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Published

Actions for Health 2020

Health 2020

Health
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Service delivery

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Health cluster for the year ended 30 June 2020. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Financial reporting

Financial reporting

Unqualified financial audit opinions

The financial statements of NSW Health and its 25 controlled entities received unqualified opinions.

The number of corrected and uncorrected misstatements increased from the prior year. Misstatements related predominantly to the implementation of new accounting standards, asset revaluations and accounting for new revenue streams to cover the cost of HSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Qualified compliance audit opinion

We issued a qualified audit opinion for the Ministry of Health’s Annual Prudential Compliance Statement for aged care facilities operated by NSW Health. We identified 18 instances of material non-compliance with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) in 2019–20 (30 in 2018–19).

Financial performance

NSW Health received an additional $3.3 billion in funding to cover costs associated with its response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the cluster were significant for health entities and included changes to operations, increased revenues, expenditure, assets and liabilities. Cancellation of elective surgery and decreased emergency department presentations meant that despite the pandemic, activity levels at many health entities decreased. Health Pathology and HealthShare were notable exceptions.

In the period to the 30 June 2020, NSW Health reported that over 900,000 COVID-19 tests were conducted. Health Pathology conducted over 500,000 of these tests. Health Pathology's surge requirements were enhanced through arrangements with 13 private sector providers. HealthShare purchased $864.2 million of personal protective equipment.

Overall, NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $3.1 billion in 2019–20, an increase of $2.0 billion from 2018–19. As in previous years, the surplus largely resulted from additional revenue received to fund capital projects including the construction of new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments. In 2019–20 additional Commonwealth and State funding for the purchase and stockpiling of personal protective equipment also contributed to the operating surplus.

Overtime payments The Ambulance Service of NSW’s (NSW Ambulance) reduced their overtime payments to $79.7 million in 2019–20 ($83.1 million in 2018–19). Overtime payments in 2019–20 included $6.8 million related to the response to the 2019–20 bushfire season. NSW Ambulance overtime payments represent 16.8 per cent of total overtime payments in the cluster.

2. Audit observations

Internal control deficiencies

We identified more internal control deficiencies in 2019–20. The number of repeat issues from prior years also remains high.

NSW Health addressed 18 out of the 25 information system control deficiencies during the year.

Several key agreements lacked formal documentation. This included agreements between the Ministry and health entities, between health entities and agencies in other clusters and between the Ministry and health departments in other jurisdictions.

Infrastructure delivery NSW Health had 44 ongoing major capital projects at 30 June 2020 with a total revised budget of $12.3 billion. The revised total budget of $12.3 billion is $2.0 billion more than the original budget. NSW Health revises budgets when it combines project stages.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the cluster were significant and included changes to the operations of the health entities and increased revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities.

As a part of this year's audits of health entities, we have considered:

  • financial implications of the COVID-19 emergency at both health entity and cluster levels
  • changes to agencies' operating models
  • agencies' access to technology and the maturity of systems and controls to prevent unauthorised and fraudulent access to data.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

The response to the COVID-19 pandemic primarily impacted the financial reporting of NSW Health through:

  • additional revenue from the State government in the form of grants and stimulus payments
  • additional revenue from the Commonwealth government under the National Partnership Agreement for COVID-19 to cover part of the cost of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic
  • increased expenses, largely due to increased payments to private health operators to maintain their viability during the COVID-19 pandemic and later to assist with public patient elective surgery waitlists and increased cleaning costs
  • increased purchases of personal protective equipment.

Chapter one outlines the impacts of NSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This chapter outlines our other audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster for 2020.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all health entities’ financial statements, although more misstatements were identified than last year.
  • NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $3.1 billion, an increase of $2.0 billion from 2018–19. This is largely due to additional capital grants for new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments and additional Commonwealth and State funding for the purchase of personal protective equipment.
  • NSW Health’s expenses increased by 5.5 per cent in 2019–20 (7.0 per cent in 2018–19) despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The primary causes for the growth in expenses are increases in:
    • employee related expenses due to higher employee numbers, increased overtime and a 2.5 per cent award increase
    • payments to private health operators to maintain their viability during the COVID-19 pandemic and later to assist with public patient elective surgery waitlists
    • payments to private health operators due to the first full year of operation of the Northern Beaches hospital.
  • The Ambulance Service of NSW (NSW Ambulance) continued to report higher overtime payments than other health entities. However, despite the response to the 2019–20 bushfire season, their overtime payments were lower than last year. NSW Ambulance paid $79.7 million in overtime payments in 2019–20 ($83.1 million in 2018–19).
  • A qualified audit opinion was issued for the Ministry of Health’s Annual Prudential Compliance Statement for aged care facilities operated by NSW Health. There were 18 instances of material non-compliance with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) in 2019–20 (30 in 2018–19)

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

The primary impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the effectiveness of the internal controls of NSW Health and health entities relates to the effectiveness of controls implemented by HealthShare relating to the stocktake of personal protective equipment inventories. Inventory managed by HealthShare increased by 2,746 per cent during 2019–20. HealthShare’s inventory controls did not maintain pace with the sudden, significant increase.

The impacts of NSW Health’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic are outlined in chapter one. This chapter outlines other observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of internal control deficiencies has increased since 2018–19. More than a third of control deficiencies are repeat issues.
  • Control deficiencies that relate to managing employees’ leave and employee’s time recording continue to be difficult for entities to resolve, particularly during the ongoing response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Several key agreements were undocumented. These included agreements between the Ministry and the health entities, between health entities, and between the Ministry and entities in other clusters and jurisdictions. These related to:
    • a loan arrangement between the Ministry and HealthShare for $319 million.
    • Northern Sydney Local Health District's use of land and buildings owned by the Graythwaite Charitable Trust
    • agreements for the treatment of New South Wales residents while they are interstate, and interstate residents receiving treatment while they are in New South Wales from Queensland, Victoria, South Australia and the ACT for both 2019–20 and 2018–19.
  • NSW Health reported that they completed nine major capital projects during 2019–20. As at 30 June 2020 there were 44 ongoing major capital health projects in NSW. The revised capital budget for these projects in total was $2.0 billion more than the original budget of $10.3 billion. NSW Health reported the budget revisions are largely the result of combining project stages.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations 

Appendix two – Status of 2019 recommendations 

Appendix three – Financial data

Appendix four – Analysis of financial indicators 

Appendix five – Analysis of performance against budget

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament

Health 2020

11 December 2020

This corrigendum has been prepared to amend the following text within the Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament on Health 2020, dated 10 December 2020.

NSW Health emergency department treatment times

On page five the original text was as follows:

NSW Health also measures the percentage of patients whose clinical care in emergency departments is completed within four hours. The measure is used as an indicator of accessibility to public hospital services.

NSW Health aims to complete clinical care in the emergency department for 81 per cent of patients within four hours. In 2019–20 NSW Health reports it completed clinical care within four hours for 72.1 per cent of patients (a 7.3 per cent decrease from 2018–19).

At Western Sydney Local Health District, 59 per cent of patients were treated within the targeted timeframe. NSW Health attribute this to the profile of patients presenting in emergency departments and additional time taken processing COVID-19 patients to ensure staff safety.

The original text has now been changed to:

NSW Health also measures the percentage of patients with total time in the emergency department of four hours or less for each local health district. The measure is used as an indicator of accessibility to public hospital services.

Local Health Districts Target % (2019–20) Actual % (2019–20)
Central Coast 77.0 59.9
Far West 90.2 86.6
Hunter New England 81.0 72.5
Illawarra Shoalhaven 79.0 60.2
Mid North Coast 82.0 76.7
Murrumbidgee 85.3 81.9
Nepean Blue Mountains 79.0 65.5
Northern NSW 81.0 78.2
Northern Sydney 79.0 73.9
South Eastern Sydney 78.0 70.3
South Western Sydney 78.0 61.2
Southern NSW 85.0 83.0
Sydney 76.0 70.9
Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network 80.0 72.1
Western NSW 85.9 81.0
Western Sydney 78.0 59.0
St Vincent's Health Network* 75.0 65.4
* St Vincent’s Health Network Sydney (SVHNS) comprises of St Vincent’s Hospital Sydney Limited as the affiliated health organisation in respect of four recognised establishments under the Health Services Act 1997 (NSW) (Health Services Act). Under the Health Services Act, St Vincent’s Hospital Sydney Limited, is treated as a Network for the purposes of the National Health Reform Agreement in respect of the three recognised establishments: St Vincent’s Hospital, Darlinghurst; Sacred Heart Health Service, Darlinghurst; St Joseph’s Hospital, Auburn; and St Vincent's Correctional Health, Parklea.
Source: NSW Health (unaudited)

The above changes will be reflected in the version of the report published on the Audit Office website and should be considered the true and accurate version.

Published

Actions for Transport 2020

Transport 2020

Transport
Asset valuation
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Project management

1. Financial Reporting

Audit opinion Unmodified audit opinions issued for the financial statements of all Transport cluster entities.
Quality and timeliness of financial reporting All cluster agencies met the statutory deadlines for completing the early close and submitting the financial statements.

Transport cluster agencies continued to experience some challenges with accounting for land and infrastructure assets. The former Roads and Maritime Services and Sydney Metro recorded prior period corrections to property, plant and equipment balances.
Impact of COVID-19 on passenger revenue and patronage Total patronage and revenue for public transport decreased by approximately 18 per cent in 2019–20 due to COVID-19.

The Transport cluster received additional funding from NSW Treasury during the year to support the reduced revenue and additional costs incurred such as cleaning on all modes of public transport and additional staff to manage physical distancing.
Completion of the CBD and South East Light Rail The CBD and South East Light Rail project was completed and commenced operations in this financial year. At 30 June 2020, the total cost of the project related to the CBD and South East Light Rail was $3.3 billion. Of this total cost, $2.6 billion was recorded as assets, whilst $700 million was expensed.

2. Audit Observations

Internal control While internal controls issues raised in management letters in the Transport cluster have decreased compared to the prior year, control weaknesses continue to exist in access security for financial systems. We identified 56 management letter findings across the cluster and 43 per cent of all issues were repeat issues. The majority of the repeat issues relate to information technology controls around user access management.

There were three high risk issues identified - two related to financial reporting of assets and one for implementation of TAHE (see below).
Agency responses to emergency events Transport for NSW established the COVID-19 Taskforce in March 2020 to take responsibility for the overall response of planning and coordination for the Transport cluster. It also implemented the COVIDSafe Transport Plan which incorporates guidance on physical distancing, increasing services to support social distancing and cleaning.
RailCorp transition to TAHE On 1 July 2020, RailCorp was renamed Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE) and converted to a for-profit statutory State-Owned Corporation. TAHE is a commercial for-profit Public Trading Entity with the intent to provide a commercial return to its shareholders.

A plan was established by NSW Treasury to transition RailCorp to TAHE which covered the period 1 July 2015 to 1 July 2019. A large portion of the planned arrangements were not implemented by 1 July 2020. As at the time of this report, the TAHE operating model, Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) and other key plans and commercial agreements are not finalised. The State Owned Corporations Act 1989 generally requires finalisation of an SCI three months after the commencement of each financial year. However, under the Transport Administration Act 1988, TAHE received an extension from the voting shareholders, the Treasurer and Minister for Finance and Small Business, to submit its first SCI by 31 December 2020. In accordance with the original plan, interim commercial access arrangements were supposed to be in place with RailCorp prior to commencement of TAHE.

Under the transitional arrangements, TAHE is continuing to operate in accordance with the asset and safety management plans of RailCorp. The final operating model is expected to include considerations of safety, operational, financial and fiscal risks. This should include a consideration of the potential conflicting objectives of a commercial return, and maintenance and safety measures.

This matter has been included as a high risk finding in our management letter due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for TAHE.

Recommendation: TAHE management should:
  • establish an operating model in line with the original intent of a commercial return
  • finalise commercial agreements with the public rail operators
  • confirm forecast financial information to assess valuation of TAHE infrastructure
  • finalise asset and safety management plans.

Resolution of the above matters are critical as they may significantly impact the financial reporting arrangements for TAHE for 2020–21, in particular, accounting policies adopted as well as measurement principles of its significant infrastructure asset base.

