The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of Service NSW’s handling of customers’ personal information to ensure its privacy.

The audit found that Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. Service NSW continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. This includes the routine emailing of personal information between Service NSW service centres and other agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the data breach earlier this year. The audit found that previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

The Auditor-General made eight recommendations aimed at ensuring improved processes, technologies, and governance arrangements for how Service NSW handles customers’ personal information.

The Hon. Victor Dominello, MP, Minister for Customer Service, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 following public reports in May 2020 of a cyber security attack which had led to a breach of Service NSW customer information. This audit also included the Department of Customer Service which supports Service NSW with privacy, risk and governance functions.

Service NSW was established in 2013 with the intention that it would, over time, 'become the primary interaction point for customers accessing New South Wales Government transaction services'.

Service NSW's functions are set out in the Service NSW (One stop Access to Government Services) Act 2013. This legislation allows for other NSW Government agencies to delegate to and enter into agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of Service NSW in order for Service NSW to undertake service functions for the agency.

Service NSW now has agreements with 36 NSW Government client agencies to facilitate over 1,200 types of interactions and transactions for the community.

The nature of each agreement between Service NSW and its client agencies varies. Some client agencies have delegated authority to allow Service NSW staff to conduct transactions on their behalf in the agencies' systems. Other arrangements do not include the same degree of delegation. In these cases, Service NSW provides services such as responding to enquiries and validating documents.

In addition, Service NSW conducts transactions for its own programs, such as the Seniors Card. Personal information for these programs, as well as information for customers' MyServiceNSW accounts, are stored by Service NSW on its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system.

In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security attacks in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these attacks resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information that was contained in these email accounts. See Section 1.1 for further details.

This audit is being conducted in response to a request from the Hon. Victor Dominello, Minister for Customer Service, under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. Minister Dominello requested that the Auditor General conduct a performance audit in relation to Service NSW's handling of sensitive customer and business information.

This audit assessed how effectively Service NSW handles personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy.

It addressed the following:

• Does Service NSW have processes and governance in place to identify and manage risks to the privacy of personal customer and business information?
• Does Service NSW have policies, processes and systems in place that support the effective handling of personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy?
• Has Service NSW effectively implemented its policies, processes and systems for managing personal customer and business information?

1. Key findings

Service NSW identifies privacy risks, but the controls and processes it put in place to mitigate these privacy risks were not adequate to prevent or limit the extent of the data breach that occurred in March 2020

Service NSW’s approach to risk management is framed by its Risk Management Guideline, which defines 'privacy and compliance' as one of the key types of risk for the agency. Service NSW's enterprise risk register identifies four strategic privacy related risks. Service NSW has set out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement.

Service NSW has assessed the adequacy of its controls for privacy risks as needing improvement. To be fully effective, the Risk Management Guideline says that these controls should have a focus that is ‘largely preventative and address the root causes’.

One of the business processes that was a key contributing factor to the data breach was the emailing of personal information by Service NSW staff to client agencies.

This process had been identified as a risk prior to the breach and some steps had been put in place to mitigate the risk. In particular, staff were required to manually delete emails that contained personal information. However, these measures were ineffective in preventing the breach, as the external threat actors still gained access to 47 staff email accounts that contained a large amount of personal information.

It is unclear why Service NSW did not effectively mitigate this risk prior to the breaches. However, Service NSW has advised that it implemented measures in June and October 2020 to automatically archive emails likely to contain personal information. This is expected to limit the quantity of information retained in email accounts for extended periods.

Service NSW has not put in place any technical or other solutions to avoid Service NSW staff having to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. Urgent action is needed to remove the requirement for staff to email personal information to client agencies, thereby mitigating the risk inherent in sending and storing this information using email.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system, which holds the personal information of over four million customers

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These weaknesses include deficiencies in governance of role based access, monitoring and audit of staff access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers which is stored in this system.

In addition, there is an absence of important controls to safeguard customers' privacy, such as multi factor authentication and reviewable logs of access history to their information. Such controls, when properly implemented, would enhance the control that customers are able to exercise over their personal information.

A privacy impact assessment conducted on Service NSW’s Salesforce CRM system in 2015 recommended that the system include the ability for customers to review access history to their personal information, as well as the option for customers to apply multi factor authentication to their accounts. While both these recommendations appeared positively received by Service NSW, neither have been implemented.

Since its inception, Service NSW’s use of Salesforce has extended to storing transaction data, particularly for transactions for which Service NSW is responsible, such as the Seniors Card. It also holds details of over four million MyServiceNSW account holders, including name, email address and phone number, and optional address details. It was not originally intended for the system to hold this volume and nature of customer information.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are unclear between Service NSW and its client agencies

Service NSW's privacy management plan does not clearly set out the privacy obligations of Service NSW and its client agencies. It sets out that 'compliance with the privacy principles will primarily be the responsibility of that [client] agency'. However, Service NSW has its own obligations under the security principles of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIP Act) to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access to personal information, which is not made clear in the privacy management plan.

The agreements between Service NSW and client agencies reviewed for this audit only include general and high level references to privacy. Most do not include details of each parties' privacy responsibilities such as: which agency will provide the customer with a privacy notice explaining how their personal information will be handled, how personal information will be kept secure, how long Service NSW will retain information, what processes will be followed for internal reviews, and what specific planning is in place to respond to data breaches.

