Reports
Transport 2020
1. Financial Reporting |
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| Audit opinion | Unmodified audit opinions issued for the financial statements of all Transport cluster entities. |
| Quality and timeliness of financial reporting | All cluster agencies met the statutory deadlines for completing the early close and submitting the financial statements. Transport cluster agencies continued to experience some challenges with accounting for land and infrastructure assets. The former Roads and Maritime Services and Sydney Metro recorded prior period corrections to property, plant and equipment balances. |
| Impact of COVID-19 on passenger revenue and patronage | Total patronage and revenue for public transport decreased by approximately 18 per cent in 2019–20 due to COVID-19. The Transport cluster received additional funding from NSW Treasury during the year to support the reduced revenue and additional costs incurred such as cleaning on all modes of public transport and additional staff to manage physical distancing. |
| Completion of the CBD and South East Light Rail | The CBD and South East Light Rail project was completed and commenced operations in this financial year. At 30 June 2020, the total cost of the project related to the CBD and South East Light Rail was $3.3 billion. Of this total cost, $2.6 billion was recorded as assets, whilst $700 million was expensed. |
2. Audit Observations |
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| Internal control | While internal controls issues raised in management letters in the Transport cluster have decreased compared to the prior year, control weaknesses continue to exist in access security for financial systems. We identified 56 management letter findings across the cluster and 43 per cent of all issues were repeat issues. The majority of the repeat issues relate to information technology controls around user access management. There were three high risk issues identified - two related to financial reporting of assets and one for implementation of TAHE (see below). |
| Agency responses to emergency events | Transport for NSW established the COVID-19 Taskforce in March 2020 to take responsibility for the overall response of planning and coordination for the Transport cluster. It also implemented the COVIDSafe Transport Plan which incorporates guidance on physical distancing, increasing services to support social distancing and cleaning. |
| RailCorp transition to TAHE | On 1 July 2020, RailCorp was renamed Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE) and converted to a for-profit statutory State-Owned Corporation. TAHE is a commercial for-profit Public Trading Entity with the intent to provide a commercial return to its shareholders. A plan was established by NSW Treasury to transition RailCorp to TAHE which covered the period 1 July 2015 to 1 July 2019. A large portion of the planned arrangements were not implemented by 1 July 2020. As at the time of this report, the TAHE operating model, Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) and other key plans and commercial agreements are not finalised. The State Owned Corporations Act 1989 generally requires finalisation of an SCI three months after the commencement of each financial year. However, under the Transport Administration Act 1988, TAHE received an extension from the voting shareholders, the Treasurer and Minister for Finance and Small Business, to submit its first SCI by 31 December 2020. In accordance with the original plan, interim commercial access arrangements were supposed to be in place with RailCorp prior to commencement of TAHE. Under the transitional arrangements, TAHE is continuing to operate in accordance with the asset and safety management plans of RailCorp. The final operating model is expected to include considerations of safety, operational, financial and fiscal risks. This should include a consideration of the potential conflicting objectives of a commercial return, and maintenance and safety measures. This matter has been included as a high risk finding in our management letter due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for TAHE. Recommendation: TAHE management should:
Resolution of the above matters are critical as they may significantly impact the financial reporting arrangements for TAHE for 2020–21, in particular, accounting policies adopted as well as measurement principles of its significant infrastructure asset base. |
| Completeness and accuracy of contracts registers | Across the Transport cluster, contracts and agreements are maintained by the transport agencies using disparate registers. Recommendation (repeat): Transport agencies should continue to implement a process to centrally capture all contracts and agreements entered. This will ensure:
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This report provides parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations
- the impact of emergencies and the pandemic.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.
Section highlights
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Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our:
- observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster
- assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.
Section highlights
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Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations
Appendix two – Status of 2019, 2018 and 2017 recommendations
Appendix three – Management letter findings
Appendix four – Financial data
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Planning, Industry and Environment 2020
This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.
1. Financial reporting
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Audit opinions |
There are 45 separate entities in the cluster. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 38 cluster agencies' 30 June 2020 financial statements audits. Four financial statements audits are still ongoing, and three agencies were not subject to audit due to NSW Treasury reporting exemptions. |
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Timeliness of financial reporting |
The majority of cluster agencies subject to statutory reporting deadlines met the revised timeline for submitting financial statements. Twenty‑four of the 26 cluster agencies required to submit early close financial statements met the revised timeframe. Due to issues identified during the audit, 13 financial statements audits were not completed and audit opinions not issued by the statutory deadline. |
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Implementation of AASB 16 'Leases' |
Significant deficiencies were identified in Property NSW's lease data maintenance and lease calculations. Recommendation (partially repeat): Property NSW should:
Our audits of the cluster agencies identified there was a lack of thorough quality assurance over the accuracy of lease information provided by Property NSW. Recommendation: The Department and cluster agencies should:
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Unprocessed Aboriginal land claims continued to increase |
In 2019–20, the Department resolved an additional 468 Aboriginal land claims compared to the prior year. However, the total number of unprocessed Aboriginal land claims increased by 914 to 36,769 at 30 June 2020. The number of claims remaining unprocessed for more than ten years after lodgement increased by 10.9 per cent from last year. Until claims are resolved, there is an uncertainty over who is entitled to the land and the uses and activities that can be carried out on the land. Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament since 2007 have recommended action to address the increasing number of unprocessed claims. To date, the Department has not been able to resolve this issue. During 2020–21, a performance audit will assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the administration of Aboriginal land claims. |
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Financial reporting of Crown land managers |
The Department will need to provide additional support and guidance to help Crown land managers (CLMs) meet their financial reporting obligations. Recommendation: The Department should:
During 2019–20, NSW Treasury established the reporting exemption criteria for the CLMs. Based on available information, the Department determined 31 CLMs would not meet the exemption criteria and therefore are required to prepare annual financial statements. |
2. Audit observations
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Internal controls |
Six high‑risk issues were identified across the cluster in 2019–20:
One in three internal control issues identified and reported to management in 2019–20 were repeat issues. Recommendation: Management letter recommendations to address internal control weaknesses should be actioned promptly, with a focus on addressing high‑risk and repeat issues. |
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Agencies response to recent emergencies |
The unprecedented bushfires and COVID‑19 pandemic presented challenges for the cluster. Agencies established taskforces or response teams to respond to these emergencies. With more staff working from home, agencies implemented protocols and procedures to manage risks associated with the remote working arrangements, and also needed to address certain technology issues. The Department is responsible for the new Planning System Acceleration Program, which aims to fast‑track planning assessments, boost the State's economy and keep people in jobs during COVID‑19 pandemic. Between April and October 2020, the Department announced and determined 101 major projects and planning proposals. |
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Recognition of Crown land |
Crown land is an important asset of the State. Management and recognition of Crown land assets is weakened when there is confusion over who is responsible for a particular Crown land parcel. Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament since 2017 have recommended that the Department should ensure the database of Crown land is complete and accurate. Whilst the Department has commenced actions to improve the database, this remained an issue in 2019–20. Recommendation (repeat issue): The Department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate. This allows state agencies and local councils to be better informed about the Crown land they control. |
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Implementation of Machinery of Government (MoG) changes |
Since its creation on 1 July 2019, the Department has largely established its governance arrangements, including setting up the Audit and Risk Committee and internal audit function for the Department and relevant cluster agencies. The Department still operated three main financial reporting systems in 2019–20, and has commenced the process to consolidate some of the systems. The recent Regional NSW MoG change led to the transfer of $446 million net assets and $284 million 2019–20 budget from the Department to the newly created Department of Regional NSW on 2 April 2020. |
This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations
- the impact of emergencies and the pandemic.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
The COVID‑19 Legislation Amendment (Emergency Measures–Treasurer) Act 2020 amended legislation administered by the Treasurer to implement further emergency measures as a result of the COVID‑19 pandemic. These amendments:
- allowed the Treasurer to authorise payments from the Consolidated fund until the enactment of the 2020–21 budget – impacting the going concern assessments of cluster agencies
- revised budgetary, financial and annual reporting time frames – impacting the timeliness of financial reporting
- exempted certain statutory bodies and departments from preparing financial statements.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.