Completeness and accuracy of contracts registers Across the Transport cluster, contracts and agreements are maintained by the transport agencies using disparate registers.

Recommendation (repeat): Transport agencies should continue to implement a process to centrally capture all contracts and agreements entered. This will ensure:
  • agencies are fully aware of contractual and other obligations
  • appropriate assessment of financial reporting implications
  • ongoing assessments of accounting standards, in particular AASB 16 ‘Leases’, AASB 15 'Revenue from Contract with Customers', AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities' and new accounting standard AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' are accurate and complete.

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • the impact of emergencies and the pandemic.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2020, including any financial implications from the recent emergency events.

Section highlights

  • Total patronage and revenue for public transport decreased by approximately 18 per cent in 2019–20 due to COVID-19.
  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Transport agencies' financial statements.
  • Transport cluster agencies continued to experience challenges with accounting of land and infrastructure assets.

 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our:

  • observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster
  • assessment of how well cluster agencies adapted their systems, policies and procedures, and governance arrangements in response to recent emergencies.

Section highlights

  • While there was a decrease in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster, 43 per cent of all issues were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to information technology controls around user access management.
  • RailCorp transitioned to TAHE on 1 July 2020. TAHE's operating model and commercial arrangements with public rail operators has not been finalised despite government original plans to be operating from 1 July 2019. TAHE management should finalise its operating model and commercial agreements with public rail operators as they may significantly impact the financial reporting arrangements for TAHE for 2020–21.
  • Completeness and accuracy of contracts registers remains an ongoing issue for the Transport cluster.

Appendix one – List of 2020 recommendations

Appendix two – Status of 2019, 2018 and 2017 recommendations

Appendix three – Management letter findings

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for State Finances 2020

State Finances 2020

Education
Finance
Community Services
Health
Justice
Industry
Planning
Environment
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Financial reporting

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on State Finances for the year ended 30 June 2020.

‘I am pleased to once again report that I issued an unmodified audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements,’ the Auditor-General said.

The report acknowledges this has been a challenging year, with New South Wales impacted by natural disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The State’s Budget Result, reported in the financial statements, was a deficit of $6.9 billion. This is different to the 2019-20 budget forecast surplus of $1.0 billion and is an outcome of the government’s significant response to bushfires and COVID-19.

The report summarises a number of audit and accounting matters arising from the audit of the Total State Sector Accounts, a sector that comprises 291 entities controlled by the NSW Government with total assets of $495 billion and total liabilities of $256 billion.

Read full report (PDF)

Our audit opinion on the State’s 2019–20 financial statements was unmodified

An unmodified audit opinion was issued on the State’s 2019–20 consolidated financial statements.

The State extended signing its financial statements by six weeks.

Natural disasters, the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors impacted the State’s 2019–20 reporting timetable. The State extended signing its financial statements by six weeks, compared with 2018–19.

All agencies were also given a two-week extension to prepare their financial statements compared with 2018–19. Further extensions beyond two weeks were subsequently approved for the following 11 agencies (7 in 2018–19) to submit completed financial statements for audit:

  • Department of Communities and Justice
  • Department of Customer Service
  • Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
  • Department of Regional NSW
  • Department of Transport
  • Environment Protection Authority
  • Infrastructure NSW
  • Lord Howe Island Board
  • NSW Crown Holiday Parks Land Manager
  • Service NSW
  • Water Administration Ministerial Corporation.

The extensions reflected that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted agencies’ work environments during the first six months of 2020. This was at a time when many were still implementing machinery of government changes and preparing to implement three significant new accounting standards:

  • AASB 15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers (issued December 2014, effective 1 July 2019)
  • AASB 16 Leases (issued February 2016, effective 1 July 2019)
  • AASB 1058 Income of Not-for-profit entities (issued December 2016, effective 1 July 2019).

These new accounting standards were issued some years before they became effective, to allow reporting entities sufficient time to prepare for implementation. Notwithstanding this, some agencies had not fully implemented the new accounting standards in time for early close procedures, and the unforeseen impact of COVID-19 further complicated the year-end financial reporting processes for the State and its agencies.

The graph below shows the number of reported errors exceeding $20 million over the past five years in agencies’ financial statements presented for audit.

In 2019–20, agency financial statements presented for audit contained 19 errors exceeding $20 million (six in 2018–19). The total value of these errors increased to $1.4 billion ($927 million in 2018–19).

The errors resulted from:

  • incorrectly applying Australian Accounting Standards and Treasury Policies
  • incorrect judgements and assumptions when valuing noncurrent physical assets and liabilities
  • incorrectly interpreting the accounting treatment for unspent stimulus funding.

Errors in agency financial statements exceeding $20m (2016–2020)

$4.1 billion in stimulus funding was allocated in 2019–20

The government implemented an economic stimulus package primarily to mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on New South Wales.

The COVID-19 pandemic and bushfires had a significant impact on the State’s finances, reducing its revenue and increasing its expenses especially in sectors directly responsible for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Health.

The government announced a $4.1 billion health and economic stimulus package in 2019–20. This primarily included:

  • $2.2 billion in health measures including purchases of essential medical equipment and increasing clinical health capacity (like intensive care spaces)
  • $1.0 billion in small business and land tax relief
  • $355 million in extra cleaning services and quarantine costs.

Cluster agencies had spent $3.0 billion (just under 75 per cent) of the COVID-19 stimulus package by 30 June 2020.

The Health cluster incurred most of this expenditure.

Total spend relating to bushfires was $1.3 billion in 2019–20.

The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster to 30 June 2020.

Economic stimulus allocation and spend by cluster to 30 June 2020

Deficit of $6.9 billion compared with a budgeted surplus of $1.0 billion

An outcome of the government’s overall activity and policies is its net operating balance (Budget Result). This is the difference between the cost of general government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 199 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.

The Non-General Government Sector, which comprises 92 government businesses, generally provides goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services that consumers pay for directly.

The Budget Result for the 2019–20 financial year was a deficit of $6.9 billion. The original budget forecast, set before the COVID-19 pandemic and bushfires, was a $1.0 billion surplus. The main driver of the change in result was:

  • $1.3 billion of higher employee costs, mainly due to:
    • increased workers compensation claims
    • additional personnel required (mainly in the Health sector) to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic
  • $2.3 billion of higher operating expenses, mainly due to:
    • $828 million from first time recognition of a child abuse claim liability
    • $507 million from additional insurance claims from the NSW bushfires
    • $343 million from COVID-19 claims by agencies for loss of revenue.
  • $1.8 billion in higher grants and subsidy expenses, mainly due to:
    • small business grants
    • COVID-19 quarantine compliance measures
    • costs incurred in response to the 2019–20 bushfires, drought and disaster relief payments
    • third party-controlled assets that were subsequently transferred to councils and utility providers, mainly arising from construction of the CBD and South East Light Rail.

The deficit was further driven by:

  • $1.9 billion less taxation revenue, mainly resulting from:
    • $1.3 billion less in payroll tax due to relief measures introduced by the government as part of its COVID-19 economic stimulus
    • $424 million less in gambling and betting taxes, due to venue closures required by COVID-19 public health orders
  • $523 million less in dividends and income tax revenue from the Non-General Government Sector, due to lower dividends received from NSW Treasury Corporation and from the State’s other commercial government businesses
  • lower fines, regulatory fees and other revenue, due to a $305 million decrease in mining royalties, largely driven by lower coal prices.

Main drivers of the 2019–20 actual vs. budget variance

Revenues increased $209 million to $86.3 billion

In 2019–20, the State’s total revenues increased by $209 million to $86.3 billion, 0.2 per cent higher than in 2018–19. COVID-19 impacted taxation revenue, which fell by $1.1 billion and revenue from the sale of goods and services, which fell by $1.1 billion. These falls were offset by a $2.5 billion (7.7 per cent) increase in grants and subsidies from the Australian Government, mainly in the form of additional stimulus funding.

Taxation revenue fell 3.5 per cent

Taxation revenue fell by $1.1 billion, mainly due to a:

  • $861 million fall in payroll tax as a result of COVID-19 relief (reduced payroll tax payments for eligible small businesses)
  • $430 million fall in stamp duty collections, driven by lower than expected growth in the property market
  • $427 million decline in gambling and betting taxes, mainly due to venue closures driven by COVID-19 public health orders.

Stamp duties of $8.8 billion were the largest source of taxation revenue, $473 million higher than payroll tax, the second-largest source of taxation revenue.

Australian Government grants and subsidies

The State received $34.2 billion in grants and subsides which are mainly from the Australian Government, $2.4 billion more than in 2018–19.

The increase was driven by a $1.1 billion increase in Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments to support the Health cluster respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Commonwealth National Partnership Payments increased by a similar amount to provide the State with Natural Disaster relief.

Sales of goods and services

In 2019–20, sales of goods and services fell $1.1 billion. This was due to the COVID-19 pandemic reducing:

  • patronage and related transport passenger revenue
  • health billing activities with elective surgery being put on hold
Fines, regulatory fees and other revenues

Fines, regulatory fees and other revenues fell $505 million. This was mainly due to a $409 million decrease in mining royalties attributed to a drop in thermal coal prices during 2019–20.

Other dividends and distributions

Other dividends and distributions rose by $616 million due to higher distributions received from the State’s investments. This was due to an additional $1.3 billion held in the State’s investment portfolio compared with last year.

Expenses increased $8.2 billion to $96.0 billion

The State’s expenses increased 9.3 per cent compared with 2018–19. Most of the increase was due to higher employee expenses, other operating costs and grants and subsidies.

Employee expenses, including superannuation, increased 5.7 per cent to $42.6 billion.

Salaries and wages increased to $42.6 billion from $40.3 billion in 2018–19. This was mainly due to increases in staff numbers and a 2.5 per cent increase in pay rates across the sector. Salaries and wages for the Education and Health sectors increased by $659 million and $732 million in each sector respectively.

The Health sector employed an additional 2,763 full time staff in 2019–20. It also incurred more overtime in response to COVID-19. Education increased staff numbers by 4,866 full time equivalents and paid a one off 11 per cent pay rise to school administration staff in 2019–20. Historically, the government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Operating expenses increased 8.7 per cent to $27.0 billion.

Operating expenses increased to $27.0 billion in 2019–20 ($24.8 billion in 2018–19) due to higher operating activities in Health. The higher level of activities and related costs is attributed to a full year of operations at the Northern Beaches Hospital (opened November 2018), and responding to COVID-19. The response to COVID-19 involved the State providing viability payments to private hospitals, higher visiting medical officer costs due to additional overtime hours and spending more on equipment to set up COVID-19 testing clinics.

Insurance claims increased by $2.0 billion. This was mainly due to NSW Self Insurance Corporation (SiCorp) recognising a liability for child abuse claims incurred but not reported for the first time, and claims for the 2019–20 bushfires, floods and COVID-19.

Health costs remain the State’s highest expense.

Total expenses of the State were $96 billion ($87.8 billion in 2018–19). Traditionally, the following clusters have the highest expenses as a percentage of total government expenses:

  • Health – 24.3 per cent (25.8 per cent in 2018–19)
  • Education – 17.6 per cent (19.3 per cent in 2018–19)
  • Transport - 12.8 per cent (12.6 per cent in 2018–19).

General public service expenses as a percentage of total State expenses is higher due to a $2.0 billion increase in SiCorp’s accrued claim expenses.

Other expenses increased due to additional grant funding by the State for drought relief and COVID-19 stimulus spend.

Health expenses increased by $632 million compared with 2018–19 but fell as a proportion of total State expenses.

Education expenses remained stable compared with last year due to savings in student transportation costs primarily driven by COVID-19. This led to a decrease in the proportion of the State’s costs relating to education activities.

Grants and subsidies increased $2.5 billion to $14.1 billion.

The increase in grants and subsidies was due to payments the State made to support businesses and local communities in the face of COVID-19 and bushfires. In addition, the State transferred CBD and South East Light Rail assets to councils and utility providers during 2019–20 as it no longer controlled these.

Depreciation expense increased $1.0 billion to $9.2 billion.

