This report analyses the results of our audits of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Three audits are ongoing.

An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Independent Planning Commission's (the IPC) audit opinion because the prior year comparative figures were not audited. Prior to 2020–21, the IPC was not required to prepare separate financial statements under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (PF&A Act). The financial reporting provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 now require the IPC to prepare financial statements.

The number of identified misstatements increased from 51 in 2019–20 to 54 in 2020–21.

The 2010–11 to 2019–20 audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s (the Corporation) financial statements are incomplete due to insufficient records and evidence to support the transactions of the Corporation, particularly for the earlier years. Management has commenced actions to improve the governance and financial management of the Corporation. These audits are currently in progress and the 2020–21 audit will commence shortly.

There are 609 State controlled Crown land managers (CLMs) across New South Wales that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land.

Eight CLMs prepared and submitted 2019–20 financial statements by the revised deadline of 30 June 2021. A further 24 CLMs did not prepare financial statements in accordance with the PF&A Act. The remaining CLMs were not required to prepare 2019–20 financial statements as they met NSW Treasury's financial reporting exemption criteria.

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment's (the department) preliminary assessment indicates that 60 CLMs are required to prepare financial statements in 2020–21. To date, no CLMs have prepared and submitted financial statements for audit in 2020–21.

There are also 120 common trusts that have never submitted financial statements for audit. Common trusts are responsible for the care, control and management of land that has been set aside for specific use in a certain locality, such as grazing, camping or bushwalking.

What the key issues were

The number of matters we reported to management increased from 135 in 2019–20 to 180 in 2020–21, of which 40 per cent were repeat findings.

Seven high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21:

• system control deficiencies at the department relating to user access to HR and payroll management systems, vendor master data management and journal processing, which require manual reviews to mitigate risks
• deficiencies related to the Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
• the Lord Howe Island Board did not regularly review and monitor privileged user access rights to key information systems
• the Natural Resources Access Regulator identified and adjusted three prior period errors retrospectively, which indicate deficiencies within the financial reporting processes
• deficiencies relating to the Parramatta Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
• lease arrangements have not been confirmed between the Planning Ministerial Corporation and Office of Sport regarding the Sydney International Regatta Centre
• the Wentworth Park Sporting Complex land manager (the land manager) has a $6.5 million loan with Greyhound Racing NSW (GRNSW). GRNSW requested the land manager to repay the loan. However, the land manager subsequently requested GRNSW to convert the loan to a grant. Should this request be denied, the land manager would not be able to continue as a going concern without financial support. This matter remains unresolved for many years.

There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department uses the Crown Land Information Database (CLID) to record key information relating to Crown land in New South Wales that are managed and controlled by the department and land managers (including councils and land managers controlled by the state). The CLID system was not designed to facilitate financial reporting and the department is required to conduct extensive adjustments and reconciliations to produce accurate information for the financial statements.

The department is implementing a new system to record Crown land (the CrownTracker project). The department advised that the project completion date will be confirmed by June 2022.

What we recommended

The department should ensure CLMs and common trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations.

Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies, with a focus on addressing high-risk and repeat issues.

The department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate. This will allow the department and CLMs to be better informed about the Crown land they control.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statements audits of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster.

Appendix one - Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What the report is about

The movement of freight contributes $66 billion annually to the NSW economy. Two thirds of all freight in NSW moves through Greater Sydney, and the volume of freight moving through Greater Sydney is expected to increase by 48 per cent by 2036.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of transport agencies in improving the use of rail freight capacity in Greater Sydney, and to meet current and future freight demand.

What we found

Transport agencies do not have strategies or targets in place to improve the efficiency or capacity of the metropolitan shared rail network for freight.

The transport agencies acknowledge that they do not have sufficient information to achieve the most efficient freight outcomes and they do not know how to use the shared rail network to maximise freight capacity without compromising passenger rail services.

The Freight and Ports Plan 2018-2023 contains one target for rail freight - to increase the use of rail at Port Botany to 28 per cent by 2021. However, Transport for NSW (TfNSW)'s data indicates this target will not be met.

Sydney Trains records data on train movements and collects some data on delays and incidents. TfNSW collects data for the construction of the Standard Working Timetable and third-party contracts.

However, a lack of clarity around what data is gathered and who has ownership of the data makes data sharing difficult and limits its analysis and reporting.

