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Published

Actions for Planning and Environment 2018

Planning and Environment 2018

Planning
Environment
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the NSW Planning and Environment cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of these agencies. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, some cultural institutions had challenges valuing collection assets in 2017–18. These issues were resolved before the financial statements were finalised.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Planning and Environment cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning and Environment cluster agencies' financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • service delivery.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning and Environment cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. The quality of financial reporting remains high across the cluster.
2.2 Key accounting issues
There were errors in some cultural institutions' collection asset valuations. Recommendation: Collection asset valuations could be improved by:
  • early engagement with key stakeholders regarding the valuation method and approach
  • completing revaluations, including quality review processes earlier 
  • improving the quality of asset data by registering all items in an electronic database. 
2.3 Timeliness of financial reporting
Except for two agencies, the audits of cluster agencies’ financial statements were completed within the statutory timeframe.  Issues with asset revaluations delayed the finalisation of two environment and heritage agencies' financial statement audits. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Planning and Environment cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office annual work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
One in five internal control weaknesses reported in 2017–18 were repeat issues. Delays in implementing audit recommendations can prolong the risk of fraud and error.
Recommendation (repeat issue): Management letter recommendations to address internal control weaknesses should be actioned promptly, with a focus on addressing repeat issues.
One extreme risk was identified relating to the National Art School. The School does not have an occupancy agreement for the Darlinghurst campus. Lack of formal agreement creates uncertainty over the School's continued occupancy of the Darlinghurst site.

The School should continue to liaise with stakeholders to formalise the occupancy arrangement. 
 
3.2 Information technology controls
The controls and governance arrangements when migrating payroll data from the Aurion system to SAP HR system were effective. Data migration from the Aurion system to SAP HR system had no significant issues.
The Department can improve controls over user access to SAP system. The Department needs to ensure the SAP user access controls are appropriate, including investigation of excess access rights and resolving segregation of duties issues. 
3.3 Annual work program
Agencies used different benchmarks to monitor their maintenance expenditure. The cluster agencies under review operate in different industries. As a result, they do not use the same benchmarks to assess the adequacy of their maintenance spend. 

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Planning and Environment cluster, and to collate and present service information for different segments of the cluster in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, ‘Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities’, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all relevant agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program

Transport
Planning
Compliance
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.

The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.

This audit had two objectives:

  1. To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
  2. To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.

We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:

a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?

Conclusion
1. The urban renewal projects on the former railway land are well targeted to support the objectives of the Program. However, there is insufficient evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to Program objectives.

The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the Government. HCCDC, and previously UrbanGrowth NSW, identified and considered options for land use that would best meet Program objectives. Required probity processes were followed for developments that involved financial transactions. Our audit did not assess the achievement of these objectives because none of the projects have been completed yet.

Analysis presented in the Program business case and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.

The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is a part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the cost of the light rail, agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

2. Consultation and oversight were mostly effective during the implementation stages of the Program. There were weaknesses in both areas in the planning stages.

Consultations about the urban renewal activities from around 2015 onward followed good practice standards. These consultations were based on an internationally accepted framework and met their stated objectives. Community consultations on the decision to close the train line were held in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision in 2012 was made without a specific community consultation. There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail.

