What this report is about

Results of the local government sector financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

Findings

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for 85 councils, eight county councils and 12 joint organisations.

Qualified audit opinions were issued for 36 councils due to non-recognition of rural firefighting equipment vested under section 119(2) of the Rural Fires Act 1997.

The audits of seven councils, one county council and one joint organisation remain in progress at the date of this report due to significant accounting issues.

Fifty councils, county councils and joint organisations missed the statutory deadline of submitting their financial statements to the Office of Local Government, within the Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure, by 31 October.

Audit management letters included 1,131 findings with 40% being repeat findings and 91 findings being high-risk. Governance, asset management and information technology continue to represent 65% of the key areas for improvement.

Fifty councils do not have basic governance and internal controls to manage cyber security.

Recommendations

To improve quality and timeliness of financial reporting, councils should:

• adopt early financial reporting procedures, including asset valuations
• ensure integrity and completeness of asset source records
• perform procedures to confirm completeness, accuracy and condition of vested rural firefighting equipment.

To improve internal controls, councils should:

• track progress of implementing audit recommendations, and prioritise high-risk repeat issues
• continue to focus on cyber security governance and controls.

Pursuant to the Local Government Act 1993 I am pleased to present my Auditor-General’s report on Local Government 2023. My report provides the results of the 2022–23 financial audits of 121 councils, eight county councils and 12 joint organisations. It also includes the results of the 2021–22 audits for two councils and two joint organisations which were completed after tabling of the Auditor-General’s report on Local Government 2022. The 2022–23 audits for eight councils, one county council and one joint organisation remain in progress due to significant accounting issues.

This will be my last consolidated report on local councils in NSW as my term as Auditor-General ends in April. Without a doubt, the change in mandate to make me the auditor of the local government sector has been the biggest challenge in my term. Challenging for councils as they adjust to consistent audit arrangements and for the staff of the Audit Office of NSW as they learn about the issues facing NSW councils.

The change in mandate aimed to improve the quality of financial management and reporting across the sector. This will take time. But this report does show some ‘green shoots’ with more councils submitting financial reports to the Office of Local Government by 31 October and more councils having Audit, Risk and Improvement Committees. 

I also want to acknowledge that councils face significant challenges responding to and recovering from emergency events whilst cost and resourcing pressures have been persistent.

The findings from our audits identify opportunities to further improve timeliness and quality of financial reporting and integrity of systems and processes. The recommendations in this report are also intended to improve financial management and reporting capability, encourage sound governance, and boost cyber resilience.

Margaret Crawford PSM
Auditor-General for New South Wales

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence in and transparency of public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines audit observations related to the financial reporting audit results of councils, county councils and joint organisations.

A strong system of internal controls enables councils to operate effectively and efficiently, produce reliable financial reports, comply with laws and regulations, and support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends in governance and internal controls across councils, county councils and joint organisations in 2022–23.

Financial audits focus on key governance matters and internal controls supporting the preparation of councils’ financial statements. Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues are reported to management and those charged with governance through audit management letters. These letters include our observations with risk ratings, related implications, and recommendations.

Appendix one – Response from the Office of Local Government within the Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure

Appendix two – NSW Crown Solicitor’s advice

Appendix three – Status of previous recommendations

Appendix four – Status of audits

Appendix five – Councils received qualified audit opinions for non-recognition of rural firefighting equipment

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

WestInvest is a $5 billion funding program announced in September 2021 to provide ‘local infrastructure to help communities hit hard by COVID-19’ in 15 local government areas (LGAs) selected by the government. It was divided into three parts: $3 billion for NSW government agency projects; $1.6 billion for competitive grants to councils and community groups; and $400 million for non-competitive grants to councils.

Following the change of government at the 2023 election, the program was renamed the Western Sydney Infrastructure Grants Program. Funding decisions made for the community and local government grants were retained, but multiple funding decisions for the NSW government projects were changed.

The audit objective was to assess the integrity of the design and implementation of the program and the award of program funding.

Findings

The design of the program lacked integrity because it was not informed by robust research or analysis to justify the commitment of public money to a program of this scale.

The then government did not have sufficient regard to the implications for the state's credit rating. A risk to the credit rating arose because the government may have been perceived to be using proceeds from major asset sales to fund new expenditure, rather than pay down its debt.

Decisions about program design were made by the then Treasurer's office without consultation with affected communities. The rationale for these decisions was not documented or made public.

For the NSW government projects, funding allocations did not follow advice from departments. Many funded projects did not meet the objectives of the program.

The two other rounds of the program were administered effectively, except for some gaps in documentation and quality assurance. The program guidelines did not require an equitable or needs-based distribution of funding across LGAs and there was a significant imbalance in funding between the 15 LGAs.

Recommendations

Our recommendations for the administration of future funding programs included:

• considering whether competitive grants are the best way to achieve the program's purpose
• completing program design and guidelines before announcements
• ensuring adequate quality assurance.

We also recommended that when providing advice for submissions by Ministers to Cabinet, agencies should ensure that departmental advice is clearly identified and is distinct from other advice or political considerations. 

WestInvest is a $5 billion funding program that was announced in September 2021. The program was established with the stated aim of building ‘new and improved facilities and local infrastructure to help communities hit hard by COVID-19’.

