Reports
Actions for Service NSW's handling of personal information
Service NSW's handling of personal information
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of Service NSW’s handling of customers’ personal information to ensure its privacy.
The audit found that Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. Service NSW continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. This includes the routine emailing of personal information between Service NSW service centres and other agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the data breach earlier this year. The audit found that previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.
The Auditor-General made eight recommendations aimed at ensuring improved processes, technologies, and governance arrangements for how Service NSW handles customers’ personal information.
The Hon. Victor Dominello, MP, Minister for Customer Service, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 following public reports in May 2020 of a cyber security attack which had led to a breach of Service NSW customer information. This audit also included the Department of Customer Service which supports Service NSW with privacy, risk and governance functions.
Service NSW was established in 2013 with the intention that it would, over time, 'become the primary interaction point for customers accessing New South Wales Government transaction services'.
Service NSW's functions are set out in the Service NSW (One stop Access to Government Services) Act 2013. This legislation allows for other NSW Government agencies to delegate to and enter into agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of Service NSW in order for Service NSW to undertake service functions for the agency.
Service NSW now has agreements with 36 NSW Government client agencies to facilitate over 1,200 types of interactions and transactions for the community.
The nature of each agreement between Service NSW and its client agencies varies. Some client agencies have delegated authority to allow Service NSW staff to conduct transactions on their behalf in the agencies' systems. Other arrangements do not include the same degree of delegation. In these cases, Service NSW provides services such as responding to enquiries and validating documents.
In addition, Service NSW conducts transactions for its own programs, such as the Seniors Card. Personal information for these programs, as well as information for customers' MyServiceNSW accounts, are stored by Service NSW on its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system.
In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security attacks in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these attacks resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information that was contained in these email accounts. See Section 1.1 for further details.
This audit is being conducted in response to a request from the Hon. Victor Dominello, Minister for Customer Service, under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. Minister Dominello requested that the Auditor General conduct a performance audit in relation to Service NSW's handling of sensitive customer and business information.
This audit assessed how effectively Service NSW handles personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy.
It addressed the following:
- Does Service NSW have processes and governance in place to identify and manage risks to the privacy of personal customer and business information?
- Does Service NSW have policies, processes and systems in place that support the effective handling of personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy?
- Has Service NSW effectively implemented its policies, processes and systems for managing personal customer and business information?
ConclusionService NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. It continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. These include routinely emailing personal customer information to client agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the March 2020 data breach. Previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.Service NSW identifies privacy as a strategic risk in both its Risk Management Guideline and enterprise risk register and sets out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement. That said, the governance, policies, and processes established by Service NSW to mitigate privacy risk are not effective in ensuring the privacy of personal customer and business information. While Service NSW had risk identification and management processes in place at the time of the March 2020 data breach, these did not prevent the breach occurring. Some of the practices that contributed to the data breach are still being followed by Service NSW staff. For example, business processes still require Service NSW staff to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. The lack of multi factor authentication has been identified as another key contributing factor to the March 2020 data breach as this enabled the external threat actors to gain access to staff email accounts once they had obtained the user account details through a phishing exercise. Service NSW had identified the lack of multi factor authentication on its webmail platform as a risk more than a year prior to the breach and had committed to addressing this by June 2019. It was not implemented until after the breach occurred. There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system, which holds the personal information of over four million NSW residents.Internal audits carried out by Service NSW, including one completed in August 2020, have identified significant weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These include deficiencies in the management of role based access, monitoring and audit of user access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers held in the system. Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are not clearly drawn between Service NSW and its client agencies.Service NSW has agreements in place with client agencies. However, the agreements lack detail and clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the agencies in relation to the collection, storage and security of customer's personal information. This lack of clarity raises the risk that privacy obligations will become confused and missed between the agencies. Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments for major new projects but does not routinely review existing processes and systems.Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments as part of its routine processes for implementing major new projects, ensuring that privacy management is considered as part of project design. Service NSW does not regularly undertake privacy impact assessments or reviews of existing or legacy processes and systems, which has resulted in some processes continuing despite posing significant risks to the privacy of personal information, such as the scanning, emailing, and storing of identification documents. |
1. Key findings
Service NSW identifies privacy risks, but the controls and processes it put in place to mitigate these privacy risks were not adequate to prevent or limit the extent of the data breach that occurred in March 2020
Service NSW’s approach to risk management is framed by its Risk Management Guideline, which defines 'privacy and compliance' as one of the key types of risk for the agency. Service NSW's enterprise risk register identifies four strategic privacy related risks. Service NSW has set out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement.