The Freight and Ports Plan 2018-2023 includes the goal of 'Reducing avoidable rail freight delays', but the transport agencies do not have any definition for an avoidable delay and, as a result, do not measure or report them.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains are appointed to manage and deliver the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE)'s obligations to allow rail freight operators to use the shared rail network. There are no performance measures in rail freight operator contracts or inter-agency agreements. This limits transport agencies' ability to improve performance.

TfNSW’s Freight Branch is working on four freight-specific strategies; a review of the Plan, a freight rail strategy, a port efficiency strategy and a freight data strategy.

TfNSW has not yet determined the timeframes or intended outcomes of these strategies.

What we recommended

Transport agencies should:

• commit, as part of the review of Future Transport 2056, to delivering the freight-specific strategies currently in development and develop whole-of-cluster accountability for this work including timeframes, specific targets and clear roles and responsibilities 
• improve the collection and sharing of freight data
• develop a plan to reduce avoidable freight delays
• systematically collect data on the management of all delays involving and/or impacting rail-freight
• develop and implement key performance indicators for the agreements between the transport agencies.

The movement of freight contributes $66.0 billion annually to the New South Wales economy — or 13 per cent of the Gross State Product. Two thirds of all freight in New South Wales moves through Greater Sydney, and the volume of freight moving through Greater Sydney is expected to increase by 48 per cent by 2036. This increasing demand is driven by increasing population and economic growth.

The sequence of activities required to move goods from their point of origin to the eventual consumer (the supply chain) is what matters most to shippers and consumers. Road can provide a single-mode door-to-door service, whereas conveying goods by rail typically involves moving freight onto road at some point. In Greater Sydney, 80 per cent of all freight is moved on road. Freight often passes through intermodal terminals (IMTs) as it transitions from one mode of transport to the next.

In 2016, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) released Future Transport 2056 - the NSW Government's 40-year vision for transport in New South Wales, which is intended to guide investment over the longer term. In Future Transport 2056, TfNSW noted that New South Wales will struggle to meet increasing demand for freight movements unless rail plays a larger role in the movement of freight.

Sydney Trains manages the metropolitan shared rail network, which is made up of rail lines that are used by both passenger and freight trains. The Transport Administration Act 1988 requires that, for the purposes of network control and timetabling, NSW Government transport agencies give ‘reasonable priority’ to passenger trains on shared lines. As the Greater Sydney population and rail patronage continue to grow, so too will competition for access to the shared rail network. See Appendix two for details of the area encompassed by Greater Sydney.

Freight operators can also use dedicated rail freight lines operated by the Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC - an Australian Government statutory-owned corporation). As the metropolitan shared rail network connects with dedicated freight lines, freight operators often use both to complete a journey.

TfNSW, Sydney Trains and the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) work in conjunction with other rail infrastructure owners and private sector entities, including port operators, privately operated IMTs and freight-shipping companies. TfNSW and Sydney Trains are responsible for managing the movement of freight across the metropolitan shared rail network. TAHE is the owner of the rail infrastructure that makes up the metropolitan shared rail network. The NSW Government established TAHE, a NSW Government state-owned corporation, on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner - RailCorp. The Auditor-General for New South Wales has commenced a performance audit on TAHE which is expected to table in 2022.

On 1 July 2021, TAHE entered into new agreements with TfNSW and Sydney Trains to operate, manage and maintain the metropolitan shared rail network. Until 30 June 2021, and in accordance with TAHE's Implementation Deed, TAHE operated under the terms of RailCorp's existing arrangements and agreements.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of TfNSW, Sydney Trains and TAHE in improving the use of rail freight capacity in Greater Sydney, and to meet current and future freight demand.

The audit focused on:

• the monitoring of access to shared rail lines
• the management of avoidable delays of rail freight movements
• steps to increase the use of rail freight capacity in Greater Sydney.

Appendix one - Response from agencies

Appendix two - The Greater Sydney region

Appendix three - TfNSW strategic projects 

Appendix four - Sydney Trains path priority principles 

Appendix five - Sydney Trains delay management

Appendix six - About the audit 

Appendix seven - Performance auditing
 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #357 - released (19 October 2021).

What the report is about

This audit assessed how effectively Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Sydney Trains identify and manage their cyber security risks.

The NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) sets out 25 mandatory requirements for agencies, including implementing the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s Essential 8 strategies to mitigate cyber security incidents, and identifying the agency’s most vital systems, their ‘crown jewels’. 

