Reports
Health 2023
What this report is about
Results of the Health portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
The audit found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Health portfolio agencies' financial statements.
The number of monetary misstatements increased in 2022–23, driven by key accounting issues, including the first-time recognition of paid parental leave and plant and equipment fair value adjustments.
The key audit issues were
NSW Health identified errors regarding the recognition and calculation of long service leave entitlements for employees with ten or more years of service that had periods of part time service in the first ten years, resulting in prior period restatements.
Comprehensive revaluation of buildings at the Graythwaite Charitable Trust found errors in the previous year's valuation, resulting in prior period restatements.
New parental leave legislation increased employee liabilities for portfolio agencies. The Ministry of Health corrected the consolidated financial statements to record parental leave liabilities for all agencies within the Health portfolio.
A repeat high-risk issue relates to processing time records by administrators that have not been reviewed prior to running the pay cycle.
Thirty per cent of reported issues were repeat issues.
The audit recommended
Portfolio agencies should ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards.
Portfolio agencies should address deficiencies that resulted in qualified reports on:
- the design and operation of shared service controls
- prudential non-compliance at residential aged care facilities.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Health portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all portfolio agencies required to prepare general purpose financial statements.
- The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased compared to the prior year.
- The Ministry of Health retrospectively corrected an $18.9 million adjustment in its financial statements relating to long service leave entitlements for certain employees.
- Graythwaite Charitable Trust retrospectively corrected a $4.2 million adjustment in its financial statements related to prior period valuations.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health portfolio.
Section highlights
- The 2022–23 audits identified one high-risk and 57 moderate risk issues across the portfolio.
- The high-risk matter related to the forced-finalisation of time records.
- The total number of findings increased from 67 to 111 in 2022–23.
- Thirty per cent of the issues were repeat issues. Most repeat issues related to internal control deficiencies or non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies.
- Forced-finalisation of time records, accounting for the new paid parental leave provision and user access review deficiencies were the most commonly reported issues.
- Qualified Assurance Practitioner's reports were issued on:
- the design and operation of controls as documented by HealthShare NSW
- the Ministry's Annual Prudential Compliance Statements in relation to residential aged care facilities.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Transport 2023
What this report is about
Result of the Transport portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
The audit found
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all Transport portfolio agencies.
An 'emphasis of matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales' (TAHE) independent auditor's report, which draws attention to management's disclosure regarding proposed changes to TAHE's operating model.
Government's decision to convert TAHE into a non-commercial Public Non-Financial Corporation may impact the future valuation and the control of TAHE's assets.
Transport for NSW's valuation of roads and bridges resulted in a net increase to its asset value by $15.7 billion.
Transport for NSW and Sydney Metro have capitalised over $300 million of tender bid costs paid to unsuccessful tender bidders relating to significant infrastructure projects. Whilst NSW Treasury policy provides clarity on the reimbursement of unsuccessful bidders' costs, clearer guidance on how to account for these costs in agency's financial statements is required.
The key audit issues were
The number of issues reported to management decreased from 53 in 2021–22 to 49 in 2022–23.
High-risk findings include:
- gaps in how Sydney Metro manages its contractors and how conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
- future financial reporting implications to account for government's proposed changes to TAHE's future operating model, including asset valuations and control assessments of assets and operations
- Parramatta Park Trust's tree assets' valuation methodology needs to be addressed.
Recommendations were made to address the identified deficiencies.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all the portfolio agencies’ 30 June 2023 financial statements.
- An 'Emphasis of Matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales’ (TAHE) Independent Auditor's Report to draw attention to management's disclosure regarding the proposed changes to TAHE's future operating model.
- The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased by 59% compared to the prior year.
- The recent government's decision to convert TAHE into a non-commercial Public Non-Financial Corporation may impact the future valuation and the control of TAHE’s assets.
- Transport for NSW needs to further improve its quality assurance processes over comprehensive valuations, in particular, ensuring key inputs used in the valuations are properly supported and verified.
