Reports
Regulation insights
What this report is about
In this report, we present findings and recommendations relevant to regulation from selected reports between 2018 and 2024.
This analysis includes performance audits, compliance audits and the outcomes of financial audits.
Effective regulation is necessary to ensure compliance with the law as well as to promote positive social and economic outcomes and minimise risks with certain activities.
The report is a resource for public sector leaders. It provides insights into the challenges and opportunities for more effective regulation.
Audit findings
The analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around four key themes related to effective regulation:
- governance and accountability
- processes and procedures
- data and information management
- support and guidance.
The report draws from this analysis to present insights for agencies to promote effective regulation. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.
In this report, we also draw out insights for agencies that provide a public sector stewardship role.
The report highlights the need for agencies to communicate a clear regulatory approach. It also emphasises the need to have a consistent regulatory approach, supported by robust information about risks and accompanied with timely and proportionate responses.
The report highlights the need to provide relevant support to regulated parties to facilitate compliance and the importance of transparency through reporting of meaningful regulatory information.
Read the PDF report
Audit Insights 2018-2022
What the report is about
In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.
This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.
The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.
The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.
The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.
What we found
Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:
- Integrity and transparency
- Performance and monitoring
- Governance and oversight
- Cyber security and data
- System planning for disruption
- Resource management.
The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.
In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.
The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.
A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.
Fast facts
- 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
- 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
- 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.
I am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.
The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.
A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.
However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.
While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.
Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales
| Integrity and transparency | Performance and monitoring | Governance and oversight | Cyber security and data | System planning | Resource management |
| Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. | Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. | The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. | Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. | Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. | Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest. |
| Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. | Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. | Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. | In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. | Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. | Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds. |
| Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. | Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. | Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. | Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. | Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. | Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office. |
| Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. | Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. | Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues. | Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need. | ||
| Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes. | |||||
| Read more | Read more | Read more | Read more | Read more | Read more |
This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.
- Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
- Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
- Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.
This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.
The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.
This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.
Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022
Appendix two – About this report
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
The effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices in four integrity agencies
The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies: the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the NSW Electoral Commission, the NSW Ombudsman, and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission. The audit also included NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) because both departments are involved in the processes that lead to decisions about funding for the integrity agencies and managing access to this funding. The Hon. Don Harwin MLC, Special Minister of State, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.
The audit found that the current approach to determining and administering annual funding for the integrity agencies presents threats to their independent status. The approach used by NSW Treasury and DPC is consistent with the legislative and Constitutional framework for financial management in New South Wales, but it does not sufficiently recognise that the roles and functions of the integrity agencies that are the focus of this audit are different to other departments and agencies. Specific mechanisms that present threats to the independence of the integrity agencies include the absence of transparency in decisions about funding for the integrity agencies, the means of applying efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures, the process of providing additional funding from DPC to the integrity agencies, and requests for the integrity agencies to report to DPC on their activities and outcomes.
The Auditor-General outlined the principles that inform the report’s recommendations in order to strengthen the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies. These principles are:
- There should be structured oversight by Parliament of the performance and financial management of the integrity agencies.
- Parliament’s role in the budget process should be expanded to ensure Cabinet is provided with more independent advice on the funding requirements for the integrity agencies.
- There should be transparency to Parliament and the relevant agency for decisions made about funding for the integrity agencies.
- The integrity agencies should be required to demonstrate their accountability as prudent managers of their financial resources.
The report also notes that the NSW Parliament should be consulted when considering the report’s recommendations.
This audit examined the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies. It was conducted with reference to the legislative and Constitutional framework that is currently in place for financial management in New South Wales.
This report appropriately recognises that the government of the day is responsible for the prudent and responsible management of the state’s finances. It identifies several areas of ambiguity in the way the current financial arrangements apply to the integrity agencies that are the subject of this audit. It also highlights threats to the independence of the integrity agencies that may arise from the involvement of the Executive Government in the decision making about funding. The report argues these risks are not mitigated sufficiently under the current financial arrangements.
The recommendations in this report outline the principles that should inform the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies. Consistent with the Audit Office of NSW’s role in auditing NSW Government departments and agencies, the recommendations are directed to NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet. However, the report recognises that the current role of these entities in the funding arrangements for the integrity agencies poses a threat to their independence. Consequently, it is important to recognise the important role of the NSW Parliament in determining the appropriate funding model for the integrity agencies. The audited agencies should consult closely with the NSW Parliament when considering these recommendations to ensure the views of Parliament are reflected appropriately in any changes arising from the implementation of these recommendations. This recognises the appropriate role of the NSW Parliament in safeguarding the independence of its integrity agencies.
On 4 November 2019, the Hon. Don Harwin MLC, Special Minister of State, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.
Consistent with the Minister’s request, this audit assessed the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies - the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), the NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC), the NSW Ombudsman (NSWO) and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC). The audit also included NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) because both departments are involved in the processes that lead to decisions about funding for the integrity agencies and managing access to this funding.
The NSW Government, through the Treasurer, is responsible to the citizens of New South Wales for the prudent and responsible management of the state’s finances. The annual budget is the primary process that the NSW Government uses for financial management. Decisions about funding for the integrity agencies are made through this budget process. NSW Treasury provides guidance to all government departments and agencies, including the integrity agencies that are the focus of this audit, on the Government’s priorities for the budget. NSW Treasury also reviews and provides advice to the Expenditure Review Committee of Cabinet on proposals for funding through the budget.
