Reports
Workers compensation claims management
What this report is about
Workers compensation schemes in NSW provide compulsory workplace injury insurance. The effective management of workers compensation is important to ensure injured workers are provided with prompt support to ensure timely, safe and sustainable return to work.
Insurance and Care NSW (icare) manages workers compensation insurance. The State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) regulates workers compensation schemes. NSW Treasury has a stewardship role but does not directly manage the schemes.
This audit assessed the effectiveness and economy of icare’s management of workers compensation claims, and the effectiveness of SIRA’s oversight of workers compensation claims.
Findings
icare is implementing major reforms to its approach to workers compensation claims management - but it is yet to demonstrate if these changes are the most effective or economical way to improve outcomes.
icare’s planning and assurance processes for its reforms have not adequately assessed existing claims models or analysed other reform options.
icare's activities have not focused enough on its core responsibilities of improving return to work and maintaining financial sustainability.
SIRA has improved the effectiveness of its workers compensation regulatory activities in recent years. Prior to 2019, SIRA was mostly focussed on developing regulatory frameworks and was less active in its supervision of workers compensation schemes.
NSW Treasury's role in relation to workers compensation has been unclear, which has limited its support for performance improvements.
Recommendations
icare should:
- Ensure that its annual Statement of Business Intent clearly sets out its approach to achieving its legislative objectives.
- Monitor and evaluate its workers compensation scheme reforms.
- Develop a quality assurance program to ensure insurance claim payments are accurate.
NSW Treasury should:
- Work with relevant agencies to improve public sector workers compensation scheme outcomes.
- Engage with the icare Board to ensure icare's management is in line with relevant NSW Treasury policies.
SIRA should:
- Address identified gaps in its fraud investigation.
- Develop a co-ordinated research strategy.
Read the PDF report
Parliamentary reference - Report number #393 - released 2 April 2024
Effectiveness of SafeWork NSW in exercising its compliance functions
What this report is about
This report assesses how effectively SafeWork NSW, a part of the Department of Customer Service (DCS), has performed its regulatory compliance functions for work health and safety in New South Wales.
The report includes a case study examining SafeWork NSW's management of a project to develop a realtime monitoring device for airborne silica in workplaces.
Findings
There is limited transparency about SafeWork NSW's effectiveness as a regulator. The limited performance information that is available is either subsumed within DCS reporting (or other sources) and is focused on activity, not outcomes.
As a work health and safety (WHS) regulator, SafeWork NSW lacks an effective strategic and data-driven approach to respond to emerging WHS risks.
It was slow to respond to the risk of respirable crystalline silica in manufactured stone.
SafeWork NSW is constrained by an information management system that is over 20 years old and has passed its effective useful life.
While it has invested effort into ensuring consistent regulatory decisions, SafeWork NSW needs to maintain a focus on this objective, including by ensuring that there is a comprehensive approach to quality assurance.
SafeWork NSW's engagement of a commercial partner to develop a real-time silica monitoring device did not comply with key procurement obligations.
There was ineffective governance and process to address important concerns about the accuracy of the real-time silica monitoring device.
As such, SafeWork NSW did not adequately manage potential WHS risks.
Recommendations
The report recommended that DCS should:
- ensure there is an independent investigation into the procurement of the research partner for the real-time silica detector
- embed a formal process to review and set its annual regulatory priorities
- publish a consolidated performance report
- set long-term priorities, including for workforce planning and technology uplift
- improve its use of data, and start work to replace its existing complaints handling system
- review its risk culture and its risk management framework
- review the quality assurance measures that support consistent regulatory decisions
Read the PDF report.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #390 - released 27 February 2024
Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity
What the report is about
The Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) is the State's custodian of rail assets. It is a state owned corporation and commenced operating on 1 July 2020.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. We audited TAHE, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and NSW Treasury.
Separate and related audits on TAHE are reported in 'State Finances 2022', 'State Finances 2021' and 'Transport and Infrastructure 2022' reports.
What we found
The design and implementation of TAHE, which spanned seven years, was not effective.
The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to support an accounting treatment to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments.
The benefits of TAHE were claimed in the 2015–16 NSW Budget before the enabling legislation was passed by Parliament in 2017. This committed the agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, regardless of any challenges that arose.
Rail safety arrangements were a priority throughout TAHE's design and implementation, and risks were raised and addressed.
Agencies relied heavily on consultants on matters related to the creation of TAHE, but failed to effectively manage these engagements. Agencies failed to ensure that consultancies delivered independent advice as an input to decision-making. A small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on the same topic. The final cost of TAHE-related consultancies was $22.6 million compared to the initial estimated cost of $12.9 million.
What we recommended
We recommended that the audited agencies should:
- improve accountability and transparency for major new fiscal transformation initiatives
- ensure entities do not reflect the financial impact of significant initiatives in the Budget when there is uncertainty, or it creates perverse incentives
- review record keeping practices, systems and policies to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998, and the NSW Government Information Classification, Labelling and Handling Guidelines
- review procurement policies to ensure that consultant use complies with all NSW Government policy requirements.
