Refine search Expand filter

Reports

Published

Actions for Office of Strategic Lands

Office of Strategic Lands

Planning
Environment
Management and administration
Procurement

The Office of Strategic Lands effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, however, it could do more to support strategic land planning by identifying and acquiring land for future public use proactively rather than waiting for agencies or landholders to approach it. It may also have greater impact if it expanded its activities beyond greater Sydney.

The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act) to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for long-term planning by the NSW Government, particularly for open space and public purposes. 

OSL is a Corporation Sole acting on behalf of the Minister for Planning and is run within the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE). OSL is a self-funding entity, and is responsible for administering the Sydney Region Development Fund (SRDF), a statutory fund used for ongoing land acquisition and management. OSL currently only operates within greater Sydney and holds over a billion dollars in land assets in this region. 

This audit assessed whether OSL effectively fulfils its role to identify, acquire, manage and dispose of land, and whether OSL ensures it is sustainable over the long-term to meet its objectives. 

Conclusion:

OSL effectively fulfils most aspects of its defined role, but is not supporting strategic land planning through proactive identification and acquisition of land for future public use. OSL is diligent in its financial management over the short and medium terms. However, it has identified that relying on the sale of surplus land to continue funding its ongoing operations is not sustainable, and it is yet to finalise a strategy to address this.


OSL does not currently have a strategic or proactive focus to improve land planning outcomes. This is primarily due to the lack of a clear strategy and business plan to direct its work which defines OSL’s purpose, objectives, goals and performance targets.

OSL expects to finalise and implement a Strategic Business Plan to guide its future direction and long-term sustainability, in late 2017. 

OSL has three primary sources of funding. The largest source is Treasury loans which it needs to repay. The next most significant source of funding is from sales of land no longer required for government’s long-term needs. OSL has identified that it is likely to run out of surplus land within ten years. This is a significant financial risk for OSL, which should be addressed through a long-term financial strategy. 

Contributions by Sydney councils into the SRDF are OSL’s only regular and consistent income stream. The formula to calculate these contributions has not been reviewed for over 25 years, and recent council mergers and border changes have increased the need to review the formula. 

OSL is not used as extensively as it could be by other NSW Government agencies. It has the potential to play a much bigger role in assisting NSW Government agencies with longer term planning by partnering with them to identify, acquire, hold and manage land for future needs. For example, it could acquire land in future residential growth areas for needed public services such as schools, hospitals and transport corridors. There is also potential for OSL to expand its operations beyond the greater Sydney region into other parts of NSW to provide a statewide benefit from its unique role in government.

OSL has a unique role amongst government agencies, and could be used across NSW

NSW Government agencies we spoke with consider OSL fulfils an important role for the state that no other government agency performs. As a self-funding long-term land holder and manager, OSL can acquire and manage land beyond the four-year budget cycle that other government agencies face. Consideration should be given to expanding to other growth areas in NSW, where its unique role could assist in longer term land planning.

OSL has established good processes and procedures for most aspects of its role. This includes governance processes that we found to have been applied effectively. There was also adequate oversight and approvals for land transactions.

OSL has yet to finalise a business strategy to ensure long-term sustainability

OSL has shown that it is financially and operationally viable in the short to medium term. However, it does not have an overarching business strategy to guide its operations and ensure it is financially sustainable for the long-term. With a unique role in government, it is important for OSL to clarify its direction and implement a strategic business plan to drive its progress.

While there is no overarching long-term strategy, OSL has documented operating plans which guide its land acquisition and land divestment activities over the short to medium term. It has not developed a plan for its ongoing land management activities.
OSL advised that its Strategic Business Plan will be finalised and implemented in late 2017. This Plan should clarify OSL’s long-term direction, and guide its business to ensure it is financially sustainable.

OSL does not have adequate performance targets and measures

OSL has four key deliverables as part of DPE’s business plan. These deliverables cover land management, working with other agencies, and ensuring the SRDF is sustainable. There was no evidence that OSL or DPE monitor whether OSL achieves all key deliverables.

Currently, OSL’s performance targets are limited to meeting dollar values. OSL does not have any measures to demonstrate the achievement of outcomes that align with its core business, such as its success in land management or in working with other agencies. OSL staff also said that dollar targets were not always adequate or appropriate to measure its business performance.

