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Published

Actions for Local Government 2021

Local Government 2021

Local Government
Asset valuation
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology

What the report is about

Results of the local government sector council financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 126 councils, 13 joint organisation audits and nine county councils in 2020–21. 

A qualified audit opinion was issued for Central Coast Council who was unable to provide evidence to support the carrying value of $5.5 billion of roads, bridges, footpaths, bulk earthworks, stormwater drainage, water supply and sewerage network assets.

The audit of Kiama Municipal Council is still in progress as at the date of this report due to significant accounting issues not resolved resulting in corrections to the financial statements and prior period errors.

Forty-one councils and joint organisations (2020: 16) received extensions to submit audited financial statements to the Office of Local Government (OLG). 

Councils were impacted by recent emergency events, including bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic. The financial implications from these events varied across councils. Councils adapted systems, processes and controls to enable staff to work flexibly.

What the key issues were

There were 1,277 audit findings reported to councils in audit management letters.

Ninety-two high-risk matters were identified across the sector:

  • 69 high-risk matters relating to asset management (see page 30)
  • six high-risk matters relating to information technology (see page 39)
  • six high-risk matters relating to financial reporting (see page 26)
  • six high-risk matters to council governance procedures (see page 22)
  • five high-risk matters relating to financial accounting (see page 28).

More needs to be done to reduce the number of errors identified in financial reports. Twenty-nine councils required material adjustments to correct errors in previous audited financial statements.

Rural firefighting equipment

Sixty-eight councils did not record rural firefighting equipment estimated to be $145 million in their financial statements.

The financial statements of the NSW Total State Sector and the NSW Rural Fire Service do not include these assets, as the State is of the view that rural firefighting equipment that has been vested to councils under the Rural Fires Act 1997 is not controlled by the State. In reaching this conclusion, the State argued that on balance it would appear the councils control rural firefighting equipment that has been vested to them.

The continued non-recording of rural firefighting equipment in financial management systems of some councils increases the risk that these assets are not properly maintained and managed.

What we recommended

Councils should perform a full asset stocktake of rural firefighting equipment, including a condition assessment for 30 June 2022 financial reporting purposes and recognise this equipment as assets in their financial statements. 

Consistent with OLG’s role to assess council’s compliance with legislative responsibilities, standards or guidelines, OLG should intervene where councils do not recognise rural firefighting equipment.

Fast facts

  • 150 councils and joint organisations in the sector
  • 99% unqualified audit opinions issued for the 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 489 monetary misstatements reported in 2020–21
  • 54 prior period errors reported
  • 92 high-risk management letter findings identified
  • 53% of reported issues were repeat issues.

Early financial reporting procedures

Fifty-nine per cent of councils performed some early financial reporting procedures, less than the prior year.

What we recommended

OLG should require early financial reporting procedures across the local government sector by April 2023. Policy requirements should be discussed with key stakeholders to ensure benefits of the procedures are realised.

Asset valuations

Audit management letters reported 288 findings relating to asset management. Fifty-eight councils had deficiencies in their processes to revalue infrastructure assets.

Thirty-five councils corrected errors relating to revaluations amounting to $1 billion and 13 councils had prior period errors relating to asset revaluations that amounted to $253 million.

What we recommended

Councils should have all asset revaluations completed by April of the financial year subject to audit.

Integrity/completeness of asset records

Sixty-seven councils had weak processes over maintenance, completeness and security of fixed asset registers.

Thirty-five councils corrected errors to the financial statements relating to poor record keeping of asset data that amounted to $102.1 million. Nineteen councils had 27 prior period financial statement errors that amounted to $417.1 million relating to the quality of asset records such as found and duplicate assets.

What we recommended

Councils need to improve controls and processes to ensure integrity and completeness of asset source records.

Cybersecurity

Our audits found that cybersecurity frameworks and related controls were not in place at 65 councils.

These councils have yet to implement basic governance and internal controls to manage cybersecurity such as having a cybersecurity framework, policy and procedure, register of cyber incidents, system penetrations testing and training.

What we recommended

OLG needs to develop a cybersecurity policy to be applied by councils as a matter of high priority in order to ensure cybersecurity risks over key data and IT assets are appropriately managed across councils and key data is safeguarded.

Councils should monitor the implementation of recommendations

Fifty-three per cent of total findings reported in 2020–21 audit management letters were repeat or partial repeat findings from prior years.

What we recommended

Councils and those charged with governance should track the progress of implementing recommendations from financial audits, performance audits and public inquiries.

Key financial information

In 2020–21, councils:

  • collected $7.6b in rates and annual charges
  • received $5.1b in grants and contributions
  • incurred $4.8b of employee benefits and on costs
  • held $15.3b of cash and investments
  • managed $161.7b of infrastructure, property, plant and equipment
  • entered into $3.4b of borrowings.

Pursuant to the Local Government Act 1993 I present my report Local Government 2021. My report provides the results of the 2020–21 financial audits of 127 councils, 13 joint organisations and nine county councils.

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 126 councils, 13 joint organisation and nine county councils in 2020–21. My independent auditor’s opinion was qualified for Central Coast Council who was unable to provide evidence to support the carrying value of $5.5 billion of roads, bridges, footpaths, bulk earthworks, stormwater drainage, water supply and sewerage network assets.

The 2020–21 year was challenging from many perspectives, not least being the continuing impact of and response to the recent emergency events, including bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic. We appreciate the efforts of council staff and management right across local government and they must be congratulated for their responsiveness and resilience in meeting their financial reporting obligations in such challenging circumstances.

This report makes a number of recommendations to councils and to the regulator, the Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning and Environment. These are intended to support councils to further improve the timeliness, accuracy and strength of financial reporting and their governance arrangements. Arguably, when faced with challenges, it is even more important to prioritise and invest in systems and processes to protect the integrity of councils' operations and promote accurate and transparent reporting.

I look forward to continuing engagement and constructive dialogue with councils in 2022–23 and beyond.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence in and transparency of public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines audit observations related to the financial reporting of councils and joint organisations.

Highlights

  • One hundred and nine councils and joint organisations (2020: 133) lodged audited financial statements with OLG by the statutory deadline of 31 October (2020: 30 November).
  • Forty-one councils and joint organisations (2020: 16) received extensions to submit audited financial statements to OLG.
  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 126 councils, 13 joint organisations and nine county councils in 2020–21. A qualified audit opinion was issued for Central Coast Council in both 2019–20 and 2020–21.
  • The audit of Kiama Municipal Council is still in progress as at the date of this report due to significant accounting issues.
  • Fifty-nine per cent of councils performed some early financial reporting procedures, less than the prior year. We recommended that OLG should require early close procedures across the local government sector by 30 April 2023.
  • The total number and dollar value of corrected financial statement errors increased compared with the prior year, however uncorrected financial statement errors and prior period financial statement errors decreased compared to the prior year.
  • Sixty-eight councils (2020: 68 councils) did not record rural firefighting equipment in their financial statements worth an estimated $145 million (2020: $119 million). The NSW Government has confirmed these assets are not controlled by the NSW Rural Fire Service and are not recognised in the financial records of the NSW Government. We recommended that consistent with the OLG's role to assess council’s compliance with legislative responsibilities, standards or guidelines, OLG should intervene where councils do not recognise rural firefighting equipment. Councils should perform a full asset stocktake of rural firefighting equipment, including a condition assessment for 30 June 2022 financial reporting purposes.

A strong system of internal controls enables councils to operate effectively and efficiently, produce reliable financial reports, comply with laws and regulations, and support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends in governance and internal control findings across councils, county councils and joint organisations in 2020–21.

Financial audits focus on key governance matters and internal controls supporting the preparation of councils' financial statements. Audit findings are reported to management and those charged with governance through audit management letters.

Highlights

  • Total number of audit findings reported in audit management letters decreased from 1,435 in 2019–20 to 1,277 in 2020–21.
  • No extreme risk audit findings were identified in 2020–21 (2019–20: 1).
  • Total number of high-risk audit findings increased from 53 in 2019–20 to 92 in 2020–21. Sixty of the high-risk findings in 2020–21 related to the non-recording of rural firefighting equipment in councils' financial statements. Twenty-six per cent of the high-risk findings identified in 2019–20 were reported as high-risk findings in 2020–21.
  • Fifty-three per cent of findings reported in audit management letters were repeat or partial repeat findings. We recommend councils and those charged with governance should track progress of implementing recommendation from our audits.
  • Governance, asset management and information technology comprise over 62% of findings and continue to be key areas requiring improvement.
  • A number of recommendations were made relating to asset valuations and integrity of asset data records, in response to the findings that:
    • 67 councils had weak processes over maintenance and security of fixed asset registers
    • 58 councils had deficiencies in their processes to revalue infrastructure assets.
  • Sixty-five councils have yet to implement basic governance and internal controls to manage cybersecurity. We recommended that OLG needs to develop a cybersecurity policy to be applied by councils as a matter of high priority.

Total number of findings reported in audit management letters decreased

In 2020–21, 1,277 audit findings were reported in audit management letters (2019–20: 1,435 findings). No extreme audit risk findings were identified this year. The extreme risk relating to Central Coast Council's use of externally restricted funds in 2019–20 was partially addressed by management and has been rated as a high-risk for 2020–21. The total number of high-risk findings increased to 92 (2019–20: 53 high-risk findings).

Findings are classified as new, repeat or ongoing, based on:

  • new findings were first reported in 2020–21 audits
  • repeat findings were first reported in prior year audits, but remain unresolved in 2020–21
  • ongoing findings were first reported in prior year audits, but the action due dates to address the findings are after 2020–21.

Findings are categorised as governance, financial reporting, financial accounting, asset management, purchases and payables, payroll, cash and banking, revenue and receivables, or information technology. The high-risk and common audit findings across these areas are explored further in this chapter.

Audit Office’s annual work program for 2021–22 onwards

Focus on integrity of systems, good governance and good advice

We have a fundamental role in helping the Parliament hold government accountable for the use of public resources. In doing so, we examine whether councils' systems and processes are effective in supporting integrity, accountability and transparency. Key aspects of integrity that we expect to through conduct of our financial and performance audits over the next three years include the integrity of systems, good governance and good advice. These focus areas have arisen from the collation of key findings and recommendations from our past reports.

Focus on local councils' continued response to recent emergencies

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on the people and the public sector of New South Wales. Local councils are continuing to assist communities in their recovery from the 2019–20 bushfires and subsequent and recent flooding. The full extent of some of these events remain unclear and will likely continue to have an impact into the future.

Image of a bus stop that's been completely burned because of a bushfire

The Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning and Environment continues to work with other state agencies to assist local councils and their communities to recover from these unprecedented events.

The increasing and changing risk environment presented by these events has meant that we have recalibrated and focused our efforts on providing assurance on how effectively aspects of responses to these emergencies have been delivered.

This includes financial and governance risks arising from the scale and complexity of government responses to these events.

We will take a phased approach to ensure our financial and performance audits address the following elements of the emergencies and the Local Government's responses:

  • local councils' planning and preparedness for emergencies
  • local councils' initial responses to support people and communities impacted by COVID-19 and the 2019–20 bushfires and recent floods
  • governance and oversight risks that arise from the need for quick decision-making and responsiveness to emergencies
  • effectiveness and robustness of processes to direct resources toward recovery efforts and ensure good governance and transparency in doing so
  • the mid to long-term impact of government responses to the natural disasters and COVID-19
  • whether government investment has achieved desired outcomes.

Focus on the effectiveness of cybersecurity in local government

The increasing global interconnectivity between computer networks has dramatically increased the risk of cybersecurity incidents. Such incidents can harm local government service delivery and may include theft of information, denial of access to critical technology, or even hijacking of systems for profit or malicious intent.

Outdated IT systems and capability present risks to government cybersecurity. Local councils need to be alert to the need to update and replace legacy systems, and regularly train and upskill staff in their use. To add to this, cybersecurity risks have been exacerbated by recent emergencies, which have resulted in greater and more diverse use of digital technology.

Our approach to auditing cybersecurity across in the sector involves:

  • considering how local councils are responding to the risks associated with cybersecurity across our financial audits
  • examining the effectiveness of cybersecurity planning and governance arrangements within local councils
  • conducting deep-dive performance audits of the effectiveness of cybersecurity measures in selected councils.

Local government elections

Local government elections took place in 2021–22

The local government elections were deferred for one year due to the COVID-19 pandemic and were held on 4 December 2021.

As part of our audits, we will consider the impact of any significant change on key decisions and activities for councils, county councils and joint organisations following the local government elections.

New rate peg methodology to support growing councils

The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) has completed its review of the local government rate peg methodology to include population growth.

On 10 September 2021, IPART provided the final report on this review to the Minister for Local Government.

The minister has endorsed the new rate peg methodology and has asked IPART to give effect to it in setting the rate peg from the 2022–23 financial year.

As part of our audits, we will consider the impact of these changes on the financial statements and on key decisions and activities for councils, county councils and joint organisations.