The audited agencies have requested that we do not disclose detail of the significant vulnerabilities detected during the audit, as these vulnerabilities are not yet remediated. We provided a detailed report to the agencies in December 2020 outlining significant issues identified in the audit. We have conceded to the agencies' request but it is disappointing that transparency to the Parliament and the public on issues that potentially directly affect them needs to be limited in this way.

What we found

TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks.

Both agencies have assessed their cyber security risks as unacceptably high and both agencies had not identified all of the risks we detected during this audit – some of which are significant.

Both agencies have cyber security plans in place that aim to address cyber security risks. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have combined this into the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program, part of the Cyber Defence Portfolio (CDP). 

However, neither agency has reached its target ratings for the CSP and the Essential 8 and maturity is low in relation to significant risks and vulnerabilities exposed.

Further, neither agency is fostering a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of decision-making.

TfNSW is not implementing cyber security training effectively across the cluster with only 7.2% of staff having completed basic cyber security training.

What we recommended

TfNSW and Sydney Trains should:

• develop and implement a plan to uplift the Essential 8 controls to the agency's target state
• as a matter of priority, address the vulnerabilities identified as part of this audit and previously described in a detailed Audit Office report provided to both agencies
• ensure cyber security risk reporting to executives and the Audit and Risk Committee
• collect supporting information for the CSP self assessments 
• classify all information and systems according to importance and integrate this with the crown jewels identification process
• require more rigorous analysis to re-prioritise CDP funding 
• increase uptake of cyber security training.

TfNSW should assess the appropriateness of its target rating for each of the CSP mandatory requirements.

Department of Customer Service should:

• clarify the requirement for the CSP reporting to apply to all systems
• require agencies to report the target level of maturity for each mandatory requirement.

Response to requests by audited agencies to remove information from this report

In preparing this audit report, I have considered how best to balance the need to support public accountability and transparency with the need to avoid revealing information that could pose additional risk to agencies’ systems. This has involved an assessment of the appropriate level of detail to include in the report about the cyber security vulnerabilities identified in this audit.

In making this assessment, the audit team consulted with Transport for NSW (TfNSW), Sydney Trains, and Cyber Security NSW to identify content which could potentially pose a threat to the agencies’ cyber security.

In December 2020, my office also provided TfNSW and Sydney Trains with a detailed report of many of the significant vulnerabilities identified in this audit, to enable the agencies to address the cyber security risks identified. The detailed report was produced as a result of a 'red team' exercise, which was conducted with both agencies' knowledge and consent. The scope of this exercise reflected the significant input provided by both agencies. More information on this exercise is at page 12 of this report.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have advised that in the six months from December 2020 and at the time of tabling this audit report, they have not yet remediated all the vulnerabilities identified. As a result, they, along with Cyber Security NSW, have requested that we not disclose all information contained in this audit report to reduce the likelihood of an attack on their systems and resulting harm to the community. I have conceded to this request because the vulnerabilities identified have not yet been remediated and leave the agencies exposed to significant risk.

It should be stressed that the risks identified in the detailed report exist due to the continued presence of these previously identified vulnerabilities, rather than due to their potential publication. The audited agencies, alone, are accountable for remediating these vulnerabilities and addressing the risks they pose.

It is disappointing that transparency to the Parliament and the public on issues that potentially directly affect them needs to be limited in this way.

That said, the conclusions drawn in this report are significant in terms of risk and remain valid, and the recommendations should be acted upon with urgency.

Cyber security risk is an increasing area of concern for governments in Australia and around the world. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cyber security attacks on government entities in Australia, including in New South Wales. Malicious cyber activity in Australia is increasing in frequency, scale, and sophistication. The Audit Office of New South Wales is responding to these risks with a program of audits in this area, which aim to identify the effectiveness of particular agencies in managing cyber risks, as well as their compliance with relevant policy.

Cyber Security NSW, part of the Department of Customer Service (DCS) releases and manages the NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP). The CSP sets out 25 mandatory requirements for agencies, including making it mandatory for agencies to implement the Australian Cyber Security Centre Essential 8 Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents (the Essential 8). The Essential 8 are key controls which serve as a baseline set of protections which agencies can put in place to make it more difficult for adversaries to compromise a system. Agencies are required to self-assess their maturity against the CSP and the Essential 8, and report that assessment to Cyber Security NSW annually.

