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Published

Actions for Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Transport
Planning
Compliance
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.

The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.

This audit had two objectives:

  1. To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
  2. To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.

We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:

a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?

Conclusion
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.

The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.

Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.

The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.

Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
The light rail is not justified by conventional cost-benefit analysis and there is insufficient evidence that the indirect contribution of light rail to achieving the economic development objectives of the Program will justify the cost.
Analysis presented in Program business cases and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The business case analysis of the benefits and costs of light rail was prepared after the decision to build light rail had been made and announced. Our previous reports, and recent reports by others, have emphasised the importance of completing thorough analysis before announcing infrastructure projects. Some advice provided after the initial light rail decision was announced was overly optimistic. It included benefits that cannot reasonably be attributed to light rail and underestimated the scope and cost of the project.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the high cost of the light rail, we believe agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
  • providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
  • providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
  • making business cases available to the public.​​​​​​
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government.

The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.

The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.

Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
  • work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities followed good practice standards, but consultation on transport decisions for the Program did not.

Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received. 

There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.

There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public. 

Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations. 

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.

Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.

The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should: 

  • develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
  • establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
    • agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
    • clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
    • establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.

By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:

  • setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
  • clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
  • monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.

Appendix one - Response from agencies    

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018

Published

Actions for Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid

Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid

Premier and Cabinet
Asset valuation
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.

A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.

Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.

In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.

On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal. 

This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide). 

The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money. 

Conclusion

The evidence available does not conclusively demonstrate the unsolicited proposal was unique, and there were some shortcomings in the negotiation process, documentation and segregation of duties. That said, before the final commitment to proceed with the lease, the state obtained assurance that the proposal delivered value for money. 

It is particularly important to demonstrate unsolicited proposals are unique, in order to justify the departure from other transaction processes that offer greater competition, transparency and certainty about value for money.

The Assessment Panel and the Proposal Specific Steering Committee determined the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal was unique, primarily on the basis that the proponent did not require foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and the lease transaction could be concluded earlier than through a second tender process. However, the evidence that persuaded the Panel and Committee did not demonstrate that no other proponent could conclude the transaction in time to meet the government’s deadline. 

It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.

The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. It also does not demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge. 

The Panel, Committee and financial advisers determined that the final price represented value for money, and that retendering offered a material risk of a worse financial outcome. However, an acceptable price was revealed early in the negotiation process, and doing so made it highly unlikely that the proponent would offer a higher price than that disclosed. The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, bargaining strategy or similar which put the negotiations in context. It is not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. 

Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place. Some shortcomings relating to role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance weakened the effectiveness of the unsolicited proposal process adopted for Ausgrid.

The reasons for accepting that the proposal and proponent were unique are not compelling.

The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says the 'unique benefits of the proposal and the unique ability of the proponent to deliver the proposal' must be demonstrated. 

The conclusion reached by the Panel and Committee that the proposal offered a ‘unique ability to deliver (a) strategic outcome’ was primarily based on the proponent not requiring foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and allowing the government to complete the lease transaction earlier than by going through a second tender process. 

It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.

The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. Nor does it demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge. 

That said, the Australian Treasurer’s decision to reject the two bids from the previous tender process created uncertainty about the conditions under which he would approve international bids. The financial advisers engaged for the Ausgrid transaction informed the Panel and Committee that:

  • it was not likely another viable proponent would emerge soon enough to meet the government’s transaction deadline
  • the market would be unlikely to deliver a better result than offered by the proponent
  • going to tender presented a material risk of a worse financial result. 

The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says that a proposal to directly purchase or acquire a government-owned entity or property will generally not be unique. The Ausgrid unsolicited proposal fell into this category. 

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:

  • recognise that when considering uniqueness they should: 
    • require very strong evidence to decide that both the proponent and proposal are the only ones of their kind that could meet the government’s objectives 
    • give thorough consideration to any reasonable counter-arguments against uniqueness.
  • rigorously consider all elements of the Unsolicited Proposals Guide when determining whether a proposal should be dealt with as an unsolicited proposal, and document these deliberations and all relevant evidence
  • do not use speed of transaction compared to a market process as justification for uniqueness.
The process to obtain assurance that the final price represented value for money was adequate. However, the negotiation approach reduced assurance that the bid price was maximised. 

The Panel and Committee concluded the price represented value for money, based on peer-reviewed advice from their financial advisers and knowledge acquired from previous tenders. The financial advisers also told the Panel and Committee that there was a material risk the state would receive a lower price than offered by the unsolicited proposal if it immediately proceeded with a second market transaction. 

The state commenced negotiations on price earlier than the Guide says they should have. Early disclosure of a price that the state would accept reduced the likelihood of achieving a price greater than this. DPC says the intent of this meeting was to quickly establish whether the proponents could meet the state’s benchmark rather than spending more time and resources on a proposal which had no prospect of proceeding.

DPC and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, negotiation strategy or similar which put the negotiations and price achieved in context. It was not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. However, the Panel and Committee endorsed the outcomes of the negotiations. 

The negotiations were informed by the range of prices achieved for similar assets and the specific bids for Ausgrid from the earlier market process.

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:

  • document a minimum acceptable price, and a negotiating strategy designed to maximise price, before commencing negotiations
  • do not communicate an acceptable price to the proponent, before the negotiation stage of the process, and then only as part of a documented bargaining strategy.
Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place, but there were some shortcomings around role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance.

The state established a governance structure in accordance with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide, including an Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee. The members of the Panel and Steering Committee were senior and experienced officers, as befitted the size and nature of the unsolicited proposal. 

The separation of negotiation, assessment and review envisaged by the Guide was not maintained fully. The Chair of the Assessment Panel and a member of the Steering Committee were involved in negotiations with the proponent. 

DPC could not provide comprehensive records of some key interactions with the proponent or a documented negotiation strategy. The absence of such records means the Department cannot demonstrate engagement and negotiation processes were authorised and rigorous. 

The probity adviser reported there were no material probity issues with the transaction. The probity adviser also provided audit services. This is not good practice. The same party should not provide both advisory and audit services on the same transaction.

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government entity or asset:
•    maintain separation between negotiation, assessment and review in line with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide
•    keep an auditable trail of documentation relating to the negotiation process
•    maintain separation between any probity audit services engaged and the probity advisory and reporting services recommended in the current Guide.

Published

Actions for Transport 2018

Transport 2018

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on key observations and findings from the 30 June 2018 financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of the broad range of transport related assets creates challenges.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
2.2 Key accounting issues
Valuation of assets continues to create challenges. Although agencies complied with the requirements of the accounting standards and Treasury policies on valuations, we identified some opportunities for improvements at RMS.

RMS incorporated data from its asset condition assessments for the first time in the valuation methodology which improved the valuation outcome. Overall, we were satisfied with the valuation methodology and key assumptions, but we noted some deficiencies in the asset data in relation to asset component unit rates and old condition data for some components of assets. 

Also, a bypass and tunnel were incorrectly excluded from RMS records and valuation process since 2013. This resulted in an increase for these assets’ value by $133 million.

The valuation inputs for Wetlands and Moorings were revised this year to better reflect the assets' characteristics resulting in a $98.0 million increase.

2.3 Timeliness of financial reporting
Residual Transport Corporation did not submit its financial statements by the statutory reporting deadline. Residual Transport Corporation remained a dormant entity with no transactions for the year ended 30 June 2018.
With the exception of Residual Transport Corporation, all agencies completed early close procedures and submitted financial statements within statutory timeframes. Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the reporting and audit process.
2.4 Financial sustainability
NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations reported negative net assets of $75.7 million and $89,000 respectively at 30 June 2018.  NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations continue to require letters of financial support to confirm their ability to pay liabilities as they fall due. 
2.5 Passenger revenue and patronage
Transport agencies revenue growth increased at a higher rate than patronage. Public transport passenger revenue increased by $114 million (8.3 per cent) in 2017–18, and patronage increased by 37.1 million (5.1 per cent) across all modes of transport based on data provided by TfNSW. 
Negative balance Opal Cards resulted in $3.8 million in revenue not collected in 2017–18 and $7.8 million since the introduction of Opal. A total of 1.1 million Opal cards issued since its introduction have negative balances. Transport for NSW advised it is liaising with the ticketing vendor to implement system changes and are investigating other ways to reduce the occurrences.
2.6 Cost recovery from public transport users
Overall cost recovery from users has decreased. Overall cost recovery from public transport users (on rail and bus services by STA) decreased from 23.2 per cent to 22.4 per cent between 2016–17 and 2017–18. The main reason for the decrease is due to expenditure increasing at a faster rate than revenue in 2017–18.