Service NSW's privacy management plan has not been updated to include new programs and governance changes

Service NSW's privacy management plan includes most of the matters required by law or good practice, with some exceptions. It does not explain any exemptions that the agency commonly relies on under the PPIP Act and does not address any health information that Service NSW may handle. It had also not been updated to reflect governance changes and the fact that, at the time this audit commenced, Service NSW was disclosing the content of internal review applications (the formal expression for 'complaints') to the Department of Customer Service (DCS). These governance changes were part of the centralisation of Service NSW's corporate support functions into DCS in late 2019, though internal review staff were seconded back into Service NSW during the course of this audit.

The current July 2019 privacy management plan has also not been updated since the rollout of a number of major new initiatives in 2020. These include 2019–20 bushfire emergency recovery initiatives (such as small business grants) and COVID 19 pandemic response initiatives (such as small business grants, border permits and the COVID safe check in app).

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for new initiatives, though privacy risks remain in legacy systems and processes

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for major new initiatives and the assessments reviewed for this audit largely accorded with good practice guidance.

Service NSW does not routinely review existing processes and systems to ensure that they are effective in ensuring the privacy of customer personal information. Business processes that create the highest risk to privacy, such as emailing of personal information, are more common in these longstanding legacy systems.

Service NSW's significant and rapid growth has outpaced the establishment of a robust control environment which has exacerbated privacy risks

Since it was established in 2013, Service NSW has experienced significant growth in the number and diversity of the types of transactions it provides, as well as the number of client agencies with which it works. The pace and extent of this growth has contributed to important controls not being properly implemented on a timely basis, which has heightened privacy risks, particularly in regard to existing, legacy systems and processes.

The pace of change and increasing demand for new program implementation has limited the opportunity for Service NSW, in collaboration with its client agencies, to revisit and redesign legacy business practices which pose a greater privacy risk. This includes the scanning and emailing of personal information.

While 2019–20 has seen additional demands placed on Service NSW in responding to the 2019–20 bushfire emergency and COVID 19 pandemic, it is the nature of the agency’s work that it operates in a fast paced and complex environment, where it is required to respond to multiple client agencies and stakeholders. Ensuring customer privacy should be integral to Service NSW’s business as usual operations.

2. Recommendations

Service NSW commissioned a number of external reviews and investigations stemming from the data breaches. The Auditor General's recommendations below have taken these other reviews into account. In order to offer assurance that it is appropriately protecting the privacy of its customers, Service NSW should address the full breadth of findings and recommendations made across all relevant reviews.

As a matter of urgency, Service NSW should:

1. in consultation with relevant client agencies and the Department of Customer Service, implement a solution for a secure method of transferring personal information between Service NSW and client agencies

2. review the need to store scanned copies of personal information and, if still required, implement a more secure method of storing this information and regular deletion of material.

By March 2021, Service NSW should:

3. ensure that all new agreements entered into with client agencies from 1 April 2021 address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

• the content and provision of privacy collection notices
• the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
• steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
• the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
• how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

4. in collaboration with the Department of Customer Service, review its privacy management plan to address the deficiencies raised in this audit, including:

• to clarify Service NSW's understanding of how responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are delineated between Service NSW and client agencies
• to better reflect the full scope and complexity of personal information handled by Service NSW
• to better explain how applications for internal review are handled between Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service
• to ensure regular ongoing review, either according to a schedule or when Service NSW experiences substantial change to its programs and handling of personal information

5. in consultation with the Department of Customer Service, review its policies and processes for the management of privacy risks, including to:

• ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to escalate identified privacy risks from business units to the Executive Leadership Team
• ensure that there are action plans to address strategic privacy risks that are assessed as having ineffective controls.

By June 2021, Service NSW should:

6. address deficiencies in the controls over, and security for, its Salesforce customer relationship management and related systems that hold customer personal information, including:

• establish policies and processes for regular access reviews and monitoring of user activity in these systems, including for privileged users
• enable partitioning and role based access restrictions to personal information collected for different programs
• provide customers the choice to use multi factor authentication to further secure their MyServiceNSW accounts
• enable customers to view the transaction history of their personal information to detect possible mishandling.

By December 2021, Service NSW should:

7. ensure that all existing agreements with client agencies address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

• the content and provision of privacy collection notices
• the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
• steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
• the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
• how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

8. carry out a risk assessment of all processes, systems and transactions that involve the handling of personal information and undertake a privacy impact assessment for those that:

• are identified as high risk and have not previously had a privacy impact assessment
• have had major changes or updates since the privacy impact assessment was completed.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

This report analyses the results of our audits of the financial statements of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, Customer Service cluster agencies (central agencies), and the Legislature for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

2. Audit observations

This report provides Parliament and other users of NSW Government central agencies' financial statements and the Legislature's financial statements with the results of our financial audits, observations, analyses, conclusions and recommendations.

Emergency events, such as bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted agencies in 2019–20. Our findings on nine agencies that were most impacted by recent emergency events are included throughout this report.

Refer to Appendix one for the names of all central agencies and Appendix four for the nine agencies most impacted by emergency events.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of central agencies and the Legislature for 2020, including the financial implications from recent emergency events.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines:

• our observations and insights from the financial statement audits of agencies in the central agencies and the Legislature
• our assessment of how well agencies adapted their systems, policies, procedures and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.