Section highlights
The Department has not yet developed a statutory reporting framework for Crown land managers and will need to provide additional resources to help Crown land managers meet their financial reporting obligations. |
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our:
- observations and insights from our financial statements audits of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster
- assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies
- review of how the cluster agencies managed the increased risks associated with new programs aimed at stemming the spread of COVID-19 and stimulating the economy.
Cluster agencies experienced a range of control and governance related issues in recent years. An increased number of high risk issues and greater proportion of repeat issues were identified as part of our audits. It is important for cluster agencies to promptly address these issues.
Section highlights
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Waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today that examined the effectiveness of the waste levy and grants for waste infrastructure in minimising the amount of waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates.
The audit found that the waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, while the levy rates increase each year in line with the consumer price index, the EPA has not conducted a review since 2009 to confirm whether they are set at the optimal level. The audit also found that there were no objective and transparent criteria for which local government areas should pay the levy, and the list of levied local government areas has not been reviewed since 2014.
Grant funding programs for waste infrastructure administered by the EPA and the Environmental Trust have supported increases in recycling capacity. However, these grant programs are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure.
The Auditor-General made six recommendations aimed at ensuring the waste levy is as effective as possible at meeting its objectives and ensuring funding for waste infrastructure is contributing effectively to recycling and waste diversion targets.
Overall, waste generation in New South Wales (NSW) is increasing. This leads to an increasing need to manage waste in ways that reduce the environmental impact of waste and promote the efficient use of resources. In 2014, the NSW Government set targets relating to recycling rates and diversion of waste from landfill, to be achieved by 2021–22. The NSW Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 identifies the waste levy, a strong compliance regime, and investment in recycling infrastructure as key tools for achieving these waste targets.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Government in minimising waste sent to landfill and increasing recycling rates. The audit focused on the waste levy, which is paid by waste facility operators when waste is sent to landfill, and grant programs that fund infrastructure for waste reuse and recycling.
The waste levy is regulated by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and is generally paid when waste is disposed in landfill. The waste levy rates are set by the NSW Government and prescribed in the Protection of Environment Operations (Waste) Regulation 2014. As part of its broader role in reviewing the regulatory framework for managing waste and recycling, the EPA can provide advice to the government on the operation of the waste levy.
The purpose of the waste levy is to act as an incentive for waste generators to reduce, re-use or recycle waste by increasing the cost of sending waste to landfill. In 2019–20, around $750 million was collected through the waste levy in NSW. The government spends approximately one third of the revenue raised through the waste levy on waste and environmental programs.
One of the waste programs funded through the one third allocation of the waste levy is Waste Less, Recycle More (WLRM). This initiative funds smaller grant programs that focus on specific aspects of waste management. This audit focused on five grant programs that fund projects that provide new or enhanced waste infrastructure such as recycling facilities. Four of these programs were administered by the Environmental Trust and one by the EPA.
Conclusion
The waste levy has a positive impact on diverting waste from landfill. However, aspects of the EPA's administration of the waste levy could be improved, including the frequency of its modelling of the waste levy impact and coverage, and the timeliness of reporting. Grant funding programs have supported increases in recycling capacity but are not guided by a clear strategy for investment in waste infrastructure which would help effectively target them to where waste infrastructure is most needed. Data published by the EPA indicates that the NSW Government is on track to meet the recycling target for construction and demolition waste, but recycling targets for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste are unlikely to be met.
Waste levy
The waste levy rate, including a schedule of annual increases to 2016, was set by the NSW Government in 2009. Since 2016, the waste levy rate has increased in line with the consumer price index (CPI). The EPA has not conducted recent modelling to test whether the waste levy is set at the optimal level to achieve its objectives. The waste levy operation was last reviewed in 2012, although some specific aspects of the waste levy have been reviewed more recently, including reviews of waste levy rates for two types of waste. The waste levy is applied at different rates across the state. Decisions about which local government areas (LGAs) are subject to the levy, and which rate each LGA pays, were made in 2009 and potential changes were considered but not implemented in 2014. Currently, there are no objective and transparent criteria for determining which LGAs pay the levy. The EPA collects waste data from waste operators. This data has improved since 2015, but published data is at least one year out of date which limits its usefulness to stakeholders when making decisions relating to waste management.
Grants for waste infrastructure
All state funding for new and enhanced waste infrastructure in NSW is administered through grants to councils and commercial waste operators. The government's Waste and Resource Recovery (WARR) Strategy 2014–21 includes few priorities for waste infrastructure and there is no other waste infrastructure strategy in place to guide investment. The absence of a formal strategy to guide infrastructure investment in NSW limits the ability of the State Government to develop a shared understanding between planners, councils and the waste industry about waste infrastructure requirements and priorities. The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment is currently developing a 20-year waste strategy and there is an opportunity for the government to take a more direct role in planning the type, location and timing of waste infrastructure needed in NSW.
The grants administration procedures used for the grant programs reviewed in this audit were well designed. However, we identified some gaps in risk management, record-keeping and consistency of information provided to applicants and assessment teams. In four of the five programs we examined, there was no direct alignment between program objectives and the NSW Government's overall waste targets.
Achievement of the 2014–21 state targets for waste and resource recovery (WARR targets) is reliant in part on the availability of infrastructure that supports waste diversion and recycling. The state WARR targets dependent on waste infrastructure are:
- Increase recycling rates to 70 per cent for municipal solid waste and commercial and industrial waste, and 80 per cent for construction and demolition waste.
- Increase waste diverted from landfill to 75 per cent.
A further target — manage problem waste better by establishing or upgrading 86 drop-off facilities or services for managing household problem wastes state-wide — is dependent on accessible community waste drop-off facilities across NSW.
Exhibit 7 identifies the five grant programs that provide funding for new or enhanced waste infrastructure to increase capacity for reuse or recycling of waste. All five of these programs were examined in the audit.
In addition to the grant programs shown in Exhibit 7, other programs provide funding for infrastructure, but at a smaller scale. Examples of these include:
- Bin Trim which provides rebates to small businesses for small scale recycling equipment such as cardboard and soft plastic balers.
- Litter grants which provide funding for litter bins.
- Weighbridges grants for installation of a weighbridge at waste facilities.
- Landfill consolidation and environmental improvement grants for rural councils to replace old landfills with transfer stations or to improve the infrastructure at landfill sites.
Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #343 - released 26 November 2020
Internal controls and governance 2020
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford today released her report on the findings and recommendations from the 2019–20 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector.
The bushfire and flood emergencies and the COVID‑19 pandemic continue to have a significant impact on the people and public sector of New South Wales. The scale of the government response to these events has been significant. The report focuses on the effectiveness of internal controls and governance processes, including relevant agencies’ response to the emergencies. In particular, the report focuses on:
- financial and information technology controls
- business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements
- procurement, including emergency procurement
- delegations that support timely and effective decision-making.
Due to the ongoing impact of COVID‑19 agencies have not yet returned to a business‑as‑usual environment. ‘Agencies will need to assess their response to the recent emergencies and update their business continuity, disaster recovery and other business resilience frameworks to reflect the lessons learnt from these events’ the Auditor-General said.