 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters. 

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls 
There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes related to information technology, employee leave entitlements and asset management. Eighteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues.
3.2 Audit Office Annual work program
The Transport cluster wrote-off over $200 million of assets which were replaced by new assets or technology.

Majority of this write-off was recognised by RMS, with $199 million relating to the write-off of existing assets which have been replaced during the year. 

RailCorp is expected to convert to TAHE from 1 July 2019. Several working groups are considering different aspects of the TAHE transition including its status as a for-profit Public Trading Enterprise and which assets to transfer to TAHE. We will continue to monitor developments on TAHE for any impact to the financial statements.
RMS' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 of $3.4 billion is lower than last year. Sydney Trains' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 increased by 20.6 per cent to $434 million. TfNSW does not quantify its backlog maintenance. TfNSW advised it is liaising with Infrastructure NSW to develop a consistent definition of maintenance backlog across all transport service providers. 
Not all agencies monitor unplanned maintenance across the Transport cluster. Unplanned maintenance can be more expensive than planned maintenance. TfNSW should develop a consistent approach to define, monitor and track unplanned maintenance across the cluster.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Transport cluster and to collate and present service information for different modes of transport in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Internal Controls and Governance 2018

Internal Controls and Governance 2018

Education
Community Services
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Environment
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The Auditor-General for New South Wales Margaret Crawford found that as NSW state government agencies’ digital footprint increases they need to do more to address new and emerging information technology (IT) risks. This is one of the key findings to emerge from the second stand-alone report on internal controls and governance of the 40 largest NSW state government agencies.

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of the 40 largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2018.

This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2017–18 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at the 40 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector.

This report offers insights into internal controls and governance in the NSW public sector

This is our second report dedicated to internal controls and governance at NSW State Government agencies. The report provides insights into the effectiveness of controls and governance processes in the NSW public sector by:

  • highlighting the potential risks posed by weaknesses in controls and governance processes
  • helping agencies benchmark the adequacy of their processes against their peers
  • focusing on new and emerging risks, and the internal controls and governance processes that might address those risks.

Without strong governance systems and internal controls, agencies increase the risks associated with effectively managing their finances and delivering services to citizens. The way agencies deliver services increasingly relies on contracts and partnerships with the private sector. Many of these arrangements deliver front line services, but others provide less visible back office support. For example, an agency may rely on an IT service provider to manage a key system used to provide services to the community. The contract and service level agreements are only truly effective where they are actively managed to reduce risks to continuous quality service delivery, such as interruptions caused by system outages, cyber security attacks and data security breaches.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present heightened risks for agencies to mitigate. This report divides these into the following five areas:

  1. Internal control trends
  2. Information technology (IT), including IT vendor management
  3. Transparency and performance reporting
  4. Management of purchasing cards and taxis
  5. Fraud and corruption control.

The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2018 cluster financial audit reports, which will be tabled in Parliament from November to December 2018.

The focus of the report has changed since last year

Last year's report topics included asset management, ethics and conduct, and risk management. We are reporting on new topics this year. We plan to introduce new topics and re-visit our previous topics in subsequent reports on a cyclical basis. This will provide a baseline against which to measure the NSW public sectors’ progress in implementing appropriate internal controls and governance processes to mitigate existing, new and emerging risks in the public sector.

Agencies selected for the volume account for 95 per cent of the state's expenditure

While we have covered only 40 agencies in this report, those selected are a large enough group to identify common issues and insights. They represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations
  • support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 High risk findings
We found six high risk findings (seven in 2016–17), one of which was repeated from both last year and 2015–16. Recommendation: Agencies should reduce risk by addressing high risk internal control deficiencies as a priority.
2.2 Common findings
We found several internal controls and governance findings common to multiple agencies. Conclusion: Central agencies or the lead agency in a cluster can play a lead role in helping ensure agency responses to common findings are consistent, timely, efficient and effective.
2.3 New and repeat findings
Although internal control deficiencies decreased over the last four years, this year has seen a 42 per cent increase in internal control deficiencies. The increase in new IT control deficiencies and repeat IT control deficiencies signifies an emerging risk for agencies.
IT control deficiencies feature in this increase, having risen by 63 per cent since last year. The number of repeat IT control deficiencies has doubled and is driven by the increasing digital footprint left by agencies as government prioritises on-line interfaces with citizens, and the number of transactions conducted through digital channels increases

Recommendation: Agencies should reduce IT risks by:

  • assigning ownership of recommendations to address IT control deficiencies, with timeframes and actions plans for implementation
  • ensuring audit and risk committees and agency management regularly monitor the implementation status of recommendations.

 

Government agencies’ financial reporting is now heavily reliant on information technology (IT). IT is also increasingly important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place to manage both key financial systems and IT service contracts.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Management of IT vendors
Contract management framework 
Although 87 per cent of agencies have a contract management policy to manage IT vendors, one fifth require review.
 

Conclusion: Agencies can more effectively manage IT vendor contracts by developing policies and procedures to ensure vendor management frameworks are kept up to date, plans are in place to manage vendor performance and risk, and compliance with the framework is monitored by:

  • internal audit focusing on key contracting activities
  • experienced officers who are independent of contract administration performing spot checks or peer reviews
  • targeted analysis of data in contract registers.
Contract risk management
Forty-one per cent of agencies are not using contract management plans and do not assess contract risks. Half of the agencies that did assess contract risks, had not updated the risk assessments since the commencement of the contract.
 
Conclusion: Instead of applying a 'set and forget' approach in relation to management of contract risks, agencies should assess risk regularly and develop a plan to actively manage identified risks throughout the contract lifecycle - from negotiation and commencement, to termination.

Performance management
Eighty-six per cent of agencies meet with vendors to discuss performance. 

Only 24 per cent of agencies sought assurance about the accuracy of vendor reporting against KPIs, yet sixty-seven per cent of the IT contracts allow agencies to determine performance based payments and/or penalise underperformance.

Conclusion: Agencies are monitoring IT vendor performance, but could improve outcomes and more effectively manage under-performance by:

  • a more active, rigorous approach to both risk and performance management
  • checking the accuracy of vendor reporting against those KPIs and where appropriate seeking assurance over their accuracy
  • invoking performance based payments clauses in contracts when performance falls below agreed standards.

Transitioning services
Forty-three per cent of the IT vendor contracts did not contain transitioning-out provisions.

Where IT vendor contracts do make provision for transitioning-out, only 28 per cent of agencies have developed a transitioning-out plan with their IT vendor.

Conclusion: Contract transition/phase out clauses and plans can mitigate risks to service disruption, ensure internal controls remain in place, avoid unnecessary costs and reduce the risk of 'vendor lock-in'.
Contract Registers
Eleven out of forty agencies did not have a contract register, or have registers that are not accurate and/or complete.

Conclusion: A contract register helps to manage an agency’s compliance obligations under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (the GIPA Act). However, it also helps agencies more effectively manage IT vendors by:

  • monitoring contract end dates and contract extensions, and commence new procurements through their central procurement teams in a timely manner
  • managing their contractual commitments, budgeting and cash flow requirements.

Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their contract registers are complete and accurate so they can more effectively govern contracts and manage compliance obligations.

3.2 IT general controls
Governance
Ninety-five per cent of agencies have established policies to manage key IT processes and functions within the agency, with ten per cent of those due for review.
 