Depreciation increased to $9.2 billion from $8.0 billion in 2018–19. At 1 July 2019, the State implemented the new leases standard recognising a right of use (ROU) asset and related lease liability in its financial statements. The value of ROU assets are amortised over the term of the lease. This contributed to $980 million of the increase in 2019–20 depreciation expense. Last year, these costs were previously reported within other operating expenses.

Assets grew by $28.0 billion to $495 billion

The State’s assets primarily include physical assets such as land, buildings and infrastructure, and financial assets such as cash, and other financial instruments and equity investments. The value of total assets increased by $28.0 billion to $495 billion. This was a six per cent increase compared with 2018–19, mostly due to changes in asset carrying values.

Of the State’s $28.0 billion increase in asset values, $9.3 billion was due to a new accounting standard requirement for operating leases to be valued and recorded on balance sheet for the first time.

AASB 16 Leases requires entities recognise values for right-ofuse assets (ROU) for the first time. An ROU asset is a lessee’s right to use an asset, the value of which is amortised over the term of the lease. This standard came into effect from 1 July 2019.

Valuing the State’s physical assets

State’s physical assets valued at $365 billion.

The value of the State’s physical assets increased by $14.1 billion to $365 billion in 2019–20. The assets include land and buildings ($168 billion), infrastructure ($180 billion) and plant and equipment ($16.7 billion). A prior period error relating to the valuation of RMS infrastructure assets reduced the reported values by $1.0 billion from $352 billion to $351 billion at 30 June 2019.

The movement in physical asset values between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuation adjustments. Other movements include reclassification of physical assets leased under finance leases to right of use assets upon adoption of AASB 16 Leases on 1 July 2019.

Movements in physical asset values

Liabilities increased $38.4 billion to $256 billion

The State borrowed additional funds in response to natural disasters and COVID-19.

The State’s borrowings rose by $33.9 billion to $113.8 billion at 30 June 2020. This accounted for most of the increase in the State’s total liabilities.

The value of TCorp bonds on issue increased by $25.2 billion to $97.0 billion to largely fund capital expenditure and costs associated with the bushfires, drought and COVID-19.

TCorp bonds are actively traded in financial markets and are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

Over 2019–20, TCorp continued to take advantage of lower interest rates, buying back short-term bonds and replacing them with longer dated debt. This lengthens the portfolio matching liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.

With effect from 1 July 2019, AASB 16 Leases required the State to recognise liabilities for operating leases for the first time. This increased total lease liabilities from $5.3 billion at 30 June 2019 to $11.8 billion at 30 June 2020.

More than a third of the State’s liabilities relate to its employees. They include unfunded superannuation and employee benefits, such as long service and recreation leave.

Valuing these obligations involves complex estimation techniques and significant judgements. Small changes in assumptions and other variables, such as a lower discount rate, can materially impact the valuation of liability balances in the financial statements.

The State’s unfunded superannuation liability rose $300 million from $70.7 billion to $71.0 billion at 30 June 2020. This was mainly due to a lower discount rate of 0.87 per cent (1.32 per cent in 2018–19). The State’s unfunded superannuation liability represents the value of its obligations to past and present employees less the value of assets set aside to fund those obligations.

 

The State maintained its AAA credit rating

The object of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 is to maintain the State’s AAA credit rating.

The government manages New South Wales’ finances in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (the Act).

The Act establishes the framework for fiscal responsibility and the strategy to maintain the State’s AAA credit rating and service delivery to the people of New South Wales.

The legislation sets out targets and principles for financial management to achieve this.

This year, the State’s credit rating from Standard & Poor’s changed from AAA/Stable to AAA/Negative. Moody’s Investors Service credit rating of Aaa/Stable did not change from the previous year.

The fiscal target for achieving this objective is that General Government annual expenditure growth should be lower than long term average revenue growth.

The State did not achieve its fiscal target of maintaining annual expenditure growth below the long-term revenue growth rate target of 5.6 per cent.

In 2019–20, General Government expenditure grew by 9.7 per cent (5.5 per cent in 2018–19).

Expenditure items that contributed most to the growth rate include:

  • recurrent grants and subsidies (20.4 per cent)
  • other operating expenses (9.5 per cent)
  • employee costs (including superannuation) (5.6 per cent)

Recurrent grant and subsidy expenses increased by $2.8 billion in 2019–20 mainly due to the COVID-19 and natural disaster payments. Other operating expenses increased mainly due to a $2.0 billion increase in SiCorp insurance claims. This included the $828 million provision for child abuse claims incurred but not reported. The bushfires and COVID-19 pandemic also increased the number and cost of claims in 2019–20.

Superannuation funding position since inception of the Act - AASB 1056 Valuation

Published

Actions for CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

CBD South East Sydney Light Rail: follow-up performance audit

Transport
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

This is a follow-up to the Auditor-General's November 2016 report on the CBD South East Sydney Light Rail project. This follow-up report assessed whether Transport for NSW has updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits.

The audit found that Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public.

The Auditor-General reports that the total cost of the project will exceed $3.1 billion, which is above the revised cost of $2.9 billion published in November 2019. $153.84 million of additional costs are due to omitted costs for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays.

The report makes four recommendations to Transport for NSW to publicly report on the final project cost, the updated expected project benefits, the benefits achieved in the first year of operations and the average weekly journey times.

Read full report (PDF)

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a 12 km light rail network for Sydney. It extends from Circular Quay along George Street to Central Station, through Surry Hills to Moore Park, then to Kensington and Kingsford via Anzac Parade and Randwick via Alison Road and High Street.

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) is responsible for planning, procuring and delivering the Central Business District and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project. In December 2014, TfNSW entered into a public private partnership with ALTRAC Light Rail as the operating company (OpCo) responsible for delivering, operating and maintaining the CSELR. OpCo engaged Alstom and Acciona, who together form its Design and Construct Contractor (D&C).

On 14 December 2019, passenger services started on the line between Circular Quay and Randwick. Passenger services on the line between Circular Quay and Kingsford commenced on 3 April 2020.

In November 2016, the Auditor-General published a performance audit report on the CSELR project. The audit found that TfNSW would deliver the CSELR at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case, and recommended that TfNSW update and consolidate information about project costs and benefits and ensure the information is readily accessible to the public.

In November 2018, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) examined TfNSW's actions taken in response to our 2016 performance audit report on the CSELR project. The PAC recommended that the Auditor-General consider undertaking a follow-up audit on the CSELR project. The purpose of this follow-up performance audit is to assess whether TfNSW has effectively updated and consolidated information about project costs and benefits for the CSELR project.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW has not consistently and accurately updated CSLER project costs, limiting the transparency of reporting to the public. In line with the NSW Government Benefits Realisation Management Framework, TfNSW intends to measure benefits after the project is completed and has not updated the expected project benefits since April 2015.

Between February 2015 and December 2019, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) regularly updated capital expenditure costs for the CSELR in internal monthly financial performance and risk reports. These reports did not include all the costs incurred by TfNSW to manage and commission the CSELR project.

Omitted costs of $153.84 million for early enabling works, the small business assistance package and financing costs attributable to project delays will bring the current estimated total cost of the CSELR project to $3.147 billion.

From February 2015, TfNSW did not regularly provide the financial performance and risk reports to key CSELR project governance bodies. TfNSW publishes information on project costs and benefits on the Sydney Light Rail website. However, the information on project costs has not always been accurate or current.

TfNSW is working with OpCo partners to deliver the expected journey time benefits. A key benefit defined in the business plan was that bus services would be reduced owing to transfer of demand to the light rail - entailing a saving. However, TfNSW reports that the full expected benefit of changes to bus services will not be realised due to bus patronage increasing above forecasted levels.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Governance and reporting arrangements for the CSELR

Appendix three – 2018 CSELR governance changes

Appendix four – About the audit

Appendix five – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #335 - released 11 June 2020

Published

Actions for Train station crowding

Train station crowding

Transport
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report focuses on how Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains manage crowding at selected metropolitan train stations.

The audit found that while Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, it does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. Sydney Trains 'do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed’, the Auditor-General said.

Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or station entries before crowding reaches unsafe levels or when it impacts on-time running. Assuming rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, causing customer delay. ‘Restricting customer access to platforms or station entries is not a sustainable approach to manage station crowding’, said the Auditor-General.

The Auditor-General made seven recommendations to improve Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains' management of station crowding. Transport for NSW have accepted these recommendations on behalf of the Transport cluster.

Public transport patronage has been impacted by COVID-19. This audit was conducted before these impacts occurred.

Read full report (PDF)

Sydney Trains patronage has increased by close to 34 per cent over the last five years, and Transport for NSW (TfNSW) expects the growth in patronage to continue over the next 30 years. As patronage increases there are more passengers entering and exiting stations, moving within stations to change services, and waiting on platforms. As a result, some Sydney metropolitan train stations are becoming increasingly crowded.

There are three main causes of station crowding:

  • patronage growth exceeding the current capacity limits of the rail network
  • service disruptions
  • special events.

Crowds can inhibit movement, cause discomfort and can lead to increased health and safety risks to customers. In the context of a train service, unmanaged crowds can affect service operation as trains spend longer at platforms waiting for customers to alight and board services which can cause service delays. Crowding can also prevent customers from accessing services.

Our 2017 performance audit, ‘Passenger Rail Punctuality’, found that rail agencies would find it hard to maintain train punctuality after 2019 unless they significantly increased the capacity of the network to carry trains and people. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have plans to improve the network to move more passengers. These plans are set out in strategies such as More Trains, More Services and in the continued implementation of new infrastructure such as the Sydney Metro. Since 2017, TfNSW and Sydney Trains have introduced 1,500 more weekly services to increase capacity. Additional network capacity improvements are in progress for delivery from 2022 onwards.

In the meantime, TfNSW and Sydney Trains need to use other ways of managing crowding at train stations until increased capacity comes on line.

This audit examined how effectively TfNSW and Sydney Trains are managing crowding at selected metropolitan train stations in the short and medium term. In doing so, the audit examined how TfNSW and Sydney Trains know whether there is a crowding problem at stations and how they manage that crowding.

TfNSW is the lead agency for transport in NSW. TfNSW is responsible for setting the standard working timetable that Sydney Trains must implement. Sydney Trains is responsible for operating and maintaining the Sydney metropolitan heavy rail passenger service. This includes operating, staffing and maintaining most metropolitan stations. Sydney Trains’ overall responsibility is to run a safe rail network to timetable.

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a key strategic risk, but does not have an overarching strategy to manage crowding in the short to medium term. TfNSW and Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers, but do not have sufficient oversight to know if crowding is being effectively managed. TfNSW is delivering a program to influence demand for transport in key precincts but the effectiveness of this program and its impact on station crowding is unclear as Transport for NSW has not evaluated the outcomes of the program.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. Data and observation on dwell time, which is the time a train waits at a platform for customers to get on and off trains, inform the development of operational approaches to manage crowding at stations. Sydney Trains has KPIs on reliability, punctuality and customer experience and use these to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. TfNSW and Sydney Trains only formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for crowd management to Customer Area Managers, who rely on frontline Sydney Trains staff to understand how crowding affects individual stations. Station staff at identified key metropolitan train stations have developed customer management plans (also known as crowd management plans). However, Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring and evaluation of these plans and does not systematically collect data on when station staff activate crowding interventions under these plans.

Sydney Trains stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services. Sydney Trains' operational response to crowding involves restricting customer access to platforms or stations before crowding reaches unsafe levels, or when it impacts on-time running. As rail patronage increases, it is likely that Sydney Trains will need to increase its use of interventions to manage crowding. As Sydney Trains restrict more customers from accessing platforms or station entries, it is likely these customers will experience delays caused by these interventions.

Since 2015, TfNSW has been delivering the 'Travel Choices' program which aims to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services in key precincts. TfNSW is unable to provide data demonstrating the overall effectiveness of this program and the impact the program has on distributing public transport usage out of peak AM and PM times. TfNSW and Sydney Trains continue to explore initiatives to specifically address crowd management.

Conclusion

TfNSW and Sydney Trains do not directly measure or collect data on station crowding. There are no key performance indicators directly related to station crowding. Sydney Trains uses performance indicators on reliability, punctuality and customer experience to indirectly assess the impact of station crowding. Sydney Trains does not have a routine process for identifying whether crowding contributed to minor safety incidents. TfNSW and Sydney Trains formally assess station crowding as part of planning for major projects, developments or events.

