Reports
Central Agencies 2019
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies, namely the Premier and Cabinet, Treasury and Customer Service clusters. There are 191 agencies in these clusters, including government financial, superannuation and insurance entities.
Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements for all agencies in the clusters. There were two high risk and 99 moderate risk audit findings on internal controls. Of these, 31 percent were repeat issues, and most related to weaknesses in information technology access controls.
The report notes a number of audit observations including:
- a qualified opinion on information technology internal controls at an outsourced service provider
- self-insurance losses of $1.4 billion partly due to unfavourable movements in the risk free discount rate, and increases in workers compensation claims, including psychological injury claims
- a shortfall (unfunded liability) of $637 million at 30 June 2019 in the Home Building Compensation Fund, due to premiums not being sufficient to meet costs of the scheme
- agencies self-assessed against the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s ‘Essential 8’ cyber risk mitigation strategies for the first time in 2018-19. Based on their own self assessments, more work needs to be done to improve cyber security resilience.
This report analyses the results of our financial statement audits of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Customer Service clusters for the year ended 30 June 2019. Our key observations are summarised below.
This report provides parliament and other users of the NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations
- government financial services.
Central agency clusters were significantly impacted by Machinery of Government changes which took effect on 1 July 2019. This report is focussed on agencies now in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Customer Service clusters. Some of these agencies may have been in another cluster during 2018–19. Please refer to the section on Machinery of Government changes for more details.
Central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.
Machinery of Government (MoG) refers to how the government organises the structures and functions of the public service. MoG changes are where the government reorganises these structures and functions and they are given effect by Administrative orders.
The MoG changes announced following the NSW State election on 23 March 2019 significantly impacted Central Agencies’ clusters through Administrative Changes Orders issued on 2 April 2019 and 1 May 2019. These orders took effect on 1 July 2019.
Section highlights
Significant impacts of the 2019 MoG changes included:
- abolishing the former Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, and creating the Department of Customer Service as the principal agency within the newly established Customer Service cluster
- transferring Jobs for NSW, Destination NSW and the Western City and Aerotropolis Authority into the Treasury cluster
- transferring Arts and Culture entities and Aboriginal Affairs NSW into the Premier and Cabinet cluster
- new responsibilities, risks and challenges for each cluster
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations on the 2019 financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Customer Service clusters.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 30 June 2019 financial statements of all agencies within the three clusters, and the Legislature.
- The NSW Self Insurance Corporation (Corporation) 2018–19 financial statements did not include an estimate of the liability for unreported incidents of abuse that have occurred within NSW Government institutions. This is because the Corporation’s financial exposure could not be reliably measured at 30 June 2019. The exposure was instead disclosed as an unquantified contingent liability in the financial statement notes. This liability may be material to the Corporation and the Total State Sector financial statements.
- We recommend management and those charged with governance review instructions provided to management experts each year, along with other significant accounting judgements.
- Agencies will be implementing the requirements of new accounting standards shortly. These could significantly impact their financial positions and operating results. We noted instances where agencies need to do more work on their impact assessments to minimise the risk of errors in the 2019–20 financial statements.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Customer Service clusters.
Section highlights
- The 2018–19 audits found two high risk and 99 moderate risk issues across the agencies. Of these, 31 per cent were repeat issues. The most common repeat issue related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration.
- NSW Government agency self-assessment results show that the NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs urgent attention.
- GovConnect received a qualified opinion from the auditor of their service provider, Unisys, over weaknesses in information technology controls.
- Crown revenues from taxes, fines and fees continued to increase, but this was offset by decreases in stamp duty on property sales.
- The CTP reform resulted in green slip refunds of $198 million to vehicle owners. Unclaimed refunds are to be returned to motorists through a reduction in green slip premiums.
Background
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.
Section highlights
- Last year's Auditor-General's Report to Parliament recommended Treasury consult with STC Pooled Fund and PCS Fund Trustees to prescribe prudential standards and requirements. Treasury has not taken specific action to address this recommendation.
We recommend Treasury formally assess the merits of implementing prudential standards and supervision arrangements, after considering the risks, benefits and costs to scheme members. - The NSW Self Insurance Corporation did not include an estimate of the liability for unreported incidents of abuse that have occurred within NSW Government institutions because it could not be reliably measured at 30 June 2019. The amounts involved could be material to the Corporation's and Total State Sector's financial statements.