The integrity agencies are subject to the application of ‘efficiency dividends’ and ‘budget savings and reform measures’, which limit their access to the full funding that has been approved by Parliament. NSW Treasury and DPC manage the application of these limits to the integrity agencies. The integrity agencies are grouped within the DPC ‘cluster’, which is an administrative arrangement created by the NSW Government. Clusters do not have legal status but are used for administrative and financial management. DPC has provided additional funding during the financial year to some of the integrity agencies in the years covered in this audit. DPC also oversees the involvement of the integrity agencies in developing and reporting on their outcomes. This is a requirement of NSW Treasury’s outcome budgeting reforms, which are currently being implemented.
Each of the integrity agencies is overseen by a parliamentary committee that includes members of both houses of the NSW Parliament. These committees are responsible for reviewing the performance of the integrity agencies that they oversee. They do not have a role in funding decisions. ICAC and LECC each have additional oversight from an Inspector. The Inspector of the ICAC’s role is to oversee the operations and conduct of ICAC to ensure that it complies with the law. The Inspector of the LECC’s role is to oversee the way LECC carries out its functions, with a focus on the legality of LECC’s use of its powers. Neither of these Inspectors has a role in funding decisions.
The Audit Office of NSW is an independent integrity agency that receives some of its revenue through the NSW Government’s budget process and sits within the DPC cluster. We have taken the following actions to preserve our independence and mitigate potential conflicts of interest that could arise in conducting this audit:
- not considering or commenting on the financial arrangements for our office
- requesting a deferral of our office’s evidence to an inquiry by the NSW Legislative Council’s Public Accountability Committee that is considering the budget process for integrity agencies. The inquiry includes the four integrity agencies that are the subject of this audit and our office
- seeking independent legal advice on the framework for the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies
- using additional internal review processes to provide quality assurance to audit conclusions.
Conclusion
The current approach to determining annual funding for the integrity agencies presents threats to their independent status. The approach is consistent with the legislative and Constitutional framework for financial management in New South Wales, but it does not sufficiently recognise that the roles and functions of the integrity agencies that are the focus of this audit are different to other departments and agencies.
The government of the day is responsible to the citizens of New South Wales for the prudent and responsible management of the state’s finances. Accordingly, the government of the day has a central role in decisions about funding for departments and agencies and in determining the financial management processes to be applied. This is clearly established in the legislative framework and conventions for managing public funds in New South Wales. This system is primarily designed to determine the funding for departments and agencies that are responsible to ministers. It is less appropriate for integrity agencies because it does not provide additional protection against the risk that funding decisions could be influenced by previous or planned investigations by the integrity agencies. This risk has the potential to limit the ability of the integrity agencies to fulfil their legislative mandate. The extent and nature of this risk differs for each of the integrity agencies. This is outlined in the key findings section below and described in detail in Chapters 2–5 of this report.
Aspects of the financial management mechanisms used to administer funding for the integrity agencies create tensions with their independent status. These mechanisms include the means of applying efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures, the provision of additional funding from DPC to the integrity agencies, and requests for the integrity agencies to report to DPC on their activities and outcomes.
NSW Treasury and DPC have administered efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures to the integrity agencies. This results in the integrity agencies not being able to access the full funding approved by Parliament. There are two competing interpretations of appropriation legislation that lead to different conclusions about whether there is a clear legal basis for doing this. NSW Treasury and DPC focus on the fact that the Appropriation Act provides funding for the integrity agencies to a Premier, rather than the agency, and does not state that a Premier must provide the full amount of funding approved to the agency. This interpretation leads to the view that a Premier can restrict access to appropriation funding that was approved by Parliament. An alternative interpretation of the Appropriation Act would consider factors specific to the integrity agencies that differentiate them from other agencies subject to these measures. These factors include that the integrity agencies are independent of ministerial control, accountable to Parliament for performing specific legislated functions, and some may conduct investigations that involve a Premier, or DPC or NSW Treasury. If this alternative interpretation is used, then the reduction of the integrity agencies’ access to appropriation funding approved by Parliament could diminish the independent status of the integrity agencies and limit their ability to fulfil their legislative mandate.
DPC has given additional funding to three of the integrity agencies in recent years in response to requests from the agencies. If the integrity agencies require additional funding during the year, the only mechanism available is to seek funding from DPC. This creates a potential threat to the independence of the integrity agencies. Asking DPC to make decisions about funding allocations between an integrity agency and another agency in the DPC cluster is inappropriate because DPC is not responsible for the functions or actions of an integrity agency. It is also possible that DPC could be the subject of an investigation conducted by an integrity agency. DPC has advised that it considers these risks more theoretical than real.
DPC’s provision of $2.5 million in additional funding to ICAC in 2019–20 may not have been consistent with the Appropriation Act 2019 (the Act), because of a change to the Act compared to previous appropriation legislation. The additional funding that was provided to ICAC in 2019–20 by DPC had been appropriated to DPC under Part 2 of the Act. The Act specified that funding appropriated under Part 2 could only be used for the purposes specified in that Part. ICAC receives its appropriation under Part 4 of the Act. It is contestable as to whether the purpose of an appropriation under Part 2 of the Act would include providing funding for an agency that receives an appropriation under another part of the Act.
The integrity agencies have been asked to report on activities and outcomes to DPC as part of the outcome budgeting reforms that are being implemented by NSW Treasury. This is inconsistent with their independent status because the integrity agencies are accountable to Parliament for their activities, not DPC or a Premier.
Our audit also assessed the integrity agencies’ systems for planning, budgeting and monitoring the efficiency of their work. We did not find major deficiencies in the management practices of the integrity agencies. We did identify opportunities for improvement in each agency. These are specific to the circumstances of each agency and are outlined in the key findings section below and Chapters 2–5 of this report.