 

Conclusion

Sydney Trains has identified platform crowding as a strategic risk but does not have an overarching strategy to manage station crowding. Sydney Trains' stated focus is on providing a safe and reliable rail service. As such, management of station crowding is a by-product of its strategies to manage customer safety and ensure on-time running of services.

Sydney Trains devolve responsibility for managing crowding at stations to Customer Area Managers but does not have sufficient oversight to know that station crowding is effectively managed. Sydney Trains does not have policies to support the creation, monitoring or evaluation of crowd management plans at key metropolitan train stations. The use of crowding interventions is likely to increase due to increasing patronage, causing more customers to experience delays directly caused by these activities.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have developed interventions to influence customer behaviour and to manage the demand for public transport services but are yet to evaluate these interventions. As such, their impact on managing station crowding is unclear.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Sydney rail network

Appendix three – Rail services contract

Appendix four – Crowding pedestrian modelling

Appendix five – Airport Link stations case study

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #333 - released 30 April 2020

 

Published

Actions for Transport 2019

Transport 2019

Transport
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

This report details the results of the financial audits of NSW Government's Transport cluster for the financial year ended 30 June 2019. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster.

Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, valuations of assets continue to create challenges across the cluster. The Audit Office identified some deficiencies in relation to asset valuations at Transport for NSW, Roads and Maritime Services, Rail Corporation New South Wales and Sydney Metro.

The Audit Office noted an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes related to information technology, asset management and employee leave entitlements. The report also highlights the status of significant infrastructure projects across the Transport cluster.

The report makes several recommendations including:

  • agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions and commercial transactions at the time of their execution to assess the financial reporting impacts
  • the Department of Transport should ensure consistent accounting policies are applied across its controlled entities.

Download the Transport 2019 report (PDF)

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2019. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Machinery of Government changes
Transport for NSW, as the
lead agency, will absorb the
functions of Roads and
Maritime Services

The NSW Government announced its intention to integrate Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) into Transport for NSW (TfNSW) as part of the Machinery of Government changes.

This change was not included in the Administrative Orders as the Transport Administration Act 1988 No. 109 governs the composition of the Transport cluster. The Transport Administration Amendment (RMS Dissolution) Act 2019 (the Act) received assent on 22 November 2019. The Act dissolves RMS and transfers the assets, rights and liabilities of RMS to TfNSW. As at the date of this Report, the Act is not yet in force.

Transport is considering the impact of the changes on its operating model and financial reporting.

2. Financial reporting
Audit opinions

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2018–19 financial statements of all agencies in the Transport cluster.

TfNSW and Sydney Metro obtained a three-week extension from NSW Treasury to submit their financial statements for audit to resolve accounting issues surrounding the valuation of property, plant and equipment.

The Department of Transport reported total consolidated property, plant and equipment of $158 billion at 30 June 2019. In 2018–19, there were issues with asset valuations at TfNSW, RMS, Sydney Metro and Rail Corporation New South Wales (RailCorp), resulting in adjustments after the submission of financial statements for audit and the correction of a prior period error.

There was also a prior period error resulting from an agreement between TfNSW and the former UrbanGrowth Development Corporation due to a lack of assessment of the financial reporting implications at the time of signing the agreement.

Recommendation: Agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions and commercial transactions to assess their accounting impacts at the time of their execution, rather than at the end of a financial year. Agencies also need to resolve all key accounting issues such as valuations as part of the early close procedures.

This would improve the quality of financial reporting and avoid the need for extensions for agencies to submit their financial statements for audit.

Preparedness for new
accounting standards
Agencies across the cluster are progressing in their implementation of the new accounting standards.

Transport cluster agencies need to improve their contracts registers to ensure they have a complete list of contracts and agreements to assess the impact of the new accounting standards.
Valuation of assets remains
a challenge in the
Transport cluster

Whilst agencies complied with the requirements of the accounting standards and NSW Treasury policies on valuations, the Audit Office identified some deficiencies in relation to asset valuations across the cluster.

TfNSW reported a retrospective correction of a prior period error at 1 July 2017 which resulted in a reduction in the valuation of its Country Rail Network earthworks by $2.1 billion. This was due to survey results which identified the earthworks were flatter and lower than estimated in the valuation at 30 June 2017.

RMS made several adjustments during the year to correct asset values due to changes to valuation assumptions or data improvements. This included:

  • reduction of $318 million in the value of land under roads
  • decrease of $84.9 million to the value of land and buildings
  • changes to the value of traffic control and traffic signal network assets, due to data improvements.

Sydney Metro North West officially opened in May 2019 and reported total assets of $9.1 billion. Sydney Metro derecognised $322 million in assets constructed to facilitate its operation but transferred to councils and utilities.

Inconsistent accounting
policies across the
Transport cluster

There was an inconsistency identified in the cluster relating to the valuation of substratum land. In 2018–19, RailCorp derecognised $109 million of substratum land to ensure consistency in its approach with other Transport agencies.

As the parent entity, the Department of Transport needs to ensure accounting policies are consistently applied across all controlled entities for consolidation purposes. Inconsistencies in the application of accounting standards across agencies will impact comparability of financial reporting and decision making across the Transport cluster.

Recommendation: The Department of Transport should ensure consistent accounting policies are applied across its controlled entities.

Revenue growth

Public transport passenger revenue increased by $89.0 million (5.9 per cent) in 2018–19, and patronage increased by 37.8 million (4.9 per cent) across all modes of transport based on data provided by TfNSW.

The increase in revenue is mainly due to an increase in patronage as well as the annual increase in fares.

Negative Opal cards

Negative balance Opal cards resulted in $2.9 million in revenue not collected in 2018–19 ($10.4 million since the introduction of Opal).

In January 2019, Transport made a change to the Sydney Airport stations to prevent customers with high negative balances exiting the station. In addition, in late 2018, Transport increased the minimum top up values for new cards at the airport stations.

Recommendation (repeat): TfNSW should implement further measures to prevent the loss of revenue from passengers tapping off with negative balance Opal cards.

3. Audit observations
Internal controls There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes relate to information technology, employee leave entitlements and asset management.

Twenty-nine per cent of all issues were repeat issues. The majority of the repeat issues related to information technology controls.
Write-off of assets In addition to a $322 million derecognition of assets transferred to councils and utilities by Sydney Metro and a $109 million derecognition of substratum land at RailCorp, the Transport cluster wrote-off $278 million of assets related to roads, bridges, maritime assets, traffic signals and controls network.

These mainly related to roads, bridges, maritime assets, traffic signals and the control network where new infrastructure assets substantially replaced an existing asset as part of construction activities.
Transport Asset Holding
Entity (TAHE)
TAHE was established to be a dedicated asset manager for the delivery of public transport asset management. The Transport Administration Amendment (Transport Entities) Act 2017 will transition RailCorp into TAHE. RailCorp is now expected to transition to TAHE from 1 July 2020 (previously 1 July 2019). Several working groups have been considering various aspects of the TAHE transition including its status as a for profit Public Trading Enterprise, the operating model and the impact of the new accounting standards AASB 16 'Leases' and AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors'. The considerations of these aspects identified several challenges in the implementation of TAHE which has led to the revised transition date. Given the delays in implementation, it is important to clarify the intent of the TAHE model.
Excess annual leave

Twenty-six per cent of Transport employees have annual leave balances exceeding 30 days. Of the employees with excess leave balances, 732 (10.3 per cent) did not take any annual leave in 2018–19.

Recommendation (repeat): Transport entities should further review the approach to managing excess annual leave in 2019–20. They should:

  • monitor current and projected leave balances to the end of the financial year each month
  • agree formal leave plans with employees to reduce leave balances over an acceptable timeframe
  • ensure leave plans are actioned appropriately
  • encourage all staff with excess leave balances take a minimum two-week period of leave per year.
Completeness and
accuracy of contracts
registers

There are no centralised processes to record all significant contracts and agreements in a register across the Transport cluster.

Across the Transport cluster, contracts and agreements are maintained by the individual agencies using disparate registers. Agencies must perform detailed assessments of their existing contracts and agreements to quantify the impact of the new accounting standards (AASB 16 ‘Leases’, AASB 15 ‘Revenue from Contracts with Customers’, AASB 1058 ‘Income of Not-for-Profit Entities’ and AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors').

In 2018–19, there was also a prior period error resulting from an agreement between TfNSW and another government agency due to a lack of assessment of the financial reporting implications at the time of signing the agreement.

A lack of a complete register of all contracts and agreements increases the risk that agencies may not be able to assess the full impact of the new accounting standards, as well as perform a complete assessment of the financial reporting implications of contracts and agreements.

Recommendation: Transport agencies should implement a process to centrally capture all significant contracts and agreements entered. This will ensure:

  • agencies are fully aware of contractual and other obligations
  • appropriate assessment of financial reporting implications
  • assessment of new accounting standards, in particular AASB 16 ‘Leases’, AASB 15 'Revenue from Contract with Customers', AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities ' and AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' are accurate and complete.

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

This cluster was impacted by the Machinery of Government changes on 1 July 2019. The NSW Government announced its intention to integrate Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) into Transport for NSW (TfNSW). This report is focused on the Transport cluster prior to these changes. Please refer to the section on Machinery of Government changes for more details.

Machinery of Government refers to how the government organises the structures and functions of the public service. Machinery of Government changes are where the government reorganises these structures and functions, and are given effect by Administrative orders.

The Transport cluster was impacted by recent Machinery of Government changes. These changes were announced by the Department of Premier and Cabinet but were not included in the Administrative Orders as the Transport Administration Act 1988 No. 109 governs the composition of the Transport cluster. It was the intention of government to transfer the functions of the RMS into TfNSW. This requires legislative changes to the Transport Administration Act 1988 No. 109.

Section highlights

Under the Machinery of Government changes, the NSW Government will transfer the functions of RMS into TfNSW.

  • The Transport Administration Amendment (RMS Dissolution) Act 2019 (the Act) received assent on 22 November 2019.
  • The Act will dissolve RMS and transfer its functions, assets, rights and liabilities to TfNSW.
  • As at the date of this report, the Act is not yet in force.
  • There are risks and challenges for asset and liability transfers, governance and retention of knowledge.
  • As of 1 July 2019, administrative arrangements (delegations and reporting line changes) were put in place to enable TfNSW and RMS to operate within a single management structure, while still remaining as separate legal entities.
  • Transport is working on a number of options as to how to implement the changes. 

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2019.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all agencies' financial statements.
  • RMS required an extension from NSW Treasury for their early close procedures.
  • TfNSW and Sydney Metro required extensions to submit their year-end financial statements.
  • Valuation of assets remains a challenge across the cluster.
  • There remains Opal cards with negative balances.
  • Sydney Metro derecognised assets of $322 million in relation to assets constructed for third parties.
  • Inconsistencies in the application of accounting policies across cluster agencies impact comparability of financial reporting across the Transport cluster.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster.

Section highlights

  • There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Twenty-nine per cent of all issues were repeat issues.
  • Transport entities wrote-off over $278 million of assets which were replaced by new assets or technology.
  • Twenty-six per cent of Transport employees have excess annual leave.
  • There are no processes to ensure all significant contracts and agreements are captured by agencies in a centralised register.

Appendix one – Timeliness of financial reporting by agency 

Appendix two – Management letter findings by agency 

Appendix three – List of 2019 recommendations 

Appendix four – Status of 2017 and 2018 recommendations 

Appendix five – Cluster agencies 

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Health 2019

Health 2019

Health
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of the Ministry of Health, local health districts, specialty health networks, health corporations and independent health agencies in New South Wales. The report also summarises self-reported performance measures across the network.

The number and value of adjustments to financial statements of entities in the Health Cluster decreased from the prior year. And unqualified audit opinions were issued for all heath entities’ financial statements.

Audit findings relating to internal controls deficiencies increased across health entities. Contributing to this increase were deficiencies in information system controls, which accounted for nearly a quarter of all control deficiencies. Repeat audit findings also accounted for more than a quarter of all control deficiencies.