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. This meant there was not a single agreed set of Program objectives until 2016 and roles and responsibilities for the Program were not clear. Leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program. Roles and responsibilities were clarified and a multi-agency steering committee was established to resolve issues that needed multi-agency coordination.
The light rail is not justified by conventional cost-benefit analysis and there is insufficient evidence that the indirect contribution of light rail to achieving the economic development objectives of the Program will justify the cost.
Analysis presented in Program business cases and other planning documents showed that the light rail would have small transport benefits and was expected to make a modest contribution to broader Program objectives. Analysis in the Program business case argued that despite this, the light rail was justified because it would attract investment and promote economic development around the route. The Program business case referred to several international examples to support this argument, but did not make a convincing case that these examples were comparable to the proposed light rail in Newcastle.
The business case analysis of the benefits and costs of light rail was prepared after the decision to build light rail had been made and announced. Our previous reports, and recent reports by others, have emphasised the importance of completing thorough analysis before announcing infrastructure projects. Some advice provided after the initial light rail decision was announced was overly optimistic. It included benefits that cannot reasonably be attributed to light rail and underestimated the scope and cost of the project.
The audited agencies argue that the contribution of light rail cannot be assessed separately because it is part of a broader Program. The cost of the light rail makes up around 53 per cent of the total Program funding. Given the high cost of the light rail, we believe agencies need to be able to demonstrate that this investment provides value for money by making a measurable contribution to the Program objectives.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should support economical decision-making on infrastructure projects by:
  • providing balanced advice to decision makers on the benefits and risks of large infrastructure investments at all stages of the decision-making process
  • providing scope and cost estimates that are as accurate and complete as possible when initial funding decisions are being made
  • making business cases available to the public.​​​​​​
The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government.

The planned uses of the former railway land align with the objectives of encouraging people to visit and live in the city centre, creating attractive public spaces, and supporting growth in employment in the city. The transport benefits of the activities are less clear, because the light rail is the major transport project and this will not make significant improvements to transport in Newcastle.

The processes used for selling and leasing parts of the former railway land followed industry standards. Options for the former railway land were identified and assessed systematically. Competitive processes were used for most transactions and the required assessment and approval processes were followed. The sale of land to the University of Newcastle did not use a competitive process, but required processes for direct negotiations were followed.

Recommendation
By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should:
  • work with relevant stakeholders to explore options for increasing the focus on the heritage objective of the Program in projects on the former railway land. This could include projects that recognise the cultural and industrial heritage of Newcastle.
Consultations about the urban renewal activities followed good practice standards, but consultation on transport decisions for the Program did not.

Consultations focusing on urban renewal options for the Program included a range of stakeholders and provided opportunities for input into decisions about the use of the former railway land. These consultations received mostly positive feedback from participants. Changes and additions were made to the objectives of the Program and specific projects in response to feedback received. 

There had been several decades of debate about the potential closure of the train line, including community consultations in 2006 and 2009. However, the final decision to close the train line was made and announced in 2012 without a specific community consultation. HCCDC states that consultation with industry and business representatives constitutes community consultation because industry representatives are also members of the community. This does not meet good practice standards because it is not a representative sample of the community.

There was no community consultation on the decision to build a light rail. There were subsequent opportunities for members of the community to comment on the implementation options, but the decision to build it had already been made. A community and industry consultation was held on which route the light rail should use, but the results of this were not made public. 

Recommendation
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should consult with a wide range of stakeholders before major decisions are made and announced, and report publicly on the results and outcomes of consultations. 

The governance arrangements that were in place during the planning stages of the Program did not provide effective oversight. Project leadership and oversight improved during the implementation phase of the Program.

Multi-agency coordination and oversight were ineffective during the planning stages of the Program. Examples include: multiple versions of Program objectives being in circulation; unclear reporting lines for project management groups; and poor role definition for the initial advisory board. Program ownership was clarified in mid-2016 with the appointment of a new Program Director with clear accountability for the delivery of the Program. This was supported by the creation of a multi-agency steering committee that was more effective than previous oversight bodies.

The limitations that existed in multi-agency coordination and oversight had some negative consequences in important aspects of project management for the Program. This included whole-of-government benefits management and the coordination of work to mitigate impacts of the Program on small businesses.

Recommendations
For future infrastructure programs, NSW Government agencies should: 

  • develop and implement a benefits management approach from the beginning of a program to ensure responsibility for defining benefits and measuring their achievement is clear
  • establish whole-of-government oversight early in the program to guide major decisions. This should include:
    • agreeing on objectives and ensuring all agencies understand these
    • clearly defining roles and responsibilities for all agencies
    • establishing whole-of-government coordination for the assessment and mitigation of the impact of major construction projects on businesses and the community.