Appendix one – Timeliness of financial reporting by agency

Appendix two – List of 2020 recommendations

Appendix three – Status of 2019 recommendations

Appendix four – Agencies most impacted by recent emergency events

Appendix five – Management letter findings by agency

Appendix six – Financial data

This report provides parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations
• the impact of emergencies and the pandemic.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our:

• observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster
• assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations

Appendix two – Status of 2019, 2018 and 2017 recommendations

Appendix three – Management letter findings

Appendix four – Financial data

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on State Finances for the year ended 30 June 2020.

‘I am pleased to once again report that I issued an unmodified audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements,’ the Auditor-General said.

The report acknowledges this has been a challenging year, with New South Wales impacted by natural disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The State’s Budget Result, reported in the financial statements, was a deficit of $6.9 billion. This is different to the 2019-20 budget forecast surplus of $1.0 billion and is an outcome of the government’s significant response to bushfires and COVID-19.

The report summarises a number of audit and accounting matters arising from the audit of the Total State Sector Accounts, a sector that comprises 291 entities controlled by the NSW Government with total assets of $495 billion and total liabilities of $256 billion.

Read full report (PDF)

Our audit opinion on the State’s 2019–20 financial statements was unmodified

An unmodified audit opinion was issued on the State’s 2019–20 consolidated financial statements.

The State extended signing its financial statements by six weeks.

Natural disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors impacted the State’s 2019–20 reporting timetable. The State extended signing its financial statements by six weeks, compared with 2018–19.

All agencies were also given a two-week extension to prepare their financial statements compared with 2018–19. Further extensions beyond two weeks were subsequently approved for the following 11 agencies (7 in 2018–19) to submit completed financial statements for audit:

• Department of Communities and Justice
• Department of Customer Service
• Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
• Department of Regional NSW
• Department of Transport
• Environment Protection Authority
• Infrastructure NSW
• Lord Howe Island Board
• NSW Crown Holiday Parks Land Manager
• Service NSW
• Water Administration Ministerial Corporation.

The extensions reflected that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted agencies’ work environments during the first six months of 2020. This was at a time when many were still implementing machinery of government changes and preparing to implement three significant new accounting standards:

• AASB 15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers (issued December 2014, effective 1 July 2019)
• AASB 16 Leases (issued February 2016, effective 1 July 2019)
• AASB 1058 Income of Not-for-profit entities (issued December 2016, effective 1 July 2019).

These new accounting standards were issued some years before they became effective, to allow reporting entities sufficient time to prepare for implementation. Notwithstanding this, some agencies had not fully implemented the new accounting standards in time for early close procedures, and the unforeseen impact of COVID-19 further complicated the year-end financial reporting processes for the State and its agencies.

The graph below shows the number of reported errors exceeding $20 million over the past five years in agencies’ financial statements presented for audit.

In 2019–20, agency financial statements presented for audit contained 19 errors exceeding $20 million (six in 2018–19). The total value of these errors increased to $1.4 billion ($927 million in 2018–19).

The errors resulted from:

• incorrectly applying Australian Accounting Standards and Treasury Policies
• incorrect judgements and assumptions when valuing noncurrent physical assets and liabilities
• incorrectly interpreting the accounting treatment for unspent stimulus funding.

Errors in agency financial statements exceeding $20m (2016–2020)

$4.1 billion in stimulus funding was allocated in 2019–20

The government implemented an economic stimulus package primarily to mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on New South Wales.

The COVID-19 pandemic and bushfires had a significant impact on the State’s finances, reducing its revenue and increasing its expenses especially in sectors directly responsible for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Health.

The government announced a $4.1 billion health and economic stimulus package in 2019–20. This primarily included:

• $2.2 billion in health measures including purchases of essential medical equipment and increasing clinical health capacity (like intensive care spaces)
• $1.0 billion in small business and land tax relief
• $355 million in extra cleaning services and quarantine costs.

Cluster agencies had spent $3.0 billion (just under 75 per cent) of the COVID-19 stimulus package by 30 June 2020.

The Health cluster incurred most of this expenditure.

Total spend relating to bushfires was $1.3 billion in 2019–20.

The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster to 30 June 2020.

Economic stimulus allocation and spend by cluster to 30 June 2020

Deficit of $6.9 billion compared with a budgeted surplus of $1.0 billion

An outcome of the government’s overall activity and policies is its net operating balance (Budget Result). This is the difference between the cost of general government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 199 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.

The Non-General Government Sector, which comprises 92 government businesses, generally provides goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services that consumers pay for directly.

The Budget Result for the 2019–20 financial year was a deficit of $6.9 billion. The original budget forecast, set before the COVID-19 pandemic and bushfires, was a $1.0 billion surplus. The main driver of the change in result was:

• $1.3 billion of higher employee costs, mainly due to:
  • increased workers compensation claims
  • additional personnel required (mainly in the Health sector) to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic
• $2.3 billion of higher operating expenses, mainly due to:
  • $828 million from first time recognition of a child abuse claim liability
  • $507 million from additional insurance claims from the NSW bushfires
  • $343 million from COVID-19 claims by agencies for loss of revenue.
• $1.8 billion in higher grants and subsidy expenses, mainly due to:
  • small business grants
  • COVID-19 quarantine compliance measures
  • costs incurred in response to the 2019–20 bushfires, drought and disaster relief payments
  • third party-controlled assets that were subsequently transferred to councils and utility providers, mainly arising from construction of the CBD and South East Light Rail.