The report notes health entities continued to experience challenges with managing employees’ excessive annual leave and time recording practices. The Ambulance Service of New South Wales continued to report high overtime payments to its employees. 

Download Health 2019 report (PDF).

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the agencies comprising the Health cluster for the year ended 30 June 2019. The table below summarises our key observations.

1. Machinery of Government changes

Cluster changes Machinery of Government (MoG) changes refer to how the government reorganises agency structures and functions and realigns ministerial responsibilities. The Health cluster was not impacted by the MoG changes.

2. Financial reporting

Financial reporting

The financial statements of NSW Health and its controlled entities received unqualified audit opinions before the legislative deadline.

The number of corrected and uncorrected misstatements decreased from the prior year.

Management implemented more robust processes for its oversight of complex asset revaluations in 2018–19. We found no significant errors in 2018–19.

Financial performance Overall, NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $1.1 billion in 2018–19, an increase of $699 million from 2017–18. This was the result of additional funding received for capital expenditure on the construction of new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments.

Budgeted expense for the 15 local health districts and two speciality networks increased from $18.3 billion to $19.4 billion in 2018–19. The 15 health entities recorded unfavourable variances between actual and budgeted expenses.
Excess annual leave

Managing excess annual leave remains a challenge for NSW Health, 36.9 per cent of the workforce have excess annual leave balances.

Recommendation: Health entities should further review their approach to managing excess annual leave in 2019–20, and:

  • monitor current and projected leave balances to the end of the financial year on a monthly basis
  • agree formal leave plans with employees to reduce leave balances over an acceptable timeframe
  • encourage staff who perform key control functions to take at least two consecutive weeks’ leave a year to mitigate fraud risks.
Overtime payments NSW Health entities generally manage overtime well. The Ambulance Service of NSW’s overtime payments of $83.1 million (9.8 per cent of total salaries and wages), remain significantly higher than other health entities.

Recommendation: The Ambulance Service of NSW should further review the effectiveness of its rostering practices to identify strategies to reduce overtime payments.

3. Audit observations

Internal control deficiencies We identified more internal control deficiencies in 2018–19. The number of repeat issues from prior years also remains high with more than one quarter of issues having been previously reported. More than a quarter of deficiencies related to information system controls.
Infrastructure delivery NSW Health defines projects with a budgeted cost greater than $50.0 million as 'major projects'. There were significant revisions to planned financial completion dates and budgeted costs of these projects. The revised total budgets for the 30 ongoing major capital projects at 30 June 2019 is $10.2 billion, $2.2 billion more than the original budget.
Health Infrastructure completed three major capital projects during 2018–19.
Asset maintenance The total cost of maintaining the health entities’ $19.8 billion of assets was $635 million for 2018–19. Health entities' approaches to setting maintenance budgets vary. Most entities are addressing their backlog maintenance, although many were not able to quantify the full extent of their backlog maintenance. Although health entities continue to use fully depreciated assets, the replacement cost of these assets is decreasing.

 

 

This report provides parliament and other users of the financial statements of agencies within the Health cluster with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas for the year ended 30 June 2019:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations. 

 The Health cluster was not impacted by the Machinery of Government changes on 1 July 2019. 

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the health cluster for 2019.

Section highlights

  • We issued unqualified audit opinions for all health entities’ financial statements and identified fewer misstatement than last year. Health entities continue to meet statutory deadlines.
  • The Ministry of Health sets significant accounting policies centrally and provides a template for the preparation of health entities’ financial statements. These processes promote consistent quality in the financial reports of health entities and reduce the number of misstatements we identify.
  • NSW Health recorded an operating surplus of $1.1 billion, an increase of $699 million from 2017–18. This is because of additional capital grants for new facilities, upgrades and redevelopments. The capital replacement ratio (investment in new assets divided by depreciation) for NSW Health is 2.6.
  • NSW Health’s expenses increased by 7.0 per cent in 2018–19 (5.5 per cent in 2017–18). This is one percentage point higher than the projected long-term annual expense growth rate of six per cent. The primary causes for the growth in expenses are increased:
    • employee related expenses because provisions for employee benefits increased when the discount rate decreased
    • operating expenses associated with the opening of Northern Beaches Hospital.
  • Excess annual leave balances continue to increase for the NSW Health workforce, with excess annual leave balances impacting 37 per cent of employees (34 per cent in 2017–18).
  • Health entities should further review their approach to managing excess annual leave in 2019–20 by monitoring current and projected leave balances on a regular basis, agreeing formal leave plans with employees and encouraging staff that perform key control functions to take a minimum of two consecutive weeks’ leave a year as a fraud mitigation strategy.
  • The Ambulance Services continued to report overtime payments higher than other health entities. The Ambulance Service paid its employees $83.1 million in overtime payments in 2018–19 ($74.8 million in 2017–18).
  • We issued a qualified audit opinion for the Ministry of Health's Annual Prudential Compliance Statement for aged care facilities operated by NSW Health. We identified 40 instances of material non-compliance with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) in 2018–19 (17 in 2017–18).

Audit opinions 

We issued unqualified audit opinions for all health entities and quality of financial reporting continues to improve

We identified fewer misstatements this year, and the errors were less significant. In 2018–19 no errors exceeded $5.0 million (eight errors recorded in 2017–18). Ten health entities conducted a full revaluation of their land, buildings and infrastructure systems in 2018–19, but more robust processes avoided the errors identified in the previous year.

Number of misstatements
Year ended 30 June 2019 2018 2017
  green circle with white tick red circle with white exclamation mark green circle with white tick red circle with white exclamation mark green circle with white tick red circle with white exclamation mark
Less than $50,000 -- -- -- 6 3 3
$50,000 to $249,999 -- 1 -- -- 2 3
$250,000 to $999,999 1 -- -- -- 1 3
$1 million to $4,999,999 -- 2 -- 2 1 5
$5 million and greater -- -- 6 2 1 2
Total number of misstatements 1 3 6 10 8 16

green circle white tick Corrected mistatements. red circle white exclamation mark Uncorrected statements.
Source: Statutory Audit Reports issued by the Audit Office.

We issued a qualified audit opinion for our compliance audit of the Ministry of Health's Annual Prudential Compliance Statement

The Ministry of Health operates eight aged care facilities in NSW and is required to comply with the Fees and Payments Principles 2014 (No. 2) (the Principles) when entering into agreements with and managing payments to and from care recipients. The Principles are set by the Commonwealth Assistant Minister for Social Services. We identified 40 instances of material non-compliance in 2018–19, including:

  • not agreeing maximum accommodation amounts payable with aged care recipients before they entered the residential care services
  • not entering into accommodation agreements with care recipients within the specified period
  • charging incorrect fees for activities or services to one care recipient
  • not refunding two bond balances within the statutory framework
  • not paying the correct amount of interest for 14 care recipients’ bonds refunded during the year.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the health cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of internal control deficiencies has increased since 2017–18. More than a quarter of control deficiencies are repeat issues and almost a quarter relate to information system controls. Both employee time recording and leave management remain as repeat issues in 2018–19.
  • Control deficiencies that relate to managing employees' leave, employees’ time recording or information system limitations can be difficult for entities to resolve in a timely manner.
  • Agreements for the treatment of New South Wales residents while they are interstate, and interstate residents while they are in New South Wales, are unsigned for Queensland, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory for 2016–17, 2017–18 and 2018–19.
  • NSW Health recorded $113.6 million in revenue from fees charged to Medicare ineligible patients during 2018–19 but has received payment for less than half of this.
  • NSW Health reported that they completed three major capital projects during 2018–19.
  • As at 30 June 2019 there were 30 ongoing major capital health projects in NSW. The revised capital budget for these projects in total was $2.2 billion more than the original budget of $8.0 billion.
  • Health entities spent $635 million maintaining assets with a fair value of $19.8 billion of assets. Almost all entities were working through backlog maintenance during 2018–19, although several were unable to quantify the backlog.
  • While entities are now regularly reassessing the useful lives of their assets, entities are still using a high volume of assets that are fully depreciated. Due to the age and nature of these assets the impact was not material.

Appendix one – List of 2019 recommendations

Appendix two – Status of 2018 recommendations

Appendix three – Financial data 

Appendix four – Analysis of financial indicators

Appendix five – Analysis of performance against budget

 

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Actions for State Finances 2019

State Finances 2019

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Financial reporting

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford, has released her report on the State Finances for the year ended 30 June 2019.

‘I am pleased to once again report that I issued an unmodified audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements,’ the Auditor-General said.

The report acknowledges NSW Treasury and agency efforts to reduce the number and value of errors compared with the previous year. ‘Strong financial management and transparent reporting are key elements of our system of government. Treasury and agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions at the time of their execution. This will ensure agencies assess the accounting implications earlier and support accurate financial statements being presented for audit on a timely basis,’ said the Auditor-General.

The report summarises the financial audit result of the Total State Sector Accounts. The Total State Sector comprises 304 entities controlled by the NSW Government with total assets of $468 billion and total liabilities of $218 billion.

The General Government sector comprises 212 entities that provide goods and services that are funded centrally by the State. General Government expenditure grew by 5.5 per cent in 2018-19, which was below the long-term revenue growth of 5.6 per cent target established by the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012.

Download PDF of State Finances 2019 report

Pursuant to the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983, I present my Report on State Finances 2019.

Strong financial management and transparent reporting are key elements of our system of government.

I am pleased to once again report that I issued an unmodified audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements. 

The number of errors in agencies’ 2018–19 financial statements fell to six compared to the 23 recorded in 2017–18. This reflects Treasury’s focus on early close and the resolution of complex accounting matters before submission. Agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions and commercial transactions to assess their accounting impacts at the time of their execution, rather than at the end of a financial year. This would improve the quality of financial reporting and avoid the need for extensions for agencies to submit their financial statements for audit.

To further increase transparency, a Key Audit Matters section was included in my Independent Auditor Report on the Total State Sector Accounts this year. This explains those matters considered most significant to the conduct of the audit and requiring significant management judgement.

Looking forward, certain factors have the potential to impact the accuracy and completeness of the Total State Sector Accounts in coming years. First, three new accounting standards are effective from 1 July 2019 and a fourth from 1 July 2020. Transitioning to new standards requires significant planning and resources to ensure the impacts are appropriately assessed and accounted for. Second, the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 will be implemented in stages over three years to 2020–21. This Act is intended to focus on performance, transparency, accountability, and efficiency of financial management in the government sector. I encourage agencies to build their awareness of this important reform and ensure their alignment with the principles of the Act. 

I want to thank Treasury staff for the way they engaged with my staff in the conduct of the audit. Our partnership is critical to ensuring the quality of financial management and reporting.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General, 10 October 2019

Our audit opinion on the State’s 2018–19 financial statements was unmodified. There were fewer reported errors but earlier resolution of accounting matters is still required.

Our audit opinion on the State’s 2018–19 financial statements was unmodified.

This year, six errors exceeding $20 million were found in agencies’ 2018–19 financial statements that make up the State’s consolidated financial statements. The total value of these errors was $927 million compared to $3.8 billion in 2017–18. The errors identified in 2018–19 resulted from:

  • incorrectly applying Australian Accounting Standards and Treasury Policies
  • using inappropriate assumptions and inaccurate data
  • incorrectly assessing the fair value of non-current physical assets.

The introduction of mandatory ‘early close procedures’ in 2011–12, saw the number of errors in agencies’ financial statements fall progressively, to a low of five in 2015–16.

In 2016–17, Treasury narrowed the scope of its mandatory early close procedures to focus on non-current physical asset valuations and pro-forma financial statements. Following this, the number of significant errors increased to 23 in 2017–18, the

highest number in six years and similar to the numbers identified before mandatory early close procedures were introduced.

In 2018–19, Treasury and agencies’ refocused their efforts around early close procedures and other year-end processes resulting in this year’s lower error total of six.

Errors in agency financial statements exceeding $20m (2015–2019)

Correction of prior year’s reported values    

Correction of earthwork assets ($2.1 billion)

Some of the State’s earthworks were first valued in 2016–17. These included earth excavations and embankments for the Country Rail and Metropolitan Network created before the year 2000 and dating back to the early 1900s.