- Transport for NSW and Sydney Metro capitalised over $300 million of bid costs paid to unsuccessful bidders. NSW Treasury’s Bid Cost Contributions Policy does not contemplate how these costs should be recognised in agency’s financial statements. Transport agencies should work with NSW Treasury to develop an accounting policy for the bid cost contributions to ensure consistent application across the sector.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport portfolio.
Section highlights
- The 2022–23 audits identified four high risks and 28 moderate risk issues across the portfolio. Thirty-nine per cent of issues were repeat findings.
- Four high risk findings include:
- TAHE’s asset valuations (new)
- TAHE’s control of assets and operations (new)
- Sydney Metro’s management of contractors and conflicts of interest (new)
- Parramatta Park Trust’s valuation of trees (repeat).
- The total number of findings decreased from 53 in 2021–22 to 49 in 2022–23. Many repeat findings related to control weaknesses over the asset valuation, payroll processes, conflicts of interest and information technology user access administration.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Premier and Cabinet 2023
What this report is about
Results of the Premier and Cabinet portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
What we found
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all Premier and Cabinet portfolio agencies.
What the key issues were
The Administrative Arrangements Orders, effective 1 July 2023, changed the name of the Department of Premier and Cabinet to the Premier's Department and transferred parts of Department of Premier and Cabinet to The Cabinet Office.
The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits decreased from 15 in 2021–22 to 12 in 2022–23.
The total number of management letter findings across the portfolio of agencies increased from ten in 2021–22 to 20 in 2022–23.
Thirty per cent of all issues were repeat issues. The most common repeat issues related to deficiencies in controls over financial reporting.
What we recommended
Portfolio agencies should:
- ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards
- prioritise and address internal control deficiencies identified in Audit Office management letters.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Premier and Cabinet portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all the portfolio agencies 2022–23 financial statements.
- The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements decreased compared to the prior year.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet portfolio.
Section highlights
- The 2022–23 audits identified eight moderate risk issues across the portfolio of agencies. Of these, two were repeat issues, and related to password and security configuration and management of excessive annual leave.
- The total number of findings increased from ten to 20, which mainly related to deficiencies in controls over financial reporting and governance and oversight.
- The most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over financial reporting.
Appendix one – Early close procedures
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Natural disasters
What this report is about
This report draws together the financial impact of natural disasters on agencies integral to the response and impact of natural disasters during 2021–22.
What we found
Over the 2021–22 financial year $1.4 billion from a budget of $1.9 billion was spent by the NSW Government in response to natural disasters.
Total expenses were less than the budget due to underspend in the following areas:
- clean-up assistance, including council grants
- anticipated temporary accommodation support
- payments relating to the Northern Rivers Business Support scheme for small businesses.
Natural disaster events damaged council assets such as roads, bridges, waste collection centres and other facilities used to provide essential services. Additional staff, contractors and experts were engaged to restore and repair damaged assets and minimise disruption to service delivery.
At 30 June 2022, the estimated damage to council infrastructure assets totalled $349 million.
Over the first half of the 2022–23 financial year, councils experienced further damage to infrastructure assets due to natural disasters. NSW Government spending on natural disasters continued with a further $1.1 billion spent over this period.
Thirty-six councils did not identify climate change or natural disaster as a strategic risk despite 22 of these having at least one natural disaster during 2021–22.
Section highlights
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Section highlights
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Universities 2022
What this report is about
Results of the financial statement audits of the public universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2022.
What we found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all ten universities.
Nine universities reported net deficits in 2022, and all showed a decline from their 2021 results.
Results were impacted by a decline in investment income and government grants.
Wage remediation provisions across the universities increased by 116% to $110 million at 31 December 2022.
Expenditure increased as universities transitioned back to face-to-face teaching with the lifting of most COVID-19 restrictions.
Revenue from overseas students decreased by 0.5% overall in 2022, although not all universities were impacted equally.
Nearly 42% of fees and charges revenue came from overseas student revenue from three countries of origin (43% in 2021).
What the key issues were
We reported 88 findings to universities on internal control deficiencies (105 in 2021).