On 4 November 2019, the Hon. Don Harwin MLC, Special Minister of State, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.
Consistent with the Minister’s request, this audit assessed the effectiveness of the financial arrangements and management practices of four integrity agencies - the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), the NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC), the NSW Ombudsman (NSWO) and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (LECC). The audit also included NSW Treasury and the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) because both departments have a role in the financial arrangements for the integrity agencies. NSW Treasury manages the budget process that determines the annual funding for the integrity agencies. DPC has a role in managing access to this funding because the integrity agencies are placed within the DPC ‘cluster’.
The Audit Office of NSW is an independent integrity agency that receives some of its revenue through the NSW Government’s budget process and sits within the DPC cluster. We have taken the following actions to preserve our independence and mitigate potential conflicts of interest that could arise in conducting this audit:
- not considering or commenting on the financial arrangements for our office
- requesting a deferral of our office’s evidence to an inquiry by the NSW Legislative Council’s Public Accountability Committee that is considering the budget process for integrity agencies and the NSW Parliament, including the four integrity agencies in this audit and our office
- seeking independent legal advice on the framework for the financial arrangements of the four integrity agencies in this audit
- using additional internal review processes to provide quality assurance to audit conclusions.
Conclusion
Financial arrangements for ICAC
ICAC's main functions are to investigate and prevent corruption in the public sector. Its legislation establishes it as an independent agency that is accountable to Parliament.
Decisions about the annual appropriation for ICAC are made by the Cabinet, with advice from NSW Treasury. Members of Cabinet or NSW Treasury could be involved in or affected by an ICAC investigation. There is no independent advice to Cabinet on ICAC’s funding requirements and there is no transparency to Parliament about the reasons for decisions made about ICAC’s budget. The absence of these safeguards in the current financial arrangements creates a threat to ICAC’s independence and have the potential to limit its ability to fulfil its legislative mandate.
ICAC submitted budget proposals seeking increases to its appropriation funding in several recent years. The budget proposals related to funding to expand its workforce to respond to increases in the volume and complexity of its work. Some of these proposals were rejected without reasons being provided. There are no formal mechanisms available to ICAC to question or challenge these decisions. The process available to ICAC to request additional funding outside the annual budget creates further risks to its independence.
ICAC’s management practices
ICAC’s staff use structured processes for prioritising work against its legislative mandate and it has conducted recent reviews to assess its operational efficiency. ICAC's internal budgeting processes are adequate but could be improved with better documentation of the reasons for its budget decisions.
Conclusion
Financial arrangements for NSWEC
NSWEC conducts elections and is responsible for maintaining the integrity of the electoral system in New South Wales. NSWEC’s legislation states that it should conduct elections and investigate potential breaches of electoral law independently and be accountable to Parliament. Decisions about the annual appropriation for NSWEC are made by the Cabinet. It is possible that NSWEC’s investigations of electoral integrity could include members of Cabinet or the political party that holds government. There is a risk that decisions about its funding could be influenced by the conduct of these investigations. If realised, this would be a threat to NSWEC’s independence and ability to fulfil its legislative mandate. NSWEC has not received the full funding amount it has requested in recent years. There is inadequate transparency about how funding decisions were made and there are no formal mechanisms to question or challenge these decisions.
The conduct of elections is a key element of a democratic system and under-funding this function could have serious implications. NSWEC’s requests for additional appropriation funding are assessed alongside the priorities of the government of the day. Its role transcends these immediate priorities and there is a risk that its funding requirements may not be prioritised.
NSWEC’s management practices
NSWEC’s internal budgeting processes and efficiency programs are clear and well documented. NSWEC has identified options to improve its operational and corporate efficiency but has not implemented all of these.
Conclusion
Financial arrangements for NSWO
NSWO oversees government agencies and some government-funded private sector bodies that provide services to the community or exercise administrative functions. NSWO’s legislation makes it clear that it should operate independently of the agencies it oversees and be accountable to Parliament.
NSWO’s investigations do not include members of Cabinet, except in relation to Public Interest Disclosures made about a minister, so the risk that decisions about its budget could be affected by its investigations is relatively lower. However, NSWO's investigations can comment on and make recommendations about government policies, which may have been endorsed by Cabinet or an individual minister, and its investigations cover systemic issues for which ministers and the heads of government departments are responsible. NSWO faces a further challenge in its ability to make compelling budget proposals under the current financial arrangements. Its funding requests are assessed alongside the government’s priorities, but its work is unlikely to align directly with these priorities.
NSWO’s management practices
NSWO has assessed its operational and corporate efficiency recently and has implemented major changes to its operating model in response to this. Its internal budgeting process is adequate but could be improved by being documented more thoroughly.
Conclusion
Financial arrangements for LECC
LECC's main functions are to investigate allegations of misconduct by law enforcement and oversee police handing of complaints. LECC’s legislation states it should operate independently of the agencies it oversees and be accountable to Parliament. LECC’s jurisdiction does not include members of Cabinet, NSW Treasury or DPC. However, LECC’s investigations have the potential to have a negative impact on a Minister for Police, who is a member of Cabinet, and the government of the day. There is a risk that decision makers for LECC’s funding could be influenced by these considerations. While LECC has not sought increases to its appropriation funding in recent years, there are no formal mechanisms to question or challenge these decisions if it did have concerns about its funding in the future.