The NSW Government established the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE), a statutory State Owned Corporation (SOC), on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner – RailCorp. It is the State's custodian of rail network assets, including rail tracks and other infrastructure, rolling stock, land, train stations and facilities, retail space, and signal and power systems, within metropolitan and regional New South Wales. It is responsible for $2.8 billion of major capital projects in 2022–23.
TAHE was established under Part 2 of the Transport Administration Act 1988 and is governed by a decision-making board. The Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Employee Relations are the Shareholding Ministers of TAHE, and they annually agree performance expectations articulated in a Statement of Corporate Intent.
Whereas TAHE is the custodian of rail assets, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains operate public rail services. TAHE does not have responsibility for the operation of the heavy rail network or train services, nor does it have network control functions. TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster in the public sector (formerly the Transport cluster and renamed in April 2022), which also includes Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW (TfNSW).
TfNSW leads the Transport and Infrastructure cluster. Its role is to set the strategic direction for transport across the State. This involves the shaping of planning, policy, strategy, regulation, resource allocation and other service and non-service delivery functions for all modes of transport.
TAHE's Operating Licence is granted by the Portfolio Minister and authorises the entity to perform the functions required to acquire, develop, finance, divest and hold assets, pursuant to the Transport Administration Act 1988. The Portfolio Minister also issues a Statement of Expectations which outlines the government’s expectation for the business for the next three to five years.
TAHE's original Portfolio Minister was the Minister for Transport who approved, on 30 June 2020, the issuing of an interim 12-month Operating Licence to enable TAHE to commence operating on 1 July 2020. The Portfolio Minister then granted TAHE's current Operating Licence in 2021. After TAHE requested a 12-month extension to its current Operating Licence, its next Operating Licence is due on 1 July 2024. The current Portfolio Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure, Cities and Active Transport.
About this audit
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. In making this assessment, we considered whether:
- the process of designing and implementing TAHE was cohesive and transparent, and delivered an effective outcome
- agencies' roles and responsibilities were clear in the planning of TAHE
- agencies effectively identified and managed certain risks.
Conclusion
The design and implementation of TAHE was not effective. The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments to sustain TAHE through continuing investment, and funding of the state owned rail operators. The ineffective process to design TAHE delivered a model that entails significant uncertainty as to whether the anticipated longer-term financial improvements to the Budget position can be achieved or sustained.
NSW Treasury and TfNSW had different objectives for TAHE
Up to June 2013, RailCorp had been the owner and operator of rail services and maintainer of the metropolitan rail network for almost a decade. It had been operating as a not-for-profit Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC).
In 2012, NSW Treasury (hereafter Treasury) decided there was a risk that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) would reclassify RailCorp to the General Government Sector (GGS), meaning depreciation expenses of approximately $870 million would be reflected in the GGS Budget. Treasury wanted to avoid this impact on the GGS Budget, and considered the establishment of a transport asset holding entity as a means to do so. Capital grants to RailCorp were being treated as an expense to the GGS Budget.
TfNSW also wanted an asset holding entity – but one that would be a non-trading ‘shell’ company with no staff that would hold and manage all public transport assets. TfNSW's concept envisaged the entity would have a structure that would enable future public transport reforms and strategic directions while ensuring vertical integration of operations between asset owners and the rail operators to maintain rail safety.
However, Treasury pursued its objective to improve the GGS Budget result, and sought to expand on TfNSW's 'shell' asset holding entity concept. Treasury wanted an entity that could generate a return on investment, as this meant that government investment in transport assets could be treated as equity investments, rather than a Budget expense, and in turn improve the GGS Budget position. As an example of the potential impact of creating this new entity, capital grants of $2.3 billion were paid to RailCorp in 2013–14. If Treasury's objective was met, grants of this significance would then be treated as an equity investment, rather than an expense in the GGS Budget.
In 2017, Treasury's preferred option was progressed through legislation, but both agencies' central objectives for the proposed asset holding entity would continue to prove difficult to reconcile. To achieve Treasury's objective to improve the Budget result, the entity would need to generate a return on investment (this is further discussed below). However, TfNSW expressed concerns that the prioritisation of rail safety, and the effective management of governance, regulation and operations would be more complex in an entity with commercial imperatives.
Asset holding entities are a common approach to the management of transport assets in Australia and internationally, and there are a range of approaches to how they are structured and used. Such structures should be driven by the goal of improved asset management. Ultimately, TfNSW's objectives could have been delivered through a simpler entity structure. However, reconciling TfNSW's objectives with Treasury's imperative to deliver and justify a Budget improvement in the short-term resulted in an overly lengthy process and an unnecessarily complex outcome that places an obligation on future governments to sustain. There is still significant uncertainty as to whether the short-term improvements to the Budget can continue to be realised in the longer-term.