Six high risk findings were identified (four in 2021), relating to:
- IT control deficiencies in monitoring privileged user access
- password configuration
- cyber security process improvements
- lack of security over access to EFT payment files
- the status of a university's work in assessing its liability for underpayment of staff
- inadequate review of contracts leading to incorrect accounting treatments.
Two out of 13 entities reported financial losses from cyber incidents in 2022.
Retention policies on personally identifiable information (PII) vary and universities can further reduce their PII exposure risk from cyber attack.
What we recommended
Universities should:
- conduct a comprehensive assessment of their employment agreements and historical pay practices to identify potential underpayments
- prioritise actions to address repeat findings on internal control deficiencies in a timely manner
- review their PII retention policies to ensure PII stored is limited to the entity's needs, held only for the minimum duration it is legally and operationally required, and access is strictly limited.
This report provides Parliament with the results of our financial audits of universities in New South Wales and their controlled entities in 2022, including our analysis, observations and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- internal controls and governance
- teaching and research.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in university sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of universities in NSW for 2022.
Section highlights
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Appropriate financial controls help to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of NSW universities.
Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. The more significant issues and risks are included in this chapter. These, along with the less significant matters, are reported to universities for management to address.
Section highlights
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Universities' primary objectives are teaching and research. They invest most of their resources aiming to achieve quality outcomes in academia and student experience. Universities have committed to achieving certain government targets and compete to advance their reputation and their standing in international and Australian rankings.
This chapter outlines teaching and research outcomes for universities in NSW for 2022.
Section highlights
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Appendix one – List of 2022 recommendations
Appendix two – Status of 2021 recommendations
Appendix three – Universities' controlled entities
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity
What the report is about
The Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) is the State's custodian of rail assets. It is a state owned corporation and commenced operating on 1 July 2020.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. We audited TAHE, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and NSW Treasury.
Separate and related audits on TAHE are reported in 'State Finances 2022', 'State Finances 2021' and 'Transport and Infrastructure 2022' reports.
What we found
The design and implementation of TAHE, which spanned seven years, was not effective.
The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to support an accounting treatment to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments.
The benefits of TAHE were claimed in the 2015–16 NSW Budget before the enabling legislation was passed by Parliament in 2017. This committed the agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, regardless of any challenges that arose.
Rail safety arrangements were a priority throughout TAHE's design and implementation, and risks were raised and addressed.
Agencies relied heavily on consultants on matters related to the creation of TAHE, but failed to effectively manage these engagements. Agencies failed to ensure that consultancies delivered independent advice as an input to decision-making. A small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on the same topic. The final cost of TAHE-related consultancies was $22.6 million compared to the initial estimated cost of $12.9 million.
What we recommended
We recommended that the audited agencies should:
- improve accountability and transparency for major new fiscal transformation initiatives
- ensure entities do not reflect the financial impact of significant initiatives in the Budget when there is uncertainty, or it creates perverse incentives
- review record keeping practices, systems and policies to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998, and the NSW Government Information Classification, Labelling and Handling Guidelines
- review procurement policies to ensure that consultant use complies with all NSW Government policy requirements.
The NSW Government established the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE), a statutory State Owned Corporation (SOC), on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner – RailCorp. It is the State's custodian of rail network assets, including rail tracks and other infrastructure, rolling stock, land, train stations and facilities, retail space, and signal and power systems, within metropolitan and regional New South Wales. It is responsible for $2.8 billion of major capital projects in 2022–23.
TAHE was established under Part 2 of the Transport Administration Act 1988 and is governed by a decision-making board. The Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Employee Relations are the Shareholding Ministers of TAHE, and they annually agree performance expectations articulated in a Statement of Corporate Intent.
Whereas TAHE is the custodian of rail assets, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains operate public rail services. TAHE does not have responsibility for the operation of the heavy rail network or train services, nor does it have network control functions. TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster in the public sector (formerly the Transport cluster and renamed in April 2022), which also includes Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW (TfNSW).
TfNSW leads the Transport and Infrastructure cluster. Its role is to set the strategic direction for transport across the State. This involves the shaping of planning, policy, strategy, regulation, resource allocation and other service and non-service delivery functions for all modes of transport.
