Reports
Actions for Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program
Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program
The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.
The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.
This audit had two objectives:
- To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
- To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.
We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:
a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.
Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.
2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
- providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
- providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
- making business cases available to the public.
The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.
The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.
Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
- work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received.
There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.
There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public.
Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations.
The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.
Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.
The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.
Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should:
- develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
- establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
- agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
- clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
- establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:
- setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
- clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
- monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018
Actions for Mobile speed cameras
Mobile speed cameras
The primary goal of speed cameras is to reduce speeding and make the roads safer. Our 2011 performance audit on speed cameras found that, in general, speed cameras change driver behaviour and have a positive impact on road safety.
Transport for NSW published the NSW Speed Camera Strategy in June 2012 in response to our audit. According to the Strategy, the main purpose of mobile speed cameras is to reduce speeding across the road network by providing a general deterrence through anywhere, anytime enforcement and by creating a perceived risk of detection across the road network. Fixed and red-light speed cameras aim to reduce speeding at specific locations.
Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW deploy mobile speed cameras (MSCs) in consultation with NSW Police. The cameras are operated by contractors authorised by Roads and Maritime Services. MSC locations are stretches of road that can be more than 20 kilometres long. MSC sites are specific places within these locations that meet the requirements for a MSC vehicle to be able to operate there.
This audit assessed whether the mobile speed camera program is effectively managed to maximise road safety benefits across the NSW road network.
The mobile speed camera program requires improvements to key aspects of its management to maximise road safety benefits. While camera locations have been selected based on crash history, the limited number of locations restricts network coverage. It also makes enforcement more predictable, reducing the ability to provide a general deterrence. Implementation of the program has been consistent with government decisions to limit its hours of operation and use multiple warning signs. These factors limit the ability of the mobile speed camera program to effectively deliver a broad general network deterrence from speeding.
Many locations are needed to enable network-wide coverage and ensure MSC sessions are randomised and not predictable. However, there are insufficient locations available to operate MSCs that meet strict criteria for crash history, operator safety, signage and technical requirements. MSC performance would be improved if there were more locations.
A scheduling system is meant to randomise MSC location visits to ensure they are not predictable. However, a relatively small number of locations have been visited many times making their deployment more predictable in these places. The allocation of MSCs across the time of day, day of week and across regions is prioritised based on crash history but the frequency of location visits does not correspond with the crash risk for each location.
There is evidence of a reduction in fatal and serious crashes at the 30 best-performing MSC locations. However, there is limited evidence that the current MSC program in NSW has led to a behavioural change in drivers by creating a general network deterrence. While the overall reduction in serious injuries on roads has continued, fatalities have started to climb again. Compliance with speed limits has improved at the sites and locations that MSCs operate, but the results of overall network speed surveys vary, with recent improvements in some speed zones but not others.
There is no supporting justification for the number of hours of operation for the program. The rate of MSC enforcement (hours per capita) in NSW is less than Queensland and Victoria. The government decision to use multiple warning signs has made it harder to identify and maintain suitable MSC locations, and impeded their use for enforcement in both traffic directions and in school zones.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #308 - released 18 October 2018
Actions for Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability
Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability
The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.
We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.
Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.
This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:
- agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
- information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
- agencies are building risk management capabilities.
The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.
In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:
Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)
In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.
That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.
For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.
Employee perceptions of risk management
Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.
Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making
We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.
Support and guidance to help staff manage risks
Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.
Recommendation
By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:
- Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #298 - released 23 April 2018
Actions for Government Advertising: Campaigns for 2015–16 and 2016–17
Government Advertising: Campaigns for 2015–16 and 2016–17
The 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' and the 'Dogs deserve better' government advertising campaigns complied with the Government Advertising Act and most elements of the Government Advertising Guidelines.
However, some advertisements were designed to build support for government policy and used subjective or emotive messages. This is inconsistent with the requirement in the Government Advertising Guidelines for 'objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner'.