Conclusion: Regular review of IT policies ensures risks are considered and appropriate strategies and procedures are implemented to manage these risks on a consistent basis. An absence of policies can lead to ad-hoc responses to risks, and failure to consider emerging IT risks and changes to agency IT environments. 

User access administration
Seventy-two deficiencies were identified related to user access administration, including:

  • thirty issues related to granting user access across 43 per cent of agencies
  • sixteen issues related to removing user access across 30 per cent of agencies
  • twenty-six issues related to periodic reviews of user access across 50 per cent of agencies.
Recommendation: Agencies should strengthen the administration of user access to prevent inappropriate access to key systems.
Privileged access
Forty per cent of agencies do not periodically review logs of the activities of privileged users to identify suspicious or unauthorised activities.

Recommendation: Agencies should:

  • review the number of, and access granted to privileged users, and assess and document the risks associated with their activities
  • monitor user access to address risks from unauthorised activity.
Password controls
Twenty-three per cent of agencies did not comply with their own policy on password parameters.
Recommendation: Agencies should ensure IT password settings comply with their password policies.
Program changes
Fifteen per cent of agencies had deficient IT program change controls mainly related to segregation of duties and authorisation and testing of IT program changes prior to deployment.
Recommendation: Agencies should maintain appropriate segregation of duties in their IT functions and test system changes before they are deployed.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations from our review of how agencies reported their performance in their 2016–17 annual reports. The Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Regulation 2015 and Annual Reports (Departments) Regulation 2015 (annual reports regulation) currently prescribes the minimum requirements for agency annual reports.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
4.1 Reporting on performance

Only 57 per cent of agencies linked reporting on performance to their strategic objectives.

The use of targets and reporting performance over time was limited and applied inconsistently.

Conclusion: There is significant disparity in the quality and consistency of how agencies report on their performance in their annual reports. This limits the reliability and transparency of reported performance information.

Agencies could improve performance reporting by clearly linking strategic objectives to reported outcomes, and reporting on performance against targets over time. NSW Treasury may need to provide more guidance to agencies to support consistent and high-quality performance reporting in annual reports.

There is no independent assurance that the performance metrics agencies report in their annual reports are accurate.

Prior performance audits have noted issues related to the collection of performance information. For example, our 2016 Report on Red Tape Reduction highlighted inaccuracies in how the dollar-value of red tape reduction had been reported.

Conclusion: The ability of Parliament and the public to rely on reported information as a relevant and accurate reflection of an agency's performance is limited.

The relevance and accuracy of performance information is enhanced when:

  • policies and guidance support the consistent and accurate collection of data
  • internal review processes and management oversight are effective
  • independent review processes are established to provide effective challenge to the assumptions, judgements and methodology used to collect the reported performance information.
4.2 Reporting on reports

Agency reporting on major projects does not meet the requirements of the annual reports regulation.

Forty-seven per cent of agencies did not report on costs to date and estimated completion dates for major works in progress. Of the 47 per cent of agencies that reported on major works, only one agency reported detail about significant cost overruns, delays, amendments, deferments or cancellations.

NSW Treasury produce an annual report checklist to help agencies comply with their annual report obligations.

Recommendation: Agencies should comply with the annual reports regulation and report on all mandatory fields, including significant cost overruns and delays, for their major works in progress.

The information the annual reports regulation requires agencies to report deals only with major works in progress. There is no requirement to report on completed works.

Sixteen of 30 agencies reported some information on completed major works.

Conclusion: Agencies could improve their transparency if they reported, or were required to report:

  • on both works in progress and projects completed during the year
  • actual costs and completion dates, and forecast completion dates for major works, against original and revised budgets and original expected completion dates
  • explanations for significant cost overruns, delays and key project performance metrics.

 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency preventative and detective controls over purchasing card and taxi use for 2017–18.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
5.1 Management of purchasing cards
Volume of credit card spend
Purchasing card expenditure has increased by 76 per cent over the last four years in response to a government review into the cost savings possible from using purchasing cards for low value, high volume procurement.
 
Conclusion: The increasing use of purchasing cards highlights the importance of an effective framework for the use and management of purchasing cards.
Policy framework
We found all agencies that held purchasing cards had a policy in place, but 26 per cent of agencies have not reviewed their purchasing card policy by the scheduled date, or do not have a scheduled revision date stated within their policy.
Recommendation: Agencies should mitigate the risks associated with increased purchasing card use by ensuring policies and purchasing card frameworks remain current and compliant with the core requirements of TPP 17–09 'Use and Management of NSW Government Purchasing Cards'.
Preventative controls
We found that:
  • all agencies maintained purchasing card registers
  • seventy-six per cent provided training to cardholders prior to being issued with a card
  • eighty-nine per cent appointed a program administrator, but only half of these had clearly defined roles and responsibilities
  • thirty-two per cent of agencies place merchant blocks on purchasing cards
  • forty-seven per cent of agencies place geographic restrictions on purchasing cards.

Agencies have designed and implemented preventative controls aimed at deterring the potential misuse of purchasing cards.

Conclusion: Further opportunities exist for agencies to better control the use of purchasing cards, such as:

  • updating purchasing card registers to contain all mandatory fields required by TPP17–09
  • appointing a program administrator for the agency's purchasing card framework and defining their role and responsibility for the function
  • strengthening preventive controls to prevent misuse.

Detective controls
Ninety-two per cent of agencies have designed and implemented at least one control to monitor purchasing card activity.

Major reviews, such as data analytics (29 per cent of agencies) and independent spot checks (49 per cent of agencies) are not widely used.

Agencies have designed and implemented detective controls aimed at identifying potential misuse of purchasing cards.

Conclusion: More effective monitoring using purchasing card data can provide better visibility over spending activity and can be used to:

  • detect misuse and investigate exceptions
  • analyse trends to highlight cost saving opportunities.
5.2 Management of taxis
Policy framework
Thirteen per cent of agencies have not developed and implemented a policy to manage taxi use. In addition:
  • a further 41 per cent of agencies have not reviewed their policies by the scheduled revision date, or do not have a scheduled revision date
  • more than half of all agencies’ policies do not offer alternative travel options. For example, only 36 per cent of policies promoted the use of general Opal cards.
Conclusion: Agencies can promote savings and provide more options to staff where their taxi use policies:
  • limit the circumstances where taxi use is appropriate
  • offer alternate, lower cost options to using taxis, such as general Opal cards and rideshare.
Detective controls
All agencies approve taxi expenditure by expense reimbursement, purchasing card and Cabcharge, and have implemented controls around this approval process. However, beyond this there is minimal monitoring and review activity, such as data monitoring, independent spot checks or internal audit reviews.
Conclusion: Taxi spend at agencies is not significant in terms of its dollar value, but it is significant from a probity perspective. Agencies can better address the probity risk by incorporating taxi use into a broader purchasing card or fraud monitoring program.

 

Fraud and corruption control is one of the 17 key elements of our governance lighthouse. Recent reports from ICAC into state agencies and local government councils highlight the need for effective fraud control and ethical frameworks. Effective frameworks can help protect an agency from events that risk serious reputational damage and financial loss.

Our 2016 Fraud Survey found the NSW Government agencies we surveyed reported 1,077 frauds over the three year period to 30 June 2015. For those frauds where an estimate of losses was made, the reported value exceeded $10.0 million. The report also highlighted that the full extent of fraud in the NSW public sector could be higher than reported because:

  • unreported frauds in organisations can be almost three times the number of reported frauds
  • our 2015 survey did not include all NSW public sector agencies, nor did it include any NSW universities or local councils
  • fraud committed by citizens such as fare evasion and fraudulent state tax self-assessments was not within the scope of our 2015 survey
  • agencies did not estimate a value for 599 of the 1,077 (56 per cent) reported frauds.

Commissioning and outsourcing of services to the private sector and the advancement of digital technology are changing the fraud and corruption risks agencies face. Fraud risk assessments should be updated regularly and in particular where there are changes in agency business models. NSW Treasury Circular TC18-02 NSW Fraud and Corruption Control Policy now requires agencies develop, implement and maintain a fraud and corruption control framework, effective from 1 July 2018. 