TAHE's Operating Licence is granted by the Portfolio Minister and authorises the entity to perform the functions required to acquire, develop, finance, divest and hold assets, pursuant to the Transport Administration Act 1988. The Portfolio Minister also issues a Statement of Expectations which outlines the government’s expectation for the business for the next three to five years.
TAHE's original Portfolio Minister was the Minister for Transport who approved, on 30 June 2020, the issuing of an interim 12-month Operating Licence to enable TAHE to commence operating on 1 July 2020. The Portfolio Minister then granted TAHE's current Operating Licence in 2021. After TAHE requested a 12-month extension to its current Operating Licence, its next Operating Licence is due on 1 July 2024. The current Portfolio Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure, Cities and Active Transport.
About this audit
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. In making this assessment, we considered whether:
- the process of designing and implementing TAHE was cohesive and transparent, and delivered an effective outcome
- agencies' roles and responsibilities were clear in the planning of TAHE
- agencies effectively identified and managed certain risks.
Conclusion
The design and implementation of TAHE was not effective. The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments to sustain TAHE through continuing investment, and funding of the state owned rail operators. The ineffective process to design TAHE delivered a model that entails significant uncertainty as to whether the anticipated longer-term financial improvements to the Budget position can be achieved or sustained.
NSW Treasury and TfNSW had different objectives for TAHE
Up to June 2013, RailCorp had been the owner and operator of rail services and maintainer of the metropolitan rail network for almost a decade. It had been operating as a not-for-profit Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC).
In 2012, NSW Treasury (hereafter Treasury) decided there was a risk that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) would reclassify RailCorp to the General Government Sector (GGS), meaning depreciation expenses of approximately $870 million would be reflected in the GGS Budget. Treasury wanted to avoid this impact on the GGS Budget, and considered the establishment of a transport asset holding entity as a means to do so. Capital grants to RailCorp were being treated as an expense to the GGS Budget.
TfNSW also wanted an asset holding entity – but one that would be a non-trading ‘shell’ company with no staff that would hold and manage all public transport assets. TfNSW's concept envisaged the entity would have a structure that would enable future public transport reforms and strategic directions while ensuring vertical integration of operations between asset owners and the rail operators to maintain rail safety.
However, Treasury pursued its objective to improve the GGS Budget result, and sought to expand on TfNSW's 'shell' asset holding entity concept. Treasury wanted an entity that could generate a return on investment, as this meant that government investment in transport assets could be treated as equity investments, rather than a Budget expense, and in turn improve the GGS Budget position. As an example of the potential impact of creating this new entity, capital grants of $2.3 billion were paid to RailCorp in 2013–14. If Treasury's objective was met, grants of this significance would then be treated as an equity investment, rather than an expense in the GGS Budget.
In 2017, Treasury's preferred option was progressed through legislation, but both agencies' central objectives for the proposed asset holding entity would continue to prove difficult to reconcile. To achieve Treasury's objective to improve the Budget result, the entity would need to generate a return on investment (this is further discussed below). However, TfNSW expressed concerns that the prioritisation of rail safety, and the effective management of governance, regulation and operations would be more complex in an entity with commercial imperatives.
Asset holding entities are a common approach to the management of transport assets in Australia and internationally, and there are a range of approaches to how they are structured and used. Such structures should be driven by the goal of improved asset management. Ultimately, TfNSW's objectives could have been delivered through a simpler entity structure. However, reconciling TfNSW's objectives with Treasury's imperative to deliver and justify a Budget improvement in the short-term resulted in an overly lengthy process and an unnecessarily complex outcome that places an obligation on future governments to sustain. There is still significant uncertainty as to whether the short-term improvements to the Budget can continue to be realised in the longer-term.
The Budget benefits of TAHE were claimed before the entity was legislated, committing the agencies to deliver, regardless of the complexities that subsequently arose
The 2015–16 GGS Budget treated the government's investment in TAHE (still known at this time as RailCorp) as an equity contribution. This had the immediate impact of improving the Budget result by $1.8 billion per annum. However, the legislation to enable the establishment of TAHE had not yet been passed by Parliament, key elements of the operating model were still under development, and imminent changes in accounting standards had the potential to impact TAHE's financial model. The decision to book the benefits in the Budget early committed the involved agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, irrespective of the challenges that arose.