- Insurance scheme liabilities were significantly impacted by unfavourable movements in economic assumptions, including a decrease in the risk free discount rate, and adverse changes in non-economic assumptions, such as higher medical costs.
Appendix one – Timeliness of financial reporting by agency
Appendix two – Management letter findings by agency
Appendix three – Status of 2018 recommendations
Appendix four – Cluster agencies
Appendix five – Financial data
Copyright notice
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Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid
In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.
A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.
Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.
In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.
On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal.
This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide).
The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money.
The evidence available does not conclusively demonstrate the unsolicited proposal was unique, and there were some shortcomings in the negotiation process, documentation and segregation of duties. That said, before the final commitment to proceed with the lease, the state obtained assurance that the proposal delivered value for money.
It is particularly important to demonstrate unsolicited proposals are unique, in order to justify the departure from other transaction processes that offer greater competition, transparency and certainty about value for money.
The Assessment Panel and the Proposal Specific Steering Committee determined the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal was unique, primarily on the basis that the proponent did not require foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and the lease transaction could be concluded earlier than through a second tender process. However, the evidence that persuaded the Panel and Committee did not demonstrate that no other proponent could conclude the transaction in time to meet the government’s deadline.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. It also does not demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
The Panel, Committee and financial advisers determined that the final price represented value for money, and that retendering offered a material risk of a worse financial outcome. However, an acceptable price was revealed early in the negotiation process, and doing so made it highly unlikely that the proponent would offer a higher price than that disclosed. The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, bargaining strategy or similar which put the negotiations in context. It is not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance.
Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place. Some shortcomings relating to role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance weakened the effectiveness of the unsolicited proposal process adopted for Ausgrid.
The reasons for accepting that the proposal and proponent were unique are not compelling.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says the 'unique benefits of the proposal and the unique ability of the proponent to deliver the proposal' must be demonstrated.
The conclusion reached by the Panel and Committee that the proposal offered a ‘unique ability to deliver (a) strategic outcome’ was primarily based on the proponent not requiring foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and allowing the government to complete the lease transaction earlier than by going through a second tender process.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. Nor does it demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
That said, the Australian Treasurer’s decision to reject the two bids from the previous tender process created uncertainty about the conditions under which he would approve international bids. The financial advisers engaged for the Ausgrid transaction informed the Panel and Committee that:
- it was not likely another viable proponent would emerge soon enough to meet the government’s transaction deadline
- the market would be unlikely to deliver a better result than offered by the proponent
- going to tender presented a material risk of a worse financial result.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says that a proposal to directly purchase or acquire a government-owned entity or property will generally not be unique. The Ausgrid unsolicited proposal fell into this category.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- recognise that when considering uniqueness they should:
- require very strong evidence to decide that both the proponent and proposal are the only ones of their kind that could meet the government’s objectives
- give thorough consideration to any reasonable counter-arguments against uniqueness.
- rigorously consider all elements of the Unsolicited Proposals Guide when determining whether a proposal should be dealt with as an unsolicited proposal, and document these deliberations and all relevant evidence
- do not use speed of transaction compared to a market process as justification for uniqueness.
The Panel and Committee concluded the price represented value for money, based on peer-reviewed advice from their financial advisers and knowledge acquired from previous tenders. The financial advisers also told the Panel and Committee that there was a material risk the state would receive a lower price than offered by the unsolicited proposal if it immediately proceeded with a second market transaction.
The state commenced negotiations on price earlier than the Guide says they should have. Early disclosure of a price that the state would accept reduced the likelihood of achieving a price greater than this. DPC says the intent of this meeting was to quickly establish whether the proponents could meet the state’s benchmark rather than spending more time and resources on a proposal which had no prospect of proceeding.
DPC and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, negotiation strategy or similar which put the negotiations and price achieved in context. It was not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. However, the Panel and Committee endorsed the outcomes of the negotiations.
The negotiations were informed by the range of prices achieved for similar assets and the specific bids for Ausgrid from the earlier market process.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- document a minimum acceptable price, and a negotiating strategy designed to maximise price, before commencing negotiations
- do not communicate an acceptable price to the proponent, before the negotiation stage of the process, and then only as part of a documented bargaining strategy.