Our Fraud Control Improvement Kit provides guidance and practical advice to help organisations implement an effective fraud control framework. The kit is divided into ten attributes. Three key attributes have been assessed below; prevention, detection and notification systems.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency fraud and corruption controls for 2017–18.

Observation Conclusion or recommendation
6.1 Prevention systems

Prevention systems
Ninety-two per cent of agencies have a fraud control plan in place, 81 per cent maintain a fraud database and 79 per cent report fraud and corruption matters as a standing item on audit and risk committee agendas.

Only 54 per cent of agencies have an employment screening policy and all agencies have IT security policies, but gaps in IT security controls could undermine their policies.

Conclusion: Most agencies have implemented fraud prevention systems to reduce the risk of fraud. However poor IT security along with other gaps in agency prevention systems, such as employment screening practices heightens the risk of fraud and inappropriate use of data.

Agencies can improve their fraud prevention systems by:

  • completing regular fraud risk assessments, embedding fraud risk assessment into their enterprise risk management process and reporting the results of the assessment to the audit and risk committee
  • maintaining a fraud database and reviewing it regularly for systemic issues and reporting a redacted version of the database on the agency's website to inform corruption prevention networks
  • developing policies and procedures for employee screening and benchmarking their current processes against ICAC's publication ‘Strengthening Employment Screening Practices in the NSW Public Sector’
  • developing and maintaining up to date IT security policies and monitoring compliance with the policy.
Twenty-three per cent of agencies were not performing fraud risk assessments and some agency fraud risk assessments may not be as robust as they could be.  Conclusion: Agencies' systems of internal controls may be less effective where new and emerging fraud risks have been overlooked, or known weaknesses have not been rectified.
6.2 Detection systems
Detection systems
Several agencies reported they were developing a data monitoring program, but only 38 per cent of agencies had already implemented a program.
 

Studies have shown data monitoring, whereby entire populations of transactional data are analysed for indicators of fraudulent activity, is one of the most effective methods of early detection. Early detection decreases the duration a fraud remains undetected thereby limiting the extent of losses.

Conclusion: Data monitoring is an effective tool for early detection of fraud and is more effective when informed by a comprehensive fraud risk assessment.

6.3 Notification systems
Notification system
All agencies have notification systems for reporting actual or suspected fraud and corruption. Most agencies provide multiple reporting lines, provide training and publicise options for staff to report actual or suspected fraud and corruption.
Conclusion: Training staff about their obligations and the use of fraud notification systems promotes a fraud-aware culture

 

Published

Actions for Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities

Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities

Premier and Cabinet
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The Premier’s Implementation Unit uses a systematic approach to measuring and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities performance targets, but public reporting needed to improve, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General of NSW, Margaret Crawford.

The Premier of New South Wales has established 12 Premier’s Priorities. These are key performance targets for government.

The 12 Premier's Priorities
  • 150,000 new jobs by 2019

  • Reduce the volume of litter by 40 per cent by 2020

  • 10 key projects in metro and regional areas to be delivered on time and on budget, and nearly 90 local infrastructure projects to be delivered on time

  • Increase the proportion of NSW students in the top two NAPLAN bands by eight per cent by 2019

  • Increase the proportion of women in senior leadership roles in the NSW Government sector from 33 to 50 per cent by 2025 and double the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in senior leadership roles in the NSW Government sector, from 57 to 114

  • Increase the proportion of young people who successfully move from Specialist Homelessness Services to long-term accommodation to more than 34 per cent by 2019

  • 61,000 housing completions on average per year to 2021

  • Reduce the proportion of domestic violence perpetrators reoffending by 25 per cent by 2021

  • Improve customer satisfaction with key government services every year, this term of government to 2019

  • Decrease the percentage of children and young people re-reported at risk of significant harm by 15 per cent by 2020

  • 81 per cent of patients through emergency departments within four hours by 2019

  • Reduce overweight and obesity rates of children by five percentage points by 2025


Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Premier’s Priorities website.

Each Premier’s Priority has a lead agency and minister responsible for achieving the performance target.

The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) was established within the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) in 2015. The PIU is a delivery unit that supports agencies to measure and monitor performance, make progress toward the Premier’s Priorities targets, and report progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public.

This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government is progressing and reporting on the Premier's Priorities.

 


The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) is effective in assisting agencies to make progress against the Premier’s Priorities targets. Progress reporting is regular but transparency to the public is weakened by the lack of information about specific measurement limitations and lack of clarity about the relationship of the targets to broader government objectives.The PIU promotes a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities’ performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives.

The PIU provides a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier's Priorities performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives. The data used to measure the Premier’s Priorities comes from a variety of government and external datasets, some of which have known limitations. These limitations are not revealed in public reporting, and only some are revealed in progress reported to the Premier and ministers. This limits the transparency of reporting.

The PIU assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising particular performance measures over other areas of activity. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach to assisting agencies to analyse performance using data, and helping them work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.


 


Data used to measure progress for some of the Premier’s Priorities has limitations which are not made clear when progress is reported. This reduces transparency about the reported progress. Public reporting would also be improved with additional information about the relationship between specific performance measures and broader government objectives.

The PIU is responsible for reporting progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public. Agencies provide performance data and some play a role in preparing progress reports for the Premier and ministers. For 11 of the Premier's Priorities, progress is reported against measurable and time-related performance targets. For the infrastructure priority, progress is reported against project milestones.

Progress of some Priorities is measured using data that has known limitations, which should be noted wherever progress is reported. For example, the data used to report on housing completions does not take housing demolitions into account, and is therefore overstating the contribution of this performance measure to housing supply. This known limitation is not explained in progress reports or on the public website.

Data used to measure progress is sourced from a mix of government and external datasets. Updated progress data for most Premier’s Priorities is published on the Premier’s Priorities website annually, although reported to the Premier and key ministers more frequently. The PIU reviews the data and validates it through fieldwork with front line agencies. The PIU also assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising single performance measures. Most, but not all, agencies use additional indicators to check for misuse of data or perverse outcomes.

We examined the reporting processes and controls for five of the Premier’s Priorities. We found that there is insufficient assurance over the accuracy of the data on housing approvals.

The relationships between performance measures and broader government objectives is not always clearly explained on the Premier’s Priority website, which is the key source of public information about the Premier’s Priorities. For example, the Premier’s Priority to reduce litter volumes is communicated as “Keeping our Environment Clean.” While the website explains why reducing litter is important, it does not clearly explain why that particular target has been chosen to measure progress in keeping the environment clean.

By December 2018, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

  1. improve transparency of public reporting by:
    • providing information about limitations of reported data and associated performance
    • clarifying the relationship between the Premier’s Priorities performance targets and broader government objectives.
  2. ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources
  3. encourage agencies to develop and implement additional supporting indicators for all Premier’s Priority performance measures to prevent and detect unintended consequences or misuse of data.

 


The Premier's Implementation Unit is effective in supporting agencies to deliver progress towards the Premier’s Priority targets.

The PIU promotes a systematic approach to monitoring and reporting progress against a target, based on a methodology used in delivery units elsewhere in the world. The PIU undertakes internal self-evaluation, and commissions regular reviews of methodology implementation from the consultancy that owns the methodology and helped to establish the PIU. However, the unit lacks periodic independent reviews of their overall effectiveness. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach and assists agencies to analyse performance using data, and work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.

Agency representatives recognise the benefits of being responsible for a Premier's Priority and speak of the value of being held to account and having the attention of the Premier and senior ministers.

By June 2019, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

  1. establish routine collection of feedback about PIU performance including:
    • independent assurance of PIU performance
    • opportunity for agencies to provide confidential feedback.

 

 

Published

Actions for Performance audit insights: key findings from 2014-2018

Performance audit insights: key findings from 2014-2018

Whole of Government
Compliance
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Project management

A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, presents key findings from four years of performance audits. The report findings are presented around six areas of government activity including planning for the future, meeting community expectations for key services, investment in infrastructure, managing natural resources, ensuring good governance and digital disruption.