The CSP makes agencies responsible for identifying and managing their cyber security risks. The CSP sets out responsibilities and governance regarding risk identification, including making agencies responsible for identifying their 'crown jewels', the agency's most valuable and operationally vital systems. Once these risks are identified, agencies are responsible for developing a cyber security plan to mitigate those risks.

This audit focussed on two agencies: Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Sydney Trains. TfNSW is the lead agency for the Transport cluster and provides a number of IT services to the entire cluster, including Sydney Trains. This audit focussed on the activities of TfNSW's Transport IT function, which is responsible for providing cyber security across the cluster, as well as directly overseeing four of TfNSW's crown jewels. Sydney Trains is one of the agencies in the Transport cluster. While it receives some services from TfNSW, it is also responsible for implementing its own IT controls, as well as controls to protect its Operational Technology (OT) environment. This OT environment includes systems which are necessary for the operation and safety of the train network.

To test the mitigations in place and the effectiveness of controls, this audit involved a 'red team' simulated exercise. A red team involves authorised attackers seeking to achieve certain objectives within the target's environment. The red team simulated a determined external cyber threat actor seeking to gain access to TfNSW's systems. The red team also sought to test the physical security of some Sydney Trains' sites relevant to the agency's cyber security. The red team exercise was conducted with the knowledge of TfNSW and Sydney Trains.

This audit included the Department of Customer Service as an auditee, as they have ownership of the CSP through Cyber Security NSW. This audit did not examine the management of cyber risk in the Department of Customer Service.

This audit assessed how effectively selected agencies identify and manage their cyber security risks. The audit assessed this with the following criteria:

• Are agencies effectively identifying and planning for their cyber security risks?
• Are agencies effectively managing their cyber security risks?

Following this in-depth portfolio assessment, the Auditor-General for NSW will also table a report on NSW agencies' compliance with the CSP in the first quarter of 2021–22.

Agencies have assessed their cyber risks as being above acceptable levels

An agency's risk tolerance is the amount of risk which the agency will accept or tolerate without developing further strategies to modify the level of risk. Risks that are within an agency's risk tolerance may not require further mitigation and may be deemed acceptable, while risks which are above the agency's risk tolerance likely require further mitigation before they become acceptable to the agency.

Both agencies have defined their risk tolerance and have identified risks which are above this level, indicating that they are unacceptable to the agency. TfNSW has defined 'very high' risks as generally intolerable and 'high' risks as undesirable. Its risk tolerance is 'medium'. Sydney Trains has four classifications of risk: A, B, C and D. A and B risks are deemed 'unacceptable' and 'undesirable' respectively, while C risks are considered 'tolerable'. This aligns with the TfNSW definition of a medium risk tolerance.

Transport IT reported five enterprise-level cyber security risks through its enterprise risk reporting tool in September 2020, all of which relate to cyber security or have causes relating to cyber security. These risks are in aggregate form, rather than relating to specific vulnerabilities. At the time of the audit, one of these risks was rated as very high and the other four rated as high. At this time, Transport IT had identified a further seven divisional-level risks which were above the agency’s risk tolerance.

Similarly, Sydney Trains has identified one main cyber security risk in its IT enterprise-level risk register and another with a potential cyber cause. Both of these IT risks are deemed to have a residual risk of ‘unacceptable’.

Similarly, two cyber-related OT risks have been determined to be above the agency's risk tolerance. One risk is rated as 'unacceptable'. Another risk, while not entirely cyber rated, is rated 'undesirable' and is deemed to have some causes which may stem from a cyber-attack.

Agencies have assessed their current cyber risk mitigations as requiring improvement

In addition to the risk ratings stated above, at the time of the audit neither agency believed that its controls were operating effectively. Transport IT had rated the control environments for its cyber security enterprise risks as 'requires improvement'. Mitigations were listed in the risk register for these risks but, in some cases, they were unlikely to reduce the risk to the target state or by the target date. For example, one risk had actions listed as 'under review' and no further treatment actions listed, but a due date of July 2021, while another risk was being treated by the CDP with a due date of July 2021. The CDP identified in May 2020 that while the average risk identified as part of that program will be reduced to a medium level by this date, ten high risks will still remain. Given the delays in the program, this number may be higher. As such, it seems unlikely that the enterprise risk will be reduced to below a 'high' level by July 2021.

