Reports
Actions for Treasury 2023
Treasury 2023
What this report is about
Result of the Treasury portfolio of agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
The results of the audit of the NSW Government’s consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which are prepared by NSW Treasury, will be reported separately in our report on ‘State Finances 2023’.
The audit found
Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all general purpose financial statement audits.
Qualified audit opinions were issued on two of the 24 other engagements prepared by portfolio agencies. These related to payments made from Special Deposit Accounts that did not comply with the relevant legislation.
The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits increased from 29 in 2021–22 to 39 in 2022–23.
The new parental leave policy impacted agencies across all portfolios. NSW Treasury should perform annual assessments to identify changes in legislation and regulation and provide timely guidance to the sector.
Transport for NSW and Sydney Metro have capitalised over $300 million of tender bid costs paid to unsuccessful tender bidders relating to significant infrastructure projects. Whilst NSW Treasury policy provides clarity on the reimbursement of unsuccessful bidders’ costs, clearer guidance on how to account for these costs in agencies’ financial statements is required.
The key audit issues were
Five high-risk issues were reported in 2022–23. Three were new findings on contract management, accounting treatments for workers compensation renewal premium adjustments and the management and oversight of a Special Deposit Account. Two repeat issues referred to the need to improve quality review processes over financial reporting and the timely approval of administration costs.
Portfolio agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Treasury portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Treasury portfolio agencies’ 2022–23 financial statements.
- Two qualified audit opinions were issued on special purpose financial reports, relating to whether payments from the Electricity Retained Interest Corporation – Ausgrid (ERIC-A) Fund and the Electricity Retained Interest Corporation – Endeavour (ERIC-E) Fund, complied with the relevant legislation.
- The total number of errors (both corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased from 29 in 2021–22 to 39 in 2022–23.
Reported corrected misstatements increased from 15 in 2021–22 to 25 with a gross value of $7.1 billion in 2022–23. Reported uncorrected misstatements increased from 13 in 2021–22 to 14 in 2022–23, with a gross value of $277.6 million in 2022–23.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury portfolio.
Section highlights
- Five high-risk issues were reported in 2022–23. Three were new findings on contract management, accounting treatments for workers compensation renewal premium adjustments and the management and oversight of a Special Deposit Account.
- A further 35 moderate risk findings were reported in 2022–23, of which ten were repeat findings.
- Some agencies have again spent monies without an authorised delegation.
- The quality of information provided for audit purposes needs to improve.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
Appendix five – Acquittals and other opinions
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Health 2023
Health 2023
What this report is about
Results of the Health portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
The audit found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Health portfolio agencies' financial statements.
The number of monetary misstatements increased in 2022–23, driven by key accounting issues, including the first-time recognition of paid parental leave and plant and equipment fair value adjustments.
The key audit issues were
NSW Health identified errors regarding the recognition and calculation of long service leave entitlements for employees with ten or more years of service that had periods of part time service in the first ten years, resulting in prior period restatements.
Comprehensive revaluation of buildings at the Graythwaite Charitable Trust found errors in the previous year's valuation, resulting in prior period restatements.
New parental leave legislation increased employee liabilities for portfolio agencies. The Ministry of Health corrected the consolidated financial statements to record parental leave liabilities for all agencies within the Health portfolio.
A repeat high-risk issue relates to processing time records by administrators that have not been reviewed prior to running the pay cycle.
Thirty per cent of reported issues were repeat issues.
The audit recommended
Portfolio agencies should ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards.
Portfolio agencies should address deficiencies that resulted in qualified reports on:
- the design and operation of shared service controls
- prudential non-compliance at residential aged care facilities.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Health portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all portfolio agencies required to prepare general purpose financial statements.
- The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased compared to the prior year.
- The Ministry of Health retrospectively corrected an $18.9 million adjustment in its financial statements relating to long service leave entitlements for certain employees.
- Graythwaite Charitable Trust retrospectively corrected a $4.2 million adjustment in its financial statements related to prior period valuations.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health portfolio.
Section highlights
- The 2022–23 audits identified one high-risk and 57 moderate risk issues across the portfolio.
- The high-risk matter related to the forced-finalisation of time records.
- The total number of findings increased from 67 to 111 in 2022–23.
- Thirty per cent of the issues were repeat issues. Most repeat issues related to internal control deficiencies or non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies.
- Forced-finalisation of time records, accounting for the new paid parental leave provision and user access review deficiencies were the most commonly reported issues.
- Qualified Assurance Practitioner's reports were issued on:
- the design and operation of controls as documented by HealthShare NSW
- the Ministry's Annual Prudential Compliance Statements in relation to residential aged care facilities.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Planning and Environment 2023
Planning and Environment 2023
What this report is about
Results of the Planning and Environment portfolio financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
The audit found
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed Planning and Environment portfolio agencies. Seven audits are ongoing.
The Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) did not comply with its obligations under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) to prepare and submit financial statements for audit.
The Department of Planning and Environment (the department) has not yet provided their assessment of the financial reporting requirements for the 579 Category 2 Statutory Land Managers (SLMs) for 2022–23.
One-hundred-and-nineteen Commons Trusts are non-compliant with the GSF Act as they have not submitted their financial statements for audit.
We issued unqualified opinions on the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation's 2020–21, 2021–22 and 2022–23 financial statements.
The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits decreased from 59 in 2021–22 to 51 in 2022–23, however the gross value of misstatements increased.
The key audit issues were
The former Resilience NSW and NSW Reconstruction Authority (the Authority) re-assessed the accounting implications arising from contractual agreements relating to temporary housing assets associated with the Northern Rivers Temporary Homes Program. This resulted in adjustments to recognise the associated assets and liabilities.
We continue to identify significant deficiencies in NSW Crown land information records.
The department has not been effective in addressing the differing practices for the financial reporting of rural firefighting equipment vested to councils under section 119 (2) of the Rural Fires Act 1997.
The number of findings across the portfolio reported to management increased from 132 in 2021–22 to 140 in 2022–23. Thirty per cent of issues were repeated from the prior year.
Seven high-risk issues were identified. These related to the findings outlined above, deficiencies in quality reviews of asset valuations, internal control processes and IT general controls.
The audit recommended
Recommendations were made to the department and portfolio agencies to address these deficiencies.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Planning and Environment portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
-
financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning and Environment portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
-
Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed 30 June 2023 financial statements audits of portfolio agencies. Seven audits are ongoing.
-
We have been unable to commence audits of the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT). NSW Treasury's position remains that the Catholic CMCT is a controlled entity of the State for financial reporting purposes. This means CMCT is a Government Sector Finance (GSF) agency and is obliged under Section 7.6 of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) to prepare financial statements and submit them to the Auditor-General for audit. To date, CMCT has not met its statutory obligations under the GSF Act.
-
The Department of Planning and Environment has not yet provided their assessment against the reporting exemption requirements in the Government Sector Finance Regulation 2018 (GSF Regulation) for the estimated 579 Category 2 Statutory Land Managers (SLMs) or 119 Commons Trusts for 2022–23 and no Category 2 SLM or Commons Trust has submitted its 2022–23
financial statements for audit. Consequently, the lack of compliance with reporting requirements by these 698 agencies presents a challenge to obtaining reliable financial data for these agencies for the purposes of consolidation to the Total State Sector Accounts.
-
The audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation's (WAMC) financial statements for the years ended 30 June 2021 and 30 June 2022 were completed in June 2023 and unqualified audit opinions issued. The 30 June 2023 audit was completed and an unqualified audit opinion was issued on 12 October 2023.
-
The number of reported corrected misstatements decreased from 46 in 2021–22 to 36, however the gross value of misstatements increased from $73 million in 2021–22 to $491.8 million in 2022–23.
-
Portfolio agencies met the statutory deadline for submitting their 2022–23 early close financial statements and other mandatory procedures.
-
A change to the NSW paid parental leave scheme, effective October 2023, created a new legal obligation that needed to be recognised by impacted government agencies. Impact to the agencies' financial statements were not material.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the portfolio.
Section highlights
-
The number of findings across the portfolio reported to management increased from 132 in 2021–22 to 140 in 2022–23 and 30% were repeat issues (34% in 2021–22).
-
The 2022–23 audits identified seven high-risk and 76 moderate risk issues across the portfolio. Four of the high-risk issues were repeat issues, one was a repeat issue with the risk rating reassessed to high-risk in the current year and two were new findings in 2022–23.
-
The former Resilience NSW and NSW Reconstruction Authority had previously assessed that they did not control the temporary housing assets associated with the administration of the Northern Rivers Temporary Homes Program, under relevant accounting standards. A re-assessment of the agreements was made subsequent to the submission of the Authority’s 2022–23 financial statements for audit, which determined that the Authority was the appropriate NSW Government agency to recognise these assets and associated liabilities not previously recognised by the Authority or the former Resilience NSW.
-
There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department should continue to implement their data strategy and action plan to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate.
-
Since 2017, the Audit Office has recommended that the department, through OLG should address the differing practices for the financial reporting of rural firefighting equipment vested to councils under section 119 (2) of the Rural Fires Act 1997. The department has not been effective in resolving this issue. In 2023, twenty-six of 108 completed audits of councils received qualified audit opinions on their 2023 financial statements (43 of 146 completed audits in 2022). Six councils had their qualifications for not recognising vested rural firefighting equipment removed in 2022–23.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Regional NSW 2023
Regional NSW 2023
What this report is about
Results of the Regional NSW financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
What we found
Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed audits in the Regional NSW portfolio agencies.
The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits increased from 28 in 2021–22 to 30 in 2022–23.
What the key issues were
Effective 1 July 2023, staff employed in the Northern Rivers Reconstruction Corporation Division of the Department of Regional NSW transferred to the NSW Reconstruction Authority Staff Agency.
The Regional NSW portfolio agencies were migrated into a new government wide enterprise resourcing planning system.
The total number of audit management letter findings across the portfolio of agencies decreased from 36 to 23.
A high risk matter was raised for the NSW Food Authority to improve the internal controls in the information technology environment including monitoring and managing privilege user access.
What we recommended
Local Land Services should prioritise completing all mandatory early close procedures.
Portfolio agencies should:
- ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards
- prioritise and address internal control deficiencies identified in audit management letters.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Regional NSW portfolio of agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Regional NSW portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed 30 June 2023 financial statements audits of the portfolio agencies. Two audits are ongoing.
- The total number of errors (including corrected and uncorrected) in the financial statements increased compared to the prior year.
- Portfolio agencies met the statutory deadline for submitting their 2022–23 early close financial statements and other mandatory procedures.
- Portfolio agencies continue to provide financial assistance to communities affected by natural disasters.
- A change to the NSW paid parental leave scheme, effective October 2023, created a new legal obligation that needed to be recognised by impacted government agencies. Impact to the agencies' financial statements were not material.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Regional NSW portfolio.
Section highlights
- The 2022–23 audits identified one high risk and nine moderate risk issues across the portfolio. Of these, one was a moderate risk repeat issue.
- The total number of findings decreased from 36 to 23 which mainly related to deficiencies in internal controls.
- The high risk matter relates to the monitoring and managing of privilege user access at NSW Food Authority.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Management of the Critical Communications Enhancement Program
Management of the Critical Communications Enhancement Program
What the report is about
Effective radio communications are crucial to NSW's emergency services organisations.
The Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP) aims to deliver an enhanced public safety radio network to serve the five emergency services organisations (ESOs), as well as a range of other users.
This report assesses whether the NSW Telco Authority is effectively managing the CCEP.
What we found
Where it has already been delivered (about 50% of the state), the enhanced network meets most of the requirements of ESOs.
