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Published

Actions for State heritage assets

State heritage assets

Environment
Local Government
Planning
Compliance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

What the report is about

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Planning and Environment (Heritage NSW) is overseeing and administering heritage assets of state significance.

Heritage that is rare, exceptional or outstanding to New South Wales may be listed on the State Heritage Register under the Heritage Act 1977. This provides assets with legal recognition and protection. Places, buildings, works, relics, objects and precincts can be listed, whether in public or private ownership.

Heritage NSW has administrative functions and regulatory powers, including under delegation from the Heritage Council of NSW, relevant to the listing, conservation and adaptive re-use of heritage assets of state significance.

In summary, the audit assessed whether Heritage NSW:

  • is effectively administering relevant advice and decisions
  • is effectively supporting and overseeing assets
  • has established clear strategic priorities and can demonstrate preparedness to implement these.

What we found

Heritage NSW does not have adequate oversight of state significant heritage assets, presenting risks to its ability to promote the objects of the Heritage Act.

Information gaps and weaknesses in quality assurance processes limit its capacity to effectively regulate activities affecting assets listed on the State Heritage Register.

Heritage NSW has adopted a focus on customer service and recently improved its timeliness in providing advice and making decisions about activities affecting listed assets. But Heritage NSW has not demonstrated how its customer-focused priorities will address known risks to its core regulatory responsibilities.

Listed assets owned by government entities are often of high heritage value. Heritage NSW could do more to promote effective heritage management among these entities.

What we recommended

The report made eight recommendations to Heritage NSW, focusing on:

  • improving quality assurance over advice and decisions
  • improving staff guidance and training
  • defining and maintaining data in the State Heritage Register
  • clarifying its regulatory intent and approach
  • sector engagement and interagency capability to support heritage outcomes.

The Heritage Act 1977 (the Heritage Act) and accompanying regulation provide the legal framework for the identification, conservation and adaptive re-use of heritage assets in New South Wales.

The Department of Planning and Environment (Heritage NSW) has responsibility for policy, legislative and program functions for state heritage matters, including supporting the Minister for Heritage to administer the Heritage Act.

Heritage assets that are rare, exceptional or outstanding beyond a local area or region may be listed on the State Heritage Register under the Heritage Act. These assets include places, buildings, works, relics, moveable objects and precincts, and assets that have significance to Aboriginal communities in New South Wales. Assets nominated for and listed on the State Heritage Register ('listed assets') may be owned privately or publicly, including by local councils and state government entities.

The Heritage Act establishes the Heritage Council of NSW (the Heritage Council) to undertake a range of functions in line with its objectives. Heritage NSW provides administrative support to the Heritage Council, for example providing advice on assets that have been nominated for listing on the State Heritage Register. Many of Heritage NSW’s core activities also relate to exercising functions and powers under delegation from the Heritage Council. These include making administrative decisions about works affecting listed assets, and exercising powers to regulate asset owners’ compliance with requirements under the Heritage Act.

Heritage NSW states that heritage:

…gives us a sense of our history and provides meaningful insights into how earlier generations lived and developed. It also enriches our lives and helps us to understand who we are.  

According to Heritage NSW, an effective heritage system will facilitate the community in harnessing the cultural and economic value of heritage.

The objective of this audit was to assess how effectively the Department of Planning and Environment (Heritage NSW) is overseeing and administering heritage assets of state significance.

For this audit, ‘heritage assets of state significance’ refers to items (including a place, building, work, relic, moveable object or precinct) listed on the State Heritage Register ('listed assets'), and those which have been nominated for listing.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning and Environment (Heritage NSW) does not have adequate oversight of state significant heritage assets. Information gaps and weaknesses in certain assurance processes limit its capacity to effectively regulate activities affecting assets listed on the State Heritage Register. These factors also constrain its ability to effectively support voluntary compliance and promote the objects of the Heritage Act, which include encouraging conservation and adaptive re-use.
Heritage NSW has adopted a focus on customer service and recently improved the timeliness of its advice and decisions on activities affecting listed assets. But Heritage NSW has not demonstrated how its customer service priorities will address known risks to its regulatory responsibilities. It could also do more to enable and promote effective heritage management among state government entities that own listed assets.

The information that Heritage NSW maintains about assets listed on the State Heritage Register ('listed assets') is insufficient for its regulatory and owner engagement purposes. Data quality and completeness issues have arisen since the register was established in 1999. But Heritage NSW's progress to address important gaps in the register, and its other information systems, has been limited in recent years. These gaps limit Heritage NSW’s capacity to detect compliance breaches early and implement risk-based regulatory responses, and to strategically target its owner engagement activities to promote conservation and re-use.

Heritage NSW makes decisions on applications for works on listed assets, requiring technical skills and professional judgement. But Heritage NSW does not provide its staff with adequate guidance to ensure that consistent approaches are used, and it lacks sufficient quality assurance processes. There are similar weaknesses in Heritage NSW's oversight of decisions on applications that are delegated to other government entities.

Heritage NSW has prioritised the implementation of customer service-focused activities, policies, and programs to reduce regulatory burdens on asset owners since 2017. For example, Heritage NSW has refreshed its website, introduced new information management systems, and implemented new regulation for the self-assessment of exemptions for minor works. However, Heritage NSW has not taken steps to mitigate oversight and quality risks introduced with the reduced regulatory burdens. Heritage NSW has made some, but to date insufficient, progress on a key project to update its publications. These documents (over 150 publications) are intended to play an important role in promoting voluntary compliance and supporting heritage outcomes. Heritage NSW started a new project to update relevant publications in April 2023.

Heritage NSW has recently implemented processes to improve its efficiency, such as screening new nominations for listing on the State Heritage Register. Heritage NSW has also reported improvements in the time it takes to decide on applications for works affecting listed assets. In the third quarter of 2022–23, 87% of decisions were made within the statutory timeframes. This compares to 48% in 2021–22. Heritage NSW has similarly improved how quickly it provides heritage advice on major projects, with 90% of advice reported as delivered on time in the third quarter of 2022–23, compared to 44% in 2020–21.

Assets owned by state government entities comprise a large proportion of State Heritage Register listings. These assets are often of high heritage value or situated within large and complex precincts or portfolios. But Heritage NSW does not implement targeted capability building activities to support good practice heritage management among state government entities and to promote compliance with their obligations under the Heritage Act.

The expected interaction between Heritage NSW's strategic plans and activities, and the priorities of the Heritage Council of NSW, is unclear. Actions to clarify the relevant governance arrangements have also been slow following a review in 2020 but this work re-commenced in late 2022.

Heritage NSW has been progressing work to draft reforms to the Heritage Act. This follows recommendations made in a 2021 Upper House Inquiry into the Heritage Act. To build preparedness for future reforms, Heritage NSW will need to do more to address the risks and opportunities identified in this audit report. In particular, it will need to ensure it has sufficient information and capacity to implement a risk-based regulatory approach; clear and effective governance arrangements with the Heritage Council of NSW; and enhanced engagement with government entities to promote the conservation and adaptive re-use of listed assets in public ownership.

This chapter assesses the effectiveness of Heritage NSW's oversight of state heritage assets, including its visibility of listed assets, and its oversight of regulatory decision-making. It also assesses Heritage NSW's activities to engage with owners to meet their obligations under the Heritage Act and to support heritage outcomes.

This chapter assesses the timeliness of Heritage NSW’s provision of advice, recommendations, and decisions on heritage issues to support heritage management outcomes with respect to listed assets.

This chapter assesses whether the Department of Planning and Environment (Heritage NSW) has established clear strategic priorities to effectively oversee and administer activities related to listed assets, and its preparedness to implement reforms. It also assesses the adequacy of planning activities and governance arrangements to support the achievement of strategic directions.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #384 - released 27 June 2023

Published

Actions for Regulation of public native forestry

Regulation of public native forestry

Environment
Industry
Compliance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

What this report is about

The Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) is a state-owned corporation that manages over two million hectares of public native forests and plantations supplying timber to sawmills across NSW.

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) is responsible for regulating the native forestry industry in NSW.

FCNSW must comply with Integrated Forestry Operations Approvals (IFOAs), which set out rules for how timber harvesting may occur.

Most harvesting is undertaken under the Coastal IFOA, which commenced in 2018.

This audit assessed how effectively Forestry Corporation of NSW manages its public native forestry activities to ensure compliance, and how effectively the Environment Protection Authority regulates these activities.

What we found

Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) clearly articulates its compliance obligations.

While FCNSW undertakes monitoring of its contractors, it does not do so consistently and does not target its monitoring activities on a risk basis.

FCNSW has largely fulfilled mandatory Coastal IFOA training requirements, but has not yet trained other staff who would also benefit from the training.

Contractor compliance appears to be improving, but there are gaps and inconsistencies in FCNSW's documentation of this.

FCNSW is not measuring its overall compliance to determine how it is tracking against its target.

The EPA undertakes proactive inspections of Coastal IFOA harvesting operations on a risk basis. However, it does not assess the risk at harvest sites covered by other IFOAs.

Most EPA compliance staff have received basic training, but few have received more advanced training required to effectively undertake forestry inspections.

Some EPA offices do not have the necessary equipment to undertake forestry inspections.

The EPA and FCNSW are not implementing all elements of a Memorandum of Understanding that aims to promote a cooperative relationship between the agencies.

What we recommended

The report made recommendations to FCNSW which aim to improve:

  • staff training
  • consistency of compliance reviews and data capture
  • targeting of compliance activities
  • measurement of performance.

The report made recommendations to the EPA which aim to improve:

  • risk-assessments
  • staff training
  • staff equipment.

The report also recommended that FCNSW and EPA should fully implement their Memorandum of Understanding.

The Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) is a state-owned corporation that supplies timber to sawmills in New South Wales, including timber harvested from public native forests. FCNSW is responsible for the management of around two million hectares of public native forests and plantations. Around half the area of native forests is permanently set aside for conservation.

Public native forestry is regulated through the Forestry Act 2012, Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016, Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 and associated regulations. Under the Forestry Act 2012, the objectives of FCNSW include, where its activities affect the environment, to conduct its operations in compliance with the principles of ecologically sustainable development contained in section 6(2) of the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991. This involves the integration of social, economic and environmental considerations in decision-making processes.

In undertaking its native forestry operations, FCNSW must comply with Integrated Forestry Operations Approvals (IFOA), issued jointly by the Minister for the Environment and the Minister for Agriculture, which set out rules to protect species and ecosystems where timber harvesting is occurring, and aim to ensure forests are managed in an ecologically sustainable way. FCNSW must also ensure that its contractors undertake forestry operations in line with IFOAs. The Coastal IFOA, developed in 2018, consolidated the four IFOAs for the Eden, Southern, Upper and Lower North East coastal regions of New South Wales into a single IFOA. The other three current IFOAs are Brigalow Nandewar, South Western Cypress and Riverina Redgum (the Western IFOAs).

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) is responsible for regulating native forestry in New South Wales. Under the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, one of the objectives of the EPA is to protect, restore and enhance the quality of the environment in New South Wales, having regard to the need to maintain ecologically sustainable development. This includes monitoring FCNSW’s compliance with IFOA conditions, including by maintaining and enforcing a compliance program.

The Coastal IFOA also introduced a new structure and regulatory approach for IFOAs, establishing outcomes, conditions and protocols. The conditions set mandatory actions and controls intended to protect threatened plants, animals, habitats, soils and water. The protocols, referenced in the conditions, set out additional enforceable actions and controls intended to support the effective implementation of the conditions.

Public native forestry is the largest component of hardwood supply in New South Wales. The 2019–20 bushfires had a major impact on regional communities, and large areas of native forest. This heightened environmental risks and challenges in public native forestry. Five million hectares of New South Wales was impacted, including more than 890,000 hectares of native State Forests. This is over 40% of the coastal and tablelands native State Forests in New South Wales.

In addition to effective compliance activities, the success of the regulatory approach to public native forestry operations depends on how wood supply yields are modelled, and ensuring that harvested volumes do not exceed these yields. This is of particular importance in areas where forests have been severely damaged by fire. This audit did not consider sustainable yields. Recent reviews of this include an independent review of the FCNSW sustainable yield model and a Natural Resources Commission review in 2021.

This audit assessed how effectively Forestry Corporation of NSW manages its public native forestry activities to ensure compliance, and how effectively the Environment Protection Authority regulates these activities.

Conclusion

Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) clearly articulates its compliance obligations at the corporate level and for each harvest site. However, there are deficiencies in FCNSW’s compliance approach. While FCNSW undertakes monitoring of its contractors in a number of ways, it does not consistently monitor compliance across its contractors and does not target its monitoring activities on a risk basis. This increases the risk that non-compliant practices will not be identified, potentially leading to environmental harm.

FCNSW has a compliance strategy and program that sets out its compliance obligations and how they will be managed. FCNSW’s Compliance Policy outlines compliance requirements, actions to ensure compliance, and responsibilities for staff, supervisors, senior management and board members. FCNSW also has a compliance monitoring system manual that outlines its monitoring program, and its risk-assessment and incident reporting procedures. These corporate documents set out FCNSW’s overall approach to managing compliance.

Harvesting in State Forests is undertaken by contractors or sub-contractors. FCNSW provides training to its staff and contractors and undertakes monitoring to identify contractor compliance with relevant requirements through a variety of means, including its quality assurance assessment (QAA) program. FCNSW also communicates compliance obligations to contractors in harvest plans.

FCNSW is not undertaking its monitoring activities on a risk basis. The frequency of contractor supervision is inconsistent and is not tied to the contractor’s past performance, meaning that monitoring resources are not necessarily being targeted at the areas of highest -risk.

FCNSW also does not target its QAAs on a risk basis. FCNSW does not have procedures for how QAAs should occur outside the North Coast region. QAAs are conducted inconsistently, with some reviews occurring in only part of the harvest site while others cover the whole harvest site. In addition, some QAAs do not meet FCNSW’s minimum standards. FCNSW’s record keeping of QAAs is also inconsistent, making it difficult to determine true levels of compliance and the cause of identified potential non-compliances.

In addition, FCNSW does not collate and analyse the results of its compliance monitoring to target its compliance audits. Undertaking these audits on a risk basis would allow FCNSW to apply its resources to the highest-risk harvest sites and contractors.

The EPA identifies native forestry as a high priority regulatory activity and undertakes proactive inspections of Coastal IFOA harvest sites on a risk basis. However, the EPA does not assess the risk at Western IFOA harvest sites, leaving a significant gap in its inspection regime. This means that the EPA may not be inspecting all high-risk harvest sites to ensure compliance with regulations across those sites. The EPA has started to train more of its staff in conducting forestry inspections, but it currently has a limited number of trained and experienced staff to undertake this work.