With the development of its Strategic Business Plan, OSL has the opportunity to clarify its future business direction. This includes ensuring it has a range of relevant goals and performance measures that will support it becoming a strategic land planning partner with NSW Government agencies and local councils, and a land holder for the long-term.

OSL’s current financial management approach may impact long-term sustainability

OSL has valued the land that it needs to purchase on behalf of government to meet long-term strategic land needs in the Greater Sydney region, at $1.2 billion. However, OSLs annual budget for purchasing land is only between $40 million and $50 million until 2021. Also, in each of the last four years, OSL has not spent more than $30 million on land purchases because it relies on landowners to initiate contact when they are ready to sell their land.

Without a more proactive approach, it is not possible for OSL to make needed purchases in a timely manner. OSL acknowledges the substantial gap between these values, but has not established a budget or plan for how it will purchase all the identified land.

OSL has developed a Divestment Strategy which provides a five-year schedule of planned divestments. This is land OSL owns which has been identified as no longer required for government purposes. OSL has established an approach to generate the best and highest price for these sales. While funds are generated through the sale of surplus land, it also means that OSL holds fewer land assets to sell. OSL has identified it will run out of surplus land within ten years.

OSL needs to finalise and implement a business model to ensure it is financially and operationally capable to sustain and grow its business for the long-term.

OSL is working to improve transparency and engagement with key stakeholders

To deliver on its role, OSL needs to be able to effectively engage and work with its stakeholders, including NSW Government agencies, local councils, and people selling or buying land.

NSW Government agencies we spoke with are generally satisfied with OSL’s level of engagement and consultation. However, it would be beneficial for all parties to clarify and document their expectations of each other through a formal arrangement. OSL could also be more proactive in promoting its services, and working with additional NSW Government agencies to identify strategic lands.

The local councils in the Sydney region we spoke with are not as satisfied with OSL’s engagement and communication. The councils advised that they do not consider they are well-informed of OSL’s plans for their area, or how their contributions to the SRDF are spent.

More broadly, the activities of OSL are not reported transparently to stakeholders or the general public. OSL is developing a communication package for local councils and the community. This is an opportunity for OSL to improve the transparency of its role, operations, projects, and the SRDF, as well as promote its services and achievements.

The Office of Strategic Lands (OSL) was established in 1951 to identify, acquire, manage and divest land required for the NSW Government's long term planning purposes. OSL acts on behalf of the Minister for Planning, as a Corporation Sole, under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (EP&A Act).

OSL acquires and manages land identified for long-term strategic needs, and then transfers or sells it to other government agencies for ultimate use. It also sells land identified as surplus to government’s long term strategic requirements. Surplus land can also be transferred to local councils. OSL operates only in the greater Sydney region (from Wyong in the north, to the base of the Blue Mountains in the west, and south to Wollondilly). OSL has 20 staff who manage over 6,000 parcels of land.
 

The Department of Planning and Environment (Office of Strategic Lands) should:

By December 2017:  

  1. clarify and document its long-term purpose, role and goals in line with its mandate. This includes:
    • finalising and implementing a business plan with outcome-based performance measures that support the achievement of its goals
    • establishing and implementing a business and financial model, including resourcing, that supports its long-term strategy
    • exploring options for expanding the operation of OSL to other areas of NSW.

By July 2018:

2. develop and implement an approach for working with NSW Government agencies to improve its efficacy in strategic land identification, acquisition and management.

On an ongoing basis:

3. improve the transparency of its operations, and its communication and engagement with all stakeholders. This includes developing engagement strategies appropriate for different stakeholder groups.

Published

Actions for Mining Rehabilitation Security Deposits

Mining Rehabilitation Security Deposits

Planning
Industry
Environment
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

The Department of Planning and Environment requires mining companies to rehabilitate sites according to conditions set in the mining development approval. The Department holds mining rehabilitation security deposits that are meant to cover the full cost of rehabilitation if a mining company defaults on its rehabilitation obligations.

The total value of security deposits held has increased from $500 million in 2005 to around $2.2 billion in 2016, covering around 450 mine sites in New South Wales.

While there have been substantial increases in total deposits held, mine rehabilitation security deposits are still not likely to be sufficient to cover the full costs of each mine's rehabilitation in the event of a default.