Appendix one – Response from the Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning and Environment

Appendix two – Status of previous recommendations

Appendix three – Status of audits

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

Community Services
Education
Health
Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Financial reporting
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

This report draws together the financial impact of COVID-19 on the agencies integral to responses across the state government sector of New South Wales.

What we found

Since the COVID-19 pandemic hit NSW in January 2020, and until 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion was spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus. The response was largely funded by borrowings.

The key areas of spending since the start of COVID-19 in NSW to 30 June 2021 were:

  • direct health response measures – $2.2 billion
  • personal protective equipment – $1.4 billion
  • small business grants – $795 million
  • quarantine costs – $613 million
  • increases in employee expenses and cleaning costs across most agencies
  • vaccine distribution, including vaccination hubs – $71 million.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the financial performance and position of state government agencies.

Decreases in revenue from providing goods and services were offset by increases in appropriations, grants and contributions, for health and economic stimulus funding in response to the pandemic.

Most agencies had expense growth, due to additional operating requirements to manage and respond to the pandemic along with implementing new or expanded stimulus programs and initiatives.

Response measures for COVID-19 have meant the NSW Government is unlikely to meet targets in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 being:

  • annual expense growth kept below long-term average revenue growth
  • elimination of State’s unfunded superannuation liability by 2030.

 Fast facts

  • First COVID-19 case in NSW on 25 January 2020
  • COVID-19 vaccinations commenced on 21 February 2021
  • By 31 December 2021, 25.2 million PCR tests had been performed in NSW and 13.6 million vaccines administered, with 93.6% of the 16 and over population receiving two doses
  • During 2020–21, NSW Health employed an extra 4,893 full-time staff and incurred $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19
  • During 2020–21, $1.2 billion was spent on direct health COVID-19 response measures and $532 million was spent on quarantine for incoming international travellers

Section highlights

  • Up to 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion has been spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus.
  • Revenue increased for most agencies as falling revenue from providing goods and services was offset by additional funding from appropriations, grants and contributions.
  • Expenses increased as most agencies incurred additional costs to manage and respond to the pandemic along with delivering stimulus and support programs.
  • Borrowings of $7.5 billion over the last two years helped to fund the response to COVID-19.

Section highlights

  • NSW Government unlikely to meet targets in Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012.

Published

Actions for Transport 2021

Transport 2021

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance

What the report is about

The results of the Transport cluster agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified financial statement audit opinions were issued for all Transport cluster agencies. Resolution of issues delayed signing the Transport Asset Holding Entity of NSW (TAHE) until 24 December 2021. Matters relating to TAHE are also reported in the report on State Finances 2021.

Emphasis of Matter - TAHE

An Emphasis of Matter paragraph was included in TAHE's audit opinion to draw attention to uncertainty associated with:

  • future access and licence fees that are subject to re-signed agreements
  • an additional $4.1 billion of funding that is outside the forward estimates period
  • a significant portion of the fair value of TAHE’s non-financial assets is reflected in the terminal value, which is outside the ten-year contract period to 30 June 2031, and the risk that TAHE will not be able to negotiate contract terms to support current projections.

TAHE's transition from RailCorp also changed its valuation of assets to an income approach, resulting in a $20.3 billion decrease to the fair value. The fair value decrease was because the cash flows were not sufficient to support the previous recorded value.

TAHE corrected a misstatement of $1.2 billion relating to the valuation of its assets. This followed significant deliberation on key judgements and assumptions, with TAHE adopting risk assumptions in its valuation that were not in line with comparable benchmarks.

Emphasis of Matter - State Transit Authority of New South Wales

An Emphasis of Matter paragraph was included in the State Transit Authority of NSW's (the Authority) audit opinion to draw attention to the financial statements not prepared on a going concern basis. This was because the NSW Government put the Authority's bus contracts out to competitive tender and accordingly, management assessed the Authority's principal activities are not expected to operate for a full 12 months after 30 June 2021.

The implementation of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’ resulted in a net increase in assets of $23.5 billion across the Transport cluster.

The 2020–21 audits identified six high-risk and 45 moderate risk issues across the cluster. Fourteen of the moderate risk issues were repeat issues, including information technology controls around management of user access for key financial systems and payroll processes.

The high-risk issues, in addition to those related to TAHE and previously reported in the report on State Finances 2021, include:

  • absence of conflict of declarations related to land acquisition processes at Transport for NSW
  • no evidence of conflict of interest declarations obtained by TAHE from consultants and contractors regarding involvement in other engagements.

What we recommended

TAHE needs to:

  • finalise revised commercial agreements to reflect fees detailed in a Heads of Agreement signed on 18 December 2021
  • prepare robust projections and business plans to support the required rate of return.

NSW Treasury and TAHE should monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in the future.

Transport for NSW needs to significantly improve its processes to ensure all key information is identified and shared with the Audit Office.

Transport agencies should implement a process to ensure conflicts of interest declarations are completed for land acquisitions and applied consistently across the cluster.

Transport agencies should implement a process to capture all contracts and agreements entered to ensure:

  • agencies are aware of contractual obligations
  • financial reporting implications are assessed, particularly with respect to leases, revenue and service concession arrangements.

Fast facts

The Transport cluster plans and delivers infrastructure and integrated services across all modes of transport. This includes road, rail, bus, ferry, light rail, cycling and walking. There are 11 agencies in the cluster.

  • $128b road and maritime system infrastructure assets as at 30 June 2021
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 26 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • $24.9b rail systems infrastructure assets as at 30 June 2021
  • high-risk management letter findings were identified
  • 37% of reported issues were repeat issues

 

This report provides Parliament and other users of the transport cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the cluster for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Transport agencies' financial statements.
  • An 'Emphasis of Matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales' (TAHE) Independent Auditor's Report to draw attention to significant uncertainty associated with the judgements, estimates and assumptions supporting the valuation of TAHE’s property, plant and equipment (PPE) and intangible assets.
  • In 2020–21, the former RailCorp transitioned to TAHE, a for-profit state-owned corporation. When TAHE became a for-profit entity, it was required to change its valuation approach. The value of a for-profit entity's assets cannot exceed the cash flows they might realise either through their sale or continued use. This change in the basis of valuation resulted in a decrease of $20.3 billion in the fair value of the assets. The decrease in fair value was because the cash flows, which support measurement under the income approach, were insufficient to support the previous valuation based on the current replacement cost of those assets.
  • TAHE also corrected a misstatement of $1.2 billion relating to the valuation of its assets after significant deliberation on key judgements and assumptions, with TAHE adopting higher risk assumptions in its valuation when compared to the relevant market benchmarks.
  • On 18 December 2021, a Heads of Agreement (HoA) was signed between TAHE, Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. This HoA reflected TAHE's intention to negotiate higher access and licence fees in order to meet the shareholding ministers' revised expectation of a higher rate of return. This matter resolved the treatment of a significant accounting issue in the State’s consolidated (whole-of-government) financial statements. Refer to the Report on State Finances tabled on 9 February 2022. The expectation of an additional $5.2 billion in fees added to the valuation of TAHE's PPE and intangibles, with a final value of $17.15 billion.
  • The implementation of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’ resulted in a net increase in assets of $23.5 billion across the cluster. AASB 1059 had a significant impact on Transport for NSW, Sydney Metro, Sydney Ferries and TAHE's 2020–21 financial statements.
  • TAHE corrected a misstatement of $97.2 million relating to the application of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' for the Airport Link Company Contract. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management increased from 56 in 2019–20 to 73 in 2020–21.
  • Thirty-seven per cent were repeat findings. Many repeat issues related to information technology controls around user access management and payroll processes. These included deficiencies in the monitoring of privileged user access to key financial systems, review of user access to key financial systems and segregation of duties between preparer and reviewer for new employee hires.
  • Six new high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of three compared to last year.
  • One high-risk issue related to conflicts of interests not being declared by all officers involved in the land acquisition process at Transport for NSW.
  • Five high-risk issues arose from the audit of TAHE, with respect to:
    • control over TAHE assets and operations
    • asset valuations
    • access price build up
    • detailed business modelling to support returns
    • conflict of interest management.
  • Based on the access and licence agreements signed at 30 June 2021 between TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, our review of the expected returns calculated by NSW Treasury did not support the assumption that there was a reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return could be achieved from the NSW Government's investment in TAHE.
  • On 14 December 2021 the shareholding ministers' increased their expectations as to TAHE's target average return from 1.5 per cent to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent.
  • On 18 December 2021 the revised shareholder expectations were confirmed in a signed Heads of Agreement. The Heads of Agreement will increase access fees paid by rail operators to TAHE by $5.2 billion.
  • TAHE's access and licence agreements specified fees that were well short of the IPART regulated maximum (ceiling price).
  • The finalisation of the access and licence agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains resulted in a significant write-down of TAHE's asset value by $20.3 billion. The revaluation loss will need to be recovered as part of the shareholders’ rate of return of 2.5 per cent in order to sustain the whole-of-government accounting treatment of cash contributions recorded as an equity contribution and not a grant expense.
  • There was a significant adjustment to TAHE’s valuation between the financial statements originally submitted for the audit and the final, signed financial statements due to differences in risk assumptions resulting in a correction of a $1.2 billion misstatement. 

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has increased, and 37 per cent of all issues were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 73 findings raised across the cluster (56 in 2019–20) and 37 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (43 per cent in 2019–20).

In view of the recent performance audit ‘Managing Cyber Risks’ and compliance audit ‘Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy’ involving the cluster, it is noted with concern that the most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration and password management. Moderate risk issues included completeness and accuracy of contract registers, accounting for assets and management of supplier and payroll masterfiles.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports, and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Control deficiencies may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation, and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating. 

Risk rating Issue
Information technology
Moderate: 7 new, 4 repeat**

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:

  • monitoring of privileged user access
  • user access management
  • password configuration management.
Low: 4 new, 1 repeat***
Internal control deficiencies or improvements
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified internal control deficiencies across key business processes, including:

  • declarations of conflicts of interest over land acquisitions (see further details below)
  • management of contracts and agreement register
  • accounting for assets
  • management of payroll and supplier masterfiles
  • payroll processes.
Moderate: 15 new, 8 repeat**
Low: 2 new, 5 repeat***
Financial reporting
High: 3 new*

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to strengthen financial reporting, including:

  • asset valuations (see further details below)
  • detailed business modelling to support returns (see further details below)
  • access price build-up (see further details below)
  • timely capitalisation of completed assets.
Moderate: 3 new, 1 repeat**
Low: 2 new***
Governance and oversight
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:

  • control over TAHE assets and operations
  • governance over Cyber Security.
Moderate: 2 new**
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve its compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, including:

  • conflict of interest (COI) management
  • outdated policies and procedures
  • incomplete probation procedures.
Moderate: 4 new, 1 repeat**
Low: 1 new, 7 repeat***

* High-risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
** Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
*** Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies.

2020–21 audits identified six high-risk findings

High-risk findings were reported at the following cluster agencies.

Agency Description
2020–21 findings
Transport for NSW (new finding)

Declaration of conflicts of interest in the land acquisition process

In 2021, we conducted a performance audit over the Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia which examined:

  • whether Transport for NSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether Transport for NSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

The report made several recommendations over Transport for NSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the land acquisition process. As part of the financial audit, we obtained an understanding of key controls and processes relating to the acquisition of land, relevant to the audit of the financial statements. We found that conflicts of interests were not always declared by all officers involved in the land acquisition process. Furthermore, processes for declaring conflicts of interests are not consistently applied across cluster agencies.

Out of a sample of 19 land acquisitions tested, we identified:

  • 14 instances where there was no evidence of declarations of conflicts of interests made by the team members involved in the acquisition process
  • 2 instances where conflicts of interest declarations were completed by key members of the acquisition team only at a project level
  • 1 instance where conflicts of interest declarations were only completed by the property negotiator and the valuer, but not the other members of the acquisition team.

Management advised that the land acquisition processes, at the time of the land acquisitions, did not require formal conflicts of interests to be declared as they believe that as per Transport for NSW code of conduct, declaration is only required where the staff member considers that a potential or perceived Conflict of Interest exists. However, Transport for NSW's Procurement Policy requires the documentation of formal declarations from all staff involved in procurement activities to formally disclose any conflicts of interest or state that they do not have a conflict of interest.

This matter has been included as a high-risk finding in the management letter as absence of rigorous and consistent management of conflicts of interests, and non-compliance with established policies increases the risk that Transport for NSW may be exposed to reputational damage or financial losses in relation to land acquisitions. Furthermore, this may result in lack of probity or value-for money considerations during the land acquisition process.

Further details are elaborated below under 'Land acquisitions'.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Control over TAHE assets and operations

The State-Owned Corporations Act 1989 maintains that all decisions relating to the operation of a statutory state-owned corporation (SOC) are to be made by or under the authority of the board. However, under the Transport Administration Act 1988 (TAA), the functions of TAHE may only be exercised under one or more operating licences issued by the portfolio minister. The current Operating Licence confers terms and conditions for TAHE to carry out its functions, and imposes constraints on TAHE, including (but not limited to):

  • railway operations not permitted
  • transport services not permitted
  • TAHE must not carry out maintenance of its assets.

