We issued unqualified audit opinions on the transport entities’ 30 June 2012 financial statements.

Some of the findings of the report include:

• government funding to the public transport operators totalled $4.4 billion in 2011-12 ($3.7 billion in 2010-11)

• passenger services revenue only covered 20 per cent of RailCorp's operating costs

• Transport for NSW has formalised a protocol to mitigate the risk of potential conflicts of interests

• At present, no sustainability framework exists for the transport agencies around environment and sustainability. Transport for NSW should complete its Environment and Sustainability Policy Framework by June 2013 and should publicly report its results annually

• Transport patronage continued to grow with 510 million journeys on train, bus and ferry services

• CityRail had two peak hour periods where only 36 per cent and 39 per cent of services were on time

• On-time running performance for Sydney Ferries was above the NSW 2021 plan target of 98.5 per cent for most routes in 2011-12

• Customer surveys by transport agencies no longer specifically address crowding on public transport. Transport for NSW should observe and report on crowding on all transport modes

• Over 2,500 transport staff, or 8.3 per cent of the workforce, have excessive leave balances. All transport entities should do more to reduce excessive annual leave balances to ensure they will comply with new targets set by the Premier.

Since the Victims’ Compensation Scheme started in 1989, $1.6 billion has been paid to victims of crime, but only $57.4 million or nearly four per cent has been recovered from convicted offenders. The remaining 96 per cent has been funded by the taxpayer.

Overtime is a significant cost for RailCorp and Roads and Maritime Services, adding about ten per cent to the cost of regular salaries. RailCorp’s overtime cost was $133.7 million in 2010–11, and at Roads and Maritime Services it cost $49.3 million.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #223 - released 20 June 2012

Neither agency (NSW Ministry of Health and NSW Police Force) demonstrated that they continued to get value for money over the life of these long term contracts or that they had effectively managed all critical elements of the three contracts we reviewed post award. This is because both agencies treated contract extensions or renewals as simply continuing previous contractual arrangements, rather than as establishing a new contract and financial commitment. Consequently, there was not a robust analysis of the continuing need for the mix and quantity of services being provided or an assessment of value for money in terms of the prices being paid.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #220 - released 1 February 2012

The NSW model of rural fire fighting is complex, and requires an extensive amount of coordination and cooperation to function properly. This has inherent risks. In general, the model has been made to work quite well and much improvement in rural fire fighting has been achieved over the past decade. The efforts of all concerned should be recognised and applauded especially since any change must be developed cooperatively between a number of agencies and groups.

Nevertheless, past tensions and difficulties have left pockets of disagreement and resistance. The rural fire fighting culture which was developed over the course of a century has always been highly dedicated, as it is today. However, changed organisational, technical, legal, financial and environmental factors have necessitated major and continuing changes.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #57 - released 2 December 1998

This audit was initiated following concerns expressed by the Department of Agriculture about the Police’s handling of a suspected fraud that it had first reported in 1996. The Department’s main concern related to the long delays before a full Police investigation took place.

Nevertheless, the current review highlighted a number of areas that, in the opinion of The Audit Office, require closer examination and resolution by the Police Service in implementing their changes. This report highlights those areas and provides recommendations for the Police to consider in its implementation of its reforms. Key areas requiring attention include: service standards are not clearly defined for the police response to fraud, without which it is difficult to ensure that police objectives and public expectations are met; restrictive employment arrangements which limit management’s ability to obtain the appropriate mix of people with skills to investigate fraud and inadequate information systems to support operational, tactical and strategic decision-making.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #53 - released 14 October 1998

While central communications units are responsible for broadcasting calls from the public for assistance to police cars; these units have no authority over those police cars. And while local police commands are responsible for police deployment, they have no ready capability to communicate with their police cars. The report also found that Local police management have limited contemporaneous knowledge of what their response resources are doing, and little useful management information that can tell them what they have done over prior periods. Current systems of response fail to distinguish adequately between calls of various types. All tend to be allocated for response by a police car, even where the caller’s needs may be equally well met by alternatives which are less resource intensive.

The NSW Police Service has begun to address these limitations. But it understands that more needs to be done before the service can realise improvements in response performance, and evidence levels of efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the NSW Police Service should: formulate a strategy for improving response overall, before it commits itself to major new investments in this area and, as part of this strategy it should clarify accountabilities throughout the response “system” and develop a framework of indicators and standards to help it (and the public) monitor response performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #47 - released 10 March 1998