The CCEP will provide additional infrastructure for public safety radio coverage in existing buildings agreed to with ESOs. However, radio coverage inside buildings constructed after the CCEP concludes will be at risk because building and fire regulations do not address the need for in-building public safety radio coverage.
Around 98% of radios connected to the network can be authenticated to protect against cloning, though only 42% are.
The NSW Telco Authority has not settled with ESOs on how call encryption will be used across the network. This creates the risk that radio interoperability between ESOs will not be maximised.
When completed, the public safety radio network will be the only mission critical radio network for ESOs. It is unclear whether governance for the ongoing running of the network will allow ESOs to participate in future network operational decisions.
The current estimated capital cost for the NSW Telco Authority to complete the CCEP is $1.293 billion. This is up from an estimated cost of $400 million in 2016. The estimated capital cost was not publicly disclosed until $1.325 billion was shown in the 2021–22 NSW Budget Papers.
We estimate that the full cost to government, including costs to the ESOs, of implementing the enhanced network is likely to exceed $2 billion.
We made recommendations about
- The governance of the enhanced Public Safety Network (PSN) to support agency relationships.
- The need to finalise a Traffic Mitigation Plan for when the network is congested.
- The need to provide advice to the NSW Government about the regulatory gap for ensuring adequate network reach in future buildings.
- The need to clarify how encryption and interoperability will work on the enhanced network.
- The need for the NSW Telco Authority to comply with its policy on Infrastructure Capacity Reservation.
- Expediting measures to protect against the risk of cloning by unauthenticated radios.
Public safety radio networks are critical for operational communications among Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs), which in New South Wales include:
- NSW Ambulance
- Fire and Rescue NSW
- NSW Police Force
- NSW Rural Fire Service
- NSW State Emergency Service.1
Since 1993, these five ESOs have had access to a NSW Government owned and operated radio communications network, the Public Safety Network (PSN), to support their operational communications. Around 60 to 70 other entities also have access to this network, including other NSW government entities, Commonwealth government entities, local councils, community organisations, and utility companies.
Pursuant to the Government Telecommunications Act 2018 ('the Act'), the New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority ('NSW Telco Authority') is responsible for the establishment, control, management, maintenance and operation of the PSN.2
Separate to the PSN, all ESOs and other government entities have historically maintained their own radio communication capabilities and networks. Accordingly, the PSN has been a supplementary source of operational radio communications for these entities.
These other radio networks maintained by ESOs and other entities are of varying size and capability, with many ageing and nearing their end-of-life. There was generally little or no interoperability between networks, infrastructure was often co-located and duplicative, and there were large gaps in geographic coverage.
In 2016, the NSW Telco Authority received dedicated NSW Government funding to commence the Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP).
According to NSW Telco Authority's 2021–22 annual report, the CCEP is a transformation program for operational communications for NSW government agencies. The CCEP '…aims to deliver greater access to public safety standard radio communications for the State’s first responders and essential service agencies'. The objective of CCEP is to consolidate the large number of separate radio networks that are owned and operated by various NSW government entities and to enhance the state’s existing shared PSN. The program also aims to deliver increased PSN coverage throughout New South Wales.
The former NSW Government intended that as the enhanced PSN was progressively rolled-out across NSW, ESOs would migrate their radio communications to the enhanced network, before closing and decommissioning their own networks.
About this Audit
This audit assessed whether the CCEP is being effectively managed by the NSW Telco Authority to deliver an enhanced PSN that meets ESOs' requirements for operational communications.
We addressed the audit objective by answering the following two questions:
- Have agreed ESO user requirements for the enhanced PSN been met under day-to-day and emergency operational conditions?
- Has there been adequate transparency to the NSW Government and other stakeholders regarding whole-of-government costs related to the CCEP?
In answering the first question, we also considered how the agreed user requirements were determined. This included whether they were supported by evidence, whether they were sufficient to meet the intent of the CCEP (including in considering any role for new or alternative technologies), and whether they met any relevant technical standards and compliance obligations (including for cyber security resilience).
While other NSW government agencies and entities use the PSN, we focused on the experience of the five primary ESOs because these will be the largest users of the enhanced PSN.
Both the cost and time required to complete the CCEP roll-out have increased since 2016. While it was originally intended to be completed in 2020, this is now forecast to be 2027. Infrastructure NSW has previously assessed the reasons for the increases in time and cost. A summary of the findings made by Infrastructure NSW is presented in Chapter 1 of this report. Accordingly, as these matters had already been assessed, we did not re-examine them in this performance audit.
The auditee for this performance audit is the NSW Telco Authority, which is a statutory authority within the Department of Customer Service portfolio.
In addition to being responsible for the operation of the PSN, section 5 of the Act also prescribes that the NSW Telco Authority is:
- to identify, develop and deliver upgrades and enhancements to the government telecommunications network to improve operational communications for government sector agencies
- to develop policies, standards and guidelines for operational communications using telecommunications networks.
The NSW Telco Authority Advisory Board is established under section 10 of the Act. The role of the board is to advise the NSW Telco Authority and the minister on any matter relating to the telecommunications requirements of government sector agencies and on any other matter relating to the functions of the Authority. As of 2 June 2023, the responsible minister is the Minister for Customer Service and Digital Government.
The five identified ESOs are critical stakeholders of the CCEP and therefore they were consulted during this audit. However, the ESOs were not auditees for this performance audit.
ConclusionIn areas of New South Wales where the enhanced Public Safety Network has been implemented under the Critical Communications Enhancement Program, the NSW Telco Authority has delivered a radio network that meets most of the agreed requirements of Emergency Services Organisations for routine and emergency operations.In April 2023, the enhanced Public Safety Network (PSN) was approximately 50% completed. In areas where it is used by Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs), the PSN generally meets agreed user requirements. This is demonstrated through extensive performance monitoring and reporting, which shows that agreed performance standards are generally achieved. Reviews by the NSW Government and the NSW Telco Authority found that the PSN performed effectively during major flood events in 2021 and 2022.Where it is completed, PSN coverage is generally equal to or better than each ESO's individual pre-existing coverage. The NSW Telco Authority has a dedicated work program to address localised coverage gaps (or 'blackspots') in those areas where coverage has otherwise been substantively delivered. Available call capacity on the network far exceeds demand in everyday use. Any operational issues that may occur with the PSN are transparent to ESOs in real time. The NSW Telco Authority consulted extensively with ESOs on requirements for the enhanced PSN, with relatively few ESO requirements not being included in the specifications for the enhanced PSN. Lessons from previous events, including the 2019–20 summer bushfires, have informed the design and implementation of the enhanced PSN (such as the need to ensure adequate backup power supply to inaccessible sites). The network is based on the Project 25 technical standards for mission-critical radio communications, which is widely-accepted in the public safety radio community throughout Australia and internationally. There is no mechanism to ensure adequate radio coverage within new building infrastructure after the CCEP concludes, but the NSW Telco Authority and ESOs have agreed an approach to prioritise existing in-building sites for coverage for the duration of the CCEP.The extent to which the PSN works within buildings and other built structures (such as railway tunnels) is of crucial importance to ESOs, especially the NSW Police Force, NSW Ambulance, and Fire and Rescue NSW. This is because a large proportion of their operational communications occurs within buildings.There is no mechanism to ensure the adequacy of future in-building coverage for the PSN in new or refurbished buildings after the CCEP concludes. Planning, building, and fire regulations are silent on this issue. We note there are examples in the United States of how in-building coverage for public safety radio networks can be incorporated into building or fire safety codes. In regard to existing buildings, it is not possible to know whether a building requires its own in-building PSN infrastructure until nearby outside radio sites, including towers and antennae, have been commissioned into the network. Only then can it be determined whether their radio transmissions are capable of penetrating inside nearby buildings. Accordingly, much of this work for in-building coverage cannot be done until outside radio sites are finished and operating. In March 2023, the NSW Telco Authority and ESOs agreed on a list of 906 mandatory and 7,086 non-mandatory sites for in-building PSN coverage. Most of these sites will likely be able to receive radio coverage via external antennae and towers, however this cannot be confirmed until those nearby external PSN sites are completed. The parties also agreed on an approach to prioritising those sites where coverage is needed but not provided by antennae and towers. Available funding will likely only extend to ensuring coverage in sites deemed mandatory, which is nonetheless expected to meet the overall benchmark of achieving 'same or better' coverage than what ESOs had previously. There is a risk that radio interoperability between ESOs will not be maximised because the NSW Telco Authority has not settled with ESOs how encryption will be used across the enhanced PSN.End-to-end encryption of radio transmissions is a security feature that prevents radio transmissions being intercepted or listened to by people who are not meant to. The ability of the PSN to provide end-to-end encryption of operational communications is of critical importance to the two largest prospective users of the PSN: the NSW Police Force and NSW Ambulance. Given that encryption excludes other parties that do not have the requisite encryption keys, its use creates an obstacle to achieving a key intended benefit of the CCEP, that is a more interoperable PSN, where first responders are better able to communicate with other ESOs.Further planning and collaboration between PSN participants are necessary to consider how these dual benefits can be achieved, including in what operational circumstances encrypted interoperability is necessary or appropriate. The capital cost to the NSW Telco Authority of the CCEP, originally estimated at $400 million in 2016, was not made public until the 2021–22 NSW Budget disclosed an estimate of $1.325 billon.The estimated capital cost to complete all stages of the CCEP increased over time. This increasing cost was progressively disclosed to the NSW Government through Cabinet processes between 2015–16 and 2021–22.In 2016, the full capital cost to the NSW Telco Authority of completing the CCEP was estimated to be $400 million. This estimated cost was not publicly disclosed, nor were subsequent increases, until the cost of $1.325 billion was publicly disclosed in the 2021–22 NSW Budget (revised down in the 2022–23 NSW Budget to $1.293 billion). There has been no transparency about the whole-of-government cost of implementing the enhanced PSN through the CCEP.In addition to the capital costs incurred directly by the NSW Telco Authority for the CCEP, ESOs have incurred costs to maintain their own networks due to the delay in implementing the CCEP. The ESOs will continue to incur these costs until they are able to fully migrate to the enhanced PSN, which is expected to be in 2027. These costs have not been tracked or reported as part of transparently accounting for the whole-of-government cost of the enhanced PSN. This is despite Infrastructure NSW in 2019 recommending to the NSW Telco Authority that it conduct a stocktake of such costs so that a whole-of-government cost impact is available to the NSW Government. |
1 The definition of 'emergency services organisation' is set out in the State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (NSW). In addition to the five ESOs discussed in this report, the definition also includes: Surf Life Saving New South Wales; New South Wales Volunteer Rescue Association Inc; Volunteer Marine Rescue NSW; an agency that manages or controls an accredited rescue unit; and a non-government agency that is prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this definition.
2 Section 15(1) of the Government Telecommunications Act 2018 (NSW).
The NSW Telco Authority established and tracked its own costs for the CCEP
Over the course of the program from 2016, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a series of business cases and program reviews that estimated its cost of implementing the program in full, including those shown in Exhibit 6 below.
Source | Capital cost ($ million) | Operating cost ($ million) |
Completion date |
March 2016 business case | 400 | 37.3 | 2020 |
November 2017 internal review | 476.7 | 41.7 | 2022 |
March 2020 business case | 950–1,050 | -- | 2025 |
October 2020 business case | 1,263.1 | 56.1 | 2026 |
In response to the 2016 CCEP business case, the then NSW Government approved the NSW Telco Authority implementing the CCEP in full, with funding provided in stages. The NSW Telco Authority tracked its costs against approved funding, with monthly reports provided to the multi-agency Program Steering Committee
Throughout the program, the NSW Government was informed of increasing costs being incurred by the NSW Telco Authority for the CCEP
The various business cases, program updates, and program reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority were provided to the NSW Government through the required Cabinet process when seeking approval for the program proceeding and requests for both capital and operational funding. These provided clear indication of the changing overall cost of the CCEP to the NSW Telco Authority, as well as the delays that were being experienced.