The Budget benefits of TAHE were claimed before the entity was legislated, committing the agencies to deliver, regardless of the complexities that subsequently arose
The 2015–16 GGS Budget treated the government's investment in TAHE (still known at this time as RailCorp) as an equity contribution. This had the immediate impact of improving the Budget result by $1.8 billion per annum. However, the legislation to enable the establishment of TAHE had not yet been passed by Parliament, key elements of the operating model were still under development, and imminent changes in accounting standards had the potential to impact TAHE's financial model. The decision to book the benefits in the Budget early committed the involved agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, irrespective of the challenges that arose.
TAHE's financial structure requires circular government investment to work
For the NSW Government to continue to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution, rather than an expense to the Budget, there must be a reasonable expectation that TAHE will generate a sufficient rate of return as required by the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) framework. In doing so, it needs to recover a revaluation loss created by a $20.3 billion reduction in the value of its assets which was incurred in its first full year of operation. This loss occurred as a result of a revaluation of TAHE's assets when RailCorp (a not-for profit entity) became TAHE (a for-profit commercial entity) – and is discussed further in the 'Key findings' below.
TAHE generates a small portion of its income from transactions with the private sector but, as noted in our report 'State Finances 2021', TAHE receives the majority of its revenue (more than 80%) from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. Both of these entities are funded by grants (a Budget expense) to TfNSW from the GGS Budget.
Based on Treasury’s correspondence with the ABS in 2015, TAHE was initially expected to pay a return on equity of 7% in 2016–17. The assumption of a 7% return persisted through to 2018, after the legislation enabling the establishment of TAHE was passed by Parliament. However, when the initial access and licence fees were agreed on 1 July 2020, this figure had been revised to an expected rate of return of 1.5% excluding the revaluation loss. This was below the long-term inflation target and did not include the recovery of the revaluation loss – risking the government's ability to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution. Importantly, as TAHE is primarily reliant on fees paid by the state owned rail operators that, in turn, are funded by the GGS Budget (as an expense), the decision to change the returns model from 7% to 1.5% would in its own right have had a positive impact on the GGS Budget. However, the decision to use a 1.5% return would ultimately be problematic as it made it difficult to treat the government's contributions to TAHE as an equity investment, as discussed below.
On 14 December 2021, to avoid a qualified audit opinion, the NSW Government made the decision to increase TAHE's expected rate of return to 2.5%, equal to the Reserve Bank’s long-term inflation target.
In 2021-22, TAHE needed to start charging rail operators higher access and licence fees in order to generate a return of 2.5%, so as to support the government's treatment of its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution in the GGS Budget. This meant the government needed to provide additional grant (expense) funding to the state owned rail operators so they could pay the increased access and licence fees to TAHE. Based on current projections, TAHE is not expected to recover the revaluation loss until 2046.
There remains a risk that TAHE will not be able to generate a sufficient return on the NSW Government's investment without relying on increased funding to state owned rail operators so that they can in turn pay the higher access and licence fees. TAHE's ability to generate returns on government investment from other sources are uncertain and may not be achievable or sustainable. Current modelling highlights that TAHE remains largely reliant, through to 2046, on increasing fees (which are assumed to increase at 2.5% per annum from 2031 onwards when the current 10 year contracts with rail operators expire) paid by the state owned rail operators that remain principally reliant on GGS Budget grants.
The process of designing and implementing TAHE was not transparent to independent scrutiny
Our report 'State Finances 2021' commented that Treasury did not always provide this Office with information relating to TAHE on a timely basis. Similarly, during this performance audit, there were also multiple instances where auditees were unable to provide documentation regarding key activities in the process to deliver TAHE. Agencies also applied higher sensitivity classifications to large tranches of documents than was justified or required by policy. Of particular concern is the incorrect classification of documents as Cabinet sensitive information. The incorrect or over-classification of documentation as Cabinet sensitive delayed this Office's ability to provide scrutiny or independent assurance.
There was a lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of governance structures set up to oversee the design and implementation of TAHE
From 2014, multiple workstreams and advisory committees were established to progress the design and implementation of TAHE. For some of these committees and workstreams, there is limited information on what they were tasked to do and what they achieved. Most had ceased meeting by 2018, before significant work needed to deliver TAHE was completed.
The lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of these governance structures reduced opportunities for TfNSW and Treasury to reconcile their differing objectives for TAHE, and resolve key questions earlier in the process.
There was a heavy reliance on consulting firms throughout the process to establish TAHE, and the management of consultant engagements failed to ensure that agencies received independent advice to support objective decision-making
In 2020, Treasury and TfNSW failed to prevent, identify, or adequately manage a conflict of interest when they engaged the same 'Big 4' consulting firm to work on separate TAHE-related projects. Both agencies used the firm's work to further their respective views with regard to the financial implications of TAHE's operating model. At this time those views were still unreconciled.
Treasury engaged the firm to provide a fiscal risk management strategy and advice on the impact of changes to accounting standards. TfNSW engaged the same firm to develop operating and financial models for TAHE, which raised concerns regarding the viability of TAHE. Disputes arose around the findings of these reports. Treasury disagreed with some of the outcomes of the work commissioned by TfNSW, relating to accounting treatment and fiscal advice.
