Reports
Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program
The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.
The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.
This audit had two objectives:
- To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
- To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.
We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:
a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.
Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.
2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
- providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
- providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
- making business cases available to the public.
The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.
The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.
Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
- work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received.
There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.
There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public.
Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.
Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.
The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should:
- develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
- establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
- agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
- clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
- establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:
- setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
- clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
- monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018
Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid
In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.
A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.
Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.
In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.
On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal.
This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide).
The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money.
The evidence available does not conclusively demonstrate the unsolicited proposal was unique, and there were some shortcomings in the negotiation process, documentation and segregation of duties. That said, before the final commitment to proceed with the lease, the state obtained assurance that the proposal delivered value for money.
It is particularly important to demonstrate unsolicited proposals are unique, in order to justify the departure from other transaction processes that offer greater competition, transparency and certainty about value for money.
The Assessment Panel and the Proposal Specific Steering Committee determined the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal was unique, primarily on the basis that the proponent did not require foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and the lease transaction could be concluded earlier than through a second tender process. However, the evidence that persuaded the Panel and Committee did not demonstrate that no other proponent could conclude the transaction in time to meet the government’s deadline.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. It also does not demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
The Panel, Committee and financial advisers determined that the final price represented value for money, and that retendering offered a material risk of a worse financial outcome. However, an acceptable price was revealed early in the negotiation process, and doing so made it highly unlikely that the proponent would offer a higher price than that disclosed. The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, bargaining strategy or similar which put the negotiations in context. It is not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance.
Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place. Some shortcomings relating to role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance weakened the effectiveness of the unsolicited proposal process adopted for Ausgrid.
The reasons for accepting that the proposal and proponent were unique are not compelling.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says the 'unique benefits of the proposal and the unique ability of the proponent to deliver the proposal' must be demonstrated.
The conclusion reached by the Panel and Committee that the proposal offered a ‘unique ability to deliver (a) strategic outcome’ was primarily based on the proponent not requiring foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and allowing the government to complete the lease transaction earlier than by going through a second tender process.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. Nor does it demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
That said, the Australian Treasurer’s decision to reject the two bids from the previous tender process created uncertainty about the conditions under which he would approve international bids. The financial advisers engaged for the Ausgrid transaction informed the Panel and Committee that:
- it was not likely another viable proponent would emerge soon enough to meet the government’s transaction deadline
- the market would be unlikely to deliver a better result than offered by the proponent
- going to tender presented a material risk of a worse financial result.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says that a proposal to directly purchase or acquire a government-owned entity or property will generally not be unique. The Ausgrid unsolicited proposal fell into this category.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- recognise that when considering uniqueness they should:
- require very strong evidence to decide that both the proponent and proposal are the only ones of their kind that could meet the government’s objectives
- give thorough consideration to any reasonable counter-arguments against uniqueness.
- rigorously consider all elements of the Unsolicited Proposals Guide when determining whether a proposal should be dealt with as an unsolicited proposal, and document these deliberations and all relevant evidence
- do not use speed of transaction compared to a market process as justification for uniqueness.
The Panel and Committee concluded the price represented value for money, based on peer-reviewed advice from their financial advisers and knowledge acquired from previous tenders. The financial advisers also told the Panel and Committee that there was a material risk the state would receive a lower price than offered by the unsolicited proposal if it immediately proceeded with a second market transaction.
The state commenced negotiations on price earlier than the Guide says they should have. Early disclosure of a price that the state would accept reduced the likelihood of achieving a price greater than this. DPC says the intent of this meeting was to quickly establish whether the proponents could meet the state’s benchmark rather than spending more time and resources on a proposal which had no prospect of proceeding.
DPC and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, negotiation strategy or similar which put the negotiations and price achieved in context. It was not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. However, the Panel and Committee endorsed the outcomes of the negotiations.
The negotiations were informed by the range of prices achieved for similar assets and the specific bids for Ausgrid from the earlier market process.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- document a minimum acceptable price, and a negotiating strategy designed to maximise price, before commencing negotiations
- do not communicate an acceptable price to the proponent, before the negotiation stage of the process, and then only as part of a documented bargaining strategy.
The state established a governance structure in accordance with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide, including an Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee. The members of the Panel and Steering Committee were senior and experienced officers, as befitted the size and nature of the unsolicited proposal.
The separation of negotiation, assessment and review envisaged by the Guide was not maintained fully. The Chair of the Assessment Panel and a member of the Steering Committee were involved in negotiations with the proponent.
DPC could not provide comprehensive records of some key interactions with the proponent or a documented negotiation strategy. The absence of such records means the Department cannot demonstrate engagement and negotiation processes were authorised and rigorous.