There was no transparency to the Parliament and community about changes in the capital cost of the CCEP until the 2021–22 NSW Budget
As the business cases for the CCEP were not publicly available, the only sources of information about capital cost were NSW Budget papers and media releases. The information provided in the annual Budget papers prior to the 2021–22 NSW Budget provided no visibility of the estimated full capital cost to complete all stages of the CCEP. As shown in Exhibit 7 below, this information was fragmented and complex.
Media releases about the progress of the CCEP did not provide the estimated total cost to the NSW Telco Authority of $1.325 billion to complete all stages of the CCEP until June 2021. Prior to this date, media releases only provided funding for the initial stages of the program or for the stages subject to a funding announcement.
Even during the September 2019 and March 2020 Parliamentary Estimate Committee hearings where the costings and delays to the CCEP were raised, the estimated full cost of the CCEP was not revealed.
Financial year | Type of major work | Description of expenditure | Forecast estimate to complete ($ million) | Estimated duration |
2015–16 | New work | Infrastructure Rationalisation Program: Planning and Pilot | 18.3 | 2015–16 |
2016–17 | Work in progress | CCEP Planning and Pilot | 18.3 | 2015–17 |
New work | CCEP | 45 | 2016–17 | |
2017–18 | New work | CCEP | 190.75 | 2017–21 |
2018–19 | Work in progress | CCEP North Coast and State-wide Detailed Design | 190.75 | 2017–21 |
New work | CCEP Greater Metropolitan Area | 236 | 2018–22 | |
2019–20 | Work in progress | CCEP | 426.9 | 2018–22 |
2020–21 | Work in progress | CCEP | 664.8 | 2018–22 |
2021–22 | Work in progress | CCEP | 1,325 | 2018–26 |
2022–23 | Work in progress | CCEP | 1,292.8 | 2018–26 |
The original business case for the CCEP included estimated ESO costs, though these costs were not tracked throughout the program
Estimates for ESO costs for operating and maintaining their own radio networks over the four years from 2016–17 were included in the original March 2016 business case. They included $75.2 million for capital expenditure and $95 million for one-off operating costs. These costs, as well as costs incurred by ESOs due to the delay in the program, were not subsequently tracked by the NSW Telco Authority.
In January 2017, Infrastructure NSW reviewed the CCEP business case of March 2016. In this review, Infrastructure NSW recommended that the NSW Telco Authority identify combined and apportioned costs and cashflow for all ESOs over the CCEP funding period reflecting all associated costs to deliver the CCEP. These to include additional incidental capital costs accruing to ESOs, transition and migration to the new network and the cost (capital and operational) of maintaining existing networks. This recommendation was implemented in the November 2017 program review, with ESO capital costs estimated as $183 million.
In 2019, Infrastructure NSW conducted a Deep Dive Review on the progress of the CCEP. In this review, Infrastructure NSW made what it described as a 'critical recommendation' that the NSW Telco Authority:
…coordinate a stocktake of the costs of operational bridging solutions implemented by PSAs [ESOs] as a result of the 18-month delay, so that a whole-of-government cost impact is available to the NSW Government. |
It should be noted that the delay to CCEP completion now is seven years and that further ‘operational bridging solutions’ have been needed by the ESOs.
'Stay Safe and Keep Operational' costs incurred by ESOs will be significantly higher than originally estimated
Stay Safe and Keep Operational (SSKO) funding was established to provide funding to ESOs to maintain their legacy networks while the CCEP was refreshing and enhancing the PSN. This recognised that much of the network infrastructure relied on by ESOs had reached – or was reaching – obsolescence and would either require extensive maintenance or replacement before the PSN was available for ESOs to migrate to it. ESOs may apply to NSW Treasury for SSKO funding, with their specific proposals being reviewed (and endorsed, where appropriate) by the NSW Telco Authority. Accordingly, SSKO expenditure does not fall within the CCEP budget allocation.
As shown in the table below, extracted from the March 2016 CCEP business case, the total expected cost for SSKO purposes over the course of the CCEP was originally $40 million, assuming the enhanced PSN would be fully available by 2020.
Year | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | Total |
SSKO forecast ($ million) | 12.5 | 15 | 10 | 2.5 | 40 |
In October 2022, the expected completion date for the CCEP was re-baselined to August 2027. Accordingly, ESOs will be required to continue to maintain their radio networks using legacy equipment for seven years longer than the original 2020 forecast. This will likely become progressively more expensive and require additional SSKO funding. For example, NSW Telco Authority endorsed SSKO bids for 2022–23 exceeded $35 million for that year alone.
Compared to the original forecast made in the March 2016 CCEP business case of $40 million, we found ESOs had estimated SSKO spending to 2027 will be $292.5 million.
A refresh of paging network used by ESOs and the decommissioning of redundant sites were both removed from the original 2016 scope of the CCEP
Paging
A paging network is considered an important user requirement by the Fire and Rescue NSW, NSW Rural Fire Service, and NSW State Emergency Service. The 2016 CCEP business case included a paging network refresh within the program scope of works. This was reiterated in the November 2017 internal review of the program. These documents did not estimate a cost for this refresh. The March 2020 and October 2020 business cases excluded paging from the program scope. The audit is unable to identify when, why or by whom the decision was made to remove paging from the program scope, something that was also not well communicated to the affected ESOs.
In 2021, after representations from the affected ESOs, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a separate business case for a refresh of the paging network at an estimated capital cost of $60.31 million. This program was subsequently approved by the NSW Government and included in the 2022–23 NSW Budget.
In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of delivering the enhanced PSN, we have included the budgeted cost of the paging network refresh on the basis that:
- it was expressly included in the original approved March 2016 business case
- the capability is deemed essential to the needs of three ESOs.
Decommissioning costs
The 2016 CCEP business case included cost estimates for decommissioning surplus sites (whether ‘old’ GRN sites or sites belonging to ESOs’ own networks). These estimates were provided for both the NSW Telco Authority ($38 million) and for the ESOs ($55 million). However, while these estimates were described, they were not included as part of the NSW Telco Authority's estimated capital cost ($400 million) or (more relevantly) operating cost ($37.3 million) for the CCEP. This is despite decommissioning being included as one of eight planned activities for the rollout of the program.
In the October 2020 business case, an estimate of $201 million was included for decommissioning agency networks based on a model whereby:
- funding would be coordinated by the NSW Telco Authority
- scheduling and reporting through an inter-agency working group and
- where appropriate, agencies would be appointed as the most appropriate decommissioning party.
This estimated cost is not included in the CCEP budget.
In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of the enhanced PSN, we have included the estimated cost of decommissioning on the basis that:
- decommissioning was included in the 2016 CCEP business case as one of eight 'planned activities for the rollout of the program'
- effective decommissioning of surplus sites and equipment (including as described in the business case as incorporating asset decommissioning, asset re-use, and site make-good) is an inherent part of the program management for an enhanced PSN
- costs incurred in decommissioning are entirely a consequence of the CCEP program.
The estimated minimum cost of building an enhanced PSN consistent with the original proposal is over $2 billion
We have derived two estimated minimum whole-of-government costs for delivering an enhanced PSN. These are:
- $2.04 billion when calculated from NSW Telco Authority data – shown as estimate A in Exhibit 9 below.
- $2.26 billion when calculated from ESO supplied data – shown as estimate B in Exhibit 9.
Both totals include:
- budgeted amounts for both CCEP capital expenditure ($1,292.8 million) and operating expenditure ($139 million)
- the NSW Telco Authority's 2020 estimated cost for decommissioning ($201 million)
- the NSW Telco Authority's approved funding for paging refresh ($60.3 million).
The two estimated totals primarily vary around the capital expenditure of ESOs (particularly SSKO funding). To determine these costs, we used ESO provided actual SSKO costs to date, as well as their estimates for maintaining their legacy radio networks through to 2027.
The equivalent cost estimates from the NSW Telco Authority were sourced from the November 2017 internal review and the October 2020 business case for CCEP. It should be noted that the amounts for both estimates are not audited, or verified, but do provide an indication of how whole-of-government costs have grown over the course of the program.
The increase in and reasons for the increase in total CCEP costs (capital and one-off operating) incurred or forecast by the NSW Telco Authority (from $437.3 million in 2016 to $1,431.8 million in 2022) have been provided to the NSW Government through various business cases and reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority, as well as by reviews conducted by Infrastructure NSW as part of its project assurance responsibilities.
However, the growth in ESO costs and other consequential costs, such as paging and decommissioning, from around $263 million in the 2016 CCEP business case to between $600 million and $800 million, has to a large degree remained invisible and unexplained to the NSW Government and other stakeholders
Estimated whole-of-government cost, over time | |||||
Cost type | 20161 | 20172 | 20203 | 2023–Estimate A4 | 2023–Estimate B5 |
$ million | $ million | $ million | $ million | $ million | |
CCEP capital expenditure | 400a | 476.7b | 1,263.1c | 1,292.8d | 1,292.8d |
CCEP operating expenditure | 37.3a | 41.7b | 41.5e | 139d | 139d |
CCEP total | 437.3 | 518.4 | 1,304.6 | 1,431.8 | 1,431.8 |
ESO capital expenditure | 75.2a,f | 183b,e | 75.4e | 258.4g | 292.5 |
ESO one-off operating expenditure | 93a | n.a.l | 86.5e | 86.5h | 273 |
ESO total | 168.2 | 183 | 161.9 | 344.9 | 565.5 |
Paging | n.a.i | n.a.i | n.a.j | 60.3k | 60.3k |
Decommissioning | 93 | n.a.l | 201.0 | 201h | 201 |
Paging and decommissioning total | 93 | n.a. | 201 | 261.3 | 261.3 |
Whole-of-government total | 698.5 | 701.4 | 1,667.5 | 2,038 | 2,258.6 |
- Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2020.
- Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2021.
- Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2025.
- Financial year 2016 to Financial year 2026.
- Financial year 2022 to Financial year 2025.
- Stay Safe and Keep Operational (SSKO) costs plus terminals costs.
- November 2017 internal review and October 2020 Business case.
- October 2020 Business case.
- Included in CCEP capital expenditure at that time.
- By 2020, a refresh of the paging network had been removed from the CCEP scope.
- A separate business case for a refresh of the paging network was approved by government in 2022.
- Figure not included in the source document.
- March 2016 CCEP business case.
- November 2017 Internal Review conducted by the NSW Telco Authority.
- October 2020 CCEP business case.
- Derived from business cases, with ESO costs drawn from NSW Telco Authority data.
- Derived from business cases, with ESO costs based on data provided to the Audit Office of New South Wales by each of the five ESOs.
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – Trunked public safety radio networks
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #383 - released 23 June 2023
Actions for Natural disasters
Natural disasters
What this report is about
This report draws together the financial impact of natural disasters on agencies integral to the response and impact of natural disasters during 2021–22.
What we found
Over the 2021–22 financial year $1.4 billion from a budget of $1.9 billion was spent by the NSW Government in response to natural disasters.
Total expenses were less than the budget due to underspend in the following areas:
- clean-up assistance, including council grants
- anticipated temporary accommodation support
- payments relating to the Northern Rivers Business Support scheme for small businesses.
Natural disaster events damaged council assets such as roads, bridges, waste collection centres and other facilities used to provide essential services. Additional staff, contractors and experts were engaged to restore and repair damaged assets and minimise disruption to service delivery.
At 30 June 2022, the estimated damage to council infrastructure assets totalled $349 million.