Service NSW has assessed the adequacy of its controls for privacy risks as needing improvement. To be fully effective, the Risk Management Guideline says that these controls should have a focus that is ‘largely preventative and address the root causes’.
One of the business processes that was a key contributing factor to the data breach was the emailing of personal information by Service NSW staff to client agencies.
This process had been identified as a risk prior to the breach and some steps had been put in place to mitigate the risk. In particular, staff were required to manually delete emails that contained personal information. However, these measures were ineffective in preventing the breach, as the external threat actors still gained access to 47 staff email accounts that contained a large amount of personal information.
It is unclear why Service NSW did not effectively mitigate this risk prior to the breaches. However, Service NSW has advised that it implemented measures in June and October 2020 to automatically archive emails likely to contain personal information. This is expected to limit the quantity of information retained in email accounts for extended periods.
Service NSW has not put in place any technical or other solutions to avoid Service NSW staff having to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. Urgent action is needed to remove the requirement for staff to email personal information to client agencies, thereby mitigating the risk inherent in sending and storing this information using email.
There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system, which holds the personal information of over four million customers
There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These weaknesses include deficiencies in governance of role based access, monitoring and audit of staff access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers which is stored in this system.
In addition, there is an absence of important controls to safeguard customers' privacy, such as multi factor authentication and reviewable logs of access history to their information. Such controls, when properly implemented, would enhance the control that customers are able to exercise over their personal information.
A privacy impact assessment conducted on Service NSW’s Salesforce CRM system in 2015 recommended that the system include the ability for customers to review access history to their personal information, as well as the option for customers to apply multi factor authentication to their accounts. While both these recommendations appeared positively received by Service NSW, neither have been implemented.
Since its inception, Service NSW’s use of Salesforce has extended to storing transaction data, particularly for transactions for which Service NSW is responsible, such as the Seniors Card. It also holds details of over four million MyServiceNSW account holders, including name, email address and phone number, and optional address details. It was not originally intended for the system to hold this volume and nature of customer information.
Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are unclear between Service NSW and its client agencies
Service NSW's privacy management plan does not clearly set out the privacy obligations of Service NSW and its client agencies. It sets out that 'compliance with the privacy principles will primarily be the responsibility of that [client] agency'. However, Service NSW has its own obligations under the security principles of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIP Act) to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access to personal information, which is not made clear in the privacy management plan.
The agreements between Service NSW and client agencies reviewed for this audit only include general and high level references to privacy. Most do not include details of each parties' privacy responsibilities such as: which agency will provide the customer with a privacy notice explaining how their personal information will be handled, how personal information will be kept secure, how long Service NSW will retain information, what processes will be followed for internal reviews, and what specific planning is in place to respond to data breaches.
Service NSW's privacy management plan has not been updated to include new programs and governance changes
Service NSW's privacy management plan includes most of the matters required by law or good practice, with some exceptions. It does not explain any exemptions that the agency commonly relies on under the PPIP Act and does not address any health information that Service NSW may handle. It had also not been updated to reflect governance changes and the fact that, at the time this audit commenced, Service NSW was disclosing the content of internal review applications (the formal expression for 'complaints') to the Department of Customer Service (DCS). These governance changes were part of the centralisation of Service NSW's corporate support functions into DCS in late 2019, though internal review staff were seconded back into Service NSW during the course of this audit.
