high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts within NSW Health to only the Ministry of Health and HealthShare NSW (HealthShare).
HealthShare NSW (HealthShare) is a NSW Health entity responsible for providing shared services, including procurement, to support the delivery of patient care within the NSW health system. In 2018, HealthShare procured high-value goods and services contracts with an annual estimated total spend of around $1.8 billion, with most of the contracts of long duration.
HealthShare’s Contract Management Guide states that, without rigorous contract management, 75 per cent of projected sourcing savings can disappear within 18 months of the contract starting.
This audit examined whether HealthShare has the required capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts. Contracts we examined included critical items such as food services in hospitals, patient transport services, intravenous equipment and kidney dialysis services, where risks include patient safety as well as value for money. We did not examine infrastructure, construction or information communication and technology contracts. We also did not examine HealthShare’s sourcing processes, including identifying business needs, tendering and contract award.
We assessed HealthShare against the following criteria:
- HealthShare's systems, policies and procedures support effective contract management and are consistent with relevant frameworks, policies and guidelines.
- HealthShare has capable personnel to effectively conduct the monitoring activities throughout the life of the contract.
We included the NSW Public Service Commission and NSW Treasury, through NSW Procurement, as auditees because they administer policies which directly affect contract management capability. These include:
- NSW Procurement Board Directions and policies
- NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework
- Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement
- the NSW Public Sector Capability Framework.
NSW Procurement was transferred to NSW Treasury from the former Department of Finance, Services and Innovation on 1 July 2019 as part of changes to government administrative arrangements.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – Contract performance management summary
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #328 - released 31 October 2019
Ensuring contract management capability in government - Department of Education
This report examines whether the Department of Education has the required contract management capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts (over $250,000). In 2017–18, the department managed high-value goods and services contracts worth $3.08 billion, with most of the contracts running over multiple years.
NSW government agencies are increasingly delivering services and projects through contracts with third parties. These contracts can be complex and governments face challenges in negotiating and implementing them effectively.
Contract management capability is a broad term, which can include aspects of individual staff capability as well as organisational capability (such as policies, frameworks and processes).
In 2017–18, the Department of Education (the Department) managed high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts worth $3.08 billion, with most of the contracts running over multiple years. The Department delivers, funds and regulates education services for NSW students from early childhood to secondary school.
This audit examined whether the Department has the required capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts.
We did not examine infrastructure, construction or information communication and technology contracts. We assessed the Department against the following criteria:
- The Department’s policies and procedures support effective contract management and are consistent with relevant frameworks, policies and guidelines.
- The Department has capable personnel to effectively conduct the monitoring activities throughout the life of the contract.
The NSW Public Service Commission and the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation are included as auditees as they administer policies which directly affect contract management capability, including:
- NSW Procurement Board Directions and policies
- NSW Procurement Agency Accreditation Scheme
- NSW Public Sector Capability Framework.
The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation's responsibility for NSW Procurement will transfer to NSW Treasury on 1 July 2019 as part of changes to government administrative arrangements announced on 2 April 2019 and amended on 1 May 2019.
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Conclusion The Department of Education's procedures and policies for goods and services contract management are consistent with relevant guidance. It also has a systemic approach to defining the capability required for contract management roles. That said, there are gaps in how well the Department uses this capability to ensure its contracts are performing. We also found one program (comprising 645 contracts) that was not compliant with the Department's policies. The Department has up-to-date policies and procedures that are consistent with relevant guidance. The Department also communicates changes to procurement related policies, monitors compliance with policies and conducts regular reviews aiming to identify non-compliance. The Department uses the NSW Public Service Commission's capability framework to support its workforce management and development. The capability framework includes general contract management capability for all staff and occupation specific capabilities for contract managers. The Department also provides learning and development for staff who manage contracts to improve their capability. The Department provides some guidance on different ways that contract managers can validate performance information provided by suppliers. However, the Department does not provide guidance to assist contract managers to choose the best validation strategy according to contract risk. This could lead to inconsistent practice and contracts not delivering what they are supposed to. We found that none of the 645 contracts associated with the Assisted Schools Travel Program (estimated value of $182 million in 2018–19) have contract management plans. This is contrary to the Department's policies and increases the risk that contract managers are not effectively reviewing performance and resolving disputes. |
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #325 - released 28 June 2019
Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Contracting non-government organisations
This report found the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) needs to do more to demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services in the Permanency Support Program (a component of out-of-home-care services) and Specialist Homelessness Services. It notes that FACS is moving to an outcomes-based commissioning model and recommends this be escalated consistent with government policy.