The EPA has developed a Regulatory and Compliance Priorities Statement 2022–23 which identifies native forestry as a key risk. This statement identifies that forestry is a priority area for its compliance activities because of the increased environmental risk and sensitivity in forests following the 2019–20 bushfires. A divisional plan for its regulatory operations contains specific actions for forestry, including ensuring that the EPA has a consistent approach to recording regulatory actions undertaken and identifying priority areas for assurance over State Forests.

As part of its compliance activities, the EPA responds to complaints received, or reports of non-compliance, across all four IFOA areas and also carries out proactive inspections in the Coastal IFOA area. To guide these inspections, the EPA determines the level of risk posed by each harvest site in the Coastal IFOA area using information it gathers from FCNSW. The EPA prioritises inspections of sites rated as high and medium-risk, but the EPA has not undertaken risk-assessments for the three Western IFOAs. By not determining the risks in these areas, the EPA does not have assurance that it is checking FCNSW compliance with regulations across all high-risk sites.

Most EPA staff have basic training in forestry matters, but few staff have the more advanced training required to effectively undertake forestry inspections. In addition, not all EPA officers have access to the technology required to undertake forestry inspections, such as internet-enabled tablets and specialised tapes for measuring tree diameter. This limits the EPA’s ability to determine the level of compliance with regulations and respond effectively to instances of environmental harm in relation to public native forestry.

The Coastal IFOA does not contain provisions which allow the EPA to unilaterally restrict forestry activities in the aftermath of a catastrophic event such as the 2019–20 bushfires. Following the bushfires, FCNSW approached the EPA and asked for additional site-specific operating conditions (SSOC) at some locations to assist it in maintaining compliance. The SSOCs were issued by the EPA and FCNSW was required to carry out forestry operations in accordance with the SSOCs at relevant harvest sites. These SSOCs were in place for 12 months. After a year, FCNSW decided not to renew this approach with the EPA, but implemented its own voluntary measures during harvesting operations. Unlike the SSOCs, the EPA was unable to undertake enforcement activities for breaches of voluntary measures.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #382 - released 22 June 2023

Published

Actions for Regulation and monitoring of local government

Regulation and monitoring of local government

Planning
Whole of Government
Environment
Local Government
Compliance
Regulation
Risk

What the report is about

The Office of Local Government (OLG) in the Department of Planning and Environment is responsible for strengthening the local government sector, including through its regulatory functions.

This audit assessed whether the OLG is effectively monitoring and regulating the sector under the Local Government Act 1993. The audit covered:

  • the effectiveness of departmental arrangements for the OLG to undertake its regulatory functions
  • whether the OLG has effective mechanisms to monitor and respond to risks and issues relating to council compliance and performance.

What we found

The OLG does not conduct effective, proactive monitoring to enable timely risk-based responses to council performance and compliance issues.

The OLG has not clearly defined and communicated its regulatory role to ensure that its priorities are well understood.

The OLG does not routinely review the results of its regulatory activities to improve its approaches.

The department lacks an adequate framework to define, measure and report on the OLG's performance, limiting transparency and its accountability.

The OLG's new strategic plan presents an opportunity for the OLG to better define, communicate, and deliver on its regulatory objectives.

What we recommended

The OLG should:

  • publish a tool to support councils to self-assess risks and report on their performance and compliance
  • ensure its council engagement strategy is consistent with its regulatory approach
  • report each year on its regulatory activities and performance
  • publish a calendar of its key sector support and monitoring activities
  • enhance processes for internally tracking operational activities
  • develop and maintain a data management framework
  • review and update frameworks and procedures for regulatory responses.

 

The Local Government Act 1993 (the LG Act) provides the legal framework for the system of local government in New South Wales. The LG Act describes the functions of councils, county councils and joint organisations which should be exercised consistent with the guiding principles and requirements of the LG Act. Councils also have functions and responsibilities under other Acts.

There are 128 local councils, nine county councils and 13 joint organisations of councils in the New South Wales local government sector. Each council is unique in size and location, owns and manages assets, and delivers services for their communities. According to 2021–22 data provided by the Department of Planning and Environment (the department), local councils managed $175.2 billion in infrastructure, property plant and equipment, held $16.8 billion of cash and investments, collected $7.8 billion in rates and charges and entered into $3.7 billion of borrowings. Councils' decision-making responsibilities directly impact the communities they serve, including responsibilities relevant to financial management, economic development, environmental sustainability and community wellbeing.

Under the LG Act, each elected council is accountable to the community they serve. In addition to Auditor-General reports, issues relating to council performance and compliance have been identified in public inquiries commissioned by the Minister for Local Government and investigations by the Independent Commission Against Corruption, NSW Ombudsman and Office of Local Government (OLG). Challenges and opportunities related to the operations and sustainability of the local government sector have also been reported by the sector and identified in reports by NSW government agencies such as the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal.

The department is the primary state government agency with responsibility for policy, legislative, regulatory and program functions for local government matters. The Office of Local Government (OLG) is a business unit within the department that advises the Minister for Local Government and exercises delegated functions of the Secretary of the Department of Planning and Environment under the LG Act.

Key departmental planning documents state that the OLG is responsible for strengthening the sustainability, performance, integrity, transparency and accountability of the local government sector. As the state regulator of the local government sector, the OLG aims to promote voluntary compliance, build councils' capacity for high performance, and intervene only when 'warranted and appropriate'. Relevant regulatory activities include issuing guidelines, investigating councils and councillors, and supporting the Minister for Local Government's discretionary intervention powers. The OLG's other functions include developing policy, administering grants and programs, supporting local government election processes, and issuing certain approvals.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether the OLG is effectively monitoring and regulating the local government sector under the LG Act. The assessment included:

  • the effectiveness of departmental arrangements for the OLG to undertake its regulatory functions
  • whether the OLG has effective mechanisms to monitor and respond to risks and issues relating to council compliance and performance.

This report focuses on the OLG’s activities relevant to powers under Chapter 13 of the LG Act, and related regulatory activities, such as monitoring risks, issuing guidance and engaging with councils. It also examines strategic and operational planning for these activities in the context of the OLG's other activities, and departmental arrangements to oversee and enable the OLG's regulatory effectiveness.

Other OLG activities were not in scope of the audit but are commented on in this report where contextually relevant. This includes the OLG's responsibilities under the LG Act with respect to councillor misconduct, and the 2022 review of the councillor misconduct framework commissioned by the former Minister for Local Government.

Conclusion

The Office of Local Government (OLG) in the Department of Planning and Environment (the department) does not conduct effective, proactive monitoring to enable timely risk-based responses to council performance and compliance issues. Council performance and compliance varies and a range of issues continue across the local government sector – some significant – that can impact on councils' operations and sustainability.

The department recognises that an effective and efficient sector is 'crucial to the economic and social wellbeing of communities across the State,' but the OLG does not routinely review the results of its regulatory activities to improve its approaches. The OLG has also not clearly defined and communicated its regulatory role to ensure that its priorities are well understood.

Inadequate performance measurement and reporting on its regulatory activities is a significant transparency and accountability issue, and the OLG cannot demonstrate that it is effectively regulating the local government sector.

The department lacks an adequate framework to define, measure and report on the OLG's performance as the state regulator of the sector under the Local Government Act 1993 (the LG Act). The OLG's various council engagement activities are not well structured and coordinated towards delivering on a clearly defined regulatory role and its regulatory priorities are not well understood. In 2022, the OLG identified, in its new strategic plan, that there is a need for it to define its role in the sector. It would be expected that a clearly defined role already underpins its aim to 'strike the right mix of monitoring, intervention, capability improvement and engagement activities'.

The OLG collects various sources of information about council compliance and performance but its systems and processes do not enable structured, proactive sector monitoring to enable timely, risk-based responses. Ineffective sector monitoring is a particular issue in the context of compliance, financial management and governance risks that have been identified in inquiries and reviews by other government agencies including integrity bodies and reported by the sector. Audit Office data for 2021–22 shows that 62 councils did not have or regularly update key corporate governance policies, and 63 do not have basic controls to manage cyber security risks. Further, 31 councils or joint organisations did not meet the statutory requirement to have an audit, risk and improvement committee by 30 June 2022.1

Overall, the OLG has made limited progress on projects that have been identified since 2019 to improve its sector monitoring, such as updating its performance measurement framework for councils. These factors limit its capacity to identify and act on issues early. In early 2023, the OLG started to implement a new council risk assessment tool.

The OLG's two main frameworks to guide its sector improvement and intervention activities were last updated in 2014 and 2017. The OLG considered relevant statutory criteria when advising the Minister on the use of powers to issue performance improvement and suspension orders under the LG Act. But the OLG lacks complete and approved procedures to guide staff when preparing advice and recommendations related to interventions, and other response options. This creates risks to the consistency and transparency of relevant processes.

The department and the OLG have identified that resourcing issues present a risk to the OLG's regulatory functions. Projects since 2021 to review the OLG's budget did not progress. The OLG does not routinely review the costs or evaluate the effectiveness of its regulatory activities.

The OLG's 2022–2026 strategic plan sets out a vision to be, 'A trusted regulator and capability builder enabling councils to better serve their communities'. Implementing the strategic plan presents an opportunity for the OLG to better define, communicate, and deliver on its regulatory objectives towards strengthening the sector. The OLG advises that a delivery plan and performance indicators for its new strategy are being developed, alongside work resulting from the 2022 review of the councillor misconduct framework.

 


1 This data has been sourced through the Audit Office's financial audits of councils. The Local Government 2022 report, which compiles results from the local government sector financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022, will include this and additional data, and related information. This report is expected to be tabled in June 2023.

This chapter considers the effectiveness of departmental arrangements for the OLG to undertake its regulatory functions.

This chapter assesses whether the OLG has effective mechanisms to monitor and respond to risks and issues relating to council compliance and performance.

The OLG’s 2017 Improvement and Intervention Framework is intended to guide appropriate responses to council compliance or performance risks and issues. The publicly available framework states that generally, the OLG will encourage councils to meet their obligations before a more formal intervention will be considered. It also states that any intervention or improvement response will be proportionate to the circumstances.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Statutory powers relevant to council accountability under the Local Government Act

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #380 - released 23 May 2023

Published

Actions for Planning and managing bushfire equipment

Planning and managing bushfire equipment

Community Services
Justice
Planning
Environment
Local Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Risk
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) and local councils in planning and managing equipment for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression.

What we found

The RFS has focused its fleet development activity on modernising and improving the safety of its firefighting fleet, and on the purchase of new firefighting aircraft.

There is limited evidence that the RFS has undertaken strategic fleet planning or assessment of the capability of the firefighting fleet to respond to current bushfire events or emerging fire risks.

The RFS does not have an overarching strategy to guide its planning, procurement, or distribution of the firefighting fleet.

The RFS does not have effective oversight of fleet maintenance activity across the State, and is not ensuring the accuracy of District Service Agreements with local councils, where maintenance responsibilities are described.

What we recommended

  1. Develop a fleet enhancement framework and strategy that is informed by an assessment of current fleet capability, and research into appropriate technologies to respond to emerging fire risks.
  2. Develop performance measures to assess the performance and capabilities of the fleet in each RFS District by recording and publicly reporting on fire response times, fire response outcomes, and completions of fire hazard reduction works.
  3. Report annually on fleet allocations to RFS Districts, and identify the ways in which fleet resources align with district-level fire risks.
  4. Develop a strategy to ensure that local brigade volunteers are adequate in numbers and appropriately trained to operate fleet appliances in RFS Districts where they are required.
  5. Establish a fleet maintenance framework to ensure regular update of District Service Agreements with local councils.
  6. Review and improve processes for timely recording of fleet asset movements, locations, and maintenance status.

This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Rural Fire Service (the RFS) plans and manages the firefighting equipment needed to prevent, mitigate, and suppress bushfires. This audit also examined the role of local councils in managing bushfire equipment fleet assets. Local councils have vested legal ownership of the majority of the land-based firefighting fleet, including a range of legislated responsibilities to carry out fleet maintenance and repairs. The RFS has responsibilities to plan and purchase firefighting fleet assets, and ensure they are ready for use in response to fires and other emergencies.

This report describes the challenges in planning and managing the firefighting fleet, including a confusion of roles and responsibilities between the RFS and local councils in relation to managing certain land-based rural firefighting fleet – a point that has been made in our Local Government financial audits over several years. This role confusion is further demonstrated in the responses of the RFS and local councils to this audit report – included at Appendix one.

The lack of cohesion in roles and responsibilities for managing rural firefighting vehicles increases the risk that these firefighting assets are not properly maintained and managed, and introduces a risk that this could affect their readiness to be mobilised when needed.

While the audit findings and recommendations address some of the operational and organisational inefficiencies in relation to rural firefighting equipment management, they do not question the legislative arrangements that govern them. This is a matter for the NSW Government to consider in ensuring the fleet arrangements are fit for purpose, and are clearly understood by the relevant agencies.

The NSW Rural Fire Service (hereafter the RFS) is the lead combat agency for bushfires in New South Wales, and has the power to take charge of bushfire prevention and response operations anywhere in the State. The RFS has responsibilities to prevent, mitigate and suppress bushfires across 95% of the State, predominantly in the non-metropolitan areas of New South Wales. Fire and Rescue NSW is responsible for fire response activity in the cities and large townships that make up the remaining five per cent of the State.

The RFS bushfire fleet is an integral part of the agency's overall bushfire risk management. The RFS also uses this fleet to respond to other emergencies such as floods and storms, motor vehicle accidents, and structural fires. Fleet planning and management is one of a number of activities that is necessary for fire mitigation and suppression.

The Rural Fires Act 1997 (Rural Fires Act) imposes obligations on all landowners and land managers to prevent the occurrence of bushfires and reduce the risk of bushfires from spreading. Local councils have fire prevention responsibilities within their local government areas, principally to reduce fire hazards near council owned or managed assets, and minor roads.

The RFS is led by a Commissioner and is comprised of both paid employees and volunteer rural firefighters. Its functions are prescribed in the Rural Fires Act and related legislation such as the State Emergency Rescue Management Act 1989. The RFS functions are also described in Bush Fire Risk Management Plans, the State Emergency Management Plan, District Service Agreements, and RFS procedural documents. Some of the core responsibilities of the RFS include:

  • preventing, mitigating, and suppressing fires across New South Wales
  • recruiting and managing volunteer firefighters in rural fire brigades
  • purchasing and allocating firefighting fleet assets to local councils
  • establishing District Service Agreements with local councils to give the RFS permissions to use the fleet assets that are vested with local councils
  • carrying out fleet maintenance and repairs when authorised to do so by local councils
  • inspecting the firefighting fleet
  • supporting land managers and private property owners with fire prevention activity.