By March 2019, the Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation should update and implement the Program Benefits Realisation Plan. This should include:

  • setting measurable targets for the desired benefits
  • clearly allocating ownership for achieving the desired benefits
  • monitoring progress toward achieving the desired benefits and reporting publicly on the results.

Appendix one - Response from agencies    

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018

Published

Actions for Regional Assistance Programs

Regional Assistance Programs

Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Transport
Compliance
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Project management

Infrastructure NSW effectively manages how grant applications for regional assistance programs are assessed and recommended for funding. Its contract management processes are also effective. However, we are unable to conclude whether the objectives of these programs have been achieved as the relevant agencies have not yet measured their benefits, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. 

In 2011, the NSW Government established Restart NSW to fund new infrastructure with the proceeds from the sale and lease of government assets. From 2011 to 2017, the NSW Government allocated $1.7 billion from the fund for infrastructure in regional areas, with an additional commitment of $1.3 billion to be allocated by 2021. The NSW Government allocates these funds through regional assistance programs such as Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads. NSW councils are the primary recipients of funding provided under these programs.

The NSW Government announced the Resources for Regions program in 2012 with the aim of addressing infrastructure constraints in mining affected communities. Infrastructure NSW administers the program, with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet.

The NSW Government announced the Fixing Country Roads program in 2014 with the aim of building more efficient road freight networks. Transport for NSW and Infrastructure NSW jointly administer this program, which funds local councils to deliver projects that help connect local and regional roads to state highways and freight hubs.

This audit assessed whether these two programs (Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads) were being effectively managed and achieved their objectives. In making this assessment, we answered the following questions:

  • How well are the relevant agencies managing the assessment and recommendation process?
  • How do the relevant agencies ensure that funded projects are being delivered?
  • Do the funded projects meet program and project objectives?

The audit focussed on four rounds of Resources for Regions funding between 2013–14 to 2015–16, as well as the first two rounds of Fixing Country Roads funding in 2014–15 and 2015–16.

Conclusion
Infrastructure NSW effectively manages how grant applications are assessed and recommended for funding. Infrastructure NSW’s contract management processes are also effective. However, we are unable to conclude on whether program objectives are being achieved as Infrastructure NSW has not yet measured program benefits.
While Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW managed the assessment processes effectively overall, they have not fully maintained all required documentation, such as conflict of interest registers. Keeping accurate records is important to support transparency and accountability to the public about funding allocation. The relevant agencies have taken steps to address this in the current funding rounds for both programs.
For both programs assessed, the relevant agencies have developed good strategies over time to support councils through the application process. These strategies include workshops, briefings and feedback for unsuccessful applicants. Transport for NSW and the Department of Premier and Cabinet have implemented effective tools to assist applicants in demonstrating the economic impact of their projects.
Infrastructure NSW is effective in identifying projects that are 'at‑risk' and assists in bringing them back on track. Infrastructure NSW has a risk‑based methodology to verify payment claims, which includes elements of good practice in grants administration. For example, it requires grant recipients to provide photos and engages Public Works Advisory to review progress claims and visit project sites.
Infrastructure NSW collects project completion reports for all Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads funded projects. Infrastructure NSW intends to assess benefits for both programs once each project in a funding round is completed. To date, no funding round has been completed. As a result, no benefits assessment has been done for any completed project funded in either program.
 

The project selection criteria are consistent with the program objectives set by the NSW Government, and the RIAP applied the criteria consistently. Probity and record keeping practices did not fully comply with the probity plans.

The assessment methodology designed by Infrastructure NSW is consistent with2 the program objectives and criteria. In the rounds that we reviewed, all funded projects met the assessment criteria.