The deficit was further driven by:

• $1.9 billion less taxation revenue, mainly resulting from:
  • $1.3 billion less in payroll tax due to relief measures introduced by the government as part of its COVID-19 economic stimulus
  • $424 million less in gambling and betting taxes, due to venue closures required by COVID-19 public health orders
• $523 million less in dividends and income tax revenue from the Non-General Government Sector, due to lower dividends received from NSW Treasury Corporation and from the State’s other commercial government businesses
• lower fines, regulatory fees and other revenue, due to a $305 million decrease in mining royalties, largely driven by lower coal prices.

Main drivers of the 2019–20 actual vs. budget variance

Revenues increased $209 million to $86.3 billion

In 2019–20, the State’s total revenues increased by $209 million to $86.3 billion, 0.2 per cent higher than in 2018–19. COVID-19 impacted taxation revenue, which fell by $1.1 billion and revenue from the sale of goods and services, which fell by $1.1 billion. These falls were offset by a $2.5 billion (7.7 per cent) increase in grants and subsidies from the Australian Government, mainly in the form of additional stimulus funding.

Taxation revenue fell 3.5 per cent

Taxation revenue fell by $1.1 billion, mainly due to a:

• $861 million fall in payroll tax as a result of COVID-19 relief (reduced payroll tax payments for eligible small businesses)
• $430 million fall in stamp duty collections, driven by lower than expected growth in the property market
• $427 million decline in gambling and betting taxes, mainly due to venue closures driven by COVID-19 public health orders.

Stamp duties of $8.8 billion were the largest source of taxation revenue, $473 million higher than payroll tax, the second-largest source of taxation revenue.

Australian Government grants and subsidies

The State received $34.2 billion in grants and subsides which are mainly from the Australian Government, $2.4 billion more than in 2018–19.

The increase was driven by a $1.1 billion increase in Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments to support the Health cluster respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Commonwealth National Partnership Payments increased by a similar amount to provide the State with Natural Disaster relief.

Sales of goods and services

In 2019–20, sales of goods and services fell $1.1 billion. This was due to the COVID-19 pandemic reducing:

• patronage and related transport passenger revenue
• health billing activities with elective surgery being put on hold

Fines, regulatory fees and other revenues

Fines, regulatory fees and other revenues fell $505 million. This was mainly due to a $409 million decrease in mining royalties attributed to a drop in thermal coal prices during 2019–20.

Other dividends and distributions

Other dividends and distributions rose by $616 million due to higher distributions received from the State’s investments. This was due to an additional $1.3 billion held in the State’s investment portfolio compared with last year.

Expenses increased $8.2 billion to $96.0 billion

The State’s expenses increased 9.3 per cent compared with 2018–19. Most of the increase was due to higher employee expenses, other operating costs and grants and subsidies.

Employee expenses, including superannuation, increased 5.7 per cent to $42.6 billion.

Salaries and wages increased to $42.6 billion from $40.3 billion in 2018–19. This was mainly due to increases in staff numbers and a 2.5 per cent increase in pay rates across the sector. Salaries and wages for the Education and Health sectors increased by $659 million and $732 million in each sector respectively.

The Health sector employed an additional 2,763 full time staff in 2019–20. It also incurred more overtime in response to COVID-19. Education increased staff numbers by 4,866 full time equivalents and paid a one off 11 per cent pay rise to school administration staff in 2019–20. Historically, the government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Operating expenses increased 8.7 per cent to $27.0 billion.

Operating expenses increased to $27.0 billion in 2019–20 ($24.8 billion in 2018–19) due to higher operating activities in Health. The higher level of activities and related costs is attributed to a full year of operations at the Northern Beaches Hospital (opened November 2018), and responding to COVID-19. The response to COVID-19 involved the State providing viability payments to private hospitals, higher visiting medical officer costs due to additional overtime hours and spending more on equipment to set up COVID-19 testing clinics.

Insurance claims increased by $2.0 billion. This was mainly due to NSW Self Insurance Corporation (SiCorp) recognising a liability for child abuse claims incurred but not reported for the first time, and claims for the 2019–20 bushfires, floods and COVID-19.

Health costs remain the State’s highest expense.

Total expenses of the State were $96 billion ($87.8 billion in 2018–19). Traditionally, the following clusters have the highest expenses as a percentage of total government expenses:

• Health – 24.3 per cent (25.8 per cent in 2018–19)
• Education – 17.6 per cent (19.3 per cent in 2018–19)
• Transport - 12.8 per cent (12.6 per cent in 2018–19).

General public service expenses as a percentage of total State expenses is higher due to a $2.0 billion increase in SiCorp’s accrued claim expenses.

Other expenses increased due to additional grant funding by the State for drought relief and COVID-19 stimulus spend.

Health expenses increased by $632 million compared with 2018–19 but fell as a proportion of total State expenses.

Education expenses remained stable compared with last year due to savings in student transportation costs primarily driven by COVID-19. This led to a decrease in the proportion of the State’s costs relating to education activities.

Grants and subsidies increased $2.5 billion to $14.1 billion.

The increase in grants and subsidies was due to payments the State made to support businesses and local communities in the face of COVID-19 and bushfires. In addition, the State transferred CBD and South East Light Rail assets to councils and utility providers during 2019–20 as it no longer controlled these.

Depreciation expense increased $1.0 billion to $9.2 billion.