In this report, we present common findings and lessons from the past four years of performance audits, and offer insights to the public sector on elements of effective performance. We have analysed the key findings and recommendations from 61 performance audits tabled in the NSW Parliament between July 2014 and June 2018, spanning varied areas of government activity. We will also use this report to help determine areas of unaddressed risk across all parts of government, and to shape our future audit priorities.

Governments play an important stewardship role. Their decisions need to consider intergenerational equity by ensuring that investment strategies are sustainable. Governments also need to consider the impact of their decisions on different parts of the community. We recognise that governments face challenges in delivering programs and services, targeting complex social issues with finite resources.

Governments are changing how they deliver services to respond to citizen needs and deliver greater value for money. In this section, we reflect on audits that looked at how government entities are planning their activities to meet the needs of the community into the future.

State and local government exist to provide services to citizens, and citizens are playing a greater role in defining what services they want or need. Expectations about consultation, ease of access, timeliness, and customisation of services are rising. Governments face challenges to continually improve the way they plan and deliver services to meet these expectations. Governments also need to provide quality services for a growing and ageing population whilst working within a constrained financial environment.

Over the past four years, our performance audits have assessed aspects of State and local government services, including education, health services, disability support, corrective services, and many others. In this section, we draw together common findings that government entities should reflect on when providing services to the community.

The NSW Government’s 2018–19 Budget forecasts an $87.2 billion infrastructure investment program over the next four years. Infrastructure investment of this size carries significant opportunities and risks. Competition for resources is high and maintaining the capability to manage and deliver projects effectively is challenging. Governments also need to plan effectively to ensure infrastructure built today will meet future needs.

Over the past four years, we have looked at some of the ways NSW Government agencies justify and prioritise projects for funding, work with contractors to deliver projects, and track and report on progress. In this section, we draw together common findings from our audits that government entities should consider when planning future infrastructure projects.

Governments face challenges in balancing the use of natural resources to meet diverse interests, while supporting a sustainable natural environment for the future. They need to supply communities with water, produce energy, protect natural habitats, and support farming, industry, and economic development.

Some of our recent audits have considered how government agencies are managing natural resources and protecting the environment for future generations. In this section, we have drawn together common findings across our audits that government entities should consider in managing the environment and natural resources.

A range of checks and balances is needed to support public confidence in government decision making. To maintain trust, government agencies should act transparently, and in accordance with relevant legislation and policy. This is particularly important as the public sector increasingly engages with external partners to deliver services and provide a more contestable environment.

Good governance arrangements should result in improved service delivery and more effective and efficient use of resources. Our audits have looked at many different elements of governance, including making sure the necessary processes and workplace cultures are in place to help government entities achieve their aims. In this section, we have drawn together various aspects of governance that government entities should consider.

The global increase in digital technology provides governments with opportunities to interact with citizens in more immediate and responsive ways than was previously possible. Data can be used in powerful ways such as predicting future demand for services, targeting interventions, responding to crises, and evaluating outcomes. Governments face challenges in doing this while maintaining secure digital environments that protect citizen interests, privacy, and autonomy.

Our audits have assessed some of the ways that government entities are incorporating digital change into their work. In this section, we draw together common themes that governments could consider in protecting their digital assets, or expanding their digital capabilities.
 

Published

Actions for Agency compliance with NSW Government travel policies

Agency compliance with NSW Government travel policies

Education
Community Services
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

Overall, agencies materially complied with NSW Government travel policies.

However, the Auditor-General found some agencies:

  • did not always book official travel through the approved supplier
  • had weaknesses in their travel approval processes
  • had travel policies that were inconsistent with the NSW Government policy
  • did not adequately manage their travel records.   

Last year the NSW Government spent almost $250 million on travel. The government’s travel policies aim to help agencies make better travel decisions and reduce costs. The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation (DFSI) is responsible for the government’s travel policy and manages the government contract with an approved private sector provider to procure travel services.

This audit assessed how effective agency processes were to ensure compliance with:

  • the ‘Policy on Official Travel within Australia and Overseas’ issued by the Department of Premier and Cabinet in Circular OFS-2014–07 ‘Official Travel in Australia and Overseas’ (the former policy)
  • the ‘NSW Government Travel and Transport Policy’ issued by DFSI (the new policy), effective from 28 September 2016.

We examined 15 agencies from different NSW Government clusters with significant travel expenditure. For a list of participating agencies, refer to the Appendix two.

Conclusion

We found that overall, agencies materially complied with NSW Government travel policies. However, some agencies:

  • did not always book official travel through the approved supplier
  • had weaknesses in their travel approval processes
  • had travel policies that were inconsistent with the government policy
  • did not adequately manage their travel records.

Self-assessments indicate agencies comply with most aspects of the new policy. Agencies also believe more guidance from DFSI about certain aspects of the policy would increase compliance.

We asked the 15 participating agencies to complete a self assessment of the processes they have implemented to comply with the new policy. The key observations are summarised below.

Published

Actions for Government Advertising: Campaigns for 2015–16 and 2016–17

Government Advertising: Campaigns for 2015–16 and 2016–17

Premier and Cabinet
Justice
Local Government
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' and the 'Dogs deserve better' government advertising campaigns complied with the Government Advertising Act and most elements of the Government Advertising Guidelines.

However, some advertisements were designed to build support for government policy and used subjective or emotive messages. This is inconsistent with the requirement in the Government Advertising Guidelines for 'objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner'.

Advertisements in the 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' campaign used subjective statements such as 'the system is broken' and 'brighter future'. While advertisements in the 'Dogs deserve better' campaign used confronting imagery such as gun targets, blood smears and gravestones.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit in relation to at least one government advertising campaign in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether advertising campaigns were carried out effectively, economically and efficiently and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines). In this audit, we examined two campaigns:

  • the ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ campaign run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet
  • the ‘Dogs deserve better’ campaign run by the Department of Justice.    

Section 6 of the Act details the specific prohibitions on political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed so as to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.

The ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ government advertising campaign was run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet in four phases from August 2015 to May 2016. The total cost of the campaign was over $4.5 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.

The ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ advertising campaign has not breached the specific provisions of Section 6 of the Act which prohibits political advertising.

Two factors potentially compromised value for money for the campaign. The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work to be undertaken, which was substantially greater than initially quoted. Further, the department did not meet all recommended timeframes to minimise media booking costs for all phases of the campaign.

The campaign did not comply with all administrative requirements in all phases. Advertising for Phase 1 commenced before the compliance certificate was signed. There was no evidence that a compliance certificate was signed for Phase 2 extension. The cost benefit analyses for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension did not sufficiently consider alternatives to advertising, as is required by the Government Advertising Guidelines.

Advertisements adopted subjective messages designed to build public support for council mergers and directed audiences to websites for more detailed information. Campaign research identified statements that were most likely to reduce resistance to mergers. Some advertising content used subjective language, which we consider inconsistent with the requirement for ‘objective presentation’. Evaluations of advertising effectiveness also measured the success of the advertisements in increasing public support for council mergers.

No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:

  • be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
  • contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
  • contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.

We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.

Request for quotes to design advertisement did not reflect the full scope required

The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work that was to be undertaken, and this created a risk to achieving value for money. The Office of Local Government sought quotes for design of a television advertisement only. It did not request an estimate for radio, online advertisements, or translation for linguistically diverse audiences, which were ultimately required for the campaign.
 

A full and fair assessment of which supplier could provide the best value for money could not be made given that the quotes obtained did not reflect the full scope of work. The final amount paid for the design of Phase 1 was 2.7 times the original quote. It is possible that another supplier that provided a quote could have provided overall better value for money.

The Office of Local Government continued to use the Phase 1 supplier for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension (Exhibit 4). Where there are other suppliers that could feasibly compete for a contract, direct negotiation increases the risk the agency has not obtained the best value for money. The department advised that it continued with the same agency to avoid costs involved in briefing a new agency on the campaign.