The state established a governance structure in accordance with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide, including an Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee. The members of the Panel and Steering Committee were senior and experienced officers, as befitted the size and nature of the unsolicited proposal.
The separation of negotiation, assessment and review envisaged by the Guide was not maintained fully. The Chair of the Assessment Panel and a member of the Steering Committee were involved in negotiations with the proponent.
DPC could not provide comprehensive records of some key interactions with the proponent or a documented negotiation strategy. The absence of such records means the Department cannot demonstrate engagement and negotiation processes were authorised and rigorous.
The probity adviser reported there were no material probity issues with the transaction. The probity adviser also provided audit services. This is not good practice. The same party should not provide both advisory and audit services on the same transaction.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government entity or asset:
• maintain separation between negotiation, assessment and review in line with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide
• keep an auditable trail of documentation relating to the negotiation process
• maintain separation between any probity audit services engaged and the probity advisory and reporting services recommended in the current Guide.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - NSW Government’s summary of assessment of the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal
Appendix three - The definition and nature of unsolicited proposals
Appendix four - Ausgrid unsolicited proposal process
Appendix five - About the audit
Appendix six - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #309 - released 11 December 2018
Central Agencies 2018
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters. While clear audit opinions were issued on all agency financial statements, the report notes that some complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in agency financial statements submitted for audit, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved.
This report analyses the results of our audits of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.
This report provides parliament and other users of the NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations
- liquidity risk management
- government financial services.
The central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.
| Central agencies | Key central agency responsibilities | Cluster responsibilities |
| The Treasury |
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The cluster:
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| Department of Premier and Cabinet |
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The cluster:
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| Department of Finance, Services and Innovation |
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The cluster:
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| Public Service Commission |
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A full list of agencies that this report covers by relevant cluster is included in Appendix three.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters for 2018.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendations |
| 2.1 Quality of financial reporting | |
| Unqualified opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements submitted to the Audit Office. Complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in some agency financial statements, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved. |
Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement. Recommendation: Agencies should respond to key accounting issues when they are identified by preparing accounting papers and engaging with Treasury, the Audit Office and their Audit and Risk Committee when these matters are identified. |
| 2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting | |
| Most agencies complied with the statutory timeframe for completion of early close procedures, 48 agencies in the Treasury cluster did not comply with the statutory requirement to prepare financial statements, and the audits of nine agencies in the Treasury cluster were not completed within the statutory timeframe. All financial statement information of the 48 agencies that did not prepare financial statements has been captured in the consolidated financial statements of their parent entity, which was subject to audit. |
Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the audit process. The timeliness of financial reporting can be improved by performing more robust early close procedures. |
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:
- our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster for 2018
- the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.
The Audit Office work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendations |
| 3.1 Internal controls | |
| The 2017–18 audits found one high risk issue and 83 moderate risk issues across the agencies. Nineteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues. | Agencies should focus on rectifying repeat issues. |
| The high risk issue at Service NSW related to several deficiencies in procurement and contract management processes. | Service NSW may not be achieving value-for-money from their procurement and contract management activities. The high risk issue should be rectified as a matter of priority. This includes updating and implementing its procurement, vendor and contract management frameworks and delivering training to key staff involved in procurement and contract management activities. |
| Property NSW has implemented several controls during the year to rectify the high risk issue identified last year related to its transition to a new property and facility management service provider. However, the service providers performance remains below expectations and there are further opportunities to improve oversight and lift performance. | Property NSW can better define roles and accountabilities with the service provider and formalise policies and processes associated with its monitoring and oversight of the service provider. Implementing relevant KPIs, receiving timely reports and providing timely review and feedback to the service provider may help to lift performance. |
| GovConnect received unqualified opinions from their service auditor on all business process controls, except for information technology controls provided by Unisys, where a qualified opinion was received from the service auditor. A qualified opinion was received because of several deficiencies in user access controls. | These internal control deficiencies increase the risk of unauthorised access to key business systems, and increase audit effort and costs associated with addressing the risks arising from the deficiencies. |