Sydney Trains’ IT and OT risk registers cross-reference controls and mitigations against the causes and consequences. The IT cyber security risk identified in the register had causes with no mitigations designed for them. Further, some of these causes did not have future mitigations designed for them. This risk also had controls in place which are identified as partially effective. For the unacceptable OT risk noted above, while there was a control designed for each of the potential causes, Sydney Trains had identified all of the controls in place as either partially effective or ineffective. This indicates that Sydney Trains was not effectively mitigating the causes of its cyber risks and, even where it had designed controls or mitigations, these were not always implemented to fully mitigate the cause of the risk.

Additional information on gaps in cyber mitigations which were exposed in the course of this audit has been detailed to both agencies. The Foreword of this report provides information about why this detail is not included here.

Essential 8 maturity is low across TfNSW and Sydney Trains and little progress was made in 2020

CSP mandatory requirement 3.2 states that agencies must implement the ACSC Essential 8. Agencies must also rate themselves against each of the Essential 8 on a maturity scale from zero to three and report this to Cyber Security NSW. A full list of the Essential 8 can be found in Exhibit 1. Both agencies have a low level of maturity against the Essential 8 not just in comparison to the targets they have set, but also in relation to the risks and vulnerabilities exposed. Both agencies have set target maturity ratings for the Essential 8 but none of the Essential 8 ratings across either agency are currently implemented to this level. Having a low level of Essential 8 maturity exposes both agencies to significant risks and vulnerabilities. Little progress was made between the 2019 and 2020 attestation periods.

Transport IT has set a target rating of three across all of the Essential 8. Sydney Trains has set a target rating of three for its IT systems. Sydney Trains had an interim target of two for its OT systems in 2020 and advised that this has since increased to three. It should be noted that not all the Essential 8 are applicable to OT systems.

None of the Essential 8 ratings across either agency are currently implemented to the target levels. Given that the Essential 8 provide the controls which are most commonly able to deter cyber-attacks, having maturity at a low level potentially exposes agencies to a cyber security attack.

Some work is underway across both TfNSW and Sydney Trains to improve the Essential 8 control ratings. The CDP provided some resources to the Essential 8 over 2019–20, with uplift focusing on specific systems. The CDP work in 2019 and 2020 relevant to the Essential 8 largely focussed on determining the current state of the Essential 8 and creating a target state roadmap. As a result, there was little improvement between the 2019 and 2020 attestation periods. The CDP has a workstream for the Essential 8 in its FY 2020–21 funding allocation, however as noted above in Exhibit 6 this was delayed as resources were redeployed to Project La Brea. Regardless, work on some specific aspects of the Essential 8 remain part of the 2020–21 CDP allocation, with workstreams allocated to improving three of the Essential 8. In addition, some work from Project La Brea should lead to an improvement in the Essential 8.

Sydney Trains' Cyber Uplift Program included a workstream which had in scope the uplift in the Essential 8 in IT. There were also other workstreams which aimed to improve some of the Essential 8 for OT systems. Work is also ongoing as part of the CDP to uplift these scores in Sydney Trains.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have not reached their target maturity across the CSP mandatory requirements and TfNSW has not evaluated its cluster-wide target to ensure it is appropriate

Cyber Security NSW allows each agency to determine its target level of maturity for the first 20 CSP mandatory requirements. Agencies can tailor their target levels to their risk profile. Not reaching the target rating of the CSP mandatory requirements risks information and systems being managed inconsistently or not in alignment with good governance principles.

Sydney Trains has set its target level of maturity for IT and OT. All of Sydney Trains' target maturity levels are at least a three (defined), with a target of four (quantitatively managed) for many of the mandatory requirements. While Cyber Security NSW does not currently mandate a minimum level of maturity, in 2019 there was a requirement for each agency to target a minimum level of three.

Sydney Trains has not met its target ratings across the mandatory requirements.

The Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program has a program KPI to ensure that the entire cluster reaches a minimum maturity level of three against all the CSP requirements by 2023. TfNSW has not reviewed its CSP mandatory requirement targets to determine if a three is desirable for all requirements or if a higher target level may be more appropriate. It is important for senior management to set cyber security objectives as a demonstration of leadership and a commitment to cyber security.

TfNSW has not met its target ratings across the mandatory requirements for its Group IT ISMS, which was the focus of this audit.

Both agencies claimed progress in their implementation of the mandatory requirements between 2019 and 2020. The audit did not seek to verify the self-assessed results from either agency.