The management of this conflict (real or perceived) was left to the 'Big 4' consulting firm when it was more appropriate for it to be managed by Treasury and TfNSW. If these agencies had communicated more effectively, used available governance structures consistently, and shared information openly about their use of the firm and the nature of their respective engagements, these disputes might have been avoided. This issue, coupled with deficiencies in procurement by both agencies, reflected and further perpetuated the lack of cohesion in the design and implementation of TAHE.
More broadly, over the period 2014 – 2021, 16 separate consulting firms were employed to work on 36 contracts, valued at over $22.56 million, relating to TAHE ranging from accounting and legal advice, project management, and the provision of administrative support and secretariat services.
Consultants are legitimately used by agencies to provide advice on how to achieve the outcomes determined by government, including advising agencies on the risks and challenges in achieving those outcomes. Similarly, consultants can provide expert knowledge in the service of achieving those outcomes and managing the risks. However, the heavy reliance on consulting firms during the design and implementation of TAHE heightened the risk that agencies were not receiving value for money, were outsourcing tasks that should be performed by the public service, and did not mitigate the risk that the advice received was not objective and impartial. The risk that the role of consultants could have been blurred between providing independent advice to government on options and facilitating a pre-determined outcome was not effectively treated or mitigated. This risk was amplified because a small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on one topic. The effective procurement and management of consultants is an obligation of government agencies.
Appendix two – Classification of government entities
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #372 - released 24 January 2023
Destination NSW's support for major events
This report focuses on whether Destination NSW (DNSW) can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money.
The audit found that DNSW’s processes for assessing and evaluating the major events it funds are mostly effective, but its public reporting does not provide enough transparency.
DNSW provides clear information to event organisers seeking funding and has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail.
DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. However, DNSW’s internal reporting to its key decision‑makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate.
The Auditor-General made four recommendations to DNSW, aimed at improving the transparency of its activities, improving the documentation of decisions and certain compliance matters, and streamlining its approach to assessing and evaluating events that receive smaller amounts of funding.
Destination NSW (DNSW) provides funding to attract a range of major events to New South Wales, including high-profile professional sports matches and tournaments, musicals, art and museum exhibitions, and participation-focused events such as festivals and sports events that members of the public can enter. The NSW Government's rationale for providing funding is to encourage event organisers to hold events in New South Wales, and to ensure that events held in New South Wales maximise the potential for attracting overseas and interstate visitors.
This audit assessed whether DNSW can demonstrate that its support for major events achieves value for money. In making this assessment, the audit examined whether:
- DNSW effectively assesses proposals to support major events
- DNSW effectively evaluates the impact of its support for major events.
This audit focused on DNSW's work to attract major events to New South Wales. It did not assess DNSW's tourism promotion or development work, which includes developing tourism strategies, marketing and advertising campaigns, national and international partnerships, and regional programs.
ConclusionDestination NSW's processes for assessing event applications and evaluating its support for major events are mostly effective. DNSW's internal systems allow it to know whether its decisions are achieving value for money. Its public reporting does not provide enough information about its activities and their outcomes, although it is consistent with that of equivalent organisations in other Australian jurisdictions. DNSW's process for assessing applications for funding from organisers of major events is mostly effective. Clear information is provided to event organisers seeking funding, and DNSW has a comprehensive methodology for conducting detailed event assessments. However, the reasons for decisions to progress events from the initial assessment to the detailed assessment stage are not documented in sufficient detail. DNSW has a framework for disclosure and monitoring staff conflicts of interest. However, its forms for staff to disclose conflicts of interest on specific events they are working on are ambiguous. DNSW's management of gifts and benefits broadly complies with the minimum standards set by the Public Service Commission, but there are some gaps in its implementation of these. DNSW conducts an evaluation of each major event it supports. DNSW articulates expected outcomes in contracts with event organisers and uses a sound methodology to evaluate events. Internal reporting to its key decision-makers, including the CEO, the Board and the Minister is appropriate. However, DNSW does not publish detailed information about the events it funds or the outcomes of these events. This means that members of the public are unable to see whether its activities achieve value for money. |
Appendix one – Response from Destination NSW
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright Notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #332 - released 9 April 2020.
Government Advertising 2017-18
The State Insurance Regulatory Authority’s (SIRA) ‘green slip refund’ campaign, and the TAFE semester one 2018 student recruitment campaign, complied with most requirements of the Government Advertising Act 2011 and the Government Advertising Guidelines, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether a government agency or agencies has carried out activities in relation to government advertising in an effective, economical and efficient manner and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines).
This audit examined two campaigns conducted in 2017–18:
- the 'Green slip refund' campaign run by the State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA)
- the semester one component of the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' run by the NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE).
Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.
