The Total State Sector Accounts for the year ended 30 June 2013 received an unqualified independent auditor’s opinion. This is the first time in over a decade the Total State Sector Accounts have not been qualified.

In looking into the resolution of qualifications:

• We obtained enough evidence supporting the value of education buildings and their depreciation expense
• Sufficent evidence has been obtained to support the existence and value of the State archives
• We obtained enough evidence supporting the completeness of land and infrastructure holdings recognised
• Improvements are still needed in the accuracy of information used to record the State’s land holdings.

Overall, the audited entities are managing some aspects of gifts and benefits effectively but other aspects require improvement. We found that all five entities had gifts and benefits policies that addressed some but not all of the attributes of a sound policy. All five have communicated their gifts and benefits policies to staff and external stakeholders, although in each case we identified opportunities to better communicate their policies.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #228 - released 27 March 2013

This overview summarises the significant findings included in my 2012 financial audit report, volumes three to eleven, and highlights NSW agencies’ overall achievements and challenges. The overview summarises key themes and messages arising from these audits to help readers understand common findings. Agencies and their audit and risk committees can use the overview to self-assess and identify issues that may be relevant to their organisations.

It found more than 85 per cent of the recommendations in my 2011 financial audit reports to Parliament were implemented in 2012. Whilst this is less than 100 per cent, NSW government agencies clearly acted on my significant recommendations. However, NSW government agencies need to do more to follow up more detailed recommendations that are made directly to management.

The Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) has improved the overall surface condition of State Roads in the last decade. Country road surfaces are now generally much better. Ride quality has improved and cracking has been reduced. The RTA has also achieved a substantial reduction in the number of structurally deficient bridges over the same period. 

Despite a significant increase in the State’s contribution to maintenance since 1999-2000, the RTA has deferred road rebuilding projects. The RTA is rebuilding at less than half its long term target, and has not met this target at any time this decade. The RTA has not identified how it will address deferred rebuilding, although it advises it is developing a new road network management plan which will address this.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #157 - released 16 August 2006

Fraud risks, and fraud control obligations, are growing at a rate which demands that more be done.  Our 2005 report showed that still only 50 per cent of NSW public sector organisations had achieved an adequate level of performance in developing and implementing a fraud control strategy.  In response to this, our 2005 report provided a range of recommendations for improving fraud control and urged that fraud control become a key item for attention by audit committees.

We recognise that organisations need a simple and effective way to review and monitor how effectively they are implementing fraud control strategies.  This kit has been developed for precisely that purpose.  Its development reflects an extended period of consultation, focus-group review and pilot-testing to ensure that that the kit is simple to use, practical and flexible.  The kit assists organisations to meet their fraud control obligations in a cost-effective manner, tailored to their situation and based on risk.

• Fraud Control Improvement Kit
• Fraud Control Improvement Kit: Health Check Worksheet

Parliamentary reference - Report number #156 - released 20 July 2006

In the cases we examined, we found that agencies working together can improve services or results. However, the changes were not always as great as anticipated or had not reached maximum potential. Establishing the right governance framework and accountability requirements between partners at the start of the project is critical to success. And joint responsibility requires new funding and reporting arrangements to be developed.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #149 - released 22 March 2006

The Audit Office is of the opinion that there are several features of the current Senior Executive Service (SES) model, or its application, which hinder the capacity of the SES to operate effectively in line with the Government’s stated objectives. The ultimate effect of these features is to reduce the capacity or perceived capacity of the SES to meet the Government’s objectives for the operation of the SES.

Taken overall, difficulties in the SES identified by the audit included: uncertainty caused by the way some contracts have been applied in practice, removal for reasons other than poor performance, informal strategies such as using restructuring to “terminate contracts and to move people in and out of positions regardless of their formal reported performance” (Section 5.4), inconsistently applied rules about selection/recruitment, appointment and removal of the SES, an imbalance between CES responsibility to the Minister as the employer/reviewer with their responsibility not to act in a political or partial manner, apparent lack of rigour in, value of and Ministerial accountability for CES performance review processes and failure to implement an adequate system of rewards and sanctions related to performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.1 - released 17 December 1998

This Performance Audit Report, prepared by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) on behalf of The Audit Office of New South Wales (NSW), is a study of the NSW Senior Executive Service (SES).

It found the dissonance between where optimal executive performance might take place on a performance spectrum, encompassing the formal SES and less formal political arenas, is canvassed. The critical point here is that this arena, between the informal political actions and the application of formal SES structures, where much of the important decision making takes place, will always be difficult to manage. Transparency in decision making processes where non partisan and partisan actions are clearly defined seems a primary essential element of performance if the integrity of the NSW SES is to be maintained.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.2 - released 17 December 1998

In most organisations with a board or committee, there was confusion about the respective roles, powers, responsibilities and accountabilities of the Minister/s, the board and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). There are a wide variety of governance arrangements in operation across the spectrum of boards and committees. This is partly due to differing arrangements set out in relevant legislation and gaps in legislative detail which have been addressed in a variety of ways.

Under current arrangements, governing boards of SOCs have accountabilities to Shareholding Ministers and Portfolio Ministers, as well as to Ministers who are responsible for industry-wide regulation. Non-corporatised Government businesses have different accountability and control arrangements. The large number of statutory and nonstatutory bodies and authorities have a wide array of governance arrangements. As a result of uncertainty and confusion on governance aspects, The Audit Office observed that many governing boards operate as high level advisory management committees. The audit also found that board and committee practices fell short of standards expected in a professional boardroom culture.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #49 - released 7 April 1998