The ‘Dogs deserve better’ government advertising campaign was run by the Department of Justice from August 2016, after the government announced its decision to prohibit greyhound racing, and was terminated in October 2016 after a change of government policy. The campaign had a budget of $1.6 million, with an actual spend of $1.3 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.

The ‘Dogs deserve better’ advertising campaign has not breached the specific provisions of Section 6 of the Act which prohibits political advertising.

The Secretary of the department determined that urgent circumstances existed that required advertising to commence prior to completing a cost benefit analysis and peer review. There was a concern that industry participants may make impulse decisions to destroy greyhounds without further information on support services; there was also an identified need to promote public greyhound adoptions.

Phase 1 advertisements focused on explaining the reasons for the prohibition on greyhound racing with a reference to a website for further information. While industry participants were identified as the primary audience, media expenditure was not specifically targeted to this group. Phase 2 advertisements more effectively addressed the originally identified ‘urgent needs’ of providing information on support services for greyhound owners and information on how the public could adopt a greyhound.

The urgency to advertise potentially compromised value for money. The department did not use price competition when selecting a creative supplier due to a concern this would add to timeframes. Further, the department did not meet recommended timeframes to minimise media booking costs.

We identified three other areas in Phase 1 advertisements that were inconsistent with government advertising requirements. Advertisements used provocative language and confronting imagery, which we consider to be inconsistent with the requirement for ‘objective presentation’. Two statements presented as fact based on the Special Commission’s Inquiry report were inaccurate; one of these was due to a calculation error. Radio advertisements did not clearly identify that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government for the first few days of the campaign.

No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:

  • be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
  • contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
  • contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.

We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.
 

Animal welfare concerns were identified as the reason for urgent advertising

A brief prepared by the department in July 2016 raised concerns about the welfare of greyhounds following the NSW Premier’s announcement that the government would prohibit greyhound racing. The brief raised the risk that industry members may make impulse decisions to destroy their greyhounds without information on support that was being offered.

The department used the provisions in Sections 7(4) and 8(3) of the Act to expedite the release of advertising due to ‘other urgent circumstances’. This provision allows advertising to commence prior to completing the peer review process and cost benefit analysis.

In introducing the Government Advertising Bill to parliament in 2011, the then Premier noted that exceptional circumstances would cover situations ‘such as a civil emergency or sudden health epidemic’. There is no other guidance on when it is appropriate to use this section. It is at the discretion of a government agency head to determine whether a campaign is urgent.
 

Phase 1 advertisements did not focus on the urgent needs

This advertising campaign had three overarching objectives:

  • to increase public awareness of the animal welfare reasons for the closure of the greyhound racing industry
  • to change the behaviour of dog owners from potentially harming their greyhounds to treating them humanely, by accessing the support options and packages available
  • to promote greyhound adoptions by the public.

Alongside advertising, the department took other steps to engage with the greyhound racing industry. This included direct mail, face to face meetings around the State, setting up a call centre and community consultation through an online survey. Other government agencies and animal welfare agencies were also engaged to reach out to affected stakeholders.

Phase 1 advertising content focused on providing information about the reasons for the closure of the industry. The department’s radio and television advertisements did not refer to support packages or encourage the public to adopt a greyhound. While print advertisements did mention these things, this was only presented in fine print. In all advertisements, audiences were referred to a website for further information.

The focus of advertisements on the reasons for industry closure was not consistent with the identified needs to urgently commence advertising to influence the behaviour of dog owners and encourage the public to adopt a greyhound.

The content in Phase 2 advertisements, which began around four weeks after the first phase, was more explicit in highlighting the services and support for industry members such as offering business and retraining advice. These advertisements also referred audiences to a call centre number as well as the website.

Peer review process limited to influencing second phase of advertisements

In urgent circumstances, the Act allows for peer review to be completed after advertising has commenced. For this campaign, the peer review process was completed on 19 August 2016, two weeks after advertising had commenced. Where advertising commences before the peer review process is completed, the usefulness of peer reviewers’ recommendations is limited to informing subsequent phases of advertising and the post-campaign evaluation.

The peer review report found the messages in Phase 1 advertisements were not clearly defined, and the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst other campaign activities. These recommendations informed the second phase of advertising, which ran from 27 August 2016 until the campaign was terminated in October 2016.
 

The department could not demonstrate value for money was achieved for creative work

The department provided a fixed budget for creative work when requesting quotes from creative agencies to develop advertising material. This is not consistent with the quotation requirements in the government’s Guidelines for Advertising and Digital Communication Services. This approach creates risks to achieving value for money as creative agencies are not required to compete on price for their services. The department advised that it had pre-set the creative costs based on a comparative government campaign of a similar size. This was done due to a concern that requiring agencies to compete on price would affect the short timeframe given to develop creative material.

Three creative agencies accepted the opportunity to present design ideas for the campaign. The department was unable to provide evidence of how it chose the preferred supplier out of these three agencies. Records are important for accountability and allow a procurement decision to be audited after an urgent decision.     
 

Short notice did not allow for cost-efficient media booking for all phases

Placement of advertisements in various media channels was done through the State’s Media Agency Services contract. This contract achieves savings as the government can use its aggregated media spend to gain discounts from the media supplier.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet provides guidance to ensure cost efficient media booking. For example, media time for a television advertisement should be booked at least 6 to 12 weeks in advance. Radio advertisements should be booked at least 2 to 8 weeks in advance.

The peer review report noted that the department did not have adequate time to look for the most cost-efficient way to advertise. In its response to the peer reviewers, the department acknowledged this to be due to the urgency to start advertising. The media booking authority was signed by the department one day before the campaign commenced.
 

The department used a wide public campaign for a narrow target audience

The campaign identified greyhound industry participants as the primary target audience. In 201516 there were 1,342 greyhound trainers, 1,695 owner/trainers, 983 attendants and 1,247 breeders in New South Wales. The department’s advertising submission identified ‘concerns that industry members could make impulsive decisions, potentially jeopardising the welfare of a large number of dogs, prior to the shutdown of the industry’.

The submission’s evidence of advertising effectiveness focused on increasing the level of wider community support for the ban rather than stopping industry members from making impulse decisions. It used an early opinion poll to show that total support for the ban on greyhound racing rises by 17 points and opposition drops by four points following explanation of the findings of the Special Commission of Inquiry report.

The peer review report noted that the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst the department’s range of other direct and targeted communications and consultations held with industry members.

No demonstrated basis for use of confronting imagery and provocative language

The Guidelines require ‘objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner’. Neither the Guidelines or Handbook further explain what objective presentation means. We have used an ordinary definition of this term as ‘not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts’. This is synonymous with terms like ‘impartial’, ‘neutral’, and ‘dispassionate’ and opposite to ‘subjective’. We consider that to meet the current requirements in the Guidelines for objectivity, advertising content should contain accurate statements or facts, and avoid subjective language.

Phase 1 focussed on the ongoing consequences if no action was taken to close the industry. The advertisements used provocative language, for example ‘Up to 70 per cent of dogs are deemed wastage by their own industry. Wastage! Slaughtered just for being slow’. Advertisements used confronting imagery like gravestones, blood smears and gun targets.

Our literature review into this area highlighted mixed findings on the effectiveness of confrontational advertising materials. In some cases, shock campaigns may cause an audience to reject or ignore the message, and may even encourage people to do the opposite of the intended behaviour. In other cases, such as in road safety campaigns, this style of advertising can be successful. This shows the importance of conducting pre-campaign research before adopting a confrontational or emotive approach in advertising.

The Government Advertising Handbook recommends that an agency explain the rationale and the evidence for their chosen advertising approach. There was no evidence that the department researched the effectiveness of its advertising approach with its target audience. The department had planned to undertake creative concept testing as part of a strategy to ensure the creative material was understood by its audience. The department advised that due to the urgency of the campaign, it did not have time to conduct this testing.