WestInvest was divided into three funding streams:

• $3 billion NSW government projects round open to NSW government agencies
• $1.6 billion community projects competitive round administered as a competitive grant program that was open to local councils, non-government organisations, Local Aboriginal Land Councils, and educational institutions in the 15 eligible LGAs
• $400 million local government projects round administered as a non-competitive grant round only open to the 15 eligible councils, with each council receiving a pre-determined share of the $400 million.

The WestInvest program was administered by NSW Treasury and the Premier's Department (previously the Department of Premier and Cabinet). Decisions about funding allocations were made by the former Treasurer in his role as the statutory decision-maker and announced by the former government in the lead up to the March 2023 NSW State election, but no funding was paid prior to the election.

Following the change of government, the funding decisions for the community projects competitive round and local government projects round were confirmed and negotiation of funding deeds commenced. The current government reviewed the decisions for the NSW government projects round and made changes to multiple decisions as part of the 2023–24 NSW Budget process. The current government has also changed the name of the program to the Western Sydney Infrastructure Grants Program.

The objective of the audit was to assess the integrity of the design and administration of the WestInvest program. This included assessing the processes used in the design and implementation of the program and award of funding.

The audit did not re-assess the merits of individual projects that were submitted for funding consideration and did not examine the implementation of projects that were allocated funding.

Decisions about the objectives and focus areas for the program were made without advice or analysis from the agencies that administered the program

The WestInvest program involved the commitment of $5 billion as a stimulus measure linked to economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there was no business case or other economic analysis conducted to support consideration of the potential benefits and costs of the program. Media releases and the public guidelines for WestInvest stated that western Sydney was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic more severely than other parts of Sydney and regional NSW. These assertions were not supported by evidence or analysis.

Evidence from NSW Treasury provided for this audit indicates that it was asked to prepare the initial proposal for the WestInvest program within a very short timeframe. This limited its ability to conduct research, analysis and consultation that could have informed the development of the program. This is particularly important for the integrity of decisions involving large-scale spending. Staff from NSW Treasury and the Premier's Department advised the audit team that the areas of focus for WestInvest were decided by Ministers and their staff without advice from the audited agencies. There is no documented analysis justifying the decision to focus the program on community infrastructure, or the six ‘areas of focus’ that were selected. The Premier's Department commissioned research from Western Sydney University after the areas of focus for the program had been decided. This did not inform decisions about the program focus but aimed to provide baseline information about community infrastructure in the 15 eligible LGAs which could be used in program evaluation.

The rationale for making 15 LGAs eligible for the program was not clear

It is not clear how the government decided which LGAs would be eligible for WestInvest funding. Public communication about the program referred to the western Sydney region and commented on areas that had been ‘hit hard’ by the COVID-19 pandemic. The specific factors that were used to decide which LGAs were eligible were not explained publicly or documented.

In the 2019–20 NSW Budget papers, "western Sydney" was defined as 12 LGAs. All of these were included as eligible for the WestInvest program. The additional three LGAs that were made eligible for the WestInvest program (Burwood, Canterbury-Bankstown, and Strathfield) were not within the NSW Budget papers definition but were designated "areas of concern" during the COVID-19 pandemic, which meant they were subject to more restrictions than other LGAs at certain points.

Georges River and Bayside LGAs both made public statements that drew attention to the fact that they were not made eligible for the WestInvest program despite being designated areas of concern. Several of the 15 LGAs that were made eligible for WestInvest had not been designated areas of concern during the pandemic, including Penrith, The Hills, and Blue Mountains. 

There was no consultation with eligible councils or other key stakeholders before the program design was decide

The program design had not been subject to consultation with councils or other relevant organisations in western Sydney. This meant that the views of eligible councils and community organisations on strategic priorities in their respective communities were not considered before decisions on program design were made.

Staff from some councils interviewed by the audit team indicated that while funding for community infrastructure is welcome, some councils had other priority areas for infrastructure development that were at least as high as new community infrastructure. As independent entities, each council has its own strategic planning processes to identify and plan for infrastructure projects and other areas of need. These were not considered in the design of the WestInvest program.

Staff at several councils we spoke to highlighted delivery risks to the projects for which they had been allocated funding. These included:

• the short timetable set by the then government (considering the amount of funding available and the requirements for applications) meant that full project development and assurance processes were not completed for most applications when they were submitted
• difficulty complying with the government’s administrative and assurance requirements for funding recipients, such as detailed planning and reporting.

When early planning for WestInvest was being done, both NSW Treasury and the Premier's Department identified the risk that applicants may not be able to deliver funded projects on time or within budget. The absence of consultation, research and analysis before the program design was finalised meant that these factors were not considered before the government had committed to the program. We did not see evidence that the then government had considered the cumulative impact of an additional $5 billion in infrastructure projects on the costs of materials and skilled labour concentrated in the eligible LGAs.

The Premier's Department conducted an online survey (WestInvest 'Have Your Say'), between 23 February 2022 and 31 March 2022. This was open to the public and asked questions about which of the six ‘areas of focus’ were most important to them and what type of community infrastructure projects they would like to see. This found higher levels of community support for two of the six areas (community infrastructure and green and open space).

On 18 April 2022, the Premier's Department released a summary report on the findings of the WestInvest ‘Have Your Say’ Survey. The Premier's Department noted that the survey was for consultation purposes only and did not form part of the application process for the WestInvest program. The Premier's Department stated in its summary report that the survey results 'will feed into the assessment process across the WestInvest Program'.