Over the first half of the 2022–23 financial year, councils experienced further damage to infrastructure assets due to natural disasters. NSW Government spending on natural disasters continued with a further $1.1 billion spent over this period.
Thirty-six councils did not identify climate change or natural disaster as a strategic risk despite 22 of these having at least one natural disaster during 2021–22.
Section highlights
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Section highlights
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Actions for Universities 2022
Universities 2022
What this report is about
Results of the financial statement audits of the public universities in NSW for the year ended 31 December 2022.
What we found
Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all ten universities.
Nine universities reported net deficits in 2022, and all showed a decline from their 2021 results.
Results were impacted by a decline in investment income and government grants.
Wage remediation provisions across the universities increased by 116% to $110 million at 31 December 2022.
Expenditure increased as universities transitioned back to face-to-face teaching with the lifting of most COVID-19 restrictions.
Revenue from overseas students decreased by 0.5% overall in 2022, although not all universities were impacted equally.
Nearly 42% of fees and charges revenue came from overseas student revenue from three countries of origin (43% in 2021).
What the key issues were
We reported 88 findings to universities on internal control deficiencies (105 in 2021).
Six high risk findings were identified (four in 2021), relating to:
- IT control deficiencies in monitoring privileged user access
- password configuration
- cyber security process improvements
- lack of security over access to EFT payment files
- the status of a university's work in assessing its liability for underpayment of staff
- inadequate review of contracts leading to incorrect accounting treatments.
Two out of 13 entities reported financial losses from cyber incidents in 2022.
Retention policies on personally identifiable information (PII) vary and universities can further reduce their PII exposure risk from cyber attack.
What we recommended
Universities should:
- conduct a comprehensive assessment of their employment agreements and historical pay practices to identify potential underpayments
- prioritise actions to address repeat findings on internal control deficiencies in a timely manner
- review their PII retention policies to ensure PII stored is limited to the entity's needs, held only for the minimum duration it is legally and operationally required, and access is strictly limited.
This report provides Parliament with the results of our financial audits of universities in New South Wales and their controlled entities in 2022, including our analysis, observations and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- internal controls and governance
- teaching and research.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in university sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of universities in NSW for 2022.
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Appropriate financial controls help to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of NSW universities.
Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. The more significant issues and risks are included in this chapter. These, along with the less significant matters, are reported to universities for management to address.
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Universities' primary objectives are teaching and research. They invest most of their resources aiming to achieve quality outcomes in academia and student experience. Universities have committed to achieving certain government targets and compete to advance their reputation and their standing in international and Australian rankings.
This chapter outlines teaching and research outcomes for universities in NSW for 2022.
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Appendix one – List of 2022 recommendations
Appendix two – Status of 2021 recommendations
Appendix three – Universities' controlled entities
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for Planning and managing bushfire equipment
Planning and managing bushfire equipment
What the report is about
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) and local councils in planning and managing equipment for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression.
What we found
The RFS has focused its fleet development activity on modernising and improving the safety of its firefighting fleet, and on the purchase of new firefighting aircraft.
There is limited evidence that the RFS has undertaken strategic fleet planning or assessment of the capability of the firefighting fleet to respond to current bushfire events or emerging fire risks.
The RFS does not have an overarching strategy to guide its planning, procurement, or distribution of the firefighting fleet.
The RFS does not have effective oversight of fleet maintenance activity across the State, and is not ensuring the accuracy of District Service Agreements with local councils, where maintenance responsibilities are described.
What we recommended
- Develop a fleet enhancement framework and strategy that is informed by an assessment of current fleet capability, and research into appropriate technologies to respond to emerging fire risks.
- Develop performance measures to assess the performance and capabilities of the fleet in each RFS District by recording and publicly reporting on fire response times, fire response outcomes, and completions of fire hazard reduction works.
- Report annually on fleet allocations to RFS Districts, and identify the ways in which fleet resources align with district-level fire risks.
- Develop a strategy to ensure that local brigade volunteers are adequate in numbers and appropriately trained to operate fleet appliances in RFS Districts where they are required.
- Establish a fleet maintenance framework to ensure regular update of District Service Agreements with local councils.
- Review and improve processes for timely recording of fleet asset movements, locations, and maintenance status.
This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Rural Fire Service (the RFS) plans and manages the firefighting equipment needed to prevent, mitigate, and suppress bushfires. This audit also examined the role of local councils in managing bushfire equipment fleet assets. Local councils have vested legal ownership of the majority of the land-based firefighting fleet, including a range of legislated responsibilities to carry out fleet maintenance and repairs. The RFS has responsibilities to plan and purchase firefighting fleet assets, and ensure they are ready for use in response to fires and other emergencies.
This report describes the challenges in planning and managing the firefighting fleet, including a confusion of roles and responsibilities between the RFS and local councils in relation to managing certain land-based rural firefighting fleet – a point that has been made in our Local Government financial audits over several years. This role confusion is further demonstrated in the responses of the RFS and local councils to this audit report – included at Appendix one.
The lack of cohesion in roles and responsibilities for managing rural firefighting vehicles increases the risk that these firefighting assets are not properly maintained and managed, and introduces a risk that this could affect their readiness to be mobilised when needed.
While the audit findings and recommendations address some of the operational and organisational inefficiencies in relation to rural firefighting equipment management, they do not question the legislative arrangements that govern them. This is a matter for the NSW Government to consider in ensuring the fleet arrangements are fit for purpose, and are clearly understood by the relevant agencies.
The NSW Rural Fire Service (hereafter the RFS) is the lead combat agency for bushfires in New South Wales, and has the power to take charge of bushfire prevention and response operations anywhere in the State. The RFS has responsibilities to prevent, mitigate and suppress bushfires across 95% of the State, predominantly in the non-metropolitan areas of New South Wales. Fire and Rescue NSW is responsible for fire response activity in the cities and large townships that make up the remaining five per cent of the State.
The RFS bushfire fleet is an integral part of the agency's overall bushfire risk management. The RFS also uses this fleet to respond to other emergencies such as floods and storms, motor vehicle accidents, and structural fires. Fleet planning and management is one of a number of activities that is necessary for fire mitigation and suppression.
The Rural Fires Act 1997 (Rural Fires Act) imposes obligations on all landowners and land managers to prevent the occurrence of bushfires and reduce the risk of bushfires from spreading. Local councils have fire prevention responsibilities within their local government areas, principally to reduce fire hazards near council owned or managed assets, and minor roads.
The RFS is led by a Commissioner and is comprised of both paid employees and volunteer rural firefighters. Its functions are prescribed in the Rural Fires Act and related legislation such as the State Emergency Rescue Management Act 1989. The RFS functions are also described in Bush Fire Risk Management Plans, the State Emergency Management Plan, District Service Agreements, and RFS procedural documents. Some of the core responsibilities of the RFS include:
- preventing, mitigating, and suppressing fires across New South Wales
- recruiting and managing volunteer firefighters in rural fire brigades
- purchasing and allocating firefighting fleet assets to local councils
- establishing District Service Agreements with local councils to give the RFS permissions to use the fleet assets that are vested with local councils
- carrying out fleet maintenance and repairs when authorised to do so by local councils
- inspecting the firefighting fleet
- supporting land managers and private property owners with fire prevention activity.
In order to carry out its legislated firefighting functions, the RFS relies on land-based vehicles, marine craft, and aircraft. These different firefighting appliance types are referred to in this report as the firefighting fleet or fleet assets.
RFS records show that in 2021 there were 6,345 firefighting fleet assets across NSW. Most of the land-based appliances commonly associated with firefighting, such as water pumpers and water tankers, are purchased by the RFS and vested with local councils under the Rural Fires Act. The vesting of firefighting assets with local councils means that the assets are legally owned by the council for which the asset has been purchased. The RFS is able to use the firefighting assets through District Service Agreements with local councils or groups of councils.
In addition to the land-based firefighting fleet, the RFS owns a fleet of aircraft with capabilities for fire mitigation, suppression, and reconnaissance during fire events. The RFS hires a fleet of different appliances to assist with fire prevention and hazard reduction works. These include aircraft for firefighting and fire reconnaissance, and heavy plant equipment such as graders and bulldozers for hazard reduction. Hazard reduction works include the clearance of bush and grasslands around major roads and protected assets, and the creation and maintenance of fire trails and fire corridors to assist with fire response activity.
The RFS is organised into 44 RFS Districts and seven Area Commands. The RFS relies on volunteer firefighters to assist in carrying out most of its firefighting functions. These functions may include the operation of the fleet during fire response activities and training exercises, and the routine inspection of the fleet to ensure it is maintained according to fleet service standards. Volunteer fleet inspections are supervised by the RFS Fire Control Officer.
In 2021 there were approximately 73,000 volunteers located in 1,993 rural fire brigades across the State, making the RFS the largest volunteer fire emergency service in Australia. In addition to brigade volunteers, the RFS has approximately 1,100 salaried staff who occupy leadership and administrative roles at RFS headquarters and in the 44 RFS Districts.
Local councils have legislative responsibilities relating to bushfire planning and management. Some of the core responsibilities of local councils include:
- establishing and equipping rural fire brigades
- contributing to the Rural Fire Fighting Fund
- vested ownership of land-based rural firefighting equipment
- carrying out firefighting fleet maintenance and repairs
- conducting bushfire prevention and hazard reduction activity.
The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the RFS and local councils in planning and managing equipment for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression. From the period of 2017 to 2022 inclusive, we addressed the audit objective by examining whether the NSW RFS and local councils effectively:
- plan for current and future bushfire fleet requirements
- manage and maintain the fleet required to prevent, mitigate, and suppress bushfires in NSW.
This audit did not assess:
- the operational effectiveness of the RFS bushfire response
- the effectiveness of personal protective equipment and clothing
- the process of vesting of rural firefighting equipment with local councils
- activities of any other statutory authorities responsible for managing bushfires in NSW.
As the lead combat agency for the bushfire response in NSW, the RFS has primary responsibility for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression.
Three local councils were selected as case studies for this audit, Hawkesbury City Council, Wagga Wagga City Council and Uralla Shire Council. These case studies highlight the ways in which the RFS and local councils collaborate and communicate in rural fire districts.
Conclusion
The RFS has focused its fleet development activity on modernising and improving the safety of its land-based firefighting fleet, and on the purchase of new firefighting aircraft
The RFS has reduced the average age of the firefighting fleet from approximately 21 years in 2017, to approximately 16 years in 2022. The RFS has also enhanced the aerial fleet with the addition of six new aircraft to add to the existing three aircraft.
Recommendations from inquiries into the 2019–20 bushfires have driven significant levels of fleet improvement activity, mainly focused on the addition of safety features to existing fleet appliances. The RFS has dedicated most of its efforts to purchasing and refurbishing firefighting appliances of the same type and in the same volumes year on year.
However, the RFS is unable to demonstrate how the composition, size, or the locations of the NSW firefighting fleet is linked to current fire prevention, mitigation, and suppression requirements, or future fire risks.
There is limited evidence that the RFS has undertaken strategic fleet planning or assessment of the capability of the firefighting fleet to respond to current bushfire events or emerging fire risks
The RFS has not established a methodology to assess the composition or volumes of the firefighting fleet against fire activity and fire risks in the 44 NSW Rural Fire Districts. The RFS has not developed performance measures or targets to assess or report on fire response times in each of its districts, nor has it developed measures to assess the effectiveness of responses according to fire sizes and fire types. Similarly, the RFS has limited performance measures to assess fire prevention activity, or to assess fuel load reduction works, so it is not possible to assess whether its fleet capabilities are fit for these purposes.
The RFS does not have an overarching strategy to guide its planning, procurement, or distribution of the firefighting fleet
RFS fleet planning and fleet allocations are based on historical fleet sizes and compositions, and distributed to locations where there are appropriately trained brigade volunteers.