Depreciation increased to $9.2 billion from $8.0 billion in 2018–19. At 1 July 2019, the State implemented the new leases standard recognising a right of use (ROU) asset and related lease liability in its financial statements. The value of ROU assets are amortised over the term of the lease. This contributed to $980 million of the increase in 2019–20 depreciation expense. Last year, these costs were previously reported within other operating expenses.

Assets grew by $28.0 billion to $495 billion

The State’s assets primarily include physical assets such as land, buildings and infrastructure, and financial assets such as cash, and other financial instruments and equity investments. The value of total assets increased by $28.0 billion to $495 billion. This was a six per cent increase compared with 2018–19, mostly due to changes in asset carrying values.

Of the State’s $28.0 billion increase in asset values, $9.3 billion was due to a new accounting standard requirement for operating leases to be valued and recorded on balance sheet for the first time.

AASB 16 Leases requires entities recognise values for right-ofuse assets (ROU) for the first time. An ROU asset is a lessee’s right to use an asset, the value of which is amortised over the term of the lease. This standard came into effect from 1 July 2019.

Valuing the State’s physical assets

The value of the State’s physical assets increased by $14.1 billion to $365 billion in 2019–20. The assets include land and buildings ($168 billion), infrastructure ($180 billion) and plant and equipment ($16.7 billion). A prior period error relating to the valuation of RMS infrastructure assets reduced the reported values by $1.0 billion from $352 billion to $351 billion at 30 June 2019.

The movement in physical asset values between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuation adjustments. Other movements include reclassification of physical assets leased under finance leases to right of use assets upon adoption of AASB 16 Leases on 1 July 2019.

Movements in physical asset values

Liabilities increased $38.4 billion to $256 billion

The State borrowed additional funds in response to natural disasters and COVID-19.

The State’s borrowings rose by $33.9 billion to $113.8 billion at 30 June 2020. This accounted for most of the increase in the State’s total liabilities.

The value of TCorp bonds on issue increased by $25.2 billion to $97.0 billion to largely fund capital expenditure and costs associated with the bushfires, drought and COVID-19.

TCorp bonds are actively traded in financial markets and are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

Over 2019–20, TCorp continued to take advantage of lower interest rates, buying back short-term bonds and replacing them with longer dated debt. This lengthens the portfolio matching liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.

With effect from 1 July 2019, AASB 16 Leases required the State to recognise liabilities for operating leases for the first time. This increased total lease liabilities from $5.3 billion at 30 June 2019 to $11.8 billion at 30 June 2020.

More than a third of the State’s liabilities relate to its employees. They include unfunded superannuation and employee benefits, such as long service and recreation leave.

Valuing these obligations involves complex estimation techniques and significant judgements. Small changes in assumptions and other variables, such as a lower discount rate, can materially impact the valuation of liability balances in the financial statements.

The State’s unfunded superannuation liability rose $300 million from $70.7 billion to $71.0 billion at 30 June 2020. This was mainly due to a lower discount rate of 0.87 per cent (1.32 per cent in 2018–19). The State’s unfunded superannuation liability represents the value of its obligations to past and present employees less the value of assets set aside to fund those obligations.

The State maintained its AAA credit rating

The object of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 is to maintain the State’s AAA credit rating.

The government manages New South Wales’ finances in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (the Act).

The Act establishes the framework for fiscal responsibility and the strategy to maintain the State’s AAA credit rating and service delivery to the people of New South Wales.

The legislation sets out targets and principles for financial management to achieve this.

This year, the State’s credit rating from Standard & Poor’s changed from AAA/Stable to AAA/Negative. Moody’s Investors Service credit rating of Aaa/Stable did not change from the previous year.

The fiscal target for achieving this objective is that General Government annual expenditure growth should be lower than long term average revenue growth.

The State did not achieve its fiscal target of maintaining annual expenditure growth below the long-term revenue growth rate target of 5.6 per cent.

In 2019–20, General Government expenditure grew by 9.7 per cent (5.5 per cent in 2018–19).

Expenditure items that contributed most to the growth rate include:

• recurrent grants and subsidies (20.4 per cent)
• other operating expenses (9.5 per cent)
• employee costs (including superannuation) (5.6 per cent)

Recurrent grant and subsidy expenses increased by $2.8 billion in 2019–20 mainly due to the COVID-19 and natural disaster payments. Other operating expenses increased mainly due to a $2.0 billion increase in SiCorp insurance claims. This included the $828 million provision for child abuse claims incurred but not reported. The bushfires and COVID-19 pandemic also increased the number and cost of claims in 2019–20.

Superannuation funding position since inception of the Act - AASB 1056 Valuation

Appendix one - Prescribed entities

Appendix two - Legal opinions

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

Read full report (PDF)

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Read full report (PDF)

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

• patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
• service disruptions
• special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

The State Insurance Regulatory Authority’s (SIRA) ‘green slip refund’ campaign, and the TAFE semester one 2018 student recruitment campaign, complied with most requirements of the Government Advertising Act 2011 and the Government Advertising Guidelines, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether a government agency or agencies has carried out activities in relation to government advertising in an effective, economical and efficient manner and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines).

This audit examined two campaigns conducted in 2017–18:

• the 'Green slip refund' campaign run by the State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA)
• the semester one component of the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' run by the NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE).

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.