In order to carry out its legislated firefighting functions, the RFS relies on land-based vehicles, marine craft, and aircraft. These different firefighting appliance types are referred to in this report as the firefighting fleet or fleet assets.

RFS records show that in 2021 there were 6,345 firefighting fleet assets across NSW. Most of the land-based appliances commonly associated with firefighting, such as water pumpers and water tankers, are purchased by the RFS and vested with local councils under the Rural Fires Act. The vesting of firefighting assets with local councils means that the assets are legally owned by the council for which the asset has been purchased. The RFS is able to use the firefighting assets through District Service Agreements with local councils or groups of councils.

In addition to the land-based firefighting fleet, the RFS owns a fleet of aircraft with capabilities for fire mitigation, suppression, and reconnaissance during fire events. The RFS hires a fleet of different appliances to assist with fire prevention and hazard reduction works. These include aircraft for firefighting and fire reconnaissance, and heavy plant equipment such as graders and bulldozers for hazard reduction. Hazard reduction works include the clearance of bush and grasslands around major roads and protected assets, and the creation and maintenance of fire trails and fire corridors to assist with fire response activity.

The RFS is organised into 44 RFS Districts and seven Area Commands. The RFS relies on volunteer firefighters to assist in carrying out most of its firefighting functions. These functions may include the operation of the fleet during fire response activities and training exercises, and the routine inspection of the fleet to ensure it is maintained according to fleet service standards. Volunteer fleet inspections are supervised by the RFS Fire Control Officer.

In 2021 there were approximately 73,000 volunteers located in 1,993 rural fire brigades across the State, making the RFS the largest volunteer fire emergency service in Australia. In addition to brigade volunteers, the RFS has approximately 1,100 salaried staff who occupy leadership and administrative roles at RFS headquarters and in the 44 RFS Districts.

Local councils have legislative responsibilities relating to bushfire planning and management. Some of the core responsibilities of local councils include:

  • establishing and equipping rural fire brigades
  • contributing to the Rural Fire Fighting Fund
  • vested ownership of land-based rural firefighting equipment
  • carrying out firefighting fleet maintenance and repairs
  • conducting bushfire prevention and hazard reduction activity.

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the RFS and local councils in planning and managing equipment for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression. From the period of 2017 to 2022 inclusive, we addressed the audit objective by examining whether the NSW RFS and local councils effectively:

  • plan for current and future bushfire fleet requirements
  • manage and maintain the fleet required to prevent, mitigate, and suppress bushfires in NSW.

This audit did not assess:

  • the operational effectiveness of the RFS bushfire response
  • the effectiveness of personal protective equipment and clothing
  • the process of vesting of rural firefighting equipment with local councils
  • activities of any other statutory authorities responsible for managing bushfires in NSW.

As the lead combat agency for the bushfire response in NSW, the RFS has primary responsibility for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression.

Three local councils were selected as case studies for this audit, Hawkesbury City Council, Wagga Wagga City Council and Uralla Shire Council. These case studies highlight the ways in which the RFS and local councils collaborate and communicate in rural fire districts.

Conclusion

The RFS has focused its fleet development activity on modernising and improving the safety of its land-based firefighting fleet, and on the purchase of new firefighting aircraft

The RFS has reduced the average age of the firefighting fleet from approximately 21 years in 2017, to approximately 16 years in 2022. The RFS has also enhanced the aerial fleet with the addition of six new aircraft to add to the existing three aircraft.

Recommendations from inquiries into the 2019–20 bushfires have driven significant levels of fleet improvement activity, mainly focused on the addition of safety features to existing fleet appliances. The RFS has dedicated most of its efforts to purchasing and refurbishing firefighting appliances of the same type and in the same volumes year on year.

However, the RFS is unable to demonstrate how the composition, size, or the locations of the NSW firefighting fleet is linked to current fire prevention, mitigation, and suppression requirements, or future fire risks.

There is limited evidence that the RFS has undertaken strategic fleet planning or assessment of the capability of the firefighting fleet to respond to current bushfire events or emerging fire risks

The RFS has not established a methodology to assess the composition or volumes of the firefighting fleet against fire activity and fire risks in the 44 NSW Rural Fire Districts. The RFS has not developed performance measures or targets to assess or report on fire response times in each of its districts, nor has it developed measures to assess the effectiveness of responses according to fire sizes and fire types. Similarly, the RFS has limited performance measures to assess fire prevention activity, or to assess fuel load reduction works, so it is not possible to assess whether its fleet capabilities are fit for these purposes.

The RFS does not have an overarching strategy to guide its planning, procurement, or distribution of the firefighting fleet

RFS fleet planning and fleet allocations are based on historical fleet sizes and compositions, and distributed to locations where there are appropriately trained brigade volunteers.

The RFS takes an asset protection approach to bushfire prevention and planning that is based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management. This approach requires that the RFS identify assets at risk of fire, and develop treatment plans to protect these assets. However, fleet requirements are not linked to NSW asset protection plans, meaning that fleet is not allocated according to the identified risks in these plans. Further, the RFS does not develop fire prevention plans for areas where there are no identified assets.

The RFS has not conducted future-focused fleet research or planning into technologies that match fleet capabilities to emerging or future fire risks. Since the significant fire events of 2019–2020, the RFS has not changed its approach to planning for, or assessing, the operational capabilities of the fleet. The RFS advises it is scoping a project to match resources to risk, which it plans to commence in 2023.

The RFS does not have effective oversight of fleet maintenance activity across the State, and is not ensuring the accuracy of District Service Agreements where maintenance responsibilities are described

The RFS does not have a framework to ensure that District Service Agreements with local councils are accurate. Almost two thirds of service agreements have not been reviewed in the last ten years, and some do not reflect actual maintenance practices. There is no formalised process to ensure communication occurs between the RFS and local councils for fleet management and maintenance.

RFS fleet management systems at the central level are not integrated with RFS district-level databases to indicate when fleet assets are in workshops being maintained and serviced. The RFS has a new centralised Computer Aided Dispatch System that relies on accurate fleet locations and fleet condition information in order to dispatch vehicles to incidents and fires. A lack of interface between the district-level fleet systems and the centralised RFS fleet dispatch system, may impact on operational responses to bushfires. 

The RFS has not made significant changes to the size or composition of the firefighting fleet in the past five years and does not have an overarching strategy to drive fleet development

Since 2017, the RFS has made minimal changes to its firefighting fleet volumes or vehicle types. The RFS is taking a fleet renewal approach to fleet planning, with a focus on refurbishing and replacing ageing firefighting assets with newer appliances and vehicles of the same classification and type. While the RFS has adopted a fleet renewal approach, driven by its Appliance Replacement Program Guide, it does not have a strategy or framework to guide its future-focused fleet development. There is no document that identifies and analyses bushfire events and risks in NSW, and matches fleet resources and fleet technologies to meet those risks. The RFS does not have fleet performance measures or targets to assess whether the size and composition of the fleet is meeting current or emerging bushfire climate hazards, or fuel load risks across its 44 NSW Fire Districts.

The RFS fleet currently comprises approximately 4,000 frontline, operational firefighting assets such as tankers, pumpers, and air and marine craft, and approximately 2,300 logistical vehicles, such as personnel transport vehicles and specialist support vehicles. Of the land-based firefighting vehicles, the RFS has maintained a steady number of approximately 3,800 tankers and 65 pumpers, year on year, for the past five years. This appliance type is an essential component of the RFS land-based, firefighting fleet with capabilities to suppress and extinguish fires.

Since 2017, most RFS fleet enhancement activity has been directed to upgrades and the modernisation of older fleet assets with new safety features. There is limited evidence of research into new fleet technologies for modern firefighting. The RFS fleet volumes and fleet types have remained relatively static since 2017, with the exception of the aerial firefighting fleet. Since 2017, the RFS has planned for, and purchased, six additional aircraft to add to the existing three aircraft in its permanent fleet.

While the RFS has made minimal changes to its fleet since 2017, in 2016 it reduced the overall number of smaller transport vehicles, by purchasing larger vehicles with increased capacity for personnel transport. The consolidation of logistical and transport vehicles accounts for an attrition in fleet numbers from 7,058 in 2016, to 6,315 in 2017 as shown in Exhibit 2.

The firefighting fleet management system is not always updated in a timely manner due to insufficient RFS personnel with permissions to make changes in the system

The RFS uses a fleet management system known as SAP EAM to record the location and status of firefighting fleet assets. The system holds information about the condition of the firefighting fleet, the home location of each fleet asset, and the maintenance, servicing, and inspection records of all assets. The RFS uses the system for almost all functions related to the firefighting fleet, including the location of vehicles so that they can be dispatched during operational exercises or fire responses.

Staff at RFS Headquarters are responsible for creating and maintaining asset records in the fleet management system. RFS District staff have limited permissions in relation to SAP EAM. They are able to raise work orders for repairs and maintenance, upload evidence to show that work has been done, and close actions in the system.

RFS District staff are not able to enter or update some fleet information in the system, such as the location of vehicles. When an RFS District receives a fleet appliance, it cannot be allocated to a brigade until the location of the asset is accurately recorded in the system. The location of the asset must be updated in the SAP EAM system by staff at RFS Headquarters. District staff can request system support from staff at RFS Headquarters to enter this information. At the time of writing, the position responsible for updating the fleet management system at RFS Headquarters was vacant, and RFS District personnel reported significant wait times in response to their service requests.

The RFS conducts annual audits of SAP EAM system information to ensure data is accurate and complete. RFS staff are currently doing data cleansing work to ensure that fleet allocations are recorded correctly in the system.

Communication between brigades, local councils and the RFS needs improvement to ensure that fleet information is promptly updated in the fleet management system

RFS brigade volunteers do not have access to the fleet management system. When fleet assets are used or moved, volunteers report information about the location and condition of the fleet to RFS District staff using a paper-based form, or by email or phone. Information such as vehicle mileage, engine hours, and defects are all captured by volunteers in a logbook which is scanned and sent to RFS District staff. RFS District staff then enter the relevant information into the fleet management system, or raise a service ticket with RFS Headquarters to enter the information.

Brigade volunteers move fleet assets for a range of reasons, including for fire practice exercises. If volunteers are unable to report the movement of assets to RFS District staff in a timely manner, this can lead to system inaccuracies. Lapses and backlogs in record keeping can occur when RFS staff at district offices or at Headquarters are not available to update records at the times that volunteers report information. A lack of accurate record keeping can potentially impact on RFS operational activities, including fire response activity.

Brigade volunteers notify RFS District staff when fleet appliances are defective, or if they have not been repaired properly. District staff then enter the information into the fleet management system. The inability of volunteers to enter information into the system means they have no visibility over their requests, including whether they have been approved, actioned, or rejected.

Local councils are responsible for servicing and maintaining the firefighting fleet according to the Rural Fires Act, but this responsibility can be transferred to the RFS through arrangements described in local service agreements. Council staff record all fleet servicing and maintenance information in their local systems. The types of fleet information that is captured in local council records can vary between councils. RFS staff described the level of council reporting, and the effectiveness of this process, as 'mixed'.

Councils use different databases and systems to record fleet assets, and some councils are better resourced for this activity than others

Firefighting fleet information is recorded in different asset management systems across NSW. Each council uses its own asset management system to record details about the vested fleet assets. All three councils that were interviewed for this audit had different systems to record information about the fleet. In addition, the type of information captured by the three councils was varied.

Exhibit 10: Systems used by local councils to manage the firefighting fleet
System Hawkesbury City Council Uralla Shire Council Wagga Wagga City Council
Financial asset management system TechnologyOne Civica Assetic
Asset management system TechnologyOne Manual MEX

Source: Audit Office analysis of information provided by the RFS and local councils.

Local councils have varying levels of resources and capabilities to manage the administrative tasks associated with the firefighting fleet. Some of the factors that impact on the ability of councils to manage administrative tasks include: the size of the council; the capabilities of the information management systems, the size of the staff team, and the levels of staff training in asset management.

Uralla Shire Council is a small rural council in northern NSW. This council uses financial software to record information about the firefighting fleet. While staff record information about the condition of the asset, its replacement value, and its depreciation, staff do not record the age of the asset, or its location. Staff manually enter fleet maintenance information into their systems. Uralla Shire Council would like to purchase asset maintenance software that generates work orders for fleet repairs and maintenance. However, the council does not have trained staff in the use of asset management software, and the small size of the fleet may not make it financially worthwhile.

The Hawkesbury City Council uses a single system to capture financial and asset information associated with the firefighting fleet. Hawkesbury is a large metropolitan council located north-west of Sydney, with a relatively large staff team in comparison with Uralla Shire Council. The Hawkesbury City Council has given RFS District staff access to their fleet information system. RFS District staff can directly raise work orders for fleet repairs and maintenance through the council system, and receive automated notifications when the work is complete.

Two of the three audited councils report that they conduct annual reviews of fleet assets to assess whether the information they hold is accurate and up-to-date.

More than half of the fleet maintenance service agreements between the RFS and local councils have not been reviewed in ten years, and some do not reflect local practices

Local councils have a legislated responsibility to service, repair, and maintain the firefighting fleet to service standards set by the RFS. Councils may transfer this responsibility to the RFS through District Service Agreements. The RFS Districts are responsible for ensuring that the service agreements are current and effective.

The RFS does not have monitoring and quality control processes to ensure that service agreements with local councils are reviewed regularly. The RFS has 73 service agreements with local councils or groups of councils. Sixty-three per cent of service agreements had not been reviewed in the last ten years. Only four service agreements specify an end date and, of those, one agreement expired in 2010 and had not been reviewed at the time of this audit.

The RFS does not have a framework to ensure that service agreements with local councils reflect actual practices. Of the three councils selected for audit, one agreement does not describe the actual arrangements for fleet maintenance practices in RFS Districts. The service agreement with Hawkesbury City Council specifies that the RFS will maintain the firefighting fleet on behalf of council when, in fact, council maintains the firefighting fleet. The current agreement commenced in 2012, and at the time of writing had not been updated to reflect local maintenance practices.

When District Service Agreements are not reviewed periodically, there is a risk that neither local councils nor the RFS have clear oversight of the status of fleet servicing, maintenance, and repairs.

RFS District Service Agreements set out a requirement that RFS and local councils establish a liaison committee. Liaison committees typically include council staff, RFS District staff, and RFS brigade volunteers. While service agreements state that liaison committees must meet periodically to monitor and review the performance of the service agreement, committee members determine when and how often the committee meets.

RFS District staff and staff at the three audited councils are not meeting routinely to review or update their service agreements. At Wagga Wagga City Council, staff meet with RFS District staff each year to report on activity to fulfil service agreement requirements. Uralla Shire Council staff did not meet routinely with RFS District staff before 2021. When liaison committees do not meet regularly, there is a risk that the RFS and local councils have incorrect or outdated information about the location, status, or condition of the firefighting fleet. Given that councils lack systems to track and monitor fleet locations, regular communication between the RFS and local councils is essential.