However, the Premier's Department staff interviewed by the audit team told us that the survey results did not play any formal role in the assessment process or funding recommendations for projects. The survey did not provide data that could be used to inform assessment decisions because:

• responses could be submitted by any member of the public who accessed the survey, not just those living in the LGAs that were eligible for the program, so the data could not be taken as representative of the views of the residents of eligible LGAs
• many survey responses were ruled ineligible as they were deemed to be associated with a community campaign that related to projects outside the focus areas of WestInvest.

The government did not have sufficient regard to risks to the State's credit rating when establishing the WestInvest program

The NSW Government has a policy of maintaining a AAA credit rating for the State of New South Wales. This is codified in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012. The NSW Government did not have sufficient regard to the implications and risks of committing $5 billion of funding to the WestInvest program to its credit rating. A risk to the State's credit rating arose because the government may have been perceived to be using proceeds from major asset sales to fund new expenditure, rather than paying down State debt.

The $3 billion NSW government projects round was open to NSW government agencies and administration of the round was led by NSW Treasury. Funding allocated through this round was not subject to the NSW Grants Administration Guide. This is because the funding was awarded to NSW government agencies rather than organisations external to government, so it did not meet the definition of a grant program. Projects were submitted by NSW government agencies to NSW Treasury and were assessed against program criteria by staff from NSW Treasury and the Premier's Department. Each project received a score and advice on whether it was suitable for funding or not. The WestInvest steering committee considered these and provided advice to the then Treasurer.

NSW Treasury prepared guidelines for the $3 billion NSW government projects round, but these were not approved by the then Treasurer until after the program assessment had commenced

NSW Treasury prepared guidelines for the NSW government projects round in September 2021. These were submitted to the then Treasurer for approval in December 2021 but were not approved. This meant that the process for assessing applications for NSW government projects was not agreed between government agencies and the then Treasurer, who was the statutory decision-maker of the allocations of funding. NSW Treasury subsequently prepared an assessment plan based on the unapproved guidelines, which set out more details about the process to be used for assessing applications for the NSW government projects round. The program guidelines were not published, which meant there was no public information about the process for assessing the largest component of the WestInvest program.

In May 2022, the then Treasurer’s Office requested that NSW Treasury make changes to the unapproved guidelines so that projects that delivered 'business as usual' state government infrastructure such as schools, roads, and health infrastructure were no longer considered ineligible for the program. These revised guidelines were approved in June 2022, but were not published. The changes were not consistent with the initial purpose of the WestInvest program which was to fund ‘transformational’ community infrastructure.

The funding advice from the WestInvest steering committee was not followed by the then Treasurer and the justifications for the funding allocation decisions were not documented

One-third of the projects that were allocated funding (9 out of 27) had been assessed by the WestInvest steering committee as having low or moderate merit. These projects were allocated combined funding of $1.1 billion. Reasons that the steering committee gave for assessing these projects as not suitable for funding through the WestInvest program included the absence of completed business cases, incomplete project development, and poor alignment to the objectives and criteria for the WestInvest program as outlined in the original program guidelines.

Staff from NSW Treasury and the Premier's Department put considerable resources into preparing guidelines and assessing and providing advice on the merits and eligibility of applications against these guidelines, but in most cases the advice was not followed by the then Treasurer. There was no documentation of reasons for the departures from steering committee advice. The NSW government projects round was not subject to the NSW Grants Administration Guide, so the requirement under those guidelines for documenting reasons for departures from advice on funding decisions did not apply. However, when the WestInvest program was established, it was noted that any departures from the funding advice from the steering committee would be documented by the then Treasurer. This applied to the entire WestInvest program. None of the projects that were allocated funding through the NSW government projects round were actually given funding, as only allocations of funding were approved by the then Treasurer.

Most of the funding was allocated to projects that did not align with the purpose of WestInvest or meet the assurance requirements of the program

Of the 27 projects that were allocated funding (Exhibit 3), 12 were from the Department of Education and seven from Transport for NSW. This resulted in over $2 billion, or 69% of the funding available through the NSW government projects round, being allocated to state school and road projects. Most of these projects were not aligned with any of the six focus areas of the WestInvest program. In addition, these projects were examples of ‘business as usual’ activities of NSW government agencies that did not clearly align with the initial purpose of the program to deliver transformational community infrastructure that would improve liveability in the 15 eligible LGAs.

Source: NSW Treasury documents.

Conditions were attached to the approval of funding allocations for 21 of the 27 projects. Most of these conditions related to the completion of a business case and other project assurance requirements, which were required under the program guidelines.

Projects approved through the WestInvest program were to receive funding from the Community Services and Facilities Fund (CSFF), which is a legislative fund created under the NSW Generations Funds Act 2018 (the Act). The Act states that the purpose of the CSFF is to provide funding for ‘cost-effective facilities and services’ (s.12(1)). The absence of business cases and other assurance requirements from most of the projects approved created the risk of legislative non-compliance, as many of the projects that had been allocated funding could not clearly demonstrate that they would be cost-effective.

NSW Treasury and the Premier's Department’s assessment of the first group of projects submitted for the NSW government projects round indicated that agencies applying for funding did not understand the purpose or requirements of the program. NSW Treasury and the Premier's Department received 153 applications after the first call for proposals. Most did not align with the stated purpose of WestInvest or meet the assurance requirements that had been set for the program. For example:

• 90 project proposals (59% of those submitted) were assessed as ineligible. Thirty-five of the 90 did not include any infrastructure, which was the main purpose of the WestInvest program. The other 55 proposed infrastructure projects were not consistent with any of six areas of focus for the program.
• 118 proposals (77% of proposals submitted) did not have a business case, which was a requirement of the WestInvest program guidelines.

