The following report assessed the activities of the two agencies in relation to their government advertising campaigns in 2012-13 and tested compliance by tracking a campaign through from development to dissemination.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #236 - released 23 September 2013

The NSW Government does not estimate or report the total cost of alcohol abuse. The Audit Office of New South Wales’ sponsored research estimates it costs the government over $1 billion a year, or around $416 from each NSW household.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #235 - released 6 August 2013

We found that the two NSW Health campaigns had followed the required approval processes and were appropriate. We had some concerns with the two Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) campaigns. The revised Guidelines, which incorporate recommendations from earlier audit reports, are a positive step towards reducing the risk that publicly funded advertising could be used inappropriately. But there are still parts of the Guidelines that require a subjective judgement and therefore do little to help manage this risk. While we did not have any concerns with the two NSW Health campaigns, the two DPC campaigns highlighted these risks.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #194 - released 9 December 2009

We found no significant difference in the funding of government and opposition electorates. However, more money was given to electorates that were safely held by the major parties. These seats received $1.29 for every dollar given to marginal and independent seats with government marginals getting the least. Electorates also receive different levels of funding according to which region they are in. Such variations may reflect valid agency objectives such as meeting State Plan targets or addressing socio-economic disadvantage.

But while agencies publish who gets what, they do not adequately evaluate or explain what grant programs have achieved. As a result, there is a risk that New South Wales may not get the best value for its spending. We recommend that agencies regularly evaluate their grant programs and publish the results.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #186 - released 6 May 2009

In our opinion the Government’s ‘no net cost to government’ requirement was a legitimate (but not the only possible) basis for the tunnel bid process. The Government was entitled to decide that tunnel users meet the tunnel costs. Structuring the bid process on the basis of an upfront reimbursement of costs incurred (or to be incurred) by the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) was therefore appropriate.

In our opinion, however, the Government, Treasury and the RTA did not sufficiently consider the implications of an upfront payment involving more than simple project cost reimbursement (i.e. the ‘Business Consideration Fee’ component). In addition, the RTA was wrong to change the toll escalation factor late in 2002 to compensate the tunnel operator, Cross City Motorway Pty Ltd, for additional costs.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #152 - released 31 May 2006

In the cases we examined, we found that agencies working together can improve services or results. However, the changes were not always as great as anticipated or had not reached maximum potential. Establishing the right governance framework and accountability requirements between partners at the start of the project is critical to success. And joint responsibility requires new funding and reporting arrangements to be developed.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #149 - released 22 March 2006

The Audit Office is of the opinion that there are several features of the current Senior Executive Service (SES) model, or its application, which hinder the capacity of the SES to operate effectively in line with the Government’s stated objectives. The ultimate effect of these features is to reduce the capacity or perceived capacity of the SES to meet the Government’s objectives for the operation of the SES.

Taken overall, difficulties in the SES identified by the audit included: uncertainty caused by the way some contracts have been applied in practice, removal for reasons other than poor performance, informal strategies such as using restructuring to “terminate contracts and to move people in and out of positions regardless of their formal reported performance” (Section 5.4), inconsistently applied rules about selection/recruitment, appointment and removal of the SES, an imbalance between CES responsibility to the Minister as the employer/reviewer with their responsibility not to act in a political or partial manner, apparent lack of rigour in, value of and Ministerial accountability for CES performance review processes and failure to implement an adequate system of rewards and sanctions related to performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.1 - released 17 December 1998

This Performance Audit Report, prepared by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) on behalf of The Audit Office of New South Wales (NSW), is a study of the NSW Senior Executive Service (SES).

It found the dissonance between where optimal executive performance might take place on a performance spectrum, encompassing the formal SES and less formal political arenas, is canvassed. The critical point here is that this arena, between the informal political actions and the application of formal SES structures, where much of the important decision making takes place, will always be difficult to manage. Transparency in decision making processes where non partisan and partisan actions are clearly defined seems a primary essential element of performance if the integrity of the NSW SES is to be maintained.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.2 - released 17 December 1998