Government agencies, such as the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), are increasingly contracting non-government organisations (NGOs) to deliver human services in New South Wales. In doing so, agencies are responsible for ensuring these services are achieving expected outcomes. Since the introduction of the Commissioning and Contestability Policy in 2016, all NSW Government agencies are expected to include plans for customer and community outcomes and look for ways to use contestability to raise standards.
Two of the areas receiving the greatest funding from FACS are the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services. In the financial year 2017–18, nearly 500 organisations received $784 million for out-of-home care programs, including the Permanency Support Program. Across New South Wales, specialist homelessness providers assist more than 54,000 people each year and in the financial year 2017–18, 145 organisations received $243 million for providing short term accommodation and homelessness support, including Specialist Homelessness Services.
In the financial year 2017–18, FACS entered into 230 contracts for out-of-home care, of which 49 were for the Permanency Support Program, representing $322 million. FACS also entered into 157 contracts for the provision of Specialist Homelessness Services which totalled $170 million. We reviewed the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services for this audit.
This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently FACS contracts NGOs to deliver community services. The audit could not assess how NGOs used the funds they received from FACS as the Audit Office does not have a mandate that could provide direct assurance that NGOs are using government funds effectively.
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Conclusion
FACS cannot demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services because it does not always use open tenders to test the market when contracting NGOs, and does not collect adequate performance data to ensure safe and quality services are being provided. While there are some valid reasons for using restricted tenders, it means that new service providers are excluded from consideration - limiting contestability. In the service delivery areas we assessed, FACS does not measure client outcomes as it has not yet moved to outcomes-based contracts. FACS' procurement approach sometimes restricts the selection of NGOs for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has a procurement policy and plan which it follows when contracting NGOs for the provision of human services. This includes the option to use restricted tenders, which FACS sometimes uses rather than opening the process to the market. The use of restricted tenders is consistent with its procurement plan where there is a limited number of possible providers and the services are highly specialised. However, this approach perpetuates existing arrangements and makes it very difficult for new service providers to enter the market. The recontracting of existing providers means FACS may miss the opportunity to benchmark existing providers against the whole market. FACS does not effectively use client data to monitor the performance of NGOs funded under the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS' contract management staff monitor individual NGO performance including safety, quality of services and compliance with contract requirements. Although FACS does provide training materials on its intranet, FACS does not provide these staff with sufficient training, support or guidance to monitor NGO performance efficiently or effectively. FACS also requires NGOs to self-report their financial performance and contract compliance annually. FACS verifies the accuracy of the financial data but conducts limited validation of client data reported by NGOs to verify its accuracy. Instead, FACS relies on contract management staff to identify errors or inaccurate reporting by NGOs. FACS' ongoing monitoring of the performance of providers under the Permanency Support Program is particularly limited due to problems with timely data collection at the program level. This reduces FACS' ability to monitor and analyse NGO performance at the program level as it does not have access to ongoing performance data for monitoring service quality. In the Specialist Homelessness Services program, FACS and NGOs both provide the data required for the National Minimum Data Set on homelessness and provide it to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, as they are required to do. However, this data is not used for NGO performance monitoring or management. FACS does not yet track outcomes for clients of NGOs
FACS began to develop an approach to outcomes-based contracting in 2015. Despite this, none of the contracts we reviewed are using outcomes as a measure of success. Currently, NGOs are required to demonstrate their performance is consistent with the measures stipulated in their contracts as part of an annual check of their contract compliance and financial accounts. NGOs report against activity-based measures (Key Performance Indicators) and not outcomes. FACS advises that the transition to outcomes-based contracting will be made with the new rounds of funding which will take place in 2020–2021 for Specialist Homelessness Services and 2023 for the Permanency Support Program. Once these contracts are in place, FACS can transition NGOs to outcomes based reporting. Incomplete data limits FACS' effectiveness in continuous improvement for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has policies and procedures in place to learn from past experiences and use this to inform future contracting decisions. However, FACS has limited client data related to the Permanency Support Program which restricts the amount of continuous improvement it can undertake. In the Specialist Homelessness Support Program data is collected to inform routine contract management discussions with service providers but FACS is not using this data for continuous improvement. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference: Report number #323 - released 26 June 2019
Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program
The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.
The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.
This audit had two objectives:
- To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
- To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.
We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:
a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.
Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.
2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
- providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
- providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
- making business cases available to the public.
The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.
The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.
Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
- work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received.
There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.
There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public.
Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.
Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.
The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should:
- develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
- establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
- agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
- clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
- establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:
- setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
- clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
- monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018
Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid
In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.
A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.
Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.
In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.
On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal.
This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide).
The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money.