As the first request for project proposals did not generate enough suitable applications, the then Treasurer made a second request to NSW government agencies in August 2022 seeking additional project proposals. This occurred after the guidelines for the NSW government projects round had been broadened to allow more projects to be considered for funding (discussed above).

Multiple state school projects were allocated funding after being assessed by the WestInvest steering committee as ineligible or unsuitable for funding

The Westmead Education Campus project, valued at $308 million, was rated as ineligible by NSW Treasury and the Premier's Department because it did not address any of the six specified focus areas for the WestInvest program. This meant it did not go through a full assessment against the program criteria and was not submitted to the then Treasurer for funding consideration.

The project was later re-submitted and the then Treasurer subsequently approved it for funding allocation. This occurred after the guidelines for the NSW government projects round had been broadened (discussed above). NSW Treasury's advice on this submission noted that the project had not been fully developed, with key decisions about the delivery model not made, and it did not have a final business case.

The Box Hill (Terry Road) new school project, valued at $112 million was rated as ‘moderate – not suitable for funding consideration at this time’ by the WestInvest steering committee. It was subsequently approved for funding by the then Treasurer.

Nine school upgrade projects with a total value of $478 million were allocated funding by the then Treasurer. Each of these had been assessed as ineligible by NSW Treasury and the Premier's Department against the original program guidelines because they did not meet any of the WestInvest focus areas and were not considered 'transformational'. There were a further 14 similar proposals for school upgrades that were also assessed as ineligible but were not allocated funding.

Funding allocations from the WestInvest program were changed after the 2023 NSW State election

Following the change of government at the 2023 NSW state election, most of the funding decisions announced by the former government were changed. The new government had announced during the election campaign that, if elected, it would redirect some WestInvest funding 'to rebuild Western Sydney schools and Western Sydney hospitals'. Eleven of the 27 projects that had been announced by the former government were not funded by the new government. The combined value of these projects was at around $1.5 billion (Exhibit 4). The seven roads projects that had been allocated funding through WestInvest, valued at $1 billion, were also removed from the WestInvest funding allocation but these still received funding from a different source.

Source: NSW Treasury documents.

The funding was reallocated to 17 projects that the new government had announced as election commitments during the 2023 State election campaign. This comprised ten school infrastructure projects, five health infrastructure projects, and two transport infrastructure projects. All of these projects had a cost of more than $10 million each, which means they are subject to NSW Government business case and gateway assurance requirements. Business cases had been completed for the two transport projects. The other 15 projects did not have business cases.

Source: NSW Treasury documents.

After these changes, the $3 billion NSW government projects round funding distribution was:

• Nine school upgrades, valued at $478 million, that had been allocated funding by the former government (see Exhibit 3).
• 17 new projects, with a total value of around $2.3 billion, that had been announced as election commitments by the new government (Exhibit 5). All of these are state school, health, or transport infrastructure.
• Three projects that covered administrative costs associated with the WestInvest program, with a total value of around $230 million (not previously announced).

The $1.6 billion community project grants - competitive round was open to local councils, NGOs, Local Aboriginal Land Councils, and educational institutions, across 15 eligible LGAs in western Sydney. Exhibit 6 shows a timeline of key dates for the community project grants - competitive round.

The $400 million local government projects round was administered as a non-competitive grant round that was only open to the 15 eligible councils. Each council was allocated a portion of the $400 million funding via a formula that provided a base allocation and an additional amount based on the population of each LGA. Each council received between $21 million and $35 million.

Applications for funding were submitted to the Premier's Department for assessment. Proposed projects were required to be eligible for the program and be rated as having merit against the published program criteria, which were the same as those for the competitive round. Exhibit 12 shows a timeline of key dates for the Local government projects competitive round.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #391 - released 28 February 2024.

What this report is about

Results of the audit of the Consolidated State Financial Statements of the New South Wales General Government Sector (GGS) and Total State Sector (TSS) for the year ended 30 June 2023.

Findings

The audit opinion on the 2022–23 Consolidated State Financial Statements was qualified in relation to two issues and included an emphasis of matter.

The first qualification matter is a continuation of the prior year limitation of scope on the audit relating to the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT), a controlled state entity, who continued to deny access to its management, books and records for the purposes of a financial audit. As a result, the Audit Office was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support the assets, liabilities, income and expenses relating to CMCT recorded in the TSS and the equity investment recognised in the GGS relating to the net assets of CMCT.

The second qualification matter relates to the limitations on the accuracy and reliability of financial information relating to Statutory Land Managers (SLMs) and Common Trust entities (CTs) controlled by the State and were either exempted from requirements to prepare financial reports, or who were required to submit financial reports and have not done so. The Audit Office was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to determine the impact on the value of non-land assets and liabilities, income and expenses that should be recognised in the 2022–23 Consolidated State Financial Statements and which have not been recorded in the Consolidated State Financial Statements.

The independent audit opinion also includes an emphasis of matter drawing attention to key decisions made by the NSW Government regarding the future of the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE).