Advertisements in the 'Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities' campaign used subjective statements such as 'the system is broken' and 'brighter future'. While advertisements in the 'Dogs deserve better' campaign used confronting imagery such as gun targets, blood smears and gravestones.
The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit in relation to at least one government advertising campaign in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether advertising campaigns were carried out effectively, economically and efficiently and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines). In this audit, we examined two campaigns:
- the ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ campaign run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet
- the ‘Dogs deserve better’ campaign run by the Department of Justice.
Section 6 of the Act details the specific prohibitions on political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed so as to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.
The ‘Stronger Councils, Stronger Communities’ government advertising campaign was run by the Office of Local Government and the Department of Premier and Cabinet in four phases from August 2015 to May 2016. The total cost of the campaign was over $4.5 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.
Two factors potentially compromised value for money for the campaign. The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work to be undertaken, which was substantially greater than initially quoted. Further, the department did not meet all recommended timeframes to minimise media booking costs for all phases of the campaign.
The campaign did not comply with all administrative requirements in all phases. Advertising for Phase 1 commenced before the compliance certificate was signed. There was no evidence that a compliance certificate was signed for Phase 2 extension. The cost benefit analyses for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension did not sufficiently consider alternatives to advertising, as is required by the Government Advertising Guidelines.
Advertisements adopted subjective messages designed to build public support for council mergers and directed audiences to websites for more detailed information. Campaign research identified statements that were most likely to reduce resistance to mergers. Some advertising content used subjective language, which we consider inconsistent with the requirement for ‘objective presentation’. Evaluations of advertising effectiveness also measured the success of the advertisements in increasing public support for council mergers.
No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act
Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:
- be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
- contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
- contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.
We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.
Request for quotes to design advertisement did not reflect the full scope required
The request for quotes for the design of the Phase 1 advertisement did not reflect the full scale of work that was to be undertaken, and this created a risk to achieving value for money. The Office of Local Government sought quotes for design of a television advertisement only. It did not request an estimate for radio, online advertisements, or translation for linguistically diverse audiences, which were ultimately required for the campaign.
A full and fair assessment of which supplier could provide the best value for money could not be made given that the quotes obtained did not reflect the full scope of work. The final amount paid for the design of Phase 1 was 2.7 times the original quote. It is possible that another supplier that provided a quote could have provided overall better value for money.
The Office of Local Government continued to use the Phase 1 supplier for Phase 2 and Phase 2 extension (Exhibit 4). Where there are other suppliers that could feasibly compete for a contract, direct negotiation increases the risk the agency has not obtained the best value for money. The department advised that it continued with the same agency to avoid costs involved in briefing a new agency on the campaign.
The ‘Dogs deserve better’ government advertising campaign was run by the Department of Justice from August 2016, after the government announced its decision to prohibit greyhound racing, and was terminated in October 2016 after a change of government policy. The campaign had a budget of $1.6 million, with an actual spend of $1.3 million. See Appendix 2 for more details on this campaign.
The Secretary of the department determined that urgent circumstances existed that required advertising to commence prior to completing a cost benefit analysis and peer review. There was a concern that industry participants may make impulse decisions to destroy greyhounds without further information on support services; there was also an identified need to promote public greyhound adoptions.
Phase 1 advertisements focused on explaining the reasons for the prohibition on greyhound racing with a reference to a website for further information. While industry participants were identified as the primary audience, media expenditure was not specifically targeted to this group. Phase 2 advertisements more effectively addressed the originally identified ‘urgent needs’ of providing information on support services for greyhound owners and information on how the public could adopt a greyhound.
The urgency to advertise potentially compromised value for money. The department did not use price competition when selecting a creative supplier due to a concern this would add to timeframes. Further, the department did not meet recommended timeframes to minimise media booking costs.
We identified three other areas in Phase 1 advertisements that were inconsistent with government advertising requirements. Advertisements used provocative language and confronting imagery, which we consider to be inconsistent with the requirement for ‘objective presentation’. Two statements presented as fact based on the Special Commission’s Inquiry report were inaccurate; one of these was due to a calculation error. Radio advertisements did not clearly identify that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government for the first few days of the campaign.