The current July 2019 privacy management plan has also not been updated since the rollout of a number of major new initiatives in 2020. These include 2019–20 bushfire emergency recovery initiatives (such as small business grants) and COVID 19 pandemic response initiatives (such as small business grants, border permits and the COVID safe check in app).
Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for new initiatives, though privacy risks remain in legacy systems and processes
Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for major new initiatives and the assessments reviewed for this audit largely accorded with good practice guidance.
Service NSW does not routinely review existing processes and systems to ensure that they are effective in ensuring the privacy of customer personal information. Business processes that create the highest risk to privacy, such as emailing of personal information, are more common in these longstanding legacy systems.
Service NSW's significant and rapid growth has outpaced the establishment of a robust control environment which has exacerbated privacy risks
Since it was established in 2013, Service NSW has experienced significant growth in the number and diversity of the types of transactions it provides, as well as the number of client agencies with which it works. The pace and extent of this growth has contributed to important controls not being properly implemented on a timely basis, which has heightened privacy risks, particularly in regard to existing, legacy systems and processes.
The pace of change and increasing demand for new program implementation has limited the opportunity for Service NSW, in collaboration with its client agencies, to revisit and redesign legacy business practices which pose a greater privacy risk. This includes the scanning and emailing of personal information.
While 2019–20 has seen additional demands placed on Service NSW in responding to the 2019–20 bushfire emergency and COVID 19 pandemic, it is the nature of the agency’s work that it operates in a fast paced and complex environment, where it is required to respond to multiple client agencies and stakeholders. Ensuring customer privacy should be integral to Service NSW’s business as usual operations.
2. Recommendations
Service NSW commissioned a number of external reviews and investigations stemming from the data breaches. The Auditor General's recommendations below have taken these other reviews into account. In order to offer assurance that it is appropriately protecting the privacy of its customers, Service NSW should address the full breadth of findings and recommendations made across all relevant reviews.
As a matter of urgency, Service NSW should:
1. in consultation with relevant client agencies and the Department of Customer Service, implement a solution for a secure method of transferring personal information between Service NSW and client agencies
2. review the need to store scanned copies of personal information and, if still required, implement a more secure method of storing this information and regular deletion of material.
By March 2021, Service NSW should:
3. ensure that all new agreements entered into with client agencies from 1 April 2021 address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:
- the content and provision of privacy collection notices
- the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
- steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
- the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
- how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies
4. in collaboration with the Department of Customer Service, review its privacy management plan to address the deficiencies raised in this audit, including:
- to clarify Service NSW's understanding of how responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are delineated between Service NSW and client agencies
- to better reflect the full scope and complexity of personal information handled by Service NSW
- to better explain how applications for internal review are handled between Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service
- to ensure regular ongoing review, either according to a schedule or when Service NSW experiences substantial change to its programs and handling of personal information
5. in consultation with the Department of Customer Service, review its policies and processes for the management of privacy risks, including to:
- ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to escalate identified privacy risks from business units to the Executive Leadership Team
- ensure that there are action plans to address strategic privacy risks that are assessed as having ineffective controls.
By June 2021, Service NSW should:
6. address deficiencies in the controls over, and security for, its Salesforce customer relationship management and related systems that hold customer personal information, including:
- establish policies and processes for regular access reviews and monitoring of user activity in these systems, including for privileged users
- enable partitioning and role based access restrictions to personal information collected for different programs
- provide customers the choice to use multi factor authentication to further secure their MyServiceNSW accounts
- enable customers to view the transaction history of their personal information to detect possible mishandling.
By December 2021, Service NSW should:
7. ensure that all existing agreements with client agencies address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:
- the content and provision of privacy collection notices
- the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
- steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
- the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
- how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies
8. carry out a risk assessment of all processes, systems and transactions that involve the handling of personal information and undertake a privacy impact assessment for those that:
- are identified as high risk and have not previously had a privacy impact assessment
- have had major changes or updates since the privacy impact assessment was completed.
Appendix one – Responses from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit
CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit
This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.