Both agencies operate ISMS in line with the CSP

CSP mandatory requirement 3.1 requires agencies to implement an Information Security Management System (ISMS) or Cyber Security Framework (CSF), with scope at least covering systems identified as the agency's ‘crown jewels’. The ISMS or CSF should be compliant with, or modelled on, one or more recognised IT or OT standard. As noted in the introduction, an ISMS ‘consists of the policies, procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an organisation, in the pursuit of protecting its information assets.’ Both agencies operate an ISMS compliant with the CSP requirement.

As noted in the introduction, TfNSW operates four ISMS. The Transport IT ISMS is certified against ISO27001, the most common standard for ISMS certification. Three of TfNSW’s six crown jewels are managed within this ISMS. The other ISMS are not certified to relevant standards, though TfNSW claims that they align with relevant controls. This is sufficient for the purposes of the CSP.

Sydney Trains operates two ISMS, one for IT and another for OT. Neither of these are certified to relevant ISMS Standards, however there have been conformance reviews of both IT and OT with relevant standards. These ISMS cover all crown jewels in the agency.

There are currently 11 ISMS in operation across the Transport cluster. TfNSW has proposed moving towards a holistic approach to these ISMS, with the CDP Board responsible for governing the available security controls and directing agency IT and OT teams to implement these.

Agencies are not routinely conducting audits of third-party suppliers to ensure compliance with contractual obligations

CSP mandatory requirement 1.5 makes agencies accountable for the cyber risks of their ICT service providers and ensuring that providers comply with the CSP and any other relevant agency security policies. The ACSC has provided advice on what organisations should do when managing third party suppliers of ICT. The ACSC advises that organisations should use contracts to define cyber security expectations and seek assurance to ensure that these contract expectations are being met. While both agencies usually include specific cyber security expectations in contracts, neither is routinely seeking assurance that these expectations are being met.

The NSW Government has mandated the use of the 'Core& One' contract template for low-value IT procurements and the Procure IT contract template for high-value IT procurements. Both of these contracts contain space for the procuring agency to include cyber security controls for the contractor to implement. The Procure IT contract template also includes a right-to-audit clause which allows agencies to receive assurance around the implementation of these controls. TfNSW and Sydney Trains used the mandated contracts for relevant contracts examined as part of this audit.

TfNSW included security controls in all the contracts examined as part of this audit. Compliance with ISO27001 was the most commonly stated security expectation. Of the contracts examined as part of this audit, only one contract did not have a right-to-audit clause. This contract was signed in October 2016. While these clauses are in place, TfNSW rarely conducted these audits on its third-party providers. Of the eight TfNSW contracts examined in detail, only two of these had been audited to confirm compliance with the stated security controls.

Sydney Trains included security controls in all but one of the contracts examined as part of this audit. Sydney Trains did not require contractors to be compliant with ISO27001, but only required compliance with whole-of-government policies. Sydney Trains does not routinely conduct audits of its third-party suppliers, however it did conduct deep-dive risk analyses of its top ten highest risk IT suppliers. This involved a detailed review of both the suppliers' security posture and also the contract underpinning the relationship with the supplier.

The CDP funding for 2020–21 includes a workstream for strategic third-party contract remediation. This funding is to conduct some foundational work which will allow the CDP to make further improvements in future years. While this funding will not address gaps in contract requirements or management across all contracts, this workstream aims to reduce the risks posed by strategic suppliers covering critical assets. Similarly, work is currently underway as part of the CDP to conduct OT risk assessments for key suppliers to Sydney Trains in a similar way to the work undertaken for IT suppliers.

Sydney Trains has risk assessed its third-party suppliers but TfNSW has not done so

It is important to conduct a risk assessment of suppliers to identify high-risk contractors. This allows agencies to identify those contractors who may require additional controls stated in the contract, those who require additional oversight, and also where auditing resources are best targeted.

Sydney Trains has risk assessed all its IT suppliers and, as noted above, has conducted a deep-dive risk analysis of its top ten highest risk suppliers. TfNSW has not undertaken similar analysis of its key suppliers, however it has identified risks attached to each of its strategic suppliers and has documented these. As a result of not risk assessing its suppliers, TfNSW cannot take a targeted approach to its contract management.