The evidence available does not conclusively demonstrate the unsolicited proposal was unique, and there were some shortcomings in the negotiation process, documentation and segregation of duties. That said, before the final commitment to proceed with the lease, the state obtained assurance that the proposal delivered value for money.
It is particularly important to demonstrate unsolicited proposals are unique, in order to justify the departure from other transaction processes that offer greater competition, transparency and certainty about value for money.
The Assessment Panel and the Proposal Specific Steering Committee determined the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal was unique, primarily on the basis that the proponent did not require foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and the lease transaction could be concluded earlier than through a second tender process. However, the evidence that persuaded the Panel and Committee did not demonstrate that no other proponent could conclude the transaction in time to meet the government’s deadline.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. It also does not demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
The Panel, Committee and financial advisers determined that the final price represented value for money, and that retendering offered a material risk of a worse financial outcome. However, an acceptable price was revealed early in the negotiation process, and doing so made it highly unlikely that the proponent would offer a higher price than that disclosed. The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, bargaining strategy or similar which put the negotiations in context. It is not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance.
Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place. Some shortcomings relating to role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance weakened the effectiveness of the unsolicited proposal process adopted for Ausgrid.
The reasons for accepting that the proposal and proponent were unique are not compelling.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says the 'unique benefits of the proposal and the unique ability of the proponent to deliver the proposal' must be demonstrated.
The conclusion reached by the Panel and Committee that the proposal offered a ‘unique ability to deliver (a) strategic outcome’ was primarily based on the proponent not requiring foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and allowing the government to complete the lease transaction earlier than by going through a second tender process.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. Nor does it demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
That said, the Australian Treasurer’s decision to reject the two bids from the previous tender process created uncertainty about the conditions under which he would approve international bids. The financial advisers engaged for the Ausgrid transaction informed the Panel and Committee that:
- it was not likely another viable proponent would emerge soon enough to meet the government’s transaction deadline
- the market would be unlikely to deliver a better result than offered by the proponent
- going to tender presented a material risk of a worse financial result.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says that a proposal to directly purchase or acquire a government-owned entity or property will generally not be unique. The Ausgrid unsolicited proposal fell into this category.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- recognise that when considering uniqueness they should:
- require very strong evidence to decide that both the proponent and proposal are the only ones of their kind that could meet the government’s objectives
- give thorough consideration to any reasonable counter-arguments against uniqueness.
- rigorously consider all elements of the Unsolicited Proposals Guide when determining whether a proposal should be dealt with as an unsolicited proposal, and document these deliberations and all relevant evidence
- do not use speed of transaction compared to a market process as justification for uniqueness.
The Panel and Committee concluded the price represented value for money, based on peer-reviewed advice from their financial advisers and knowledge acquired from previous tenders. The financial advisers also told the Panel and Committee that there was a material risk the state would receive a lower price than offered by the unsolicited proposal if it immediately proceeded with a second market transaction.
The state commenced negotiations on price earlier than the Guide says they should have. Early disclosure of a price that the state would accept reduced the likelihood of achieving a price greater than this. DPC says the intent of this meeting was to quickly establish whether the proponents could meet the state’s benchmark rather than spending more time and resources on a proposal which had no prospect of proceeding.
DPC and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, negotiation strategy or similar which put the negotiations and price achieved in context. It was not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. However, the Panel and Committee endorsed the outcomes of the negotiations.
The negotiations were informed by the range of prices achieved for similar assets and the specific bids for Ausgrid from the earlier market process.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- document a minimum acceptable price, and a negotiating strategy designed to maximise price, before commencing negotiations
- do not communicate an acceptable price to the proponent, before the negotiation stage of the process, and then only as part of a documented bargaining strategy.
The state established a governance structure in accordance with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide, including an Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee. The members of the Panel and Steering Committee were senior and experienced officers, as befitted the size and nature of the unsolicited proposal.
The separation of negotiation, assessment and review envisaged by the Guide was not maintained fully. The Chair of the Assessment Panel and a member of the Steering Committee were involved in negotiations with the proponent.
DPC could not provide comprehensive records of some key interactions with the proponent or a documented negotiation strategy. The absence of such records means the Department cannot demonstrate engagement and negotiation processes were authorised and rigorous.