For many years, the State did not account for earthworks because it believed the value could not be reliably measured. In 2016–17, the State engaged an external valuer who identified a methodology showing the earthworks could be valued. That valuer performed a valuation using topography maps for the Country Rail Network (CRN) because information in this earthworks database was of poor quality and incomplete. The valuation resulted in the State recognising $7.5 billion of earthworks for the first time in 2016–17. This was disclosed as a prior period error.

Over the following years, the State improved the quality of the CRN earthworks database by engaging an engineering firm to perform more detailed earthworks surveys. The work involved the use of technology to survey most of the CRN lines.

In 2018–19, the State once again engaged an external valuer to assess the fair value of the CRN earthworks. The valuer determined that incorrect assumptions were used in the 2016–17 valuation. These primarily related to land elevations, which were corrected in the earthworks database and this resulted in a new fair value of $5.4 billion, $2.1 billion less than the previous valuation. The error reported in the 2017–18 value has been corrected in the 2018–2019 financial statements to reflect the revised value.

Previously reported value for earthworks reduced from $7.5 billion to $5.4 billion.

Correction of museum collection assets ($27 million)

The Australian Museum’s collection assets were restated by $27 million to $800 million in 2017–18.

After the 2017–18 financial statements were published, the Australian Museum identified additional collection assets that were not included in the original valuation. This resulted in a $27 million error relating to collection asset values. As last year’s valuation was based on an incomplete listing of collection assets, the 2017-18 value has been corrected in the 2018–19 financial statements to reflect the revised value.

Correction of lease liability ($46.2 million)

On 1 July 1995, the Department of Justice entered into a 25-year lease arrangement with an option to extend for a further 15 years.

The Department accounted for the arrangement as a finance lease by recognising a building asset and a corresponding finance lease liability for the period of 25 years. The Department depreciated the leased asset based on a useful life of 40 years.

As it was reasonably certain the Department would exercise the lease option at inception, it should have recognised a liability that reflected the entire 40 year lease period. To correct the prior year error and properly reflect the extended lease period, the Department of Justice increased the lease liability and decreased retained earnings by $46.2 million as at 1 July 2017.

Abuse Claims remain a significant contingent liability of the State

The State discloses a contingent liability in its financial statements when the possibility of settling the liability in the future is considered less than probable, but more likely than remote, or the amount of the obligation cannot be measured with sufficient reliability.

If the expected settlement subsequently becomes probable and reliably estimable, a provision is recognised.

The State has numerous contingent liabilities. Some are quantifiable while others are not. As contingent liabilities are potentially material future liabilities of the State, every effort should be made to quantify these as accurately as possible. They also need to be monitored closely to ensure that they are recognised and brought on balance sheet as they crystallise.

At 30 June 2019, NSW Self Insurance Corporation (SiCorp) could not reliably measure the claims liability arising from past incidences of abuse that occurred within NSW Government institutions which have not yet been reported. These are referred to as incurred but not reported claims (IBNR).

Since 1 July 2018, victims of child sexual abuse can opt to claim compensation through the National Redress Scheme, or to lodge a civil claim. Civil claims for incidents that occurred within NSW Government institutions may be covered by SiCorp. An estimate of an IBNR for child abuse claims within SiCorp will be impacted by the extent that victims claim compensation through redress as compared to civil claims.

Recent legislative changes have added further uncertainty to estimating the extent of IBNR claims. SiCorp requires more reliable data on the number of IBNR child abuse claims and the expected average size of the related payments. As such, the liabilities presented in the SiCorp and the State financial statements do not include an allowance for IBNR abuse claims.

As more information becomes available it may be possible for SiCorp to reasonably estimate the value of abuse claim liabilities. It is possible that such an estimate may be material to SiCorp and the State’s financial statements. 

TAFE update

In prior years we reported on information system limitations at TAFE NSW, specifically relating to its student administration system. TAFE NSW continues to implement additional processes to verify the accuracy and completeness of revenue from student fees for the 2018–19 financial year.

In 2017–18 TAFE NSW started implementing a new student management system. Significant delays have occurred in implementing this system, mainly due to the complexity of integrating the vendor solution with the requirements of TAFE. TAFE will now bring the final commissioning and operation of the system in house. Final project delivery timeframes and estimated completion costs are being reviewed. Costs incurred to date amount to $67 million. The original budget for this new system is $89.4 million.

Light Rail settlement

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a new twelve kilometre light rail network for Sydney, currently under construction. Passenger trips are set to begin on the light rail by December between Circular Quay and Randwick. The second stage from Randwick to Kingsford is planned to open in March 2020. The original budget for construction work of $1.6 billion was revised to $2.1 billion in 2014.

The State Government has been in dispute with the firm responsible for delivering and operating the CBD and South East light rail project. In May 2019, the parties reached a Settlement Arrangement resulting in the State agreeing to pay a settlement amount of $576 million, which is in addition to the revised budget. Transport has advised a final cost is still to be determined following project completion.

The Audit Office has commenced a follow up audit on the CBD South East Light Rail. This audit will consider whether recommendations of our previous audit have been implemented. We will also review the current status and budget of this project.

Sydney Metro Northwest project commissioning

The Sydney Metro North West officially opened in May 2019.

In constructing the metro, some assets were built to facilitate its operation. These included pavements, roadworks, and electricity
and water connections.

When the project was completed, the assets and the responsibility for maintaining them transferred to third parties, primarily Councils and utility providers. In 2018–19, the State expensed (derecognised) the assets, valued at $306 million, because it no longer controlled them.

Financial Reporting by Crown Land Reserve Trusts

Approximately 700 reserve trusts, managed by Trust Boards, did not prepare the financial statements at 30 June 2019 as required by the
Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

These Crown reserves contain showgrounds, cemeteries, racecourses, local parks, and other community facilities and public areas. Some of the Crown reserves have independent streams of revenue from user charges.

In 2016–17, Treasury determined that NSW cemetery trusts and a holiday park reserve trust were controlled entities of the State. As such, the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 requires them to prepare financial statements and have these audited by the Auditor-General.

In 2017–18, three reserve trusts accepted NSW Treasury’s view, prepared financial statements and had them audited by the Auditor-General.

However, three cemetery reserve trusts continue to maintain they are not controlled by the State and therefore their financial statements are not audited by the Audit Office. These cemeteries shared their unaudited financial statements with Treasury so they could be incorporated into the State’s financial statements. At 30 June 2019, the value of their combined assets and liabilities, which are not audited by the Audit Office, was $564 million.

The State included an additional $319 million in assets that relate to Crown land values of approximately 700 reserve trusts that did not prepare or submit financial statements.

We performed additional audit procedures to obtain some assurance over the value of these crown lands. The nature and extent of the limitations to the scope of these procedures was not significant enough to impact our audit opinion. Treasury should ensure these trusts comply with the requirements of the Public Finance and Audit Act.

Derecognition of investment in City West Housing

In 2017–18, the State had an equity investment of $680 million in a community housing provider, City West Housing Pty Limited (CWH).

During 2018–19, CWH amended its constitution to ensure alignment with its charitable status. The unintended impact of this change was that on windup the net assets would not be distributed to the State. The accounting implications to the State’s investment was not considered by Treasury at the time of approving the amended constitution. Consequently, the State wrote off its $680 million investment in CWH in 2018–19.

It is important that accounting impacts of such changes are discussed and agreed upon early. At the time of approving the decision to change the constitution, all accounting implications should be made available and understood. Such information is relevant when approving decisions. The theme of what is relevant
information will be explored further in our Performance Audit of ‘Advice on Major Decisions’.

Machinery of government (MoG) changes refers to how the government reorganises agency structures and functions and realigns ministerial responsibilities.

Cluster changes

On 2 April 2019, the Government reorganised public sector agencies into eight clusters (ten in 2017–18) with effect from 1 July 2019.

Prior to 30 June 2019, two subsequent administrative arrangement orders were made to amend and finalise the MoG changes.

The key MoG changes included:

  • abolishing the following five departments:
    • Finance, Services and Innovation
    • Industry
    • Planning and Environment
    • Family and Communities
    • Justice
  • transferring their functions into three new departments:
    • Department of Customer Service
    • Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
    • Department of Communities and Justice
The State’s consolidated financial statements at 30 June 2019 were not impacted by the changes, as they were effective from 1 July 2019.

The chart below shows the cluster arrangements before and after the MoG changes to the General Government Sector. It compares total budgeted expenses presented in the 2018–19 and 2019–20 Budget Papers (1).

Each cluster’s share of the General Government Sector’s (GGS) total expenditure remains relatively unchanged after the MoG changes. Further details on other functions transferred between clusters are detailed in the 2019–20 Budget Papers.

Of the clusters, Education is affected most by the MoG changes from the perspective of increased expenditure in the 2019–20 budget. This is because the TAFE Commission transferred into this cluster from the former Department of Industry on 1 July 2019, resulting in a corresponding decrease in the new Planning, Industry and Environment cluster’s expenditure.

(1) The 2018–19 Budget Paper 3 (unaudited) and 2019–20 Budget Paper 3 (unaudited).

Cluster expenses

2018-19
Before MoG Changes

2019-20
After MoG Changes

Industry 6% Planning, Industry and Environment 7%
Planning and Environment 4%
Education 18% Education 21%
Premier and Cabinet 1% Premier and Cabinet 2%
Finance, Service and Innovation 4% Customer Service 3%
Family and Community Services 8% Stronger Communities 18%
Justice 10%
Transport 9% Transport 9%
Treasury 14% Treasury 14%
Health 26% Health 26%

 

$1.2 billion surplus, $0.2 billion below 2018–19 budget of $1.4 billion

The Total State Sector comprises 304 entities controlled by the NSW Government.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 212 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.
The non-General Government Sector, which comprises 92 Government businesses, generally provides goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services that consumers pay for directly.

A principal measure of a Government’s overall performance is its Net Operating Balance (Budget Result). This is the difference
between the cost of General Government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

What changed from 2018 to 2019?

The State maintained its AAA credit rating.

The object of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 is to maintain the State’s AAA credit rating.

The Government manages NSW’s finances in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (the Act).

The Act establishes the framework for fiscal responsibility and the strategy to protect the State’s AAA credit rating and service delivery to the people of New South Wales.

The legislation sets out targets and principles for financial management to achieve this.

New South Wales has credit ratings of AAA/Stable from Standard & Poor’s and Aaa/Stable from Moody’s Investors Service.

The fiscal targets for achieving this objective are:

General Government annual expenditure growth is lower than long term average revenue growth.

General Government expenditure grew by 5.5 per cent in 2018–19 (5.1 per cent in 2017–18 based on restated balances). This was slightly below the long-term revenue growth rate of 5.6 per cent.

Eliminating unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.

The Act sets a target to eliminate unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.

The State’s funding plan is to contribute amounts escalated by five per cent each year so the schemes will be fully funded by 2030. In 2018–19, the State made employer contributions of $1.73 billion ($1.67 billion in 2017–18), an increase of $64 million or 3.8 per cent ($52 million or 3.2 per cent in 2017–18). This was under the five per cent target by $19.5 million.

For fiscal responsibility purposes, the State uses AASB 1056: Superannuation Entities. This accounting standard discounts superannuation liabilities using the expected return from the assets backing the liability.

Using this method, the State’s unfunded superannuation liability was $13.2 billion at 30 June 2019 ($14.0 billion).

Superannuation funding position since inception of the Act - AASB 1056 Valuation

State revenues fell $604 million to $86.1 billion in 2018–19    

In the prior years, revenue growth was underpinned by cyclical increases in land tax, payroll tax and one-off large stamp duty receipts from the lease of the State’s electricity network assets. In 2018–19, the State’s revenue fell by $604 million to $86.1 billion ($86.7 million in 2017–18).

Taxation revenue remained relatively stable

Taxation revenue only grew slightly, mainly due to:

  • a $517 million increase in payroll tax from NSW wages growth
  • a $469 million increase in land tax from growth in land values
  • offset by a $1.2 billion decrease in stamp duty due to lower than expected growth in the property market. This decrease would have been higher had the State not received $555 million in stamp duty from the new 51 per cent owner of WestConnex.