Unlike the other integrity agencies in this audit, LECC is not classified as a separate GSF agency under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018. This difference means that LECC has less independence from the Executive Government, because LECC would have to comply with a Treasurer’s Direction even if it believes it is not consistent with the independent exercise of its functions.
LECC's management practices
LECC's internal budgeting processes are clear and documented and it has identified and implemented operational and corporate efficiency savings in several areas. LECC published a new strategic plan in July 2020. Over the first three years of its operations since 2017, LECC had not conducted effective strategic planning which made it difficult for LECC to demonstrate that it had a cohesive approach to its operations across the agency during this time.
Conclusion
Aspects of the financial management mechanisms used by NSW Treasury and DPC to administer funding for the integrity agencies create tensions with their independent status.
NSW Treasury and DPC have administered efficiency dividends and budget savings and reform measures which results in the integrity agencies not being able to access the full funding approved by Parliament. There are two competing interpretations of appropriation legislation that lead to different conclusions about whether there is a clear legal basis for doing this. NSW Treasury and DPC take the view that the Appropriation Act provides funding for the integrity agencies to a Premier and does not state that a Premier must provide the full amount of funding to the agencies. This interpretation leads to the view that a Premier can restrict access to appropriation funding that was approved by Parliament. An alternative approach to interpreting the Appropriation Act would consider the contextual factors specific to the integrity agencies. These factors include: the integrity agencies are independent of ministerial control, the integrity agencies are accountable to Parliament for performing specific legislated functions, and the integrity agencies may conduct investigations that involve a Premier, or DPC or NSW Treasury. If this alternative interpretation is accepted, then the reduction of the integrity agencies’ access to appropriation funding could diminish the independent status of the integrity agencies.
DPC has given additional funding to three of the integrity agencies in recent years in response to requests from the agencies. If the integrity agencies require additional funding during the year, the only mechanism available is to seek funding from DPC. This creates a potential threat to the independence of the integrity agencies. Asking DPC to make decisions about funding allocations between an integrity agency and another agency in the DPC cluster is inappropriate because DPC is not responsible for the functions or actions of an integrity agency. It is also possible that DPC could be the subject of an investigation conducted by an integrity agency. Separately, DPC’s provision of $2.5 million in additional funding to ICAC in 2019–20 may not have been consistent with the Appropriation Act 2019. The appropriations for DPC and ICAC were made under different parts of the Act. Appropriation funding can only be paid out for the purpose specified in each part of the Act. It is not clear whether it is permissible to transfer funding between agencies that receive appropriations from different Parts of the Act.
The integrity agencies have recently been asked to report activity and outcome measures to DPC, as the principal department for the cluster that they have been placed in, under the outcome budgeting reforms that are being implemented by NSW Treasury. This is inconsistent with their independent status because the integrity agencies are accountable to Parliament for their activities, not DPC or a Premier. DPC has advised that it considers the risks to the independence of the integrity agencies described above to be more theoretical than real.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Opinion from the Crown Solicitor’s Office
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors
Three key agencies are not fully complying with the NSW Procurement Board’s Direction for engaging probity practitioners, according to a report released today by the Acting Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin. They also do not have effective processes to achieve compliance or assure that probity engagements achieved value for money.
Probity is defined as the quality of having strong moral principles, honesty and decency. Probity is important for NSW Government agencies as it helps ensure decisions are made with integrity, fairness and accountability, while attaining value for money.
Probity advisers provide guidance on issues concerning integrity, fairness and accountability that may arise throughout asset procurement and disposal processes. Probity auditors verify that agencies' processes are consistent with government laws and legislation, guidelines and best practice principles.
According to the NSW State Infrastructure Strategy 2018-2038, New South Wales has more infrastructure projects underway than any state or territory in Australia. The scale of the spend on procuring and constructing new public transport networks, roads, schools and hospitals, the complexity of these projects and public scrutiny of aspects of their delivery has increased the focus on probity in the public sector.
A Procurement Board Direction, 'PBD-2013-05 Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors' (the Direction), sets out the requirements for NSW Government agencies' use and engagement of probity practitioners. It confirms agencies should routinely take into account probity considerations in their procurement. The Direction also specifies that NSW Government agencies can use probity advisers and probity auditors (probity practitioners) when making decisions on procuring and disposing of assets, but that agencies:
- should use external probity practitioners as the exception rather than the rule
- should not use external probity practitioners as an 'insurance policy'
- must be accountable for decisions made
- cannot substitute the use of probity practitioners for good management practices
- not engage the same probity practitioner on an ongoing basis, and ensure the relationship remains robustly independent.
The scale of probity spend may be small in the context of the NSW Government's spend on projects. However, government agencies remain responsible for probity considerations whether they engage external probity practitioners or not.
The audit assessed whether Transport for NSW, the Department of Education and the Ministry of Health:
- complied with the requirements of ‘PBD-2013-05 Engagement of Probity Advisers and Probity Auditors’
- effectively ensured they achieved value for money when they used probity practitioners.
These entities are referred to as 'participating agencies' in this report.
We also surveyed 40 NSW Government agencies with the largest total expenditures (top 40 agencies) to get a cross sector view of their use of probity practitioners. These agencies are listed in Appendix two.
Conclusion
We found instances where each of the three participating agencies had not fully complied with the requirements of the NSW Procurement Board Direction ‘PBD-2013-05 Engagement of Probity Advisers and Probity Auditors’ when they engaged probity practitioners. We also found they did not have effective processes to achieve compliance or assure the engagements achieved value for money.