Not all Phase 1 radio advertisements clearly identified that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government

For the first few days on air, Phase 1 radio advertisements ended by referring the audience to a government website, instead of clearly identifying that it had been authorised by the New South Wales Government. Government authorisations and logos ensure the work and the programs of the NSW Government are easily identifiable by the community.    

The department’s cost benefit analysis did not consider alternatives to advertising

For government advertising campaigns that cost over $1.0 million, the Act requires the advertising agency to carry out a cost benefit analysis and obtain approval from the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communications, prior to commencing the campaign.

The department engaged with audiences through direct mail, face to face forums, and a telephone helpline in addition to advertising. However, the department’s cost benefit analysis did not meet the requirements in the Guidelines to specify the extent to which expected benefits could be achieved without advertising, and to compare costs of options other than advertising that could be used to successfully implement the program (see Exhibit 6).

The cost benefit analysis made optimistic assumptions about the impact of the campaign on greyhound adoptions. It estimated that 2,360 greyhounds would be adopted if the campaign was run. This is significantly higher than the ‘most optimistic outcome’ of re-homing in the Special Commission Inquiry report (we calculated this to be 1,467 greyhounds). There was insufficient evidence to support the higher number of adoptions in the cost benefit analysis.

The sensitivity analysis shows that using the Special Commission’s ‘most optimistic outcome’ figure of re-homing would reduce the net present value of advertising to be negative. Further, the cost benefit analysis also assumed that increased government funding would be made available to animal welfare and rehoming organisations to support more adoptions, but did not estimate or include this cost when calculating the net present value of advertising.
 

There were two factual inaccuracies in key messages used for Phase 1 advertisements

Section 8(2) of the Act requires the head of a government agency to certify that the proposed campaign ‘contains accurate information’. The Secretary of the Department of Justice signed the compliance certificate on 29 July 2016, before advertisements commenced.

We examined the accuracy of factual claims in this advertising campaign, by comparing the key statements to the report of Special Commission of Inquiry into the Greyhound Racing Industry (the Commissioner report). The Commissioner report was quoted by the NSW Government as the basis for its policy to transition the greyhound racing industry to closure.

We identified that two of the key statements used in Phase 1 advertisements to support the animal welfare reasons for industry closure were inaccurate (Exhibit 7).    

Published

Actions for Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts

Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

In November 2013, Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) outsourced the maintenance of State roads in the Sydney region south and west zones using an innovative contracting approach called the Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC). The SMC links risk to reward, and uses a performance framework where outcomes should drive improved performance over time.

RMS’ SMC contract management includes most elements of good practice, including governance and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, key elements are missing which reduces its effectiveness.

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is responsible for the Sydney region State roads network This includes over 2,800 kilometres of roads and associated road corridor infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and drainage structures. RMS divides the network into three geographical areas: south, west and north zones.

In 1995, RMS first outsourced road corridor infrastructure maintenance for the north zone through a Performance Specified Maintenance Contract (PSMC). The current 10-year PSMC for the north zone will expire in October 2018. Prior to November 2013, RMS maintained roads in the south and west zones through its Road and Fleet Services unit. 

In November 2013, RMS outsourced road maintenance services for the south and west zones using Stewardship Maintenance Contracts (SMC). The contracts run for seven years with an option for a further three years at RMS’ discretion. RMS estimated that the annual cost of these contracts was around $240 million in total. In March 2018, the contract prices are due to be reset by negotiation to reflect the contractors’ experience with, and better information about, the road networks and routine maintenance requirements. 

The SMC model adopted stewardship principles to improve value for money. RMS defined stewardship principles as a broad set of values, attitudes and behaviours, required of the contractor to effectively manage the assets on behalf of RMS. The SMC also includes commercial principles, such as linking risk to reward, and a performance framework where outcomes drive performance.

This audit assessed whether RMS had effectively managed the outsourcing of road maintenance in the Sydney region south and west zones. In making this assessment, we answered the following questions:

  1. Did RMS justify the decision to adopt the SMC model?
  2. Do SMCs include key performance indicators (KPIs) and incentives which promote efficiency and effectiveness? 
  3. Does RMS collect high quality information on contractor performance and take action to correct performance deficiencies?
  4. Are the expected benefits being achieved?

Conclusion

RMS developed an innovative contracting approach with the SMC. RMS has realised some benefits in the first year, including savings, from outsourcing road maintenance in the Sydney region south and west zones using the SMC. However, RMS’ management of the SMC has key elements missing which reduces its effectiveness.

The SMC includes performance measures and incentives to drive efficiency and effectiveness improvements over time.  

RMS has established a contract management framework which includes most elements of good practice, including governance and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, it does not have procedures to guide its contract managers in managing specific provisions of the SMC. Consequently, RMS has not exercised several significant SMC requirements, such as having the contractor account for an efficiency dividend in its pricing at the start of each three-year works period. It also has not done enough to assure itself that the contractor provided performance and financial data are correct. This is important because the data is used to measure performance and calculate contractor payments.  

RMS assessed that it had achieved around 80 per cent of the expected cost benefit in the initial year of the SMC. However, it has not tracked its achievement of benefits since then.

The Stewardship Maintenance Contract

RMS justified adopting the SMC model and included KPIs to drive efficiency and effectiveness

The SMC model includes features that RMS had not previously used for road maintenance contracts. These included adopting stewardship principles and transferring price risk to the contractor over time as the contractor becomes familiar with the assets being maintained.

The SMC model meets RMS’ requirements for flexibility in pricing models, the need for collaboration in asset maintenance planning, promoting innovation and effective performance management.

RMS used many good practices to develop the SMC model, including:

  • preparing a robust business case comparing the SMC model to RMS maintaining the road network itself, as well as assessing whether two other contracting models
    (traditional and alliance) would meet its requirements
  • assessing experiences with similar arrangements in other jurisdictions and identifying elements that worked to get the best outcomes
  • developing a robust performance framework, which included a mix of efficiency and effectiveness KPIs that reflected NSW Government policy and RMS priorities
  • incorporating risk and reward incentives delivered through cost sharing arrangements which change as the contract matures
  • using a contract duration that supports RMS priorities and provides an incentive for better quality outcomes.

RMS uses data provided by the contractor to measure performance and calculate payments to the contractor. The SMC includes a specific sanction if RMS finds that the contractor provided incorrect performance data, but no specific sanction if the contractor provides incorrect financial data. If RMS finds that the contactor provided incorrect performance or financial data, RMS can only recover over-payments which may have been made using the incorrect data.  

To provide a stronger incentive for the contractor to ensure data it provides is accurate, RMS should consider whether to incorporate stronger sanctions when negotiating the commercial reset due in mid-2018 for south and west zones. RMS should also consider this for the new contract for the north zone when the current PSMC contract expires in October 2018.

RMS' contract management approach and benefits realization

RMS can improve the effectiveness of its oversight and management of the SMC

RMS does not have SMC specific contract procedures to guide its contract managers. Consequently, RMS has not exercised several significant SMC requirements, such as having the contractors account for an efficiency dividend in their pricing at the start of each three-year works period. Effective contract management should be supported by contract specific procedures, with explanations of, and allocation of responsibility for, the various interventions that RMS may be required to exercise in the SMC.

Performance and financial reporting under the SMC is based on a mix of RMS and contractor provided data. While there are a range of audits of contractor provided performance and financial data that RMS can conduct each year under the SMC, it does not have a schedule of audits it will conduct and when.  
During the first year of the SMC, RMS commissioned some limited audits of financial data. In the first three years of the SMC, RMS did not conduct any audits of performance data. Had there been SMC specific procedures in place, this would have reduced the risk of RMS not implementing a systematic audit program to give it reasonable assurance on the quality of the data that the contractor has provided. This is important because the data is used to measure performance and calculate contractor payments.

RMS has been aware of data quality issues since 2015. While RMS advised that it commenced addressing some data quality issues in response to a series of reviews conducted in 2015, a recent internal audit report indicates that RMS has not resolved the data quality issues.  