The report noted that special procurement provisions were put in place to allow agencies to better respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Auditor-General recommended agencies update their procurement policies to reflect the current requirements of the NSW Procurement Framework and the emergency procurement requirements.
This report analyses the internal controls and governance of 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2020. These 40 agencies constitute an estimated 85 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.
1. Internal control trends
| New, repeat and high risk findings |
Internal control deficiencies increased by 13 per cent compared to last year. This is predominately due to a seven per cent increase in new internal control deficiencies and 24 per cent increase in repeat internal control deficiencies. There were ten high risk findings compared to four last year. The recent emergencies have consumed agency time and resources and may have contributed to the increase in internal control deficiencies, particularly repeat deficiencies. Agencies should:
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| Common findings |
A number of findings remain common across multiple agencies over the last four years, including:
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2. Information technology controls
| IT general controls |
We found deficiencies in information security controls over key financial systems including:
The deficiencies above increase the risk of non-compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy, which requires agencies to have processes in place to manage user access, including privileged user access to sensitive information or systems and remove that access once it is not required or employment is terminated. |
3. Business continuity and disaster recovery planning
| Assessing risks to business continuity and Scenario testing |
The response to the recent emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic has encompassed a wide range of activities, including policy setting, on-going service delivery, safety and availability of staff, availability of IT and other systems and financial management. Agencies were required to activate their business continuity plans in response, and with the continued impact of COVID-19 have not yet returned to a business-as-usual environment. Our audits focused on the preparedness of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. We identified deficiencies in agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements. Twenty-three per cent of agencies had not conducted a business impact analysis (BIA) to identify critical business functions and determine business continuity priorities. Agencies can also improve the content of their BIA. For example, ten per cent of agencies' BIAs did not include recovery time objectives and six per cent of agencies did not identify key IT systems that support critical business functions. Scenario testing improves the effectiveness with which a live crisis is handled, but 40 per cent of agencies had not conducted a business continuity scenario testing exercise in the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. There were also opportunities to improve the effectiveness of scenario testing exercises by:
Agencies have responded to the recent emergencies but addressing deficiencies will ensure agencies have adequate safeguards in their processes to again respond in the future, if required. During 2020–21 we plan to conduct a performance audit on 'Business continuity and disaster recovery planning'. This audit will consider the effectiveness of agency business continuity planning arrangements to maintain business continuity through the recent emergencies and/or COVID-19 pandemic and return to a business-as-usual environment. We also plan to conduct a performance audit on whole-of-government 'Coordination of emergency responses'. |
| Responding to disruptions |
We found agencies' governance functions could have been better informed about responses to disruptive incidents that had activated a business continuity or disaster recovery response between 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. For instance: in 89 per cent of instances where a business continuity response was activated, a post-incident review had been performed. In 82 per cent of these instances, the outcomes were reported to a relevant governance or executive management committee in 95 per cent of instances where a disaster recovery response was activated, a post incident review had been performed. In 86 per cent of these instances, the outcomes were reported to a relevant governance committee or executive management committee. Examples of recorded incidents included extensive air quality issues and power outages due to bushfires, system and network outages, and infected and hijacked servers. Agencies should assess their response to the recent emergencies and the COVID-19 pandemic and update business continuity, disaster recovery and other business resilience frameworks to incorporate lessons learned. Agencies should report to those charged with governance on the results and planned actions. |
| Management review and oversight | Eighty-two per cent and 86 per cent of agencies report to their audit and risk committees (ARC) on their business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements, respectively. Only 18 per cent and five per cent of ARCs are briefed on the results of respective scenario testing. Briefing ARCs on the results of scenario testing exercises helps inform their decisions about whether sound and effective business continuity and disaster recovery arrangements have been established. |
4. Procurement, including emergency procurement
| Policy framework |
Agency procurement policies did not capture the requirements of several key NSW Procurement Board Directions (the Directions), increasing the risk of non-compliance with the Directions. We noted:
Recommendation: Agencies should review their procurement policies and guidelines to ensure they capture the key requirements of the NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework, including NSW Procurement Board Directions. |
| Managing contracts |
Eighty-eight per cent of agencies maintain a central contract register to record all details of contracts above $150,000, which is a requirement of GIPA legislation. Of the agencies that maintained registers, 13 per cent did not capture all contracts and eight per cent did not include all relevant contract details. Sixteen per cent of agencies did not periodically review their contract register. Timely review increases compliance with GIPA legislation, and enhances the effectiveness with which procurement business units monitor contract end dates, contract extensions and commence new procurement. |
| Training and support |
Ninety-three per cent of agencies provide training to staff involved in procurement processes, and a further 77 per cent of agencies provide this training on an on-going basis. Of the seven per cent of agencies that had not provided training to staff, we noted gaps in aspects of their procurement activity, including:
Training on procurement activities ensures there is effective management of procurement processes to support operational requirements, and compliance with procurement directions. |
| Procurement activities | While agencies had implemented controls for tender activities above $650,000, 43 per cent of unaccredited agencies did not comply with the NSW Procurement Policy Framework because they had not had their procurement endorsed by an accredited agency within the cluster or by NSW Procurement. This endorsement aims to ensure the procurement is properly planned to deliver a value for money outcome before it commences. |
| Emergency procurement |
As at 30 June 2020, agencies within the scope of this report reported conducting 32,239 emergency procurements with a total contract value of $316,908,485. Emergency procurement activities included the purchase of COVID-19 cleaning and hygiene supplies. The government, through NSW Procurement released the 'COVID-19 Emergency procurement procedure', which relaxed procurement requirements to allow agencies to make COVID-19 emergency procurements. Our review against the emergency procurement measures found most agencies complied with requirements. For example:
Complying with the procedure helps to ensure government resources are being efficiently, effectively, economically and in accordance with the law. Recommendation: Agency procurement frameworks should be reviewed and updated so they can respond effectively to emergency situations that may arise in the future. This includes:
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5. Delegations
| Instruments of delegation |
We found that agencies have established financial and human resources delegations, but some had not revisited their delegation manuals following the legislative and machinery of government changes. For those agencies impacted by machinery of government changes we noted:
Delegations manuals are not always complete; 16 per cent of agencies had no delegation for writing off bad debts and 26 per cent of agencies had no delegation for writing off capital assets. Recommendation: Agencies should ensure their financial and human resources delegation manuals contain regular set review dates and are updated to reflect the Government Sector Finance Act 2018, machinery of government changes and their current organisational structure and roles and responsibilities. |
| Compliance with delegations |
Agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act), resulting in non-compliance with the Act. We found that 18 per cent of agencies spent deemed appropriations without obtaining an authorised delegation from the relevant Minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act. Further detail on this issue will be included in our Auditor-General's Reports to Parliament on Central Agencies, Education, Health and Stronger Communities, which will be tabled throughout December 2020. Recommendation: Agencies should review financial and human resources delegations to ensure they capture all key functions of laws and regulations, and clearly specify the relevant power or function being conferred on the officer. |
6. Status of 2019 recommendations
| Progress implementing last year's recommendations |
Recommendations were made last year to improve transparency over reporting on gifts and benefits and improve the visibility management and those charged with governance had over actions taken to address conflicts of interest that may arise. This year, we continue to note:
While we acknowledge the significance of the recent emergencies, which have consumed agency time and resources, we note limited progress has been made implementing these recommendations. Further detail on the status of implementing all recommendations is in Appendix 2. Recommendation: Agencies should re-visit the recommendations made in last year's report on internal controls and governance and action these recommendations. |
Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:
- operate effectively and efficiently
- produce reliable financial reports
- comply with laws and regulations
- support ethical government.