The State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) conducted the 'Green slip refund' campaign between March and June 2018. SIRA ran this campaign to raise awareness of the Compulsory Third Party (CTP) refunds and reforms after the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 commenced in December 2017. SIRA's view is that the reforms include a reduced cost for CTP insurance, benefits for at-fault drivers, reduced opportunity for fraud and attempts to lower insurance company profits. Green slip holders are also able to claim partial refunds on their 2017 green slip insurance premium. The campaign aimed to make green slip holders aware of the refunds available, encourage them to claim online and to inform people about the changes to the green slip scheme. The campaign focused on the first two of these objectives. The total cost of the campaign was $1.9 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.
Campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act
Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:
- be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
- contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
- contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.
The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.
Before the start of the campaign, SIRA conducted a survey which asked people whether they agreed ‘that the NSW Government is helping to reduce the cost of living by making positive reforms to:
- reduce the cost of green slips
- reduce the cost of health insurance
- increase the number of jobs
- increase investment in the state.'
SIRA's initial submission to peer review listed one of the campaign objectives as improving the perception of the government as a positive reformer. DPC advised SIRA that this should not be included. SIRA removed this objective.
Even though SIRA appropriately removed this objective, the post-campaign evaluation still measured agreement with the above statements, three of which did not relate to this campaign or SIRA's responsibilities. SIRA advised that these three additional statements were included to provide a broader context for any change in the green slip campaign survey results. For example, if all four measures reported an increase in positive responses of roughly the same size, then the increase may have been due to factors other than the advertising campaign.
This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation, which should measure the success of the campaign against its stated objectives. The Guidelines list the purposes that government advertising may serve and none of these relate to improving the perception of the government. The inclusion of the above questions in SIRA's post-campaign evaluation creates a risk that the results may be used for party political purposes.
The campaign met most targets, however some were not challenging to achieve
The post-campaign evaluation demonstrated that the campaign met the targets for 12 of its 13 objectives including the targets relating to raising awareness of the refunds and the proportion of people claiming their refunds online. A fourteenth objective, the percentage of people aware that they should contact SIRA after a road accident injury, did not have a target set, meaning that it is not possible to say whether the campaign had the desired impact in this case.
In August 2017, before the campaign commenced, SIRA conducted a survey to determine the baselines for some of its objectives. This is a good practice to support an effective post campaign evaluation process. The survey found that 20 per cent of people were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA's objective was to raise this to 25 per cent, which represents a small gain relative to the proposed campaign expenditure. The campaign aimed for 40 per cent of motorists to be aware of refunds, which is very low given that this was the primary focus of the campaign. SIRA followed the advice of its survey provider when setting these targets.
In the survey carried out after the campaign, 66 per cent of people were aware of the availability of green slip refunds for most motorists. The campaign also aimed to get 83 per cent of motorists to claim their refunds via online channels. It met this target, with a total of 84 per cent. Finally, 62 per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. This result is discussed further below.
The overall target for total number of refunds claimed is 85 per cent of eligible drivers, that is to say CTP holders. SIRA will evaluate the results of this objective after the conclusion of the refund period in June 2019.
The campaign did little to inform the public about the broader green slip reforms
One objective of the green slip refund campaign was to inform the public about the green slip reforms. The final campaign creative material focused almost entirely on the green slip refunds rather than the range of other reforms. This was because the peer review raised concerns that the creative material was attempting to deliver too many messages.
The campaign submission stated that the advertising campaign would raise awareness of the broader reforms to the CTP scheme, citing several examples such as reduced opportunities for fraud and reduced insurer profits. SIRA also advised the Minister for Finance, Services and Property that secondary messaging in the campaign would benefit public understanding of the reforms.
Some of the television and radio advertisements referred to ‘more protection’ or ‘better protection’ for people injured on New South Wales roads, however advertisements did not refer to other elements of the reforms. Other campaign creative materials contained messages solely relating to the green slip refund and made no further reference to the broader reforms. SIRA used other communication channels, such as giving wallet cards to health service providers, to spread these messages to people, particularly those who had been injured.
Sixty two per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA asked these people which benefits they associated with the reforms. The results of this survey are in Exhibit 4. Seventy-one per cent of this sample identified the reduced costs of green slips as one of the changes, but awareness of other elements of the reforms remains low. Though 29 per cent of people perceive the reforms to make the green slip scheme ‘fairer’, no more than 15 per cent of people could list a specific benefit which did not relate to insurance prices.
| Perceived benefit | Percentage aware of this benefit |
|---|---|
| Reduced costs of green slips for vehicle owners | 71% |
| A fairer scheme for all people | 29% |
| Reduced costs of comprehensive vehicle insurance | 20% |
| Better support for people injured on our roads | 15% |
| Less chances of fraudulent claims | 15% |
| Lowering insurance company profits | 13% |
| Quicker payment of claims to injured people | 10% |
Another campaign target was to ensure that people understood that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury. None of the campaign creative materials contained this information. SIRA did some limited work to inform the public about this through its social media channels. One of the pieces of creative material directed the reader to SIRA's website for further information on the reforms, which contained this information. During the campaign period, there was an increase in the number of calls received by SIRA's CTP Assist phone line. However, in the post-campaign evaluation, only two per cent of surveyed people identified that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury.