RMS achieved benefits in the first year, but has not tracked benefits since

As part of the business case, RMS agreed to implement a benefits realisation strategy, including a benefits tracking tool. RMS commenced tracking benefits, but did not establish a comparative baseline pre-SMC on non-financial benefits, and has not tracked benefits past year one.

In 2015, a benchmarking study commissioned by RMS found that it had achieved 80 per cent of the expected recurrent cost savings and other benefits, such as improved workplace safety, in the first full year of the SMC. However, there was no clear baseline to measure
non-financial performance. The study was qualified due to gaps in available data. The study also did not reconcile the actual one-off transition costs to the business case estimate.

During the course of the audit, RMS advised that it intends to repeat this type of study to determine whether it has achieved all expected benefits (and their value), and that it would use the results to inform its negotiation with the SMC contractors as part of the commercial reset due in mid-2018.

Roads and Maritime Services is responsible for the State Roads network in the Sydney region

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is responsible for the Sydney region State roads network. This includes over 2,800 kilometres of roads and associated road corridor infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and drainage structures. The network is divided into three geographical areas: south, west and north zones. Prior to November 2013, RMS maintained roads in the Sydney region south and west zones through its Road and Fleet Services unit.  

In 1995, RMS first outsourced road corridor infrastructure maintenance for the north zone through a Performance Specified Maintenance Contract (PSMC). The current 10-year PSMC for the north zone will expire in October 2018. This contract is worth around $35 million per annum.  

NSW Government priorities and road maintenance

Efficient and effective road maintenance contributes to the following NSW Government priorities:

  • improving road travel reliability
  • ensuring on-time running of public transport
  • reducing road fatalities
  • improving government services
  • keeping our environment clean.

The NSW Commission of Audit recommended outsourcing the maintenance of State roads

The NSW Commission of Audit in its Final Report on Government Expenditure (May 2012) recommended contestability as an appropriate strategy to consider for improving road maintenance service delivery for State roads.  

The Commission benchmarked RMS’ road surface quality and cost per lane kilometre against those of Western Australia, Victoria, and Queensland. This showed that New South Wales lagged the other states on both these measures.  

Exhibit 1: Interjurisdictional comparison of road maintenance outcomes 2009–10
  WA VIC QLD NSW
Roads managed (lane kms) 52,659 50,510 71,353 80,348
Estimated spend ($/lane km) 5,000 4,500 6,000 7,000
Road quality measure (%) 99 99 94 91

Source: NSW Commission of Audit Final Report May 2012.

The Commission noted that RMS had conducted two independent reviews to examine the potential for extending road maintenance contestability. The Commission found that there was inadequate and inconclusive benchmarking to establish the efficiency of RMS’ Road and Fleet Services unit when compared to outsourcing. It recommended that RMS bring forward a proposal to conduct a competitive tender for the road maintenance of the Sydney region south zone road network to inform the feasibility of a progressive rollout of road maintenance contestability across other areas of the State. In August 2012, the NSW Government adopted the Commission’s recommendation.

The NSW Government introduced road maintenance contestability through Stewardship Maintenance Contracts

In April 2013, the NSW Government announced that it would introduce road maintenance contestability across the Sydney region, using a Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC) model to improve value for money. In doing so, it excluded RMS’ Road and Fleet Services unit from tendering.  

The SMC model is based on the following key commercial and performance principles set by RMS:

  • performance driven by outcomes
  • flexible and adaptable
  • transparent and measurable
  • linking risk to reward
  • continuous improvement
  • criteria for selection of, and transition to, different payment models.

The following key stewardship principles underpin the SMC’s broad set of values, attitudes and behaviours, which are required of the contractor to effectively manage the assets on behalf of RMS:

  • putting RMS’ customers (road users and the general public) first and being responsive to them
  • being responsible and accountable for the outcomes resulting from the management of the assets
  • managing the assets diligently, efficiently and effectively with limited direction from RMS
  • working collaboratively with RMS to deliver services that are tailored to meet RMS’ evolving needs
  • acting with integrity and transparency in performing the services
  • performing the services in the best interests of RMS and asset users.

Other key features of the SMC include:

  • service requirements which describe the scope of the services, and the standards the contractor must meet
  • a commercial framework which defines how payments are structured, how performance assessment will impact on payments and outlines the key commercial principles. SMCs primarily divide payments into two main mechanisms, these being the priced component (or fixed price) and the target cost calculated as follows:
    • fixed price – the contractor is paid a pre-agreed amount for specific services being provided, regardless of the actual costs incurred
    • target cost – RMS and the contractor agree on a target cost for a project, and any cost overruns or underruns are shared between them
  • a performance framework which provides mechanisms for assessing contractor performance. This includes a comprehensive listing of the key result areas (KRAs) and key performance indicators (KPIs) against which RMS measures the contractor’s performance. The framework also outlines the scoring methodology that RMS uses to determine whether the contractor’s bid margin (profit and overheads) is reduced due to less than satisfactory performance or whether a bonus is paid if a threshold performance score is exceeded.

Road maintenance under SMCs for Sydney region south and west zones commenced in November 2013

In November 2013, RMS awarded SMCs to the Leighton Boral Amey consortium, now named Ventia Boral Amey (VBA), for the south zone and the DownerMouchel (DM) consortium for the west zone. The contracts run for seven years with an option for a further three years at RMS’ discretion. In April 2014, full services commenced following a four-month transition period. RMS estimated that the annual cost of these contracts was around $240 million in total. In March 2018, the contract prices are due to be reset by negotiation to reflect the contractors’ experience with, and better information about, the road networks and routine maintenance requirements. 

  1. Roads and Maritime Services should consider whether to incorporate stronger sanctions in the Stewardship Maintenance Contract if the contractor provides incorrect performance or financial data to RMS, when:
     
    1. negotiating the commercial reset for the next works period with the Sydney region south and west zone contractors due in July 2018.
    2. finalising a new SMC contract for the Sydney region north zone, due to commence in October 2018.

Roads and Maritime Services should, by September 2017:

2.  Review its contract management framework for SMCs to ensure that all authorities and accountabilities of
     contract managers are clearly defined, including:

a) accountability and procedures for exercising all operational clauses in the SMC where RMS may opt to, or be required to intervene, or make a decision

b) authority to approve or initiate the interventions RMS is required to, or may, exercise under the SMC

c) the audits that RMS will conduct to systematically validate the performance and financial data that the SMC contractors provide

d) the accountabilities of RMS contract managers to systematically review audits and quality reviews that the SMC contractors must conduct to demonstrate compliance with their service plans

e) the accountabilities of RMS contract managers to check that the monthly and annual reports provided by SMC contractors do not contain errors, omissions or inaccuracies.

3.  Improve its management of benefits realisation by:

a) initiating a further benefits realisation review and record the benefits delivered against those
    estimated following the tender process, including the one-off transition costs

b) identify any benefits, including savings, not yet attained and develop strategies to address any short-falls

c) establish a tool to track the ongoing realisation of benefits.

Published

Actions for NorthConnex

NorthConnex

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Transport
Compliance
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement

The processes used to assess NorthConnex adequately considered value for money for taxpayers.This report also found that the impact of tolling concessions on road users and the motorway network was consistent with policy objectives described in the 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan.

NorthConnex is a nine-kilometre tolled motorway tunnel between the M1 Pacific motorway at Wahroonga and the M2 Hills motorway at West Pennant Hills. The total cost for the project is $3.1 billion. NorthConnex will be funded through toll charges, and contributions from the NSW and Australian Governments of up to $405 million each. In January 2015, the NSW Roads Minister signed the final contracts for NorthConnex.

By December 2017, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

1. publish an updated ‘Unsolicited Proposals – Guide for Submission and Assessment’ which clarifies obligations with requirements in other NSW Government policies such as the NSW PPP guideline and Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework. The update should require:

a) a business case to be prepared, and a business case gateway review completed, as part of the assessment of the detailed proposal (currently stage 2)

b) probity reports must be completed and considered before the decision to proceed to the next stage.
 

The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Treasury should immediately:

2. improve record keeping to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998 and the NSW Government Standard on Records Management.