No breach of specific prohibitions in the Act
Section 6 of the Act prohibits the use of government advertising for political advertising. A government advertising campaign must not:
- be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
- contain the name, voice or image of a minister, any other member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
- contain the name, logo or any slogan of, or any other reference relating to, a political party.
We did not identify any breach of the specific prohibitions listed above in the advertising content of this campaign.
Animal welfare concerns were identified as the reason for urgent advertising
A brief prepared by the department in July 2016 raised concerns about the welfare of greyhounds following the NSW Premier’s announcement that the government would prohibit greyhound racing. The brief raised the risk that industry members may make impulse decisions to destroy their greyhounds without information on support that was being offered.
The department used the provisions in Sections 7(4) and 8(3) of the Act to expedite the release of advertising due to ‘other urgent circumstances’. This provision allows advertising to commence prior to completing the peer review process and cost benefit analysis.
In introducing the Government Advertising Bill to parliament in 2011, the then Premier noted that exceptional circumstances would cover situations ‘such as a civil emergency or sudden health epidemic’. There is no other guidance on when it is appropriate to use this section. It is at the discretion of a government agency head to determine whether a campaign is urgent.
Phase 1 advertisements did not focus on the urgent needs
This advertising campaign had three overarching objectives:
- to increase public awareness of the animal welfare reasons for the closure of the greyhound racing industry
- to change the behaviour of dog owners from potentially harming their greyhounds to treating them humanely, by accessing the support options and packages available
- to promote greyhound adoptions by the public.
Alongside advertising, the department took other steps to engage with the greyhound racing industry. This included direct mail, face to face meetings around the State, setting up a call centre and community consultation through an online survey. Other government agencies and animal welfare agencies were also engaged to reach out to affected stakeholders.
Phase 1 advertising content focused on providing information about the reasons for the closure of the industry. The department’s radio and television advertisements did not refer to support packages or encourage the public to adopt a greyhound. While print advertisements did mention these things, this was only presented in fine print. In all advertisements, audiences were referred to a website for further information.
The focus of advertisements on the reasons for industry closure was not consistent with the identified needs to urgently commence advertising to influence the behaviour of dog owners and encourage the public to adopt a greyhound.
The content in Phase 2 advertisements, which began around four weeks after the first phase, was more explicit in highlighting the services and support for industry members such as offering business and retraining advice. These advertisements also referred audiences to a call centre number as well as the website.
Peer review process limited to influencing second phase of advertisements
In urgent circumstances, the Act allows for peer review to be completed after advertising has commenced. For this campaign, the peer review process was completed on 19 August 2016, two weeks after advertising had commenced. Where advertising commences before the peer review process is completed, the usefulness of peer reviewers’ recommendations is limited to informing subsequent phases of advertising and the post-campaign evaluation.
The peer review report found the messages in Phase 1 advertisements were not clearly defined, and the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst other campaign activities. These recommendations informed the second phase of advertising, which ran from 27 August 2016 until the campaign was terminated in October 2016.
The department could not demonstrate value for money was achieved for creative work
The department provided a fixed budget for creative work when requesting quotes from creative agencies to develop advertising material. This is not consistent with the quotation requirements in the government’s Guidelines for Advertising and Digital Communication Services. This approach creates risks to achieving value for money as creative agencies are not required to compete on price for their services. The department advised that it had pre-set the creative costs based on a comparative government campaign of a similar size. This was done due to a concern that requiring agencies to compete on price would affect the short timeframe given to develop creative material.
Three creative agencies accepted the opportunity to present design ideas for the campaign. The department was unable to provide evidence of how it chose the preferred supplier out of these three agencies. Records are important for accountability and allow a procurement decision to be audited after an urgent decision.
Short notice did not allow for cost-efficient media booking for all phases
Placement of advertisements in various media channels was done through the State’s Media Agency Services contract. This contract achieves savings as the government can use its aggregated media spend to gain discounts from the media supplier.