Such operating licences are short term in nature, and the TAA allows the transport minister (portfolio minister) to grant one or more operating licences to TAHE and may amend, substitute, or impose, amend or revoke conditions of the operating licence.

For the current year, the legal form of the arrangements established in its first year of operation imply TAHE has control over the assets based on the Implementation Deed and the agreements signed with the public operators.

However, risks remain as TAHE is in its early stages, and the actual substance of operations will need to be observed and considered.

Given the restrictions that can be placed on the entity through the Operating Licence, and the ability to make further changes to the Operating Licence and Statement of Expectations set by the portfolio minister, there is a risk there could be limitations placed on the Board of Directors to operate with sufficient independence in its decision-making with respect to the operations of TAHE. Over time, this may further impact the degree of control required by TAHE to satisfy the recognition criteria over its assets. It may also fundamentally change the presentation of TAHE’s financial statements.

Future limitations to the degree of control TAHE, and its Board, can exercise over its functions may impact the degree of control TAHE has over its assets going forward. As part of the 2021–22 audit, we will monitor and assess whether, in substance, these assets continue to be controlled by TAHE and whether, in substance, TAHE can operate as an independent SOC. We require management continue to demonstrate that TAHE continues to maintain control over its assets and has the ability to operate as an independent SOC. Further details are described below under 'Transport Asset Holding Entity'.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Asset valuation

The final updated valuation was based on cash flows that were in a signed Heads of Agreement, which stated that it set out the proposed indicative future access and licence fees which will form the basis of the negotiations between TAHE, Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, who will work together to review access fees and licence fees payable under the agreements and to make all necessary changes to the Operating Agreements by 1 July 2022.

This adds uncertainty in the cash flows. It is crucial that TAHE formalises these updated fees in legally binding signed access and licence agreements with the relevant parties as soon as possible.

Refer below for further details on the Heads of Agreement.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Conflict of interest (COI) management

For procurement transactions through direct negotiation with single quotes, there was no evidence of COI declarations obtained from the consultants and contractors regarding involvement in other engagements. Contractors and consultants are required to declare actual COI. However, there was no requirement to confirm nil conflict of interest. In addition, there is a risk that perceived COI may not be adequately assessed or managed. TAHE is expected to operate as an independent SOC and would need to ensure any perceived or actual conflict of interest is adequately addressed.

Management should implement a process to:

  • ensure conflicts of interest declarations are completed when engaging all consultants and contractors (including involvement with other engagements and confirmation of nil conflicts of interests)
  • ensure probity is undertaken to identify any actual or perceived conflicts of interest.

The declarations should consider individuals and relationships that may create, or may be perceived to create, conflicts of interest.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Detailed business modelling to support returns

On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW, TAHE and the operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This HoA forms the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing 10-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders' expectation of a return of 2.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity, including recovering the revaluation loss incurred in 2020–21.

TAHE needs to revise its business plan and include detailed business modelling that supports the shareholding ministers' revised expectations of return (2.5 per cent return on the State’s equity injections and recovery of the write-down of assets over the average useful life of those assets) and align the business plan and Statement of Corporate Intent. This requires more detailed projections, estimates and plans that support how TAHE expects to recover the asset write-down and expected returns to government. The current modelling for ten years needs to be enhanced with modelling over the expected recovery period of approximately 33 years.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Access price build-up

Management explained that in determining access and licence fees for the agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, assets prior to the commencement of equity injections in 2015–16 were excluded from the calculations. Management explained the premise being that these assets were previously funded by government through capital grants. The replacement and refurbishment of these assets is expected to be through government funded maintenance performed through the public rail operators and/or the equity injections from NSW Treasury rather than through access and licence fees.


The number of moderate risk findings increased from prior year

Forty-five moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, representing a 73.1 per cent increase from 2019–20. Of these, 14 were repeat findings, and 31 were new issues. 

Key moderate risk findings related to:

  • weaknesses in user access management to key financial systems
  • management of contracts and agreements register
  • management of supplier and payroll masterfiles
  • accounting for assets
  • control deficiencies at service organisations
  • segregation of duties relating to the hiring of employees
  • conflict of interest management
  • annual leave management
  • review of internal audit charter
  • disaster recovery planning.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales

Background

The establishment of TAHE was originally announced by the NSW Government in the 2015–16 State Budget. On 1 July 2020, the former Rail Corporation New South Wales (RailCorp), a not-for-profit entity, transitioned to the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE), a for-profit statutory state-owned corporation under the Transport Administration Act 1988. There was no change in the structure of TAHE as a new entity was not created. Ownership remains fully with the government. TAHE, and the former RailCorp, were both classified as Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entities within the Total State Sector Accounts.

Prior to 1 July 2015, the government paid appropriations to Transport for NSW, a General Government Sector (GGS) agency, to construct transport assets. When completed, these assets were granted to the former RailCorp, a not for-profit entity within the PNFC sector. The grants to the former RailCorp were recorded as an expense in the State’s GGS budget result.

From 1 July 2015, the government announced the creation of TAHE (a dedicated asset manager). Funding for new capital projects was to be provided through equity injections and was no longer recorded as an expense to the GGS budget, even though the business model was yet to be determined. The change, as explained in the 2015–16 State Budget, was due to the expectation that the former RailCorp will transition to TAHE, which was intended, over time to provide a commercial return. That Budget also highlighted how the change, which was largely a change in the basis of accounting, was intended to improve the GGS budget result each year. In total, the GGS has contributed approximately $11.1 billion to TAHE since 2015–16. This includes the equity injections from the GGS to TAHE made in the current year of $2.4 billion.

NSW Treasury initially set a timetable for the stand-up of TAHE of 1 July 2019, which included finalising the business model, operating model and contracts for the use of TAHE's assets. The enactment of the Transport Administration Act 1988 resulted in RailCorp transitioning to TAHE on 1 July 2020, 12 months after its originally planned operational date. Contributions paid to the former RailCorp and subsequently to TAHE by the GGS were treated as equity investments from July 2015 forward. This treatment continued, despite delays in settling the business model. In 2020, the Audit Office raised a high-risk finding due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for NSW Treasury and TAHE.

The business model adopted and the flow of funds between transport agencies in the GGS and PNFC sectors is shown in the diagram below. For further details refer to the Report on State Finances 2021.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Financial data

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Published

Actions for Treasury 2021

Treasury 2021

Treasury
Finance
Compliance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

What the report is about

The results of Treasury cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021. The results of the audit of the NSW Government's consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which are prepared by NSW Treasury, are reported separately in our report on State Finances 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Treasury cluster agencies.

The number of identified monetary misstatements increased from 16 in 2019–20 to 24 in 2020–21.

Reported corrected monetary misstatements decreased from 15 in 2019–20 to seven with a gross value of $1.1 billion in 2020–21.

The largest corrected misstatement was in NSW Treasury's financial statements and was a $1 billion correction to administered borrowings.

Reported uncorrected monetary misstatements increased from one in 2019–20 to 17 with a gross value of $168 million in 2020–21.

Seven of the 2020–21 uncorrected misstatements related to one common decision relating to investment management funds terminated during the year by the NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp).

All agencies submitted their 2020–21 financial statements within NSW Treasury's reporting deadlines.

What the key issues were

Significant audit findings were identified with respect to NSW Treasury's processes to prepare the NSW Government's consolidated TSSA (whole of government accounts). This included one extreme finding and several high-risk findings related to NSW Treasury processes. These are reported in our report on State Finances 2021.

Two high-risk issues raised in 2019–20 were also not addressed by NSW Treasury during the year and were repeat issues reported to management. These related to the appropriations framework and resolution of cross cluster payments, and instances where some agencies spent deemed appropriations money without an authorised delegation.

A number of previously reported audit findings and recommendations with respect to icare continue to be ongoing issues, namely:

  • The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer continues to hold less assets than the estimated present value of its future payment obligations.
  • The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer's four week return-to-work rate fell from 68% to 64%. This is below icare's 70% target. Contributing factors include COVID-19 lockdowns which have impacted claims handling processes, and increased barriers to claimants returning to work.
  • Instances were noted where inadequate documentation was kept on file to support claims, including pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE) calculations.

The Workers Compensation (Dust Diseases) Authority increased its outstanding claims liability by $93.9 million, which included $39.3 million to remediate historical underpayments, resulting from workers not being paid the rate required by existing legislation.

The icare Board approved a new approach for remediating PIAWE underpayments on 24 September 2021, the date the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer’s financial statements were approved for issue. The impact of the decision on the financial statements was not discussed with the Audit Office and assessed as an ‘after balance date event’.

What we recommended

Our report on State Finances 2021 made several recommendations to improve NSW Treasury processes. These included:

  • improve processes to ensure information is shared with audit on a timely basis
  • seek legislative amendments to resolve statutory inconsistencies relating to statutory reporting time frames
  • implement effective quality review processes over key accounting information
  • establish a policy to determine the minimum expected rate of return on equity injections in other public sector entities
  • prepare robust financial projections to support accounting decisions
  • re-confirm sector classifications of TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains
  • ensure sufficient oversight of its use of consultants and assess the risk of an overdependence on consultants at the cost of internal capability
  • improve disclosures of equity injections invested in other public sector entities
  • determine a state-wide policy on when borrowings are recognised in agency financial statements
  • make legislative amendments to ensure expenditure incurred across financial years does not exceed the appropriation authority and assess the financial reporting impact
  • improve the guidance provided to agencies to ensure expenditure of public money is properly supported by authorised delegations.

We also recommended icare should ensure:

  • it has sufficient controls over claim payments including an effective quality assurance program, to minimise claim payment errors
  • that documentation to support injured worker benefit calculations is appropriately maintained, and the documentation requirements are set out in a policy
  • the impact of ‘after balance date events’ on financial statements is appropriately assessed
  • its operational practices are improved to ensure the correct payment of claims in compliance with legislative requirements. icare also needs to act on a timely basis on received legal advice and amend operational practices to ensure correct payments are made.

Fast facts 

NSW Treasury notes that it is the Government's principal financial and economic adviser to guide the State’s growth for the benefit of the people who live, work and study in NSW.

  • $111b funds under management as at 30 June 2021
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies’ 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 24 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • $17b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21
  • 12 extreme and high-risk findings were identified
  • 30% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report focuses on agencies within the Treasury cluster and provides parliament and other users of the Treasury cluster's financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

NSW Treasury also prepares the consolidated NSW whole of government financial statements (the Total State Sector Accounts), which is reported in the report on State Finances 2021.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unmodified audit opinions were issued on all the cluster agencies 2020–21 financial statements.
  • The number of identified monetary misstatements increased from 16 in 2019–20 to 24 in 2020–21.
  • Reported corrected monetary misstatements decreased from 15 in 2019–20 to seven with a gross value of $1.1 billion in 2020–21. The largest corrected misstatement was in NSW Treasury's financial statements resulting in a $1 billion correction to its administered borrowings. The correction was to address an understatement by NSW Treasury which did not recognise a liability for funds raised by NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp) on its behalf as it applied settlement date accounting rather than trade date when recognising these borrowings. A corresponding receivable from TCorp was also recognised to reflect that funds were to be received on 1 July 2021.
  • The number of uncorrected misstatements increased from one in 2019–20 to 17 in 2020–21. Two of the misstatements above $5 million related to investment valuations within the SAS Trustee Corporation Pooled Fund, two related to premium income overstatements within the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, and one related to NSW Treasury administered liabilities and expenses where it recognised a provision for remediation costs when it had no present obligation. A further seven related to investment management funds that were terminated during the year by TCorp.
  • Nine agencies that were required to perform early close procedures did not complete a total of 25 mandatory procedures. The most common incomplete early close procedures include inter and intra (cluster) agency balances and transactions not confirmed with the counterparty agency and significant management judgements and assumptions made when estimating transactions and balances not documented.
  • To ensure compliance with Australian Accounting Standards, transactions and balances that were formerly reported in the Crown Entity’s financial statements are now reported by NSW Treasury as it primarily controls or administers the transactions and balances on behalf of the State.
  • icare changed the risk margin applied to measure the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer's outstanding claims liability. If the risk margin used when valuing its 2019–20 outstanding claims liability had been retained, its net asset deficiency would have worsened compared to the prior year. The change in risk margin aligns the Nominal Insurer’s ‘probability of adequacy’ with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s minimum reporting requirements for general insurers.
  • The icare Board approved a new approach for remediating pre-injury average weekly earnings underpayments (subject to legal advice, and assessment by a wage remediation expert), on 24 September 2021 and announced on 11 November 2021. The impact of the decision on the Nominal Insurer's financial statements was not assessed by icare as an ‘after balance date event’ and was not raised with the Audit Office prior to icare finalising its 2021 financial statements on 24 September 2021.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2020–21 audits identified one new Extreme Risk and 11 High Risk findings. The extreme risk finding related to the incomplete provision and timely access to information to the Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) audit and the accounting for the General Government Sector's investment in TAHE. Findings related to the TSSA audit are reported in the report on State Finances 2021. Of the 11 high risk findings, two were repeat findings relating to cross cluster payments and authorisation to spend deemed funds. High risk repeat findings need to be addressed with greater priority.
  • There were 21 moderate risk findings reported to management in 2020–21, ten of which were repeat findings. The most common repeat finding related to claims processing, information technology user access administration. Repeat findings, particularly those that relate to data protection, need greater prioritisation and should be implemented on a timely basis.
  • icare is in the process of implementing organisational reform in response to findings in recent external reviews. These reviews identified 151 recommendations for icare to improve in the areas of risk and governance, performance, and culture and accountability. All of the recommendations were accepted by icare and are expected to be addressed through their ‘Improvement Program’. A number of the observations referred to in this report were also identified in the external reviews.
  • The Nominal Insurer's four week return-to-work rate fell from 68% at 30 June 2020 to 64% at 30 June 2021 and was at 63% at 30 September 2021. This is below icare's target of 70%.
  • The Nominal Insurer overpaid, and underpaid claims to policyholders due to claims processing weaknesses. There was also insufficient documentation to support key inputs to weekly benefit payments, thereby further increasing the risk of claims being overpaid, and underpaid.
  • The Home Building Compensation Fund's net liability position reduced from $746 million at 30 June 2020 to $534 million at 30 June 2021 due to increases in premium rates and increased building activity from stimulus measures.
  • The Nominal Insurer's provision for errors in pre-injury average weekly earnings decreased from $21 million to 30 June 2020, to $11.6 million at 30 June 2021. The provision was not reassessed for icare’s decision to proactively remediate PIAWE underpayments.
  • The NSW Self Insurance Corporation also recognised a $12.8 million provision at 30 June 2021 to remediate past underpayments.