The RFS has not established processes to ensure that local councils and RFS District personnel meet and exchange information about the fleet. Of the three councils selected for this audit, one council had not received information about the number, type, or status of the fleet for at least five years, and did not receive an updated list of appliances until there was a change in RFS District personnel. This has impacted on the accuracy of council record keeping. Councils do not always receive notification about new assets or information about the location of assets from the RFS, and therefore cannot reflect this information in their accounting and reporting.

RFS area commands audit system records to ensure fleet inspections occur as planned, but central systems are not always updated, creating operational risks

RFS District staff are required by the Rural Fires Act to ensure the firefighting fleet is inspected at least once a year. Regular inspections of the fleet are vital to ensure that vehicles are fit-for-purpose and safe for brigade volunteers. Inspections are also fundamental to the operational readiness and capability of RFS to respond to fire incidents.

RFS Area Command personnel conduct audits of fleet maintenance data to ensure that fleet inspections are occurring as planned. These inspections provide the RFS with assurance that the fleet is being maintained and serviced by local council workshops, or third-party maintenance contractors.

Some RFS Districts run their own fleet management systems outside of the central management system. They do this to manage their fleet inspection activity effectively. Annual fleet inspection dates are programmed by staff at RFS Headquarters. Most of the inspection dates generated by RFS Headquarters are clustered together and RFS Districts need to separate inspection times to manage workloads over the year. Spreading inspection dates is necessary to avoid exceeding the capacity of local council workshops or third party contractors, and to ensure that fleet are available during the bushfire season.

The fleet inspection records at RFS Headquarters are not always updated in a timely manner to reflect actual inspection and service dates of vehicles. District staff are not able to change fleet inspection and service dates in the central management system because they do not have the necessary permissions to access the system. The usual practice is for RFS District staff to notify staff at RFS Headquarters, and ask them to retrospectively update the system. As there is a lag in updating the central database, at a point in time, the actual inspection and service dates of vehicles can be different to the dates entered in the central fleet management system.

Fleet inspection and maintenance records must be accurately recorded in the central RFS management system for operational reasons. RFS Headquarters personnel need to know the location and maintenance status of fleet vehicles at all times in order to dispatch vehicles to incidents and fires. The RFS fleet management system is integrated with a new Computer Aided Dispatch System. The Computer Aided Dispatch System assigns the nearest and most appropriate vehicles to fire incidents. The system relies on accurate fleet locations and fleet condition information in order to dispatch these vehicles.

There is a risk that RFS Headquarters' systems do not contain accurate information about the location and status of vehicles. Some may be in workshops for servicing and repair, while the system may record them as available for dispatch. As there are many thousands of fleet vehicles, all requiring an annual service and inspection, a lack of accurate record keeping has wide implications for State fire operations.

RFS is currently exploring ways to improve the ways in which fleet inspections are programmed into the fleet management system.

RFS provides funds to councils to assist with maintaining the firefighting fleet, but does not receive fleet maintenance cost information from all local councils

Each year the RFS provides local councils with a lump sum to assist with the cost of repairing and maintaining the firefighting fleet. This lump sum funding is also used for meeting the costs of maintaining brigade stations, utilities, and other miscellaneous matters associated with RFS business.

In 2020–21, the RFS provided NSW local councils with approximately $23 million for maintenance and repairs of appliances, buildings, and utilities. Ninety councils were provided with lump sum funding in 2021, receiving on average $257,000. The amounts received by individual councils ranged from $56,200 to $1,029,884.

Some councils provide itemised repairs and maintenance reports to RFS District staff, showing the work completed and the cost of that work. However, not all councils collect this information or provide it to the RFS. Local councils collect fleet maintenance information in their local council systems. In some cases, the responsibility for fleet maintenance is shared across a group of councils, and not all councils have oversight of this process.

The RFS has not taken steps to require local councils to provide itemised maintenance costings for the firefighting fleet. Thus, the RFS does not have a clear understanding of how local councils are spending their annual fleet maintenance funding allocations. The RFS does not know if the funding allocations are keeping pace with the actual cost of repairing and maintaining the fleet.

RFS District staff report that funding shortfalls are impacting on the prioritisation of fleet servicing and maintenance works in some council areas. When fleet servicing and maintenance is not completed routinely or effectively, there is a risk that it can negatively impact the overall condition and lifespan of the vehicle. Poor processes in relation to fleet maintenance and repair risk impacting on the operational capabilities of the fleet during fire events.

The timeliness and effectiveness of fleet servicing and maintenance is affected by resource levels in RFS Districts and local councils

Local councils have a legislated responsibility to service and maintain the firefighting fleet to the service standards set by the RFS. Fleet maintenance is usually done by the entity with the appropriate workshops and resources, and the maintenance arrangements are described in District Service Agreements. RFS District staff conduct annual inspections to ensure that the firefighting fleet has been serviced and maintained appropriately, and is safe for use by brigade volunteers. If the fleet has not been maintained to RFS service standards or timelines, RFS District staff may work with local councils to support or remediate these works.

The effectiveness of this quality control activity is dependent on relationships and communication between the RFS Districts and local councils. While some RFS staff reported having positive relationships with local councils, others said they struggled to get fleet maintenance work done in a timely manner. Some councils reported that funding shortfalls for fleet maintenance activity was impacting on the prioritisation of RFS fleet maintenance works. When fleet maintenance work is not completed routinely or effectively, it can negatively impact on the overall condition and lifespan of the vehicle. It can also reduce the capacity of the RFS to respond to fire events.

Fleet quality control activities are carried out by RFS District staff. In some of the smaller RFS Districts, one person is responsible for liaising with local councils and brigade volunteers about fleet maintenance and repairs. In the regions where resources are limited, there is less ability to maintain ongoing communication. This is impacting on fleet service and maintenance timelines and the timeliness of fleet monitoring activity.

The RFS has mutual support arrangements with agencies in NSW and interstate, though shared fleet levels are yet to be quantified

The RFS has arrangements with state, federal, and international fire authorities to provide mutual support during fire incidents. In NSW, the RFS has agreements with the three statutory authorities – Fire and Rescue NSW, the Forestry Corporation of NSW, and the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service. The agreement with Fire and Rescue NSW provides a framework for cooperation and joint operations between the agencies. The agreements with the Forestry Corporation of NSW and the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service describe the control and coordination arrangements for bush and grass fires across NSW. These arrangements are set out in legislation and incorporated into local Bush Fire Risk Management Plans.

The RFS has agreements with fire authorities in three of the four Australian states and territories that share a border with NSW – the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, and South Australia. Each agreement sets out the arrangements for mutual assistance and joint operations, including arrangements for sharing aircraft. The agreement between the RFS and Victoria had lapsed. The RFS told the NSW Bushfire Inquiry that the agreement with Victoria would be finalised by June 2020. In June 2022, the RFS reported that the agreement was in the process of being finalised.

The arrangements for mutual aid from Western Australia, Northern Territory and Tasmania, are managed by the National Resource Sharing Centre. These agreements set out the arrangements for interstate assistance between Australian fire services, emergency services, and land management agencies in those states and territories.

These mutual support arrangements may assist during state-based fire events. However, when there are competing demands for resources, such as during the bushfires of 2019–2020, there can be limits on fleet availability. During the 2019–2020 fires, resources were stretched in all jurisdictions as these fires affected NSW, Victoria, and Queensland.

There are opportunities for the RFS and other NSW agencies to quantify fleet resources across the State and identify assets that can be mobilised for different fire activities. This form of fleet planning may be used to enhance surge capabilities during times of high fire activity. There are also opportunities for the RFS and other agencies to match the levels of shared assets to projected bushfire risks.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies 

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #376 - released 27 February 2023

 

Published

Actions for Effectiveness of the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme

Effectiveness of the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme

Planning
Environment
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation

What the report is about

This audit examined whether the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) and the Biodiversity Conservation Trust (BCT) have effectively designed and implemented the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme (‘the Scheme’) to compensate for the loss of biodiversity due to development.

Under the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016, the Scheme enables landholders to establish in-perpetuity Biodiversity Stewardship Agreements on sites to generate credits for the unique biodiversity on that land. These credits can be sold to offset the negative impact of development on biodiversity.

What we found

DPE has not effectively designed core elements of the Scheme. DPE did not establish a clear strategic plan to guide the implementation of the Scheme.

The BCT has various roles in the Scheme but lacked safeguards against potential conflicts, creating risks to credit supply.

The effectiveness of its implementation has also been limited. Key concerns around the Scheme’s transparency, sustainability and integrity are yet to be fully resolved.

A market-based approach to biodiversity offsetting is central to the Scheme's operation but credit supply is lacking and poorly matched to growing demand. DPE has not established a clear, resourced plan to manage the shortage in credit supply. Data about the market, published by the DPE and the BCT, does not provide an adequate picture of credit supply, demand and price to readily support market participation.

These factors create a risk that biodiversity gains made through the Scheme will not be sufficient to offset losses resulting from development, and that the DPE will not be able to assess the Scheme’s overall effectiveness.

DPE is leading work with the BCT to improve the Scheme, but this is not yet guided by a long-term strategy with clear goals.

What we recommended

The audit made 11 recommendations to DPE and the BCT, focusing on:

  • a long-term strategic plan for the Scheme
  • improvements to the operation and transparency of the market and credit supply
  • frameworks to ensure the financial and ecological sustainability of biodiversity stewardship sites
  • enhanced public reporting and data management
  • resolving issues in conflicting governance and oversight.

 

 Fast facts

  • 96% –  proportion of developer demand for species credits not met by current supply
  • 97% – proportion of species credits that have never been traded on the biodiversity market
  • 60% – proportion of the 226 Biodiversity Stewardship sites under active land management
  • $90m – value of developers’ obligations paid directly into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund
  • 20% – proportion of developer obligations transferred to the BCT that have been acquitted.

The NSW Government's Biodiversity Outlook Report 2020 estimates that, without effective management, only 50% of species and 59% of ecological communities that are listed as threatened in New South Wales will still exist in 100 years. The NSW State of the Environment 2021 report identifies habitat destruction and native vegetation clearing as presenting the single greatest threat to biodiversity in the State.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), biodiversity offsets are 'measurable conservation outcomes that result from actions designed to compensate for significant, residual biodiversity loss from development projects'. The OECD states that a feature of such schemes is that biodiversity offsets are intended to be implemented as the 'final step of a mitigation hierarchy' whereby reasonable first steps are taken to avoid and minimise the negative impacts.

The NSW Biodiversity Offsets Scheme was established in 2017 under the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act). The purpose of the Act is to 'maintain a healthy, productive and resilient environment for the greatest well-being of the community, now and into the future, consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable development'.

The Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) designed and manages this Scheme. Under the Act, a feature of the Scheme is a 'market-based conservation mechanism through which the impacts to biodiversity can be offset.' The Scheme enables landholders to establish in-perpetuity Biodiversity Stewardship Agreements (BSAs) on sites to generate biodiversity credits, which can be sold to offset the negative impact of development on biodiversity. BSA sites are intended to be managed over the long term to generate the biodiversity gains required to offset the impact.

The Biodiversity Conservation Trust (BCT) monitors and supports landholders to manage BSA sites under the Scheme. This includes making payments to landholders from funds held in the Biodiversity Stewardship Payments Fund for undertaking the required biodiversity management actions.

This Scheme was preceded by several other offsetting schemes in New South Wales, including the BioBanking scheme that started in 2008. DPE has arrangements to transition sites, credits, and offset obligations from this and other previous schemes.

The current biodiversity credit market in New South Wales consists of 1394 different types of ecosystem credits, which are approved to be traded in 364 different offset trading groups, and 867 different species credits. Trading rules, set out in the Biodiversity Conservation Regulation 2017 (the Regulation), prioritise offsetting the obligations of a development with like-for-like ecosystem or species credits.

The Scheme is implemented through the planning system in New South Wales. Proposed development that involves the clearing of native vegetation, and meets certain thresholds, is required to undertake a Biodiversity Development Assessment Report. These reports determine an offset obligation, in biodiversity credits, to compensate for the biodiversity loss proposed. These reports are considered by consent authorities (such as a council, for local development, or by the Minister for Planning for major projects). An offset obligation is then included in the conditions of development approval.

In addition to establishing a market for trading between developers, with offset obligations, and landholders, who sell credits from their BSA sites, the Scheme allows developers to pay into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund and transfer their obligations to the BCT. This allows the developer to proceed with their project. The BCT must then meet these acquired obligations by buying the required credits, or by undertaking other approved activities set out in the Regulation. The BCT has more options than developers on how and when it acquits its obligations.

This audit examined whether DPE and the BCT have effectively designed and implemented the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme to compensate for the loss of biodiversity due to development.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning and Environment (DPE) has not effectively designed core elements of the NSW Biodiversity Offsets Scheme. DPE did not establish a clear strategy to develop the biodiversity credit market or determine whether the Scheme’s operation and outcomes are consistent with the purposes of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016.

The effectiveness of the Scheme's implementation by DPE and the BCT has been limited. A market-based approach to biodiversity offsetting is central to the Scheme's operation but credit supply is lacking and poorly matched to growing demand: this includes a potential undersupply of in-demand credits for numerous endangered species. Key concerns around the Scheme’s integrity, transparency, and sustainability are also yet to be fully resolved. As such, there is a risk that biodiversity gains made through the Scheme will not be sufficient to offset losses resulting from the impacts of development, and that DPE will not be able to assess the Scheme’s overall effectiveness.

DPE developed the Scheme following a 2014 review of the State's biodiversity legislation and building on previous offsetting arrangements in New South Wales. At the time the Scheme commenced in 2017, DPE lacked a strategic plan to guide its implementation, set clear outcomes and performance measures, and respond effectively to risks. DPE did establish a detailed scientific method for assessing biodiversity impacts under the Scheme and a system for accrediting assessors to undertake this technical work. These are important foundations for the robustness of the Scheme.

The Scheme has been in place for five years, but the biodiversity credit market is not well developed. Most credit types have never been traded. Also, according to DPE data, around 90% of demand cannot be matched to credit supply – and there is likely to be a substantial credit undersupply for at least seven endangered flora species, three endangered fauna species, and eight threatened ecological communities. Credit demand is projected to grow – especially in relation to the NSW Government’s $112.7 billion four-year infrastructure pipeline.

