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Actions for Report on Local Government 2019

Report on Local Government 2019

Local Government
Asset valuation
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

I am pleased to present my third report to the Parliament on the 2019 audits of local government councils in New South Wales.

This report notes that unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2018–19 financial statements of 134 councils and 11 joint organisations. The opinion for one council was disclaimed and three audits are yet to complete.

The report also highlights improvements I have seen in financial reporting and governance arrangements across councils. Fewer errors were identified. More councils have audit, risk and improvement committees and internal audit functions. Risk management practices, including fraud control systems, have also improved.

These are very pleasing indicators of the gradual strengthening of governance and financial oversight of the sector. I want to acknowledge the investment councils have made in working with the Audit Office to improve consistency of practice and accountability generally.

Of course there is more work to do, particularly to prepare for new accounting standards and to strengthen controls over information technology and cyber security management. Asset management practices can also be improved. This report provides some guidance to council on these matters and we will continue to partner with the Office of Local Government in the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment to support good practice.

Margaret Crawford

Auditor-General
5 March 2020

This report focuses on key observations and findings from the 2018–19 financial audits of councils and joint organisations.

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements for 134 councils and 11 joint organisations. The audit opinion for Bayside’s 2017–18 and 2018–19 financial statements were disclaimed. Three audits are still in progress and will be included in next year’s report.

The report highlights a number of areas where there has been improvement. There was a reduction in errors identified in council financial statements and high risk issues reported in audit management letters. More councils have audit, risk and improvement committees and internal audit functions. Risk management practices and fraud control systems have also improved.

The report also found that councils could do more to be better prepared for the new accounting standards, asset management practices could be strengthened, and information technology controls and cyber security management could be improved.

The Auditor-General recommended that the Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment develop a cyber security policy by 30 June 2021 to ensure a consistent response to cyber security risks across councils.

Read the PDF Report

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence in and transparency of public sector decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. Strong financial performance provides the platform for councils to deliver services and respond to community needs.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting and performance of councils and joint organisations.

Section highlights
  • There was a reduction in the number and dollar value of errors identified in councils' financial statements.
  • We continue to identify prior period errors, which are predominantly asset-related.
  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 99 per cent of completed audits for councils and joint organisations.
  • Three audits remain outstanding, with the outcomes to be reported in next year's Report to Parliament.
  • Seventy-nine per cent of councils and joint organisations lodged their financial reports by 31 October 2019.
  • Councils that performed some early reporting procedures achieved better outcomes in terms of the quality and timeliness of financial reporting.
  • Councils are at various levels of preparedness to implement the new accounting standards for the 2019–20 financial year. Some have made the necessary modifications to systems and processes, but others are still assessing impacts.
  • Most councils met the prescribed benchmarks for the liquidity and working capital performance measures over the past three years.
  • More councils reported negative operating performance compared with the prior year, meaning their operating expenditure exceeded their operating revenue.

Strong governance systems and internal controls help councils to operate effectively and efficiently, produce reliable financial reports, comply with laws and regulations and support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends related to governance and internal control issues across councils and joint organisations for 2018–19.

Section highlights
  • While the total number of issues reported in our management letters increased compared with the prior year, the total number of high risk issues have decreased. Of the high-risk issues, 41 per cent were deficiencies in information technology controls.
  • More councils have established audit, risk and improvement committees and internal audit functions.
  • Councils have improved risk management practices, with over 75 per cent of councils now having a risk management policy and register.
  • While most councils have policies and processes to manage gifts and benefits, we identified some instances of non-compliance with the Model Code of Conduct.
  • Most councils have policies and processes to manage the use of credit cards.
  • Councils can strengthen policies and practices for managing fraud controls and legislative compliance.
  • There are further opportunities for councils to improve internal controls over revenue, purchasing, payroll, cash, financial accounting and governance processes.

Councils rely on information technology (IT) to deliver services and manage information. While IT delivers considerable benefits, it also presents risks that council needs to address.

In prior years, we reported that councils need to improve IT governance and controls to manage key financial systems. This chapter outlines the progress made by councils in the management of key IT risks and controls, with an added focus on cyber security.