| 3.2 Audit Office annual work program | |
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Remediation of the Barangaroo site is now estimated to cost the Barangaroo Delivery Authority in excess of net $400 million. |
Measuring the remaining costs to remediate requires the use of estimation techniques and judgements, making the actual outcome inherently uncertain. We reviewed evidence to support the provision for remediation, including future costs estimates and this evidence supported management’s estimate. |
| The State Insurance Regulatory Authority have administered the refund of $138 million in Green slip refunds to policy holders through Service NSW during 2017–18. At 30 June 2018, $112 million in refunds are yet to be claimed. We reviewed the systems and processes supporting the refund process. While we found that this supports the disbursement of refunds to policyholders there were some deficiencies in Service NSW’s project controls when the program was being developed. |
Service NSW should apply the lessons learnt from this program to other programs it is delivering or will be delivering for agencies. |
| Revenue NSW recorded $30.4 billion from taxes, fines and fees in 2017–18 ($30.0 billion in 2016–17) to support the State’s finances. |
Crown revenue has steadily increased over the last five years predominately driven by rises in payroll tax and land tax and responsibility for collection of the Emergency Services Levy transferring to Revenue NSW under the Emergency Services Levy Act 2017 effective from July 2017. |
| 3.3 Managing maintenance | |
| Place Management NSW manages significant commercial and retail leases and maintains public domain spaces and other assets around the harbour foreshore. It has consistently underspent its asset maintenance budget. In 2017–18, asset maintenance expenses were only 34 per cent of budgeted maintenance expense. Currently, Place Management NSW does not use any ratios or benchmarks to determine the adequacy of its maintenance spend or to monitor whether it is achieving its budgeted maintenance program. |
This may be contributing to a high proportion of unplanned maintenance, which Place Management NSW reports was 38 per cent of total maintenance expense in 2017–18. Place Management NSW is outsourcing its property and facilities management function from 1 December 2018 to an external service provider. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendation |
| 5.1 Superannuation funds | |
| The SAS Trustee Corporation (STC) Pooled Fund and the Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation (PCS) Fund are not required to comply with the prudential and reporting standards issued by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). However, legislation allows the responsible Minister to prescribe prudential standards, reporting and audit requirements. |
Structured and comprehensive prudential oversight of these Funds is important as they operate in a volatile financial sector, have 103,000 members and manage investments of $43.3 billion. Recommendation: Treasury should consult with the Trustees of the STC Pooled Fund and PCS Fund to prescribe appropriate prudential standards and requirements, including oversight arrangements. |
| 5.2 Insurance and compensation | |
| Nominal Insurer and NSW Self Insurance Corporation investment performance marginally exceeded benchmark over the past five years. | Investment returns can impact on the premiums required to maintain an adequate funding ratio in addition to other factors such as claims experience and discount rates. |
| The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (Nominal Insurer) and NSW Self Insurance Corporation's net collected premiums and contributions decreased over the past five years. | The insurance schemes' investment performance and stable claim payments have enabled less reliance on net collected premiums and contributions as a source of funding, over the past five years. |
| Reforms were introduced to manage the Home Warranty Scheme's financial sustainability risks. | The Home Warranty Scheme has not collected sufficient premiums to fund expected claims costs, since commencing operations in 2011. In 2017–18, the Crown contributed $181 million for historical shortfalls. New reforms started on 1 January 2018 enabling the Scheme to price premiums based on risk. |
Members' Additional Entitlements 2017
Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities
The Premier’s Implementation Unit uses a systematic approach to measuring and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities performance targets, but public reporting needed to improve, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General of NSW, Margaret Crawford.
The Premier of New South Wales has established 12 Premier’s Priorities. These are key performance targets for government.
| The 12 Premier's Priorities | |
|---|---|
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Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Premier’s Priorities website.
Each Premier’s Priority has a lead agency and minister responsible for achieving the performance target.
The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) was established within the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) in 2015. The PIU is a delivery unit that supports agencies to measure and monitor performance, make progress toward the Premier’s Priorities targets, and report progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public.
This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government is progressing and reporting on the Premier's Priorities.
The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) is effective in assisting agencies to make progress against the Premier’s Priorities targets. Progress reporting is regular but transparency to the public is weakened by the lack of information about specific measurement limitations and lack of clarity about the relationship of the targets to broader government objectives.The PIU promotes a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities’ performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives.
The PIU provides a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier's Priorities performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives. The data used to measure the Premier’s Priorities comes from a variety of government and external datasets, some of which have known limitations. These limitations are not revealed in public reporting, and only some are revealed in progress reported to the Premier and ministers. This limits the transparency of reporting.