The probity adviser reported there were no material probity issues with the transaction. The probity adviser also provided audit services. This is not good practice. The same party should not provide both advisory and audit services on the same transaction.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government entity or asset:
• maintain separation between negotiation, assessment and review in line with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide
• keep an auditable trail of documentation relating to the negotiation process
• maintain separation between any probity audit services engaged and the probity advisory and reporting services recommended in the current Guide.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - NSW Government’s summary of assessment of the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal
Appendix three - The definition and nature of unsolicited proposals
Appendix four - Ausgrid unsolicited proposal process
Appendix five - About the audit
Appendix six - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #309 - released 11 December 2018
Managing IT Services Contracts
Neither agency (NSW Ministry of Health and NSW Police Force) demonstrated that they continued to get value for money over the life of these long term contracts or that they had effectively managed all critical elements of the three contracts we reviewed post award. This is because both agencies treated contract extensions or renewals as simply continuing previous contractual arrangements, rather than as establishing a new contract and financial commitment. Consequently, there was not a robust analysis of the continuing need for the mix and quantity of services being provided or an assessment of value for money in terms of the prices being paid.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #220 - released 1 February 2012
Improving efficiency of irrigation water use on farms
The Department of Primary Industries (DPI) has a crucial role in assisting the irrigation industry to respond to the conflicting demands placed upon the state’s water resources. The State Plan emphasises the importance of water to agriculture, and gives DPI responsibility to use its training programs to help farmers continue to increase water use efficiency. DPI needs to work closely with agencies with which it shares responsibilities in the State Plan to ensure that its water use efficiency activities contribute to the State Plan goals. It needs to work closely with Treasury to document the services it will require to do this, the resources which will be needed, and how its success will be measured. This will ensure that DPI is well placed to continue to assist the NSW farming industry to adapt and survive periods of reduced water availability.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #172 - released 21 November 2007
Government office accommodation
The Audit Office has undertaken an audit on Government Office Accommodation. The audit examined the cost effectiveness of long-term leasing versus ownership and the housing of agencies involved with the delivery of core government activities. Core activities are those intrinsically linked to basic and ongoing functions of Government and Parliament.
It recommends that:
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the Government consider owning office accommodation, as opposed to leasing, for its long-term core needs, subject to a case by case analysis of the relevant financial and nonfinancial factors
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the Government undertake an analysis of the costs/savings from proposed asset sales of office accommodation in light of the demonstrated need for long-term office accommodation (for core needs) New, Expired and Expiring Leases
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given the findings of the own versus lease case studies presented in this report, it is recommended that the Government require agencies to undertake, in collaboration with the Department of Public Works and Services (DPWS) a cost/benefit analysis of available accommodation options prior to committing to any proposed major new leases
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the Government direct the DPWS, in collaboration with all agencies, to negotiate the renewal of all major expired/expiring leases (where continued occupancy is warranted) in order to reduce the financial risk of above-market rent increases and the risk of cancellation of leases (Major leases are defined, for the purposes of these recommendations, to be those over $500,000 rental per annum or a net lettable area over 1,000 square metres) Management of Property Information
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in order to improve the integrity of the Government Office Accommodation Database, agencies be required to respond to the annual data request from DPWS by a predetermined date
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a senior officer within each agency be required to certify to the accuracy of information provided by an agency as input to the database maintained by DPWS
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DPWS verify, on a sample basis, information provided by agencies as input to the Government Office Accommodation Database Premier’s Memorandum No 97-2
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the compliance by agencies with Premier’s Memorandum No 97-2 Government Office Accommodation and Property Disposal be established by DPWS.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #45 - released 11 December 1997
Lease to Fox Studios Australia
The audit found that the process for the lease and development of the Showground site commenced on the basis that no Government moneys would be provided and no theme park activities would be allowed. However despite this a State Government subsidy of between $84.8m and $106.8m (in net present value terms) is to be provided for the development and the area of the Showground to be leased to Fox was extended to comprise 24.3 hectares of the 28.8 hectare site to allow Fox also to develop a family entertainment park.
The audit also found that the process commenced under the former Government were intended to ensure that no one party was placed above another however, the actual processes employed up to the General Election in March 1995 were so flawed as not to be relied upon to select a preferred proponent or to justify dispensing with a tender process.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #44 - released 8 December 1997
Review of Eastern Distributor
Following a resolution of the Legislative Council, the Audit Office has undertaken a performance audit of the Eastern Distributor. For a number of reasons, The Audit Office is not in the position to determine “whether the proposed toll and concession period represents the best deal”. In part this is the result of time constraints which do not allow a careful analysis of many toll and concession options. Similarly, the audit does not answer “whether the current proposal represents the best environmental outcome”. But each of these issues (toll and concession and environmental consequences) is discussed in the audit report.
The Audit Office recommends that the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA), for any further major project of this type, ensures that it establishes a process which allows all decision makers to have a thorough understanding of the reasonableness of the proponents’ offers and their implications for the State and for the public. The Audit Office also recommends that the RTA should at the outset consult with TCorp in respect of each major project put to tender.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #42 - released 31 July 1997