Section highlights
  • We continue to report deficiencies in information technology controls, particularly around user access management. These controls are key to ensuring IT systems are protected from inappropriate access and misuse.
  • Many councils do not have IT policies and procedures and others do not identify, monitor or report on IT risks.
  • Cyber security management requires improvement, with some basic elements of governance not yet in place for many councils.

Councils are responsible for managing a significant range of assets to deliver services on behalf of the community.

This chapter outlines our asset management observations across councils and joint organisations.

Section highlights
  • There was an increase in the total number of issues reported in our management letters for asset management processes.
  • There were less high-risk issues reported compared to the previous year.
  • We continue to identify discrepancies between the council's Crown land asset records and the Crown Land Information Database (CLID) managed by the former Department of Industry (DOI).
  • Inconsistent practices remain across the Local Government sector in accounting for landfill sites.

Appendix one – Response from the Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – Status of 2018 recommendations

Appendix three – Status of audits 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid

Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid

Premier and Cabinet
Asset valuation
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.

A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.

Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.

In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.

On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal. 

This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide). 

The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money. 

Conclusion

The evidence available does not conclusively demonstrate the unsolicited proposal was unique, and there were some shortcomings in the negotiation process, documentation and segregation of duties. That said, before the final commitment to proceed with the lease, the state obtained assurance that the proposal delivered value for money. 

It is particularly important to demonstrate unsolicited proposals are unique, in order to justify the departure from other transaction processes that offer greater competition, transparency and certainty about value for money.

The Assessment Panel and the Proposal Specific Steering Committee determined the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal was unique, primarily on the basis that the proponent did not require foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and the lease transaction could be concluded earlier than through a second tender process. However, the evidence that persuaded the Panel and Committee did not demonstrate that no other proponent could conclude the transaction in time to meet the government’s deadline. 

It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.

The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. It also does not demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge. 

The Panel, Committee and financial advisers determined that the final price represented value for money, and that retendering offered a material risk of a worse financial outcome. However, an acceptable price was revealed early in the negotiation process, and doing so made it highly unlikely that the proponent would offer a higher price than that disclosed. The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, bargaining strategy or similar which put the negotiations in context. It is not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. 

Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place. Some shortcomings relating to role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance weakened the effectiveness of the unsolicited proposal process adopted for Ausgrid.

The reasons for accepting that the proposal and proponent were unique are not compelling.

The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says the 'unique benefits of the proposal and the unique ability of the proponent to deliver the proposal' must be demonstrated. 

The conclusion reached by the Panel and Committee that the proposal offered a ‘unique ability to deliver (a) strategic outcome’ was primarily based on the proponent not requiring foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and allowing the government to complete the lease transaction earlier than by going through a second tender process. 

It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.

The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. Nor does it demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge. 

That said, the Australian Treasurer’s decision to reject the two bids from the previous tender process created uncertainty about the conditions under which he would approve international bids. The financial advisers engaged for the Ausgrid transaction informed the Panel and Committee that:

  • it was not likely another viable proponent would emerge soon enough to meet the government’s transaction deadline
  • the market would be unlikely to deliver a better result than offered by the proponent
  • going to tender presented a material risk of a worse financial result. 

The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says that a proposal to directly purchase or acquire a government-owned entity or property will generally not be unique. The Ausgrid unsolicited proposal fell into this category. 

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:

  • recognise that when considering uniqueness they should: 
    • require very strong evidence to decide that both the proponent and proposal are the only ones of their kind that could meet the government’s objectives 
    • give thorough consideration to any reasonable counter-arguments against uniqueness.
  • rigorously consider all elements of the Unsolicited Proposals Guide when determining whether a proposal should be dealt with as an unsolicited proposal, and document these deliberations and all relevant evidence
  • do not use speed of transaction compared to a market process as justification for uniqueness.
The process to obtain assurance that the final price represented value for money was adequate. However, the negotiation approach reduced assurance that the bid price was maximised. 