The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.
The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.
The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.
The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.
Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).
On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.
In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.
In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.
Conclusion
Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.
Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.
From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.
TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR
Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes
Appendix four – About the audit
Appendix five – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020
Actions for Train station crowding
Train station crowding
This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.
The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.
Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.
The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.
Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.
Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.
There are three main causes of station crowding:
- patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
- service disruptions
- special events.
Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.
Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.
In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.
This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.
TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.
ConclusionSydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program. TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events. Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans. Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions. Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management. |
ConclusionTfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events. |
ConclusionSydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Sydney rail network
Appendix three – Rail services contract
Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling
Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study
Appendix six – About the audit
Appendix seven – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020
Actions for Transport 2019
Transport 2019
This report details the results of the financial audits of NSW Government's Transport cluster for the financial year ended 30 June 2019. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster.
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, valuations of assets continue to create challenges across the cluster. The Audit Office identified some deficiencies in relation to asset valuations at Transport for NSW, Roads and Maritime Services, Rail Corporation New South Wales and Sydney Metro.
The Audit Office noted an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes related to information technology, asset management and employee leave entitlements. The report also highlights the status of significant infrastructure projects across the Transport cluster.
The report makes several recommendations including:
- agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions and commercial transactions at the time of their execution to assess the financial reporting impacts
- the Department of Transport should ensure consistent accounting policies are applied across its controlled entities.
This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2019. The table below summarises our key observations.
1. Machinery of Government changes
Transport for NSW, as the lead agency, will absorb the functions of Roads and Maritime Services |
The NSW Government announced its intention to integrate Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) into Transport for NSW (TfNSW) as part of the Machinery of Government changes. This change was not included in the Administrative Orders as the Transport Administration Act 1988 No. 109 governs the composition of the Transport cluster. The Transport Administration Amendment (RMS Dissolution) Act 2019 (the Act) received assent on 22 November 2019. The Act dissolves RMS and transfers the assets, rights and liabilities of RMS to TfNSW. As at the date of this Report, the Act is not yet in force. Transport is considering the impact of the changes on its operating model and financial reporting. |
2. Financial reporting
Audit opinions |
Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2018–19 financial statements of all agencies in the Transport cluster. TfNSW and Sydney Metro obtained a three-week extension from NSW Treasury to submit their financial statements for audit to resolve accounting issues surrounding the valuation of property, plant and equipment. The Department of Transport reported total consolidated property, plant and equipment of $158 billion at 30 June 2019. In 2018–19, there were issues with asset valuations at TfNSW, RMS, Sydney Metro and Rail Corporation New South Wales (RailCorp), resulting in adjustments after the submission of financial statements for audit and the correction of a prior period error. |
Preparedness for new accounting standards |
Agencies across the cluster are progressing in their implementation of the new accounting standards. Transport cluster agencies need to improve their contracts registers to ensure they have a complete list of contracts and agreements to assess the impact of the new accounting standards. |
Valuation of assets remains a challenge in the Transport cluster |
Whilst agencies complied with the requirements of the accounting standards and NSW Treasury policies on valuations, the Audit Office identified some deficiencies in relation to asset valuations across the cluster.