As with any market, potential participants need information about demand and price in order to understand risks and opportunities. But information about the biodiversity credit market, published by DPE and the BCT, does not provide an adequate picture of credit supply, demand and price to support market participation. This can create uncertainty for landholders who may be weighing the costs and benefits of establishing Biodiversity Stewardship Agreement (BSA) sites, and for development proponents who need to know whether they can purchase sufficient credits and at what price. Development proponents who lack market information are being incentivised to meet their offset obligations by paying into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund, which is managed by the BCT. This option provides developers with more certainty that enables them to progress their projects, but does not result in the development being offset until the BCT later acquits the obligation.

The BCT has multiple roles in the Scheme. These include setting-up and administering BSAs which generate credits, acquiring offset obligations from developers who pay into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund, and purchasing credits to meet its acquired obligations. There have been inadequate safeguards to mitigate the potential for conflicts between these roles. As the BCT directs its efforts towards facilitating BSA sites and purchasing credits to meet its obligations, there is a risk that government is insufficiently focused on supporting overall credit supply.

DPE has begun developing a credit supply strategy. Its absence, and a lack of clarity around responsibility for credit supply under the Scheme, has contributed to the significant risk of insufficient and poorly matched credits to meet the growing demand. The BCT's acquired obligations from developers have been increasing year-on-year, and are likely to continue to grow. 

There is a risk that the BCT will not have sufficient funds to acquit its growing obligations with like-for-like credits, which could result in sub-optimal biodiversity outcomes. The Scheme rules allow the BCT to acquit its obligations with measures other than like-for-like credits. DPE has not provided clear guidance to the BCT on when or how to do so, or how this would fulfil the 'no net loss' of biodiversity standard.

There are transparency and integrity risks to the Scheme. DPE does not maintain a public register of biodiversity credits with complete information, including credits' transaction histories, consistent with the legislative intent for a single register. DPE also does not have ready access to information to check that developments have been acquitted with the required credits.

Risks to the sustainability of the Scheme and its outcomes remain. DPE and the BCT have not yet implemented a decision-making and intervention framework to ensure adequate initial and ongoing funding for the long-term management of new and existing BSA sites. DPE also did not collect ecological data from sites under previous schemes before they were transitioned, and BCT only introduced ecological monitoring requirements for new BSA sites in March 2021. The lack of monitoring requirements creates a risk that the biodiversity gains, which BSA sites are required to generate to offset biodiversity losses, will not be measured and achieved under the Scheme.

This section presents an overview of the status of the biodiversity credit market in New South Wales. It describes development of the market under the Scheme in the context of transitional arrangements from previous schemes, and the extent of market participation and transactions to date. It also presents information about emerging trends in credit demand and supply.

Background

A purpose of the Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act) is to establish a market-based conservation mechanism through which impacts on biodiversity can be offset. Sufficient credits of appropriate types, which are well matched to demand, are necessary for enough transactions to inform prices and enable efficient like-for-like offsetting. For transactions to occur efficiently in the market, participants require reliable and easy-to-access information about supply, demand and price.

The Scheme was established in 2017 with an existing credit supply and offset obligations (credit demand) as regulations had been introduced to preserve and transition credits and obligations from previous schemes including the BioBanking Scheme, which started in 2008.

Credits under the BioBanking scheme are referred to as 'BBAM credits', and credits under the current Scheme are referred to as 'BAM credits'. BBAM credits are still available, and the transitional arrangements enable DPE to determine the 'reasonable equivalence' of these to the current Scheme's credit numbers and classes. DPE has stated that reasonable equivalence of credits is based on ecological not financial equivalence. 

This section assesses the clarity and alignment of the goals of the Scheme to key features of its design and operations. It also examines structural elements of the Scheme that aim to maintain integrity within administering agencies, and the status of actions to address risks or issues.

Background

The Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act) sets out the legal framework for the Scheme. Given the complexities, financial interests, and range of stakeholders associated with the Scheme, it requires strong safeguards. Transparency and assurances around the Scheme's integrity are also relevant to participants' confidence in it, which in turn is important for market development.

Core components of the Scheme, identified in section 1.3 of the Act, are to be consistent with the ‘principles of ecologically sustainable development’.

The Act and other administrative arrangements of government allocate responsibility to DPE and the Minister for Environment and Heritage for the Scheme’s design and elements of its implementation. This includes responsibility for the Scheme’s policy, legislative and regulatory framework.

Responsibility is allocated to the BCT for implementing and operating certain elements of the Scheme. This includes administering Biodiversity Stewardship Agreements (which generate credits) and securing offsets on behalf of development proponents who pay into the Biodiversity Conservation Fund to meet their offset obligations.

This broad legislative framework is not intended to detail responsibilities for the full range of roles and activities that agencies need to take to implement and regulate the Scheme effectively, and ensure its good governance. Agencies should do this as part of sound and transparent public administration. 

This section assesses how effectively components of the Scheme have been designed and are being implemented to provide assurance that the impacts of development are being avoided and minimised such that only ‘unavoidable’ impacts remain to be offset. The section also assesses whether the Scheme and its market embeds the necessary controls to ensure that obligations are offset as required.

Background

The Biodiversity Assessment Method, and the quality of its application by DPE-Accredited Assessors, is critical to the robustness the Scheme. The method is designed to be applied to avoid and minimise impacts at proposed development sites before identifying offset obligations. The effectiveness of Scheme outcomes requires that obligations are offset with the retirement of the necessary and appropriate credits.

The Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016 (the Act) requires the relevant Minister (the current Minister for Environment and Heritage) to establish a method for the purpose of assessing the impacts of actions on threatened species and ecological communities.

The Act also specifies that this method must be applied by an accredited person. DPE is responsible for the design and implementation of this accreditation system, arrangements for which are set out in an instrument under the Act.

A Biodiversity Development Assessment Report is a report by a DPE-Accredited Assessor using the Biodiversity Assessment Method. These reports assess the biodiversity impacts of the proposed development and establish offset obligations as part of the development approval process. It is important that local councils and other development consent authorities understand and can assess the quality of these reports.

DPE manages the process of ‘retiring’ credits against the identified offset obligations. Once a credit is retired it cannot be reused to acquit another obligation, which is critical to Scheme outcomes. DPE is also responsible for maintaining records of credit transactions, which results in a legally binding transfer of credit ownership from seller to buyer. 

This section assesses how effectively the supply of biodiversity credits has been supported by encouraging and enabling landholders to participate in the Scheme. It also assesses whether sufficient action is underway to address issues and risks to the establishment of BSA sites, especially in the context of known credit supply issues (section 2).

Background

Credit supply is generated when a landholder establishes a Biodiversity Stewardship Agreement (BSA) on their land. Establishing a BSA site requires landholders agree to an in-perpetuity management plan, so it is important that they have sufficient support and access to relevant information about risks and opportunities when deciding to do so. Ensuring adequate credits supply underpins the Scheme's ability to deliver the intended biodiversity outcomes.

A landholder establishes an offset site through a BSA, which is a legal agreement with the Minister of Environment and Heritage (delegated to the Biodiversity Conservation Trust). The BSA is registered on the title of the land.

DPE-Accredited Assessors develop Biodiversity Stewardship Site Assessment Reports, which are submitted by landholders to the BCT as part of the BSA application. These reports apply the Biodiversity Assessment Method to detail the number and types of credits that a BSA site is expected to generate by implementing a 20-year management plan. The BCT issues credits to landholders on registration of the BSA.

Ensuring an adequate and appropriate supply of credits is important so that like-for-like matches between credits and obligations can be efficiently secured in a timely way. This minimises the use of offset variation rules, and can avoid potential delays in developers securing appropriate offsets to meet their offset obligations. It also makes it easier for the BCT to locate the necessary credits to acquit the obligations it acquires from developers. 

This section assesses how effectively BSA sites, which need to be managed by landholders to generate the biodiversity gains represented by credits, are regulated and supported by the Biodiversity Conservation Trust. It also assesses whether actions have been taken to address identified risks to the suitability of funds required to ensure long-term BSA site management.

Background

For Biodiversity Stewardship Agreement (BSA) sites to achieve the expected biodiversity gains to offset losses from development impact, they need sufficient funding for the required management actions, and to be effectively regulated and supported over the long-term. Funding for these sites is generated through the returns on landholders' initial investment (Total Fund Deposit). The BCT is required to monitor landholders' compliance with BSAs and should also ensure ecological outcomes on sites are measured.

DPE and the BCT are responsible for developing and implementing a system of oversight to ensure the implementation of management actions at BSA sites is delivering the intended outcomes in a financially and environmentally sustainable way. The agencies' key mechanisms for delivering this are:

  • calculating the costs of the required land management actions in perpetuity
  • annual reporting systems for monitoring compliance with land management requirements
  • reporting systems for monitoring ecological outcomes arising from land management actions.

Landholders are required to pay the required Total Fund Deposit amount for their BSA accounts into the Biodiversity Stewardship Payments Fund, which is held in trust and managed by the BCT. A costing tool is used by landholders to calculate the value of the deposit, based on the required management payments (in perpetuity), administrative fees, and the discount rate applied.

The Total Fund Deposit can be paid upfront but is usually paid from the proceeds of the sale of credits. Once this occurs the BSA site becomes 'active' and management payments commence to enable the landholder to undertake the required management actions. BSA sites that have not yet sold enough credits to make the deposit are 'passive' sites that do not require active land management.

Sites in passive management for an extended duration present risks to biodiversity outcomes, and potentially to Scheme integrity, if the quality of credits is undermined due to an absence of active site management. 

Appendix one – Response from agencies 

Appendix two – Like-for-like, variation and ancillary rules

Appendix three – Detail on progress of the IIAP

Appendix four – About the audit 

Appendix five – Performance auditing 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #367 - released 30 August 2022

Published

Actions for NSW planning portal

NSW planning portal

Planning
Industry
Environment
Local Government
Information technology
Project management
Risk

What the report is about

The ePlanning program is an initiative of the Department of Planning and Environment (the department) to deliver a digital planning service for New South Wales through the NSW planning portal (the portal).

Using the portal, relevant planning activities can be carried out online, including all stages of development applications.

The portal has been developed under three separate business cases in 2013, 2014 and 2020.

In late 2019, the government mandated the use of the portal for all development applications. This decision took effect across 2020–21.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the department's implementation, governance and stakeholder engagement in delivering the NSW planning portal. 

What we found

Since implementation commenced in 2013, the NSW planning portal has progressively achieved its objectives to provide citizens with access to consolidated planning information, and allow them to prepare and submit development applications online.

Shortcomings in the department's initial planning and management of the program led to a significant time overrun. It has taken the department longer and cost significantly more to implement the portal than first anticipated. 

In recent years the department has improved the planning, implementation and governance of the ePlanning program, resulting in improved delivery of the portal’s core functions.

The department now has a clear view of the scope necessary to finalise the program, but has not yet published the services it plans to implement in 2022 and 2023.

Mandating the use of the portal for all development applications changed the program's strategic risk environment and required the department to work more closely with a cohort of stakeholders, many of whom did not want to adopt the portal.

Despite this change, the department kept its overall delivery approach the same.

While implementation of the portal has delivered financial benefits, the department has overestimated their value.

The Department has only reported benefits since 2019 and has not independently assured the calculation of benefits.

What we recommended

By December 2022, the department should:

  • publish a roadmap of the services it expects to release on the portal across 2022 and 2023
  • update its ePlanning program assumptions, benefits targets and change management approach to reflect the government's decision to mandate the use of the portal for all stages of a development application
  • independently assure and report publicly the correct calculation of ePlanning program benefits.

Fast facts

  • 10 years taken to implement the portal when completed
  • 3 years longer than initially planned to implement the portal
  • $146m capital expenditure on the portal when completed
  • $38.5m more spent than planned in the business cases.

The ePlanning program is an initiative of the Department of Planning and Environment (the department) to deliver a digital planning service for New South Wales through the NSW planning portal (the portal, or the planning portal). The department defines the portal as an online environment where community, industry and government can work together to better understand and meet their obligations under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). Using the portal, relevant planning activities can be carried out online throughout New South Wales. This includes, but is not limited to:

  • applying for and gaining planning approval
  • applying for and gaining approval for building works, sub-dividing land and similar activities
  • issuing occupancy and other certificates.

The portal has been developed under three separate business cases. The first business case in 2013 led to the creation of a central portal, which made planning information available to view by planning applicants and allowed some planning applications to be lodged and tracked online.

Under a second business case prepared in 2014, the department set out to improve and widen the functions available via the portal. The department prepared a third business case in 2020 to fund further improvements to the portal over the period July 2020 to June 2023. The third business case also extended the portal's functions to support the building and occupation stages of the planning cycle.

In late 2019, the government mandated the use of the portal for all stages of development applications. This decision took effect across 2020–21 and applied to all councils as well as certifiers and others involved in the planning process.

The objective of this performance audit was to assess the effectiveness of the department's implementation, governance and stakeholder engagement in delivering the NSW planning portal. We investigated whether:

  • delivery of the NSW planning portal was planned effectively
  • sound governance arrangements are in place to ensure effective implementation of the program
  • users of the NSW planning portal are supported effectively to adopt and use the system.
Conclusion

Since implementation commenced in 2013, the NSW planning portal has progressively achieved its objectives to provide citizens with access to consolidated planning information and allow them to prepare and submit development applications online. Implementation was initially hindered by deficiencies in planning and it has taken the department significantly longer and cost significantly more to implement the portal than first anticipated. While the portal's implementation has delivered financial benefits, the department has overestimated their value. As a result, the department cannot yet demonstrate that the portal has achieved overall financial benefits, relative to its costs.

In the first two years of the ePlanning program, the department delivered a portal that allowed planners, developers, certifiers and the public to view important planning information. However, the department found the delivery of a second, transactional version of the portal in 2017 to be much more challenging. This version was intended to offer more integrated information and allow development applications to be submitted and managed online. The department did not rollout this version after a pilot showed significant weaknesses with the portal's performance. A subsequent review found that this was partly because the department did not have a clear view of the portal’s role or the best way to implement it. In recent years the department has improved the planning, implementation and governance of the ePlanning program resulting in improved delivery of the portal’s core functions.

By the time the program reaches its scheduled completion in 2023, it will have taken the department ten years and around $146 million in capital expenditure to implement the portal. This will be significantly longer and more expensive than the department originally expected. This overrun is partly due to an increased scope of services delivered through the portal and an initial under-appreciation of what is involved in creating a standard, central resource such as the portal. The department also experienced some significant implementation difficulties – which saw the transactional portal discontinued after it was found to be not fit for purpose. Following this, the department re-set the program in 2017–18 and re-planned much of the portal's subsequent development.

In November 2019, the New South Wales Government decided to mandate the use of the portal for all stages of development applications by the end of 2020–21. The department had previously planned that the portal would be progressively adopted by all councils and other stakeholders over the five years to 2025. The decision to mandate the portal's use for all development applications brought forward many of the portal's benefits as well as the challenges of its implementation. The department did not change its overall delivery approach in response to the changed risks associated with the government's decision to mandate use of the portal.