The probity adviser reported there were no material probity issues with the transaction. The probity adviser also provided audit services. This is not good practice. The same party should not provide both advisory and audit services on the same transaction.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government entity or asset:
• maintain separation between negotiation, assessment and review in line with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide
• keep an auditable trail of documentation relating to the negotiation process
• maintain separation between any probity audit services engaged and the probity advisory and reporting services recommended in the current Guide.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - NSW Government’s summary of assessment of the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal
Appendix three - The definition and nature of unsolicited proposals
Appendix four - Ausgrid unsolicited proposal process
Appendix five - About the audit
Appendix six - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #309 - released 11 December 2018
Transport 2018
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on key observations and findings from the 30 June 2018 financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of the broad range of transport related assets creates challenges.
This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendations |
| 2.1 Quality of financial reporting | |
| Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements | Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement. |
| 2.2 Key accounting issues | |
| Valuation of assets continues to create challenges. Although agencies complied with the requirements of the accounting standards and Treasury policies on valuations, we identified some opportunities for improvements at RMS. |
RMS incorporated data from its asset condition assessments for the first time in the valuation methodology which improved the valuation outcome. Overall, we were satisfied with the valuation methodology and key assumptions, but we noted some deficiencies in the asset data in relation to asset component unit rates and old condition data for some components of assets. Also, a bypass and tunnel were incorrectly excluded from RMS records and valuation process since 2013. This resulted in an increase for these assets’ value by $133 million. The valuation inputs for Wetlands and Moorings were revised this year to better reflect the assets' characteristics resulting in a $98.0 million increase. |
| 2.3 Timeliness of financial reporting | |
| Residual Transport Corporation did not submit its financial statements by the statutory reporting deadline. | Residual Transport Corporation remained a dormant entity with no transactions for the year ended 30 June 2018. |
| With the exception of Residual Transport Corporation, all agencies completed early close procedures and submitted financial statements within statutory timeframes. | Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the reporting and audit process. |
| 2.4 Financial sustainability | |
| NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations reported negative net assets of $75.7 million and $89,000 respectively at 30 June 2018. | NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations continue to require letters of financial support to confirm their ability to pay liabilities as they fall due. |
| 2.5 Passenger revenue and patronage | |
| Transport agencies revenue growth increased at a higher rate than patronage. | Public transport passenger revenue increased by $114 million (8.3 per cent) in 2017–18, and patronage increased by 37.1 million (5.1 per cent) across all modes of transport based on data provided by TfNSW. |
| Negative balance Opal Cards resulted in $3.8 million in revenue not collected in 2017–18 and $7.8 million since the introduction of Opal. A total of 1.1 million Opal cards issued since its introduction have negative balances. | Transport for NSW advised it is liaising with the ticketing vendor to implement system changes and are investigating other ways to reduce the occurrences. |
| 2.6 Cost recovery from public transport users | |
| Overall cost recovery from users has decreased. | Overall cost recovery from public transport users (on rail and bus services by STA) decreased from 23.2 per cent to 22.4 per cent between 2016–17 and 2017–18. The main reason for the decrease is due to expenditure increasing at a faster rate than revenue in 2017–18. |
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:
- our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018
- the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.
The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.
| Observation | Conclusions and recommendations |
| 3.1 Internal controls | |
| There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. | Key themes related to information technology, employee leave entitlements and asset management. Eighteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues. |
| 3.2 Audit Office Annual work program | |
| The Transport cluster wrote-off over $200 million of assets which were replaced by new assets or technology. |
Majority of this write-off was recognised by RMS, with $199 million relating to the write-off of existing assets which have been replaced during the year. |
| RailCorp is expected to convert to TAHE from 1 July 2019. | Several working groups are considering different aspects of the TAHE transition including its status as a for-profit Public Trading Enterprise and which assets to transfer to TAHE. We will continue to monitor developments on TAHE for any impact to the financial statements. |
| RMS' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 of $3.4 billion is lower than last year. Sydney Trains' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 increased by 20.6 per cent to $434 million. TfNSW does not quantify its backlog maintenance. | TfNSW advised it is liaising with Infrastructure NSW to develop a consistent definition of maintenance backlog across all transport service providers. |
| Not all agencies monitor unplanned maintenance across the Transport cluster. | Unplanned maintenance can be more expensive than planned maintenance. TfNSW should develop a consistent approach to define, monitor and track unplanned maintenance across the cluster. |
This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited.
We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Transport cluster and to collate and present service information for different modes of transport in one report.
In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.
Regional Assistance Programs
Infrastructure NSW effectively manages how grant applications for regional assistance programs are assessed and recommended for funding. Its contract management processes are also effective. However, we are unable to conclude whether the objectives of these programs have been achieved as the relevant agencies have not yet measured their benefits, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
In 2011, the NSW Government established Restart NSW to fund new infrastructure with the proceeds from the sale and lease of government assets. From 2011 to 2017, the NSW Government allocated $1.7 billion from the fund for infrastructure in regional areas, with an additional commitment of $1.3 billion to be allocated by 2021. The NSW Government allocates these funds through regional assistance programs such as Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads. NSW councils are the primary recipients of funding provided under these programs.
The NSW Government announced the Resources for Regions program in 2012 with the aim of addressing infrastructure constraints in mining affected communities. Infrastructure NSW administers the program, with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet.