This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this report presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.
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Section highlights We identified ten high risk findings, compared to four last year with two findings repeated from the previous year. There was an overall increase of 13 per cent in the number of internal control deficiencies compared to last year due to a seven per cent increase in new internal control deficiencies, and a 24 per cent increase in repeat internal control deficiencies. The recent emergencies have consumed agency time and resources and may have contributed to the increase in internal control deficiencies, particularly repeat deficiencies. We identified a number of findings that remain common across multiple agencies over the last four years. Some of these findings related to areas that are fundamental to good internal control environments and effective organisational governance. Examples include:
Policies, procedures and internal controls should be properly designed, be appropriate for the current organisational structure and its business activities, and work effectively. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.
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Section highlights Government agencies’ financial reporting is heavily reliant on information technology (IT). We continue to see a high number of deficiencies related to IT general controls, particularly those related to user access administration. These controls are key in adequately protecting IT systems from inappropriate access and misuse. IT is also important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our financial audits do not review all agency IT systems. For example, IT systems used to support agency service delivery are generally outside the scope of our financial audit. However, agencies should also consider the relevance of our findings to these systems. Agencies need to continue to focus on assessing the risks of inappropriate access and misuse and the implementation of controls to adequately protect their systems, focussing on the processes in place to grant, remove and monitor user access, particularly privileged user access. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements.
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Section highlights We identified deficiencies in agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements and opportunities for agencies to enhance their business continuity management and disaster recovery planning arrangements. This will better prepare them to respond to a disruption to their critical functions, resulting from an emergency or other serious event. Twenty-three per cent of agencies had not conducted a business impact analysis (BIA) to identify critical business functions and determine business continuity priorities and 40 per cent of agencies had not conducted a business continuity scenario testing exercise in the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2019. Scenario testing improves the effectiveness with which a live crisis is handled. This section focusses on the preparedness of agency business continuity and disaster recovery planning arrangements prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. While agencies have responded to the recent emergencies, proactively addressing deficiencies will ensure agencies have adequate safeguards in their processes to again respond in the future, if required. During 2020–21 we plan to conduct a performance audit on 'Business continuity and disaster recovery planning'. This audit will consider the effectiveness of agency business continuity planning arrangements to maintain business continuity through the recent emergencies and/or COVID-19 pandemic and return to a business-as-usual environment. We also plan to conduct a performance audit on whole-of-government 'Coordination of emergency responses'. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of procurement agency procurement policies and procurement activity.
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Section highlights We found agencies have procurement policies in place to manage procurement activity, but the content of these policies was not sufficiently detailed to ensure compliance with NSW Procurement Board Directions (the Directions). The Directions aim to ensure procurement activity achieves value for money and meets the principles of probity and fairness. Agencies have generally implemented controls over their procurement process. In relation to emergency procurement activity, agencies reported conducting 32,239 emergency procurements with a total contract value of $316,908,485 up to 30 June 2020. Our review of emergency procurement activity conducted during 2019–20 identified areas where some agencies did not fully comply with the 'COVID-19 Emergency procurement procedure'. We also found not all agencies are maintaining complete and accurate contract registers. This not only increases the risk of non-compliance with GIPA legislation, but also limits the effectiveness of procurement business units to monitor contract end dates, contract extensions and commence new procurement in a timely manner. We noted instances where agencies renewed or extended contracts without going through a competitive tender process during the year. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency compliance with financial and human resources delegations.
Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations
Appendix two – Status of 2019 recommendations
Appendix three – Cluster agencies
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Support for regional town water infrastructure
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining whether the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has effectively supported the planning for, and funding of, town water infrastructure in regional NSW.
The audit found that the department has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning since at least 2014. It does not have a clear regulatory approach and lacks internal procedures and data to guide its support for local water utilities that service around 1.85 million people in regional NSW.
The audit also found that the department has not had a strategy in place to target investments in town water infrastructure to the areas of greatest priority. A state-wide plan is now in development.
The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to the department, aimed at improving the administration and transparency of its oversight, support and funding for town water infrastructure, and at strengthening its sector engagement and interagency coordination on town water planning issues and investments.
According to the Auditor-General, ‘A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and to work with local water utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities.’
This report is part of a multi-volume series on the theme of water. Refer to ‘Water conservation in Greater Sydney’ and ‘Water management and regulation – undertaking in 2020-21’.
Safe and reliable water and sewer services are essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. In 2019, during intense drought, around ten regional New South Wales (NSW) cities or towns were close to ‘zero’ water and others had six to 12 months of supply. In some towns, water quality was declared unsafe.
Ensuring the right water and sewer infrastructure in regional NSW to deliver these services (known as 'town water infrastructure') involves a strategic, integrated approach to water management. The NSW Government committed to ‘secure long-term potable water supplies for towns and cities’ in 2011. In 2019, it reiterated a commitment to invest in water security by funding town water infrastructure projects.
The New South Wales’ Water Management Act 2000 (WM Act) aims to promote the sustainable, integrated and best practice management of the State’s water resources, and establishes the priority of town water for meeting critical human needs.
The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (the department) is the lead agency for water resource policy, regulation and planning in NSW. It is also responsible for ensuring water management is consistent with the shared commitments of the Australian, State and Territory Governments under the National Water Initiative. This includes the provision of healthy, safe and reliable water supplies, and reporting on the performance of water utilities.
Ninety-two Local Water Utilities (LWUs) plan for, price and deliver town water services in regional NSW. Eighty-nine are operated by local councils under the New South Wales’ Local Government Act 1993, and other LWUs exercise their functions under the WM Act. The Minister for Water, Property and Housing is the responsible minister for water supply functions under both acts.
The department is the primary regulator of LWUs. NSW Health, the NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) and the Natural Access Resource Regulator (NRAR) also regulate aspects of LWUs' operations. The department’s legislative powers with respect to LWUs cover approving infrastructure developments and intervening where there are town water risks, or in emergencies. In this context, the department administers the Best Practice Management of Water Supply and Sewerage Guidelines (BPM Guidelines) to support its regulation and to assist LWUs to strategically plan and price their services, including their planning for town water infrastructure.
Under the BPM Guidelines, the department supports LWU’s town water infrastructure planning with the Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) Checklist. The Checklist outlines steps for LWUs to prepare an IWCM strategy: a long-term planning document that sets out town water priorities, including infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments, water conservation and drought measures. The department's objective is to review and approve (i.e. give ‘concurrence to’) an IWCM strategy before the LWU implements it. In turn, these documents should provide the department with evidence of town water risks, issues and infrastructure priorities.
The department also assesses and co-funds LWU's town water infrastructure projects. In 2017, the department launched the $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program to ensure town water infrastructure in regional NSW is secure and meets current health and environmental standards. The program was initially established under the Restart NSW Fund.
This audit examined whether the department has effectively supported the planning for and funding of town water infrastructure in regional NSW. It focused on the department’s activities since 2014. This audit follows a previous Audit Office of NSW report which found that the department had helped to promote better management practices in the LWU sector, up to 2012–13.