Sydney Metro North West officially opened in May 2019 and reported total assets of $9.1 billion. Sydney Metro derecognised $322 million in assets constructed to facilitate its operation but transferred to councils and utilities. |
Inconsistent accounting policies across the Transport cluster |
There was an inconsistency identified in the cluster relating to the valuation of substratum land. In 2018–19, RailCorp derecognised $109 million of substratum land to ensure consistency in its approach with other Transport agencies. As the parent entity, the Department of Transport needs to ensure accounting policies are consistently applied across all controlled entities for consolidation purposes. Inconsistencies in the application of accounting standards across agencies will impact comparability of financial reporting and decision making across the Transport cluster. |
Revenue growth |
Public transport passenger revenue increased by $89.0 million (5.9 per cent) in 2018–19, and patronage increased by 37.8 million (4.9 per cent) across all modes of transport based on data provided by TfNSW. The increase in revenue is mainly due to an increase in patronage as well as the annual increase in fares. |
Negative Opal cards |
Negative balance Opal cards resulted in $2.9 million in revenue not collected in 2018–19 ($10.4 million since the introduction of Opal). In January 2019, Transport made a change to the Sydney Airport stations to prevent customers with high negative balances exiting the station. In addition, in late 2018, Transport increased the minimum top up values for new cards at the airport stations. |
3. Audit observations
Internal controls | There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes relate to information technology, employee leave entitlements and asset management. Twenty-nine per cent of all issues were repeat issues. The majority of the repeat issues related to information technology controls. |
Write-off of assets | In addition to a $322 million derecognition of assets transferred to councils and utilities by Sydney Metro and a $109 million derecognition of substratum land at RailCorp, the Transport cluster wrote-off $278 million of assets related to roads, bridges, maritime assets, traffic signals and controls network. These mainly related to roads, bridges, maritime assets, traffic signals and the control network where new infrastructure assets substantially replaced an existing asset as part of construction activities. |
Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) |
TAHE was established to be a dedicated asset manager for the delivery of public transport asset management. The Transport Administration Amendment (Transport Entities) Act 2017 will transition RailCorp into TAHE. RailCorp is now expected to transition to TAHE from 1 July 2020 (previously 1 July 2019). Several working groups have been considering various aspects of the TAHE transition including its status as a for profit Public Trading Enterprise, the operating model and the impact of the new accounting standards AASB 16 'Leases' and AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors'. The considerations of these aspects identified several challenges in the implementation of TAHE which has led to the revised transition date. Given the delays in implementation, it is important to clarify the intent of the TAHE model. |
Excess annual leave |
Twenty-six per cent of Transport employees have annual leave balances exceeding 30 days. Of the employees with excess leave balances, 732 (10.3 per cent) did not take any annual leave in 2018–19.
|
Completeness and accuracy of contracts registers |
There are no centralised processes to record all significant contracts and agreements in a register across the Transport cluster.
|
This report provides parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
This cluster was impacted by the Machinery of Government changes on 1 July 2019. The NSW Government announced its intention to integrate Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) into Transport for NSW (TfNSW). This report is focused on the Transport cluster prior to these changes. Please refer to the section on Machinery of Government changes for more details.
Machinery of Government refers to how the government organises the structures and functions of the public service. Machinery of Government changes are where the government reorganises these structures and functions, and are given effect by Administrative orders.
The Transport cluster was impacted by recent Machinery of Government changes. These changes were announced by the Department of Premier and Cabinet but were not included in the Administrative Orders as the Transport Administration Act 1988 No. 109 governs the composition of the Transport cluster. It was the intention of government to transfer the functions of the RMS into TfNSW. This requires legislative changes to the Transport Administration Act 1988 No. 109.
Section highlights
Under the Machinery of Government changes, the NSW Government will transfer the functions of RMS into TfNSW.
- The Transport Administration Amendment (RMS Dissolution) Act 2019 (the Act) received assent on 22 November 2019.
- The Act will dissolve RMS and transfer its functions, assets, rights and liabilities to TfNSW.
- As at the date of this report, the Act is not yet in force.
- There are risks and challenges for asset and liability transfers, governance and retention of knowledge.
- As of 1 July 2019, administrative arrangements (delegations and reporting line changes) were put in place to enable TfNSW and RMS to operate within a single management structure, while still remaining as separate legal entities.
- Transport is working on a number of options as to how to implement the changes.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2019.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all agencies' financial statements.
- RMS required an extension from NSW Treasury for their early close procedures.
- TfNSW and Sydney Metro required extensions to submit their year-end financial statements.
- Valuation of assets remains a challenge across the cluster.
- There remains Opal cards with negative balances.
- Sydney Metro derecognised assets of $322 million in relation to assets constructed for third parties.
- Inconsistencies in the application of accounting policies across cluster agencies impact comparability of financial reporting across the Transport cluster.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster.