In the sample of engagements we selected, we found instances where the participating agencies did not always:
- document detailed terms of reference
- ensure the practitioner was sufficiently independent
- manage probity practitioners' independence and conflict of interest issues transparently
- provide practitioners with full access to records, people and meetings
- establish independent reporting lines reporting was limited to project managers
- evaluate whether value for money was achieved.
We also found:
- agencies tend to rely on only a limited number of probity service providers, sometimes using them on a continuous basis, which may threaten the actual or perceived independence of probity practitioners
- the NSW Procurement Board does not effectively monitor agencies' compliance with the Direction's requirements. Our enquiries revealed that the Board has not asked any agency to report on its use of probity practitioners since the Direction's inception in 2013.
There are no professional standards and capability requirements for probity practitioners
NSW Government agencies use probity practitioners to independently verify that their procurement and asset disposal processes are transparent, fair and accountable in the pursuit of value for money.
Probity practitioners are not subject to regulations that require them to have professional qualifications, experience and capability. Government agencies in New South Wales have difficulty finding probity standards, regulations or best practice guides to reference, which may diminish the degree of reliance stakeholders can place on practitioners’ work.
The NSW Procurement Board provides direction for the use of probity practitioners
The NSW Procurement Board Direction 'PBD-2013-15 for engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors' outlines the requirements for agencies' use of probity practitioners in the New South Wales public sector. All NSW Government agencies, except local government, state owned corporations and universities, must comply with the Direction when engaging probity practitioners. This is illustrated in Exhibit 1 below.
Compliance of expenditure with Section 12A of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 - Law Enforcement Conduct Commission
The Hon. Troy Grant MP, Minister for Police and Minister for Emergency Services requested an audit under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983, to determine whether expenditure on overseas travel by the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (the Commission) complied with section 12A of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.
On 9 November 2018, the Hon. Troy Grant MP, Minister for Police and Minister for Emergency Services (the Minister), requested an audit under s. 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (the PF&A Act) to determine whether the expenditure of $8,074.66 on overseas travel by the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (the LECC) complied with s. 12A of the PF&A Act.
In forming my audit conclusion, I have reviewed documentation provided by the Minister and the LECC, made enquiries of LECC staff, and sought independent legal advice on key aspects of the PF&A Act and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (the LECC Act) and their interface.
In my opinion, the LECC did not comply with s. 12A of the PF&A Act because the Minister:
- had not delegated his authority to approve expenditure for overseas travel to an officer in the LECC
- had specifically declined approving a request from the LECC to incur expenditure on the travel in question.
Despite this, the LECC incurred the expenditure.
In my view, the LECC required the Minister’s approval to incur the overseas travel expenditure before it could legally spend funds for this purpose from its appropriation.
The LECC is an independent investigative body, funded by appropriation, to oversight NSW Police and the Crime Commission
The Bill to establish the LECC was introduced to parliament following a review of the police oversight system.1 The establishment of the LECC drew together functions previously undertaken by the Police Integrity Commission, the Ombudsman and the Inspector of the Crime Commission. It aimed to ‘remove overlapping responsibilities, inefficiencies and failures’ and ‘create a single civilian law enforcement oversight body’.2
Part 4 of the LECC Act sets out the functions of the Commission as an independent investigative body. The objects of the LECC Act are summarised in Appendix one. The LECC Act provides that the Minister cannot direct the LECC on how to perform its functions.
Notably, s. 22 of the LECC Act states:
The Commission and Commissioners are not subject to the control or direction of the Minister in the exercise of their functions.
For the financial year ended 30 June 2018, under s. 22 of the Appropriation Act 2017 (NSW), $21,195,000 was appropriated to the Minister for the LECC’s services. This provided the statutory basis for the sum in question to be drawn from the Consolidated Fund, but only in accordance with the PF&A Act.
The PF&A Act is the legislation that governs the administration of public finances
The PF&A Act determines how expenditure is to occur and sets out the conditions under which such expenditure can occur in NSW public sector agencies.The LECC is an agency within the NSW public sector.
Section 12A of the PF&A Act stipulates that:
A Minister to whom a sum of money is appropriated out of the Consolidated Fund for a use or purpose (whether by an annual Appropriation Act or other Act) may delegate to another Minister or to an officer of any authority, or authorise another Minister to delegate to an officer of any authority, the committing or incurring of expenditure from the sum so appropriated.
Section 12 of the PF&A Act also stipulates that:
Expenditure shall be committed or incurred by an officer of an authority only within the limits of a delegation in writing conferred on the officer by a person entitled to make the delegation.
The relevant ‘authority’ in this case was the Office of the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (Office of the LECC) - a body which, under the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 (the GSE Act)3 employs the staff of the LECC.
Prima facie, as the LECC is funded by appropriation and is subject to the PF&A Act, its officers can only commit or incur expenditure with a delegation from the Minister.
The Minister did not delegate his right to approve expenditure on overseas travel
In April 2017, the Minister approved the LECC’s financial delegations under the authority vested in him by s. 12A of the PF&A Act. However, he reserved his right to approve any expenditure on overseas travel. This effectively required the LECC to obtain his approval for each instance of such expenditure.4
The Minister declined approval of a LECC request for an officer to travel overseas
In August 2017, the Chief Commissioner sought the Minister’s approval to incur overseas travel expenditure. The Minister exercised his right under the PF&A Act to decline the request and confirmed this in writing:
Establishment of LECC being in its infancy, travel is not supported at this time. Operating priorities should be the focus at this time.
The LECC paid the overseas travel expenses without a delegation or Ministerial approval
In October 2017, despite the absence of a delegation or approval from the Minister to incur expenditure on overseas travel, the Chief Commissioner approved a total of $8,074.66 for the LECC’s Director of Covert Services to travel to, and attend an international conference.