This audit was undertaken when the Department of Industry, Skills and Regional Development was responsible for ensuring land disturbed by mining activities is rehabilitated in accordance with the relevant development approval, including the administration of mining rehabilitation security deposits. On 1 April 2017, this responsibility was transferred to the Department of Planning and Environment (the Department).  

This audit assessed whether the Department maintains adequate security deposits to cover the liabilities associated with mine closures, including rehabilitation. Companies authorised by the Department to undertake mining activities must provide a security deposit to cover the full costs of rehabilitation in the event of default by the company. Rehabilitation is the treatment of disturbed land or water to establish a safe, stable, non-polluting and sustainable environment.

Mining companies must provide an estimate of rehabilitation costs for each site. The Department provides a Rehabilitation Cost Calculation tool to assist companies calculate the deposit amount. Companies are also required to ensure that the cost estimate is in accordance with the approved Mining Operations Plan (MOP). The MOP is intended to be a mine rehabilitation and closure plan, and forms the basis for the estimation of the security deposit. The Department reviews the estimates and determines the deposit for each site.  

Security deposits are an option of last resort. The Department has other legislative and regulatory tools which it normally uses to promote compliance with rehabilitation requirements before accessing a security deposit. It can direct action by the mining company, issue fines and even have the Minister revoke a mining lease. To date, the Department has never had to access a security deposit for a state significant development mine site.

Conclusion

The Department holds security deposits for mining rehabilitation consistent with the amounts it has requested from mining companies, and it should be able to claim on a deposit if a mining company defaults on its rehabilitation obligations. The total value of deposits has increased from $500 million in 2005 to around $2.2 billion in 2016, covering around 450 mine sites. The Department’s management of the security deposit process has improved in recent years, and it has well advanced plans for further improvement, including a revised cost calculation tool.

The Department’s policy is that each mine’s security deposit should cover the full costs of rehabilitation for that mine. The security deposits the Department holds are not likely to be sufficient to cover the full costs of each mine’s rehabilitation in the event of a default. The rates and allowances in the current cost calculation tool have not been updated since 2013 and some activities required for effective rehabilitation are not covered, or not covered adequately.

Security deposits also do not include sufficient contingency given the substantial risks and uncertainties associated with mine rehabilitation and closure, particularly in the absence of a detailed closure plan. This risk is exacerbated by the limited independent verification of mining company claims about the size of the outstanding rehabilitation task, which remains the case despite recent improvements to monitoring and review procedures and practices.  

There is also no financial assurance held over the risk of significant unexpected environmental degradation in the long-term after a mine is deemed to be rehabilitated and the security deposit is returned. A security deposit is not an appropriate vehicle for covering this risk.

Security deposits are close to calculated value and should be accessible if needed

The value of securities held by the Department aligns with the latest approved rehabilitation cost estimates. This contrasts with the situation found by investigations in Victoria and Queensland, where deposit amounts held fell below the calculated costs.

The security deposits are usually in the form of a bank guarantee or cash. The Department has obtained legal advice indicating that it should be able to claim on these bank guarantees if the need arises. As the guarantee is between the financial institution and the Department, if a mining company goes into liquidation the Department should still be able to access the funds.  

When the latest estimate of rehabilitation costs is higher than the existing deposit, the Department will request additional security. It has experienced extensive delays in obtaining additional security for some sites, increasing the risk that available funds will be insufficient if needed.

Rehabilitation cost estimates are not yet adequate, but improvements are planned

The Department’s policy is for security deposits to cover the full cost of rehabilitation. No discounts are provided to mining companies for past good behaviour or low likelihood of default, unlike in some other states. Discounting could undermine the policy position.  

Current security deposits are unlikely to cover the full cost of rehabilitation on each mine site. The Department provides a rehabilitation cost calculation tool to help mining companies calculate the cost of rehabilitation and the required deposit amount, but:

  • several activities required to effect closure are not included and others underestimated
  • it does not make provision for industry cost changes over time
  • the rates used in the tool have not been updated since 2013
  • it was not able to provide the basis for the rates and allowances in the tool.

