This audit assesses the assurance provided to the NSW Government for the initial stages of the WestConnex project.

The audit examined the WestConnex project from concept development to the pre-tender phase for Stage 1A – M4 (Parramatta to Homebush Bay). It did not examine the merit of the project or whether it represented value-for-money.

This audit found a number of shortcomings with the governance of the WestConnex project during its early stages and makes recommendations on how to better govern the remainder of the project to minimise the risk of failure.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #247 - released 18 December 2014

There have been tangible improvements in the time it takes NSW Government agencies to engage consultants through the Government’s Prequalification Scheme. The Scheme was introduced in February 2008 to improve agencies’ procurement of consultants. More than 300 service providers have been prequalified and over $300 million worth of consultancy services have been provided. Ideally agencies should know what assignments each consultant has won, for what services, what their rates are and how well they have performed. Agencies should then be free to contact other agencies before engaging a consultant.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #216 - released 28 September 2011

To date the Two Ways Together Plan (the Plan) has not delivered the improvement in overall outcomes for Aboriginal people that was intended. Stronger partnerships between the government and Aboriginal people are only beginning to emerge. The disadvantage still experienced by some of the estimated 160,000 Aboriginal people in NSW is substantial. For example, the unemployment rate for Aboriginal people is at least three times higher than the rate for all NSW residents and hospital admissions for diabetes are also around three times higher.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #213 - released 18 May 2011

In our opinion the Government’s ‘no net cost to government’ requirement was a legitimate (but not the only possible) basis for the tunnel bid process. The Government was entitled to decide that tunnel users meet the tunnel costs. Structuring the bid process on the basis of an upfront reimbursement of costs incurred (or to be incurred) by the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) was therefore appropriate.

In our opinion, however, the Government, Treasury and the RTA did not sufficiently consider the implications of an upfront payment involving more than simple project cost reimbursement (i.e. the ‘Business Consideration Fee’ component). In addition, the RTA was wrong to change the toll escalation factor late in 2002 to compensate the tunnel operator, Cross City Motorway Pty Ltd, for additional costs.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #152 - released 31 May 2006

In the cases we examined, we found that agencies working together can improve services or results. However, the changes were not always as great as anticipated or had not reached maximum potential. Establishing the right governance framework and accountability requirements between partners at the start of the project is critical to success. And joint responsibility requires new funding and reporting arrangements to be developed.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #149 - released 22 March 2006

The Audit Office is of the opinion that there are several features of the current Senior Executive Service (SES) model, or its application, which hinder the capacity of the SES to operate effectively in line with the Government’s stated objectives. The ultimate effect of these features is to reduce the capacity or perceived capacity of the SES to meet the Government’s objectives for the operation of the SES.

Taken overall, difficulties in the SES identified by the audit included: uncertainty caused by the way some contracts have been applied in practice, removal for reasons other than poor performance, informal strategies such as using restructuring to “terminate contracts and to move people in and out of positions regardless of their formal reported performance” (Section 5.4), inconsistently applied rules about selection/recruitment, appointment and removal of the SES, an imbalance between CES responsibility to the Minister as the employer/reviewer with their responsibility not to act in a political or partial manner, apparent lack of rigour in, value of and Ministerial accountability for CES performance review processes and failure to implement an adequate system of rewards and sanctions related to performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.1 - released 17 December 1998

This Performance Audit Report, prepared by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) on behalf of The Audit Office of New South Wales (NSW), is a study of the NSW Senior Executive Service (SES).

It found the dissonance between where optimal executive performance might take place on a performance spectrum, encompassing the formal SES and less formal political arenas, is canvassed. The critical point here is that this arena, between the informal political actions and the application of formal SES structures, where much of the important decision making takes place, will always be difficult to manage. Transparency in decision making processes where non partisan and partisan actions are clearly defined seems a primary essential element of performance if the integrity of the NSW SES is to be maintained.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.2 - released 17 December 1998

The audit found that the process for the lease and development of the Showground site commenced on the basis that no Government moneys would be provided and no theme park activities would be allowed. However despite this a State Government subsidy of between $84.8m and $106.8m (in net present value terms) is to be provided for the development and the area of the Showground to be leased to Fox was extended to comprise 24.3 hectares of the 28.8 hectare site to allow Fox also to develop a family entertainment park.

The audit also found that the process commenced under the former Government were intended to ensure that no one party was placed above another however, the actual processes employed up to the General Election in March 1995 were so flawed as not to be relied upon to select a preferred proponent or to justify dispensing with a tender process.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #44 - released 8 December 1997