The LECC booked and paid for the travel in four payments between October and December 2017. Over the same period the Chief Commissioner reimbursed the agency for these expenses from his personal funds. On 13 October 2017, the Chief Commissioner wrote to the Minister asking him to reconsider his decision. On 12 January 2018, in the absence of a response from the Minister, the Chief Commissioner directed the LECC’s finance officer to ‘repay the relevant costs to my account’.5 On 16 January 2018, the LECC’s Chief Executive Officer approved the reimbursement to the Chief Commissioner, which occurred on 17 January 2018. Appendix three provides further detail on the series of payments.
The Chief Commissioner first disclosed he had been reimbursed for the expenses, without Ministerial approval, in March 2018. In August 2018, the Chief Commissioner made a further disclosure about the expenditure at Budget Estimates.6
The Chief Commissioner argues the overseas travel expenditure was properly incurred
The Chief Commissioner argues the LECC’s overseas travel expenditure was properly incurred because:
- the travel was undertaken in pursuit of the detective and investigative functions specified in s. 26(b)(i) of Part 4 of the LECC Act7
- a specific reservation in public policy cannot be qualified by general rules of public policy.8 The Chief Commissioner argues s. 22 of the LECC Act is a specific provision that conflicts with the general provisions in ss. 12 and 12A of the PF&A Act. In his view, the conflict is resolved by applying the principle that a specific later provision effectively repeals an earlier general provision. In his view, the LECC Act contains a specific provision that the Minister cannot direct the LECC in exercising its functions, whereas the PF&A Act contains general provisions which deal with the spending of public money.
The Chief Commissioner believes the Minister’s decision7:
- was not made in the bona fide exercise of the power conferred on him by the PF&A Act as it interfered with the management of the LECC’s operating priorities
- and his failure to enquire into the operational situation of the LECC were not decisions a rational decision maker could have made
- was made for an improper purpose and was biased, in that the Minister had approved expenditure for a member of NSW Police to travel to the conference, but denied the same to a member of the LECC, which oversights NSW Police
- breached s. 22 of the LECC Act, because it directed the LECC Commissioners in the exercise of their functions.
The Crown Solicitor and Solicitor General advised the expenditure breached the PF&A Act
On 7 September 2017, the Crown Solicitor advised the Office of Police (part of the Department of Justice) that:
The Minister’s authority to determine whether or not to approve a particular expenditure from the amount appropriated from the Consolidated Fund for the purpose of the Commission under the Constitution Act 1902 and the PF&A Act is not affected by s.22 of the LECC Act. These have different spheres of operation. It is not unusual for otherwise independent bodies to be subject to restrictions with respect to the use of public moneys.9
Subsequently, the Crown Solicitor asked the Solicitor General to review the matter of her previous advice. On 14 December 2017, the Solicitor General concurred with the Crown Solicitor’s advice. He concluded that:
Although LECC has a high degree of independence under its legislation, it is a body operating in the public sector and within the context of the broad policies of the government of the day in relation to public administration... it is not a function of LECC or its Commissioners to deal directly with money appropriated to the Minister out of the Consolidated Fund.10
The Secretary of the Department of Justice forwarded the Crown Solicitor’s and the Solicitor General’s advice to the Chief Commissioner.11 The Chief Commissioner continues to contest the Crown Solicitor’s and the Solicitor General’s advice.12
The Minister referred the matter to the Inspector of the LECC
In August 2018, the Minister referred the Chief Commissioner’s disclosure in Budget Estimates13 that he had been personally reimbursed for an expense concerning overseas travel by an officer of the LECC, to the Inspector of the LECC (the Inspector).14 The Inspector is the person, under s. 122 of the LECC Act, responsible for 'auditing the operation of the Commission for the purpose of monitoring compliance with the law of the State'. On 4 September 2018, the Inspector recused himself from investigating the Minister’s complaint.15 In his letter to the Premier dated 19 September 2018, he wrote ‘I informed the Minister for Police that I had acquired information in my capacity as Inspector of LECC (and in the discharge of my statutory functions) prior to receiving his letter of complaint…’. He further suggested to the Minister and the Premier that an Assistant Inspector be appointed to investigate the complaint under s. 121(1) of the LECC Act to give ‘proper and independent’ consideration to the Minister’s complaint.16
The Minister asks the Auditor General to audit the transaction’s compliance with the PF&A Act
An Assistant Inspector appointed under section 121 of the LECC Act can exercise any function of the Inspector, including ‘auditing the operations of the Commission’. The reasons why an Assistant Inspector was not appointed to investigate the matter are not apparent. Instead, on 9 November 2018, the Minister requested the Auditor General to conduct an audit of whether the expenditure complied with s. 12A of the PF&A Act.17
2 Second reading speech of Minister Troy Grant for the LECC Bill.
3 Per the definition of ‘authority’ in s. 4(1) of the PF&A Act and the definition of ‘Public Service agency’ in s. 3 of the GSE Act and Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the GSE Act.
In forming my adverse conclusion, I considered the Chief Commissioner’s argument that s. 22 of the LECC Act prevailed over those sections of the PF&A Act that deal with spending public money, and:
- the principles of statutory interpretation that might apply when a potential conflict between a general provision in one Act and specific provisions in another exists
- whether an apparent conflict exists
- whether the Chief Commissioner was entitled to incur the expenditure without Ministerial approval
- whether the Minister was lawfully entitled to withhold approval for the expenditure from the Chief Commissioner.