TAHE's financial structure requires circular government investment to work
For the NSW Government to continue to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution, rather than an expense to the Budget, there must be a reasonable expectation that TAHE will generate a sufficient rate of return as required by the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) framework. In doing so, it needs to recover a revaluation loss created by a $20.3 billion reduction in the value of its assets which was incurred in its first full year of operation. This loss occurred as a result of a revaluation of TAHE's assets when RailCorp (a not-for profit entity) became TAHE (a for-profit commercial entity) – and is discussed further in the 'Key findings' below.
TAHE generates a small portion of its income from transactions with the private sector but, as noted in our report 'State Finances 2021', TAHE receives the majority of its revenue (more than 80%) from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. Both of these entities are funded by grants (a Budget expense) to TfNSW from the GGS Budget.
Based on Treasury’s correspondence with the ABS in 2015, TAHE was initially expected to pay a return on equity of 7% in 2016–17. The assumption of a 7% return persisted through to 2018, after the legislation enabling the establishment of TAHE was passed by Parliament. However, when the initial access and licence fees were agreed on 1 July 2020, this figure had been revised to an expected rate of return of 1.5% excluding the revaluation loss. This was below the long-term inflation target and did not include the recovery of the revaluation loss – risking the government's ability to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution. Importantly, as TAHE is primarily reliant on fees paid by the state owned rail operators that, in turn, are funded by the GGS Budget (as an expense), the decision to change the returns model from 7% to 1.5% would in its own right have had a positive impact on the GGS Budget. However, the decision to use a 1.5% return would ultimately be problematic as it made it difficult to treat the government's contributions to TAHE as an equity investment, as discussed below.
On 14 December 2021, to avoid a qualified audit opinion, the NSW Government made the decision to increase TAHE's expected rate of return to 2.5%, equal to the Reserve Bank’s long-term inflation target.
In 2021-22, TAHE needed to start charging rail operators higher access and licence fees in order to generate a return of 2.5%, so as to support the government's treatment of its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution in the GGS Budget. This meant the government needed to provide additional grant (expense) funding to the state owned rail operators so they could pay the increased access and licence fees to TAHE. Based on current projections, TAHE is not expected to recover the revaluation loss until 2046.
There remains a risk that TAHE will not be able to generate a sufficient return on the NSW Government's investment without relying on increased funding to state owned rail operators so that they can in turn pay the higher access and licence fees. TAHE's ability to generate returns on government investment from other sources are uncertain and may not be achievable or sustainable. Current modelling highlights that TAHE remains largely reliant, through to 2046, on increasing fees (which are assumed to increase at 2.5% per annum from 2031 onwards when the current 10 year contracts with rail operators expire) paid by the state owned rail operators that remain principally reliant on GGS Budget grants.
The process of designing and implementing TAHE was not transparent to independent scrutiny
Our report 'State Finances 2021' commented that Treasury did not always provide this Office with information relating to TAHE on a timely basis. Similarly, during this performance audit, there were also multiple instances where auditees were unable to provide documentation regarding key activities in the process to deliver TAHE. Agencies also applied higher sensitivity classifications to large tranches of documents than was justified or required by policy. Of particular concern is the incorrect classification of documents as Cabinet sensitive information. The incorrect or over-classification of documentation as Cabinet sensitive delayed this Office's ability to provide scrutiny or independent assurance.
There was a lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of governance structures set up to oversee the design and implementation of TAHE
From 2014, multiple workstreams and advisory committees were established to progress the design and implementation of TAHE. For some of these committees and workstreams, there is limited information on what they were tasked to do and what they achieved. Most had ceased meeting by 2018, before significant work needed to deliver TAHE was completed.
The lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of these governance structures reduced opportunities for TfNSW and Treasury to reconcile their differing objectives for TAHE, and resolve key questions earlier in the process.