ConclusionThe Department of Planning, Industry and Environment has not effectively supported or overseen town water infrastructure planning in regional NSW since at least 2014. It has also lacked a strategic, evidence-based approach to target investments in town water infrastructure. A continued focus on coordinating town water planning, investments and sector engagement is needed for the department to more effectively support, plan for and fund town water infrastructure, and work with Local Water Utilities to help avoid future shortages of safe water in regional towns and cities. The department has had limited impact on facilitating Local Water Utilities’ (LWU) strategic town water planning. Its lack of internal procedures, records and data mean that the department cannot demonstrate it has effectively engaged, guided or supported the LWU sector in Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning over the past six years. Today, less than ten per cent of the 92 LWUs have an IWCM strategy approved by the department. The department did not design or implement a strategic approach for targeting town water infrastructure investment through its $1 billion Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP). Most projects in the program were reviewed by a technical panel but there was limited evidence available about regional and local priorities to inform strategic project assessments. About a third of funded SSWP projects were recommended via various alternative processes that were not transparent. The department also lacks systems for integrated project monitoring and program evaluation to determine the contribution of its investments to improved town water outcomes for communities. The department has recently developed a risk-based framework to inform future town water infrastructure funding priorities. The department does not have strategic water plans in place at state and regional levels: a key objective of these is to improve town water for regional communities. The department started a program of regional water planning in 2018, following the NSW Government’s commitment to this in 2014. It also started developing a state water strategy in 2020, as part of an integrated water planning framework to align local, regional and state priorities. One of 12 regional water strategies has been completed and the remaining strategies are being developed to an accelerated timeframe: this has limited the department’s engagement with some LWUs on town water risks and priorities. |
Regional New South Wales (NSW) is home to about a third of the state's population. Infrastructure that provides safe and reliable water and sewer services (also known simply as 'town water infrastructure') is essential for community health and wellbeing, environmental protection, and economic productivity. Planning for and meeting these infrastructure needs, as well as identifying when non-infrastructure options may be a better solution, involves a strategic and integrated approach to water resource management in regional NSW.
We examined whether the department has effectively supported planning for town water infrastructure since 2014. This assessment was made in the context of its current approach to LWU sector regulation. The findings below focus on whether the department has an effective framework including governance arrangements for town water issues to inform state-wide strategic water planning, and whether (at the local level) the department has effectively overseen and facilitated town water infrastructure planning through its Integrated Water Cycle Management (IWCM) planning guidance to LWUs.
We examined whether the department has effectively targeted town water infrastructure funding to policy objectives, with a focus on the design and implementation of the Safe and Secure Water Program (SSWP) since its commencement in 2017. The program’s aim was to fund town water infrastructure projects that would deliver health, social and environmental benefits, and support economic growth and productivity. We also assessed the department’s capacity to demonstrate the outcomes of the SSWP funding and the contributions of its town water infrastructure investments more broadly. Finally, we identified risks to the effectiveness of the department’s work underway since 2018–19, which is intended to enhance its strategic water planning and approach to prioritising investments in reducing town water risks.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #341 - released 24 September 2020
Credit card management in Local Government
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining credit card management in Local Government.
The audit was in response to a letter from the then Minister for Local Government in November 2018. The audit assessed the effectiveness of credit card management practices in six councils, including in the areas of policies, procedures, compliance and monitoring.
The audit found that all six councils had gaps in their credit card policies and procedures. The Auditor-General recommended that the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment publish guidelines on credit card management for the Local Government sector. The report also generated insights for the Local Government sector with respect to credit card management.
In 2018–19, all councils responding to an Audit Office survey (representing over 90 per cent of the sector) indicated they issued credit cards to staff members to make work-related purchases. As there are no sector-wide requirements or policies for credit card use and management in Local Government, councils have developed their credit card management frameworks to suit their own needs. The quality of credit card policies and procedures may therefore vary across the sector.
Credit cards are an efficient means of payment, especially for low-value purchases. Compared to the use of petty cash, credit card transactions provide better transparency and accountability for expenditure. By using credit cards, councils only need to make one payment each month, which can reduce the time spent on paying separate vendors, as in the case of purchase orders.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of credit card management practices in six councils: Dubbo Regional Council, Junee Shire Council, Lane Cove Council, Nambucca Valley Council, Penrith City Council and Shellharbour City Council. The councils selected represent a mix of rural, regional and metropolitan councils. They were also among the top ten users of credit cards within their geographical classification, in terms of the number of credit cards issued or the number of transactions per credit card.
This audit referenced the NSW Treasury's Policy and Guidelines Paper TPP17–09 'Use and Management of NSW Government Purchasing Cards', as its principles and recommendations for NSW Government agencies are relevant for councils.
The Audit Office of New South Wales Report on Local Government 2019 provided a high-level overview of credit card management across the sector. While over 90 per cent of councils reported that they had a credit card policy and a credit card acquittal process, the quality of these policies and procedures may vary across the sector as there is no standardised or recommended approach to credit card management for Local Government. This audit complements the Report on Local Government 2019 by providing a detailed discussion of the effectiveness of credit card management practices in councils.
Audit conclusionAll six audited councils had important gaps in their credit card policies and procedures. Their reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud.
The audit found important gaps in each of the six audited councils' credit card management practices. Their policies and procedures covered the essential aspects of credit card use and management, but a lack of coverage or clarity in some areas could lead to inconsistent and inappropriate use of credit cards. These areas included: eligibility to hold a credit card, aligning credit card limits with financial delegations, and the reconciliation procedures.
While all six councils conducted reconciliations of credit card transactions, the processes need to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. Reconciliations had focused solely on verifying receipts, and did not require evidence of business-related purposes, even for transactions such as alcohol purchases or spending at entertainment venues. Five of the six councils also did not include compliance checks in their reconciliation process, such as checking that purchases were not for restricted items.
The level of senior management involvement in monitoring credit card use varied across the six councils. Three of the six councils did not generate regular reports for management oversight. Five of the six councils had no plans for internal audits or targeted reviews of credit card management and use.
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Council staff provided with a credit card can purchase from a wide range of businesses, including online transactions with overseas vendors. However, councils may limit the types of purchases that staff can make through their policies and procedures or by setting controls that block certain transaction types such as cash advances. To examine credit card usage, the audit obtained credit card transaction data from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2019 for the six councils in this review. The data included:
- transaction date
- amount
- merchant category code (MCC)
- merchant name.
The audit analysed the number and value of transactions by each council, and the types of purchases made using credit cards.
The existence of a documented approach to managing credit cards ensures transparency and consistency of use within the council. A credit card management framework that contains preventative and detective controls can also minimise risks of fraud, misuse and wastage.
There is no prescribed credit card management framework for Local Government, but typical components of a credit card management framework include:
- policies and procedures
- guidance for staff
- monitoring and reporting.
With no detailed guidance notes similar to those in TPP17–09 for NSW Government, councils have developed their own credit card management framework based on their size, structure, resources and intended credit card usage. For instance, the size of a council has implications for the number of credit cards issued, which in turn influences the arrangements for training and guidance provided to cardholders and approvers.
The intended level of credit card usage may determine whether a council adopts a manual or electronic credit card management system and councils should identify the system that best meets their needs. For instance, a council with few credit cards may not be able to justify investment in an electronic system. On the other hand, a manual system may only be viable for councils with a low number of credit cards and a low number of transactions.
Among the six councils audited, the three councils with fewer cards and a lower number of transactions had a manual credit card management system, while the three councils with more cards and a higher number of transactions used an electronic system.