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has decreased, but 30% of all issues were repeat issues and these need greater focus and prioritisation

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 57 findings raised across the cluster (71 in 2019–20), 30% of which were repeat issues (32% in 2019–20).

The most common repeat issues related to claims processing and information technology user access administration.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

Moderate2
4 new
2 repeat

Low1
6 new
4 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:
  • poor user access administration and monitoring of privileged user activities
  • lack of disaster recovery planning.
Internal control deficiencies or improvements

High3
1 repeat

Moderate2
5 new
7 repeat

Low1
9 new
 

 

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes, including:
  • lack of controls to ensure cluster expenditure does not exceed a minister's appropriation authority received under the annual Appropriations Act and the GSF Act
  • inadequate procurement controls including purchase orders not being used and policy documents not stipulating thresholds which require minimum quotations or tenders
  • inadequate claim processing controls leading to documentation not kept to support claims, and errors in payments.
High risk issues are discussed later in this chapter.
Financial reporting

High3
2 new

Moderate2
2 new
1 repeat

Low1
2 new 

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to strengthen financial reporting, including:
  • need to review significant judgements, and continue to assess whether assets are controlled
  • grants being incorrectly accounted for leading to errors
  • provisions not including costs to settle the obligation and errors in the accuracy and completeness of underlying data used in valuations.
High risk issues are discussed later in this chapter.
Governance and oversight

Extreme4
1 new

High3
7 new

Low1
1 new
 

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:
  • documentation was inadequate and key documents were either not provided to the Audit Office, or were not provided on a timely basis, or their existence was not made known to the Audit Office
  • inconsistencies in the GSF Act and GSA Act relating to statutory timeframes
  • numerous versions of working papers were submitted all of which contained errors, omissions and/or poor logic
  • no formal policy or benchmark on expected investment returns from other government sectors
  • addressing significant uncertainty relating to access fees to be paid by rail operators raised in the Total State Sector Accounts audit opinion
  • the sector classification of certain Public Non-Financial Corporations needs to be confirmed with the Australian Bureau of Statistics
  • external consultants were used extensively to advise government agencies on matters related to TAHE
  • there is no state-wide policy about borrowings which provides guidance around performance obligations arising under trades between government agencies.
Extreme and high risk issues are discussed later in this chapter and in the report on State Finances 2021.
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies

High3
1 repeat

Low1
1 new
1 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve its compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, including:
  • non-compliance with the GSA Act and expenditure of public monies not supported by authorised delegations or spent for an authorised and valid purpose
  • input tax credits were not always claimed correctly.
High risk issues are discussed later in this chapter.

 Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.

 Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.

The number of moderate risk findings decreased from prior year

There were 21 moderate risk findings reported in 2020–21, representing a 30% decrease from 2019–20. Of these, ten were repeat findings, and 11 were new issues.

Moderate risk repeat findings include:

  • claims processing weaknesses including claim payment errors, and inadequate documentation to support calculations and evidence claims were reviewed by someone with appropriate delegation
  • inadequate review of user access and higher risks of unintended or unauthorised system access
  • controls assurance reports from an outsourced service provider did not cover the services it provided to the government agency
  • failure to review procurement contracts register to ensure it is accurate and complete
  • ongoing control deficiencies with grant application and approval processes
  • key policies including delegations not being reviewed in a number of years and do not incorporate new requirements from more recent legislation
  • quality review processes failing to identify material classification errors associated with grant funding.

NSW Treasury related matters

Accounting for the Government's investment in Transport Asset Holding Entity

A total of seven recommendations were made with respect to NSW Treasury's processes to prepare the NSW Government's consolidated whole of government accounts (the TSSA). This included one extreme risk finding and six high risk findings. The extreme finding related to NSW Treasury needing to significantly improve its processes to ensure all key information is identified and shared with the Audit Office on a timely basis. Other high-risk findings were identified which resulted in the following recommendations for NSW Treasury:

  • establishing a policy to determine the minimum expected rate of return on the GGS equity injections in other public sectors entities and report on the performance of these GGS investments in the TSSA, including how much and what type of returns the government is obtaining from its investments compared to its targeted return
  • facilitate revised commercial agreements to reflect access and license fees that were agreed in the 18 December 2021 Heads of Agreement between Transport for NSW, TAHE and the operators Sydney Trains and NSW Trains
  • with TAHE, prepare robust projections and business plans to support GGS investment returns beyond FY2031.
  • liaising with the ABS to re-confirm the classification of TAHE, NSW Trains and Sydney Trains as entities within the PNFC sector
  • monitoring the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in future reporting periods and the implications on the TSSA
  • consider whether there is sufficient competent oversight of its use of consultants and assess the risk of an over dependence on consultants at the cost of internal capability.

More details on the recommendations to NSW Treasury relating to its accounting for the GGS investment in TAHE are included on pages 7 to 24 of the State Finances 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament. 

Borrowings of $1 billion were understated by NSW Treasury

NSW Treasury, a GGS agency, made agreements to borrow $1 billion from New South Wales Treasury Corporation (TCorp), a PFC sector agency. Some of these agreements were entered as early as 17 May 2021 and all agreements for borrowings were entered into before 30 June 2021. However, NSW Treasury requested that settlement of those additional borrowings be deferred until 1 July 2021.

As TCorp raised the funds before 30 June 2021, it recognised a financial asset and liability to NSW Treasury on 30 June 2021. Despite TCorp having raised the funds by 30 June 2021 under the mutually agreed trade deal, NSW Treasury did not recognise any borrowings at year end on the basis that it requested the settlement date and receipt of cash to be deferred to past the balance sheet date. This led to an understatement of debt liabilities of $1 billion by NSW Treasury, and an inconsistent accounting treatment between the two agencies. NSW Treasury subsequently corrected the misstatement after the matter was raised by the audit, resulting in the GGS recognising $1 billion in financial assets and borrowings at 30 June 2021.

More detail on these inconsistencies is on page 37 of the State Finances 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament. We recommended NSW Treasury seek develop a state-wide accounting policy for borrowings which ensure correct and consistent accounting treatment between agencies and sectors.

Inconsistencies exist in the GSF Act and GSA Act related to key statutory timeframes

There are inconsistencies between key statutory reporting timeframes imposed on the Treasurer and Auditor-General for the Consolidated State Financial Statements (the Statements) in the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) and Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (GSA Act). Ambiguity in the statutory reporting timeframes could impact on the future timely provision of this information to Parliament. More detail on these inconsistencies is on page 54 of the State Finances 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament. We recommended NSW Treasury seek legislative amendments in Parliament to resolve these inconsistencies.

NSW Treasury lacks a framework to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that they are in compliance with their appropriation authority

In July 2021, NSW Treasury highlighted a potential issue associated with certain cross-cluster payments which was based on advice received from the Crown Solicitor in January 2021. After being made aware of the issue, the Audit Office obtained its own advice on matters related to the appropriations framework under relevant state legislation. In the advice to the Audit Office, the Crown Solicitor advised that an agency is not subject to its own legally appropriated expenditure limit (assuming it is not subject to any annual spending limit imposed through an instrument of delegation or a budget control authority issued by the Treasurer under section 5.1 of the GSF Act). In effect, because responsible ministers are given appropriations, these legal expenditure limits, rest in aggregate, with the principal department and agencies the minister is responsible for. It is not possible for an individual agency to monitor or determine at what ‘point in time’ expenditure has been incurred in excess of the minister’s appropriation authority and there is currently no framework to monitor this.

Further detail on this matter is on pages 54 to 56 of the State Finances 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament. In this report, we recommended that NSW Treasury:

  • ensure a framework exists to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that expenditure incurred across a financial year by agencies under the relevant minister's coordination does not exceed the appropriation authority conferred by the annual Appropriations Act and the GSF Act
  • assess how the requirement to prepare a Summary of Compliance under Australian Accounting Standards impacts relevant principal departments and cluster agencies financial statement disclosures.

Agencies have again spent monies without an authorised delegation

In the State Finances NSW Auditor-General's Report to Parliament for 2020 and 2021 we reported instances where agencies spent money received from an annual appropriation and/or deemed appropriation money without an authorised delegation from the relevant minister(s) as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act. Further detail on this matter is on pages 56 to 57 of the State Finances 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament. In this report, we recommended NSW Treasury promptly improve the guidance it provides agencies to ensure that expenditure of public monies is properly supported by authorised delegations.

Control deficiencies at NSW Treasury's service providers

NSW Treasury's business processes and information technology services were provided by Infosys, Unisys and the Department of Customer Service during 2020–21. Together this constitutes the GovConnect environment.

The GovConnect information technology general controls (ITGC) were qualified in 2020–21. The key controls over user access, system changes and batch process failed in all ITGC reports. Most of these deviations were not mitigated or sufficiently mitigated to address the risk of unauthorised user access.

In response to the internal control qualifications, the audit teams performed data analytics over payroll and accounts payable to obtain reasonable assurance that these control deficiencies did not materially impact on relevant agencies' financial statements.

Refer to the Customer Service 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament for further details.

Insurance related matters

icare is in the process of implementing organisational reform in response to findings in recent external reviews. These reviews have identified 151 recommendations for icare to improve in the areas of risk and governance, performance, and culture and accountability. The reviews include the April 2021 McDougall Review, and the February 2021 ‘Independent Review of icare governance, accountability and culture’ which was recommended by SIRA in the Dore Report.

All of these recommendations were accepted by icare and are expected to be addressed through their ‘Improvement Program’. As at February 2022, icare report that 21 have been addressed, 139 are in progress, and 15 still to commence.

A number of the observations referred to in this report were also identified in the above reviews and are expected to be actioned as part of the improvement program.

Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (the Nominal Insurer)

The Nominal Insurer’s net asset deficiency at 30 June 2021

Last year's Central Agencies Report to Parliament reported that the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (the Nominal Insurer), the NSW Self Insurance Corporation and the Lifetime Care and Support Authority of New South Wales all had negative net assets at 30 June 2020. After strong investment returns in 2020–21, only the Nominal Insurer continued to have negative net assets at 30 June 2021.

The Nominal Insurer's negative net assets of $252.9 million at 30 June 2021 ($316.2 million at 30 June 2020) means that it still does not hold sufficient capital to meet the estimated present value of its future payment obligations, when measured in accordance with the accounting framework. The financial statements continued to be prepared on a going concern basis because the future payment obligations are not all due for settlement within the next 12 months.

As noted in section 2.4 ‘Key accounting issues’, icare changed from an 'Accounting Ratio', to an 'Insurance Ratio', to assess the Nominal Insurer’s capital position from 2020–21. The insurance ratio uses a (higher) discount rate based on the expected earnings rate on the Nominal Insurer’s assets, rather the ‘risk free’ rate which is used for financial reporting.

Last year's Report to Parliament also noted that the deterioration in the value of the Nominal Insurer’s net assets has resulted in its funding ratio at 30 June 2020 being outside of the ‘target operating zone’ set by the Board of icare. The Insurance Ratio at 30 June 2021 is 122%, which is less than icare's target operating zone of over 130%.

icare is assessing how it can increase the Nominal Insurer’s funding ratio, and advises that actions taken to date include the execution of the Nominal Insurer Improvement Program (the Improvement Program) and an increase in premium rates.

icare were given approval by the State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) to increase workers compensation premium rates from 1.4% to 1.44%  of wages (2.9%) for the 2021–22 policy year. icare advises that their pricing strategy for workers compensation premiums is for ‘modest increases over the medium term’.