The current version of the portal has given the department more timely and comprehensive planning information and has helped New South Wales to provide continuous planning services during COVID-19 lockdowns, which interrupted many other public functions. The portal has also delivered financial benefits, however the department has not independently assured benefits calculations carried out by its consultant, and the reported benefits are overstated. In addition, some stakeholders report that the portal is a net cost to their organisation. This has included some certifiers and some councils which had implemented or had started to implement their own ePlanning reforms when use of the portal was mandated in 2019. The department now needs to address the issues faced by these stakeholders while continuing to deliver the remaining improvements and enhancements to the portal. Over the remaining year of the program, it will be critical that the department focuses on the agreed program scope and carefully evaluates any opportunities to further develop the portal to support future planning reforms.

This part of the report sets out how:

  • the ePlanning program has been planned and delivered
  • users of the portal have been supported
  • the program has been governed.

This part of the report sets out the ePlanning program's:

  • expected and reported financial benefits
  • calculation of financial benefits.

In 2019, the department increased its expectations for net financial benefits

The department's three ePlanning business cases each forecast substantial financial benefits from the implementation of the planning portal. The department expected that most financial benefits would flow to planning applicants due to a quicker and more consistent planning process. It also expected that government agencies and councils would benefit from the portal.

Exhibit 6: Summary of the financial benefits originally expected
  Business case 1
($ million)
Business case 2
($ million)
Business case 3
($ million)
Total
($ million)
Benefits 90.0 44.3 270.9 405.2
Costs 43.3 29.4 89.8 162.5
Net benefits 46.7 15.0 181.1 242.7

Note: Benefits and costs are incremental. All amounts are calculated over ten years. Amounts for business case 1, 2 and 3 amounts are expressed in 2013, 2015 and 2019 dollars respectively. All amounts are discounted at seven per cent to show their value at the time when they were calculated. Amounts may not add due to rounding.
Source: Audit Office analysis of data provided by the Department of Planning and Environment.

In 2019 the department commissioned a review to explore opportunities to better identify, monitor and realise the benefits of the ePlanning program. Using this work, the department updated the expected benefits for business cases 1 and 2 to take account of:

  • errors and miscalculations in the original benefits calculations
  • slower delivery of the portal and changes to the take-up of portal services by councils
  • changes to the services supported by the portal.
Exhibit 7: Summary of the financial benefits expected for business case 1 and 2 after the 2019 update
  Original business case 1 and 2 (combined)
($ million)
New business case 1 and 2 (combined)
($ million)
Benefits 134.3 210.6
Costs 72.7 96.3
Net benefits 61.7 114.3

Note: Benefits and costs are incremental. All amounts are calculated over ten years. Amounts for the original business case 1 and 2 are expressed in 2013 and 2015 dollars respectively. The new combined amount is expressed in 2019 dollars. All amounts are discounted or inflated at seven per cent to show their value at the time when they were calculated. Amounts may not add due to rounding.
Source: Audit Office analysis of data provided by the Department of Planning and Environment.

Reported benefits significantly exceed the current targets

In September 2021, the department reported that the program had achieved $334 million of benefits over the three financial years up to June 2021 plus the first two months of 2021–22. These reported benefits were significantly higher than expected. 

Exhibit 8: Reported financial benefits from the ePlanning program
  2018–19
($ million)
2019–20
($ million)
2020–21
($ million)
July to August 2021
($ million)
Total
($ million)
Benefits 5.2 68.8 214.7 45.1 333.8
Target 2.5 14.4 56.7 19.2 92.8
Amount and per cent above target 2.7
108%
54.4
378%
158
279%
25.9
135%
241
260%

Source: Audit Office analysis of data provided by the Department of Planning and Environment.

The department attributes the higher-than-expected financial benefits to the following:

  • benefit targets have not been updated to reflect the impact of the 2019 decision to mandate the use of the portal for all development applications. This decision brought forward the expected benefits as well as potential costs of the program. However, the department did not update its third business case which was draft at the time. The business case was subsequently approved in July 2020
  • one-off cost savings for agencies not having to develop their own systems
  • public exhibitions of planning proposals continuing to be available online during 2020 when some newspapers stopping printing due to COVID-19.

The calculation of benefits is overstated

The department reported $334 million of benefits in September 2021 due to the ePlanning program. This calculation is overstated because:

  • a proportion of reported benefits is likely to be due to other planning reforms
  • the calculation of the largest single benefit is incorrect
  • the reported benefits may not fully account for dis-benefits reported by some stakeholders.

The program’s benefits are calculated primarily from changes in planning performance data, such as the time it takes to determine a planning development application. The department currently attributes the benefits from shorter planning cycles entirely to the effect of the ePlanning program. However, planning cycles are impacted by many other factors such as the complexity of planning regulations and the availability of planning professionals. Planning cycles may also be impacted by other departmental initiatives which are designed to improve the time that it takes for a planning application to be evaluated. The Introduction describes some of these initiatives.

The largest contribution to the department’s September 2021 benefit report was an estimated saving of $151 million for developers due to lower costs associated with holding their investment for a shorter time. However, the department’s calculation of this benefit assumes a high baseline for the time to determine a development application. It also assumes that all development applications except for additions or alterations to existing properties will incur financing costs. However, a small but material number of these applications will be self-financed. The calculation also includes several data errors in spreadsheets.

The calculation of some benefits relies upon an extrapolation of the benefits experienced by a small number of early-adopter councils, including lower printing and scanning costs, fewer forms and quicker processing times. However, some councils report that their costs have increased following the introduction of the portal, primarily because aspects of the portal duplicate work that they carry out in their own systems. The portal has also required some councils to re-engineer aspects of their own systems, such as the integration of their planning systems with other council systems such as finance or property and rating systems. It has also required councils to create new ways of integrating council information systems with the planning portal.

The department has published information to help councils and certifiers to automatically integrate their systems with the planning portal. This approach uses application programming interfaces (or APIs) which are an industry-standard way for systems to share information. In April and May 2021, the government granted $4.8 million to 96 regional councils to assist with the cost of developing, implementing and maintaining APIs. The maximum amount of funding for each council was $50,000. The department is closely monitoring the implementation of APIs by councils and other portal users. Once they are fully implemented the department expects APIs to reduce costs incurred by stakeholders.

The department has not yet measured stakeholder costs. It was beyond the scope of this audit to validate these costs.

The department has not independently assured the calculation of reported benefits

In 2020 the department appointed an external provider to calculate the benefits achieved by the ePlanning program. The department advised that it chose to outsource the calculation of benefits because the provider had the required expertise and because it wanted an independent calculation of the benefits. The process involves:

  • extraction and verification of planning performance data by the department
  • population of data input sheets by the department
  • calculation of benefits by the external provider using the data input
  • confirmation by the department that the calculation includes all expected benefit sources.

The department does not have access to the benefits calculation model which is owned and operated by the external provider. The department trusts that the provider correctly calculates the benefits and does not verify the reported benefit numbers. However, as the benefits model involves many linked spreadsheets and approximately 300 individual data points, there is a risk that the calculation model contains errors beyond those discussed in this audit.

The reported benefits have only been calculated since 2019

The department originally intended to track benefits from October 2014. However, it only started to track benefits in 2019 when it appointed an external provider to calculate the benefits achieved by the portal. Any benefits or dis-benefits between the introduction of the portal and 2019 are unknown and not included in the department’s calculation of benefits.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #366 - released 21 June 2022

Published

Actions for Managing climate risks to assets and services

Managing climate risks to assets and services

Planning
Environment
Treasury
Industry
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

This report assessed how effectively the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (DPIE) and NSW Treasury have supported state agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services.

Climate risks that can impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. Impacts can include damage to transport, communications and energy infrastructure, increases in hospital admissions, and making social housing or school buildings unsuitable.

NSW Treasury estimates these risks could have significant costs.

What we found

DPIE and NSW Treasury’s support to agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services has been insufficient.

In 2021, key agencies with critical assets and services have not conducted climate risk assessments, and most lack adaptation plans.

DPIE has not delivered on the NSW Government commitment to develop a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan. This was to be complete in 2017.

There is also no adaptation strategy for the state. These have been released in all other Australian jurisdictions. The NSW Government’s draft strategic plan for its Climate Change Fund was also never finalised.

DPIE’s approach to developing climate projections is robust, but it hasn’t effectively educated agencies in how to use this information to assess climate risk.

NSW Treasury did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019.

In March 2021, DPIE and NSW Treasury released the Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course. These are designed to improve support to agencies.

What we recommended

DPIE and NSW Treasury should, in partnership:

  • enhance the coordination of climate risk management across agencies
  • implement climate risk management across their clusters.

DPIE should:

  • update information and strengthen education to agencies, and monitor progress
  • review relevant land-use planning, development and building guidance
  • deliver a climate change adaptation action plan for the state.

NSW Treasury should:

  • strengthen climate risk-related guidance to agencies
  • coordinate guidance on resilience in infrastructure planning
  • review how climate risks have been assured in agencies’ asset management plans.

Fast facts

4 years

between commitments in the NSW Climate Change Policy Framework, and DPIE and NSW Treasury producing key supports to agencies for climate risk management.

$120bn

Value of physical assets held by nine NSW Government entities we examined that have not completed climate risk assessments.

Low capability to do climate risk assessment has been found across state agencies. The total value of NSW Government physical assets is $365 billion, as at 30 June 2020.

x3

NSW Treasury’s estimates of the annual fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters will triple by 2060–61.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2021, each of the last four decades has been successively warmer and surface temperatures will continue to increase until at least the mid-century. The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) have reported that extreme weather across Australia is more frequent and intense, and there have been longer-term changes to weather patterns. They also report sea levels are rising around Australia increasing the risk of inundation and damage to coastal infrastructure and communities.

According to the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department), in New South Wales the impacts of a changing climate, and the risks associated with it, will be felt differently across regions, populations and economic sectors. The department's climate projections indicate the number of hot days will increase, rainfall will vary across the state, and the number of severe fire days will increase.

The NSW Government is a provider of essential services, such as health care, education and public transport. It also owns and manages around $365 billion in physical assets (as at June 2020). More than $180 billion of its assets are in major infrastructure such as roads and railway lines.

In NSW, climate risks that could directly impact on state agencies' assets and services include flooding, bushfires, and extreme temperatures. In recent years, natural hazards exacerbated by climate change have damaged and disrupted government transport, communications and energy infrastructure. As climate risks eventuate, they can also increase hospital admissions when people are affected by poorer air quality, and make social housing dwellings or schools unsafe and unusable during heatwaves. The physical impacts of a changing climate also have significant financial costs. Taking into account projected economic growth, NSW Treasury has estimated that the fiscal and economic costs associated with natural disasters due to climate change will more than triple per year by 2061.

The department and NSW Treasury advise that leading practice in climate risk management includes a process that explicitly identifies climate risks and integrates these into existing risk management, monitoring and reporting systems. This is in line with international risk management and climate adaptation standards. For agencies to manage the physical risks of climate change to their assets and services, leading practice identified by the department means that they need to:

  • use robust climate projection information to understand the potential climate impacts
  • undertake sound climate risk assessments, within an enterprise risk management framework
  • implement adaptation plans that reduce these risks, and harness opportunities.

Adaptation responses that could be planned for include: controlling development in flood-prone locations; ensuring demand for health services can be met during heatwaves; improving thermal comfort in schools to support student engagement; proactive asset maintenance to reduce disruption of essential services, and safeguarding infrastructure from more frequent and intense natural disasters.

According to NSW Treasury policy, agencies are individually responsible for risk management systems appropriate to their context. The department and NSW Treasury have key roles in ensuring that agencies are supported with robust information and timely, relevant guidance to help manage risks to assets and services effectively, especially for emerging risks that require coordinated responses, such as those posed by climate change.

This audit assessed whether the department and NSW Treasury are effectively supporting NSW Government agencies to manage climate risks to their assets and services. It focused on the management of physical risks to assets and services associated with climate change.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) has made climate projections available to agencies since 2014, but provided limited guidance to assist agencies to identify and manage climate risks. NSW Treasury first noted climate change as a contextual factor in its 2012 guidance on risk management. NSW Treasury only clarified requirements for agencies to integrate climate considerations into their risk management processes in December 2020.
The department has not delivered on a NSW Government commitment for a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan, which was meant to be completed in 2017. Currently many state agencies that own or manage assets and provide services do not have climate risk management in place.
Since 2019, the department and NSW Treasury have worked in partnership to develop a coordinated approach to supporting agencies to manage these risks. This includes guidance to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaptation planning published in 2021.
More work is needed to embed, sustain and lead effective climate risk management across the NSW public sector, especially for the state's critical infrastructure and essential services that may be exposed to climate change impacts.

The NSW Government set directions in the 2016 NSW Climate Change Policy Framework to 'manage the impact of climate change on its assets and services by embedding climate change considerations into asset and risk management’ and more broadly into 'government decision-making'.

The department released climate projections and has made information on projected climate change impacts available since 2014, but this has not been effectively communicated to agencies. The absence of a state-wide climate change adaptation action plan has limited the department's implementation of a coordinated, well-communicated program of support to agencies for their climate risk management.

NSW Treasury is responsible for managing the state's finances and providing stewardship to the public sector on financial and risk management, but it did not consistently apply dedicated resourcing to support agencies' climate risk management until late 2019. NSW Treasury estimates the financial costs of climate-related physical risks are significant and will continue to grow.

The partnership between the department and NSW Treasury has produced the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which aim to help agencies understand their exposure to climate risks and develop adaptation responses. The Guide maps out a process for climate risk assessment and adaptation planning and is referenced in NSW Treasury policy on internal audit and risk management. It is also referenced in NSW Treasury guidance to agencies on how to reflect the effects of climate-related matters in financial statements.

There is more work to be done by the department on maintaining robust, accessible climate information and educating agencies in its use. NSW Treasury will need to continue to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to managing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

The effectiveness of the department and NSW Treasury's support involves the proactive and sustained take-up of climate risk management by state agencies. There is a key role for the department and NSW Treasury in monitoring this progress and its results.

Prior to 2021, support provided by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) to agencies for managing physical climate risks to their assets and services has been limited. NSW Treasury has a stewardship role in public sector performance, including risk management, but has not had a defined role in working with the department on climate risk matters until mid-2019. The low capacity of agencies to undertake this work has been known to NSW Government through agency surveys by the department in 2015 and by the department and NSW Treasury in 2018.

The support delivered to agencies around climate risk management, including risk assessment and adaptation planning, has been slow to start and of limited impact. The department's capacity to implement a coordinated approach to supporting agencies has also been limited by the absence of a state-wide adaptation strategy and related action plan.