Exhibit 10 summarises the six councils' policies on use of credit cards.
| Council | Audit Office classification | Number of staff (full-time equivalent) | Number of credit cards issued (current at August 2019) | Policy on credit card use |
| Dubbo Regional Council | Regional | 453 | 77 | Purchase cards are used for official council business up to $5,000 and the policy allows cardholders to delegate the use of their purchase cards to other staff members. |
| Junee Shire Council | Rural | 71 | 1 | Corporate credit cards are for council business activities and minor purchases where a purchase order is not accepted. Items that can be purchased via a purchase order should not be purchased on a corporate credit card. |
| Lane Cove Council | Metropolitan | 192 | 6 | Corporate credit cards are for official council business, but should not be used when there is an alternative form of payment that aligns with the council's purchasing process. |
| Nambucca Valley Council | Rural | 110 | 37 | Purchase cards are used for the payment of goods and services associated with council businesses. |
| Penrith City Council | Metropolitan | 1,031 | 167 | Purchase cards are used for ‘low value and low risk procurement of goods and services’, while corporate cards are held by senior staff for ‘non-routine low value work related purchases’. |
| Shellharbour City Council | Regional | 372 | 65 | Credit cards are for purchases up to $9,999 and the preferred payment method for transactions under $1,000. |
While it is important for councils to have an established credit card management framework, it is equally important that they ensure compliance in practice. This chapter examines councils' credit card management practices – how well staff members were complying with policies and procedures, and how effective their credit card controls were. The chapter is structured to cover:
- preventative controls (embedded in the issuance, use and cancellation of cards) that prevent fraud and misuse
- detective controls (embedded in reconciliation and record keeping) that assist in detecting fraud and misuse.
Where ineffective credit card management practices are identified, councils should reflect on whether they need to more closely monitor compliance, or whether there are fundamental deficiencies in their policies and procedures that need to be refined.
Dubbo Regional Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. It allowed cardholders to share their credit card with other staff members, which complicated credit card management, increased the risk of misuse and fraud, and breached its agreement with the credit card issuer. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.Dubbo Regional Council had 77 credit cards at the time of the audit. The council's policy on credit card sharing violated its agreement with the card issuer that each credit card should be for the respective cardholder's use only. Credit card sharing also increases the risk of misuse and fraud. The council's credit card policy and procedures lacked clarity in several areas. The eligibility criteria were broad and there was a risk of inconsistency in granting approvals, especially since the council gave approval delegations to multiple senior staff members. The policy and procedures also lacked guidance on the reconciliation of the general manager's credit card and the management of Cabcharge. The audit identified gaps in the council's credit card management practices. While the council had a clear policy on financial delegations, there was no evidence that credit card limits were monitored in line with financial delegations. The credit card register contained inaccurate information, and the council was also unable to provide records of certain transactions requested for review by the audit. The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. It did not include compliance checks or reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. Purchases of restricted items such as fuel, meals and entertainment were not accompanied by evidence of need or exemption. Travel expenses were not checked against travel pre-approval forms. The audit also identified instances of split transactions. The council provided no evidence of the finance team's involvement in the reconciliation of credit card transactions. Senior management oversight of credit card use was lacking, as the council did not produce reports on credit card use. There was also no evidence that the internal auditor had undertaken monitoring activities as required in the credit card policy. RecommendationsDubbo Regional Council should immediately: 1. amend its credit card policy to prevent cardholders from sharing their credit card with other staff. By December 2020, Dubbo Regional Council should: 2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures:
3. ensure that credit card management practices include:
4. ensure reconciliation involves:
5. ensure there is ongoing senior management oversight of credit card use 6. ensure the internal auditor undertakes monitoring activities as specified in the credit card policy. |
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Junee Shire Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud. Junee Shire Council had only one credit card, held by the general manager, at the time of the audit. Staff members could seek approval from the general manager to purchase using the credit card. This raises concerns of credit card sharing, which would be a violation of the council's agreement with its credit card issuer. Credit card sharing also increases the risk of misuse and fraud. The council had fuel cards and store cards for use by staff members. However, its credit card policy and procedures did not cover the management of these types of cards. The lack of documented rules and guidance increases the risk of misuse and fraud. The audit identified other gaps in the council's credit card management practices:
The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. It did not include reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. The council also provided no evidence of the finance team's involvement in the reconciliation of credit card transactions. As the cardholder, the general manager reviewed all transactions every month. As the approver, the mayor (or deputy mayor) had to sign off on these transactions. Hence, there was sufficient management oversight of the council's credit card use. However, there was a lack of periodic review of the council's credit card use, as it was not included in the council's forward program of internal audits. RecommendationsJunee Shire Council should immediately: 1. amend its credit card policy to prevent cardholders from sharing their credit card with other staff. By December 2020, Junee Shire Council should: 2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures:
3. ensure that credit card management practices include:
4. ensure reconciliation involves:
5. develop a plan for periodic reviews (e.g. internal audit) of credit card use and management 6. ensure its credit card policy and procedures are reviewed according to schedule. |
Lane Cove Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.Lane Cove Council had six credit cards, held by the most senior staff members, at the time of the audit. During our interviews, cardholders advised that they had shared their credit card with reporting staff. Credit card sharing is a violation of the council's agreement with its credit card issuer, and it also increases the risk of misuse and fraud. The council's credit card policy lacked clarity in several areas. While the general manager had delegation to authorise the issue of credit cards, the policy did not specify any eligibility criteria. The policy and procedures also lacked guidance on the reconciliation of the general manager's credit card and the management of fuel cards and store cards. The audit identified gaps in the council's credit card management practices. There was no evidence that credit card limits were monitored in line with financial delegations. The credit card register contained inaccurate information, and the council was also unable to provide records of certain transactions requested for review by the audit. The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. The process also did not include compliance checks or reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. Purchases of restricted items such as fuel and fine payments were not accompanied by adequate justification. There was a lack of targeted guidance for approvers in reconciliation, and the council only evidenced the finance team's involvement in an administrative capacity (i.e. entering data into the journals). Senior management oversight of credit card use was lacking. Although the credit card policy referred to management reporting, the council had not been producing such reports at the time of the audit. Management reporting was implemented in December 2019 following our discussions. There was a lack of periodic review of the council's credit card use, as it was not included in the council's forward program of internal audits. The council has adopted a new Management Directive in January 2020, which has clarified the eligibility criteria for credit cards. RecommendationsLane Cove Council should immediately: 1. amend its credit card policy to prevent cardholders from sharing their credit card with other staff. By December 2020, Lane Cove Council should: 2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures:
3. ensure that credit card management practices include:
4. ensure reconciliation involves:
5. develop a plan for periodic reviews (e.g. internal audit) of credit card use and management. |
Nambucca Valley Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.Nambucca Valley Council had 37 credit cards at the time of the audit. During our interviews, cardholders described instances of credit card sharing within the council. Credit card sharing is a violation of the council's agreement with its credit card issuer, and it also increases the risk of misuse and fraud. The council's credit card policy lacked clarity in several areas. While the general manager had delegation to authorise the issue of credit cards, the policy did not specify any eligibility criteria. The policy and procedures lacked guidance on the management of fuel cards, store cards and Cabcharge. The policy also lacked coverage of the reconciliation arrangements for the general manager's credit card as the general manager did not hold a credit card. While the policy did not preclude the mayor and the general manager from holding a credit card, both opted not to do so. The audit identified gaps in the council's credit card management practices. There was no evidence that credit card limits were monitored in line with financial delegations. The credit card register contained inaccurate information, and there was insufficient control in handling staff departures, as the audit identified one incident where a credit card was returned after the staff member's last day. The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. The process also did not include adequate compliance checks or reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. Purchases of restricted items such as fuel and the use of third-party travel websites were not accompanied by adequate justification. Travel expenses were not checked against travel pre-approval forms. The audit also identified instances of split transactions. Senior management oversight of credit card use was insufficient, as the council had been producing reports for only one manager for his department at the time of the audit. Management reporting for the Chief Finance Officer was implemented following our discussions. There was a lack of periodic review of the council's credit card use, as it was not included in the council's forward program of internal audits. The audit acknowledges that the council had revised its credit card procedures following our discussions to address our preliminary findings. The council has also set additional credit card blocks in response to this audit. The recommendations below contain only the outstanding items. RecommendationsNambucca Valley Council should immediately: 1. ensure cardholders stop sharing their credit card with other staff. By December 2020, Nambucca Valley Council should: 2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures:
3. ensure that credit card management practices include:
4. ensure reconciliation involves:
5. develop a plan for periodic reviews (e.g. internal audit) of credit card use and management. |