Section highlights
- There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Twenty-nine per cent of all issues were repeat issues.
- Transport entities wrote-off over $278 million of assets which were replaced by new assets or technology.
- Twenty-six per cent of Transport employees have excess annual leave.
- There are no processes to ensure all significant contracts and agreements are captured by agencies in a centralised register.
Appendix one – Timeliness of financial reporting by agency
Appendix two – Management letter findings by agency
Appendix three – List of 2019 recommendations
Appendix four – Status of 2017 and 2018 recommendations
Appendix five – Cluster agencies
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Actions for Transport Access Program
Transport Access Program
The following report is available in an Easy English version that is intended to meet the needs of some people with lower literacy skills, some people with an intellectual disability and some people from different cultural backgrounds.
View the Easy English version of the Transport Access Program report
Transport for NSW’s process for selecting and prioritising projects for the third stage of its Transport Access Program balanced compliance with national disability standards with broader customer outcomes. Demographics, deliverability and value for money were also considered. However, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required for full compliance, limiting its ability to demonstrate that its approach is effective, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
Access to transport is critical to ensuring that people can engage in all aspects of community life, including education, employment and recreation. People with disability can encounter barriers when accessing public transport services. In 2015, there were 1.37 million people living with disability in New South Wales.
Accessible public transport is about more than physical accessibility. It also means barrier-free access for people who have vision, hearing or cognitive impairments. All users, not just people with disability, benefit from improvements to the accessibility and inclusiveness of transport services.
Transport for NSW has an obligation under Australian Government legislation to provide accessible services to people with disabilities in a manner which is not discriminatory. Under the Disability Standards for Accessible Public Transport 2002 (the DSAPT - an instrument of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (the Act) (Commonwealth)), there is a requirement to modify and develop new infrastructure, means of transport and services to provide access for people with disabilities. All public transport operators are required to ensure that at least 90 per cent of their networks met DSAPT by December 2017 and the networks will need to be 100 per cent compliant with all parts of the standards by 31 December 2022. Trains are not required to be fully compliant with DSAPT until December 2032.
The Transport Access Program (TAP) is Transport for NSW's largest program with a specific focus on improving access to public transport for people with disability. The TAP is a series of projects to upgrade existing public transport infrastructure across four networks: Sydney Trains, Intercity Trains, Regional Trains and Sydney Ferries. Transport for NSW established the TAP as a rolling program and, to date, it has delivered the first tranche of TAP (TAP 1) and is completing the final projects for the second tranche (TAP 2). NSW budget papers estimate that by 30 June 2018, Transport for NSW had spent $1.2 billion in the TAP since its commencement in 2011-12.
After the completion of TAP 1 and TAP 2 (as well as through other transport infrastructure programs), Transport for NSW estimates that 58.5 per cent of the Sydney Trains, Regional Trains and Intercity Trains networks, and 66 per cent of the Sydney Ferries network, will be accessible. To close the significant gap in compliance with the DSAPT target, the objective for TAP 3 is ‘to contribute to Disability Discrimination Act 1992 related targets through DSAPT compliance upgrades’.
The audit assessed whether Transport for NSW has an effective process to select and prioritise projects as part of the TAP, with a specific focus on the third tranche of TAP funding.
In August 2018, at the commencement of this audit, Transport for NSW intended to complete the selection of projects for the TAP 3 final business case in December 2018. Transport for NSW advise that it now intends to complete the development stage and final business case in the first quarter of 2019, prior to the final investment decision of the TAP program. This report is based on the TAP 3 strategic business case and information provided by Transport for NSW up to December 2018.
Transport for NSW’s process for selecting and prioritising projects for TAP 3 balanced DSAPT compliance goals with broader customer outcomes. It also considered demographics, deliverability and value for money. However, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required for full DSAPT compliance, and this limits its ability to demonstrate that its approach is effective.