The NSW Government announced the Fixing Country Roads program in 2014 with the aim of building more efficient road freight networks. Transport for NSW and Infrastructure NSW jointly administer this program, which funds local councils to deliver projects that help connect local and regional roads to state highways and freight hubs.
This audit assessed whether these two programs (Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads) were being effectively managed and achieved their objectives. In making this assessment, we answered the following questions:
- How well are the relevant agencies managing the assessment and recommendation process?
- How do the relevant agencies ensure that funded projects are being delivered?
- Do the funded projects meet program and project objectives?
The audit focussed on four rounds of Resources for Regions funding between 2013–14 to 2015–16, as well as the first two rounds of Fixing Country Roads funding in 2014–15 and 2015–16.
The project selection criteria are consistent with the program objectives set by the NSW Government, and the RIAP applied the criteria consistently. Probity and record keeping practices did not fully comply with the probity plans.
The assessment methodology designed by Infrastructure NSW is consistent with2 the program objectives and criteria. In the rounds that we reviewed, all funded projects met the assessment criteria.
Infrastructure NSW developed probity plans for both programs which provided guidance on the record keeping required to maintain an audit trail, including the use of conflict of interest registers. Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW did not fully comply with these requirements. The relevant agencies have taken steps to address this in the current funding rounds for both programs.
NSW Procurement Board Directions require agencies to ensure that they do not engage a probity advisor that is engaged elsewhere in the agency. Infrastructure NSW has not fully complied with this requirement. A conflict of interest arose when Infrastructure NSW engaged the same consultancy to act as its internal auditor and probity advisor.
While these infringements of probity arrangements are unlikely to have had a major impact on the assessment process, they weaken the transparency and accountability of the process.
Some councils have identified resourcing and capability issues which impact on their ability to participate in the application process. For both programs, the relevant agencies conducted briefings and webinars with applicants to provide advice on the objectives of the programs and how to improve the quality of their applications. Additionally, Transport for NSW and the Department of Premier and Cabinet have developed tools to assist councils to demonstrate the economic impact of their applications.
The relevant agencies provided feedback on unsuccessful applications to councils. Councils reported that the quality of this feedback has improved over time.
Recommendations
- By June 2018, Infrastructure NSW should:
- ensure probity reports address whether all elements of the probity plan have been effectively implemented.
- By June 2018, Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW should:
- maintain and store all documentation regarding assessment and probity matters according to the State Records Act 1998, the NSW Standard on Records Management and the relevant probity plans
Infrastructure NSW is responsible for overseeing and monitoring projects funded under Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads. Infrastructure NSW effectively manages projects to keep them on track, however it could do more to assure itself that all recipients have complied with funding deeds. Benefits and outcomes should also start to be measured and reported as soon as practicable after projects are completed to inform assessment of future projects.
Infrastructure NSW identifies projects experiencing unreasonable delays or higher than expected expenses as 'at‑risk'. After Infrastructure NSW identifies a project as 'at‑risk', it puts in place processes to resolve issues to bring them back on track. Infrastructure NSW, working with Public Works Advisory regional offices, employs a risk‑based approach to validate payment claims, however this process should be strengthened. Infrastructure NSW would get better assurance by also conducting annual audits of compliance with the funding deed for a random sample of projects.
Infrastructure NSW collects project completion reports for all Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads funded projects. It applies the Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework to Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads at a program level. This means that each round of funding (under both programs) is treated as a distinct program for the purposes of benefits realisation. It plans to assess whether benefits have been realised once each project in a funding round is completed. As a result, no benefits realisation assessment has been done for any project funded under either Resources for Regions or Fixing Country Roads. Without project‑level benefits realisation, future decisions are not informed by the lessons from previous investments.
Recommendations
- By December 2018, Infrastructure NSW should:
- conduct annual audits of compliance with the funding deed for a random sample of projects funded under Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads
- publish the circumstances under which unspent funds can be allocated to changes in project scope
- measure benefits delivered by projects that were completed before December 2017
- implement an annual process to measure benefits for projects completed after December 2017
- By December 2018, Transport for NSW and Infrastructure NSW should:
- incorporate a benefits realisation framework as part of the detailed application.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - Maps of funded projects
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #300 - released 17 May 2018
Report on Local Government 2017
Under section 421C of the Local Government Act 1993, I am pleased to present our first report on the statutory financial audits of councils, to NSW Parliament.
My appointment as the auditor of local government in New South Wales is the most significant change to the Auditor-General's mandate in nearly three decades.
Moving to the new audit arrangements over the past 18 months has been challenging but rewarding. It has confirmed my appreciation of local government – a sector passionate about the community and focused on delivering local services.
The unique relationship each council has with its community differentiates it from other tiers of government.
Our audits
I am pleased to report that we completed 139 out of 140 financial statement audits for the 2016–17 audit cycle. The remaining council received an extension to lodge its financial statements.
We have also released a performance audit report on council reporting on service delivery. We will soon release another report on fraud controls in local councils and a report on council shared services later this year.