Recommendations

The report includes recommendations for NSW Treasury to address several high-risk findings, including:

• ensuring accurate and reliable financial information is available to recognise the non-land balances of SLMs and CTs
• ensuring the CMCT, SLMs and CTs meet their statutory reporting obligations
• conducting a broader review of the financial reporting exemption framework
• continued monitoring of TAHE's control over its assets
• providing timely guidance to the sector relating to legislative or policy changes that impact financial reporting
• developing an accounting policy for the reimbursement of unsuccessful tender bid cost contributions.

Read the PDF report

What this report is about

Result of the Treasury portfolio of agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

The results of the audit of the NSW Government’s consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which are prepared by NSW Treasury, will be reported separately in our report on ‘State Finances 2023’.

The audit found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all general purpose financial statement audits.

Qualified audit opinions were issued on two of the 24 other engagements prepared by portfolio agencies. These related to payments made from Special Deposit Accounts that did not comply with the relevant legislation.

The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits increased from 29 in 2021–22 to 39 in 2022–23.

The new parental leave policy impacted agencies across all portfolios. NSW Treasury should perform annual assessments to identify changes in legislation and regulation and provide timely guidance to the sector.

Transport for NSW and Sydney Metro have capitalised over $300 million of tender bid costs paid to unsuccessful tender bidders relating to significant infrastructure projects. Whilst NSW Treasury policy provides clarity on the reimbursement of unsuccessful bidders’ costs, clearer guidance on how to account for these costs in agencies’ financial statements is required.

The key audit issues were

Five high-risk issues were reported in 2022–23. Three were new findings on contract management, accounting treatments for workers compensation renewal premium adjustments and the management and oversight of a Special Deposit Account. Two repeat issues referred to the need to improve quality review processes over financial reporting and the timely approval of administration costs.

Portfolio agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Treasury portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury portfolio.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Acquittals and other opinions

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

Results of the Health portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

The audit found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Health portfolio agencies' financial statements. 

The number of monetary misstatements increased in 2022–23, driven by key accounting issues, including the first-time recognition of paid parental leave and plant and equipment fair value adjustments. 

The key audit issues were 

NSW Health identified errors regarding the recognition and calculation of long service leave entitlements for employees with ten or more years of service that had periods of part time service in the first ten years, resulting in prior period restatements. 

Comprehensive revaluation of buildings at the Graythwaite Charitable Trust found errors in the previous year's valuation, resulting in prior period restatements. 

New parental leave legislation increased employee liabilities for portfolio agencies. The Ministry of Health corrected the consolidated financial statements to record parental leave liabilities for all agencies within the Health portfolio.   

A repeat high-risk issue relates to processing time records by administrators that have not been reviewed prior to running the pay cycle.   

Thirty per cent of reported issues were repeat issues. 

The audit recommended 

Portfolio agencies should ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards. 

Portfolio agencies should address deficiencies that resulted in qualified reports on:   

• the design and operation of shared service controls
• prudential non-compliance at residential aged care facilities.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Health portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health portfolio.  

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

Result of the Transport portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

The audit found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all Transport portfolio agencies.

An 'emphasis of matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales' (TAHE) independent auditor's report, which draws attention to management's disclosure regarding proposed changes to TAHE's operating model.

Government's decision to convert TAHE into a non-commercial Public Non-Financial Corporation may impact the future valuation and the control of TAHE's assets.

Transport for NSW's valuation of roads and bridges resulted in a net increase to its asset value by $15.7 billion.

Transport for NSW and Sydney Metro have capitalised over $300 million of tender bid costs paid to unsuccessful tender bidders relating to significant infrastructure projects. Whilst NSW Treasury policy provides clarity on the reimbursement of unsuccessful bidders' costs, clearer guidance on how to account for these costs in agency's financial statements is required.

The key audit issues were

The number of issues reported to management decreased from 53 in 2021–22 to 49 in 2022–23.

High-risk findings include:

• gaps in how Sydney Metro manages its contractors and how conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
• future financial reporting implications to account for government's proposed changes to TAHE's future operating model, including asset valuations and control assessments of assets and operations
• Parramatta Park Trust's tree assets' valuation methodology needs to be addressed.

Recommendations were made to address the identified deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport portfolio.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit 

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting 

Appendix four – Financial data 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

Results of the Planning and Environment portfolio financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

The audit found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed Planning and Environment portfolio agencies. Seven audits are ongoing.

The Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) did not comply with its obligations under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) to prepare and submit financial statements for audit.

The Department of Planning and Environment (the department) has not yet provided their assessment of the financial reporting requirements for the 579 Category 2 Statutory Land Managers (SLMs) for 2022–23.

One-hundred-and-nineteen Commons Trusts are non-compliant with the GSF Act as they have not submitted their financial statements for audit.

We issued unqualified opinions on the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation's 2020–21, 2021–22 and 2022–23 financial statements.

The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits decreased from 59 in 2021–22 to 51 in 2022–23, however the gross value of misstatements increased.

The key audit issues were

The former Resilience NSW and NSW Reconstruction Authority (the Authority) re-assessed the accounting implications arising from contractual agreements relating to temporary housing assets associated with the Northern Rivers Temporary Homes Program. This resulted in adjustments to recognise the associated assets and liabilities.

We continue to identify significant deficiencies in NSW Crown land information records.

The department has not been effective in addressing the differing practices for the financial reporting of rural firefighting equipment vested to councils under section 119 (2) of the Rural Fires Act 1997.

The number of findings across the portfolio reported to management increased from 132 in 2021–22 to 140 in 2022–23. Thirty per cent of issues were repeated from the prior year.