Penrith City Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.Penrith City Council had 167 credit cards at the time of the audit. During our interviews, cardholders described instances of credit card sharing within the council. Credit card sharing is a violation of the council's agreement with its credit card issuer, and it also increases the risk of misuse and fraud. The audit identified gaps in the council's credit card policy and procedures. There was no documented arrangement for the reconciliation of the general manager's credit card. There was also no guidance on the management of Cabcharge. The credit card register contained inaccurate information, and the council was also unable to provide records of certain transactions requested for review by the audit. The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. The process did not include adequate compliance checks or reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. The council's policy required prior approval for conferences, accommodation or meal expenses. However, there was no evidence that such approvals were checked during credit card reconciliation. The audit also identified instances of split transactions. The council implemented monthly reporting for managers in July 2019. There was a lack of periodic review of the council's credit card use, as it was not included in the council's forward program of internal audits. RecommendationsPenrith City Council should immediately: 1. ensure cardholders stop sharing their credit card with other staff. By December 2020, Penrith City Council should: 2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures
3. ensure that credit card management practices include:
4. ensure reconciliation involves:
5. develop a plan for periodic reviews (e.g. internal audit) of credit card use and management. |
Shellharbour City Council had gaps in its credit card policy and procedures. The council's reconciliation of credit card transactions needs to be enhanced to ensure it can review compliance with policy and detect potential misuse or fraud.Shellharbour City Council had 65 credit cards at the time of the audit. During our interviews, cardholders described instances of credit card sharing within the council. Credit card sharing is a violation of the council's agreement with its credit card issuer, and it also increases the risk of misuse and fraud. The council's credit card policy lacked clarity in several areas. While the general manager had delegation to authorise the issue of credit cards, the policy did not specify any eligibility criteria. The council did not align credit card limits with financial delegations, and while blocking codes were used, there was no explanation in the policy or procedures. Although the mayor and general manager's credit card transactions were reviewed during the council's monthly Executive Leadership Team meetings, the policy and procedures lacked guidance on the reconciliation of their credit cards. The council also did not have sufficiently detailed documentation for the management of fuel cards. The audit identified gaps in the council's credit card management practices:
The council's credit card reconciliation process needs to be enhanced to enable detection of potential misuse or fraud. The process did not include compliance checks or reviewing the business-related purpose of transactions. Purchases of restricted items, such as fuel and fine payments, were not accompanied by adequate justification. The audit identified instances of split transactions, and travel or conference approval forms were also not checked during reconciliation. There was a lack of targeted guidance for approvers in reconciliation, and the council also provided no evidence of the finance team's involvement in the reconciliation of credit card transactions. The council's Executive Leadership Team was involved in the monthly review of credit card transactions, hence there was management oversight of credit card use. However, there was a lack of periodic review of the council's credit card use, as it was not included in the council's forward program of internal audits. RecommendationsShellharbour City Council should immediately: 1. ensure cardholders stop sharing their credit card with other staff. By December 2020, Shellharbour City Council should: 2. clarify in the credit card policy and procedures:
3. ensure that credit card management practices include:
4. ensure reconciliation involves:
5. develop a plan for periodic reviews (e.g. internal audit) of credit card use and management 6. ensure its credit card policy and procedures are reviewed according to schedule. |
Appendix one – Responses from councils and the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #340 - released 3 September 2020
CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit
This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.
The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.
The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.
The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.
The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.
Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).
On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.
In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.
In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.
Conclusion
Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.
Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.
From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.
TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR
Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes
Appendix four – About the audit
Appendix five – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020
Train station crowding
This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.
The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.
Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.
The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.
Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.
Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.
There are three main causes of station crowding:
- patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
- service disruptions
- special events.
Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.
Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.
In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.
This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.
TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.
ConclusionSydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program. TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events. Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans. Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions. Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management. |
ConclusionTfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events. |
ConclusionSydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Sydney rail network
Appendix three – Rail services contract
Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling
Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study
Appendix six – About the audit
Appendix seven – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020
Report on Local Government 2019
I am pleased to present my third report to the Parliament on the 2019 audits of local government councils in New South Wales.
This report notes that unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2018–19 financial statements of 134 councils and 11 joint organisations. The opinion for one council was disclaimed and three audits are yet to complete.
The report also highlights improvements I have seen in financial reporting and governance arrangements across councils. Fewer errors were identified. More councils have audit, risk and improvement committees and internal audit functions. Risk management practices, including fraud control systems, have also improved.
These are very pleasing indicators of the gradual strengthening of governance and financial oversight of the sector. I want to acknowledge the investment councils have made in working with the Audit Office to improve consistency of practice and accountability generally.
Of course there is more work to do, particularly to prepare for new accounting standards and to strengthen controls over information technology and cyber security management. Asset management practices can also be improved. This report provides some guidance to council on these matters and we will continue to partner with the Office of Local Government in the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment to support good practice.
Auditor-General
5 March 2020
This report focuses on key observations and findings from the 2018–19 financial audits of councils and joint organisations.
Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements for 134 councils and 11 joint organisations. The audit opinion for Bayside’s 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial statements were disclaimed. Three audits are still in progress and will be included in next year’s report.
The report highlights a number of areas where there has been improvement. There was a reduction in errors identified in council financial statements and high risk issues reported in audit management letters. More councils have audit, risk and improvement committees and internal audit functions. Risk management practices and fraud control systems have also improved.
The report also found that councils could do more to be better prepared for the new accounting standards, asset management practices could be strengthened, and information technology controls and cyber security management could be improved.
The Auditor-General recommended that the Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment develop a cyber security policy by 30 June 2021 to ensure a consistent response to cyber security risks across councils.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence in and transparency of public sector decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. Strong financial performance provides the platform for councils to deliver services and respond to community needs.
This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting and performance of councils and joint organisations.
Section highlights
- There was a reduction in the number and dollar value of errors identified in councils' financial statements.
- We continue to identify prior period errors, which are predominantly asset-related.
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 99 per cent of completed audits for councils and joint organisations.
- Three audits remain outstanding, with the outcomes to be reported in next year's Report to Parliament.
- Seventy-nine per cent of councils and joint organisations lodged their financial reports by 31 October 2019.
- Councils that performed some early reporting procedures achieved better outcomes in terms of the quality and timeliness of financial reporting.
- Councils are at various levels of preparedness to implement the new accounting standards for the 2019–20 financial year. Some have made the necessary modifications to systems and processes, but others are still assessing impacts.
- Most councils met the prescribed benchmarks for the liquidity and working capital performance measures over the past three years.
- More councils reported negative operating performance compared with the prior year, meaning their operating expenditure exceeded their operating revenue.
Strong governance systems and internal controls help councils to operate effectively and efficiently, produce reliable financial reports, comply with laws and regulations and support ethical government.
This chapter outlines the overall trends related to governance and internal control issues across councils and joint organisations for 2018–19.
Section highlights
- While the total number of issues reported in our management letters increased compared with the prior year, the total number of high risk issues have decreased. Of the high-risk issues, 41 per cent were deficiencies in information technology controls.
- More councils have established audit, risk and improvement committees and internal audit functions.
- Councils have improved risk management practices, with over 75 per cent of councils now having a risk management policy and register.
- While most councils have policies and processes to manage gifts and benefits, we identified some instances of non-compliance with the Model Code of Conduct.