In 2021, products were released by the department and NSW Treasury with potential to improve support to agencies on climate risk assessment and adaption planning (that this, Climate Risk Ready NSW Guide and Course, which provides links to key NSW Treasury polices). The department and NSW Treasury are now leading work to develop a more coordinated approach to climate risk management for agencies' assets and services, and building the resilience of the state to climate risk more broadly.

Climate projections are a key means of understanding the potential impacts of climate change, which is an important step in the climate risk assessment process. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) used a robust approach to develop its climate projections (NARCliM). The full version of NARCliM (v1.0) is based on 2007 models11 and while still relevant, this has limited its perceived usefulness and uptake. The process of updating these projections requires significant resourcing. The department has made recent updates to enhance the currency and usefulness of its climate projections. NARCliM (v2.0) should be available in 2022.

While climate projections have been available to agencies and the community more broadly since 2013–14, the department has not been effective in educating the relevant data users within agencies in how to use the information for climate risk assessments and adaptation planning.

The absence of a strategy focused on this is significant and has contributed to the current low levels of climate risk assessment uptake across agencies (see section 2). Agencies are required to use the climate projections developed by the department when developing long term plans and strategies as part of the NSW Government Common Planning Assumptions.


11 The department advises the 2007 global climate models were released to users by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2010.
It is too soon to determine the impact of the 2021 Climate Risk Ready NSW (CRR) Guide and Course, produced by the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) and NSW Treasury. But there are opportunities for these agencies to progress these developments in partnership: especially with the establishment of senior executive steering and oversight committees related to climate risk.

For the department, key opportunities to embed climate risk management include leveraging land use planning policies and guidance to drive adaptation, which has potential to better protect the state's assets and services. NSW Treasury has a role in continuing to update its policies, guidance and economic analyses with relevant climate change considerations to support an informed, coordinated approach to addressing physical climate risks to agencies' assets and services, and to the state's finances more broadly.

There is currently no plan on how the department and NSW Treasury intend to routinely monitor the progress of agencies with implementing the CRR Guide or developing climate risk 'maturity' more broadly. As agencies are responsible for implementing risk management systems that meet NSW Treasury standards, which now clearly includes consideration of climate risk (TPP20-08), establishing effective monitoring, reporting and accountability around this progress should be a priority for the department and NSW Treasury.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Timeline of key activities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #355 - released (7 September 2021).

Published

Actions for Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure

Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure

Planning
Environment
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today that examined the effectiveness of the waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure in minimising the amount of waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates.  

The audit found that the waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, while the levy rates increase each year in line with the consumer price index, the EPA has not conducted a review since 2009 to confirm whether they are set at the optimal level. The audit also found that there were no objective and transparent criteria for which local government areas should pay the levy, and the list of levied local government areas has not been reviewed since 2014. 

Grant funding programs for waste infrastructure administered by the EPA and the Environmental Trust have supported increases in recycling capacity. However, these grant programs are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure. 

The Auditor-General made six recommendations aimed at ensuring the waste levy is as effective as possible at meeting its objectives and ensuring funding for waste infrastructure is contributing effectively to recycling and waste diversion targets.

 

Overall, waste generation in New South Wales (NSW) is increasing. This leads to an increasing need to manage waste in ways that reduce the environmental impact of waste and promote the efficient use of resources. In 2014, the NSW Government set targets relating to recycling rates and diversion of waste from landfill, to be achieved by 2021–22. The NSW Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 identifies the waste levy, a strong compliance regime, and investment in recycling infrastructure as key tools for achieving these waste targets.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Government in minimising waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates. The audit focused on the waste levy, which is paid by waste facility operators when waste is sent to landfill, and grant programs that fund infrastructure for waste reuse and recycling.

The waste levy is regulated by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and is generally paid when waste is disposed in landfill. The waste levy rates are set by the NSW Government and prescribed in the Protection of Environment Operations (Waste) Regulation 2014. As part of its broader role in reviewing the regulatory framework for managing waste and recycling, the EPA can provide advice to the government on the operation of the waste levy.

The purpose of the waste levy is to act as an incentive for waste generators to reduce, re-use or recycle waste by increasing the cost of sending waste to landfill. In 2019–20, around $750 million was collected through the waste levy in NSW. The government spends approximately one third of the revenue raised through the waste levy on waste and environmental programs.

One of the waste programs funded through the one third allocation of the waste levy is Waste Less, Recycle More (WLRM). This initiative funds smaller grant programs that focus on specific aspects of waste management. This audit focused on five grant programs that fund projects that provide new or enhanced waste infrastructure such as recycling facilities. Four of these programs were administered by the Environmental Trust and one by the EPA.

Conclusion

The waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, aspects of the EPA's administration of the waste levy could be improved, including the frequency of its modelling of the waste levy impact and coverage, and the timeliness of reporting. Grant funding programs have supported increases in recycling capacity but are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure which would help effectively target them to where waste infrastructure is most needed. Data published by the EPA indicates that the NSW Government is on track to meet the recycling target for construction and demolition waste, but recycling targets for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste are unlikely to be met.

Waste levy

The waste levy rate, including a schedule of annual increases to 2016, was set by the NSW Government in 2009. Since 2016, the waste levy rate has increased in line with the consumer price index (CPI). The EPA has not conducted recent modelling to test whether the waste levy is set at the optimal level to achieve its objectives. The waste levy operation was last reviewed in 2012, although some specific aspects of the waste levy have been reviewed more recently, including reviews of waste levy rates for two types of waste. The waste levy is applied at different rates across the state. Decisions about which local government areas (LGAs) are subject to the levy, and which rate each LGA pays, were made in 2009 and potential changes were considered but not implemented in 2014. Currently, there are no objective and transparent criteria for determining which LGAs pay the levy. The EPA collects waste data from waste operators. This data has improved since 2015, but published data is at least one year out of date which limits its usefulness to stakeholders when making decisions relating to waste management.

Grants for waste infrastructure

All state funding for new and enhanced waste infrastructure in NSW is administered through grants to councils and commercial waste operators. The government's Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 includes few priorities for waste infrastructure and there is no other waste infrastructure strategy in place to guide investment. The absence of a formal strategy to guide infrastructure investment in NSW limits the ability of the State Government to develop a shared understanding between planners, councils and the waste industry about waste infrastructure requirements and priorities. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment is currently developing a 20-year waste strategy and there is an opportunity for the government to take a more direct role in planning the type, location and timing of waste infrastructure needed in NSW.

The grants administration procedures used for the grant programs reviewed in this audit were well designed. However, we identified some gaps in risk management, record-keeping and consistency of information provided to applicants and assessment teams. In four of the five programs we examined, there was no direct alignment between program objectives and the NSW Government's overall waste targets.

Achievement of the 2014–21 state targets for waste and resource recovery (WARR targets) is reliant in part on the availability of infrastructure that supports waste diversion and recycling. The state WARR targets dependent on waste infrastructure are:

  • Increase recycling rates to 70 per cent for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste, and 80 per cent for construction and demolition waste.
  • Increase waste diverted from landfill to 75 per cent.

A further target — manage problem waste better by establishing or upgrading 86 drop-off facilities or services for managing household problem wastes state-wide — is dependent on accessible community waste drop-off facilities across NSW.

Exhibit 7 identifies the five grant programs that provide funding for new or enhanced waste infrastructure to increase capacity for reuse or recycling of waste. All five of these programs were examined in the audit.
In addition to the grant programs shown in Exhibit 7, other programs provide funding for infrastructure, but at a smaller scale. Examples of these include:

  • Bin Trim which provides rebates to small businesses for small scale recycling equipment such as cardboard and soft plastic balers.
  • Litter grants which provide funding for litter bins.
  • Weighbridges grants for installation of a weighbridge at waste facilities.
  • Landfill consolidation and environmental improvement grants for rural councils to replace old landfills with transfer stations or to improve the infrastructure at landfill sites.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #343 - released 26 November 2020

Published

Actions for Support for regional town water infrastructure

Support for regional town water infrastructure

Industry
Environment
Local Government
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has effectively supported the planning for, and funding of, town water infrastructure in regional NSW.

The audit found that the department has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning since at least 2014. It does not have a clear regulatory approach and lacks internal procedures and data to guide its support for local water utilities that service around 1.85 million people in regional NSW.

The audit also found that the department has not had a strategy in place to target investments in town water infrastructure to the areas of greatest priority. A state-wide plan is now in development.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to the department, aimed at improving the administration and transparency of its oversight, support and funding for town water infrastructure, and at strengthening its sector engagement and interagency coordination on town water planning issues and investments.

According to the Auditor-General, ‘A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and to work with local water utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities.’ 

This report is part of a multi-volume series on the theme of water. Refer to ‘Water conservation in Greater Sydney’ and ‘Water management and regulation – undertaking in 2020-21’.

Read full report (PDF)

Safe and reliable water and sewer services are essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. In 2019, during intense drought, around ten regional New South Wales (NSW) cities or towns were close to ‘zero’ water and others had six to 12 months of supply. In some towns, water quality was declared unsafe.

Ensuring the right water and sewer infrastructure in regional NSW to deliver these services (known as 'town water infrastructure') involves a strategic, integrated approach to water management. The NSW Government committed to ‘secure long-term potable water supplies for towns and cities’ in 2011. In 2019, it reiterated a commitment to invest in water security by funding town water infrastructure projects.

The New South Wales’ Water Management Act 2000 (WM Act) aims to promote the sustainable, integrated and best practice management of the State’s water resources, and establishes the priority of town water for meeting critical human needs.

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) is the lead agency for water resource policy, regulation and planning in NSW. It is also responsible for ensuring water management is consistent with the shared commitments of the Australian, State and Territory Governments under the National Water Initiative. This includes the provision of healthy, safe and reliable water supplies, and reporting on the performance of water utilities.

Ninety-two Local Water Utilities (LWUs) plan for, price and deliver town water services in regional NSW. Eighty-nine are operated by local councils under the New South Wales’ Local Government Act 1993, and other LWUs exercise their functions under the WM Act. The Minister for Water, Property and Housing is the responsible minister for water supply functions under both acts.

The department is the primary regulator of LWUs. NSW Health, the NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and the Natural Access Resource Regulator (NRAR) also regulate aspects of LWUs' operations. The department’s legislative powers with respect to LWUs cover approving infrastructure developments and intervening where there are town water risks, or in emergencies. In this context, the department administers the Best Practice Management of Water Supply and Sewerage Guidelines (BPM Guidelines) to support its regulation and to assist LWUs to strategically plan and price their services, including their planning for town water infrastructure.

Under the BPM Guidelines, the department supports LWU’s town water infrastructure planning with the Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) Checklist. The Checklist outlines steps for LWUs to prepare an IWCM strategy: a long-term planning document that sets out town water priorities, including infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments, water conservation and drought measures. The department's objective is to review and approve (i.e. give ‘concurrence to’) an IWCM strategy before the LWU implements it. In turn, these documents should provide the department with evidence of town water risks, issues and infrastructure priorities.

The department also assesses and co-funds LWU's town water infrastructure projects. In 2017, the department launched the $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program to ensure town water infrastructure in regional NSW is secure and meets current health and environmental standards. The program was initially established under the Restart NSW Fund.

This audit examined whether the department has effectively supported the planning for and funding of town water infrastructure in regional NSW. It focused on the department’s activities since 2014. This audit follows a previous Audit Office of NSW report which found that the department had helped to promote better management practices in the LWU sector, up to 2012–13.

Conclusion

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning in regional NSW since at least 2014. It has also lacked a strategic, evidence-based approach to target investments in town water infrastructure.

A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and work with Local Water Utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities.

The department has had limited impact on facilitating Local Water Utilities’ (LWU) strategic town water planning. Its lack of internal procedures, records and data mean that the department cannot demonstrate it has effectively engaged, guided or supported the LWU sector in Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning over the past six years. Today, less than ten per cent of the 92 LWUs have an IWCM strategy approved by the department.

The department did not design or implement a strategic approach for targeting town water infrastructure investment through its $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP). Most projects in the program were reviewed by a technical panel but there was limited evidence available about regional and local priorities to inform strategic project assessments. About a third of funded SSWP projects were recommended via various alternative processes that were not transparent. The department also lacks systems for integrated project monitoring and program evaluation to determine the contribution of its investments to improved town water outcomes for communities. The department has recently developed a risk-based framework to inform future town water infrastructure funding priorities.

The department does not have strategic water plans in place at state and regional levels: a key objective of these is to improve town water for regional communities. The department started a program of regional water planning in 2018, following the NSW Government’s commitment to this in 2014. It also started developing a state water strategy in 2020, as part of an integrated water planning framework to align local, regional and state priorities. One of 12 regional water strategies has been completed and the remaining strategies are being developed to an accelerated timeframe: this has limited the department’s engagement with some LWUs on town water risks and priorities.

Regional New South Wales (NSW) is home to about a third of the state's population. Infrastructure that provides safe and reliable water and sewer services (also known simply as 'town water infrastructure') is essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. Planning for and meeting these infrastructure needs, as well as identifying when non-infrastructure options may be a better solution, involves a strategic and integrated approach to water resource management in regional NSW.

We examined whether the department has effectively supported planning for town water infrastructure since 2014. This assessment was made in the context of its current approach to LWU sector regulation. The findings below focus on whether the department has an effective framework including governance arrangements for town water issues to inform state-wide strategic water planning, and whether (at the local level) the department has effectively overseen and facilitated town water infrastructure planning through its Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning guidance to LWUs.

We examined whether the department has effectively targeted town water infrastructure funding to policy objectives, with a focus on the design and implementation of the Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP) since its commencement in 2017. The program’s aim was to fund town water infrastructure projects that would deliver health, social and environmental benefits, and support economic growth and productivity. We also assessed the department’s capacity to demonstrate the outcomes of the SSWP funding and the contributions of its town water infrastructure investments more broadly. Finally, we identified risks to the effectiveness of the department’s work underway since 2018–19, which is intended to enhance its strategic water planning and approach to prioritising investments in reducing town water risks.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Key terms

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #341 - released 24 September 2020

Published

Actions for Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions

Governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions

Local Government
Planning
Environment
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on how well four councils managed their local infrastructure contributions during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 financial years. 

Local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, are collected from developers to pay for local infrastructure such as drainage, local roads, open space and community facilities. Controls over local infrastructure contributions help to ensure that all contributions owed are collected, funds are spent as intended, and any contributions paid in the form of works-in-kind or dedicated land are correctly valued.

The audit found that Blacktown City Council and City of Sydney Council provided effective governance over their local infrastructure contributions whereas Central Coast and Liverpool City Councils’ governance arrangements require improvement.