- While the new audit mandate brings immense responsibility, my office has embraced the challenges involved and the objectives that NSW Parliament gave us:
- strengthening governance and financial oversight in local government
- providing greater consistency in external audit
- ensuring reliable financial information is available to assess council performance
- improving financial management, fiscal responsibility and public accountability in how councils use citizens’ funds.
This report
This report is rich in data extracted from the results of the 2016–17 financial audits. For the first time, it presents a consistent view of financial performance across the New South Wales local government landscape. The report also provides guidance and includes recommendations to councils and the Office of Local Government aimed at strengthening financial reporting, asset management, governance and internal controls.
The report will help NSW Parliament understand the common challenges that councils face. It provides points of comparison for councils and signposts matters that will be the focus of future audits. Importantly, this report and the data visualisation that accompanies it, provides comprehensive and accessible information to citizens regarding the management and performance of their councils.
I would like to acknowledge the cooperation of councils throughout the audit process and our partnerships with the contract audit firms that helped us to deliver the audits. Together we can learn from each other and work towards improving outcomes for the community.
| 1. Introduction | |
| Local government sector | NSW has 140 councils: 128 local councils serving a geographic area and 12 county councils formed for a specific purpose. We completed audits of 139 councils' 2016–17 financial statements and eight councils' 2015–16 financial statements. Bayside Council received a lodgement extension from the Office of Local Government (OLG) and has not yet presented their 2016–17 financial statements for audit. |
| Service delivery | Each council provides a range of services, influenced by population density, demographics, the local economy, geographic and climatic characteristics. These differences influence the financial profile of councils. |
| 2. Financial reporting | |
| Quality of financial reporting |
The overall quality of financial reporting needs to improve:
OLG guidance for council year-end financial reporting needs to align with Australian Accounting Standards and be issued earlier. |
| Timeliness of financial reporting | Timeliness of financial reporting needs to improve. Forty councils required lodgement extensions past the 31 October 2017 statutory reporting deadline. |
| 3. Financial performance and sustainability | |
| Operating revenue | Eighteen councils operating expenses exceed current operating revenue. Fifty-nine councils do not meet OLG’s target of 60 per cent for own source operating revenue. |
| Liquidity and working capital | Most councils have sufficient liquidity and working capital. However, there are indicators that:
|
| Asset management measures | Reporting against OLG’s asset management performance measures highlights that councils need to consider whether spending on existing infrastructure assets is sufficient to ensure they continue to meet service delivery standards:
|
| 4. Asset management | |
| High risk issues | We reported ten high risk issues relating to councils’ asset management and accounting practices. |
| Asset reporting | The accuracy of asset registers requires improvement and all assets need to be reported in the financial statements. At 30 June 2017, 62 councils did not record all rural fire-fighting equipment in their financial statements. A large proportion of rural fire-fighting equipment is not reported in either State government or local government financial statements. |
| Asset valuation | We reported seven high risk matters related to asset valuations, including two that resulted in qualified audit opinions. |
| Asset useful life estimates | We identified that accounting for the useful lives of similar assets varied across councils, resulting in variable depreciation expense for these assets. In addition, the useful lives of assets need to be reviewed annually. This review should be supported by current condition assessments. |
| Asset policy and planning | Thirteen councils do not have an asset management strategy, policy and plan, as required by the Office of Local Government’s Integrated Planning and Reporting Framework. |
| 5. Governance and internal controls | |
| High risk issues | We reported 17 high risk issues relating to governance, financial accounting, purchasing and payables and payroll matters. |
| Governance | There is currently no requirement for councils to have an audit, risk and improvement committee and internal audit function. Consequently, 53 councils do not have an audit committee and 52 councils do not have an internal audit function. The Office of Local Government has incomplete information on the number of entities established by councils. There is no financial reporting framework for the variety of entities established by councils. Councils can strengthen policies and procedures to support critical business processes, practices for risk management and compliance with key laws and regulations. |
| Internal controls | Councils can improve internal controls over manual journals, reconciliations, purchasing and payables and payroll. |
| 6. Information technology | |
| High risk issues | We reported nine high risk issues relating to information technology. |
| Access to IT systems | Controls over user access to IT systems need to be strengthened. |
| Information Technology governance | IT governance benefits from appropriate policies, standards and guidelines across all critical IT processes. We identified that:
|
Accurate and timely financial statements are an important element of sound financial management. They bring accountability and transparency to the way councils use public resources. Our financial audits assessed the following aspects of councils’ financial reporting:
- quality of financial reporting
- timeliness of financial reporting.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 2.1 Quality of financial reporting | |
|
Qualified audit opinions
|
The councils that received unmodified audit opinions prepared financial statements that fairly present their financial position and results. |