In 2015, there were 1.37 million people living with disability in New South Wales. Access to transport is critical to ensuring that people can engage in all aspects of community life, including education, employment and recreation. People with disability can encounter barriers when accessing public transport services.
The social model of disability, outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, views people with disability as not disabled by their impairment but by the barriers in the community and environment that restrict their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.
Accessible public transport is more than the provision of physical access to premises and conveyances, it provides barrier-free access for people who have vision, hearing or cognitive impairments. All users, not just people with disability, benefit from improvements to the accessibility and inclusiveness of transport services.
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the main types of difficulties experienced by people with disability when using public transport relate to steps (39.9 per cent), difficulty getting to stops and stations (25 per cent), fear and anxiety (23.3 per cent) and lack of seating or difficulty standing (20.7 per cent).
Transport for NSW has a Disability Inclusion Action Plan (the Action Plan) 2018-2022 that sets an overall framework for planning, delivering and reporting on initiatives to increase accessibility of the transport network. It covers all elements of the journey experienced when using public transport, including journey planning, staff training, customer services and interaction between the physical environment and modes of transport. Appendix five outlines the guiding principles of the Action Plan.
Transport for NSW's Transport Social Policy branch developed the Action Plan in consultation with internal and external stakeholders. The director of the Transport Social Policy branch is a member of the TAP executive steering committee, which supports alignment between the Action Plan and TAP.
Transport for NSW's Disability Inclusion Action Plan describes a customer focussed approach to accessibility
One of the guiding principles of the Action Plan is ‘intelligent compliance’. Transport for NSW describes this as compliance that prioritises customer-focused outcomes over a narrow focus on legal compliance with accessibility standards. As well as being compliant, infrastructure should be practical, usable, fit for purpose and convenient.
The TAP prioritisation and selection methodology reflects Transport for NSW’s focus on intelligent compliance. We consider this a reasonable approach as had Transport for NSW focussed exclusively on achieving compliance with the DSAPT targets by upgrading the most affordable infrastructure, some locations, that are used by more customers, would remain inaccessible to people with disability. However, this approach should not be seen as an alternative to Transport for NSW meeting its DSAPT compliance obligations.
TAP program staff consult with the Accessible Transport Advisory Committee
The Accessible Transport Advisory Committee (ATAC) has representatives from disability and ageing organisations, who provide expert guidance to Transport for NSW on access and inclusion. The ATAC provide guidance and feedback on projects and project solutions, including user testing where appropriate. TAP program staff provide regular updates at ATAC meetings, which include briefings on progress. The ATAC also provides feedback and suggestions to TAP program staff, which is considered and sometimes included in current and future projects.For example, in March 2017 the TAP program team briefed the ATAC on the challenges with respect to a number of ferry wharves and sought support for DSAPT exemptions proposed in the TAP 3 strategic business case.
In June 2018, the Program team sought feedback on a variety of lift button options to improve accessibility on future TAP projects. In September 2018, during the ATAC meeting attended by the Audit Office, the program team sought feedback on the standard designs for TAP 3. Some ATAC members noted that the standard design included Braille lettering on the lift buttons, and that this was not good practice because people can accidently press the button while reading it. As a result, Transport for NSW are incorporating this feedback into design requirements for the lifts for TAP 3, which will consider larger buttons, clearer Braille and Braille signage adjacent to the button. |
Transport for NSW has not briefed the Advisory Committee on the outcome of the prioritisation and selection process
TAP program staff briefed the Advisory Committee about the prioritisation and selection methodology, after the Minister approved it in 2016. However, Transport for NSW have not briefed or consulted the Advisory Committee on the outcome of the prioritisation process. Infrastructure NSW noted this issue during its review of the strategic business case.
Transport for NSW advised us that it established the ATAC as an advisory group, and that Transport for NSW does not disclose sensitive information to it. Transport for NSW intends to share the outcome of the prioritisation process following the completion of the TAP 3 development stage and final investment decision.