Return-to-work rates have worsened

Last year's Central Agencies Report to Parliament noted that the Nominal Insurer has experienced deteriorating return-to-work rates since late 2017. According to data published by SIRA, the Nominal Insurer’s monthly four week return-to-work rate has continued to decline, falling from 68% at 30 June 2020 to 64% at 30 June 2021, and down to 63% at 30 September 2021.

A key assumption when measuring the Nominal Insurer’s outstanding claims liability, is the amount of time that injured workers will remain on benefits (i.e. continuance rates). This assumption is significantly aligned with return-to-work rate measures. At 30 June 2021, the liability was increased by $296 million due to changes in continuance rate assumptions, with workers expected to remain on benefits longer. This change is consistent with the fall in four week return-to-work rates.

The four week return-to-work rate trend since August 2017 is shown in the graph below.

Appendix one - Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Acquittals and other opinions

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Published

Actions for Planning, Industry and Environment 2021

Planning, Industry and Environment 2021

Environment
Industry
Local Government
Planning
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Risk

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Three audits are ongoing.

An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Independent Planning Commission's (the IPC) audit opinion because the prior year comparative figures were not audited. Prior to 2020–21, the IPC was not required to prepare separate financial statements under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (PF&A Act). The financial reporting provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 now require the IPC to prepare financial statements.

The number of identified misstatements increased from 51 in 2019–20 to 54 in 2020–21.

The 2010–11 to 2019–20 audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s (the Corporation) financial statements are incomplete due to insufficient records and evidence to support the transactions of the Corporation, particularly for the earlier years. Management has commenced actions to improve the governance and financial management of the Corporation. These audits are currently in progress and the 2020–21 audit will commence shortly.

There are 609 State controlled Crown land managers (CLMs) across New South Wales that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land.

Eight CLMs prepared and submitted 2019–20 financial statements by the revised deadline of 30 June 2021. A further 24 CLMs did not prepare financial statements in accordance with the PF&A Act. The remaining CLMs were not required to prepare 2019–20 financial statements as they met NSW Treasury's financial reporting exemption criteria.

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment's (the department) preliminary assessment indicates that 60 CLMs are required to prepare financial statements in 2020–21. To date, no CLMs have prepared and submitted financial statements for audit in 2020–21.

There are also 120 common trusts that have never submitted financial statements for audit. Common trusts are responsible for the care, control and management of land that has been set aside for specific use in a certain locality, such as grazing, camping or bushwalking.

What the key issues were

The number of matters we reported to management increased from 135 in 2019–20 to 180 in 2020–21, of which 40 per cent were repeat findings.

Seven high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21:

  • system control deficiencies at the department relating to user access to HR and payroll management systems, vendor master data management and journal processing, which require manual reviews to mitigate risks
  • deficiencies related to the Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
  • the Lord Howe Island Board did not regularly review and monitor privileged user access rights to key information systems
  • the Natural Resources Access Regulator identified and adjusted three prior period errors retrospectively, which indicate deficiencies within the financial reporting processes
  • deficiencies relating to the Parramatta Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
  • lease arrangements have not been confirmed between the Planning Ministerial Corporation and Office of Sport regarding the Sydney International Regatta Centre
  • the Wentworth Park Sporting Complex land manager (the land manager) has a $6.5 million loan with Greyhound Racing NSW (GRNSW). GRNSW requested the land manager to repay the loan. However, the land manager subsequently requested GRNSW to convert the loan to a grant. Should this request be denied, the land manager would not be able to continue as a going concern without financial support. This matter remains unresolved for many years.

There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department uses the Crown Land Information Database (CLID) to record key information relating to Crown land in New South Wales that are managed and controlled by the department and land managers (including councils and land managers controlled by the state). The CLID system was not designed to facilitate financial reporting and the department is required to conduct extensive adjustments and reconciliations to produce accurate information for the financial statements.

The department is implementing a new system to record Crown land (the CrownTracker project). The department advised that the project completion date will be confirmed by June 2022.

What we recommended

The department should ensure CLMs and common trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations.

Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies, with a focus on addressing high-risk and repeat issues.

The department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate. This will allow the department and CLMs to be better informed about the Crown land they control.

Fast facts

The Planning, Industry and Environment cluster aims to make the lives of people in New South Wales better by developing well-connected communities, preserving the environment, supporting industries and contributing to a strong economy.

There are 54 agencies, 609 State controlled Crown land managers that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land and 120 common trusts in the cluster.

  • 42% of the area of NSW is Crown land
  • $33.2b water and electricity infrastructure as at 30 June 2021
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits
  • 7 high-risk management letter findings were identified
  • 54 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 40% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Three audits are ongoing.
  • An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Independent Planning Commission’s (the IPC) audit opinion because the prior year comparative figures were not audited. Prior to 2020–21, the IPC was not required to prepare separate financial statements under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. From 2020–21, the IPC is required to prepare financial statements under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018.
  • The 2010–11 to 2019–20 audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s (the Corporation) financial statements were incomplete due to insufficient records and evidence to support the transactions of the Corporation, particularly for the earlier years. These audits are currently underway, and the 2020–21 audit will commence shortly.
  • The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment's (the department) preliminary assessment indicates that 60 State controlled Crown land managers (CLMs) are required to prepare financial statements in 2020–21. To date, no CLMs have prepared and submitted financial statements for audit in 2020–21. All 120 common trusts have never submitted their financial statements for audit. The department needs to do more to ensure that the CLMs and common trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations.
  • Nine agencies that were required to perform early close procedures did not complete a total of 20 mandatory procedures. The most common incomplete early close procedures include the revaluation of property, plant and equipment, documenting all significant management judgments and assumptions, and the implementation of new and updated accounting standards.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statements audits of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management has increased from 135 in 2019–20 to 180 in 2020–21, and 40 per cent were repeat issues.
  • Seven high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21, and three high-risk findings were repeat issues.
  • There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate.

Appendix one - Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Premier and Cabinet 2021

Premier and Cabinet 2021

Premier and Cabinet
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Shared services and collaboration

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Premier and Cabinet cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Premier and Cabinet cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies.

The number of monetary misstatements decreased from 49 in 2019–20 to 38 in 2020–21.

The Library Council of New South Wales corrected a prior period error of $325 million. In 2017, the council split its collection assets into six asset classes, but not the related asset revaluation reserves. To correct this error, some revaluation decrements previously recognised in asset revaluation reserves were reclassified to accumulated funds.

Eight agencies did not complete all of the mandatory early close procedures.

What the key issues were

The Premier and Cabinet cluster was impacted by three Machinery of Government (MoG) changes during 2020–21.

The changes resulted in the transfer of activities and functions in and out of the cluster and the creation of a new entity - Investment NSW.

The transferor entities continued to provide services to Investment NSW subsequent to 30 June 2021. There were no formal service level agreements in place for the provision of these services.

The New South Wales Electoral Commission (the Commission) and Sydney Opera House Trust obtained letters of financial support from their relevant Minister and/or NSW Treasury in 2020–21. The postponement of local government elections impacted the Commission's operations due to increased planned expenditure to support a COVID-safe election. Sydney Opera House Trust's ability to generate revenue was impacted due to the closure of the Concert Hall partly due to COVID-19 and planned renovations.

The number of repeated audit issues raised with management and those charged with governance increased from 22 in 2019–20 to 24 in 2020–21.

There were 47 moderate risk and 28 low risk findings identified. Of the total findings there were 24 repeat issues.

What we recommended

Investment NSW should ensure services received from other agencies are governed by service level agreements.

Fast facts

The Department of Premier and Cabinet supports the Premier and Cabinet to deliver the government's objectives, infrastructure, preparedness for disaster, incident recovery, arts and culture.

  • $11.9b of property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
  • $4.4b total expenditure incurred in 2020-21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies' 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 47 moderate risk findings were reported to management 
  • 38 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020-21
  • 32% of all reported issues were repeat issues.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Premier and Cabinet’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed cluster agencies' 2020–21 financial statements.
  • Monetary misstatements decreased from 49 in 2019–20 to 38 in 2020–21.
  • Thirteen agencies were exempt from financial reporting in 2020–21. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2020–21 audits identified 47 moderate risk issues across the cluster. Sixteen of the moderate risk issues were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to governance and oversight and information technology.
  • The number of moderate risk findings increased by 42 per cent in 2020–21.
  • The moderate risk issues included information technology improvements, lack of service level agreements, risk management, contract and procurement and asset management improvements.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Universities 2020 audits

Universities 2020 audits

Universities
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance

What the report is about

Results of the financial statement audits of the public universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2020.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all ten universities.

Two universities reported retrospective corrections of prior period errors.

Universities were impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic with student enrolments decreasing in 2020 compared to 2019 by 10,032 (3.3 per cent). Of this decrease 8,310 students were from overseas.

In response to the pandemic, each university provided welfare support, created student hardship funds, provided accommodation and flexibility on payment of course fees. State and Commonwealth governments provided additional support to the sector.

Six universities recorded negative net operating results in 2020 (two in 2019). The combined revenues of the ten universities from fees and charges decreased by $361 million (5.8 per cent).

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which will continue to impact the financial results of universities in 2021, enrolments of overseas students in semester one of 2021 increased at two universities. This growth meant that total overseas student enrolments increased by 7,944 or 5.8 per cent across the sector as a whole. However, eight universities experienced decreases in overseas student enrolments compared to semester one of 2020. All universities have experienced growth in domestic student enrolments.

What the key issues were

There were 110 findings reported to universities in audit management letters.

Three high risk findings were identified. One related to the continued work by the University of New South Wales to assess its liability for underpayment of casual staff entitlements. The other two deficiencies were at Charles Sturt University, relating to financial reporting implications of major contracts, and resolving issues identified by an internal review of its employment contracts to reliably quantify the university’s liability to its employees.

What we recommended

Universities should prioritise actions to address repeat findings. Forty-five findings were repeated from 2019, of which 23 related to information technology.

Fast facts

There are ten public universities in NSW with 51 local controlled entities and 23 overseas controlled entities.

  • $10.9bn Total combined revenue in 2020, a decrease of $538.5 million (4.7 per cent) from 2019.
  • 106,984 Overseas student enrolments in 2020, a decrease of 8,310 students (7.2 per cent) from 2019.
  • 3 High risk management letter findings were identified.
  • $11.0bn Total combined expenditure in 2020, a decrease of $147.8 million (0.9 per cent) from 2019.
  • 182,683 Domestic student enrolments in 2020, a decrease of 1,722 students (0.9 per cent) from 2019.
  • 41% Of reported issues were repeat issues.

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

This report analyses the results of our audits of the financial statements of the ten universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Financial reporting The 2020 financial statements of all ten universities received unmodified audit opinions.

Two universities reported retrospective corrections of prior period errors. The University of Sydney reported errors relating to the underpayment of staff entitlements and the fair value of buildings. Charles Sturt University reported an error relating to how it had calculated right‑of‑use assets and lease liabilities on initial application of the new leasing standard in the previous year.

Impacts of COVID‑19

Student enrolments decreased in 2020 compared to 2019 by 10,032 (3.3 per cent). Of this decrease, 8,310 students were from overseas.

The ongoing impact of COVID‑19 in the short‑term, on semester one enrolments for 2021 compared to semester one of 2020, has been mixed:

  • all universities in NSW experienced a growth in their domestic student enrolments
  • eight universities experienced decreases in overseas student enrolments.

During 2020, universities provided welfare support to students, created student hardship funds, provided accommodation, and flexibility on payment of course fees.

State and Commonwealth governments provided additional support to the sector:

  • those university controlled entities eligible to receive JobKeeper payments received a combined amount under the Commonwealth scheme totalling $47.6 million in 2020
  • the NSW Government launched a University Loan Guarantee scheme.
Financial results

Six universities recorded negative net operating results in 2020 (two in 2019). While most universities experienced decreased revenue in 2020, only four had reduced their expenses to a level that was less than revenue.

Revenue from operations

Universities' revenue streams were impacted in 2020 by the COVID‑19 pandemic, with fees and charges decreasing by $361 million (5.8 per cent).

Government grants as a proportion of total revenue increased for the first time in five years to 34 per cent in 2020.

Nearly 40 per cent of universities' total revenue from course fees in 2020 (40.9 per cent in 2019) came from overseas students from three countries: China, India and Nepal (same in 2019). Students from these countries of origin contributed $2.2 billion ($2.4 billion in 2019) in fees. Some universities continue to be dependent on revenues from students from these destinations and their results are more sensitive to fluctuations in demand as a result.

Other revenues

Overall philanthropic contributions to universities increased by 32.2 per cent in 2020 to $222 million ($167.9 million in 2019). The University of Sydney and the University of New South Wales attracted 75.2 per cent of the total philanthropic contributions in 2020 (69.5 per cent in 2019).

Total research income for universities was $1.4 billion in 20191, with the University of Sydney and the University of New South Wales attracting 66.5 per cent of the total research income of all universities in NSW (65.2 per cent in 2018).