TfNSW demonstrated poor records handling relating to the contracts examined as part of this audit

TfNSW was not able to locate one of the contracts requested as part of the audit's sample. Other documentation, such as contract management plans, could not be located for many of the other contracts requested as part of this audit. These poor document handling practices limits TfNSW's ability to effectively oversee service providers and ensure that they are implementing agreed controls. It also limits public transparency on the effectiveness of these controls.

The Transport cluster is not effectively implementing cyber security awareness training

Agencies are responsible for implementing regular cyber security education for all employees and contractors under mandatory requirement 2.1 in the CSP. TfNSW is responsible for delivering this training to the whole Transport cluster, including Sydney Trains. The Transport cluster has basic cyber awareness training available for all staff. TfNSW also offers additional training provided by Cyber Security NSW targeted at executives and executive assistants. While TfNSW has training available to staff, it is not delivering this effectively. TfNSW does not make training mandatory for most staff nor does it require staff to repeat training regularly. Even among those staff who have been assigned the training, completion rates are low, meaning that delivery is not effectively monitored. Cyber security training is important for building and supporting a cyber security culture.

TfNSW is responsible for creating and rolling out all forms of training to agencies within the Transport cluster. Both TfNSW and Sydney Trains have the same mandatory cyber awareness training that is automatically assigned to new starters. At the time of the audit, this training was not mandatory for ongoing staff. TfNSW does make additional cyber security training available to staff who can choose to undertake the training themselves, or can be assigned the training by their manager. All TfNSW cyber security training is delivered via online modules and it is the responsibility of managers to ensure that it is completed.

Cyber security training completion rates for both TfNSW and Sydney Trains are low. Only 13.5 per cent of staff across the Transport cluster had been assigned the Cyber Safety for New Starters training as of January 2021. Although this course is mandatory for new starters, only 53 per cent of staff assigned the Cyber Safety for New Starters training module had completed the course by January 2021. As a result, only 7.2 per cent of staff across the entire Transport cluster had completed this training at that time. In Sydney Trains, less than one per cent of staff had completed this training as at January 2021 and a further 7.6 per cent of staff have completed the 'Cyber Security: Beyond the Basics' training. These low completion rates indicate that TfNSW is not effectively rolling out cyber security training across the cluster.

In October 2020, the Department of Customer Service released 'DCS-2020-05 Cyber Security NSW Directive - Practice Requirement for NSW Government', which made annual cyber security training mandatory for all staff from 2021. In line with this requirement, TfNSW has advised that it will be gradually implementing mandatory annual training from July 2021 for all staff.

The Transport cluster undertakes activities to build a cyber-aware culture in accordance with the CSP, but awareness remains low

Increasing staff awareness of cyber security risks and maintaining a cyber secure culture are both mandatory requirements of the CSP. While TfNSW does undertake some activities to build a cyber aware culture, awareness of cyber security risks remains low. This can be demonstrated by the low training rates outlined above, and the 'Spot the Scammer' exercise, described in Exhibit 7. TfNSW is responsible for delivering these awareness raising activities across the cluster.

TfNSW frequently communicates with staff across the Transport cluster about various cyber security risks through multiple avenues. Both agencies use the intranet, emails and other awareness raising activities to highlight the importance for staff to be aware of the seriousness of cyber risks. Advice given on the intranet includes tips for spotting scammers on mobile phones, promoting the cluster-wide training courses, as well as various advice that staff could use when dealing with cyber risks in the workplace.

In addition to these awareness raising activities, TfNSW has also undertaken a cluster-wide phishing email exercise called 'Spot the Scammer'. This is outlined in Exhibit 7. This exercise was carried out in 2019 and 2020 and allowed the Transport cluster to measure the degree to which staff were able to identify phishing emails. As can be seen in Exhibit 7, the results of this exercise indicate that staff awareness of phishing emails remains low.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

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Parliamentary reference - Report number #353 - released (13 July 2021).

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the NSW Planning and Environment cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of these agencies. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, some cultural institutions had challenges valuing collection assets in 2017–18. These issues were resolved before the financial statements were finalised.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Planning and Environment cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning and Environment cluster agencies' financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations
• service delivery.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning and Environment cluster for 2018.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

• our financial statement audits of agencies in the Planning and Environment cluster for 2018
• the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office annual work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Planning and Environment cluster, and to collate and present service information for different segments of the cluster in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, ‘Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities’, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all relevant agency data sources.