The media plan allowed sufficient time for cost-efficient media placement
During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.
SIRA allowed sufficient time between the completion of the peer review process and the commencement of the first advertising. SIRA signed the agreement with the approved Media Agency Services provider eight weeks before the campaign started, meaning that it could achieve cost-efficient media placement for all types of media used in this campaign.
SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier, making it difficult to demonstrate value for money
SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier to procure the campaign's creative material. A direct negotiation occurs when an agency negotiates with a proponent without first undergoing a competitive process. It is difficult to demonstrate value for money using direct negotiation due to the lack of competition.
ICAC's 'Guidelines for managing risks in direct negotiations' (ICAC Guidelines) provide guidance on how to undertake direct negotiations. SIRA has a direct negotiation checklist that aligns to the ICAC Guidelines. The SIRA checklist advises that staff should confirm that existing New South Wales prequalification schemes cannot provide the procurement before undertaking a direct negotiation. SIRA did not do this.
To procure creative materials, agencies can access the Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme (the prequalification scheme). Using the prequalification scheme allows agencies to quickly seek quotes from suppliers who have a demonstrated track record and expertise. While agencies are not required to use the prequalification scheme, the NSW Procurement Board advises that agencies should use prequalification schemes where they are available to promote competition.
By using direct negotiation when the prequalification scheme was available, and by not seeking quotes from other suppliers, SIRA was acting in a way that reduced competition. This increases the risk that SIRA did not achieve value for money in its procurement of creative materials.
SIRA advised that it sought to ensure value for money by comparing the quote from its selected supplier with the amount spent on creative materials in other campaigns of similar size. SIRA did not document this analysis at the time or include it as part of the briefing note staff used to seek approval for undertaking direct negotiation. As a result, decision-makers were not fully informed when approving this engagement.
SIRA reported in a briefing note that it engaged in direct negotiations because:
- it believed that the original timeframe did not allow for a competitive tender process
- the supplier had done previous work on a related campaign for SIRA
- the supplier provided sample work which received positive feedback from focus groups.
In July 2017, when peer review commenced, SIRA planned to launch the campaign in November 2017 to coincide with the beginning of the green slip reforms. SIRA believed that this timeframe was narrow enough to warrant entering direct negotiations. The ICAC Guidelines advise that a narrow timeframe is not a valid reason to enter into a direct negotiation. In late October 2017, the campaign launch was delayed until March 2018 to stagger the demand on the resources of Service NSW, which is administering the refund.
The ICAC Guidelines also advise against re-appointing a supplier because it has performed previous work. Instead, agencies could consider previous experience as one of several factors when deciding between quotes. In cases where an agency asks a supplier to provide sample work, the ICAC Guidelines advise that agencies should request sample work from multiple potential suppliers to promote competition.
The campaign's cost benefit analysis complied with the Act and Guidelines
The Act requires a cost benefit analysis (CBA) for any government advertising campaign likely to exceed $1.0 million in value. Section six of the Guidelines set out the requirements for a government advertising CBA. The campaign's CBA complied with the requirements of the Act and the Guidelines.
The campaign CBA could have demonstrated further cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.
The cluster Secretary signed the compliance certificate instead of the head of SIRA
The Act requires the head of the agency running the campaign to sign a compliance certificate.
The Secretary of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, the cluster to which SIRA belongs, signed the campaign's compliance certificate. However, section 17(2) of the State Insurance and Care Governance Act 2015 states that SIRA is ‘for the purposes of any Act, a NSW Government agency.’ Given this, the Chief Executive of SIRA was responsible for signing the compliance certificate for this campaign.
This is a minor non-compliance with the Act because the Chief Executive had reviewed the campaign and recommended that the Secretary sign the compliance certificate.
The NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE) ran the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' from November 2017 to September 2018. The aim of the campaign was to assist TAFE in achieving its 2018 student enrolment target by improving the perception of TAFE's brand and generating student enquiries. This is the first state-wide campaign run by TAFE operating under the One TAFE model. Previously, each TAFE Institute ran its own campaigns. The total budget of the campaign was $19.5 million. This audit examined only the semester one 2018 component of the campaign, which ran from November 2017 to April 2018 at a total cost of $9.5 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.
TAFE was able to place most of its campaign media within cost-efficient timeframes. TAFE also achieved efficiencies by re-using many creative materials from a previous campaign.
The campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act
Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:
- be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
- contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
- contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.
The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.
The campaign achieved 16 of 24 objectives, but did not reach its enrolment target
The campaign had 24 objectives which had a target for semester one. TAFE set these targets using a combination of previous experience, corporate objectives and brand surveys.
The overall objective of the combined semester one and two campaigns was to support TAFE achieving its 2018 total enrolment target of 549,636. TAFE's semester one target was 361,350, which it did not achieve. This indicates that the campaign was not fully effective.