Seven high-risk issues were identified. These related to the findings outlined above, deficiencies in quality reviews of asset valuations, internal control processes and IT general controls.

The audit recommended

Recommendations were made to the department and portfolio agencies to address these deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Planning and Environment portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting

• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning and Environment portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the portfolio.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures 

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting 

Appendix four – Financial data

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

Results of the Regional NSW financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed audits in the Regional NSW portfolio agencies.

The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits increased from 28 in 2021–22 to 30 in 2022–23.

What the key issues were

Effective 1 July 2023, staff employed in the Northern Rivers Reconstruction Corporation Division of the Department of Regional NSW transferred to the NSW Reconstruction Authority Staff Agency.

The Regional NSW portfolio agencies were migrated into a new government wide enterprise resourcing planning system.

The total number of audit management letter findings across the portfolio of agencies decreased from 36 to 23.

A high risk matter was raised for the NSW Food Authority to improve the internal controls in the information technology environment including monitoring and managing privilege user access.

What we recommended

Local Land Services should prioritise completing all mandatory early close procedures.

Portfolio agencies should:

• ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards
• prioritise and address internal control deficiencies identified in audit management letters.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Regional NSW portfolio of agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Regional NSW portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Regional NSW portfolio.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

Results of the Premier and Cabinet portfolio of agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all Premier and Cabinet portfolio agencies.

What the key issues were

The Administrative Arrangements Orders, effective 1 July 2023, changed the name of the Department of Premier and Cabinet to the Premier's Department and transferred parts of Department of Premier and Cabinet to The Cabinet Office.

The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits decreased from 15 in 2021–22 to 12 in 2022–23.

The total number of management letter findings across the portfolio of agencies increased from ten in 2021–22 to 20 in 2022–23.

Thirty per cent of all issues were repeat issues. The most common repeat issues related to deficiencies in controls over financial reporting.

What we recommended

Portfolio agencies should:

• ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards
• prioritise and address internal control deficiencies identified in Audit Office management letters.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Premier and Cabinet portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet portfolio.

Appendix one – Early close procedures

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What the report is about

Effective radio communications are crucial to NSW's emergency services organisations.

The Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP) aims to deliver an enhanced public safety radio network to serve the five emergency services organisations (ESOs), as well as a range of other users.

This report assesses whether the NSW Telco Authority is effectively managing the CCEP.

What we found

Where it has already been delivered (about 50% of the state), the enhanced network meets most of the requirements of ESOs.

The CCEP will provide additional infrastructure for public safety radio coverage in existing buildings agreed to with ESOs. However, radio coverage inside buildings constructed after the CCEP concludes will be at risk because building and fire regulations do not address the need for in-building public safety radio coverage.

Around 98% of radios connected to the network can be authenticated to protect against cloning, though only 42% are.

The NSW Telco Authority has not settled with ESOs on how call encryption will be used across the network. This creates the risk that radio interoperability between ESOs will not be maximised.

When completed, the public safety radio network will be the only mission critical radio network for ESOs. It is unclear whether governance for the ongoing running of the network will allow ESOs to participate in future network operational decisions.

The current estimated capital cost for the NSW Telco Authority to complete the CCEP is $1.293 billion. This is up from an estimated cost of $400 million in 2016. The estimated capital cost was not publicly disclosed until $1.325 billion was shown in the 2021–22 NSW Budget Papers.

We estimate that the full cost to government, including costs to the ESOs, of implementing the enhanced network is likely to exceed $2 billion.

We made recommendations about

• The governance of the enhanced Public Safety Network (PSN) to support agency relationships.
• The need to finalise a Traffic Mitigation Plan for when the network is congested.
• The need to provide advice to the NSW Government about the regulatory gap for ensuring adequate network reach in future buildings.
• The need to clarify how encryption and interoperability will work on the enhanced network.
• The need for the NSW Telco Authority to comply with its policy on Infrastructure Capacity Reservation.
• Expediting measures to protect against the risk of cloning by unauthenticated radios.

Public safety radio networks are critical for operational communications among Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs), which in New South Wales include:

• NSW Ambulance
• Fire and Rescue NSW
• NSW Police Force
• NSW Rural Fire Service
• NSW State Emergency Service.¹

Since 1993, these five ESOs have had access to a NSW Government owned and operated radio communications network, the Public Safety Network (PSN), to support their operational communications. Around 60 to 70 other entities also have access to this network, including other NSW government entities, Commonwealth government entities, local councils, community organisations, and utility companies.

Pursuant to the Government Telecommunications Act 2018 ('the Act'), the New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority ('NSW Telco Authority') is responsible for the establishment, control, management, maintenance and operation of the PSN.²

Separate to the PSN, all ESOs and other government entities have historically maintained their own radio communication capabilities and networks. Accordingly, the PSN has been a supplementary source of operational radio communications for these entities.

These other radio networks maintained by ESOs and other entities are of varying size and capability, with many ageing and nearing their end-of-life. There was generally little or no interoperability between networks, infrastructure was often co-located and duplicative, and there were large gaps in geographic coverage.

In 2016, the NSW Telco Authority received dedicated NSW Government funding to commence the Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP).

According to NSW Telco Authority's 2021–22 annual report, the CCEP is a transformation program for operational communications for NSW government agencies. The CCEP '…aims to deliver greater access to public safety standard radio communications for the State’s first responders and essential service agencies'. The objective of CCEP is to consolidate the large number of separate radio networks that are owned and operated by various NSW government entities and to enhance the state’s existing shared PSN. The program also aims to deliver increased PSN coverage throughout New South Wales.