The principles of statutory interpretation apply where potential conflicts exist between Acts
A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that all legislation be given its full scope and effect. Courts, and thereby other interpreters, are not at liberty to consider any word or meaning as superfluous. The starting point is that all words must be given some meaning and effect.18 If there is an apparent conflict between two Acts, the pieces of legislation should be read in such a way as to avoid that conflict by giving the words the construction that produces the greatest harmony and the least inconsistency.19
One way conflict can be avoided is to apply the approach that a later general provision does not override an earlier specific provision.20 However, this approach is rebuttable, as a later general Act might also be said to qualify an earlier specific Act.21 The reverse can also apply, in that a later specific Act can be claimed to qualify or supersede an earlier general provision. In such a case, it is said that the later Act impliedly repeals the earlier. This is an easier case to make out because it is apparent the parliament has dealt with the specific instance and it would be reasonable to expect that it had considered any contrary general legislation. However, here again, the courts have qualified this approach by suggesting it should be presumed unlikely that a parliament would intend to contradict itself. If the specific Act was intended to qualify an earlier general Act, then the legislation would have spelt this out.
One must therefore always start from the premise that all words are to be given meaning and effect, and that meaning should enable both pieces of legislation to operate. It is only where the point is reached that it is not possible for both pieces of legislation to operate to their full extent that the approaches to resolving conflicts can be usefully invoked. The approaches may then be useful to determine which is the primary provision and which provision must give way to the requirements set out in that primary provision.
Is there an apparent conflict between the LECC Act and the PF&A Act that needs to be resolved?
No. The LECC Act deals specifically with the operational functions of the LECC, while the PF&A Act deals with the specific issue of expenditure by a delegate of the Minister.
The Chief Commissioner argues that s. 22 of the LECC Act is a specific provision and should take precedence over general delegation provisions in the PF&A Act, namely ss. 12 and 12A. He argues this because s. 22 deals specifically with the operation of the LECC and prohibits the Minister from directing the LECC in the performance of its functions. In his view, this includes the administrative and financial functions impliedly invested in the LECC for it to perform the specific functions referred to in the LECC Act.
However, it can also be readily argued that s. 22 of the LECC Act deals with the general issue of Minister's directions to the LECC and the PF&A deals with the specific issue of expenditure by a delegate of the Minister. While the expenditure of funds may be essential for the LECC to perform its functions, that expenditure is controlled by the PF&A Act, as it controls all expenditure from the Consolidated Fund. The PF&A Act is the specific legislation that relates to expenditure.
The issues that have arisen can be resolved by looking at the effect of the two Acts in their application to the facts. In my view, the PF&A Act and the LECC Act can be applied to the facts under consideration as they deal with different issues and are thereby capable of separate operation.
Was the LECC able to incur expenditure without Ministerial approval?
No. The PF&A Act applies to the LECC in the same way it applies to all NSW Government agencies. While the Minister had approved the LECC’s financial delegations under the authority vested in him by s. 12A of the PF&A Act, he reserved his right to approve all expenditure on overseas travel. This effectively required the LECC to obtain his approval for each instance of such expenditure. As the Minister did not approve the overseas travel request, the Chief Commissioner was not legally able to authorise the expenditure.
The PF&A Act determines how expenditure is to occur and sets out the conditions under which such expenditure can occur in New South Wales public sector agencies. Expenditure can ‘only be committed or incurred by an officer of an authority within the limits of a delegation in writing conferred on the officer by a person entitled to make the delegation’.22
Was the Minister lawfully entitled to withhold approval of the overseas travel expenditure?
Yes. If one accepts the premise that the PF&A Act determines the basis on which public money can be spent, it follows that the Minister could exercise the discretion reserved to him by financial delegation and withhold approval of the overseas travel expenditure for the LECC officer.
Section 22 of the LECC Act prevents the Minister from directing the LECC to send (or not to send) an officer to a conference. However, the Minister did not direct the LECC as to whether the person should or should not attend the conference. Rather, he exercised the responsibility given to him to determine how public funds were to be spent.
The appropriation to the LECC provided funding to the delegate of the Minister to support the performance of the agency’s functions. However, the expenditure of money for overseas travel was governed by ss. 12 and 12A of the PF&A Act. This gave the Minister discretion to approve or refuse to approve expenditure for overseas travel on a case by case basis. It follows from this that the Chief Commissioner was not entitled to spend money for overseas travel, even though in the Commissioner’s view it was beneficial to the performance of the LECC’s functions.
It may be suggested that the Minister’s refusal to provide funding for a particular function may have the same effect as directing an agency not to perform that function. NSW’s constitutional structure of government establishes that public money can only be spent in accordance with legislation and if expenditure requires a Minister’s approval, that approval establishes the ability of an agency to spend that money. That said, in reserving approval for certain types of expenditures, care should be exercised not to unduly interfere with the legitimate functions of independent agencies.
This assurance audit is a ‘direct engagement’ whereby the Auditor‑General provides the Minister and parliament with reasonable assurance about whether $8,074.66 spent on overseas travel by the LECC complied, in all material respects with s. 12A of the PF&A Act.
My audit was conducted in accordance with applicable Standards on Assurance Engagements (ASAE 3100 ‘Compliance Engagements’).
In conducting my audit, I have complied with:
- the independence requirements of Australian Auditing and Assurance Standards
- ASQC 1 ‘Quality Control for firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of Financial Reports and Other Financial Information, Other Assurance Engagements and Related Service Engagements’
- relevant ethical pronouncements.