The gap between payroll tax and stamp duty reduced significantly in 2018–19. Stamp duty still remains the largest source of revenue for the State at $9.2 billion, only $42 million above payroll tax.

Australian Government grants and subsidies

The State received $31.8 billion in grants and subsidies from the Australian Government, $158 million less than the previous year. This was due to falls in other grants and subsidies of $98 million and GST revenues of $48 million.

GST revenues fell due to weaker growth in national consumption expenditure and a smaller GST pool. The GST pool represents funds made available by the Commonwealth for transfer to the States as untied financial assistance. The allocation of GST is determined by the Commonwealth, not the State.

A $392 million decrease in National Partnership Payments was offset by a $380 million increase in Specific Purpose Payments.
 
In 2018–19, sales of goods and services fell $395 million mainly due to the sale of WestConnex.

Other dividends and distributions fell by $122 million due to lower distributions from associates. This reflected weaker performance in the electricity sector (Ausgrid and Endeavour) resulting in lower distributions paid to the State following changes in the Electricity Network Service Providers regulatory environment and the sale of Snowy Hydro Pty Ltd in 2017–18.

Fines, regulatory fees and other revenues increased by $242 million largely from mineral royalties. The increase was attributed to strong demand across Asian markets for coal exports, which the State expects will continue to experience steady growth.

Expenses increased $4 billion to $87.9 billion in 2018–19    

Overall, the State’s expenses increased 4.8 per cent in 2018–19 compared to 2017–18. Most of the increase was due to higher employee expenses, operating costs and grants and subsidies.

Employee expenses, including superannuation, increased by 3.9 per cent to $40.3 billion.

Salaries and wages increased to $40.3 billion in 2018–19 from $38.8 billion 2017–18. This was mainly due to salary and wage increases. The Government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Operating expenses increased 6.1 per cent from 2017–18.

Within operating expenses, payments for supplies, services and other expenses increased due to:

  • increased operating costs associated with the commencement of the new Sydney Metro
  • higher operating activity levels experienced in the Health sector resulting in higher visiting medical officer costs, surgical supplies and information management costs
  • higher school operating expenses in Education, mainly relating to teaching cloud tools and purchase of computer equipment.
Health costs remain the highest expense of the State.

The following clusters have the highest expenses as a percentage of total government expenses:

  • Health - 25.8 per cent (24.6 per cent in 2017–18)
  • Education - 20 per cent (18.5 per cent)
  • Transport - 14.7 per cent (17.6 per cent).

Other, mainly relates to Economic Affairs, Housing and Community, Recreation and Culture functions of the State.

Transport expenses have decreased in 2018–19 mainly due to the sale of WestConnex. This is partially offset by costs associated with the new Sydney Metro, which commenced operations from 1 July 2018. The graph highlights annual expenditure by function in 2018–19 compared to 2017–18.

Grants and subsidies increased by $782 million to $11.7 billion.

This was mainly due to:

  • the $239 million Emergency Drought Relief Package
  • a $226 million increase in funding to the Human Services sector to deliver key election commitments, including 5,000 more nurses and midwives
  • $123 million in funding for sporting facilities and creating NSW Centre's of Excellence.

Assets grew by $26.7 billion to $468 billion in 2018–19    

Overall, the States total assets increased by $26.7 billion to $468 billion in 2018–19. This is a six per cent increase compared to 2017–18. Most of this was due to increases in carrying value of the State’s physical assets and investments.

Valuing the State's physical assets

The State’s physical assets were valued at $352 billion at 30 June 2019.

The State’s physical assets include land and buildings ($166 billion) and infrastructure ($168 billion). The value of the State’s physical assets at 30 June 2018 was restated from $339 billion to $337 billion. The restatement was required to correct errors in the fair value of earthworks previously reported at $7.5 billion and subsequently corrected to $5.4 billion.

Our audits assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of assumptions used to value physical assets. This includes
obtaining an understanding of the valuation methodologies used and judgements made. We also review the completeness of asset registers and the mathematical accuracy of valuation models.

Net movements between years include additions, disposals, depreciation and valuations. The State’s physical assets increased by $15.2 billion compared with 2017–18.

Movement in the State's physical assets

Liabilities increased $28.6 billion to $217.5 billion in 2018–19    

The State relies on actuarial assessments to value its liabilities

Nearly half of the State’s liabilities relate to its employees. They include unfunded superannuation and employee benefits, such as long service and recreation leave.

Valuing these obligations involves complex estimation techniques and significant judgements. Small changes in assumptions can materially impact balances in the financial statements, such as a lower discount rate.

Superannuation obligations rose by $14.3 billion.

The State’s $70.7 billion unfunded superannuation liability represents obligations to past and present employees less the value of assets set aside to meet those obligations. The unfunded superannuation liability rose by $14.3 billion from $56.4 billion at 30 June 2018 to $70.7 billion at 30 June 2019. This was mainly due to a lower discount rate.

Borrowings totalled $79.9 billion at 30 June 2019.

The State’s borrowings of $79.9 billion at 30 June 2019 were $8.6 billion higher than they were at 30 June 2018.

TCorp issues bonds to raise funds for NSW Government agencies. These are actively traded in financial markets, which provides price transparency and liquidity to public sector borrowers and institutional investors. All TCorp bonds are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

The Government manages its debt liabilities through its balance sheet management strategy. The strategy extends to TCorp, which applies an active risk management strategy to the Government’s debt portfolio.

General Government Sector debt has been restructured by replacing shorter-term debt with longer-term debt. This lengthens the portfolio to match liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.

Implementing the requirements of new accounting standards will be challenging

Risks to the quality and timeliness of financial reporting

The State and its agencies will be implementing the requirements of new accounting standards shortly. These are likely to have a major impact on the financial positions and operating results of agencies across the sector.

Accounting standards require agencies to assess and disclose where possible, the impact of the new standards in their 2018–19 financial statements.

Our review found agencies needed to do more work on their impact assessments to minimise the risk of errors in the financial statement disclosures. Some agencies disclosed that the new standards would not have a material impact on their reported financial position and performance, but had little evidence to support this.

Each agency is unique and implementing the new standards is not straight forward as many new principles apply. Management judgement is needed to interpret how the principles apply to each agency. As a result, agencies face the following risks and challenges:

  • having the required technical skills in house
  • having accurate data to assess the impacts
  • correctly and consistently interpreting the new requirements
  • adequately planning and preparing for their application
  • implementing new systems to capture the information needed to meet the new reporting obligations.

To help agencies implement the new standards consistently across the sector, Treasury:

  • issued guidance to agencies
  • prepared position papers on proposed accounting treatments
  • provided briefing sessions to agencies
  • mandated which option in the new standards agencies had to adopt on transition.

Key dates

Section 45 of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 requires the Auditor-General to perform audits of the financial statements of entities prescribed for the purposes of that section.
The following were prescribed entities as at 30 June 2019:

Entity/Fund Latest financial statements audited Type of audit opinion issued
Agricultural Scientific Collections Trust 30 June 2019 Unmodified
AustLII Foundation Limited 31 December 2018 Unmodified
Belgenny Farm Agricultural Heritage Centre Trust 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The Brett Whiteley Foundation 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Buroba Pty Ltd 30 June 2018* Unmodified
C. B. Alexander Foundation 30 June 2018 Unmodified
City West Housing Pty Ltd 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The Commissioner for Uniform Legal Services Regulation 30 June 2019 N/A (a)
Cowra Japanese Garden Maintenance Foundation Limited 31 March 2019 Unmodified
Cowra Japanese Garden Trust 31 March 2019 Unmodified
Crown Employees (NSW Fire Brigades Firefighting Staff Death and Disability) Superannuation Fund 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Eif Pty Limited 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Energy Investment Fund 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Central Coast Council Water Supply Authority (formerly Gosford City and Wyong City Council Water Supply Authorities) 30 June 2018 Unmodified
Home Building Compensation Fund 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The funds for the time being under the management of the New South Wales Treasury Corporation, as trustee 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The Illawarra Health and Medical Research Institute Limited 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The Legal Services Council 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Macquarie University Professorial Superannuation Scheme 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Planning Ministerial Corporation 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Corporation Sole 'Minister administering the Heritage Act 1977' (a corporation) 30 June 2019 Unmodified
National Art School 31 December 2018 Unmodified
NSW Fire Brigades Superannuation Pty Limited 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation Fund 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Sydney Education Broadcasting Limited 31 December 2018 Unmodified
The superannuation fund amalgamated under the Superannuation Administration Act 1991 and continued to be amalgamated under the Superannuation Administration 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Act 1996 (known as the SAS Trustee Corporation Pooled Fund) 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The trustees for the time being of each superannuation scheme established by a trust deed as referred to in section 127 of the Superannuation Administration Act 1996 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The Art Gallery of New South Wales Foundation 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Trustee of the Home Purchase Assistance Fund 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Trustees of the Farrer Memorial Research Scholarship Fund 31 December 2018 Unmodified
United States Studies Centre 31 December 2018 Unmodified
Universities Admissions Centre (NSW and ACT) Pty Limited 30 June 2018 Unmodified
University of Sydney Professorial Superannuation System 31 December 2018 Unmodified
Valley Commerce Pty Ltd 30 June 2018* Unmodified
     
(a) Included as part of the Legal Services Council.
*Entities exempt from preparing financial statements at 30 June 2019.
aa


 

Published

Actions for Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales

Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales

Health
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

A report released by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has found that NSW Health is not forming effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver appropriate mental health services. There is limited evidence that NSW Health is using the knowledge and expertise of Aboriginal communities to guide how mental health care is structured and delivered.

Mental illness (including substance use disorders) is the main contributor to lower life expectancy and increased mortality in the Aboriginal population of New South Wales. It contributes to a higher burden of disease and premature death at rates that are 40 per cent higher than the next highest chronic disease group, cardiovascular disease.1 

Aboriginal people have significantly higher rates of mental illness than non Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They are more likely to present at emergency departments in crisis or acute phases of mental illness than the rest of the population and are more likely to be admitted to hospital for mental health treatments.2 

In acknowledgement of the significant health disparities between Aboriginal and non Aboriginal people, NSW Health implemented the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan 2013 2023 (the Aboriginal Health Plan). The overarching message of the Aboriginal Health Plan is ‘to build respectful, trusting and effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities’ and to implement ‘integrated planning and service delivery’ with sector partners. Through the Plan, NSW Health commits to providing culturally appropriate and ‘holistic approaches to the health of Aboriginal people'.

The mental health sector is complex, involving Commonwealth, state and non government service providers. In broad terms, NSW Health has responsibility to support patients requiring higher levels of clinical support for mental illnesses, while the Commonwealth and non government organisations offer non acute care such as assessments, referrals and early intervention treatments.

The NSW Health network includes 15 Local Health Districts and the Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Network that provide care to patients during acute and severe phases of mental illness in hospitals, prisons and community service environments. This includes care to Aboriginal patients in the community at rates that are more than four times higher than the non Aboriginal population. Community services are usually provided as follow up after acute admissions or interactions with hospital services. The environments where NSW Health delivers mental health care include:

  • hospital emergency departments, for short term assessment and referral
  • inpatient hospital care for patients in acute and sub acute phases of mental illness
  • mental health outpatient services in the community, such as support with medications
  • custodial mental health services in adult prisons and juvenile justice centres.

The NSW Government is reforming its mental health funding model to incrementally shift the balance from hospital care to enhanced community care. In 2018–19, the NSW Government committed $400 million over four years into early intervention and specialist community mental health teams.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Health’s planning and coordination of mental health services and service pathways for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. We addressed the audit objective by answering three questions: 

  1. Is NSW Health using evidence to plan and inform the availability of mental health services for Aboriginal people in New South Wales?
  2. Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to create accessible mental health service pathways for Aboriginal people?
  3. Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to ensure the appropriateness and quality of mental health services for Aboriginal people?
Conclusion

NSW Health is not meeting the objectives of the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan, to form effective partnerships with Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services and Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver mental health services.

There is limited evidence that existing partnerships between NSW Health and Aboriginal communities meet its own commitment to use the ‘knowledge and expertise of the Aboriginal community (to) guide the health system at every level, including (for) the identification of key issues, the development of policy solutions, the structuring and delivery of services' 3 and the development of culturally appropriate models of mental health care.