The TAP communication plan does not fully meet the requirements of the Disability Inclusion Action Plan
The Disability Inclusion Action Plan includes an action item to ‘provide a listing of stations and wharves to be upgraded with estimated time of construction as each new tranche of the Transport Access Program is announced’ The TAP Communication Plan that we reviewed does not include this provision instead focussing on communication on a per project basis. Given the long timeframes associated with improving transport infrastructure, this information is important as it allows people to make informed decisions about where they live, work or study.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - Compliance requirements of Disability Standards for Accessible Public Transport
Appendix three - TAP 1 and TAP 2 sub-programs
Appendix four - Prioritisation Assessment for the TAP 3 Strategic Business Case
Appendix five - The guiding principles of Transport for NSW's Disability Inclusion Action Plan
Appendix six - Transport projects and programs that contribute to DSAPT compliance
Appendix seven - About the audit
Appendix eight - Performance auditing
Parliamentary Reference - Report number #314 - released 19 February 2019.
Actions for Solar Bonus Scheme
Solar Bonus Scheme
A NSW Auditor General’s Report has found that the NSW Government and its agencies grossly underestimated the cost and number of people that would install systems under the Solar Bonus Scheme.
By October 2010, the estimated cost of the Scheme, if it continued the way it was going, would have reached $3.988 billion. More than ten times the original estimate of $362 million. In response to the increased cost, the gross tariff for new applicants was reduced from 60 to 20 cents reducing the estimated cost to $1.954 billion.
It was a statutory requirement that when 50 mega watts of installed capacity was reached, the Government would review the Scheme. By the time the review was completed the installed capacity had reached 101 mega watts.
Actions for Improving road safety: Young drivers
Improving road safety: Young drivers
The audit concluded that the RTA’s licence testing and regulation has been generally effective in ensuring the safety of young drivers. There has been a significant reduction in crash and fatality rates involving young drivers over the last decade, more so than for drivers 26 years and older. This has coincided with the introduction by the RTA of an enhanced GLS. International and national research has demonstrated graduated licensing systems to be effective in reducing crashes and saving lives. Despite these improvements, young drivers are more likely to be involved in fatal crashes than other drivers.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #217 - released 19 October 2011
Actions for Government expenditure and transport planning in relation to implementing Barangaroo
Government expenditure and transport planning in relation to implementing Barangaroo
Barangaroo is an ambitious and significant development on Government-owned Sydney Harbour foreshore. Construction on the 22 hectare CBD site is expected to take 12 years to 2023. Developer contributions to Government of $1 billion are to provide for public domain and other Government development costs, including a six hectare Headland Park. When completed the precinct is to service an anticipated 26,000 workers and residents and up to 33,000 visitors a day. The Auditor-General concluded that while there was extensive transport planning and extensive documentation supporting Government financial forecasts, considerable risks remain for the implementation of the Barangaroo project.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #214 - released 15 June 2011
Actions for Two Ways Together - NSW Aboriginal Affairs Plan
Two Ways Together - NSW Aboriginal Affairs Plan
To date the Two Ways Together Plan (the Plan) has not delivered the improvement in overall outcomes for Aboriginal people that was intended. Stronger partnerships between the government and Aboriginal people are only beginning to emerge. The disadvantage still experienced by some of the estimated 160,000 Aboriginal people in NSW is substantial. For example, the unemployment rate for Aboriginal people is at least three times higher than the rate for all NSW residents and hospital admissions for diabetes are also around three times higher.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #213 - released 18 May 2011
Actions for Condition of State Roads
Condition of State Roads
The Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) has improved the overall surface condition of State Roads in the last decade. Country road surfaces are now generally much better. Ride quality has improved and cracking has been reduced. The RTA has also achieved a substantial reduction in the number of structurally deficient bridges over the same period.
Despite a significant increase in the State’s contribution to maintenance since 1999-2000, the RTA has deferred road rebuilding projects. The RTA is rebuilding at less than half its long term target, and has not met this target at any time this decade. The RTA has not identified how it will address deferred rebuilding, although it advises it is developing a new road network management plan which will address this.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #157 - released 16 August 2006