Parliament promotes independence by ensuring the Auditor‑General and the Audit Office of New South Wales are not compromised in their roles by:
- providing that only parliament, and not the executive government, can remove an Auditor‑General
- mandating the Auditor‑General as auditor of public sector agencies
- precluding the Auditor‑General from providing non‑audit services.
I have reviewed documentation provided by the Minister and the LECC, gained an understanding of the LECC’s controls and processes for approving and making expenditure and made enquiries of LECC staff. I have also:
- gained an understanding of the relevant pieces of legislation and case law
- reviewed the advice of the Crown Solicitor and the Solicitor‑General
- sought independent legal advice on key aspects of the PF&A Act and the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (the LECC Act) from an acknowledged expert in statutory interpretation
- conducted interviews with key persons
- reviewed the documentation listed in Appendix four.
Agency compliance with NSW Government travel policies
Overall, agencies materially complied with NSW Government travel policies.
However, the Auditor-General found some agencies:
- did not always book official travel through the approved supplier
- had weaknesses in their travel approval processes
- had travel policies that were inconsistent with the NSW Government policy
- did not adequately manage their travel records.
We asked the 15 participating agencies to complete a self assessment of the processes they have implemented to comply with the new policy. The key observations are summarised below.
2016 - An overview
This report focuses on key observations and findings from 2016 audits and highlights key areas of focus for financial and performance audits in 2017.
| Financial reporting | |
| Observation | Conclusion |
| Only one qualified audit opinion was issued on the 2015–16 financial statements of NSW public sector agencies, compared to two in 2014–15. | The quality of financial reporting continued to improve across the NSW public sector. |
| More 2015–16 financial statements and audit opinions were signed within three months of the year end. | Timely financial reporting was facilitated by more agencies resolving significant accounting issues early, completing asset valuations on time and compiling sufficient evidence to support financial statement balances. |
|
NSW Treasury’s early close procedures in 2015–16 were again successful in improving the quality and timeliness of financial reporting, largely facilitated by the early resolution of accounting issues. For 2016–17, NSW Treasury has narrowed the scope of mandatory early close procedures. |
The narrowed scope of mandatory early close procedures may diminish the good performance in ensuring the quality and timeliness of financial reporting achieved in recent years. To mitigate this risk, NSW Treasury has mandated that agencies perform non-financial asset valuations and prepare proforma financial statements in their early close procedures. It also encourages them to continue with the good practices embedded in recent years. |
| Although most agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s early close asset revaluation procedures we identified areas where they can improve. | Asset revaluations need to commence early enough to ensure all assets are identified and the results are analysed, recorded and reflected accurately in the early close financial statements. |
| Number of misstatements | |||||
| Year ended 30 June | 2015-16 | 2014-15 | 2013-14 | 2012-13 | 2011-12 |
| Total reported misstatements | 298 | 396 | 459 | 661 | 1,077 |
All material misstatements identified by agencies and audit teams were corrected before the financial statements and audit opinions were signed. A material misstatement relates to an incorrect amount, classification, presentation or disclosure in the financial statements that could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users.
Significant matters reported to the portfolio Minister, Treasurer and Agency Head
In 2015–16, we reported the following significant matters to the portfolio Minister, Treasurer and agency head in our Statutory Audit Reports:
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and the implementation and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
In 2015–16, our audit teams made the following key observations on the financial controls of NSW public sector agencies.
| Financial controls | |
| Observation | Conclusion |
| More needs to be done to implement audit recommendations on a timely basis. We found 212 internal control issues identified in previous audits had not been adequately addressed by 30 June 2016. |
Delays in implementing audit recommendations can impact the quality of financial information and the effectiveness of decision making. Agencies need to ensure they have action plans, timeframes and assigned responsibilities to address recommendations in a timely manner. |
| Agencies continue to face challenges managing information security. Most information technology issues we identified related to poor IT user administration in areas like password controls and inappropriate access. | Agencies should review the design and effectiveness of information security controls to ensure data is adequately protected. |
|
We found shared service provider agreements did not always adequately address information security requirements. |
Where agencies use shared service providers they should consider whether the service level arrangements adequately address information security. |
| Thirteen of 108 agencies required to attest to having a minimum set of information security controls did not do so in their 2015 annual reports. | The 'NSW Government Digital Information Security Policy' recognises the growing need for effective information security. With cyber security threats continuing to increase as digital services expand we plan to look at cyber security as part of our 2017–18 performance audit program. |
| We identified instances where service level agreements with shared service providers were outdated, signed too late or did not exist. | Corporate and shared service arrangements are more effective when service level arrangements are negotiated and signed in time, clearly detail rights and responsibilities and include meaningful KPIs, fee arrangements and dispute resolution processes. |
| Internal controls at GovConnect, the private sector provider of transactional and information technology services to many NSW public sector agencies were ineffective in 2015–16. We found mitigating actions taken to manage transition risks from ServiceFirst to GovConnect were ineffective in ensuring effective control over client transactions and data. | The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should ensure GovConnect addresses the control deficiencies. It should also examine the breakdowns in the transition of the shared service arrangements and apply the learnings to other services being transitioned to the private sector. |
| Maintenance backlogs exist in several NSW public sector agencies, including Roads and Maritime Services, Sydney Trains, NSW Health, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice. | To address backlog maintenance it is important for agencies to have asset lifecycle planning strategies that ensure newly built and existing assets are funded and maintained to a desired service level. |
Fraud Survey
In a report released today, the NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford provides a snapshot of reported fraud in the NSW public sector and an analysis of NSW Government agencies’ fraud controls based on a survey of 102 agencies.