|
We issued modified (qualified) opinions on the:
|
Councils with modified opinions should address the issues that give rise to the audit qualification. |
| Significant audit matters We reported 39 significant matters in 29 councils. They included material accounting issues and significant deficiencies in internal controls. Seventy-seven per cent of the matters related to assets. |
Significant issues with the quality of financial reporting delayed the completion of a number of audits. Improving the reporting on assets should be a priority. |
| Prior period errors We found 33 material errors worth $9.1 billion in the previous audited financial statements of 22 councils. These all required prior-year audited balances to be corrected. Eighty eight per cent of these were asset related. |
The high number of asset-related prior-period errors reinforces the need for councils to improve the way they value and account for assets. |
| Financial statements We reported 43 moderate risk findings where councils can improve the way they complete their financial statements. |
Recommendation Councils can improve the quality of financial reporting by reviewing their financial statements close processes to identify areas for improvements. |
| Of the councils that had an audit, risk and improvement committee, 55 per cent of these did not review the financial statements before audit. | Recommendation Councils can improve the quality of financial reporting by involving an audit, risk and improvement committee in the review of financial statements. |
| OLG guidance To support councils in preparing 30 June 2017 financial statements, OLG issued guidance documents in June 2017 and September 2017. This limited the time councils had to prepare financial statements in the prescribed form and resolve financial reporting and audit issues. |
Recommendation The Office of Local Government should release the Local Government Code of Accounting Practice and Financial Reporting and the End of Year Financial Reporting Circular earlier in the audit cycle, ideally by 30 April each year. |
| The Code applicable for the 2016–17 financial reporting period provided options and guidance that in some instances did not fully align with Australian Accounting Standards. | Recommendation The Local Government Code of Accounting Practice and Financial Reporting should align with Australian Accounting Standards. |
| 2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting | |
| Statutory deadlines One hundred councils submitted audited financial statements to OLG by the statutory deadline of 31 October 2017. Thirty-nine councils received reporting extensions up to 28 February, including 16 of the 20 newly amalgamated councils. Bayside Council received a reporting extension to 31 May 2018 and has not yet presented their financial statements for audit. |
Councils need to improve their financial reporting processes in order to lodge their financial statements by the statutory reporting deadline. |
| Early close procedures Councils currently do not use early close procedures to resolve accounting issues before the end of the financial year. |
Recommendation The Office of Local Government should introduce early close procedures with an emphasis on asset valuations. |
3 The Auditor‑General was appointed statutory auditor of eight councils for the 2015–16 reporting period at the specific request of councils, due to the failure by councils to appoint an auditor, or the inability of the previous auditor to complete the audit due to external investigation or auditor retirement.
Strong and sustainable financial performance provides the platform for councils to deliver services and respond to the needs of their community. This chapter outlines our audit observations on the performance of councils against the Office of Local Government's (OLG) performance indicators, grouped in three areas:
- operating revenue performance measures
- liquidity and working capital performance measures
- asset management performance measures.
Our analysis indicates that some councils face challenges in meeting these performance and sustainability measures.
| Observations | Conclusions |
| 3.1 Operating revenue performance measures | |
|
Operating performance Another 20 councils would not have met OLG’s operating performance benchmark without the receipt of 2017–18 financial assistance grants which was recorded as revenue during 2016–17. Eleven councils have not met OLG’s operating performance benchmark for the last three years. |
It is important that councils have financial management strategies that support their financial sustainability and ability to meet OLG’s operating performance benchmark over the long term. |
| Operating performance measures how well councils contain operating expenses within operating revenue. OLG has prescribed a benchmark of greater than zero. | |
|
Own source operating revenue |
Rural councils have high-value infrastructure assets that cover large areas with smaller populations and less capacity to raise revenue from alternative sources compared with metropolitan councils. |
| Own source operating revenue measures a council’s fiscal flexibility and the degree to which it can generate revenue from own sources compared with total revenue from all sources. OLG has prescribed a benchmark of more than 60 per cent of total revenue. | |
| 3.2 Liquidity and working capital performance measures | |
|
Unrestricted current ratio |
Most councils can meet short-term obligations as they fall due. |
| The unrestricted current ratio represents a council’s ability to meet its short-term obligations as they fall due. OLG has prescribed a benchmark of greater than 1.5 times. | |
|
Debt service cover ratio Regional councils have 56 per cent of the value of all borrowings in the sector. |
Most councils have sufficient operating cash available to service their borrowings. Regional councils borrow more heavily than metropolitan councils to deliver water and sewerage infrastructure. Metropolitan councils do not have the responsibility to provide water and sewerage infrastructure. |
| The debt service cover ratio measures the operating cash available to service debt including interest, principal and lease payments. OLG has prescribed a benchmark of greater than two times. | |
|
Rates and annual charges outstanding These councils also did not meet the infrastructure backlog ratio. |