NSW Health is planning and coordinating its resources to support Aboriginal people in acute phases of mental illness in hospital environments. However, it is not effectively planning for the supply and delivery of sufficient mental health services to assist Aboriginal patients to manage mental illness in community environments. Existing planning approaches, data and systems are insufficient to guide the $400 million investment into community mental health services announced in the 2018–19 Budget.

NSW Health is not consistently forming partnerships to ensure coordinated care for patients as they move between mental health services. There is no policy to guide this process and practices are not systematised or widespread.

In this report, the term ‘Aboriginal people’ is used to describe both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The Audit Office of NSW acknowledges the diversity of traditional countries and Aboriginal language groups across the state of New South Wales.


1 Australian Burden of Disease Study: Impact and causes of illness and death in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 2011 (unaudited).
2 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare data 2016–17 (unaudited).
3 NSW Health, The Aboriginal Health Plan 2013-2023.

In May 2019, the Audit Office of New South Wales invited Aboriginal mental health clinicians and policy experts from government and non-government organisations to attend a one-day workshop. Workshop attendees advised on factors that improve the quality and appropriateness of mental health care for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They described appropriate mental health care as:

  • culturally safe, allowing Aboriginal people to draw strength in their identity, culture and community
  • person centred and focussed on individual needs
  • delivered by culturally competent staff with no bias
  • holistic, trauma-informed and focussed on early intervention where possible
  • delivered in places that are appropriate including outreach to homes and communities
  • welcoming of the involvement of local Aboriginal community and connected to local knowledge and expertise including totems and kinship structures. 

The definition of 'appropriate' mental health care for Aboriginal people throughout this report is based on this advice.

Aboriginal people access emergency services at much higher rates than non-Aboriginal people

The choices that people make in relation to health service options provide some insight into the suitability and appropriateness of the service to their needs.

Aboriginal people have different mental health service use patterns than non-Aboriginal people. Aboriginal people are much more likely to be in a crisis situation before receiving mental health services, usually in an emergency department of a hospital.

Aboriginal people make up three per cent of the total New South Wales population, but they constitute 11 per cent of emergency department presentations for mental health treatments. In regional areas, Aboriginal people make up 20.5 per cent of presentations at emergency departments for mental health reasons. 

A number of factors help to explain Aboriginal mental health service usage patterns. According to government and non-government mental health organisations:

  • emergency department services are better known to Aboriginal people than other mental health services
  • community-based models of care are not appropriate for Aboriginal people
  • Aboriginal people are reluctant to access community-based mental health services to prevent crisis situations
  • community mental health services are not available for Aboriginal people after hours and during the weekend, so emergency services are the only option.

The statewide proportions of Aboriginal people presenting at emergency departments for mental health treatments has been increasing over time (Exhibit 6).

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – The NSW Aboriginal Health Plan

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #326 - released 29 August 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Transport Access Program

Transport Access Program

Transport
Infrastructure
Project management
Service delivery

The following report is available in an Easy English version that is intended to meet the needs of some people with lower literacy skills, some people with an intellectual disability and some people from different cultural backgrounds.

View the Easy English version of the Transport Access Program report

Transport for NSW’s process for selecting and prioritising projects for the third stage of its Transport Access Program balanced compliance with national disability standards with broader customer outcomes. Demographics, deliverability and value for money were also considered. However, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required for full compliance, limiting its ability to demonstrate that its approach is effective, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

Access to transport is critical to ensuring that people can engage in all aspects of community life, including education, employment and recreation. People with disability can encounter barriers when accessing public transport services. In 2015, there were 1.37 million people living with disability in New South Wales.

Accessible public transport is about more than physical accessibility. It also means barrier-free access for people who have vision, hearing or cognitive impairments. All users, not just people with disability, benefit from improvements to the accessibility and inclusiveness of transport services. 

Transport for NSW has an obligation under Australian Government legislation to provide accessible services to people with disabilities in a manner which is not discriminatory. Under the Disability Standards for Accessible Public Transport 2002 (the DSAPT - an instrument of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (the Act) (Commonwealth)), there is a requirement to modify and develop new infrastructure, means of transport and services to provide access for people with disabilities. All public transport operators are required to ensure that at least 90 per cent of their networks met DSAPT by December 2017 and the networks will need to be 100 per cent compliant with all parts of the standards by 31 December 2022. Trains are not required to be fully compliant with DSAPT until December 2032. 

The Transport Access Program (TAP) is Transport for NSW's largest program with a specific focus on improving access to public transport for people with disability. The TAP is a series of projects to upgrade existing public transport infrastructure across four networks: Sydney Trains, Intercity Trains, Regional Trains and Sydney Ferries. Transport for NSW established the TAP as a rolling program and, to date, it has delivered the first tranche of TAP (TAP 1) and is completing the final projects for the second tranche (TAP 2). NSW budget papers estimate that by 30 June 2018, Transport for NSW had spent $1.2 billion in the TAP since its commencement in 2011-12.

After the completion of TAP 1 and TAP 2 (as well as through other transport infrastructure programs), Transport for NSW estimates that 58.5 per cent of the Sydney Trains, Regional Trains and Intercity Trains networks, and 66 per cent of the Sydney Ferries network, will be accessible. To close the significant gap in compliance with the DSAPT target, the objective for TAP 3 is ‘to contribute to Disability Discrimination Act 1992 related targets through DSAPT compliance upgrades’. 

The audit assessed whether Transport for NSW has an effective process to select and prioritise projects as part of the TAP, with a specific focus on the third tranche of TAP funding.

In August 2018, at the commencement of this audit, Transport for NSW intended to complete the selection of projects for the TAP 3 final business case in December 2018. Transport for NSW advise that it now intends to complete the development stage and final business case in the first quarter of 2019, prior to the final investment decision of the TAP program. This report is based on the TAP 3 strategic business case and information provided by Transport for NSW up to December 2018.

Conclusion
Transport for NSW’s process for selecting and prioritising projects for TAP 3 balanced DSAPT compliance goals with broader customer outcomes. It also considered demographics, deliverability and value for money. However, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required for full DSAPT compliance, and this limits its ability to demonstrate that its approach is effective. 
Transport for NSW has applied most of the external review recommendations from previous funding rounds to the implementation of the third round of TAP funding (TAP3), with positive results. Changes made include a clear objective for TAP 3 to focus on improving compliance, improved governance arrangements, and better consideration of deliverability and design during project planning. 
Through TAP 3, Transport for NSW is also trying to better address disability access in a way that balances DSAPT compliance with other considerations - such as population demographics, access to services and value for money. Transport for NSW developed an objective prioritisation and selection methodology to assess projects for TAP 3 funding. 
Transport for NSW cannot quantify the work needed to meet DSAPT compliance targets across the rail and ferry networks as it has not completed a comprehensive audit of compliance. This information is needed to ensure the effective targeting of funding, and to measure the contribution of TAP 3 work to meeting the DSAPT compliance targets. Instead, Transport for NSW has undertaken a phased approach to completing a comprehensive audit of compliance across the networks, with a focus on first assessing compliance at locations that are not wheelchair accessible. This creates two problems. First, Transport for NSW does not know the complete scope of work required to achieve DSAPT compliance. Second, not all wheelchair accessible locations fully meet DSAPT standards.
Transport for NSW's proposed communication plan for the schedule of TAP 3 funded works does not align with its Disability Inclusion Action Plan 2018-2022. The Disability Inclusion Action Plan commits Transport for NSW to providing a full list of stations and wharves to be upgraded with their estimated time of construction when the next round of funding, TAP 3, is announced. Given the long timeframes associated with improving transport infrastructure, this information is important as it allows people to make informed decisions about where they live, work or study. Instead, Transport for NSW plans to communicate information to customers on a project by project basis.

In 2015, there were 1.37 million people living with disability in New South Wales. Access to transport is critical to ensuring that people can engage in all aspects of community life, including education, employment and recreation. People with disability can encounter barriers when accessing public transport services. 

The social model of disability, outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, views people with disability as not disabled by their impairment but by the barriers in the community and environment that restrict their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others. 

Accessible public transport is more than the provision of physical access to premises and conveyances, it provides barrier-free access for people who have vision, hearing or cognitive impairments. All users, not just people with disability, benefit from improvements to the accessibility and inclusiveness of transport services.

According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the main types of difficulties experienced by people with disability when using public transport relate to steps (39.9 per cent), difficulty getting to stops and stations (25 per cent), fear and anxiety (23.3 per cent) and lack of seating or difficulty standing (20.7 per cent).

Transport for NSW has a Disability Inclusion Action Plan (the Action Plan) 2018-2022 that sets an overall framework for planning, delivering and reporting on initiatives to increase accessibility of the transport network. It covers all elements of the journey experienced when using public transport, including journey planning, staff training, customer services and interaction between the physical environment and modes of transport. Appendix five outlines the guiding principles of the Action Plan.

Transport for NSW's Transport Social Policy branch developed the Action Plan in consultation with internal and external stakeholders. The director of the Transport Social Policy branch is a member of the TAP executive steering committee, which supports alignment between the Action Plan and TAP.

Transport for NSW's Disability Inclusion Action Plan describes a customer focussed approach to accessibility

One of the guiding principles of the Action Plan is ‘intelligent compliance’. Transport for NSW describes this as compliance that prioritises customer-focused outcomes over a narrow focus on legal compliance with accessibility standards. As well as being compliant, infrastructure should be practical, usable, fit for purpose and convenient. 

The TAP prioritisation and selection methodology reflects Transport for NSW’s focus on intelligent compliance. We consider this a reasonable approach as had Transport for NSW focussed exclusively on achieving compliance with the DSAPT targets by upgrading the most affordable infrastructure, some locations, that are used by more customers, would remain inaccessible to people with disability. However, this approach should not be seen as an alternative to Transport for NSW meeting its DSAPT compliance obligations.

TAP program staff consult with the Accessible Transport Advisory Committee

The Accessible Transport Advisory Committee (ATAC) has representatives from disability and ageing organisations, who provide expert guidance to Transport for NSW on access and inclusion. The ATAC provide guidance and feedback on projects and project solutions, including user testing where appropriate. TAP program staff provide regular updates at ATAC meetings, which include briefings on progress. The ATAC also provides feedback and suggestions to TAP program staff, which is considered and sometimes included in current and future projects.For example, in March 2017 the TAP program team briefed the ATAC on the challenges with respect to a number of ferry wharves and sought support for DSAPT exemptions proposed in the TAP 3 strategic business case.

Case study: Feedback on Braille lettering for lift buttons
In June 2018, the Program team sought feedback on a variety of lift button options to improve accessibility on future TAP projects. In September 2018, during the ATAC meeting attended by the Audit Office, the program team sought feedback on the standard designs for TAP 3. Some ATAC members noted that the standard design included Braille lettering on the lift buttons, and that this was not good practice because people can accidently press the button while reading it. As a result, Transport for NSW are incorporating this feedback into design requirements for the lifts for TAP 3, which will consider larger buttons, clearer Braille and Braille signage adjacent to the button.

Transport for NSW has not briefed the Advisory Committee on the outcome of the prioritisation and selection process

TAP program staff briefed the Advisory Committee about the prioritisation and selection methodology, after the Minister approved it in 2016. However, Transport for NSW have not briefed or consulted the Advisory Committee on the outcome of the prioritisation process. Infrastructure NSW noted this issue during its review of the strategic business case. 

Transport for NSW advised us that it established the ATAC as an advisory group, and that Transport for NSW does not disclose sensitive information to it. Transport for NSW intends to share the outcome of the prioritisation process following the completion of the TAP 3 development stage and final investment decision.

The TAP communication plan does not fully meet the requirements of the Disability Inclusion Action Plan

The Disability Inclusion Action Plan includes an action item to ‘provide a listing of stations and wharves to be upgraded with estimated time of construction as each new tranche of the Transport Access Program is announced’ The TAP Communication Plan that we reviewed does not include this provision instead focussing on communication on a per project basis. Given the long timeframes associated with improving transport infrastructure, this information is important as it allows people to make informed decisions about where they live, work or study.