There was a heavy reliance on consulting firms throughout the process to establish TAHE, and the management of consultant engagements failed to ensure that agencies received independent advice to support objective decision-making
In 2020, Treasury and TfNSW failed to prevent, identify, or adequately manage a conflict of interest when they engaged the same 'Big 4' consulting firm to work on separate TAHE-related projects. Both agencies used the firm's work to further their respective views with regard to the financial implications of TAHE's operating model. At this time those views were still unreconciled.
Treasury engaged the firm to provide a fiscal risk management strategy and advice on the impact of changes to accounting standards. TfNSW engaged the same firm to develop operating and financial models for TAHE, which raised concerns regarding the viability of TAHE. Disputes arose around the findings of these reports. Treasury disagreed with some of the outcomes of the work commissioned by TfNSW, relating to accounting treatment and fiscal advice.
The management of this conflict (real or perceived) was left to the 'Big 4' consulting firm when it was more appropriate for it to be managed by Treasury and TfNSW. If these agencies had communicated more effectively, used available governance structures consistently, and shared information openly about their use of the firm and the nature of their respective engagements, these disputes might have been avoided. This issue, coupled with deficiencies in procurement by both agencies, reflected and further perpetuated the lack of cohesion in the design and implementation of TAHE.
More broadly, over the period 2014 – 2021, 16 separate consulting firms were employed to work on 36 contracts, valued at over $22.56 million, relating to TAHE ranging from accounting and legal advice, project management, and the provision of administrative support and secretariat services.
Consultants are legitimately used by agencies to provide advice on how to achieve the outcomes determined by government, including advising agencies on the risks and challenges in achieving those outcomes. Similarly, consultants can provide expert knowledge in the service of achieving those outcomes and managing the risks. However, the heavy reliance on consulting firms during the design and implementation of TAHE heightened the risk that agencies were not receiving value for money, were outsourcing tasks that should be performed by the public service, and did not mitigate the risk that the advice received was not objective and impartial. The risk that the role of consultants could have been blurred between providing independent advice to government on options and facilitating a pre-determined outcome was not effectively treated or mitigated. This risk was amplified because a small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on one topic. The effective procurement and management of consultants is an obligation of government agencies.
Appendix two – Classification of government entities
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #372 - released 24 January 2023
Transport and Infrastructure 2022
What the report is about
Result of the Transport and Infrastructure cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.
What we found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Transport and Infrastructure cluster agencies' financial statements.
An 'other matter' paragraph was included in TAHE's Independent Auditor's Report for its 30 June 2022 financial statements which draws attention to Transport and Asset Holding Entity's (TAHE) reliance on government-funded customers.
We included an ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraph in the Independent Auditor’s Report for State Transit Authority of New South Wales’ (the authority) 30 June 2022 financial statements, which draws attention to the financial statements being prepared on a liquidation basis as the authority’s principal activities ceased operations on 3 April 2022.
What the key issues were
The 2021–22 audits identified five high-risk findings:
- detailed business modelling to support returns from TAHE
- valuation of assets at TAHE
- control of assets at TAHE
- accounting and valuation of tree assets at Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust and Parramatta Park Trust.
Access and licence fees - TAHE
Revised commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, the operators and Transport for NSW on 23 June 2022 to reflect increased access and licence fees detailed in the 18 December 2021 Heads of Agreement.
TAHE’s ability to generate the expected return of 2.5% based on the current modelling is heavily reliant on the government funding the public rail operators (TAHE's customers).
There are risks that:
- TAHE will not be able to recontract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
- future governments' funding to TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
- TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.
Valuation of assets - TAHE
Although TAHE's selected valuation of assets falls within an acceptable range, there remains a significant gap between what has been assessed as an acceptable range and TAHE's range.
What we recommended
Control of assets - TAHE
While we accepted TAHE’s position on control for the current year, NSW Treasury and TAHE should continue to monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in future reporting periods. TAHE must continue to demonstrate control of its assets or the current accounting presentation would need to be reconsidered.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport and Infrastructure cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster (the cluster) for 2022.
Section highlights
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Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.
Section highlights
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Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Health 2022
What the report is about
Result of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.
What we found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for the financial statements for all Health cluster agencies.