Most councils are collecting rates and annual charges levied. Councils with higher levels of uncollected rates and charges can experience increased pressure on the working capital available to fund operations. |
| The rates and annual charges outstanding measure assesses the impact of uncollected rates and annual charges on a council’s liquidity and the adequacy of debt recovery efforts. OLG has prescribed a benchmark of less than five per cent for metropolitan and less than ten per cent for other councils. | |
|
Cash expense cover ratio |
Most councils have the capacity to cover more than three months of operating expenses. |
| The cash expense cover ratio indicates the number of months a council can continue paying its expenses without additional cash inflows. OLG has prescribed a benchmark of greater than three months. | |
|
This measure does not exclude externally and internally restricted funds. If externally restricted funds are excluded, all councils would still meet OLG’s benchmark. If both externally and internally restricted funds are excluded:
|
Councils with a higher proportion of restricted funds may have less flexibility to pay operational expenses than the cash expense cover ratio suggests. However, councils can resolve to lift internal restriction if required. |
|
3.3. Asset management performance measures (not audited) |
|
|
Building and infrastructure renewals ratio Most councils included expenditure related to work-in-progress in calculating this ratio. OLG are of the view that work-in-progress should be excluded and as a result identified that a further 23 councils do not meet the benchmark. |
These councils appear to not be renewing assets in line with the rate they are depreciating them. This raises questions as to whether council asset management plans are adequate to determine whether assets are being kept up to agreed standards. Uncertainty on the inclusion of work-in-progress assets does need to be is clarified in order to ensure consistency in determining whether councils are adequately renewing their assets. |
| The building and infrastructure renewals ratio represents the rate at which assets are being renewed relative to the rate at which they are depreciating. OLG has prescribed a benchmark of greater than 100 per cent. | |
|
Infrastructure backlog ratio |
These councils may not be maintaining their infrastructure backlog at a manageable level. |
| The infrastructure backlog ratio represents the proportion of infrastructure backlog relative to the total net book value of a council's infrastructure assets. OLG has prescribed a benchmark of less than two per cent. | |
|
Asset maintenance ratio |
These councils’ maintenance expenditure may be insufficient to sustain their assets in a functional state so they reach their predicted useful life. |
| The asset maintenance ratio represents the rate at which assets are being maintained relative to the rate at which they are required to be maintained. OLG has prescribed a benchmark of greater than 100 per cent. | |
|
Costs to bring assets to agreed service level |
There is variability between councils in the amount of outstanding renewal works to be completed. |
| This ratio represents the estimated cost to renew or rehabilitate existing infrastructure assets that have reached the condition-based interval level adopted by a council, relative to the gross replacement cost of all infrastructure assets. OLG has not prescribed a benchmark for this performance measure. | |
OLG’s benchmarks for financial performance and sustainability
Each local council has unique characteristics such as its size, location and services provided to their communities. These differences affect the nature of each council's assets and liabilities, revenue and expenses, and in turn the financial performance measures against which it reports.
The Office of Local Government prescribes performance indicators for council reporting
The analysis in this chapter is based on performance measures prescribed in OLG’s Code of Accounting Practice and Financial Reporting (the Code). Councils report against these measures in their annual report, which includes the audited financial statements and other unaudited information. In the audited financial statements, councils report performance against six financial sustainability measures:
- operating performance
- own source operating revenue
- unrestricted current ratio
- debt service cover ratio
- rates and annual charges outstanding percentage
- cash expense cover ratio.
Councils also include the unaudited Special Schedule 7 'Report on Infrastructure Assets' in their annual reports. In this schedule, councils report to OLG on performance against four further measures:
- building and infrastructure renewals ratio
- infrastructure backlog ratio
- asset maintenance ratio
- cost to bring assets to agreed service level.
Each audited measure and three of the four unaudited measures has a prescribed benchmark. OLG’s benchmarks are the same for metropolitan, regional, rural and county councils, with the exception of the rates and annual charges outstanding percentage. Regional, rural and county councils have a different benchmark to metropolitan councils for this measure.
Three rural councils did not meet three of the audited OLG benchmarks
Most councils met OLG’s benchmarks for at least five or all of the six audited performance measures. Eight rural, four regional, four metropolitan and two county councils did not meet OLG’s benchmarks for two out of the six audited performance measures. Three rural councils did not meet OLG’s benchmarks for three out of the six audited performance measures.
The following table summarises how the councils performed across the six audited performance measures.
| Number of OLG benchmarks met by councils | Number of councils | |||
| Metropolitan | Regional | Rural | County | |
| 6 | 12 | 12 | 29 | 5 |
| 5 | 17 | 21 | 17 | 5 |
| 4 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 2 |
| 3 | -- | -- | 3 | -- |
| Not available* | 1 | -- | -- | -- |
| Total | 34 | 37 | 57 | 12 |
Source: Audited Financial Statements for 2016–17.
Appendix ten lists the performance of each council against all performance measures.
NSW councils own and manage a significant range of assets, including infrastructure, property, plant and equipment with a total value of $136 billion.