The State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) conducted the 'Green slip refund' campaign between March and June 2018. SIRA ran this campaign to raise awareness of the Compulsory Third Party (CTP) refunds and reforms after the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 commenced in December 2017. SIRA's view is that the reforms include a reduced cost for CTP insurance, benefits for at-fault drivers, reduced opportunity for fraud and attempts to lower insurance company profits. Green slip holders are also able to claim partial refunds on their 2017 green slip insurance premium. The campaign aimed to make green slip holders aware of the refunds available, encourage them to claim online and to inform people about the changes to the green slip scheme. The campaign focused on the first two of these objectives. The total cost of the campaign was $1.9 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.

Campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

• be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
• contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
• contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.
 
Before the start of the campaign, SIRA conducted a survey which asked people whether they agreed ‘that the NSW Government is helping to reduce the cost of living by making positive reforms to:

• reduce the cost of green slips
• reduce the cost of health insurance
• increase the number of jobs
• increase investment in the state.'

SIRA's initial submission to peer review listed one of the campaign objectives as improving the perception of the government as a positive reformer. DPC advised SIRA that this should not be included. SIRA removed this objective.

Even though SIRA appropriately removed this objective, the post-campaign evaluation still measured agreement with the above statements, three of which did not relate to this campaign or SIRA's responsibilities. SIRA advised that these three additional statements were included to provide a broader context for any change in the green slip campaign survey results. For example, if all four measures reported an increase in positive responses of roughly the same size, then the increase may have been due to factors other than the advertising campaign.

This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation, which should measure the success of the campaign against its stated objectives. The Guidelines list the purposes that government advertising may serve and none of these relate to improving the perception of the government. The inclusion of the above questions in SIRA's post-campaign evaluation creates a risk that the results may be used for party political purposes.

The campaign met most targets, however some were not challenging to achieve

The post-campaign evaluation demonstrated that the campaign met the targets for 12 of its 13 objectives including the targets relating to raising awareness of the refunds and the proportion of people claiming their refunds online. A fourteenth objective, the percentage of people aware that they should contact SIRA after a road accident injury, did not have a target set, meaning that it is not possible to say whether the campaign had the desired impact in this case.

In August 2017, before the campaign commenced, SIRA conducted a survey to determine the baselines for some of its objectives. This is a good practice to support an effective post campaign evaluation process. The survey found that 20 per cent of people were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA's objective was to raise this to 25 per cent, which represents a small gain relative to the proposed campaign expenditure. The campaign aimed for 40 per cent of motorists to be aware of refunds, which is very low given that this was the primary focus of the campaign. SIRA followed the advice of its survey provider when setting these targets. 

In the survey carried out after the campaign, 66 per cent of people were aware of the availability of green slip refunds for most motorists. The campaign also aimed to get 83 per cent of motorists to claim their refunds via online channels. It met this target, with a total of 84 per cent. Finally, 62 per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. This result is discussed further below.

The overall target for total number of refunds claimed is 85 per cent of eligible drivers, that is to say CTP holders. SIRA will evaluate the results of this objective after the conclusion of the refund period in June 2019.

The campaign did little to inform the public about the broader green slip reforms

One objective of the green slip refund campaign was to inform the public about the green slip reforms. The final campaign creative material focused almost entirely on the green slip refunds rather than the range of other reforms. This was because the peer review raised concerns that the creative material was attempting to deliver too many messages. 
 
The campaign submission stated that the advertising campaign would raise awareness of the broader reforms to the CTP scheme, citing several examples such as reduced opportunities for fraud and reduced insurer profits. SIRA also advised the Minister for Finance, Services and Property that secondary messaging in the campaign would benefit public understanding of the reforms.

Some of the television and radio advertisements referred to ‘more protection’ or ‘better protection’ for people injured on New South Wales roads, however advertisements did not refer to other elements of the reforms. Other campaign creative materials contained messages solely relating to the green slip refund and made no further reference to the broader reforms. SIRA used other communication channels, such as giving wallet cards to health service providers, to spread these messages to people, particularly those who had been injured.

Sixty two per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA asked these people which benefits they associated with the reforms. The results of this survey are in Exhibit 4. Seventy-one per cent of this sample identified the reduced costs of green slips as one of the changes, but awareness of other elements of the reforms remains low. Though 29 per cent of people perceive the reforms to make the green slip scheme ‘fairer’, no more than 15 per cent of people could list a specific benefit which did not relate to insurance prices.

Another campaign target was to ensure that people understood that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury. None of the campaign creative materials contained this information. SIRA did some limited work to inform the public about this through its social media channels. One of the pieces of creative material directed the reader to SIRA's website for further information on the reforms, which contained this information. During the campaign period, there was an increase in the number of calls received by SIRA's CTP Assist phone line. However, in the post-campaign evaluation, only two per cent of surveyed people identified that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury.

The media plan allowed sufficient time for cost-efficient media placement

During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.

SIRA allowed sufficient time between the completion of the peer review process and the commencement of the first advertising. SIRA signed the agreement with the approved Media Agency Services provider eight weeks before the campaign started, meaning that it could achieve cost-efficient media placement for all types of media used in this campaign.

SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier, making it difficult to demonstrate value for money

SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier to procure the campaign's creative material. A direct negotiation occurs when an agency negotiates with a proponent without first undergoing a competitive process. It is difficult to demonstrate value for money using direct negotiation due to the lack of competition. 