The RFS takes an asset protection approach to bushfire prevention and planning that is based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management. This approach requires that the RFS identify assets at risk of fire, and develop treatment plans to protect these assets. However, fleet requirements are not linked to NSW asset protection plans, meaning that fleet is not allocated according to the identified risks in these plans. Further, the RFS does not develop fire prevention plans for areas where there are no identified assets.
The RFS has not conducted future-focused fleet research or planning into technologies that match fleet capabilities to emerging or future fire risks. Since the significant fire events of 2019–2020, the RFS has not changed its approach to planning for, or assessing, the operational capabilities of the fleet. The RFS advises it is scoping a project to match resources to risk, which it plans to commence in 2023.
The RFS does not have effective oversight of fleet maintenance activity across the State, and is not ensuring the accuracy of District Service Agreements where maintenance responsibilities are described
The RFS does not have a framework to ensure that District Service Agreements with local councils are accurate. Almost two thirds of service agreements have not been reviewed in the last ten years, and some do not reflect actual maintenance practices. There is no formalised process to ensure communication occurs between the RFS and local councils for fleet management and maintenance.
RFS fleet management systems at the central level are not integrated with RFS district-level databases to indicate when fleet assets are in workshops being maintained and serviced. The RFS has a new centralised Computer Aided Dispatch System that relies on accurate fleet locations and fleet condition information in order to dispatch vehicles to incidents and fires. A lack of interface between the district-level fleet systems and the centralised RFS fleet dispatch system, may impact on operational responses to bushfires.
The RFS has not made significant changes to the size or composition of the firefighting fleet in the past five years and does not have an overarching strategy to drive fleet development
Since 2017, the RFS has made minimal changes to its firefighting fleet volumes or vehicle types. The RFS is taking a fleet renewal approach to fleet planning, with a focus on refurbishing and replacing ageing firefighting assets with newer appliances and vehicles of the same classification and type. While the RFS has adopted a fleet renewal approach, driven by its Appliance Replacement Program Guide, it does not have a strategy or framework to guide its future-focused fleet development. There is no document that identifies and analyses bushfire events and risks in NSW, and matches fleet resources and fleet technologies to meet those risks. The RFS does not have fleet performance measures or targets to assess whether the size and composition of the fleet is meeting current or emerging bushfire climate hazards, or fuel load risks across its 44 NSW Fire Districts.
The RFS fleet currently comprises approximately 4,000 frontline, operational firefighting assets such as tankers, pumpers, and air and marine craft, and approximately 2,300 logistical vehicles, such as personnel transport vehicles and specialist support vehicles. Of the land-based firefighting vehicles, the RFS has maintained a steady number of approximately 3,800 tankers and 65 pumpers, year on year, for the past five years. This appliance type is an essential component of the RFS land-based, firefighting fleet with capabilities to suppress and extinguish fires.
Since 2017, most RFS fleet enhancement activity has been directed to upgrades and the modernisation of older fleet assets with new safety features. There is limited evidence of research into new fleet technologies for modern firefighting. The RFS fleet volumes and fleet types have remained relatively static since 2017, with the exception of the aerial firefighting fleet. Since 2017, the RFS has planned for, and purchased, six additional aircraft to add to the existing three aircraft in its permanent fleet.
While the RFS has made minimal changes to its fleet since 2017, in 2016 it reduced the overall number of smaller transport vehicles, by purchasing larger vehicles with increased capacity for personnel transport. The consolidation of logistical and transport vehicles accounts for an attrition in fleet numbers from 7,058 in 2016, to 6,315 in 2017 as shown in Exhibit 2.
The firefighting fleet management system is not always updated in a timely manner due to insufficient RFS personnel with permissions to make changes in the system
The RFS uses a fleet management system known as SAP EAM to record the location and status of firefighting fleet assets. The system holds information about the condition of the firefighting fleet, the home location of each fleet asset, and the maintenance, servicing, and inspection records of all assets. The RFS uses the system for almost all functions related to the firefighting fleet, including the location of vehicles so that they can be dispatched during operational exercises or fire responses.
Staff at RFS Headquarters are responsible for creating and maintaining asset records in the fleet management system. RFS District staff have limited permissions in relation to SAP EAM. They are able to raise work orders for repairs and maintenance, upload evidence to show that work has been done, and close actions in the system.
RFS District staff are not able to enter or update some fleet information in the system, such as the location of vehicles. When an RFS District receives a fleet appliance, it cannot be allocated to a brigade until the location of the asset is accurately recorded in the system. The location of the asset must be updated in the SAP EAM system by staff at RFS Headquarters. District staff can request system support from staff at RFS Headquarters to enter this information. At the time of writing, the position responsible for updating the fleet management system at RFS Headquarters was vacant, and RFS District personnel reported significant wait times in response to their service requests.
The RFS conducts annual audits of SAP EAM system information to ensure data is accurate and complete. RFS staff are currently doing data cleansing work to ensure that fleet allocations are recorded correctly in the system.
Communication between brigades, local councils and the RFS needs improvement to ensure that fleet information is promptly updated in the fleet management system
RFS brigade volunteers do not have access to the fleet management system. When fleet assets are used or moved, volunteers report information about the location and condition of the fleet to RFS District staff using a paper-based form, or by email or phone. Information such as vehicle mileage, engine hours, and defects are all captured by volunteers in a logbook which is scanned and sent to RFS District staff. RFS District staff then enter the relevant information into the fleet management system, or raise a service ticket with RFS Headquarters to enter the information.
Brigade volunteers move fleet assets for a range of reasons, including for fire practice exercises. If volunteers are unable to report the movement of assets to RFS District staff in a timely manner, this can lead to system inaccuracies. Lapses and backlogs in record keeping can occur when RFS staff at district offices or at Headquarters are not available to update records at the times that volunteers report information. A lack of accurate record keeping can potentially impact on RFS operational activities, including fire response activity.
Brigade volunteers notify RFS District staff when fleet appliances are defective, or if they have not been repaired properly. District staff then enter the information into the fleet management system. The inability of volunteers to enter information into the system means they have no visibility over their requests, including whether they have been approved, actioned, or rejected.
Local councils are responsible for servicing and maintaining the firefighting fleet according to the Rural Fires Act, but this responsibility can be transferred to the RFS through arrangements described in local service agreements. Council staff record all fleet servicing and maintenance information in their local systems. The types of fleet information that is captured in local council records can vary between councils. RFS staff described the level of council reporting, and the effectiveness of this process, as 'mixed'.
Councils use different databases and systems to record fleet assets, and some councils are better resourced for this activity than others
Firefighting fleet information is recorded in different asset management systems across NSW. Each council uses its own asset management system to record details about the vested fleet assets. All three councils that were interviewed for this audit had different systems to record information about the fleet. In addition, the type of information captured by the three councils was varied.
System | Hawkesbury City Council | Uralla Shire Council | Wagga Wagga City Council |
---|---|---|---|
Financial asset management system | TechnologyOne | Civica | Assetic |
Asset management system | TechnologyOne | Manual | MEX |
Local councils have varying levels of resources and capabilities to manage the administrative tasks associated with the firefighting fleet. Some of the factors that impact on the ability of councils to manage administrative tasks include: the size of the council; the capabilities of the information management systems, the size of the staff team, and the levels of staff training in asset management.
Uralla Shire Council is a small rural council in northern NSW. This council uses financial software to record information about the firefighting fleet. While staff record information about the condition of the asset, its replacement value, and its depreciation, staff do not record the age of the asset, or its location. Staff manually enter fleet maintenance information into their systems. Uralla Shire Council would like to purchase asset maintenance software that generates work orders for fleet repairs and maintenance. However, the council does not have trained staff in the use of asset management software, and the small size of the fleet may not make it financially worthwhile.
The Hawkesbury City Council uses a single system to capture financial and asset information associated with the firefighting fleet. Hawkesbury is a large metropolitan council located north-west of Sydney, with a relatively large staff team in comparison with Uralla Shire Council. The Hawkesbury City Council has given RFS District staff access to their fleet information system. RFS District staff can directly raise work orders for fleet repairs and maintenance through the council system, and receive automated notifications when the work is complete.
Two of the three audited councils report that they conduct annual reviews of fleet assets to assess whether the information they hold is accurate and up-to-date.
More than half of the fleet maintenance service agreements between the RFS and local councils have not been reviewed in ten years, and some do not reflect local practices
Local councils have a legislated responsibility to service, repair, and maintain the firefighting fleet to service standards set by the RFS. Councils may transfer this responsibility to the RFS through District Service Agreements. The RFS Districts are responsible for ensuring that the service agreements are current and effective.
The RFS does not have monitoring and quality control processes to ensure that service agreements with local councils are reviewed regularly. The RFS has 73 service agreements with local councils or groups of councils. Sixty-three per cent of service agreements had not been reviewed in the last ten years. Only four service agreements specify an end date and, of those, one agreement expired in 2010 and had not been reviewed at the time of this audit.
The RFS does not have a framework to ensure that service agreements with local councils reflect actual practices. Of the three councils selected for audit, one agreement does not describe the actual arrangements for fleet maintenance practices in RFS Districts. The service agreement with Hawkesbury City Council specifies that the RFS will maintain the firefighting fleet on behalf of council when, in fact, council maintains the firefighting fleet. The current agreement commenced in 2012, and at the time of writing had not been updated to reflect local maintenance practices.
When District Service Agreements are not reviewed periodically, there is a risk that neither local councils nor the RFS have clear oversight of the status of fleet servicing, maintenance, and repairs.
RFS District Service Agreements set out a requirement that RFS and local councils establish a liaison committee. Liaison committees typically include council staff, RFS District staff, and RFS brigade volunteers. While service agreements state that liaison committees must meet periodically to monitor and review the performance of the service agreement, committee members determine when and how often the committee meets.
RFS District staff and staff at the three audited councils are not meeting routinely to review or update their service agreements. At Wagga Wagga City Council, staff meet with RFS District staff each year to report on activity to fulfil service agreement requirements. Uralla Shire Council staff did not meet routinely with RFS District staff before 2021. When liaison committees do not meet regularly, there is a risk that the RFS and local councils have incorrect or outdated information about the location, status, or condition of the firefighting fleet. Given that councils lack systems to track and monitor fleet locations, regular communication between the RFS and local councils is essential.
The RFS has not established processes to ensure that local councils and RFS District personnel meet and exchange information about the fleet. Of the three councils selected for this audit, one council had not received information about the number, type, or status of the fleet for at least five years, and did not receive an updated list of appliances until there was a change in RFS District personnel. This has impacted on the accuracy of council record keeping. Councils do not always receive notification about new assets or information about the location of assets from the RFS, and therefore cannot reflect this information in their accounting and reporting.
RFS area commands audit system records to ensure fleet inspections occur as planned, but central systems are not always updated, creating operational risks
RFS District staff are required by the Rural Fires Act to ensure the firefighting fleet is inspected at least once a year. Regular inspections of the fleet are vital to ensure that vehicles are fit-for-purpose and safe for brigade volunteers. Inspections are also fundamental to the operational readiness and capability of RFS to respond to fire incidents.
RFS Area Command personnel conduct audits of fleet maintenance data to ensure that fleet inspections are occurring as planned. These inspections provide the RFS with assurance that the fleet is being maintained and serviced by local council workshops, or third-party maintenance contractors.
Some RFS Districts run their own fleet management systems outside of the central management system. They do this to manage their fleet inspection activity effectively. Annual fleet inspection dates are programmed by staff at RFS Headquarters. Most of the inspection dates generated by RFS Headquarters are clustered together and RFS Districts need to separate inspection times to manage workloads over the year. Spreading inspection dates is necessary to avoid exceeding the capacity of local council workshops or third party contractors, and to ensure that fleet are available during the bushfire season.