The Panel and Committee concluded the price represented value for money, based on peer-reviewed advice from their financial advisers and knowledge acquired from previous tenders. The financial advisers also told the Panel and Committee that there was a material risk the state would receive a lower price than offered by the unsolicited proposal if it immediately proceeded with a second market transaction. 

The state commenced negotiations on price earlier than the Guide says they should have. Early disclosure of a price that the state would accept reduced the likelihood of achieving a price greater than this. DPC says the intent of this meeting was to quickly establish whether the proponents could meet the state’s benchmark rather than spending more time and resources on a proposal which had no prospect of proceeding.

DPC and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, negotiation strategy or similar which put the negotiations and price achieved in context. It was not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. However, the Panel and Committee endorsed the outcomes of the negotiations. 

The negotiations were informed by the range of prices achieved for similar assets and the specific bids for Ausgrid from the earlier market process.

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:

  • document a minimum acceptable price, and a negotiating strategy designed to maximise price, before commencing negotiations
  • do not communicate an acceptable price to the proponent, before the negotiation stage of the process, and then only as part of a documented bargaining strategy.
Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place, but there were some shortcomings around role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance.

The state established a governance structure in accordance with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide, including an Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee. The members of the Panel and Steering Committee were senior and experienced officers, as befitted the size and nature of the unsolicited proposal. 

The separation of negotiation, assessment and review envisaged by the Guide was not maintained fully. The Chair of the Assessment Panel and a member of the Steering Committee were involved in negotiations with the proponent. 

DPC could not provide comprehensive records of some key interactions with the proponent or a documented negotiation strategy. The absence of such records means the Department cannot demonstrate engagement and negotiation processes were authorised and rigorous. 

The probity adviser reported there were no material probity issues with the transaction. The probity adviser also provided audit services. This is not good practice. The same party should not provide both advisory and audit services on the same transaction.

Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government entity or asset:
•    maintain separation between negotiation, assessment and review in line with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide
•    keep an auditable trail of documentation relating to the negotiation process
•    maintain separation between any probity audit services engaged and the probity advisory and reporting services recommended in the current Guide.

Published

Actions for Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities

Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities

Premier and Cabinet
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The Premier’s Implementation Unit uses a systematic approach to measuring and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities performance targets, but public reporting needed to improve, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General of NSW, Margaret Crawford.

The Premier of New South Wales has established 12 Premier’s Priorities. These are key performance targets for government.

The 12 Premier's Priorities
  • 150,000 new jobs by 2019

  • Reduce the volume of litter by 40 per cent by 2020

  • 10 key projects in metro and regional areas to be delivered on time and on budget, and nearly 90 local infrastructure projects to be delivered on time

  • Increase the proportion of NSW students in the top two NAPLAN bands by eight per cent by 2019

  • Increase the proportion of women in senior leadership roles in the NSW Government sector from 33 to 50 per cent by 2025 and double the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in senior leadership roles in the NSW Government sector, from 57 to 114

  • Increase the proportion of young people who successfully move from Specialist Homelessness Services to long-term accommodation to more than 34 per cent by 2019

  • 61,000 housing completions on average per year to 2021

  • Reduce the proportion of domestic violence perpetrators reoffending by 25 per cent by 2021

  • Improve customer satisfaction with key government services every year, this term of government to 2019

  • Decrease the percentage of children and young people re-reported at risk of significant harm by 15 per cent by 2020

  • 81 per cent of patients through emergency departments within four hours by 2019

  • Reduce overweight and obesity rates of children by five percentage points by 2025


Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Premier’s Priorities website.

Each Premier’s Priority has a lead agency and minister responsible for achieving the performance target.

The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) was established within the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) in 2015. The PIU is a delivery unit that supports agencies to measure and monitor performance, make progress toward the Premier’s Priorities targets, and report progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public.

This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government is progressing and reporting on the Premier's Priorities.

 


The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) is effective in assisting agencies to make progress against the Premier’s Priorities targets. Progress reporting is regular but transparency to the public is weakened by the lack of information about specific measurement limitations and lack of clarity about the relationship of the targets to broader government objectives.The PIU promotes a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities’ performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives.