ICAC's 'Guidelines for managing risks in direct negotiations' (ICAC Guidelines) provide guidance on how to undertake direct negotiations. SIRA has a direct negotiation checklist that aligns to the ICAC Guidelines. The SIRA checklist advises that staff should confirm that existing New South Wales prequalification schemes cannot provide the procurement before undertaking a direct negotiation. SIRA did not do this.

To procure creative materials, agencies can access the Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme (the prequalification scheme). Using the prequalification scheme allows agencies to quickly seek quotes from suppliers who have a demonstrated track record and expertise. While agencies are not required to use the prequalification scheme, the NSW Procurement Board advises that agencies should use prequalification schemes where they are available to promote competition. 

By using direct negotiation when the prequalification scheme was available, and by not seeking quotes from other suppliers, SIRA was acting in a way that reduced competition. This increases the risk that SIRA did not achieve value for money in its procurement of creative materials.

SIRA advised that it sought to ensure value for money by comparing the quote from its selected supplier with the amount spent on creative materials in other campaigns of similar size. SIRA did not document this analysis at the time or include it as part of the briefing note staff used to seek approval for undertaking direct negotiation. As a result, decision-makers were not fully informed when approving this engagement. 

SIRA reported in a briefing note that it engaged in direct negotiations because:

• it believed that the original timeframe did not allow for a competitive tender process
• the supplier had done previous work on a related campaign for SIRA
• the supplier provided sample work which received positive feedback from focus groups.

In July 2017, when peer review commenced, SIRA planned to launch the campaign in November 2017 to coincide with the beginning of the green slip reforms. SIRA believed that this timeframe was narrow enough to warrant entering direct negotiations. The ICAC Guidelines advise that a narrow timeframe is not a valid reason to enter into a direct negotiation. In late October 2017, the campaign launch was delayed until March 2018 to stagger the demand on the resources of Service NSW, which is administering the refund. 

The ICAC Guidelines also advise against re-appointing a supplier because it has performed previous work. Instead, agencies could consider previous experience as one of several factors when deciding between quotes. In cases where an agency asks a supplier to provide sample work, the ICAC Guidelines advise that agencies should request sample work from multiple potential suppliers to promote competition.

The campaign's cost benefit analysis complied with the Act and Guidelines 

The Act requires a cost benefit analysis (CBA) for any government advertising campaign likely to exceed $1.0 million in value. Section six of the Guidelines set out the requirements for a government advertising CBA. The campaign's CBA complied with the requirements of the Act and the Guidelines.

The campaign CBA could have demonstrated further cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.

The cluster Secretary signed the compliance certificate instead of the head of SIRA

The Act requires the head of the agency running the campaign to sign a compliance certificate. 

The Secretary of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, the cluster to which SIRA belongs, signed the campaign's compliance certificate. However, section 17(2) of the State Insurance and Care Governance Act 2015 states that SIRA is ‘for the purposes of any Act, a NSW Government agency.’ Given this, the Chief Executive of SIRA was responsible for signing the compliance certificate for this campaign.

This is a minor non-compliance with the Act because the Chief Executive had reviewed the campaign and recommended that the Secretary sign the compliance certificate.  

The NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE) ran the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' from November 2017 to September 2018. The aim of the campaign was to assist TAFE in achieving its 2018 student enrolment target by improving the perception of TAFE's brand and generating student enquiries. This is the first state-wide campaign run by TAFE operating under the One TAFE model. Previously, each TAFE Institute ran its own campaigns. The total budget of the campaign was $19.5 million. This audit examined only the semester one 2018 component of the campaign, which ran from November 2017 to April 2018 at a total cost of $9.5 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.

The campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

• be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
• contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
• contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.

The campaign achieved 16 of 24 objectives, but did not reach its enrolment target

The campaign had 24 objectives which had a target for semester one. TAFE set these targets using a combination of previous experience, corporate objectives and brand surveys.

The overall objective of the combined semester one and two campaigns was to support TAFE achieving its 2018 total enrolment target of 549,636. TAFE's semester one target was 361,350, which it did not achieve. This indicates that the campaign was not fully effective.

The campaign achieved 11 of its 16 output objectives. The output targets related to TAFE's media placements and ability to reach an audience efficiently. TAFE tracked progress against many of the campaign's output objectives daily. TAFE altered its media channels throughout the campaign meaning that some of the output objectives were not met because TAFE decided to focus on alternative media channels. The campaign also achieved all seven of its outcome objectives. The outcome objectives related to changing the public perception of TAFE.

TAFE's initial media plan allowed for efficient media placement

During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance. 

While TAFE's initial media plan allowed sufficient time between the approval of the campaign and its launch, a delay in receiving final approval for the campaign meant TAFE could not purchase media placements until two months later than planned. Most purchases still remained within DPC's recommended timeframes, but Indigenous television advertisements and metropolitan out of home advertisements both fell outside DPC's recommended time periods by one week. These delays did not impact on TAFE's efficiency.

TAFE re-used many creative materials, achieving some cost-savings

Rather than commissioning new creative materials, TAFE re-used many creative materials from the previous campaign and supplemented these with a selection of new creative materials. TAFE advised that this led to a cost saving of approximately $130,000.
TAFE sought quotes from suppliers on the government's Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme for two creative material contracts. These contracts covered updates to existing materials and a selection of new materials.