The campaign achieved 11 of its 16 output objectives. The output targets related to TAFE's media placements and ability to reach an audience efficiently. TAFE tracked progress against many of the campaign's output objectives daily. TAFE altered its media channels throughout the campaign meaning that some of the output objectives were not met because TAFE decided to focus on alternative media channels. The campaign also achieved all seven of its outcome objectives. The outcome objectives related to changing the public perception of TAFE.
TAFE's initial media plan allowed for efficient media placement
During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.
While TAFE's initial media plan allowed sufficient time between the approval of the campaign and its launch, a delay in receiving final approval for the campaign meant TAFE could not purchase media placements until two months later than planned. Most purchases still remained within DPC's recommended timeframes, but Indigenous television advertisements and metropolitan out of home advertisements both fell outside DPC's recommended time periods by one week. These delays did not impact on TAFE's efficiency.
TAFE re-used many creative materials, achieving some cost-savings
Rather than commissioning new creative materials, TAFE re-used many creative materials from the previous campaign and supplemented these with a selection of new creative materials. TAFE advised that this led to a cost saving of approximately $130,000.
TAFE sought quotes from suppliers on the government's Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme for two creative material contracts. These contracts covered updates to existing materials and a selection of new materials.
The campaign's cost-benefit analysis did not comply with three requirements of the Guidelines
The Act requires an agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) if the cost of an advertising campaign is likely to exceed $1.0 million. The Guidelines set out the requirements of this CBA. TAFE did not comply with three of these requirements, outlined in Exhibit 5.
| 6.2 The cost benefit analysis must isolate the additional costs and benefits attributable to the advertising campaign itself compared to the base-case of not-advertising. 6.3 The cost benefit analysis must specify the extent to which the expected benefits could be achieved without advertising. 6.4 The cost benefit analysis must outline what options other than advertising could be used to successfully implement the program and achieve the program benefits and a comparison of their costs. |
In this circumstance, section 6.2 of the Guidelines required the CBA to identify the number of enrolments TAFE would expect if it did not advertise. TAFE advised us that it is not possible to say what this scenario would look like because there had always been some degree of advertising, however, this argument is not reflected in the CBA.
TAFE used 2017 as the baseline in the CBA. In 2017, TAFE spent $13.2 million on advertising. As such, the CBA was only able to isolate the impact of the increased expenditure rather than the impact of the campaign's entire $19.5 million expenditure. TAFE advised that 2017 had the most reliable state-wide data and this contributed to the decision to use it as the baseline.
During the audit, TAFE sought advice from NSW Treasury regarding whether a 2017 baseline was appropriate and NSW Treasury advised that it was. Regardless, TAFE did not receive this advice prior to writing the CBA and did not put commentary around this in the CBA. This would also not be sufficient for fulfilling the requirements of the Guidelines.
The CBA did not comply with sections 6.3 and 6.4 of the Guidelines. The CBA briefly considered the impact of spending the campaign budget directly on new training courses, however there was no sustained analysis of this option. TAFE staff advised that there are no realistic alternatives to advertising for achieving the campaign's objectives. However we did not see analysis to support this conclusion in documents provided to us.
The campaign CBA could have better demonstrated cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.
TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second
The Guidelines set out rules regarding the content of a government advertising campaign. Exhibit 6 sets out one of the principles with which agencies must comply.
The following principles apply to the style and content of government advertising campaigns:
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TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second.
In some campaign creative material, TAFE claimed that 78 per cent of its own graduates are employed after training (Exhibit 15 in Appendix 2). According to the National Centre for Vocational Education Research, 78 per cent of New South Wales Vocational Education and Training (VET) graduates (i.e. from all training providers) are employed after training. The result for TAFE graduates is 70.4 per cent.
One of the campaign's television advertisements refers to TAFE as ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’. This statement referred to a survey of current TAFE students who were asked where they would consider studying in future: TAFE, University or a private college. The current TAFE students selected TAFE by a large margin. The limited scope of TAFE's student survey and its results do not support the claim that it is ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’.
DPC did not consistently communicate the transitional arrangements for the Brand Guidelines and as such much of TAFE's creative material did not comply at campaign launch
On 7 August 2017, the government released the NSW Government Brand Guidelines (Brand Guidelines), setting out how agencies use the NSW Government logo. The Brand Guidelines replaced the Branding Style Guide which had been in place since September 2015. Some agencies were exempt from using the Branding Style Guide and the introduction of the new Brand Guidelines required these agencies to apply for a new exemption.
TAFE had recently commenced the peer review process for this campaign when the Brand Guidelines were released. TAFE was exempt from the requirements of the Branding Style Guide and as such the material which TAFE was planning to re-use in the new campaign did not contain the NSW Government logo.
Communication about how long agencies had to make themselves compliant with the Brand Guidelines was unclear. On 11 August 2017, the Chair of the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communication and Government Advertising (the Committee) sent a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Industry informing him that the Department must update all its material to be compliant with the Brand Guidelines ‘as soon as practicable within an 18-month transition period’. The Department of Industry advised TAFE that new advertising would need to be immediately compliant, however it was not clear if this included materials which agencies were re-using from previous campaigns. DPC advised the audit team that it expected re-used materials to be compliant when agencies launched new campaigns. DPC provided this advice to some agencies but did not communicate it more broadly. We could not source evidence that DPC provided this advice to TAFE.