Many of the issues that our local government audits identified related to asset management. This chapter discusses some of the asset accounting issues we found, focusing on five areas:
- overall asset management issues
- asset registers
- asset valuation
- recognition and asset useful life estimates
- asset policy and planning.
| Observations | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 4.1 High risk issues | |
|
Significant matters reported to those charged with council governance |
High risk issues affect council’s ability to maintain their assets in the condition required to deliver essential services. |
| 4.2 Asset reporting | |
|
Accuracy of asset registers |
Maintaining accurate asset records is important as it enables councils to manage their assets effectively and report on finances appropriately. |
|
Unrecorded land and infrastructure assets |
Assets not captured in council records is at risk of not being subject to their care and control, nor recorded in the financial statements. |
|
Rural fire-fighting equipment |
Recommendation In doing so, the Office of Local Government should work with NSW Treasury to ensure there is a whole‑of‑government approach. |
|
4.3 Asset valuation |
|
|
Restricted assets Nine councils corrected the land values in their 2016–17 financial statements, reducing the reported value of community land and land under roads by $12.1 billion. |
The valuation of community land and land under roads should reflect the physical and legislative restrictions on these assets as required by Australian Accounting Standards. The impact of restrictions can be significant. Councils should consider engaging experts to assist with the determination of asset fair values, as necessary. |
| Asset revaluations Our audits found many cases where councils did not review valuation results, comply with applicable codes, or work effectively with valuers to obtain accurate asset valuations. |
Valuing large infrastructure assets is a complex process. Councils would benefit if the process is started earlier and there is a clear plan to ensure valuations are appropriately managed and documented. |
|
4.4 Asset useful life estimates |
|
|
Asset useful life estimates In some cases, the useful lives of assets are not reviewed annually or supported by regular condition assessment. |
Depreciation is a significant expense for councils and therefore impacts on reported financial results and key performance indicators. To comply with Australian Accounting Standards, councils need to reassess the useful lives of all assets annually. Regular condition assessments are essential to identify maintenance requirements and maintain service delivery. |
|
4.5 Asset policy and planning |
|
| Asset management strategy Thirteen councils do not have an asset management policy, strategy and plan, as required by OLG's Integrated Planning and Reporting Framework. Newly amalgamated councils have until 30 June 2018 to implement this. |
An effective asset management strategy, policy and plan helps councils to manage their assets appropriately over their life cycle and to make informed decisions on the allocation of resources. |
Asset overview
NSW councils own and manage a significant range of assets, including infrastructure, property, plant and equipment.
At 30 June 2017, the combined carrying value of NSW council assets was as follows.
Good governance systems help councils to operate effectively and comply with relevant laws and standards. Internal controls assist councils to operate reliably and produce effective financial statements.
This chapter highlights the high risk issues we found and reports on a range of governance and control areas. Governance and control issues relating to asset management and information technology are covered in separate chapters.
| Observation | Conclusion or recommendation |
| 5.1 High risk issues | |
| Significant matters reported to those charged with council governance | |
| Our 2016–17 audits identified 36 high risk governance and internal control deficiencies across 17 councils. | Asset practices accounted for the highest number of high risk issues and information technology accounted for the largest overall number of control deficiencies. These matters are covered in chapters four and six respectively. |
We reported:
|
High risk issues affect council’s ability to achieve their objectives and increase the risk of fraud and error. |
| 5.2 Governance | |
| Audit committees | |
| Councils are currently not required to have an audit, risk and improvement committee. Consequently, 53 councils do not have an audit committee. |
Proposed legislative changes will require councils to establish an audit, risk and improvement committee by March 2021. Recommendation |
|
Internal audit |
Recommendation |
|
Council entities |
Recommendation |
| The Local Government Act 1993 does not stipulate a financial reporting framework for council entities. |
Recommendation |
|
Policies and procedures |
It is important there are current policies, standards and guidelines available to staff and contractors across all critical business processes. |
|
Legislative compliance frameworks |
Councils can improve practices in monitoring compliance with key laws and regulations. This includes implementing a legislative compliance framework, register and policy. |
|
Risk management |
Council risk management practices are enhanced when there is a fit-for-purpose risk management framework, register and policy to outline how risks are identified, managed and monitored. |
| 5.3 Internal controls | |
|
Financial accounting We identified 51 high and moderate risk issues across 39 councils where reconciliation processes need to improve to support the preparation of accurate financial statements |
Sound financial accounting processes include controls to ensure:
|
| Purchasing and payables We found 102 high and moderate risk deficiencies in purchasing and payable controls across 64 councils. Sound purchasing controls are important to minimise error, unauthorised purchases, fraud and waste. |
As councils spend a substantial amount each year to procure goods and services, strong controls over purchasing and payment practices are critical. These include:
|
|
Payroll Managing excess annual leave balances was a challenge for 32 councils. |
Effective payroll controls are important because employee expenses represent a large portion of council expenditure. These controls include segregation of duties in the review of payroll master file data, timesheets, leave forms, payroll exception reports and termination payments. Excessive annual leave balances can have implications on employee costs, disrupts service delivery and affect work, health and safety. Excess annual leave balances should be continuously monitored and managed. |
Like most public sector agencies, councils increasingly rely on information technology (IT) to deliver services and manage sensitive information. While IT delivers considerable benefits, it also presents risks that councils need to address.