Expenditure Universities initiated cost saving measures in response to the COVID‑19 pandemic. The cost of redundancy programs increased employee related expenses in 2020 by 4.4 per cent to $6.5 billion ($6.2 billion in 2019). The cost of redundancies offered in 2020 across the universities totalled $293.9 million. Combined other expenses decreased to $2.8 billion in 2020, a reduction of $436 million (13.4 per cent).

2. Internal controls and governance

Internal control findings One hundred and ten internal control deficiencies were identified in 2020 (108 in 2019). Forty‑five findings were repeated from 2019, of which 23 related to information technology.

Recommendation: Universities should prioritise actions to address repeat findings on internal control deficiencies in a timely manner. Risks associated with unmitigated control deficiencies may increase over time.

Three high risk internal control deficiencies were identified, namely:

  • The University of New South Wales should continue work to assess its liability for the underpayment of casual staff entitlements. This issue was also reported last year.
  • Two high risk deficiencies were identified at Charles Sturt University. One related to misunderstanding the requirements of the new accounting standard in relation to recognising grant funding revenue for construction work. The second related to resolving issues identified by an ongoing internal review of its employment contracts to enable a reliable quantification as to the university's liability to its employees.

Gaps in information technology (IT) controls comprised the majority of the remaining deficiencies. Deficiencies included a lack of sufficient privileged user access reviews and monitoring, payment files being held in editable formats and accessible by unauthorised persons, and password settings not aligning with the requirements of information security policies.

Business continuity and disaster recovery planning All universities have a business continuity policy supported with a business impact analysis.

Except for Macquarie University, all other universities had disaster recovery plans prepared for all of the IT systems that support critical business functions. Macquarie University’s disaster recovery plans were still in progress at 31 December 2020.

Only half of the universities' policies require regular testing of their business continuity plans and six universities' plans do not specify staff must capture, asses and report disruptive incidents.

3. Teaching and research

Graduate employment outcomes Eight out of ten universities were reported as having full‑time employment rates of their undergraduates in 2020 that were greater than the national average.

Six universities were reported as having full‑time employment rates of their postgraduates in 2020 that were greater than the national average.

Student enrolments by field of education Enrolments at universities in NSW decreased the most in Management and Commerce courses and Engineering and Related Technologies courses. The largest increase in enrolments was in Society and Culture courses.
Achieving diversity outcomes Five universities in 2019 were reported as meeting the target enrolment rate for students from low socio‑economic status (SES) backgrounds.

Seven universities were reported to have increased their enrolments of students from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander backgrounds in 2019. The target growth rate for increases in enrolments of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander students (to exceed the growth rate of enrolments of non‑indigenous students by at least 50 per cent) was achieved in 2019.

 1 2020 data, which is compiled by the Australian Department of Education and Training, is not yet available.

This report provides Parliament with the results of our financial audits of universities in NSW and their controlled entities in 2020, including our analysis, observations and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • internal controls and governance
  • teaching and research.

Financial reporting is an important element of governance. Confidence and transparency in university sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of universities in NSW for 2020.

Financial results

The graph below shows the net results of individual universities for 2020.

Appropriate and robust internal controls help reduce risks associated with managing finances, compliance and administration of universities.

This chapter outlines the internal controls related observations and insights across universities in NSW for 2020, including overall trends in findings, level of risk and implications.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. The more significant issues and risks are included in this chapter. These along with the less significant matters are reported to universities for management to address.

Universities' primary objectives are teaching and research. They invest most of their resources to achieve quality outcomes in academia and student experience. Universities have committed to achieving certain government targets and compete to advance their reputation and their standing in international and Australian rankings.

This chapter outlines teaching and research outcomes for universities in NSW for 2020.

Published

Actions for Report on Local Government 2020

Report on Local Government 2020

Local Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

What the report is about

Results of the local government sector council financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2020.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 127 councils, 9 county councils and 13 joint organisation audits in 2019–20. A qualified audit opinion was issued for Central Coast Council.

Councils were impacted by recent emergency events, including bushfires and the COVID-19 pandemic. The financial implications from these events varied across councils. Councils adapted systems, processes and controls to enable staff to work flexibly.

What the key issues were

There were 1,435 findings reported to councils in audit management letters.

One extreme risk finding was identified related to Central Coast Council’s use of restricted funds for general purposes.

Fifty-three high risk matters were identified across the sector:

  • 21 high risk matters relating to asset management
  • 14 high risk matters relating to information technology
  • 7 high risk matters relating to financial reporting
  • 4 high risk matters to council governance procedures
  • 3 high risk matters relating to financial accounting
  • 3 high risk matters relating to purchasing and payables
  • 1 high risk matter relating to cash and banking.

More can be done to reduce the number of errors identified in financial reports. 61 councils required material adjustments to correct errors in previous audited financial statements.

Fast facts

  • 150 councils and joint organisations in the sector
  • 99% unqualified audit opinions issued for the 30 June 2020 financial statements
  • 490 monetary misstatements were reported in 2019-20
  • 61 prior period errors reported
  • 53 high risk management letters findings identified
  • 49% of reported issues were repeat issues

Rural fire fighting equipment

Sixty-eight councils did not record rural fire fighting equipment worth $119 million in their financial statements.

The NSW Government has confirmed these assets are not controlled by the NSW Rural Fire Service and are not recognised in the financial records of the NSW Government.

What we recommended

The Office of Local Government should communicate the State's view that rural firefighting equipment is controlled by councils in the local government sector, and therefore this equipment should be properly recorded in their financial statements.

Central Coast Council

A qualified opinion was issued for Central Coast Council (the Council) relating to two matters.

Council did not conduct the required revaluation to support the valuation of roads.

Council also disclosed a prior period error relating to restrictions of monies collected for their water, sewer, and drainage operations, which, based on the NSW Crown Solicitor’s advice, should be considered a change in accounting policy.

What we recommended

The Office of Local Government should clarify the legal framework relating to restrictions of water, sewerage and drainage funds (restricted reserves) by either seeking an amendment to the relevant legislation or by issuing a policy instrument to remove ambiguity from the current framework.

Key financial information

In 2019-20, councils:

  • collected $7.3 billion rates and annual charges
  • received $4.7 billion grants and contributions 
  • incurred $4.8 billion of employee benefits and on-costs
  • held $14.2 billion of cash and investments
  • managed $160.0 billion of infrastructure, property, plant and equipment
  • entered into $3.3 billion of borrowings.

Further information

Please contact Ian Goodwin, Deputy Auditor-General on 9275 7347 or by email.

 

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence in and transparency of public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines audit observations related to the financial reporting of councils and joint organisations.

Highlights

  • The Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment (OLG) extended the statutory deadline for councils and joint organisations to lodge their audited financial statements by an additional month to 30 November 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • One hundred and thirty-three councils and joint organisations (2019: 117) lodged audited financial statements with the OLG by the revised statutory deadline of 30 November (2019: 30 October). Sixteen (2019: 30) councils received extensions to submit audited financial statements to OLG. Canberra Region Joint Organisation did not submit their audited financial statements by the statutory deadline and did not formally apply for extension before the deadline lapsed.
  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 127 councils, nine county councils and 13 joint organisation audits in 2019–20. A qualified audit opinion was issued for Central Coast Council.
  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for the 2018–19 financial audits of Hilltops, MidCoast and Murrumbidgee Councils, which were not completed at the time of tabling the 'Local Government 2019' report in Parliament.
  • The total number and dollar value of corrected and uncorrected financial statement errors increased compared with the prior year.
  • Sixty-eight councils did not record rural fire fighting equipment in their financial statements worth $119 million. The NSW Government has confirmed these assets are not controlled by the NSW Rural Fire Service and are not recognised in the financial records of the NSW Government.
  • The total number of prior period financial statement errors increased from 59 in the prior year to 61, but the total dollar value of the errors decreased from $1,272 million to $813 million.
  • Councils implemented three new accounting standards in 2019–20 relating to revenue and leases.

 

Recent emergency events, including drought, bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic have impacted councils.

This chapter will provide insights into how these events have impacted councils, including:

  • financial implications of the emergency events
  • changes to councils' operating models, processes and controls
  • accessibility to technology and the maturity of councils' systems and controls to prevent unauthorised and fraudulent access to data
  • receipt and delivery of stimulus packages or programs at short notice.

Highlights

  • All councils were impacted by the recent emergency events.
  • Councils changed governance, policies, systems and processes to respond to the recent emergency events.
  • Challenges were experienced adapting Information Technology (IT) infrastructure and controls to enable staff to work from home.
  • Sixty-five per cent of councils updated business continuity plans and 42 per cent updated disaster recovery plans as a response to recent emergency events.
  • Councils received various forms of assistance from government relating to the recent emergencies, which was used to provide support to local communities.

Recent emergency events significantly impacted councils

Recent emergencies, including drought, bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic have brought particular challenges for councils and their communities.

 

A strong system of internal controls enables councils to operate effectively and efficiently, produce reliable financial reports, comply with laws and regulations and support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends in governance and internal control findings across councils, county councils and joint organisations in 2019–20. It also includes the findings reported in the 2018–19 audits of Hilltops, MidCoast and Murrumbidgee councils as these audits were finalised after the Report on Local Government 2019 was published.

Financial audits focus on key governance matters and internal controls supporting the preparation of councils' financial statements. Audit findings are reported to management and those charged with governance through audit management letters.

Highlights

  • Total number of findings reported in audit management letters decreased from 1,985 in 2018–19 to 1,435 in 2019–20.
  • One extreme risk finding was identified in 2019–20 (2018–19: nil).
  • Total number of high-risk findings decreased from 82 in 2018–19 to 53 in 2019–20. Thirty per cent of the high-risk findings identified in 2018–19 were reported as high-risk findings in 2019–20.
  • Forty-nine per cent of findings reported in audit management letters were repeat or partial repeat findings.
  • Governance, asset management and information technology (IT) comprise over 61 per cent of findings and continue to be key areas requiring improvement.
  • Fifty-six councils could strengthen their policies, processes and controls around fraud prevention and legislative compliance.
  • Sixty-eight councils had deficiencies in their processes to revalue infrastructure assets.
  • Fifty-eight councils have yet to implement basic governance and internal controls to manage cybersecurity.
  • Sixty-four councils should formalise and periodically review their IT policies and procedures.

Total number of findings reported in audit management letters decreased

In 2019–20, 1,435 findings were reported in audit management letters (2018–19: 1,985 findings). An extreme risk finding was also identified this year related to Central Coast Council's use of restricted funds. The total number of high-risk findings decreased to 53 (2018–19: 82 high-risk findings).

Findings are classified as new, repeat or ongoing findings, based on:

  • new findings were first reported in 2019–20 audits
  • repeat findings were first reported in prior year audits, but remain unresolved in 2019–20
  • ongoing findings were first reported in prior year audits, but the action due dates to address the findings are after 2019–20.

Findings are categorised as governance, financial reporting, financial accounting, asset management, purchases and payables, payroll, cash and banking, revenue and receivables, or information technology. The high-risk and common findings across these areas are explored further in this chapter.

Audit Office’s work plan for 2020–21 onwards

Focus on local council's response and recovery from recent emergencies

Local councils and their communities will continue to experience the effects of recent emergency events, including the bushfires, floods and the COVID 19 pandemic for some time. The full extent of some of these events remain unclear and will continue to have an impact into the future. The recovery is likely to take many years.

The Office of Local Government (OLG) within the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment is working with other state agencies to assist local councils and their communities to recover from these unprecedented events.

These events have created additional risks and challenges, and changed the way that councils deliver their services.

We will take a phased approach to ensure our financial and performance audits address the following elements of the emergencies and the Local Government's responses:

  • local councils' preparedness for emergencies
  • its initial responses to support people and communities impacted by the 2019–20 bushfires and floods, and COVID-19
  • the governance and oversight risks that arise from the need for quick decision making and responsiveness to emergencies
  • the effectiveness and robustness of processes to direct resources toward recovery efforts and ensure good governance and transparency in doing so
  • the mid to long-term impact of government responses to the natural disasters and COVID-19
  • whether government investment has achieved desired outcomes.

Planned financial audit focus areas in Local Government

During 2020–21, the financial audits will focus on the following key areas:

  • cybersecurity, including:
    • cybersecurity framework, policies and procedures
    • assessing the controls management has to address the risk of cybersecurity incidents
    • whether cybersecurity risks represent a risk of material misstatement to council's financial statements
  • budget management
  • financial sustainability
  • quality and timeliness of financial reporting
  • infrastructure, property, plant and equipment
  • information technology general controls.

Audit, risk and improvement committees

All councils are required to have an audit, risk and improvement committee by March 2022

The requirement for all councils to establish an audit, risk and improvement committee was deferred by 12 months to March 2022 due to the COVID 19 pandemic.

Audit, risk and improvement committees are an important contributor to good governance. They help councils to understand strategic risks and how they can mitigate them. An effective committee helps councils to build community confidence, meet legislative and other requirements and meet standards of probity, accountability and transparency.