The COVID-19 pandemic continued to increase the complexity and number of accounting matters faced by the cluster. The total gross value of corrected misstatements in 2021–22 was $353.3 million, of which $186.7 million related to an increase in the impairment provision for Rapid Antigen Tests (RATs).
A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Annual Prudential Compliance Statement related to five residential aged care facilities. There were 20 instances (19 in 2020–21) of non-compliance with the prudential responsibilities within the Aged Care Act 1997.
What the key issues were
The total number of matters we reported to management across the cluster decreased from 116 in 2020–21 to 67 in 2021–22. Of the 67 issues raised, four were high risk (three in 2020-21) and 37 were moderate risk (57 in 2020–21). Nearly half of all control deficiencies reported in 2021–22 were repeat issues.
Three unresolved high-risk issues were:
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COVID-19 inventories impairment – we continued to identify issues relating to management’s impairment model which relies on anticipated future consumption patterns. RATs had not been assessed for impairment.
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Asset capitalisation threshold – management has not reviewed the appropriateness of the asset capitalisation threshold since 2006.
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Forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records – we continued to observe unapproved rosters being finalised by system administrators so payroll can be processed on time. 2.6 million time records were processed in this way in 2021–22.
What we recommended
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COVID-19 inventories impairment – ensure consumption patterns are supported by relevant data and plans.
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Assets capitalisation threshold – undertake further review of the appropriateness of applying a $10,000 threshold before capitalising expenditure on property, plant and equipment.
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Forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records – develop a methodology to quantify the potential monetary value of unapproved rosters being finalised.
This report provides Parliament and other users of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
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financial reporting
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audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster (the cluster) for 2022.
Section highlights
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Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.
Section highlights
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Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Premier and Cabinet 2022
What the report is about
Result of the Premier and Cabinet cluster financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.
What we found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies.
The machinery of government changes within the Premier and Cabinet cluster resulted in the transfer of net assets of $1 billion from the Department of Premier and Cabinet.
The Department of Premier and Cabinet, Public Service Commission and Parliamentary Counsel's Office accepted changes to their office leasing arrangements managed by Property NSW. These changes resulted in the collective de-recognition of $167.3 million of right-of-use assets, $225.1 million in lease liabilities and recognition of $47.8 million of other gains/losses.
What the key issues were
The number of issues we reported to management decreased.
Forty per cent of issues were repeated from the prior year.
Four moderate risk issues were reported in the management letters for Department of Premier and Cabinet and New South Wales Electoral Commission. Three out of the four moderate risk issues were repeat issues.
The repeat issues related to internal control deficiencies in agencies' including lack of updated procurement policies and procedures and information technology general controls.
Fast facts
The Premier and Cabinet cluster comprises seven agencies, delivering the government's objectives and facilitating stewardship of the public service.
- $0.2b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2022
- $3b total expenditure incurred in 2021–22
- 100% unqualified audit opinions issued on agencies’ 30 June 2022 financial statements
- 4 moderate risk findings identified
- 15 monetary misstatements reported in 2021–22
- 40% of reported issues were repeat issues
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Premier and Cabinet’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster for 2022.
Section highlights
|
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster.
Section highlights
|
Appendix one – Early close procedures
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Audit Insights 2018-2022
What the report is about
In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.
This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.
The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.
The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.
The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.
What we found
Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:
- Integrity and transparency
- Performance and monitoring
- Governance and oversight
- Cyber security and data
- System planning for disruption
- Resource management.
The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.
In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.
The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.
A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.
Fast facts
- 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
- 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
- 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.
I am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.
The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.
A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.
However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.
While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.
Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales
| Integrity and transparency | Performance and monitoring | Governance and oversight | Cyber security and data | System planning | Resource management |
| Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. | Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. | The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. | Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. | Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. | Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest. |
| Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. | Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. | Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. | In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. | Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. | Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds. |
| Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. | Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. | Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. | Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. | Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. | Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office. |
| Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. | Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. | Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues. | Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need. | ||
| Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes. | |||||
| Read more | Read more | Read more | Read more | Read more | Read more |
This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.
- Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
- Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
- Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.
This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.
The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.
This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.
Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022
Appendix two – About this report
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