The Department of Premier and Cabinet provides guidance to ensure cost efficient media booking. For example, media time for a television advertisement should be booked at least 6 to 12 weeks in advance. Radio advertisements should be booked at least 2 to 8 weeks in advance.
The peer review report noted that the department did not have adequate time to look for the most cost-efficient way to advertise. In its response to the peer reviewers, the department acknowledged this to be due to the urgency to start advertising. The media booking authority was signed by the department one day before the campaign commenced.
The department used a wide public campaign for a narrow target audience
The campaign identified greyhound industry participants as the primary target audience. In 201516 there were 1,342 greyhound trainers, 1,695 owner/trainers, 983 attendants and 1,247 breeders in New South Wales. The department’s advertising submission identified ‘concerns that industry members could make impulsive decisions, potentially jeopardising the welfare of a large number of dogs, prior to the shutdown of the industry’.
The submission’s evidence of advertising effectiveness focused on increasing the level of wider community support for the ban rather than stopping industry members from making impulse decisions. It used an early opinion poll to show that total support for the ban on greyhound racing rises by 17 points and opposition drops by four points following explanation of the findings of the Special Commission of Inquiry report.
The peer review report noted that the role of advertising was not clearly defined amongst the department’s range of other direct and targeted communications and consultations held with industry members.
No demonstrated basis for use of confronting imagery and provocative language
The Guidelines require ‘objective presentation in a fair and accessible manner’. Neither the Guidelines or Handbook further explain what objective presentation means. We have used an ordinary definition of this term as ‘not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts’. This is synonymous with terms like ‘impartial’, ‘neutral’, and ‘dispassionate’ and opposite to ‘subjective’. We consider that to meet the current requirements in the Guidelines for objectivity, advertising content should contain accurate statements or facts, and avoid subjective language.
Phase 1 focussed on the ongoing consequences if no action was taken to close the industry. The advertisements used provocative language, for example ‘Up to 70 per cent of dogs are deemed wastage by their own industry. Wastage! Slaughtered just for being slow’. Advertisements used confronting imagery like gravestones, blood smears and gun targets.
Our literature review into this area highlighted mixed findings on the effectiveness of confrontational advertising materials. In some cases, shock campaigns may cause an audience to reject or ignore the message, and may even encourage people to do the opposite of the intended behaviour. In other cases, such as in road safety campaigns, this style of advertising can be successful. This shows the importance of conducting pre-campaign research before adopting a confrontational or emotive approach in advertising.
The Government Advertising Handbook recommends that an agency explain the rationale and the evidence for their chosen advertising approach. There was no evidence that the department researched the effectiveness of its advertising approach with its target audience. The department had planned to undertake creative concept testing as part of a strategy to ensure the creative material was understood by its audience. The department advised that due to the urgency of the campaign, it did not have time to conduct this testing.
Not all Phase 1 radio advertisements clearly identified that they were authorised by the New South Wales Government
For the first few days on air, Phase 1 radio advertisements ended by referring the audience to a government website, instead of clearly identifying that it had been authorised by the New South Wales Government. Government authorisations and logos ensure the work and the programs of the NSW Government are easily identifiable by the community.
The department’s cost benefit analysis did not consider alternatives to advertising
For government advertising campaigns that cost over $1.0 million, the Act requires the advertising agency to carry out a cost benefit analysis and obtain approval from the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communications, prior to commencing the campaign.
The department engaged with audiences through direct mail, face to face forums, and a telephone helpline in addition to advertising. However, the department’s cost benefit analysis did not meet the requirements in the Guidelines to specify the extent to which expected benefits could be achieved without advertising, and to compare costs of options other than advertising that could be used to successfully implement the program (see Exhibit 6).
The cost benefit analysis made optimistic assumptions about the impact of the campaign on greyhound adoptions. It estimated that 2,360 greyhounds would be adopted if the campaign was run. This is significantly higher than the ‘most optimistic outcome’ of re-homing in the Special Commission Inquiry report (we calculated this to be 1,467 greyhounds). There was insufficient evidence to support the higher number of adoptions in the cost benefit analysis.