The fleet inspection records at RFS Headquarters are not always updated in a timely manner to reflect actual inspection and service dates of vehicles. District staff are not able to change fleet inspection and service dates in the central management system because they do not have the necessary permissions to access the system. The usual practice is for RFS District staff to notify staff at RFS Headquarters, and ask them to retrospectively update the system. As there is a lag in updating the central database, at a point in time, the actual inspection and service dates of vehicles can be different to the dates entered in the central fleet management system.
Fleet inspection and maintenance records must be accurately recorded in the central RFS management system for operational reasons. RFS Headquarters personnel need to know the location and maintenance status of fleet vehicles at all times in order to dispatch vehicles to incidents and fires. The RFS fleet management system is integrated with a new Computer Aided Dispatch System. The Computer Aided Dispatch System assigns the nearest and most appropriate vehicles to fire incidents. The system relies on accurate fleet locations and fleet condition information in order to dispatch these vehicles.
There is a risk that RFS Headquarters' systems do not contain accurate information about the location and status of vehicles. Some may be in workshops for servicing and repair, while the system may record them as available for dispatch. As there are many thousands of fleet vehicles, all requiring an annual service and inspection, a lack of accurate record keeping has wide implications for State fire operations.
RFS is currently exploring ways to improve the ways in which fleet inspections are programmed into the fleet management system.
RFS provides funds to councils to assist with maintaining the firefighting fleet, but does not receive fleet maintenance cost information from all local councils
Each year the RFS provides local councils with a lump sum to assist with the cost of repairing and maintaining the firefighting fleet. This lump sum funding is also used for meeting the costs of maintaining brigade stations, utilities, and other miscellaneous matters associated with RFS business.
In 2020–21, the RFS provided NSW local councils with approximately $23 million for maintenance and repairs of appliances, buildings, and utilities. Ninety councils were provided with lump sum funding in 2021, receiving on average $257,000. The amounts received by individual councils ranged from $56,200 to $1,029,884.
Some councils provide itemised repairs and maintenance reports to RFS District staff, showing the work completed and the cost of that work. However, not all councils collect this information or provide it to the RFS. Local councils collect fleet maintenance information in their local council systems. In some cases, the responsibility for fleet maintenance is shared across a group of councils, and not all councils have oversight of this process.
The RFS has not taken steps to require local councils to provide itemised maintenance costings for the firefighting fleet. Thus, the RFS does not have a clear understanding of how local councils are spending their annual fleet maintenance funding allocations. The RFS does not know if the funding allocations are keeping pace with the actual cost of repairing and maintaining the fleet.
RFS District staff report that funding shortfalls are impacting on the prioritisation of fleet servicing and maintenance works in some council areas. When fleet servicing and maintenance is not completed routinely or effectively, there is a risk that it can negatively impact the overall condition and lifespan of the vehicle. Poor processes in relation to fleet maintenance and repair risk impacting on the operational capabilities of the fleet during fire events.
The timeliness and effectiveness of fleet servicing and maintenance is affected by resource levels in RFS Districts and local councils
Local councils have a legislated responsibility to service and maintain the firefighting fleet to the service standards set by the RFS. Fleet maintenance is usually done by the entity with the appropriate workshops and resources, and the maintenance arrangements are described in District Service Agreements. RFS District staff conduct annual inspections to ensure that the firefighting fleet has been serviced and maintained appropriately, and is safe for use by brigade volunteers. If the fleet has not been maintained to RFS service standards or timelines, RFS District staff may work with local councils to support or remediate these works.
The effectiveness of this quality control activity is dependent on relationships and communication between the RFS Districts and local councils. While some RFS staff reported having positive relationships with local councils, others said they struggled to get fleet maintenance work done in a timely manner. Some councils reported that funding shortfalls for fleet maintenance activity was impacting on the prioritisation of RFS fleet maintenance works. When fleet maintenance work is not completed routinely or effectively, it can negatively impact on the overall condition and lifespan of the vehicle. It can also reduce the capacity of the RFS to respond to fire events.
Fleet quality control activities are carried out by RFS District staff. In some of the smaller RFS Districts, one person is responsible for liaising with local councils and brigade volunteers about fleet maintenance and repairs. In the regions where resources are limited, there is less ability to maintain ongoing communication. This is impacting on fleet service and maintenance timelines and the timeliness of fleet monitoring activity.
The RFS has mutual support arrangements with agencies in NSW and interstate, though shared fleet levels are yet to be quantified
The RFS has arrangements with state, federal, and international fire authorities to provide mutual support during fire incidents. In NSW, the RFS has agreements with the three statutory authorities – Fire and Rescue NSW, the Forestry Corporation of NSW, and the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service. The agreement with Fire and Rescue NSW provides a framework for cooperation and joint operations between the agencies. The agreements with the Forestry Corporation of NSW and the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service describe the control and coordination arrangements for bush and grass fires across NSW. These arrangements are set out in legislation and incorporated into local Bush Fire Risk Management Plans.
The RFS has agreements with fire authorities in three of the four Australian states and territories that share a border with NSW – the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, and South Australia. Each agreement sets out the arrangements for mutual assistance and joint operations, including arrangements for sharing aircraft. The agreement between the RFS and Victoria had lapsed. The RFS told the NSW Bushfire Inquiry that the agreement with Victoria would be finalised by June 2020. In June 2022, the RFS reported that the agreement was in the process of being finalised.
The arrangements for mutual aid from Western Australia, Northern Territory and Tasmania, are managed by the National Resource Sharing Centre. These agreements set out the arrangements for interstate assistance between Australian fire services, emergency services, and land management agencies in those states and territories.
These mutual support arrangements may assist during state-based fire events. However, when there are competing demands for resources, such as during the bushfires of 2019–2020, there can be limits on fleet availability. During the 2019–2020 fires, resources were stretched in all jurisdictions as these fires affected NSW, Victoria, and Queensland.
There are opportunities for the RFS and other NSW agencies to quantify fleet resources across the State and identify assets that can be mobilised for different fire activities. This form of fleet planning may be used to enhance surge capabilities during times of high fire activity. There are also opportunities for the RFS and other agencies to match the levels of shared assets to projected bushfire risks.
Appendix one – Responses from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #376 - released 27 February 2023
Actions for Bushfire recovery grants
Bushfire recovery grants
What the report is about
The Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program was created after the 2019–20 bushfires, and commits $541.8 million to bushfire affected areas in New South Wales. It is co-funded by the Commonwealth and NSW governments.
This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Regional NSW (the department) and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the BLER program. These rounds were:
- Round one: early co-funding, split between two streams:
- Fast-Tracked projects
- Sector Development Grants (SDG)
- Round two: open round.
What we found
The Department of Regional NSW did not effectively administer the Fast-Tracked stream of the BLER.
The administration process lacked integrity, given it did not have sufficiently detailed guidelines and the assessment process for projects lacked transparency and consistency.
At the request of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million threshold was applied, below which projects were not approved for funding. The department advises that some of the projects excluded were subsequently funded from other programs.
This threshold resulted in a number of shortlisted projects in areas highly impacted by the bushfires being excluded, including all shortlisted projects located in Labor Party-held electorates.
The department's administration of the SDG stream had a detailed and transparent assessment process. However, conflicts of interest were not effectively managed.
The department's administration of the open round included a clearly documented, detailed and transparent assessment framework. Some weaknesses in the approach to conflicts of interest remained.
What we recommended
The Department of Regional NSW should ensure that for all future grant programs it:
- establishes and follows guidelines that align with relevant good practice guidance
- ensures a communications plan is in place, including the communication of guidelines to potential applicants
- ensures staff declare conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of a grants stream, and that these conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
- ensures regular monitoring is in place as part of funding deeds
- documents all key decisions and approvals in line with record keeping obligations.
This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Regional NSW and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program.
As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was involved in the set-up and ongoing administration and monitoring of the BLER program. During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with working with the Department of Regional NSW to create program objectives, guidelines and criteria. Their role also involved liaising with the Commonwealth Government, which provided co-funding for the program. Resilience NSW also had an ongoing role in quality assurance and compliance to ensure agencies administering disaster assistance did so in accordance with relevant guidelines. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.
Our work for this performance audit was completed on 3 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the two audited agencies. The audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW. On 24 November 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.
During the 2019–20 bushfire season, New South Wales experienced 11,774 fire incidents, burning 5.5 million hectares of the state. There were 26 fatalities and 2,476 homes destroyed. The agriculture sector was heavily impacted with 601,858 hectares of pasture damaged.
Due to the widespread impacts of these fires on the state, the NSW and Commonwealth governments committed $4.4 billion toward bushfire response, recovery, and preparedness. This included the establishment of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program, with $541.8 million committed to support job retention and creation in areas impacted by bushfires. The program also aims to strengthen community resilience and reduce the impact of future natural disasters. The BLER program is co-funded, with the Commonwealth and NSW governments funding 50% each.
The BLER program is comprised of three funding rounds:
- round one early co-funding, split between
- Fast-Tracked projects
- Sector Development Grants (SDG)
- round two: open round
- round three: final projects and initiatives.
Resilience NSW was involved in setting up the BLER program and the Department of Regional NSW (the department) is responsible for administering it. The Commonwealth National Recovery and Resilience Agency must also endorse any projects proposed by the NSW Government for funding as part of the funding agreement between the State and Commonwealth governments.
Successful projects under the SDG stream were announced in September 2020 and projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream were announced in October 2020. Round two (the open round) was administered after these two streams and successful projects were announced in June 2021.
The Department of Premier and Cabinet established the 'Good Practice Guide to Grants Administration' (the Good Practice Guide) in 2010 to assist the NSW Government in ensuring grants administration was performed consistently across all NSW Government grants programs. Compliance with the Good Practice Guide was not compulsory, but provided an outline of best practice covering the entire lifecycle of a grants program. This guide was in place at the time these grants were designed and administered.
The design and delivery of round one of the program occurred quickly, as part of the response to the 2019–20 bushfires, and was responding to a request from the Commonwealth Government for rapid project identification.
The objective of this audit was to assess how effectively the Department of Regional NSW and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the BLER program. Round three was excluded from this audit because it had not been announced at the time of the audit.
We addressed this objective by examining whether the audited agencies:
- effectively planned administration of the BLER program and established appropriate guidelines
- implemented an effective assessment process for the BLER program
- are effectively monitoring implementation of projects and program outcomes.
