A NSW Auditor General’s Report has found that the NSW Government and its agencies grossly underestimated the cost and number of people that would install systems under the Solar Bonus Scheme.

By October 2010, the estimated cost of the Scheme, if it continued the way it was going, would have reached $3.988 billion. More than ten times the original estimate of $362 million. In response to the increased cost, the gross tariff for new applicants was reduced from 60 to 20 cents reducing the estimated cost to $1.954 billion.

It was a statutory requirement that when 50 mega watts of installed capacity was reached, the Government would review the Scheme. By the time the review was completed the installed capacity had reached 101 mega watts.

The audit concluded that the RTA’s licence testing and regulation has been generally effective in ensuring the safety of young drivers. There has been a significant reduction in crash and fatality rates involving young drivers over the last decade, more so than for drivers 26 years and older. This has coincided with the introduction by the RTA of an enhanced GLS. International and national research has demonstrated graduated licensing systems to be effective in reducing crashes and saving lives. Despite these improvements, young drivers are more likely to be involved in fatal crashes than other drivers.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #217 - released 19 October 2011

Barangaroo is an ambitious and significant development on Government-owned Sydney Harbour foreshore. Construction on the 22 hectare CBD site is expected to take 12 years to 2023. Developer contributions to Government of $1 billion are to provide for public domain and other Government development costs, including a six hectare Headland Park. When completed the precinct is to service an anticipated 26,000 workers and residents and up to 33,000 visitors a day. The Auditor-General concluded that while there was extensive transport planning and extensive documentation supporting Government financial forecasts, considerable risks remain for the implementation of the Barangaroo project. 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #214 - released 15 June 2011

To date the Two Ways Together Plan (the Plan) has not delivered the improvement in overall outcomes for Aboriginal people that was intended. Stronger partnerships between the government and Aboriginal people are only beginning to emerge. The disadvantage still experienced by some of the estimated 160,000 Aboriginal people in NSW is substantial. For example, the unemployment rate for Aboriginal people is at least three times higher than the rate for all NSW residents and hospital admissions for diabetes are also around three times higher.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #213 - released 18 May 2011

Decisions to relocate government agencies to non-metropolitan areas are not made purely for cost reasons. They can also serve government policy objectives, such as promoting regional economic development.

Regardless of the policy objectives that may exist, I would expect that decisions on individual agency relocations would be based on sound business cases. Those business cases would show how the relocation achieves any relevant government objectives, what costs (or savings) would be involved, logistical considerations such as obtaining appropriate accommodation and staff, and any impacts on levels service to the public.

In my view, the existence of government policy objectives does not remove the need for individual decisions to be made in a transparent, rational and accountable manner. Responsible public servants should provide the appropriate information to government to allow it to judge how best to implement its policies.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #147 - released 14 December 2005

Several of my recent audits have identified a need to improve our public transport system – both for the benefit of travellers and to assist in achieving better air quality.

Bus Transitways can provide a good public transport solution for lower density population areas, potentially at a relatively low capital cost. This audit examines the transitway running between Liverpool and Parramatta, the first of several planned for Sydney. This audit should contribute to a better understanding of the lessons learnt from this first project, and so to future transitways providing better value for money.

But this audit also raises broader issues.

It highlights the importance of accurately projecting the total cost of major infrastructure projects before governments lock in their decisions. It also highlights the need for sound decision-making processes when government agencies compete with the private sector. The principles and recommendations flowing from these issues are ones I would draw to the attention of all agencies, and to the Government.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #146 - released 5 December 2005

About one in every twelve Sydney people travels by train each weekday.

Unplanned disruptions to services are inevitable, even on the best-run railways.

Because of the complexities of Sydney’s rail network, a single event can disrupt many services.

From a passenger’s perspective, three issues are important –

• how quickly the disruption is fixed (“When will my train arrive?”)
• the accuracy of information provided about the disruption (“Should I change my travel/meeting/other arrangements?”)
• how often the disruptions occur (“Should I give up on rail travel?”).

In this audit, we looked at how well RailCorp responds when there are routine disruptions to its CityRail passenger services. We focused on how RailCorp manages passenger journeys and informs passengers.

This report informs Parliament and the community about the limitations of the current system, and what more needs to be done in order to minimise the impact of disruptions on passengers.

It should also help passengers judge the extent to which they can rely on the information they receive, and to better understand some of the obstacles faced by staff.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #139 - released 22 June 2005

Periodically we review the extent to which agencies have implemented the recommendations they accepted from our earlier audits.

This gives Parliament and the public an update on the extent of progress made.

In this follow-up audit, we examine changes following our May 2002 report on how well the:

• State Transit Authority maintained its buses
• Ministry of Transport administered contracts for the provision of regular passenger bus services.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #138 - released 14 June 2005

Reliably supplying water to our State’s principal city, Sydney, is a major responsibility for the Government.

The community has been made keenly aware in recent years that inflows have been decreasing, and that Sydney has been using more water than is available. In April 2005 the water in Sydney’s storages dropped to 41.5 per cent of their capacity – the lowest level since the construction of Warragamba dam in 1960.

As Sydney continues to develop, it is expected that the demand for water will increase. The way that we use it will need to be sustainable, as it has a direct impact on our economy, our lifestyle and our environment.

In planning for the future the State’s water agencies face a range of uncertainties. But the task is vital.

This report informs Parliament and the community on the progress made - and what remains to be done - to ensure a reliable water supply for Sydney.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #135 - released 4 May 2005

Periodically we review the extent to which agencies have implemented the recommendations they accepted from our earlier audits. This gives Parliament and the public an update on the extent of progress made.

Major development and infrastructure projects may have significant environmental, social and quality-of-life impacts. The purpose of environmental impact assessment is to ensure that major projects are environmentally and socially sustainable and integrated with State, regional and local planning.

The Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources (DIPNR) manages the assessment of major infrastructure proposals and coordinates whole of Government involvement. In November 2001 we audited this process, then undertaken by the Department of Urban and Regional Planning. (In July 2003 the new Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources assumed responsibility.)

In this follow-up audit, we examine DIPNR’s implementation of the recommendations of the 2001 audit.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #129 - released 1 February 2005