The audit found that three councils had spent local infrastructure contributions in accordance with approved contributions plans. Central Coast Council and the former Gosford City Council had spent $13.2 million on administration costs in breach of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. These funds were repaid into the council’s local infrastructure fund during the course of the audit.

The Auditor-General made a number of recommendations for each council relating to improving controls over contributions and increasing transparency. 

Read full report (PDF)
 

This audit examined the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over local infrastructure contributions, also known as developer contributions, held by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years.

This performance audit was conducted with reference to the legislative and regulatory planning framework that was in place during that period.

Our work for this performance audit was completed at the end of March 2020 when we issued the final report to the four audited councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment. We received their respective formal responses to the report’s recommendations during April and May 2020.

Concurrently to this audit, we sought Crown Solicitor’s advice (the ‘Advice’) regarding the use of local infrastructure contributions collected by local councils under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (‘the EPA Act’) for our financial audit work. The Advice clarified the applicable legislative requirements with reference to the application, investment and pooling of local infrastructure contributions. The Advice is included in Appendix 2 of this report. The Advice has not impacted on the findings and recommendations of this report.

Councils collect Local Infrastructure Contributions (LICs) from developers under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (1979), the Local Government Act (1993) and the City of Sydney Act (2000) (EP&A Act, LG Act and City of Sydney Act) to fund infrastructure required to service and support new development. At 30 June 2018, councils across NSW collectively held more than $3.0 billion in LICs collected from developers. Just over $1.37 billion in total was held by ten councils. Councils collecting LICs must prepare a contributions plan, which outlines how LICs will be calculated and apportioned across different types of infrastructure. Councils that deliver water and sewer services prepare a development servicing plan (DSP) which allows them to collect contributions for water and sewer infrastructure.

Development timeframes are such that there is often several years between when LICs are collected and the infrastructure is required. Good governance and internal controls are needed over these funds to ensure they are available when needed and spent appropriately.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of governance and internal controls over LICs collected by four councils during the 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial years: Blacktown City Council, Central Coast Council, City of Sydney Council and Liverpool City Council. As at June 2018 these councils held the four highest LIC balances, each in excess of $140 million.

Audit Conclusion

Three of the four councils audited were currently compliant with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions regarding LICs. All had gaps in governance and controls over LICs which limited effective oversight.

Three of the councils included in the audit complied with legislation, regulations and Ministerial Directions relating to LICs. Central Coast Council breached the EP&A Act between 2001 and 2019 when it used LICs for administration costs. These funds were repaid in late 2019.

While controls over the receipt and expenditure of contributions funds were largely in place at all councils, there were some exceptions relating to valuing work and land delivered in lieu of cash. Three councils do not provide probity guidance in policies relating to LICs delivered through works-in-kind. Three of the councils had contributions plans that were more than five years old.

Staff at all four councils are knowledgeable about LICs but not all councils keep procedures up to date. Three councils' governance frameworks operate effectively with senior officers from across the council involved in decisions about spending LICs, entering into voluntary planning agreements (VPAs) and reviewing contributions plans.

Transparency over key information relating to LICs is important for senior management so they can make informed decisions, and for the community who pay LICs and expect infrastructure to be provided. During the period of the audit, none of the councils included in the audit provided sufficient information to senior management or their councillors about the projected financial status of contributions plans. This information would be valuable when making broader strategic and financial decisions. Information about LIC levies and intended infrastructure is available to the community but not always easy to find.

A strong governance framework is important at each council to ensure that the funds are managed well, available when needed and spent as intended. The audit examined the following features of each council's governance framework as they apply to LICs:

  • decision-making by councillors and council officers relating to LICs
  • monitoring delivery of contributions plans and DSPs including:
    • reviewing assumptions underlying the plans
    • monitoring projected status of plans.

Internal controls over LICs are important to promote accountability, prevent fraud and deliver infrastructure to the required standard at the best possible price. If financial controls are weak or are not implemented well, there is a risk that LICs are misspent or that councils pay too much for infrastructure.

Not all councils' internal controls adequately addressed risks associated with the administration of LICs

The audit examined a number of internal controls that manage risks related to LICs. These included:

  • financial controls over receipt and expenditure of LIC funds
  • management of conflicts-of-interest when dealing with developers
  • independent valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
  • ensuring delivery and quality of works-in-kind, and obtaining security from developers in the event of non-delivery or poor quality work
  • management of variations to VPAs and works-in-kind agreements.

We reviewed controls included in policies and procedures and then checked samples of work to ensure that controls were implemented. We found variation in the controls that councils implemented, and some weaknesses in controls. It is a matter for each council to assess their financial risk and develop internal controls that support the collection, management, and expenditure of LICs. However, councils must be able to assure their communities and developers that they are doing everything possible to collect all LICs owing and that work conducted by developers in lieu of cash payments is properly valued and carried out to the required standard.

Further information about audit findings in relation to internal controls for each council are included in chapters five to eight. The exhibit below demonstrates variation in several controls implemented in the audited councils.

In a 2018 report, the Independent Commission Against Corruption noted that 'the appetite for transparency is expanding in both the public and private sectors'.

The Practice Note and S64 Guidance refer to transparency, including the importance of transparency over:

  • calculation and apportionment of LICs
  • funding of infrastructure, including where and when infrastructure is delivered
  • arrangements made with developers through VPAs.

The LIC system is largely transparent for community members who know where to look

Contributions plans and DSPs are public documents, exhibited to the public before being adopted by council. Councils included in the audit publish their contributions plans and DSPs on their websites and meet statutory requirements with regard to reporting and accessibility of information.

However, other public information relating to the LIC system is fragmented across different websites and reports and varies in detail across councils.

Exhibit 10: Published information about LICs at the four audited councils
  Blacktown City Council Central Coast Council City of Sydney Council Liverpool City Council
Financial details about contributions collected and spent Financial statements Financial statements Financial statements Financial statements
Implementation plans for spending LICs Contribution plans S64 implementation plans in DSPs. S7.11 & S7.12 implementation plans developed annually within capital works plan Contribution plans Developed annually within capital works plan
Capital works underway or completed, funded by LICs Capital works plan and annual report Not published Not published Capital works plan
Source: Audit Office analysis.

The Practice Note states that councils are accountable for providing the infrastructure for which contributions are collected. Demonstrating that infrastructure has been provided is difficult with fragmented information. As an example of transparent reporting, Blacktown City Council's 2018–19 annual report includes information about infrastructure that has been delivered for every contributions plan, providing transparency over how LICs have been spent.

Use of LICs collected under VPAs is not always transparent

Contributions collected under VPAs are not required to demonstrate the same relationship to a development as LICs collected under section 7.11 of the EP&A Act. VPAs are often negotiated because a developer requests a change to a planning instrument, and it is important that these arrangements, and their outcomes, are transparent to the community.

The EP&A Regulation includes mechanisms to ensure that VPAs are partially transparent. VPAs are exhibited to the public and approved by the elected council. Councils must maintain a VPA Register and make the VPA Deeds of Agreement available on request. However, there is no obligation on council to report on the outcomes or delivery of developers' obligations under VPAs. The four audited councils vary in transparency and accessibility of information available about VPAs.

Exhibit 11: Published information about VPAs at the four audited councils
  Blacktown City Council Central Coast Council City of Sydney Council Liverpool City Council
VPA Register Council website and annual report Annual report Annual report Council website and annual report
VPA Deeds of Agreement Council website Available on request Available on request Council website
Intended use of LICs collected under VPAs In Deeds of Agreement In Deeds of Agreement In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement In VPA Register and most Deeds of Agreement
Completion of work funded by cash collected under VPAs Not published Not published Not published Not published
Delivery of works-in-kind or land negotiated under VPAs Not published Not published In VPA Register Not published
Source: Audit Office analysis.

The Practice Note suggests that councils incorporate the intended use of LICs collected under VPAs in the Deed of Agreement, but there is no guidance relating to transparency over where and when funds have actually been spent. There is merit in councils providing greater transparency over public benefits delivered through VPAs to give communities confidence in VPAs as a planning tool.

Credit arrangements with developers are not always well documented or monitored

When levying LICs, section 7.11(6) of the EP&A Act requires councils to take into account land, money, or works-in-kind that the developer has contributed on other development sites over and above their LIC obligations. This section of the EP&A Act allows a developer to offset a LIC owed on one site against land or works contributed on another. This leads to some developers carrying 'credits' for work delivered to councils, to be paid back by reduced LICs on a future development. Blacktown City Council and Central Coast Council allow developers to carry credits. Liverpool City Council and City of Sydney Council do not permit credits and instead pay the developers for any additional work undertaken.

Councils should formally document credit arrangements and have a robust process to validate and keep track of credit balances and report on them. Central Coast Council does not keep good track of credit arrangements and neither Blacktown City Council or Central Coast Council aggregate or report on outstanding credit balances.

Blacktown City Council manages the largest LIC fund in NSW and negotiates more VPAs than any other council. Overall, Blacktown City Council demonstrates effective governance over the LIC funds but there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Blacktown City Council also needs to update its operating procedures relating to LICs and improve security over key information.

Blacktown City Council is managing areas with high growth. There is a risk that Blacktown City Council will be unable to collect sufficient LICs to fund the infrastructure required to support that growth. However, Blacktown City Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.

Blacktown City Council has policies in place to guide the management of LICs although management of credit arrangements with developers requires greater oversight. Policies relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers and valuations of works-in-kind are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. Blacktown City Council's S7.11 committee structure could act as a model for other councils. Blacktown City Council is spending LICs according to its contributions plans. Staff managing LICs demonstrate good knowledge of the regulatory environment. However, a number of administrative processes need attention such as outdated procedures, lack of security over key spreadsheets, and inappropriate retention of sensitive personal data.

Recommendations

By December 2020, Blacktown City Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. update council's works-in-kind policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
  3. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind
  4. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  5. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers
  6. update procedures for managing LICs
  7. implement security measures over critical or personal information and spreadsheets. 

Central Coast Council's governance and internal controls over LICs were not fully effective. Between 2001 and 2019, more than $13.0 million in LICs was misspent on administration costs in breach of the EP&A Act. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans and credit arrangements with developers. Policies and procedures from the two former councils are not aligned.

In May 2016, the newly amalgamated Central Coast Council inherited 53 contributions plans from the former Gosford City and Wyong Shire Councils. Managing this number of contributions plans fragments the available funds and increases complexity. Central Coast Council is currently working on consolidating these plans. Between June 2016 and June 2019, its LIC balance doubled from $90.0 million to $196 million. Central Coast Council does not assess and report to senior management or its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans. Central Coast Council has a LIC committee but it has no formal charter and senior officers do not regularly attend meetings. This limits the committee's effectiveness as a decision-making body. A draft policy relating to works-in-kind agreements provide no guidance about probity in negotiations with developers. Valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer.

Central Coast Council has adjusted its accounts in 2018–19 by $13.2 million to repay the LIC fund for administration expenses that were not provided for in 40 contributions plans.

Recommendations

By June 2020, Central Coast Council should:

1. obtain independent validation of the adjustment made to the restricted asset accounts and general fund to repay LICs spent on administration, and adjustments made to each infrastructure category within the contributions plans

2. publish current contributions plans from the former Gosford City Council on the Central Coast Council website.

By December 2020, Central Coast Council should:

3. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans

4. increase transparency of information available to the public about LIC works planned and underway, including intended use of contributions collected under VPAs

5. consolidate existing plans, ensuring the new contributions plans includes a regular review cycle

6. develop a formal charter for the developer contributions committee and increase the seniority of membership

7. complete and adopt council's works-in-kind policy currently under development, ensuring it addresses probity risks during negotiations with developers

8. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land

9. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs

10. improve management oversight of credit arrangements with developers

11. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs

12. align policies and procedures relating to LICs across the amalgamated council including developing policies and procedures for the management of S64 LICs

13. update council's VPA policy to address increased or indexed bank guarantees to accommodate cost increases.

City of Sydney Council manages a complex development environment across the Sydney CBD and inner suburbs. Overall, governance and internal controls over LICs are effective although there is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.

City of Sydney Council maintains a large balance of LICs, although not excessive relative to the annual level of LIC expenditure. Unspent contributions are largely associated with open space infrastructure that cannot be delivered until suitable land is available. Thirty per cent of cash contributions are collected under VPAs and there is limited transparency over how these funds are spent. City of Sydney Council does not assess and report to management or its Audit, Risk and Compliance Committee about the projected financial status of contributions plans.

In 2017–18 and 2018–19, LICs were spent in accordance with the corresponding contributions plans. City of Sydney Council staff are knowledgeable about the regulatory environment and are supported by up-to-date policies and procedures.

Recommendations

By December 2020, City of Sydney Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  3. periodically review the risk of unpaid LICs associated with complying development certificates and assess whether additional controls are required
  4. implement security measures to ensure the integrity of key spreadsheets used to manage LICs. 

During the audit period 2017–18 and 2018–19, Liverpool City Council did not have effective governance and internal controls over LICs. Liverpool City Council is addressing deficiencies and risks identified through an internal audit published in December 2018 although further work is required. There is scope for improved oversight of the projected financial status of contributions plans.

In the two years to 30 June 2019, the balance of unspent LICs increased by more than 60 per cent against a relatively low pattern of expenditure. Prior to an internal audit completed in late 2018, there was no regular reporting on the status of LICs and a lack of transparency when prioritising the expenditure of LIC funds. During 2019, and following the internal audit, Liverpool City Council engaged additional skilled resources to improve focus and accountability for LICs. A LIC committee has been established to manage contributions plans and support business units to initiate relevant infrastructure projects, although it is too early to assess whether this committee is operating effectively. From February 2019, Liverpool City Council commenced monthly reporting to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) about the point-in-time status of LIC funds, and to its Audit, Risk and Improvement Committee about risks associated with LICs and the implementation of internal audit recommendations. There is limited reporting to senior management about the projected financial status of some contributions plans. Our audit found no evidence of misuse of funds during the audited period. Methods for valuing work and land are not aligned with policies and procedures and are implemented inconsistently. In addition, valuations of works-in-kind and land dedications are not independent as they are paid for by the developer. The policy relating to works-in-kind provides no guidance about managing probity risks when negotiating with developers.

Recommendations

By December 2020, Liverpool City Council should:

  1. regularly report to senior management on the projected financial status of contributions plans
  2. update council's policies and procedures to provide consistent guidance about how works and land offered by developers should be valued
  3. update council's Works-in-Kind and Land Acquisition Policy to address probity risks during negotiations with developers
  4. improve public reporting about expenditure of cash collected under VPAs
  5. mitigate risks associated with lack of independence in valuations of works-in-kind and dedicated land
  6. implement security measures over critical or private information. 

Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – Advice from the Crown Solicitor

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

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Parliamentary reference - Report number #339 - released 17 August 2020