Local Government elections

Local Government elections were postponed for one year due to the COVID 19 pandemic

The Local Government elections were deferred for one year due to the COVID 19 pandemic and will now be held on 4 September 2021. As the statutory deadline for the 2020–21 financial statements is 30 October 2021, some of the newly elected councillors will be required to endorse them.

Implementation of AASB 1059

Accounting standards implementation continue next year

AASB 1059 is effective for councils for the 2020–21 financial year.

A service concession arrangement typically involves a private sector operator that is involved with designing, constructing or upgrading assets used to provide public services. They then operate and maintain those assets for a specified period of time and is compensated by the public sector entity in return. Examples of potential service concession arrangements impacting councils include roads, community housing, childcare services and nursing homes.

AASB 1059 may result in councils recognising more service concession assets and liabilities in their financial statements.

 

Appendix one – Response from the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment

Appendix two – NSW Crown Solicitor’s advice

Appendix three – Status of 2019 recommendations

Appendix four – Status of audits

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia

Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Fraud
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has today released a report on Transport for NSW’s (TfNSW) acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue in Camellia.

This audit, which was requested on 17 November 2020 by the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, examined:

  • whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

The audit found that TfNSW conducted an ineffective process when it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. The audit also found that TfNSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the transaction were, and continue to be, insufficient.

The Auditor-General has made seven recommendations to address the issues identified in the report.

On 17 November 2020, the Hon. Andrew Constance MP, the Minister for Transport and Roads, requested this audit under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

On 15 June 2016, Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) acquired 6.3 hectares of land at 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia, by agreement from Grand 4 Investments Pty Ltd. Grand 4 Investments was a business entity established by the owners of Billbergia Pty Ltd, a property development and investment company.

TfNSW paid Grand 4 Investments $53.5 million and assumed liability for addressing environmental issues and contamination associated with the site. This took place seven months after the vendor acquired the land as part of a competitive Expression of Interest process, in which TfNSW also participated, for $38.15 million.

TfNSW is the NSW Government agency responsible for most major transport infrastructure projects in New South Wales. TfNSW acquired the Camellia site for use as a stabling and maintenance depot to support the Parramatta Light Rail (PLR) project.

Consistent with the minister’s request, this audit assessed:

  • whether TfNSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether TfNSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

In considering the effectiveness of the processes for this purchase, the audit considered:

  • the requirements of the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act)
  • the application of sound processes to manage risk to the NSW Government and to achieve value for money
  • the application of disciplines associated with complex procurement, such as probity, in a NSW Government context.
The acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia was consistent with a 2014 feasibility study for the PLR, but occurred before the completion of detailed project planning or an acquisition strategy.

TfNSW made two attempts to acquire the 4–6 Grand Avenue site in Camellia, and was successful on the second attempt. TfNSW recognised the risks associated with early acquisition and had high-level strategies in place should the site not be required.

The specific site had been identified in a feasibility study for the PLR commissioned by TfNSW in 2014 as one of several options in Camellia for a stabling and maintenance depot. However, TfNSW had not done any substantive analysis of the various options to identify a preferred location before the two opportunities to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue were brought to TfNSW’s attention by the landowners (or their agents). On both occasions, TfNSW chose to actively pursue acquisition in advance of any such analysis.

The acquisition was also not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy, which TfNSW policy recommends in order to guide the process and manage acquisition specific risks.

In 2015, TfNSW identified that it would require a stabling and maintenance depot in the Camellia area for the Parramatta Light Rail

In 2014, TfNSW commissioned an external engineering consultancy to undertake a feasibility design study for the Parramatta Light Rail - the Parramatta Transport Corridor Strategy Feasibility Design study (herein referred to as ‘the feasibility study’). In early 2015, TfNSW received the feasibility study, which was one of several key sources that informed the development of business cases for the PLR.

The feasibility study recommended that TfNSW should consolidate the maintenance and cleaning operations with overnight stabling facilities on one site. The study noted that the optimal location for any such site would be in close proximity to the proposed network, and noted that the site must have access to road connections to accommodate access for cars and trucks.

The study found that a centrally located stabling and maintenance facility would be required for all routes serving the Parramatta CBD, and that the Camellia industrial area was a preferred location for such a facility. The study noted that the Camellia area was contaminated.

The feasibility study notes that its conclusions were based on assumptions about the light rail system adopted and decisions made by the future operator of the system, who had not yet been selected or appointed.

TfNSW's decision to progress a potential acquisition in 2015 considered the risk that the site may not be required

TfNSW's FIC was responsible for making decisions on funding allocations at a whole of program level within TfNSW. FIC was also responsible for approving ‘high-risk/high-value’ variations to program budgets. Members of the FIC included:

  • Secretary of Transport for NSW
  • Deputy Secretary, Infrastructure and Services
  • Deputy Secretary, Freight, Strategy and Planning
  • Deputy Secretary, Customer Services
  • Deputy Secretary Finance and Investment
  • Deputy Secretary People and Corporate Services.

An April 2015 submission, from the then Deputy Director-General to the agency’s FIC, sought authorisation and funding approval to participate in an Expression of Interest sale process. It noted the risk that the project may not go ahead. The submission advised that:

By acquiring a strategic site now, it reduces the risk of having to pay an improved value or a value that may be subject to rapidly improving land values due to changes in land use and rezoning.

The property can be acquired for the project, held strategically and income generated by leasing the site as hardstand 1 space until the project requires the land for the Parramatta Light Rail project.

If the project does not proceed in the medium to longer term, the property can be sold at a premium to what has been paid today as property fundamentals improve.

This submission acknowledged the risks associated with environmental contamination and proposed that these risks would be managed by negotiating a contract where the remediation and associated expenses would be at the landowner’s cost. 

TfNSW assessed the 4–6 Grand Avenue site as one of several sites in Camellia that was a feasible location for a stabling and maintenance facility

The Departmental feasibility study assessed six potential sites for a stabling and maintenance facility, including 4–6 Grand Avenue, noting strengths and weaknesses of each site. A different site on Grand Avenue was assessed as the ‘base case’ option (1 Grand Avenue). The study’s comments on the 4–6 Grand Avenue site included the following:

With an area of approximately 63,000m2, this site has sufficient space for a depot with the required stabling yard and maintenance facilities. The location allows for good road access and LRT [light rail transit] access would be from Grand Avenue, which may require a road crossing or signalised intersection. The site has been used for general industrial uses; however the land has been cleared and is currently undergoing remediation 2. The site is not affected by flooding based on one in 100-year flood data.

In early 2015, once the opportunity to acquire 4–6 Grand Avenue emerged, TfNSW commissioned a specific feasibility study of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site. The feasibility studies clearly documented the existence of environmental contamination. In April 2015, the report concluded:

Given the limitations of this report and within the parameters that have been set it is concluded that from a spatial and geographic perspective the site at 6 Grand Avenue would be suitable as a stabling and maintenance depot for the Parramatta light rail project. There are few engineering and environmental constraints that would affect the feasibility level analysis of this site and all issues identified, within this desk study, are considered to be resolvable. However this being said there is a significant amount of work necessary to reach the final layout and definition of the stabling and maintenance depot. There are numerous items which require further consideration and conformation; planning approvals could impose restrictions on building heights, noise mitigation measures, light and visual impact requirements all of which can have significant impacts on the spatial requirements of any stabling and maintenance depot. 

The acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue was not informed by a Property Acquisition Strategy

For major projects, TfNSW typically requires the project team to complete a Property Acquisition Strategy, which is intended to guide both process as well as specific acquisition issues expected to be faced during the project. The Property Acquisition Strategy is not a mandated document but is a recommended tool to support property acquisition as part of major projects.

TfNSW did not have a Property Acquisition Strategy in place to guide the 2015 Expression of Interest process. On 6 November 2015, the then Project Director for the PLR project emailed the property team, noting a need to develop a Property Acquisition Strategy to close off the scoping design and preliminary business case.

In January 2016, TfNSW developed a draft Property Acquisition Strategy for the Parramatta Light Rail Project, although it was silent on the potential sites for the stabling and maintenance facility.

TfNSW focussed on 4–6 Grand Avenue because it was available and aligned to TfNSW's strategic interests

In early 2015, officials commenced monitoring the market for industrial real estate in the Camellia area and surrounds for possible sites for a stabling and maintenance facility.

In March 2015, then owner of the site, Akzo Nobel Pty Limited released the 4–6 Grand Avenue site through an Expression of Interest process managed by CBRE.

TfNSW’s then Deputy Director-General, Planning, sought approval from FIC to lodge an Expression of Interest up to $30.0 million. Approval was sought on the basis that it would ‘provide certainty for the Parramatta Light Rail project by allowing for a depot site in a suitable location and potentially avoid higher costs or longer timeframes associated with compulsory acquisition following completion of the project’s business case’. FIC approved the request at its meeting on 9 April 2015.

At this time, TfNSW had not conducted any analysis of financial or operational benefits and costs of the potential sites identified in earlier feasibility studies. TfNSW staff advised us that the decision to participate in the Expression of Interest process for 4–6 Grand Avenue was because it was available. There is no documentation substantiating this statement, which TfNSW staff provided verbally as part of this audit.

In November 2015, TfNSW was advised that it was unsuccessful in the Expression of Interest process and that Grand 4 Investments (a related entity of Billbergia) had purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue. TfNSW did not conduct any further analysis of alternative potential sites in Camellia between this date and commencing discussions with Grand 4 Investments in April 2016. In that time there had been some movement on other properties that were included in the feasibility study, including 37–39a Grand Avenue being under offer in September 2015.

In March 2016, TfNSW approached CBRE to organise a meeting with Grand 4 Investments. On 1 April 2016, TfNSW met with Grand 4 Investments.

TfNSW advises that a perceived benefit of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site was that it was not subject to other uses or leaseholds that would increase the cost of compulsory acquisition. Officers involved in the acquisition advised that other nominated sites in the feasibility study were subject to other uses or leaseholds. 


1  A hardstand space is a large, paved area to store cars, heavy vehicles and machinery.
2  Officers familiar with the acquisition could not confirm the nature of remediation being undertaken, but noted that the previous landowner had cleared buildings from the site, which may have been considered part of remediation.
TfNSW's independent valuation, which it commissioned and received after the acquisition, specifically excluded consideration of environmental contamination risk. As a result, TfNSW is exposed to the risk that the acquisition was not fully compliant with the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Act) because it did not use an accurate estimate of market value during negotiations. That said, the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue by agreement was consistent with preferred processes described in the Act.

TfNSW acquired the site from the landowner by agreement, and this is consistent with provisions in the Act. Obtaining approval for compulsory acquisition should negotiations for agreement break down is also consistent with the Act. That said, TfNSW did not at any time assess whether a compulsory acquisition could have resulted in acquisition at a lower cost than what was negotiated by agreement.

Despite the high risks associated with the acquisition, TfNSW did not commission a formal valuation in time to inform the negotiation and purchase. Instead, TfNSW relied on internal advice to estimate market value, but did not obtain a formal valuation from those advisors. For high-risk transactions, the greater expertise and arm's-length independence of an external specialist valuer should be preferred over an agency's own staff.

On 15 June 2016, the settlement date for the acquisition, TfNSW commissioned a formal independent valuation of the site. On 23 November 2016, TfNSW received the final formal valuation report. By not obtaining a formal independent valuation of the property in advance of acquisition to inform the acquisition value, TfNSW exposed itself to non-compliance with the Act by not establishing the market value as the basis for the acquisition price. TfNSW also breached its own internal policies.

TfNSW instructed the valuer to conduct its valuation within the following parameters:

  • Market valuation on an ‘as is’ basis – market value based on the methodology described in the Act. This approach valued the site at $25.0 million.
  • Market valuation on a speculative development basis – market value based on the financial value of the vendor's intended use of the site which, in this case, involved leasing the site for industrial use. This approach valued the site at $52.0 million, and TfNSW advised us this valuation supported the purchase price.
  • Disregard the impact of environmental contamination – TfNSW specifically instructed the independent valuer to disregard any known (or unknown) site contamination. As TfNSW knew of the significant environmental contamination affecting the site, this parameter resulted in a valuation that overstated the value of the site as it did not consider the cost of environmental remediation. The valuer applied this assumption for both market valuation approaches.

Additionally, as the independent valuer completed the valuation after the purchase was finalised, there is a risk that the valuation may have been influenced by the known purchase price.

TfNSW's failure to acquire a formal valuation and an assessment of the financial impact of environmental remediation before it purchased 4–6 Grand Avenue represents ineffective administration and governance.
TfNSW acquired the site at a time when there was demand and increasing prices for industrial property in the area. However, TfNSW did not effectively assess and manage the risks associated with the acquisition, and gaps in process led to increased risk. Briefings to decision-makers did not contain important information, and we found no evidence that gaps in advice were queried or explored by decision-makers.

TfNSW did not have plans or advice in place to assist in managing risk, such as:

  • a property acquisition plan
  • a comprehensive and up-to-date risk management plan
  • a negotiation strategy, or any authorisation limit or minimal acceptable position
  • an independent professional evaluation
  • external expert advice (with the exception of legal advice relating to the contract of sale).