The former NSW Government intended that as the enhanced PSN was progressively rolled-out across NSW, ESOs would migrate their radio communications to the enhanced network, before closing and decommissioning their own networks.

About this Audit

This audit assessed whether the CCEP is being effectively managed by the NSW Telco Authority to deliver an enhanced PSN that meets ESOs' requirements for operational communications.

We addressed the audit objective by answering the following two questions:

1. Have agreed ESO user requirements for the enhanced PSN been met under day-to-day and emergency operational conditions?
2. Has there been adequate transparency to the NSW Government and other stakeholders regarding whole-of-government costs related to the CCEP?

In answering the first question, we also considered how the agreed user requirements were determined. This included whether they were supported by evidence, whether they were sufficient to meet the intent of the CCEP (including in considering any role for new or alternative technologies), and whether they met any relevant technical standards and compliance obligations (including for cyber security resilience).

While other NSW government agencies and entities use the PSN, we focused on the experience of the five primary ESOs because these will be the largest users of the enhanced PSN.

Both the cost and time required to complete the CCEP roll-out have increased since 2016. While it was originally intended to be completed in 2020, this is now forecast to be 2027. Infrastructure NSW has previously assessed the reasons for the increases in time and cost. A summary of the findings made by Infrastructure NSW is presented in Chapter 1 of this report. Accordingly, as these matters had already been assessed, we did not re-examine them in this performance audit.

The auditee for this performance audit is the NSW Telco Authority, which is a statutory authority within the Department of Customer Service portfolio.

In addition to being responsible for the operation of the PSN, section 5 of the Act also prescribes that the NSW Telco Authority is:

• to identify, develop and deliver upgrades and enhancements to the government telecommunications network to improve operational communications for government sector agencies
• to develop policies, standards and guidelines for operational communications using telecommunications networks.

The NSW Telco Authority Advisory Board is established under section 10 of the Act. The role of the board is to advise the NSW Telco Authority and the minister on any matter relating to the telecommunications requirements of government sector agencies and on any other matter relating to the functions of the Authority. As of 2 June 2023, the responsible minister is the Minister for Customer Service and Digital Government.

The five identified ESOs are critical stakeholders of the CCEP and therefore they were consulted during this audit. However, the ESOs were not auditees for this performance audit.

The NSW Telco Authority established and tracked its own costs for the CCEP

Over the course of the program from 2016, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a series of business cases and program reviews that estimated its cost of implementing the program in full, including those shown in Exhibit 6 below.

In response to the 2016 CCEP business case, the then NSW Government approved the NSW Telco Authority implementing the CCEP in full, with funding provided in stages. The NSW Telco Authority tracked its costs against approved funding, with monthly reports provided to the multi-agency Program Steering Committee

Throughout the program, the NSW Government was informed of increasing costs being incurred by the NSW Telco Authority for the CCEP

The various business cases, program updates, and program reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority were provided to the NSW Government through the required Cabinet process when seeking approval for the program proceeding and requests for both capital and operational funding. These provided clear indication of the changing overall cost of the CCEP to the NSW Telco Authority, as well as the delays that were being experienced.

There was no transparency to the Parliament and community about changes in the capital cost of the CCEP until the 2021–22 NSW Budget

As the business cases for the CCEP were not publicly available, the only sources of information about capital cost were NSW Budget papers and media releases. The information provided in the annual Budget papers prior to the 2021–22 NSW Budget provided no visibility of the estimated full capital cost to complete all stages of the CCEP. As shown in Exhibit 7 below, this information was fragmented and complex.

Media releases about the progress of the CCEP did not provide the estimated total cost to the NSW Telco Authority of $1.325 billion to complete all stages of the CCEP until June 2021. Prior to this date, media releases only provided funding for the initial stages of the program or for the stages subject to a funding announcement.

Even during the September 2019 and March 2020 Parliamentary Estimate Committee hearings where the costings and delays to the CCEP were raised, the estimated full cost of the CCEP was not revealed.

The original business case for the CCEP included estimated ESO costs, though these costs were not tracked throughout the program

Estimates for ESO costs for operating and maintaining their own radio networks over the four years from 2016–17 were included in the original March 2016 business case. They included $75.2 million for capital expenditure and $95 million for one-off operating costs. These costs, as well as costs incurred by ESOs due to the delay in the program, were not subsequently tracked by the NSW Telco Authority.

In January 2017, Infrastructure NSW reviewed the CCEP business case of March 2016. In this review, Infrastructure NSW recommended that the NSW Telco Authority identify combined and apportioned costs and cashflow for all ESOs over the CCEP funding period reflecting all associated costs to deliver the CCEP. These to include additional incidental capital costs accruing to ESOs, transition and migration to the new network and the cost (capital and operational) of maintaining existing networks. This recommendation was implemented in the November 2017 program review, with ESO capital costs estimated as $183 million.

In 2019, Infrastructure NSW conducted a Deep Dive Review on the progress of the CCEP. In this review, Infrastructure NSW made what it described as a 'critical recommendation' that the NSW Telco Authority:

It should be noted that the delay to CCEP completion now is seven years and that further ‘operational bridging solutions’ have been needed by the ESOs.

