Volume Five 2015 covered Premier and Cabinet agencies such as the Department of Premier and Cabinet, Office of Sport, Venues NSW, Barangaroo Delivery Authority and Infrastructure NSW.

On 9 September 2015, the Acting Auditor-General of New South Wales, Tony Whitfield, released a report on Sydney Metropolitan Bus Service Contracts.
 
All scheduled bus services in the Sydney metropolitan area are provided under contracts with the public and private operators. The contracts allow Transport for NSW (TfNSW) to determine what bus services are provided and to whom. This audit assessed the effectiveness of TfNSW’s design and management of these contracts.
 
Bus services provided under the Sydney Metropolitan Bus Service Contracts have largely been effective and efficient. Operators are mostly meeting their key performance indicators. Customer satisfaction is better than under the previous contracts and improving, patronage is increasing, and the unit costs of providing services are now lower than under the previous contracts. 
 
However, punctuality remains a problem. Private operators are mostly starting their trips on time, but rarely meeting their mid and end-of-trip targets. State Transit Authority’s (STA) punctuality is improving but is worse than private operators, and other areas of performance are generally below private operators.
 
The current situation is a substantial improvement over what we found in our 2010 audit on the previous contracts.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #258 - released 9 September 2015

This report examines selected areas of government activity to see if sufficient information was available to identify and assess changes in productivity. The areas examined were primary and secondary school public education, acute inpatient care in NSW public hospitals, CityRail, the NSW Police Force, and the NSW Local Court.

Productivity is commonly defined as the amount of output per unit of input.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #256 - released 16 July 2015

NSW Government agencies have sound processes for implementing performance audit recommendations in Auditor-General’s Reports to Parliament. There are many cases of good practice. For example, some agencies formed a steering committee and developed a detailed plan to implement recommendations. Another incorporated the implementation of recommendations into both its business plan and the work plans of individual officers who were managing projects. Most agencies also used their Audit and Risk Committees to monitor recommendations.
 
We found some cases where agencies can improve how they coordinate actions to address recommendations. Most agencies were not revisiting these actions to determine whether they remain appropriate.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #254 - released 24 June 2015

The independent assurance given to the NSW Government and sponsor agencies on the viability of large capital projects throughout their lifecycle is inadequate. Government policy is regularly not followed and not properly communicated to those responsible for implementing such policy.
 
This audit sought to test the effectiveness of the NSW capital project assurance system - which includes gateway reviews and reporting - but significant levels of non-compliance identified in our case studies prevented this. The NSW Commission of Audit also identified this issue in 2012. Gateway reviews are conducted by independent reviewers at key stages of a project’s life cycle and provide an independent assessment on a project’s readiness to proceed to the next stage.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #252 - released 7 May 2015

Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW have deployed many controls to protect traffic management systems but these would have been only partially effective in detecting and preventing incidents and unlikely to support a timely response. There was a potential for unauthorised access to sensitive information and systems that could have disrupted traffic.
 
Until Roads and Maritime Services’ IT disaster recovery site is fully commissioned, a disaster involving the main data centre is likely to lead to higher congestion in the short-term as traffic controllers would be operating on a regional basis without the benefit of the Traffic Management Centre.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #248 - released 21 January 2015

This audit assesses the assurance provided to the NSW Government for the initial stages of the WestConnex project.

The audit examined the WestConnex project from concept development to the pre-tender phase for Stage 1A – M4 (Parramatta to Homebush Bay). It did not examine the merit of the project or whether it represented value-for-money.

This audit found a number of shortcomings with the governance of the WestConnex project during its early stages and makes recommendations on how to better govern the remainder of the project to minimise the risk of failure.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #247 - released 18 December 2014

In 2013–14, Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) provided over $170 million to local councils through the Block Grant and REPAIR programs to spend on Regional Roads. Regional Roads are the link between State Roads and Local Roads.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #241 - released 8 May 2014

The report includes comments on financial audits of government agencies in the Transport and Ports sectors. The audit of corporations’ financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2011 resulted in unmodified audit opinions within the Independent Auditor’s Reports. A key recommendation from the report is that Sydney Ports Corporation should continue working with other government authorities and industry stakeholders to improve the effectiveness of program initiatives for increasing container freight movements by rail. The Corporation should review the underlying causes hindering growth in the rail mode and develop and implement strategies to address the unfavourable trend.

A NSW Auditor General’s Report has found that the NSW Government and its agencies grossly underestimated the cost and number of people that would install systems under the Solar Bonus Scheme.

By October 2010, the estimated cost of the Scheme, if it continued the way it was going, would have reached $3.988 billion. More than ten times the original estimate of $362 million. In response to the increased cost, the gross tariff for new applicants was reduced from 60 to 20 cents reducing the estimated cost to $1.954 billion.

It was a statutory requirement that when 50 mega watts of installed capacity was reached, the Government would review the Scheme. By the time the review was completed the installed capacity had reached 101 mega watts.