The sensitivity analysis shows that using the Special Commission’s ‘most optimistic outcome’ figure of re-homing would reduce the net present value of advertising to be negative. Further, the cost benefit analysis also assumed that increased government funding would be made available to animal welfare and rehoming organisations to support more adoptions, but did not estimate or include this cost when calculating the net present value of advertising.
There were two factual inaccuracies in key messages used for Phase 1 advertisements
Section 8(2) of the Act requires the head of a government agency to certify that the proposed campaign ‘contains accurate information’. The Secretary of the Department of Justice signed the compliance certificate on 29 July 2016, before advertisements commenced.
We examined the accuracy of factual claims in this advertising campaign, by comparing the key statements to the report of Special Commission of Inquiry into the Greyhound Racing Industry (the Commissioner report). The Commissioner report was quoted by the NSW Government as the basis for its policy to transition the greyhound racing industry to closure.
We identified that two of the key statements used in Phase 1 advertisements to support the animal welfare reasons for industry closure were inaccurate (Exhibit 7).
Appendix one - Responses from agencies
Appendix two - About the campaigns
Appendix three - About the Audit
Appendix four - Performance Auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #294 - released 2 November 2017
Actions for Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts
Sydney Road Maintenance Contracts
In November 2013, Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) outsourced the maintenance of State roads in the Sydney region south and west zones using an innovative contracting approach called the Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC). The SMC links risk to reward, and uses a performance framework where outcomes should drive improved performance over time.
WA | VIC | QLD | NSW | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Roads managed (lane kms) | 52,659 | 50,510 | 71,353 | 80,348 |
Estimated spend ($/lane km) | 5,000 | 4,500 | 6,000 | 7,000 |
Road quality measure (%) | 99 | 99 | 94 | 91 |
Parliamentary reference - Report number #288 - released 15 June 2017
Actions for NorthConnex
NorthConnex
The processes used to assess NorthConnex adequately considered value for money for taxpayers.This report also found that the impact of tolling concessions on road users and the motorway network was consistent with policy objectives described in the 2012 NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #287 - released 8 June 2017
Actions for CBD and South East Light Rail Project
CBD and South East Light Rail Project
Transport for NSW did not effectively plan and procure the CBD and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project to achieve best value for money according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.
Transport for NSW is on track to deliver the project, but it will come at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #278 - released 30 November 2016
Actions for Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative
Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative
The NSW Government’s ‘program evaluation initiative’, introduced to assess whether service delivery programs achieve expected outcomes and value for money, is largely ineffective according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.
Government services, in areas such as public order and safety, health and education, are delivered by agencies through a variety of programs. In 2016–17, the NSW Government estimates that it will spend over $73 billion on programs to deliver services.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #277 - released 3 November 2016
Actions for Preventing and managing worker injuries
Preventing and managing worker injuries
Police officers and firefighters in NSW are benefiting from an improved focus on preventing and managing injuries, according to a report released today by the NSW Auditor-General. However, the audit found these gains may not be enough to offset risks associated with increasing common law claims, and death and disability scheme costs.
‘Emergency service workers face dangerous situations and traumatic scenes’ said the Auditor-General ‘and are at a significant risk of injury and illness. While the NSW Police Force and Fire & Rescue NSW have made positive shifts towards more proactive injury prevention and better return to work programs and practices, both face significant cost issues.’
Parliamentary reference - Report number #275 - released 13 October 2016
Actions for Reintegrating young offenders into the community after detention
Reintegrating young offenders into the community after detention
Juvenile Justice prepares and assists young people to reintegrate into the community reasonably well, given the complex needs of young people in detention, according to a report released today by the NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.
Juvenile Justice has many processes and programs to identify and address young people’s needs while in detention and links them to relevant support services in the community. It still faces some significant barriers which make reintegration difficult. Some are within its control to fix, such as improving training and recreational activities available to young people in detention. Others relate to external factors, such as the capacity of other organisations to address their reintegration needs like housing, education and employment, and a young person’s period of detention.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #269 - released 28 April 2016