DPC ran workshops to explain the transitional arrangements in September 2017 for the changes in the Brand Guidelines, however these did not specifically address the transitional timeframes for new advertising campaigns.
The Department of Industry, on behalf of TAFE, applied to the Committee for approval to co-brand the TAFE logo with the NSW Government logo. This was approved in October 2017. The requirements for co-branding are in Exhibit 7.
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Co-branding partners the agency logo with the NSW Government logo. The NSW Government logo must always be presented as the dominant or lead brand. The Brand Guidelines provide the following template shown below the exhibit box. The NSW Government logo is on the left and the agency logo is placed on the right, with a dividing line between them. |
Appendix one - Responses from agencies
Appendix two - About the campaigns
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #311 - released 18 December 2018
Mobile speed cameras
The primary goal of speed cameras is to reduce speeding and make the roads safer. Our 2011 performance audit on speed cameras found that, in general, speed cameras change driver behaviour and have a positive impact on road safety.
Transport for NSW published the NSW Speed Camera Strategy in June 2012 in response to our audit. According to the Strategy, the main purpose of mobile speed cameras is to reduce speeding across the road network by providing a general deterrence through anywhere, anytime enforcement and by creating a perceived risk of detection across the road network. Fixed and red-light speed cameras aim to reduce speeding at specific locations.
Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW deploy mobile speed cameras (MSCs) in consultation with NSW Police. The cameras are operated by contractors authorised by Roads and Maritime Services. MSC locations are stretches of road that can be more than 20 kilometres long. MSC sites are specific places within these locations that meet the requirements for a MSC vehicle to be able to operate there.
This audit assessed whether the mobile speed camera program is effectively managed to maximise road safety benefits across the NSW road network.
The mobile speed camera program requires improvements to key aspects of its management to maximise road safety benefits. While camera locations have been selected based on crash history, the limited number of locations restricts network coverage. It also makes enforcement more predictable, reducing the ability to provide a general deterrence. Implementation of the program has been consistent with government decisions to limit its hours of operation and use multiple warning signs. These factors limit the ability of the mobile speed camera program to effectively deliver a broad general network deterrence from speeding.
Many locations are needed to enable network-wide coverage and ensure MSC sessions are randomised and not predictable. However, there are insufficient locations available to operate MSCs that meet strict criteria for crash history, operator safety, signage and technical requirements. MSC performance would be improved if there were more locations.
A scheduling system is meant to randomise MSC location visits to ensure they are not predictable. However, a relatively small number of locations have been visited many times making their deployment more predictable in these places. The allocation of MSCs across the time of day, day of week and across regions is prioritised based on crash history but the frequency of location visits does not correspond with the crash risk for each location.
There is evidence of a reduction in fatal and serious crashes at the 30 best-performing MSC locations. However, there is limited evidence that the current MSC program in NSW has led to a behavioural change in drivers by creating a general network deterrence. While the overall reduction in serious injuries on roads has continued, fatalities have started to climb again. Compliance with speed limits has improved at the sites and locations that MSCs operate, but the results of overall network speed surveys vary, with recent improvements in some speed zones but not others.
There is no supporting justification for the number of hours of operation for the program. The rate of MSC enforcement (hours per capita) in NSW is less than Queensland and Victoria. The government decision to use multiple warning signs has made it harder to identify and maintain suitable MSC locations, and impeded their use for enforcement in both traffic directions and in school zones.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #308 - released 18 October 2018
CBD and South East Light Rail Project
Transport for NSW did not effectively plan and procure the CBD and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project to achieve best value for money according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.
Transport for NSW is on track to deliver the project, but it will come at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #278 - released 30 November 2016
Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative
The NSW Government’s ‘program evaluation initiative’, introduced to assess whether service delivery programs achieve expected outcomes and value for money, is largely ineffective according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.
Government services, in areas such as public order and safety, health and education, are delivered by agencies through a variety of programs. In 2016–17, the NSW Government estimates that it will spend over $73 billion on programs to deliver services.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #277 - released 3 November 2016
Red tape reduction
Overall, NSW Government initiatives and processes to prevent and reduce red tape were not effective, according to a report released today by the NSW Auditor-General.
In 2015, the Government reported that its red tape reduction initiatives, implemented between 2011 and 2015, had resulted in $896 million in savings. While these initiatives resulted in some savings, the total value of savings is unknown because estimates for some initiatives were based on unverified assumptions, cost transfers or unrealised projections.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #272 - released 25 August 2016
Cost of Alcohol Abuse to the NSW Government
The NSW Government does not estimate or report the total cost of alcohol abuse. The Audit Office of New South Wales’ sponsored research estimates it costs the government over $1 billion a year, or around $416 from each NSW household.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #235 - released 6 August 2013