The campaign's cost-benefit analysis did not comply with three requirements of the Guidelines

The Act requires an agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) if the cost of an advertising campaign is likely to exceed $1.0 million. The Guidelines set out the requirements of this CBA. TAFE did not comply with three of these requirements, outlined in Exhibit 5.

In this circumstance, section 6.2 of the Guidelines required the CBA to identify the number of enrolments TAFE would expect if it did not advertise. TAFE advised us that it is not possible to say what this scenario would look like because there had always been some degree of advertising, however, this argument is not reflected in the CBA. 

TAFE used 2017 as the baseline in the CBA. In 2017, TAFE spent $13.2 million on advertising. As such, the CBA was only able to isolate the impact of the increased expenditure rather than the impact of the campaign's entire $19.5 million expenditure. TAFE advised that 2017 had the most reliable state-wide data and this contributed to the decision to use it as the baseline.

During the audit, TAFE sought advice from NSW Treasury regarding whether a 2017 baseline was appropriate and NSW Treasury advised that it was. Regardless, TAFE did not receive this advice prior to writing the CBA and did not put commentary around this in the CBA. This would also not be sufficient for fulfilling the requirements of the Guidelines.

The CBA did not comply with sections 6.3 and 6.4 of the Guidelines. The CBA briefly considered the impact of spending the campaign budget directly on new training courses, however there was no sustained analysis of this option. TAFE staff advised that there are no realistic alternatives to advertising for achieving the campaign's objectives. However we did not see analysis to support this conclusion in documents provided to us. 

The campaign CBA could have better demonstrated cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.

TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second

The Guidelines set out rules regarding the content of a government advertising campaign. Exhibit 6 sets out one of the principles with which agencies must comply.

TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second.

In some campaign creative material, TAFE claimed that 78 per cent of its own graduates are employed after training (Exhibit 15 in Appendix 2). According to the National Centre for Vocational Education Research, 78 per cent of New South Wales Vocational Education and Training (VET) graduates (i.e. from all training providers) are employed after training. The result for TAFE graduates is 70.4 per cent.

One of the campaign's television advertisements refers to TAFE as ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’. This statement referred to a survey of current TAFE students who were asked where they would consider studying in future: TAFE, University or a private college. The current TAFE students selected TAFE by a large margin. The limited scope of TAFE's student survey and its results do not support the claim that it is ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’.

DPC did not consistently communicate the transitional arrangements for the Brand Guidelines and as such much of TAFE's creative material did not comply at campaign launch

On 7 August 2017, the government released the NSW Government Brand Guidelines (Brand Guidelines), setting out how agencies use the NSW Government logo. The Brand Guidelines replaced the Branding Style Guide which had been in place since September 2015. Some agencies were exempt from using the Branding Style Guide and the introduction of the new Brand Guidelines required these agencies to apply for a new exemption.

TAFE had recently commenced the peer review process for this campaign when the Brand Guidelines were released. TAFE was exempt from the requirements of the Branding Style Guide and as such the material which TAFE was planning to re-use in the new campaign did not contain the NSW Government logo.

Communication about how long agencies had to make themselves compliant with the Brand Guidelines was unclear. On 11 August 2017, the Chair of the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communication and Government Advertising (the Committee) sent a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Industry informing him that the Department must update all its material to be compliant with the Brand Guidelines ‘as soon as practicable within an 18-month transition period’. The Department of Industry advised TAFE that new advertising would need to be immediately compliant, however it was not clear if this included materials which agencies were re-using from previous campaigns. DPC advised the audit team that it expected re-used materials to be compliant when agencies launched new campaigns. DPC provided this advice to some agencies but did not communicate it more broadly. We could not source evidence that DPC provided this advice to TAFE.

DPC ran workshops to explain the transitional arrangements in September 2017 for the changes in the Brand Guidelines, however these did not specifically address the transitional timeframes for new advertising campaigns.

The Department of Industry, on behalf of TAFE, applied to the Committee for approval to co-brand the TAFE logo with the NSW Government logo. This was approved in October 2017. The requirements for co-branding are in Exhibit 7.

Appendix one - Responses from agencies 

Appendix two - About the campaigns

Appendix three - About the audit

Appendix four - Performance auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #311 - released 18 December 2018

In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.

A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.

Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.

In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.

On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal. 

This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide). 

The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money. 

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - NSW Government’s summary of assessment of the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal   

Appendix three - The definition and nature of unsolicited proposals

Appendix four - Ausgrid unsolicited proposal process

Appendix five - About the audit

Appendix six - Performance auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #309 - released 11 December 2018

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters. While clear audit opinions were issued on all agency financial statements, the report notes that some complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in agency financial statements submitted for audit, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved. 

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations
• liquidity risk management
• government financial services.

The central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.

A full list of agencies that this report covers by relevant cluster is included in Appendix three.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters for 2018.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

• our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster for 2018
• the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.

Appendix one - List of 2018 recommendations

Appendix two - Status of 2017 recommendations

Appendix three - Cluster agencies

Appendix four - Timeliness of financial reporting and audit reporting

Appendix five - Management letter findings by risk rating

Appendix six – Financial data

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on key observations and findings from the 30 June 2018 financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of the broad range of transport related assets creates challenges.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

• our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018
• the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters. 

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Transport cluster and to collate and present service information for different modes of transport in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Appendix one - Status of 2016 and 2017 recommendations

Appendix two - Cluster agencies 

Appendix three - Financial data 

Appendix four - Bus contracts regions