The PIU assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising particular performance measures over other areas of activity. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach to assisting agencies to analyse performance using data, and helping them work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.
Data used to measure progress for some of the Premier’s Priorities has limitations which are not made clear when progress is reported. This reduces transparency about the reported progress. Public reporting would also be improved with additional information about the relationship between specific performance measures and broader government objectives.
The PIU is responsible for reporting progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public. Agencies provide performance data and some play a role in preparing progress reports for the Premier and ministers. For 11 of the Premier's Priorities, progress is reported against measurable and time-related performance targets. For the infrastructure priority, progress is reported against project milestones.
Progress of some Priorities is measured using data that has known limitations, which should be noted wherever progress is reported. For example, the data used to report on housing completions does not take housing demolitions into account, and is therefore overstating the contribution of this performance measure to housing supply. This known limitation is not explained in progress reports or on the public website.
Data used to measure progress is sourced from a mix of government and external datasets. Updated progress data for most Premier’s Priorities is published on the Premier’s Priorities website annually, although reported to the Premier and key ministers more frequently. The PIU reviews the data and validates it through fieldwork with front line agencies. The PIU also assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising single performance measures. Most, but not all, agencies use additional indicators to check for misuse of data or perverse outcomes.
We examined the reporting processes and controls for five of the Premier’s Priorities. We found that there is insufficient assurance over the accuracy of the data on housing approvals.
The relationships between performance measures and broader government objectives is not always clearly explained on the Premier’s Priority website, which is the key source of public information about the Premier’s Priorities. For example, the Premier’s Priority to reduce litter volumes is communicated as “Keeping our Environment Clean.” While the website explains why reducing litter is important, it does not clearly explain why that particular target has been chosen to measure progress in keeping the environment clean.
By December 2018, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:
- improve transparency of public reporting by:
- providing information about limitations of reported data and associated performance
- clarifying the relationship between the Premier’s Priorities performance targets and broader government objectives.
- ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources
- encourage agencies to develop and implement additional supporting indicators for all Premier’s Priority performance measures to prevent and detect unintended consequences or misuse of data.
The Premier's Implementation Unit is effective in supporting agencies to deliver progress towards the Premier’s Priority targets.
The PIU promotes a systematic approach to monitoring and reporting progress against a target, based on a methodology used in delivery units elsewhere in the world. The PIU undertakes internal self-evaluation, and commissions regular reviews of methodology implementation from the consultancy that owns the methodology and helped to establish the PIU. However, the unit lacks periodic independent reviews of their overall effectiveness. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach and assists agencies to analyse performance using data, and work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.
Agency representatives recognise the benefits of being responsible for a Premier's Priority and speak of the value of being held to account and having the attention of the Premier and senior ministers.
By June 2019, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:
- establish routine collection of feedback about PIU performance including:
- independent assurance of PIU performance
- opportunity for agencies to provide confidential feedback.
Appendix one: Response from agency
Appendix three: About the audit
Appendix four: Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #307 - released 13 September 2018
Grants Administration
We found no significant difference in the funding of government and opposition electorates. However, more money was given to electorates that were safely held by the major parties. These seats received $1.29 for every dollar given to marginal and independent seats with government marginals getting the least. Electorates also receive different levels of funding according to which region they are in. Such variations may reflect valid agency objectives such as meeting State Plan targets or addressing socio-economic disadvantage.
But while agencies publish who gets what, they do not adequately evaluate or explain what grant programs have achieved. As a result, there is a risk that New South Wales may not get the best value for its spending. We recommend that agencies regularly evaluate their grant programs and publish the results.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #186 - released 6 May 2009
Relocating Agencies to Regional Areas
Decisions to relocate government agencies to non-metropolitan areas are not made purely for cost reasons. They can also serve government policy objectives, such as promoting regional economic development.
Regardless of the policy objectives that may exist, I would expect that decisions on individual agency relocations would be based on sound business cases. Those business cases would show how the relocation achieves any relevant government objectives, what costs (or savings) would be involved, logistical considerations such as obtaining appropriate accommodation and staff, and any impacts on levels service to the public.
In my view, the existence of government policy objectives does not remove the need for individual decisions to be made in a transparent, rational and accountable manner. Responsible public servants should provide the appropriate information to government to allow it to judge how best to implement its policies.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #147 - released 14 December 2005