The Department reviews cost estimates provided by mining companies, but its verification of the extent of rehabilitation work on which these estimates are based is limited. It relies instead on section 387C of the Mining Act 1992 which makes it an offence for mining companies to provide false or misleading information. It is not evident how the Department would establish that information provided was false or misleading without more verification work, and six of the 14 cost estimates we reviewed were not signed by the mine manager, making enforcement more difficult.  

The Department has developed a new calculation tool, and recently released it for industry consultation. The new tool should improve rehabilitation estimates. It updates rates and allowances, and includes additional items to better cover required rehabilitation tasks. While a substantial improvement, the new tool could be further improved by providing additional coverage for stakeholder engagement, additional planning approvals, insurance costs, and any additional design, research and verification work required for successful closure.

There is no financial assurance over long-term environmental risks

The Department does not hold any financial assurance to cover the costs associated with mitigating any future environmental degradation once a mine closes and the security deposit is relinquished to the mining company. Security deposits are probably not the appropriate mechanism to cover these long-term risks but the risk of potential post-closure environmental degradation still needs to be costed and covered. A fund to cover the state-wide risk, to which all mines would contribute, is a possible mechanism.

Rehabilitation and closure outcomes are vague, particularly for unplanned closure

Rehabilitation outcomes in the MOPs we reviewed were generally not specific. Any lack of specificity in MOPs translates into uncertainty about rehabilitation work required if a mining company defaults. Part of the problem is that rehabilitation outcomes established in planning approvals are usually not specific and may not address all closure requirements. The Department has recognised there is scope to improve the clarity and specificity of rehabilitation requirements in planning approvals, and has started a review focusing on open-cut mines.

Rehabilitation outcomes are even less specific in the event of an unexpected early closure because they will probably be different from that achievable from a planned closure.  

MOP guidelines do not cover management of some key closure matters, such as the requirements of environment protection licences issued by the Environment Protection Authority and the management of heritage sites during closure.

There were significant variations in quality of MOPs we reviewed and the way closure risks and uncertainties were identified and addressed. The Department plans to improve the quality of rehabilitation programs through enhanced guidance and oversight.

Monitoring is not adequate to effectively gauge rehabilitation progress

The Department was not able to show it has been monitoring operational mine sites effectively to gauge the progress of ongoing site rehabilitation and the management of closure risks. There was no protocol for site inspections and limited evidence of inspections for the sites we reviewed.

The Department receives annual environmental management reports from mining companies, with most describing the areas of disturbance and rehabilitation occurring at each mine site. The Department recently established procedures for reviewing these annual reports, and has developed a risk-based process for prioritising reviews.

Most annual reports we reviewed did not explain environmental changes over time, nor the risks to mine closure and the measures required to mitigate them. For example, analysis of changes to surface water and groundwater quality was limited despite its relevance for assessing future contamination risks.

The Department does not currently have adequate processes in place to effectively verify the reported areas of disturbance and rehabilitation. It is developing geographic information system-based tools to better measure areas of disturbance and rehabilitation, new rehabilitation guidelines, and a procedure for determining whether rehabilitation has been successful. These initiatives should improve the monitoring and reporting of rehabilitation progress at mine sites.

There is no mechanism to prevent a mine being in ‘care and maintenance’ indefinitely

The Department does not have a clear policy on the length of time and circumstances under which a mine can remain in ‘care and maintenance’. Indefinite postponement of rehabilitation and closure is therefore possible. 'Care and maintenance' is the period following temporary cessation of operations when infrastructure remains largely intact and the site continues to be managed. There are a range of valid reasons for a mining company to put a mine in ‘care and maintenance’, but it is also reasonable for the community to expect a limit to how long it has to wait for proper rehabilitation.

Mining operations make a significant contribution to the NSW economy, including over $1.3 billion in royalties each year. Around 400 mine sites throughout NSW provide over 40,000 jobs and are a major source of economic activity for many communities. Despite these benefits, it is important to ensure that mining companies fulfil their obligations to rehabilitate land disturbed as a result of mining activity.

We recommend that the Department should, by January 2018:

1. Improve the quality of rehabilitation and closure plans by:

  • ensuring plans submitted by mining companies include robust mine rehabilitation and closure risk assessments
  • clarifying the level of detail required in plans at each stage of a mine’s operation
  • specifying how requirements set under other legislative instruments (e.g. environment protection licences, heritage assets) should be addressed.