'Stay Safe and Keep Operational' costs incurred by ESOs will be significantly higher than originally estimated

Stay Safe and Keep Operational (SSKO) funding was established to provide funding to ESOs to maintain their legacy networks while the CCEP was refreshing and enhancing the PSN. This recognised that much of the network infrastructure relied on by ESOs had reached – or was reaching – obsolescence and would either require extensive maintenance or replacement before the PSN was available for ESOs to migrate to it. ESOs may apply to NSW Treasury for SSKO funding, with their specific proposals being reviewed (and endorsed, where appropriate) by the NSW Telco Authority. Accordingly, SSKO expenditure does not fall within the CCEP budget allocation.

As shown in the table below, extracted from the March 2016 CCEP business case, the total expected cost for SSKO purposes over the course of the CCEP was originally $40 million, assuming the enhanced PSN would be fully available by 2020.

In October 2022, the expected completion date for the CCEP was re-baselined to August 2027. Accordingly, ESOs will be required to continue to maintain their radio networks using legacy equipment for seven years longer than the original 2020 forecast. This will likely become progressively more expensive and require additional SSKO funding. For example, NSW Telco Authority endorsed SSKO bids for 2022–23 exceeded $35 million for that year alone.

Compared to the original forecast made in the March 2016 CCEP business case of $40 million, we found ESOs had estimated SSKO spending to 2027 will be $292.5 million.

A refresh of paging network used by ESOs and the decommissioning of redundant sites were both removed from the original 2016 scope of the CCEP

Paging

A paging network is considered an important user requirement by the Fire and Rescue NSW, NSW Rural Fire Service, and NSW State Emergency Service. The 2016 CCEP business case included a paging network refresh within the program scope of works. This was reiterated in the November 2017 internal review of the program. These documents did not estimate a cost for this refresh. The March 2020 and October 2020 business cases excluded paging from the program scope. The audit is unable to identify when, why or by whom the decision was made to remove paging from the program scope, something that was also not well communicated to the affected ESOs.

In 2021, after representations from the affected ESOs, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a separate business case for a refresh of the paging network at an estimated capital cost of $60.31 million. This program was subsequently approved by the NSW Government and included in the 2022–23 NSW Budget.

In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of delivering the enhanced PSN, we have included the budgeted cost of the paging network refresh on the basis that:

• it was expressly included in the original approved March 2016 business case
• the capability is deemed essential to the needs of three ESOs.

Decommissioning costs

The 2016 CCEP business case included cost estimates for decommissioning surplus sites (whether ‘old’ GRN sites or sites belonging to ESOs’ own networks). These estimates were provided for both the NSW Telco Authority ($38 million) and for the ESOs ($55 million). However, while these estimates were described, they were not included as part of the NSW Telco Authority's estimated capital cost ($400 million) or (more relevantly) operating cost ($37.3 million) for the CCEP. This is despite decommissioning being included as one of eight planned activities for the rollout of the program.

In the October 2020 business case, an estimate of $201 million was included for decommissioning agency networks based on a model whereby:

• funding would be coordinated by the NSW Telco Authority
• scheduling and reporting through an inter-agency working group and
• where appropriate, agencies would be appointed as the most appropriate decommissioning party.

This estimated cost is not included in the CCEP budget.

In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of the enhanced PSN, we have included the estimated cost of decommissioning on the basis that:

• decommissioning was included in the 2016 CCEP business case as one of eight 'planned activities for the rollout of the program'
• effective decommissioning of surplus sites and equipment (including as described in the business case as incorporating asset decommissioning, asset re-use, and site make-good) is an inherent part of the program management for an enhanced PSN
• costs incurred in decommissioning are entirely a consequence of the CCEP program.

The estimated minimum cost of building an enhanced PSN consistent with the original proposal is over $2 billion

We have derived two estimated minimum whole-of-government costs for delivering an enhanced PSN. These are:

• $2.04 billion when calculated from NSW Telco Authority data – shown as estimate A in Exhibit 9 below.
• $2.26 billion when calculated from ESO supplied data – shown as estimate B in Exhibit 9.

Both totals include:

• budgeted amounts for both CCEP capital expenditure ($1,292.8 million) and operating expenditure ($139 million)
• the NSW Telco Authority's 2020 estimated cost for decommissioning ($201 million)
• the NSW Telco Authority's approved funding for paging refresh ($60.3 million).

The two estimated totals primarily vary around the capital expenditure of ESOs (particularly SSKO funding). To determine these costs, we used ESO provided actual SSKO costs to date, as well as their estimates for maintaining their legacy radio networks through to 2027.

The equivalent cost estimates from the NSW Telco Authority were sourced from the November 2017 internal review and the October 2020 business case for CCEP. It should be noted that the amounts for both estimates are not audited, or verified, but do provide an indication of how whole-of-government costs have grown over the course of the program.

The increase in and reasons for the increase in total CCEP costs (capital and one-off operating) incurred or forecast by the NSW Telco Authority (from $437.3 million in 2016 to $1,431.8 million in 2022) have been provided to the NSW Government through various business cases and reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority, as well as by reviews conducted by Infrastructure NSW as part of its project assurance responsibilities.

However, the growth in ESO costs and other consequential costs, such as paging and decommissioning, from around $263 million in the 2016 CCEP business case to between $600 million and $800 million, has to a large degree remained invisible and unexplained to the NSW Government and other stakeholders

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Trunked public safety radio networks

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #383 - released 23 June 2023