The PIU provides a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier's Priorities performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives. The data used to measure the Premier’s Priorities comes from a variety of government and external datasets, some of which have known limitations. These limitations are not revealed in public reporting, and only some are revealed in progress reported to the Premier and ministers. This limits the transparency of reporting.

The PIU assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising particular performance measures over other areas of activity. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach to assisting agencies to analyse performance using data, and helping them work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.


 


Data used to measure progress for some of the Premier’s Priorities has limitations which are not made clear when progress is reported. This reduces transparency about the reported progress. Public reporting would also be improved with additional information about the relationship between specific performance measures and broader government objectives.

The PIU is responsible for reporting progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public. Agencies provide performance data and some play a role in preparing progress reports for the Premier and ministers. For 11 of the Premier's Priorities, progress is reported against measurable and time-related performance targets. For the infrastructure priority, progress is reported against project milestones.

Progress of some Priorities is measured using data that has known limitations, which should be noted wherever progress is reported. For example, the data used to report on housing completions does not take housing demolitions into account, and is therefore overstating the contribution of this performance measure to housing supply. This known limitation is not explained in progress reports or on the public website.

Data used to measure progress is sourced from a mix of government and external datasets. Updated progress data for most Premier’s Priorities is published on the Premier’s Priorities website annually, although reported to the Premier and key ministers more frequently. The PIU reviews the data and validates it through fieldwork with front line agencies. The PIU also assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising single performance measures. Most, but not all, agencies use additional indicators to check for misuse of data or perverse outcomes.

We examined the reporting processes and controls for five of the Premier’s Priorities. We found that there is insufficient assurance over the accuracy of the data on housing approvals.

The relationships between performance measures and broader government objectives is not always clearly explained on the Premier’s Priority website, which is the key source of public information about the Premier’s Priorities. For example, the Premier’s Priority to reduce litter volumes is communicated as “Keeping our Environment Clean.” While the website explains why reducing litter is important, it does not clearly explain why that particular target has been chosen to measure progress in keeping the environment clean.

By December 2018, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

  1. improve transparency of public reporting by:
    • providing information about limitations of reported data and associated performance
    • clarifying the relationship between the Premier’s Priorities performance targets and broader government objectives.
  2. ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources
  3. encourage agencies to develop and implement additional supporting indicators for all Premier’s Priority performance measures to prevent and detect unintended consequences or misuse of data.

 


The Premier's Implementation Unit is effective in supporting agencies to deliver progress towards the Premier’s Priority targets.

The PIU promotes a systematic approach to monitoring and reporting progress against a target, based on a methodology used in delivery units elsewhere in the world. The PIU undertakes internal self-evaluation, and commissions regular reviews of methodology implementation from the consultancy that owns the methodology and helped to establish the PIU. However, the unit lacks periodic independent reviews of their overall effectiveness. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach and assists agencies to analyse performance using data, and work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.

Agency representatives recognise the benefits of being responsible for a Premier's Priority and speak of the value of being held to account and having the attention of the Premier and senior ministers.

By June 2019, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

  1. establish routine collection of feedback about PIU performance including:
    • independent assurance of PIU performance
    • opportunity for agencies to provide confidential feedback.

 

 

Published

Actions for Shared services in local government

Shared services in local government

Local Government
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Shared services and collaboration

Local councils need to properly assess the performance of their current services before considering whether to enter into arrangements with other councils to jointly manage back-office functions or services for their communities. This is one of the recommended practices for councils in a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. ‘When councils have decided to jointly provide services, they do not always have a strong business case, which clearly identifies the expected costs, benefits and risks of shared service arrangements’, said the Auditor-General.

Councils provide a range of services to meet the needs of their communities. It is important that they consider the most effective and efficient way to deliver them. Many councils work together to share knowledge, resources and services. When done well, councils can save money and improve access to services. This audit assessed how efficiently and effectively councils engage in shared service arrangements. We define ‘shared services’ as two or more councils jointly managing activities to deliver services to communities or perform back-office functions. 