TfNSW was aware of contamination issues affecting the land and had access to considerable information about the environmental conditions, such as site environmental audit reports and information on the NSW Environment Protection Authority's contaminated land register. However, TfNSW had not analysed specific technical information about the contamination and therefore was not aware of the risk implications and cost for remediation. Despite this, TfNSW changed its position from not accepting the risks and costs of contamination, to acquiring the site unconditionally. The basis for this decision is unclear and undocumented.

Briefing to senior leaders on the acquisition was silent on a number of important matters that would have been important for approvers to consider, including:

  • an explanation of the 40 per cent increase in purchase price between November 2015 and May 2016, and a 165 per cent increase from TfNSW’s offer in April 2015
  • the contamination risks associated with the site and an evidence-based estimate of potential costs to remediate the site
  • advice that an independent valuation had not been obtained, inconsistent with TfNSW policy.

Consideration of the acquisition by FIC was based on a summary business paper and was managed out-of-session, thereby removing the ability for comprehensive consideration of the acquisition proposal and its risks.

The probity management controls and assurances in place for the acquisition of the 4–6 Grand Avenue site were insufficient. These insufficiencies were exacerbated by the probity risk profile of the transaction.

The 4–6 Grand Avenue acquisition was a high-risk/high-value transaction, undertaken in a volatile property market in a short timeframe under pressure from Grand 4 Investments. TfNSW was engaging in a direct negotiation in advance of detailed planning for the acquisition, or the PLR as a whole. These circumstances contribute to heightened probity risk.

TfNSW did not establish a probity plan and sought no probity support throughout the acquisition. Also, with one exception, the staff involved in the acquisition did not complete conflict of interest declarations.

TfNSW was aware of the potential for probity or integrity issues with the transaction when it commissioned an internal audit in connection with the transaction in 2019. Internal discussions considered whether a misconduct investigation may be more appropriate, however no such investigation was undertaken.

TfNSW's insufficient probity practices, in addition to its failure to keep complete or comprehensive records of negotiations or decisions, reduce transparency of the process and its outcome and expose TfNSW to a greater risk of misconduct, corruption and maladministration.

At the time of the transaction, the TfNSW policy framework was not sufficiently risk-focussed and did not provide clarity on when officers ought to apply specific guidance or procedures. TfNSW's policies and procedures are more focussed on acquiring land to meet project needs and timeframes, and less on assuring value for money and managing risks.

At the time of its acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, TfNSW had property acquisitions policies and procedures in place. Each of these were broadly sound in their content and intent. However, they lacked specificity on how or when to apply guidance, and when risk levels should elevate the importance of recommended guidance.

TfNSW's key guidance was principles based and relied on agency staff using their experience and expertise to apply guidance according to the circumstances of an individual transaction. This guidance was not duly applied in the acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia. In addition, TfNSW does not have quality or control assurance to identify when TfNSW officers did not apply important policies or processes.

The primary focus of the TfNSW’s property acquisition guidance is to achieve vacant possession of land in a timeframe that meets the need of the relevant transport project. There is less specific focus on the need to meet the requirements of the NSW Government financial management framework.

Appendix one – Response from agency 

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Copyright Notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #349 - released (18 May 2021).

Published

Actions for Central Agencies 2020

Central Agencies 2020

Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk

This report analyses the results of our audits of the financial statements of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, Customer Service cluster agencies (central agencies), and the Legislature for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Audit opinions and timeliness of reporting

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2019–20 financial statements of central agencies and the Legislature.

The audit opinion on the Social and Affordable Housing NSW Fund's compliance with the payment requirements of the Social and Affordable Housing NSW Fund Act 2016 was qualified.

All agencies met statutory deadlines for submitting
financial statements. 

Agencies were financially impacted by recent emergency events The NSW Government allocated $1.4 billion to provide small business support and bushfire recovery relief, support COVID-19 quarantine compliance management, recruit more staff to respond to increased customer demand, and meet additional COVID-19 cleaning requirements. Agencies spent $901 million (64 per cent of the allocated funding) for the financial year ended 30 June 2020. NSW Self Insurance Corporation reported an increase of $850 million in its liability for claims related to emergency events.
AASB 16 'Leases' resulted in significant changes to agencies' financial position The implementation of new accounting standards was challenging for many agencies. The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority was not well-prepared to implement AASB 16 'Leases' and had not completely assessed contracts that contained leases. This resulted in understatements of leased assets and liabilities by $56 million which were subsequently corrected.
Implementation of new revenue standards NSW Treasury did not adequately implement the new revenue standard AASB 1058 ‘Income of Not-for-Profit Entities’ for the Crown Entity. This resulted in understatements of $274 million in opening equity and $254 million to current year revenue, which have been corrected in the final financial statements.

2. Audit observations

Management letter findings and repeat issues Our 2019–20 audits identified nine high risk and 122 moderate risk issues across central agencies and the Legislature. The high risk issues were identified in the audits of:
  • Insurance and Care NSW
  • New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority
  • Rental Bond Board
  • Independent Commission Against Corruption
  • NSW Treasury
  • Crown Entity
  • Department of Premier and Cabinet.

High risk findings include:

  • Insurance and Care NSW (icare) allocates service costs to the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, and the other schemes it supports. The documentation supporting cost allocations does not demonstrate how these allocations reflect actual costs. There is a risk of the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer being overcharged.
  • New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority's delay in capitalisation and valuation of material capital projects; and insufficient work performed to implement the new accounting standard AASB 16 ‘Leases’.
  • NSW Treasury's four-year plan to transition RailCorp to a for-profit State Owned Corporation called Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE) by 1 July 2019, remains to be implemented. On 1 July 2020, RailCorp converted to TAHE. A large portion of the planned arrangements are still to be implemented. As at the time of the audit, the TAHE operating model, Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) and other key plans and commercial agreements were not finalised. In the absence of commercial arrangements with the public rail operators, there is a lack of evidence to demonstrate TAHE’s ability to create a commercial return in the long term. This matter has been included as a high risk finding in our management letter as there may be financial reporting implications to the State if TAHE does not generate a commercial return for its shareholders in line with the original intent. NSW Treasury and TAHE should ensure the commercial arrangements, operating model and SCI are finalised in 2020–21.

Of the 122 moderate risk issues, 36 per cent were repeat issues. The most common repeat issue related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration, which increases the risk of inappropriate access to systems and records.

Grants administration for disaster relief Service NSW delivers grants responding to emergency events on behalf of other NSW Public Sector agencies. Since the first grant program commenced in January 2020, Service NSW processed approximately $791 million to NSW citizens and businesses impacted by emergency events for the financial year ended 30 June 2020. A performance audit of grants administration for disaster relief is planned for 2020–21. It will assess whether grants programs administered under the Small Business Support Fund were effectively designed and implemented to provide disaster relief.
Internal controls at GovConnect NSW service providers require enhancement

GovConnect NSW provides transactional and information technology services to central agencies. It engages an independent service auditor (service auditor) from the private sector to perform annual assurance reviews of controls at service providers, namely Infosys, Unisys and the Department of Customer Service (DCS). The service auditor issued:

  • unqualified opinions on information technology and business process controls at Infosys and Unisys, but there was an increase in control deficiencies identified in the user access controls at these service providers
  • a qualified opinion on DCS's information technology (IT) security monitoring controls because security tools were not implemented and monitored for the entire financial year. Responsibility for IT security monitoring transitioned from Unisys to DCS in 2019–20. These control deficiencies can increase the risk of fraud and inappropriate use of sensitive data.

These may impact on the ability of agencies to detect and respond to a cyber incident.

Recommendation:

We recommend DCS work with GovConnect service providers to resolve the identified control deficiencies as a matter of priority.

The NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs to improve

The NSW Cyber Security Policy requires agencies to provide a maturity self-assessment against the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) Essential 8 to the head of the agency and Cyber Security NSW annually. Completed self-assessment returns highlighted limited progress in implementing the Essential 8.

Repeat recommendation:

Cyber Security NSW and NSW government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency

Three Insurance and Care NSW (icare) entities had net asset deficiencies at 30 June 2020 The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, NSW Self Insurance Corporation and the Lifetime Care and Support Authority of NSW all had negative net assets at 30 June 2020. These icare entities did not hold sufficient assets to meet the estimated present value of all of their future payment obligations at 30 June 2020. The deterioration in net assets was largely due to increases in outstanding claims liabilities. Notwithstanding the overall net asset deficiencies, the financial statements for these entities were prepared on a going concern basis. This is because future payment obligations are not all due within the next 12 months. Settlement is instead expected to occur over years into the future, depending on the nature of the benefits provided by each scheme.
icare has not been able to demonstrate that its allocation of costs reflects the actual costs incurred by the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer and other schemes

Costs are incurred by icare as the 'service entity' of the statutory scheme it administers, and then subsequently recovered from the schemes through 'service fees'. In the absence of documentation supported by robust supporting analysis, there is a risk of the schemes being overcharged, and the allocation of costs being in breach of legislative requirements.

Recommendation:

icare should ensure its approach to allocating service fees to the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer and the other schemes it manages, is transparent and reflects actual costs.

icare did not comply with GIPA requirements icare did not comply with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA) contract disclosure requirements in 2019–20 and has not complied for several years. A total of 417 contracts were identified by management as not having been published on the NSW Government’s eTendering website. The final upload of these past contracts occurred on 20 August 2020.
Implementation of Machinery of Government (MoG) changes MoG changes impacted the governance and business processes of some agencies. Our audits identified and reported areas for improvement in the consolidation of corporate functions following MoG implementation processes at Infrastructure NSW and in the Customer Service cluster.

This report provides Parliament and other users of NSW Government central agencies' financial statements and the Legislature's financial statements with the results of our financial audits, observations, analyses, conclusions and recommendations.

Emergency events, such as bushfires, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted agencies in 2019–20. Our findings on nine agencies that were most impacted by recent emergency events are included throughout this report.

Refer to Appendix one for the names of all central agencies and Appendix four for the nine agencies most impacted by emergency events.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting of central agencies and the Legislature for 2020, including the financial implications from recent emergency events.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2019–20 financial statements of central agencies and the Legislature. All agencies met the statutory deadlines for submitting their financial statements.
  • The audit opinion on the Social and Affordable Housing NSW Fund's compliance with the payment requirements of the Social and Affordable Housing NSW Fund Act 2016 was qualified as a result of a payment made without a Treasurer's delegation.
  • Agencies were impacted by emergency events during 2019–20. This included additional grants to fund specific deliverables.
  • The implementation of new accounting standards was challenging for many agencies. The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority was not well-prepared to implement AASB 16 'Leases' and had not completely assessed contracts that contained leases. This resulted in understatements of leased assets and liabilities by $56 million which were subsequently corrected.
  • NSW Treasury did not adequately implement the new revenue standard AASB 1058 ‘Income of Not-for-Profit Entities’ for the Crown Entity. This resulted in understatements of $274 million in opening equity and $254 million to current year revenue in the financial statements. These misstatements were due to incorrect revenue calculations performed by the Transport agencies. The Crown Entity relies on information from Transport agencies as they are responsible for carrying out the State’s contractual obligations for Commonwealth funded transport projects. The extent of misstatements could have been reduced with more robust quality review processes in place by Treasury and Transport.

 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines:

  • our observations and insights from the financial statement audits of agencies in the central agencies and the Legislature
  • our assessment of how well agencies adapted their systems, policies, procedures and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.

Section highlights

  • The 2019–20 audits identified nine high risk and 122 moderate risk issues across the agencies. Of the 122 moderate risk issues, 44 (36 per cent) were repeat issues. The most common repeat issue relates to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration.
  • Service NSW delivers grants responding to emergency events on behalf of other NSW Public Sector agencies. Since the first grant program commenced in January 2020, Service NSW processed approximately $791 million to NSW citizens and businesses impacted by these emergency events for the financial year ended 30 June 2020.
  • GovConnect NSW engaged an independent auditor (the service auditor) from the private sector to evaluate the internal controls of its service providers. DCS's information technology security monitoring controls were qualified by the service auditor because security tools were not implemented and monitored for the entire financial year. These may impact on the ability of agencies to detect and respond to a cyber incident.
  • NSW Government agency self-assessment results show that the NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs urgent attention.
  • The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, NSW Self Insurance Corporation and the Lifetime Care and Support Authority of NSW all had negative net assets at 30 June 2020. The financial statements for these entities continued to be prepared on a going concern basis as their liabilities are not all due for settlement within the next 12 months.
  • icare did not comply with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA) contract disclosure requirements in 2019–20, and has not complied for several years. A total of 417 contracts were identified by management as not having been published on the NSW Government’s eTendering website. The final upload of these past contracts occurred on 20 August 2020.
  • Machinery of Government (MoG) changes impacted the governance and business processes of affected agencies. Our audits identified and reported areas for improvement in the consolidation of corporate functions following MoG changes at Infrastructure NSW and in the Customer Service cluster.