Our review of council IT systems focused on understanding the processes and controls that support the integrity, availability and security of the data used to prepare financial statements. This chapter outlines issues in three broad areas:
- high risk issues
- access to IT systems
- IT governance.
| Issues | Conclusion |
| 6.1 High risk issues | |
| Significant matters reported to those charged with council governance | |
| Our 2016–17 audits identified nine high risk IT control deficiencies across seven councils. The issues related to user access controls, privileged access controls and user developed applications. | High risk issues affect council’s ability to achieve their objectives and increase the risk of fraud and error. |
| 6.2 Access to IT systems | |
| User access controls We identified 107 issues across 56 councils where user access controls could be strengthened. |
Inadequate IT policies and controls around user access, including privileged access, increases the risk of individuals having excessive or unauthorised access to critical financial systems and data. |
|
Privileged access |
|
|
User developed applications Our audits found 22 councils using spreadsheets for business operations, decision making and financial reporting that were not adequately secured, with changes that were not tracked, tested or reviewed. We also identified five councils where finance staff and senior management use database query tools to directly modify financial data, circumventing system-based business process controls. |
It is important councils are aware of all circumstances they are relying on UDAs to limit the risk of errors and potential misuse. This allows councils to:
|
| 6.3 IT Governance | |
|
Strategy, policies and procedures Sixty-six councils do not have an adequate information security policy. |
IT governance is enhanced where there is:
|
|
Disaster recovery and business continuity The ability to restore data from backups is critical to ensure business continuity in the face of a system disaster. We also found that 15 councils do not periodically test their ability to restore backups of data relevant to financial reporting. |
Sound management of disaster recovery and business continuity includes:
We expect to focus on these areas in our future audits. |
Appendix one - Response from the Office of Local Government
Appendix two - List of recommendations
Appendix three - Sources of information and council classifications
Appendix four - Councils amalgamated in 2016
Appendix five - Status of audits
Appendix seven - OLG’s performance indicators from the audited financial statement - Descriptions
Appendix eight - OLG’s performance indicators from the unaudited special schedule 7 - Descriptions
Appendix nine - Financial information
Volume Eight 2011 Focus on Transport and Ports
The report includes comments on financial audits of government agencies in the Transport and Ports sectors. The audit of corporations’ financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2011 resulted in unmodified audit opinions within the Independent Auditor’s Reports. A key recommendation from the report is that Sydney Ports Corporation should continue working with other government authorities and industry stakeholders to improve the effectiveness of program initiatives for increasing container freight movements by rail. The Corporation should review the underlying causes hindering growth in the rail mode and develop and implement strategies to address the unfavourable trend.
Solar Bonus Scheme
A NSW Auditor General’s Report has found that the NSW Government and its agencies grossly underestimated the cost and number of people that would install systems under the Solar Bonus Scheme.
By October 2010, the estimated cost of the Scheme, if it continued the way it was going, would have reached $3.988 billion. More than ten times the original estimate of $362 million. In response to the increased cost, the gross tariff for new applicants was reduced from 60 to 20 cents reducing the estimated cost to $1.954 billion.
It was a statutory requirement that when 50 mega watts of installed capacity was reached, the Government would review the Scheme. By the time the review was completed the installed capacity had reached 101 mega watts.
Condition of State Roads
The Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) has improved the overall surface condition of State Roads in the last decade. Country road surfaces are now generally much better. Ride quality has improved and cracking has been reduced. The RTA has also achieved a substantial reduction in the number of structurally deficient bridges over the same period.
Despite a significant increase in the State’s contribution to maintenance since 1999-2000, the RTA has deferred road rebuilding projects. The RTA is rebuilding at less than half its long term target, and has not met this target at any time this decade. The RTA has not identified how it will address deferred rebuilding, although it advises it is developing a new road network management plan which will address this.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #157 - released 16 August 2006
The Cross City Tunnel Project
In our opinion the Government’s ‘no net cost to government’ requirement was a legitimate (but not the only possible) basis for the tunnel bid process. The Government was entitled to decide that tunnel users meet the tunnel costs. Structuring the bid process on the basis of an upfront reimbursement of costs incurred (or to be incurred) by the Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) was therefore appropriate.
In our opinion, however, the Government, Treasury and the RTA did not sufficiently consider the implications of an upfront payment involving more than simple project cost reimbursement (i.e. the ‘Business Consideration Fee’ component). In addition, the RTA was wrong to change the toll escalation factor late in 2002 to compensate the tunnel operator, Cross City Motorway Pty Ltd, for additional costs.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #152 - released 31 May 2006
Lease to Fox Studios Australia
The audit found that the process for the lease and development of the Showground site commenced on the basis that no Government moneys would be provided and no theme park activities would be allowed. However despite this a State Government subsidy of between $84.8m and $106.8m (in net present value terms) is to be provided for the development and the area of the Showground to be leased to Fox was extended to comprise 24.3 hectares of the 28.8 hectare site to allow Fox also to develop a family entertainment park.
The audit also found that the process commenced under the former Government were intended to ensure that no one party was placed above another however, the actual processes employed up to the General Election in March 1995 were so flawed as not to be relied upon to select a preferred proponent or to justify dispensing with a tender process.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #44 - released 8 December 1997