The information we gathered for this audit included a survey of all general-purpose councils in NSW. In total 67 councils (52 per cent) responded to the survey from 128 invited to participate. Appendix two outlines in more detail some of the results from our survey. 

Conclusion
Most councils we surveyed are not efficiently and effectively engaging in shared services. This is due to three main factors. 
First, not all surveyed councils are assessing the performance of their current services before deciding on the best service delivery model. Where they have decided that sharing services is the best way to deliver services, they do not always build a business case which outlines the costs, benefits and risks of the proposed shared service arrangement before entering into it.
Second, some governance models used by councils to share services affect the scope, management and effectiveness of their shared service operations. Not all models are subject to the same checks and balances applied to councils, risking transparency and accountability. Councils must comply with legislative obligations under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW), including principles for their day-to-day operations. When two or more councils decide to share services, they should choose the most suitable governance model in line with these obligations. 
Third, some councils we surveyed and spoke to lack the capability required to establish and manage shared service arrangements. Identifying whether sharing is the best way to deliver council services involves analysing how services are currently being delivered and building a business case. Councils also need to negotiate with partner councils and determine which governance model is fit for purpose. Planning to establish a shared service arrangement involves strong project management. Evaluating the arrangements identifies whether they are delivering to the expected outcomes. All of these tasks need a specialised skill set that councils do not always have in-house. Resources are available to support councils and to build their capability, but not all councils are seeking this out or considering their capability needs before proceeding.  
Some councils are not clearly defining the expected costs and benefits of shared service arrangements. As a result, the benefits from these arrangements cannot be effectively evaluated.
Some councils are entering into shared service arrangements without formally assessing their costs and benefits or investigating alternative service delivery models. Some councils are also not evaluating shared services against baseline data or initial expectations. Councils should base their arrangements on a clear analysis of the costs, benefits and risks involved. They should evaluate performance against clearly defined outcomes.
The decision to share a service involves an assessment of financial and non-financial costs and benefits. Non-financial benefits include being able to deliver additional services, improve service quality, and deliver regional services across councils or levels of government. 
When councils need support to assess and evaluate shared service arrangements, guidance is available through organisations or by peer learning with other councils.
The governance models councils use for shared services can affect their scope and effectiveness. Some councils need to improve their project management practices to better manage issues, risks and reporting. 
Shared services can operate under several possible governance models. Each governance model has different legal or administrative obligations, risks and benefits. Some arrangements can affect the scope and effectiveness of shared services. For example, some models do not allow councils to jointly manage services, requiring one council to take all risks and responsibilities. In addition, some models may reduce transparency and accountability to councils and their communities.
Regardless of these obligations and risks, councils can still improve how they manage their shared services operations by focusing on project management and better oversight. They would benefit from more guidance on shared service governance models to help them ensure the they are fit for purpose.
Recommendation
The Office of Local Government should, by April 2019:

Develop guidance which outlines the risks and opportunities of governance models that councils can use to share services. This should include advice on legal requirements, transparency in decisions, and accountability for effective use of public resources.

Published

Actions for Administering Domestic Waterfront Tenancies

Administering Domestic Waterfront Tenancies

Planning
Transport
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

The audit’s overall conclusion is that Lands and Maritime are broadly achieving outcomes consistent with the IPART report on administering domestic waterfront tenancies. But a lack of collaboration between the agencies is contributing to poor customer service. Inconsistencies with the IPART report recommendations and operational differences between the two agencies result in different rents and conditions for tenants in the two agencies. The differences are having a significant impact on customer service.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #191 - released 23 September 2009

Published

Actions for Agencies working together to improve services

Agencies working together to improve services

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Justice
Transport
Education
Internal controls and governance
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

In the cases we examined, we found that agencies working together can improve services or results. However, the changes were not always as great as anticipated or had not reached maximum potential. Establishing the right governance framework and accountability requirements between partners at the start of the project is critical to success. And joint responsibility requires new funding and reporting arrangements to be developed.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #149 - released 22 March 2006