ConclusionThe Department of Regional NSW did not effectively administer the Fast-Tracked stream of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery program. The administration process lacked integrity, given it did not have sufficiently detailed guidelines, and the assessment process for projects lacked transparency and consistency. There were significant gaps in the documentation of decision-making throughout this funding stream. At the request of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million threshold was applied, below which projects were not approved for funding. This threshold was applied without a documented reason and was not part of the program guidelines. The department advises that some of the projects excluded through application of the threshold were subsequently funded from other programs. The department's administration of the Sector Development Grants stream had a detailed and transparent assessment process. That said, conflicts of interest were not effectively managed, and the department did not effectively engage with stakeholders during the grants process. The department's administration of the open round included a clearly documented, detailed and transparent assessment framework that it followed throughout. The department also implemented probity arrangements in the open round, although some weaknesses in the department's approach to conflicts of interest remained. Fast-Tracked streamFollowing requests from the Commonwealth Government in May and June 2020 to identify projects rapidly and as soon as practical, the department used an expedited process to identify relevant projects that had applied for other grants programs but had not received funding or which were identified as local priority projects. The department developed a set of guidelines for the Fast-Tracked stream based on draft Commonwealth funding criteria, but the department's guidelines lacked sufficient detail to ensure transparent and consistent decision-making. The guidelines also did not contain detailed information on how the assessment and approval processes would work. The department did not implement conflict of interest declarations for staff involved in the assessment process. The assessment process implemented for the Fast-Tracked stream deviated from the guidelines. For example, the guidelines did not set out a role for the then Deputy Premier or his office in the assessment process, but the Deputy Premier's office played a key role in project selection. At the direction of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million minimum threshold, not mentioned in the guidelines, was applied to projects, below which, projects would not be funded. This resulted in a number of shortlisted projects in areas highly impacted by the bushfires, including all shortlisted projects located in Labor Party-held electorates, being excluded without a rationale being documented at the time. The department advised that some of these projects were subsequently funded through other funding streams. The department's assessment process was inconsistent, poorly documented and lacked transparency. The department initially identified 445 potential projects through consultation with councils and through identifying projects that had been unsuccessful for other grant programs. The department only assessed 164 of these 445 projects for funding against the criteria in the guidelines. The department did not document the rationale for not assessing the remaining 281 projects against the criteria. The department also sought advice from Public Works Advisory (PWA) on whether projects could commence within six months, which was an eligibility criterion for the Fast-Tracked stream. PWA were only asked to assess 25 of the 445 projects, of which 19 were funded through the Fast-Tracked stream. The department also did not consistently follow PWA's advice and funded projects which PWA had advised were unable to commence within six months, which was not in line with the guidelines. The department monitors 21 of the 22 Fast-Tracked projects on a quarterly basis to ensure projects are on track. Resilience NSW is responsible for the remaining project and does not monitor this on a quarterly basis but has established a project control group that performs a similar function. The agencies advised that this project is being transitioned to the department's management. Sector Development Grants (SDG)The department designed and published guidelines for the SDG stream. The guidelines largely align with the Department of Premier and Cabinet's 'Good Practice Guide to Grants Administration', although they could have been strengthened by including more detail on the eligibility of projects and the role of cost benefit analyses in the assessment process. The guidelines included a detailed and transparent assessment process which the department largely followed. There were gaps in the administration of the SDG stream assessment process. The department did not effectively manage conflicts of interest as it did not ensure all required conflict of interest forms were completed and some forms were completed after the assessment process was finalised. The department also advised that the final version of the conflict of interest register, which contained the declarations for the SDG stream, was lost during a record management system change. The department did not develop guidance for communicating with stakeholders for the SDG stream. Feedback was received from industries which had been excluded from the SDG stream, relaying their concerns, and requesting a broader range of agribusiness sectors be considered for eligibility. A communications plan or strategy could have incorporated guidance on engaging agribusiness stakeholders during the planning stages of the stream, ensuring they were aware of the rationale for the eligible industries selected. The majority of SDG funding went to areas highly impacted by the bushfires, although some highly impacted areas received less funding than lower impacted areas, and there is no clear reason for this. The department does not monitor SDG projects on a quarterly basis to ensure that they remain on track but it ensures it has sufficient evidence that milestones have been completed before making funding payments. Open roundThe department designed and implemented a clearly documented and detailed assessment process for the open round. There were some areas where the process could have been improved, for example, the published guidelines did not set out the role of the former Deputy Premier or include reference to consultation with members of Parliament (MP) as part of the process, despite the fact that MPs were consulted as part of this round. The department improved its management of conflicts of interest compared to the Fast-Tracked and SDG streams by maintaining a conflict of interest register, though not all conflict of interest declarations were collected. The department also developed a communications plan which led to improvements in stakeholder engagement. One of the purposes of the open round was to distribute funding to local government areas (LGA) which did not receive funding through the Fast-Tracked stream. This intention was not outlined in the guidelines for this funding stream. The majority of funding from the open round went to LGAs which had been highly impacted by the bushfires. The department monitors the open round projects on a quarterly basis to ensure that they are on track. |
1. Recommendations
To promote integrity and transparency, the Department of Regional NSW should ensure that for all future grant programs it:
- establishes and follows guidelines that align with relevant good practice guidance including accountabilities, key assessment steps and clear assessment criteria
- ensures a communications plan is in place, including the communication of guidelines to potential applicants
- ensures staff declare conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of a grants stream, and that these conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
- ensures regular monitoring is in place as part of funding deeds
- documents all key decisions and approvals in line with record keeping obligations.
Stage one of the BLER program consisted of early co-funded projects valued at a total of $180 million. This included 22 Fast-Tracked priority projects valued at a total of $107.8 million. The purpose of these projects was to deliver immediate and significant economic impacts to high and moderate bushfire-impacted areas.
A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 5.
Fifty-two projects worth a total of $73.2 million were funded through the SDG stream. One grantee withdrew their project from the stream in early 2021, leaving a total of 51 projects (of which 49 are co-funded with the Commonwealth Government).
A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 9.
The department distributed $283 million to 195 successful projects as part of the open round of the BLER program.
A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 11.
The department entered into funding deeds with successful applicants
The Good Practice Guide advises that the agency administering a grant should enter into a formal agreement with each grant recipient which sets out the arrangements under which a grant is provided, received, managed and acquitted. Across all three streams, the department sent out a letter of offer to successful project managers to let them know that they had been successful in receiving funding, and then entered into funding deeds with grantees. The one exception was the project that RNSW managed, discussed below.
The reviewed funding deeds were signed by department staff with the appropriate level of delegation. They contained an appropriate level of information and key clauses that would allow the department to monitor the progress of the grant to ensure its completion as agreed with the grantee. The reviewed funding deeds contained key information, including:
- total value of the grant
- key deliverables at each milestone
- expected completion date of both the overall project and each milestone
- reporting requirements, including provisions to allow the department to request relevant information
- variation procedures.
The department only makes payments after confirming that milestones have been reached
The department has provided payments to grantees only after they could demonstrate that they had completed the agreed milestone. To ensure each milestone has been completed, the department requires grantees to provide evidence that they have fulfilled the milestone. Types of evidence provided includes photographs and invoices. Where the grantee provides insufficient evidence to the department, the department follows-up with the grantee to ensure that enough information is provided to justify the milestone payment.
The department also plans to undertake site visits of projects at select milestones and at the completion of most projects. The department has undertaken a risk assessment of each SDG and open round project, and uses this risk assessment to determine the number of milestones for the project, as well as the number of site visits that the department will undertake. Fast-Tracked projects all had PWA providing either project management or assurance and as such oversight is being provided through that mechanism. The milestones and site visits at each level of risk can be seen in Exhibit 15 for SDG and Exhibit 16 for open round.
Risk rating | Milestones | Site visits |
Low | Two | Zero |
Medium | Three | One |
High | Four | Two |
Risk rating | Milestones | Site visits |
Low | Three | One |
Medium | Four | Two |
High | Five | Three |
The department does not monitor quarterly progress for SDG grants
As part of the LER framework, the department reports to the Commonwealth every quarter on the status and financials of each project, including whether there are any risks to project delivery and the mitigations in place for those risks. For projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream and the open round, the department collects quarterly progress reports from the grantees. These progress reports allow the department to determine if there are project risks, which can then be reported to the Commonwealth. The progress reports also allow the department to determine if a milestone is likely to be met within the next quarter or whether a project variation may be needed.
While the department monitors projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream and the open round on a quarterly basis, there is no quarterly monitoring of progress for projects funded through the SDG stream. The SDG funding deeds do not include a provision to require quarterly reporting to the department. The department only collects progress reports from grantees when the grantee reports that it has completed a milestone. Quarterly monitoring of the SDG stream would allow the department to determine if projects require corrective action.
Resilience NSW is not collecting quarterly reports for the Fast-Tracked grant it is responsible for administering
One of the projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream was the rebuilding of three local halls across two LGAs, for a total value of $3 million. RNSW is responsible for managing this grant and entered into funding deeds with the relevant councils. It is not documented why RNSW is responsible for these funding deeds rather than the department, which is the signatory for all of the other Fast-Tracked stream funding deeds. RNSW advised it was due to the responsible RNSW Director having a strong working relationship with the relevant councils.
The funding deeds which RNSW signed with the relevant councils set out a requirement that the councils would report on this project to RNSW every quarter. The second milestone of each of these projects involved the submission of a quarterly report. However, RNSW was unable to provide evidence that it carried out this monitoring of the project. At the time of the audit, no second milestone payment had been made. Undertaking quarterly monitoring would provide RNSW with assurance that the money is being expended for the proper purpose and whether the projects will be completed by the target date.
RNSW and the relevant councils developed project control groups for each project, which allows it to monitor the implementation of the projects. PWA is also represented on these project control groups and provides an advisory role in the implementation of the projects.
RNSW and the department advised that responsibility for this project will be transitioned to the department and it will be monitored on a quarterly basis, in line with the other Fast-Tracked projects.
The department has a consistent approach to validating variations
The department's funding deeds with grantees allow for the variation of contracts at the department's discretion after the grantee has written to the department. It is important for the department to consider the impact of any project variation request on the overall program objectives, because a project which costs more than was originally planned or which takes additional time may put at risk the objectives of the BLER program. To ensure that requests for variation are handled consistently and appropriately, the department's Grants Management Office (GMO) has developed a process document which applies to variation requests across the BLER program.
For the grants reviewed as part of this audit, the GMO applied this variation process consistently and has documented the outcomes. Larger variations are reviewed at a higher level of delegation and sign-off. To determine whether a variation is accepted, the GMO considers the following factors:
- consistency with BLER program objectives
- delivery within the timeframes of the BLER program
- eligibility under the BLER program guidelines
- financial viability to deliver within the requested budget.
The department is preparing multiple evaluations, but it has delayed its process evaluation
When developing round one of the BLER program, the department developed an evaluation plan. A total of $1.1 million has been reserved for conducting process, outcome, and economic evaluations of the BLER program and two other bushfire recovery grant programs.
To assist with evaluating program outcomes and economic impact, the department is planning a post-completion survey in 2023–24. This timeline will allow most projects to be completed and enough time for project outcomes to be realised. The department advised that the data collected through this survey would allow the department to determine whether the BLER program has achieved its objectives, as it includes information such as the number of jobs created through each project.
The process evaluation was initially planned for March to June 2021. This would have aligned with the announcement of the open round funding and would have allowed for the learnings from rounds one and two of the BLER program to be applied to the development of round three. However, the department did not conduct this evaluation in a timely way. The department advised that this was because funding deed negotiations were still ongoing, and the department was waiting for 50% of funding deeds to be signed. Given this, the department was not in a position to commence its process evaluation. In December 2021, the department revised its evaluation plan and advised that it commenced its process evaluation in April 2022. It is unlikely that this will allow time for the department to apply learnings to round three, which is currently underway.
Appendix one – Responses from agencies
Appendix two – BLER program distribution
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #373 - released 2 February 2023
Actions for Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity
Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity
What the report is about
The Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) is the State's custodian of rail assets. It is a state owned corporation and commenced operating on 1 July 2020.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. We audited TAHE, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and NSW Treasury.
Separate and related audits on TAHE are reported in 'State Finances 2022', 'State Finances 2021' and 'Transport and Infrastructure 2022' reports.
What we found
The design and implementation of TAHE, which spanned seven years, was not effective.
The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to support an accounting treatment to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments.
The benefits of TAHE were claimed in the 2015–16 NSW Budget before the enabling legislation was passed by Parliament in 2017. This committed the agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, regardless of any challenges that arose.
Rail safety arrangements were a priority throughout TAHE's design and implementation, and risks were raised and addressed.
Agencies relied heavily on consultants on matters related to the creation of TAHE, but failed to effectively manage these engagements. Agencies failed to ensure that consultancies delivered independent advice as an input to decision-making. A small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on the same topic. The final cost of TAHE-related consultancies was $22.6 million compared to the initial estimated cost of $12.9 million.