- Most councils have policies and processes to manage the use of credit cards.
- Councils can strengthen policies and practices for managing fraud controls and legislative compliance.
- There are further opportunities for councils to improve internal controls over revenue, purchasing, payroll, cash, financial accounting and governance processes.
Councils rely on information technology (IT) to deliver services and manage information. While IT delivers considerable benefits, it also presents risks that council needs to address.
In prior years, we reported that councils need to improve IT governance and controls to manage key financial systems. This chapter outlines the progress made by councils in the management of key IT risks and controls, with an added focus on cyber security.
Section highlights
- We continue to report deficiencies in information technology controls, particularly around user access management. These controls are key to ensuring IT systems are protected from inappropriate access and misuse.
- Many councils do not have IT policies and procedures and others do not identify, monitor or report on IT risks.
- Cyber security management requires improvement, with some basic elements of governance not yet in place for many councils.
Councils are responsible for managing a significant range of assets to deliver services on behalf of the community.
This chapter outlines our asset management observations across councils and joint organisations.
Section highlights
- There was an increase in the total number of issues reported in our management letters for asset management processes.
- There were less high-risk issues reported compared to the previous year.
- We continue to identify discrepancies between the council's Crown land asset records and the Crown Land Information Database (CLID) managed by the former Department of Industry (DOI).
- Inconsistent practices remain across the Local Government sector in accounting for landfill sites.
Appendix one – Response from the Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
Appendix two – Status of 2018 recommendations
Appendix three – Status of audits
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Planning and Environment 2017
The following report highlights results of financial audits of agencies in the Planning and Environment cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent audits of these agencies.
The audits were completed for most agencies in the cluster and unqualified audit opinions issued. Issues identified during the financial statement audits of seven small agencies delayed their finalisation beyond the statutory deadline, and six of these remain incomplete. Apart from these small agencies, the quality of financial reporting across the cluster remained at a high standard.
This report provides Parliament and others with the audit results, observations and recommendations for Planning and Environment cluster agencies. The report has been structured into two chapters focussing on financial reporting and controls and service delivery.
The Planning and Environment cluster plays a role in ensuring each community across New South Wales receives the services and infrastructure it needs.
This chapter outlines our audit observations and recommendations related to financial reporting and controls of Planning and Environment cluster agencies for 2016–17.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
2.1 Quality of financial reporting |
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Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 39 of the 45 cluster agencies' financial statements. |
Issues identified during the financial statement audits of seven smaller agencies delayed their completion. Six audits remain incomplete at the date of this report. Apart from these seven small agency audits, the quality of financial reporting across the cluster remained at a high standard. |
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting |
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Seven agencies' financial statement audits were not completed by the statutory deadline with six audits incomplete at the date of this report. |
Issues identified during the financial statement audits of seven smaller agencies delayed their finalisation beyond the statutory deadline. These agencies would benefit from performing additional early close procedures in future reporting periods. |
2.3 Financial and sustainability analysis |
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Water and Electricity utility agencies continue to operate with low liquidity ratios. |
A liquidity ratio below one is an indicator that an entity may not be able to pay its debts as and when they fall due. Whilst liquidity ratios were below one, utility agencies demonstrated they can continue to support ongoing operations due to:
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2.5 Internal controls |
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One in six internal control weaknesses reported in 2016–17 were repeat issues. |
Delays in implementing audit recommendations can prolong the risk of fraud and error. Recommendation (repeat issue): anagement letter recommendations to address internal control weaknesses should be actioned promptly, with a focus on addressing repeat issues. |
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Nine of these internal control weaknesses related to the creation, modification, deletion and review of user access to financial systems. |
These control weaknesses may compromise the integrity and security of financial data. Recommendation (repeat issue): Management of user administration over financial systems should be strengthened to prevent inappropriate access to financial information. |
This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations relating to service delivery for 2016–17.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
3.1 Premier's and State priorities |
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| The Planning and Environment cluster is responsible for delivering five Premier's and State priorities. |
One priority target was achieved in 2016–17, two targets are on track to be achieved and progress towards one target slowed. Progress against one target cannot be determined. |
3.2 Planning |
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Housing Completion |
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| There were 63,506 housing completions in 2016–17. This was 4.1 per cent above the Premier’s priority target of delivering 61,000 housing completions per year. |
The Australian Bureau of Statistics data shows the housing completions target was achieved in 2016–17. |
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Housing supply |
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| The number of approvals for new houses in 2016–17 was 72,472 against the State priority target of more than 50,000 approvals per year. |
The Australian Bureau of Statistics data indicates the housing approvals target was achieved in 2016–17. |
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Major project assessment |
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| State significant developments are not clearly defined for the purposes of reporting against the State priority target. | The Department of Planning and Environment will clarify with the Department of Premier and Cabinet which developments are captured by the State priority target. |
| The Department of Planning and Environment’s data shows the time taken to assess complex State significant developments increased by 16 per cent in 2016–17 while the time taken to assess less complex developments reduced by 20 per cent. | The Department of Planning and Environment considers it is on track to meet the State priority target of halving the time taken to assess State significant developments, despite uncertainty over the target measure. |
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Housing acceleration fund |
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Program business cases were not developed for projects in Housing Acceleration Fund Rounds 1 to 4. The Department advised a program business case will be developed for Housing Acceleration Fund Round 5 projects. |
A program business case is necessary to ensure related projects are evaluated, managed and coordinated effectively. |
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A benefit realisation review process has not yet been approved for Housing Acceleration Fund projects. The Department of Planning and Environment advised it is developing a benefit realisation review process. |
A benefit realisation review process is necessary to determine whether funded projects achieved intended outcomes. |
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Greater Sydney Commission |
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| The Greater Sydney Commission forecasts a further 725,000 dwellings in the greater Sydney region will be required up to 2036 to meet housing demand. | In response to population growth, the Commission has set a five-year housing supply target of 189,100 houses across the five Greater Sydney Commission districts. |
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ePlanning system |
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| The Department of Planning and Environment did not perform a benefit realisation review for phase one of the ePlanning project. It has committed to performing a benefit realisation review after completion of phase two in 2018. | It cannot be determined if phase one of the project delivered expected outcomes as a benefit realisation review was not performed. |
3.3. Environment and Heritage |
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| Litter volume in New South Wales was 6.6 litres per 1,000 square metres in 2016–17, an increase of 16 per cent from the prior year. This is above the Premier's priority litter volume target of 4.2 litres per 1,000 square metres by 2020. | The Environment Protection Authority's data indicates the progress towards the target of reducing the volume of litter by 40 per cent by 2020 has slowed. |
| The NSW Government plans to invest $240 million to facilitate strategic biodiversity conservation on private land. | Performance measures have not yet been developed for the private land conservation program. |
3.4 Water |
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| IPART reduced water usage charges for most Sydney Water Corporation customers in 2016–17. | Water usage prices in New South Wales compare favourably to larger water utilities in other jurisdictions. |
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Hunter Water Corporation's water recycling and water conservation performance has been stable over recent years. The volume of Sydney Water Corporation’s recycled water reduced by 12 per cent in 2016–17 compared to the previous year. |
Sydney Water Corporation experienced reduced industry demand for recycled water. Several large industrial customers relocated away from Sydney. |
3.5 Arts and culture |
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| A State priority target is to increase overall attendance at cultural venues and events in New South Wales by 15 per cent from 2014–15 levels by 2019. | The Department of Planning and Environment's data indicates overall attendance increased by 16 per cent in 2015–16, although attendance fluctuated across individual venues and events. This indicates progress towards achieving the overall target by 2019. |