Infrastructure NSW developed probity plans for both programs which provided guidance on the record keeping required to maintain an audit trail, including the use of conflict of interest registers. Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW did not fully comply with these requirements. The relevant agencies have taken steps to address this in the current funding rounds for both programs.

NSW Procurement Board Directions require agencies to ensure that they do not engage a probity advisor that is engaged elsewhere in the agency. Infrastructure NSW has not fully complied with this requirement. A conflict of interest arose when Infrastructure NSW engaged the same consultancy to act as its internal auditor and probity advisor.

While these infringements of probity arrangements are unlikely to have had a major impact on the assessment process, they weaken the transparency and accountability of the process.

Some councils have identified resourcing and capability issues which impact on their ability to participate in the application process. For both programs, the relevant agencies conducted briefings and webinars with applicants to provide advice on the objectives of the programs and how to improve the quality of their applications. Additionally, Transport for NSW and the Department of Premier and Cabinet have developed tools to assist councils to demonstrate the economic impact of their applications.

The relevant agencies provided feedback on unsuccessful applications to councils. Councils reported that the quality of this feedback has improved over time.

Recommendations

  1. By June 2018, Infrastructure NSW should:
    • ensure probity reports address whether all elements of the probity plan have been effectively implemented.
  1. By June 2018, Infrastructure NSW and Transport for NSW should:
    • maintain and store all documentation regarding assessment and probity matters according to the State Records Act 1998, the NSW Standard on Records Management and the relevant probity plans

Infrastructure NSW is responsible for overseeing and monitoring projects funded under Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads. Infrastructure NSW effectively manages projects to keep them on track, however it could do more to assure itself that all recipients have complied with funding deeds. Benefits and outcomes should also start to be measured and reported as soon as practicable after projects are completed to inform assessment of future projects.

Infrastructure NSW identifies projects experiencing unreasonable delays or higher than expected expenses as 'at‑risk'. After Infrastructure NSW identifies a project as 'at‑risk', it puts in place processes to resolve issues to bring them back on track. Infrastructure NSW, working with Public Works Advisory regional offices, employs a risk‑based approach to validate payment claims, however this process should be strengthened. Infrastructure NSW would get better assurance by also conducting annual audits of compliance with the funding deed for a random sample of projects.

Infrastructure NSW collects project completion reports for all Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads funded projects. It applies the Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework to Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads at a program level. This means that each round of funding (under both programs) is treated as a distinct program for the purposes of benefits realisation. It plans to assess whether benefits have been realised once each project in a funding round is completed. As a result, no benefits realisation assessment has been done for any project funded under either Resources for Regions or Fixing Country Roads. Without project‑level benefits realisation, future decisions are not informed by the lessons from previous investments.

Recommendations

  1. By December 2018, Infrastructure NSW should:
    • conduct annual audits of compliance with the funding deed for a random sample of projects funded under Resources for Regions and Fixing Country Roads
    • publish the circumstances under which unspent funds can be allocated to changes in project scope
    • measure benefits delivered by projects that were completed before December 2017
    • implement an annual process to measure benefits for projects completed after December 2017
  1. By December 2018, Transport for NSW and Infrastructure NSW should:
    • incorporate a benefits realisation framework as part of the detailed application.

Published

Actions for Volume One 2012 focusing on themes from 2011

Volume One 2012 focusing on themes from 2011

Health
Industry
Premier and Cabinet
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Shared services and collaboration

The following overview of audits from 2011 found agency restructures significantly impacted agency financial reporting processes, agencies are having difficulty establishing and enforcing compliance with their own policies and procedures, agencies experienced problems complying with regulations and providing adequate documentation to support their financial statements, the poor quality of some financial statements with 1,256 misstatements identified, 540 so significant they had to be corrected, deficiencies in information security exist across many agencies, computer system disaster recovery plans for financial systems not existing or outdated, do not align with agencies’ business recovery requirements, do not properly identify and assess critical systems and processes and testing is incomplete.