What we recommended
We recommended that the audited agencies should:
- improve accountability and transparency for major new fiscal transformation initiatives
- ensure entities do not reflect the financial impact of significant initiatives in the Budget when there is uncertainty, or it creates perverse incentives
- review record keeping practices, systems and policies to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998, and the NSW Government Information Classification, Labelling and Handling Guidelines
- review procurement policies to ensure that consultant use complies with all NSW Government policy requirements.
The NSW Government established the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE), a statutory State Owned Corporation (SOC), on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner – RailCorp. It is the State's custodian of rail network assets, including rail tracks and other infrastructure, rolling stock, land, train stations and facilities, retail space, and signal and power systems, within metropolitan and regional New South Wales. It is responsible for $2.8 billion of major capital projects in 2022–23.
TAHE was established under Part 2 of the Transport Administration Act 1988 and is governed by a decision-making board. The Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Employee Relations are the Shareholding Ministers of TAHE, and they annually agree performance expectations articulated in a Statement of Corporate Intent.
Whereas TAHE is the custodian of rail assets, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains operate public rail services. TAHE does not have responsibility for the operation of the heavy rail network or train services, nor does it have network control functions. TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster in the public sector (formerly the Transport cluster and renamed in April 2022), which also includes Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW (TfNSW).
TfNSW leads the Transport and Infrastructure cluster. Its role is to set the strategic direction for transport across the State. This involves the shaping of planning, policy, strategy, regulation, resource allocation and other service and non-service delivery functions for all modes of transport.
TAHE's Operating Licence is granted by the Portfolio Minister and authorises the entity to perform the functions required to acquire, develop, finance, divest and hold assets, pursuant to the Transport Administration Act 1988. The Portfolio Minister also issues a Statement of Expectations which outlines the government’s expectation for the business for the next three to five years.
TAHE's original Portfolio Minister was the Minister for Transport who approved, on 30 June 2020, the issuing of an interim 12-month Operating Licence to enable TAHE to commence operating on 1 July 2020. The Portfolio Minister then granted TAHE's current Operating Licence in 2021. After TAHE requested a 12-month extension to its current Operating Licence, its next Operating Licence is due on 1 July 2024. The current Portfolio Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure, Cities and Active Transport.
About this audit
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. In making this assessment, we considered whether:
- the process of designing and implementing TAHE was cohesive and transparent, and delivered an effective outcome
- agencies' roles and responsibilities were clear in the planning of TAHE
- agencies effectively identified and managed certain risks.
Conclusion
The design and implementation of TAHE was not effective. The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments to sustain TAHE through continuing investment, and funding of the state owned rail operators. The ineffective process to design TAHE delivered a model that entails significant uncertainty as to whether the anticipated longer-term financial improvements to the Budget position can be achieved or sustained.
NSW Treasury and TfNSW had different objectives for TAHE
Up to June 2013, RailCorp had been the owner and operator of rail services and maintainer of the metropolitan rail network for almost a decade. It had been operating as a not-for-profit Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC).
In 2012, NSW Treasury (hereafter Treasury) decided there was a risk that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) would reclassify RailCorp to the General Government Sector (GGS), meaning depreciation expenses of approximately $870 million would be reflected in the GGS Budget. Treasury wanted to avoid this impact on the GGS Budget, and considered the establishment of a transport asset holding entity as a means to do so. Capital grants to RailCorp were being treated as an expense to the GGS Budget.
TfNSW also wanted an asset holding entity – but one that would be a non-trading ‘shell’ company with no staff that would hold and manage all public transport assets. TfNSW's concept envisaged the entity would have a structure that would enable future public transport reforms and strategic directions while ensuring vertical integration of operations between asset owners and the rail operators to maintain rail safety.
However, Treasury pursued its objective to improve the GGS Budget result, and sought to expand on TfNSW's 'shell' asset holding entity concept. Treasury wanted an entity that could generate a return on investment, as this meant that government investment in transport assets could be treated as equity investments, rather than a Budget expense, and in turn improve the GGS Budget position. As an example of the potential impact of creating this new entity, capital grants of $2.3 billion were paid to RailCorp in 2013–14. If Treasury's objective was met, grants of this significance would then be treated as an equity investment, rather than an expense in the GGS Budget.
In 2017, Treasury's preferred option was progressed through legislation, but both agencies' central objectives for the proposed asset holding entity would continue to prove difficult to reconcile. To achieve Treasury's objective to improve the Budget result, the entity would need to generate a return on investment (this is further discussed below). However, TfNSW expressed concerns that the prioritisation of rail safety, and the effective management of governance, regulation and operations would be more complex in an entity with commercial imperatives.
Asset holding entities are a common approach to the management of transport assets in Australia and internationally, and there are a range of approaches to how they are structured and used. Such structures should be driven by the goal of improved asset management. Ultimately, TfNSW's objectives could have been delivered through a simpler entity structure. However, reconciling TfNSW's objectives with Treasury's imperative to deliver and justify a Budget improvement in the short-term resulted in an overly lengthy process and an unnecessarily complex outcome that places an obligation on future governments to sustain. There is still significant uncertainty as to whether the short-term improvements to the Budget can continue to be realised in the longer-term.
The Budget benefits of TAHE were claimed before the entity was legislated, committing the agencies to deliver, regardless of the complexities that subsequently arose
The 2015–16 GGS Budget treated the government's investment in TAHE (still known at this time as RailCorp) as an equity contribution. This had the immediate impact of improving the Budget result by $1.8 billion per annum. However, the legislation to enable the establishment of TAHE had not yet been passed by Parliament, key elements of the operating model were still under development, and imminent changes in accounting standards had the potential to impact TAHE's financial model. The decision to book the benefits in the Budget early committed the involved agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, irrespective of the challenges that arose.
TAHE's financial structure requires circular government investment to work
For the NSW Government to continue to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution, rather than an expense to the Budget, there must be a reasonable expectation that TAHE will generate a sufficient rate of return as required by the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) framework. In doing so, it needs to recover a revaluation loss created by a $20.3 billion reduction in the value of its assets which was incurred in its first full year of operation. This loss occurred as a result of a revaluation of TAHE's assets when RailCorp (a not-for profit entity) became TAHE (a for-profit commercial entity) – and is discussed further in the 'Key findings' below.
TAHE generates a small portion of its income from transactions with the private sector but, as noted in our report 'State Finances 2021', TAHE receives the majority of its revenue (more than 80%) from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. Both of these entities are funded by grants (a Budget expense) to TfNSW from the GGS Budget.
Based on Treasury’s correspondence with the ABS in 2015, TAHE was initially expected to pay a return on equity of 7% in 2016–17. The assumption of a 7% return persisted through to 2018, after the legislation enabling the establishment of TAHE was passed by Parliament. However, when the initial access and licence fees were agreed on 1 July 2020, this figure had been revised to an expected rate of return of 1.5% excluding the revaluation loss. This was below the long-term inflation target and did not include the recovery of the revaluation loss – risking the government's ability to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution. Importantly, as TAHE is primarily reliant on fees paid by the state owned rail operators that, in turn, are funded by the GGS Budget (as an expense), the decision to change the returns model from 7% to 1.5% would in its own right have had a positive impact on the GGS Budget. However, the decision to use a 1.5% return would ultimately be problematic as it made it difficult to treat the government's contributions to TAHE as an equity investment, as discussed below.
On 14 December 2021, to avoid a qualified audit opinion, the NSW Government made the decision to increase TAHE's expected rate of return to 2.5%, equal to the Reserve Bank’s long-term inflation target.
In 2021-22, TAHE needed to start charging rail operators higher access and licence fees in order to generate a return of 2.5%, so as to support the government's treatment of its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution in the GGS Budget. This meant the government needed to provide additional grant (expense) funding to the state owned rail operators so they could pay the increased access and licence fees to TAHE. Based on current projections, TAHE is not expected to recover the revaluation loss until 2046.
There remains a risk that TAHE will not be able to generate a sufficient return on the NSW Government's investment without relying on increased funding to state owned rail operators so that they can in turn pay the higher access and licence fees. TAHE's ability to generate returns on government investment from other sources are uncertain and may not be achievable or sustainable. Current modelling highlights that TAHE remains largely reliant, through to 2046, on increasing fees (which are assumed to increase at 2.5% per annum from 2031 onwards when the current 10 year contracts with rail operators expire) paid by the state owned rail operators that remain principally reliant on GGS Budget grants.
The process of designing and implementing TAHE was not transparent to independent scrutiny
Our report 'State Finances 2021' commented that Treasury did not always provide this Office with information relating to TAHE on a timely basis. Similarly, during this performance audit, there were also multiple instances where auditees were unable to provide documentation regarding key activities in the process to deliver TAHE. Agencies also applied higher sensitivity classifications to large tranches of documents than was justified or required by policy. Of particular concern is the incorrect classification of documents as Cabinet sensitive information. The incorrect or over-classification of documentation as Cabinet sensitive delayed this Office's ability to provide scrutiny or independent assurance.
There was a lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of governance structures set up to oversee the design and implementation of TAHE
From 2014, multiple workstreams and advisory committees were established to progress the design and implementation of TAHE. For some of these committees and workstreams, there is limited information on what they were tasked to do and what they achieved. Most had ceased meeting by 2018, before significant work needed to deliver TAHE was completed.
The lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of these governance structures reduced opportunities for TfNSW and Treasury to reconcile their differing objectives for TAHE, and resolve key questions earlier in the process.
There was a heavy reliance on consulting firms throughout the process to establish TAHE, and the management of consultant engagements failed to ensure that agencies received independent advice to support objective decision-making
In 2020, Treasury and TfNSW failed to prevent, identify, or adequately manage a conflict of interest when they engaged the same 'Big 4' consulting firm to work on separate TAHE-related projects. Both agencies used the firm's work to further their respective views with regard to the financial implications of TAHE's operating model. At this time those views were still unreconciled.
Treasury engaged the firm to provide a fiscal risk management strategy and advice on the impact of changes to accounting standards. TfNSW engaged the same firm to develop operating and financial models for TAHE, which raised concerns regarding the viability of TAHE. Disputes arose around the findings of these reports. Treasury disagreed with some of the outcomes of the work commissioned by TfNSW, relating to accounting treatment and fiscal advice.
The management of this conflict (real or perceived) was left to the 'Big 4' consulting firm when it was more appropriate for it to be managed by Treasury and TfNSW. If these agencies had communicated more effectively, used available governance structures consistently, and shared information openly about their use of the firm and the nature of their respective engagements, these disputes might have been avoided. This issue, coupled with deficiencies in procurement by both agencies, reflected and further perpetuated the lack of cohesion in the design and implementation of TAHE.
More broadly, over the period 2014 – 2021, 16 separate consulting firms were employed to work on 36 contracts, valued at over $22.56 million, relating to TAHE ranging from accounting and legal advice, project management, and the provision of administrative support and secretariat services.
Consultants are legitimately used by agencies to provide advice on how to achieve the outcomes determined by government, including advising agencies on the risks and challenges in achieving those outcomes. Similarly, consultants can provide expert knowledge in the service of achieving those outcomes and managing the risks. However, the heavy reliance on consulting firms during the design and implementation of TAHE heightened the risk that agencies were not receiving value for money, were outsourcing tasks that should be performed by the public service, and did not mitigate the risk that the advice received was not objective and impartial. The risk that the role of consultants could have been blurred between providing independent advice to government on options and facilitating a pre-determined outcome was not effectively treated or mitigated. This risk was amplified because a small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on one topic. The effective procurement and management of consultants is an obligation of government agencies.
Appendix two – Classification of government entities
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
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Parliamentary reference - Report number #372 - released 24 January 2023