2. Improve assurance that security deposits are sufficient by:

  • ensuring its new cost calculation tool adequately covers all works needed for rehabilitation and closure
  • increasing the contingency for uncertainties associated with mine rehabilitation and closure, at least until the mining company provides a detailed closure plan
  • verifying the cost estimates for a sample of high risk sites annually
  • ensuring that when mining companies are required to provide increased security deposits, they do so with minimal delay.

3. Enhance oversight of mine rehabilitation by:

  • developing a protocol to ensure sufficient and adequate site inspections
  • ensuring mining companies report performance against rehabilitation targets and environmental changes clearly, including an analysis of long-term surface water and groundwater trends in terms of levels, flow and quality
  • improving how it determines the progress and success of mine rehabilitation
  • developing clear policy and procedures for ensuring a mine cannot be put into ‘care and maintenance’ indefinitely.

4. Collaborate with relevant agencies to establish a financial assurance mechanism, such as a sinking fund, to cover the risk of long-term environmental degradation after mines are closed and security deposits returned.

Appendix One - Response from the Department

Appendix Two - About the audit

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #285 - released 11 May 2017

Published

Actions for Disposal of Sydney Harbour Foreshore Land

Disposal of Sydney Harbour Foreshore Land

Finance
Environment
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

Our view is that decisions need to be made on a more strategic basis, if the Government’s aspirations for Sydney Harbour’s foreshores are to be met. At present there are high-level ‘aspirations’, but there is no overarching strategy or plan for Sydney Harbour that can guide individual decisions. Decision-making appears to be triggered when a proposal is made to dispose of a particular property. Decisions to dispose of, retain, or change the use of individual properties should be made in the context of a broader strategy, rather than on a case-by-case basis.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #119 - released 26 November 2003

Published

Actions for Northside Storage Tunnel Project

Northside Storage Tunnel Project

Planning
Environment
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery

The Northside Storage Tunnel was the first major public sector construction project using an alliance approach. In our opinion, the outcome of the project suggests that an alliance approach, when applied to a suitable project and managed appropriately, can support positive project outcomes. And in many respects the Alliance worked well. There are, however, a number of issues that we believe need to be addressed for future alliances.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #113 - released 24 July 2003

Published

Actions for Protecting Our Rivers

Protecting Our Rivers

Environment
Internal controls and governance
Regulation
Shared services and collaboration

The Audit Office is of the opinion that responsibility for protecting the quality of river water is not clearly delineated. The current arrangements lack the structure to ensure success. There is no lead entity to co-ordinate efforts to protect river water. New South Wales has no overarching water quality or river health strategy and no water quality management plans to ensure clear outcomes and responsibilities for protecting river water quality and integrated decision-making to protect areas of greatest risk to water quality.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #108 - released 7 May 2003

Published

Actions for Environmental impact assessment of major projects in NSW

Environmental impact assessment of major projects in NSW

Environment
Management and administration
Regulation
Service delivery

The Audit Office is of the opinion that the basis for environmental impact assessment of major projects in NSW is sound. The key concept of 'environmental significance' is well defined. The system is closely specified. The Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (DUAP) leads a whole-of-government approach to environmental impact assessment and its assessments are comprehensive. However, the Audit Office considers that there are opportunities for improvement by more actively managing the participants and the performance of the environmental impact assessment system. DUAP needs to strengthen its internal documentation and must ensure the public have greater involvement.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #92 - released 28 November 2001

Published

Actions for Controlling and reducing pollution from industry

Controlling and reducing pollution from industry

Planning
Environment
Compliance
Management and administration
Regulation

The regulatory framework introduced under the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997, along with other initiatives progressively being implemented by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA), should enhance the overall effectiveness of environment protection in NSW. The Audit Office is of the opinion that the framework is consistent with best practice and once fully implemented, should contribute to the achievement of further improvements in the environmental performance of industry.

However while the legislative framework supports best practice in regulation and enforcement, there are a number of issues which limit the effectiveness of the reforms. Some of the problems, such as the quality of licences and the effectiveness of compliance activities, have been identified by the EPA and may be addressed through recent initiatives.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #82 - released 18 April 2001