Appendix one - List of 2018 recommendations

Appendix two - Status of 2017 recommendations

Appendix three- Cluster agencies

Appendix four - Financial data

Appendix five - Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix six - Management letter findings by risk rating

The Auditor-General for New South Wales Margaret Crawford found that as NSW state government agencies’ digital footprint increases they need to do more to address new and emerging information technology (IT) risks. This is one of the key findings to emerge from the second stand-alone report on internal controls and governance of the 40 largest NSW state government agencies.

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of the 40 largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2018.

This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2017–18 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at the 40 largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector.

This report offers insights into internal controls and governance in the NSW public sector

This is our second report dedicated to internal controls and governance at NSW State Government agencies. The report provides insights into the effectiveness of controls and governance processes in the NSW public sector by:

• highlighting the potential risks posed by weaknesses in controls and governance processes
• helping agencies benchmark the adequacy of their processes against their peers
• focusing on new and emerging risks, and the internal controls and governance processes that might address those risks.

Without strong governance systems and internal controls, agencies increase the risks associated with effectively managing their finances and delivering services to citizens. The way agencies deliver services increasingly relies on contracts and partnerships with the private sector. Many of these arrangements deliver front line services, but others provide less visible back office support. For example, an agency may rely on an IT service provider to manage a key system used to provide services to the community. The contract and service level agreements are only truly effective where they are actively managed to reduce risks to continuous quality service delivery, such as interruptions caused by system outages, cyber security attacks and data security breaches.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present heightened risks for agencies to mitigate. This report divides these into the following five areas:

1. Internal control trends
2. Information technology (IT), including IT vendor management
3. Transparency and performance reporting
4. Management of purchasing cards and taxis
5. Fraud and corruption control.

The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, controls and service delivery comments are included in the individual 2018 cluster financial audit reports, which will be tabled in Parliament from November to December 2018.

The focus of the report has changed since last year

Last year's report topics included asset management, ethics and conduct, and risk management. We are reporting on new topics this year. We plan to introduce new topics and re-visit our previous topics in subsequent reports on a cyclical basis. This will provide a baseline against which to measure the NSW public sectors’ progress in implementing appropriate internal controls and governance processes to mitigate existing, new and emerging risks in the public sector.

Agencies selected for the volume account for 95 per cent of the state's expenditure

While we have covered only 40 agencies in this report, those selected are a large enough group to identify common issues and insights. They represent about 95 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

• operate effectively and efficiently
• produce reliable financial reports
• comply with laws and regulations
• support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this volume presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

Government agencies’ financial reporting is now heavily reliant on information technology (IT). IT is also increasingly important to the delivery of agency services. These systems often provide the data to help monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of agency processes and services they deliver. Our audits reviewed whether agencies have effective controls in place to manage both key financial systems and IT service contracts.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations from our review of how agencies reported their performance in their 2016–17 annual reports. The Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Regulation 2015 and Annual Reports (Departments) Regulation 2015 (annual reports regulation) currently prescribes the minimum requirements for agency annual reports.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency preventative and detective controls over purchasing card and taxi use for 2017–18.

Fraud and corruption control is one of the 17 key elements of our governance lighthouse. Recent reports from ICAC into state agencies and local government councils highlight the need for effective fraud control and ethical frameworks. Effective frameworks can help protect an agency from events that risk serious reputational damage and financial loss.

Our 2016 Fraud Survey found the NSW Government agencies we surveyed reported 1,077 frauds over the three year period to 30 June 2015. For those frauds where an estimate of losses was made, the reported value exceeded $10.0 million. The report also highlighted that the full extent of fraud in the NSW public sector could be higher than reported because:

• unreported frauds in organisations can be almost three times the number of reported frauds
• our 2015 survey did not include all NSW public sector agencies, nor did it include any NSW universities or local councils
• fraud committed by citizens such as fare evasion and fraudulent state tax self-assessments was not within the scope of our 2015 survey
• agencies did not estimate a value for 599 of the 1,077 (56 per cent) reported frauds.

Commissioning and outsourcing of services to the private sector and the advancement of digital technology are changing the fraud and corruption risks agencies face. Fraud risk assessments should be updated regularly and in particular where there are changes in agency business models. NSW Treasury Circular TC18-02 NSW Fraud and Corruption Control Policy now requires agencies develop, implement and maintain a fraud and corruption control framework, effective from 1 July 2018. 

Our Fraud Control Improvement Kit provides guidance and practical advice to help organisations implement an effective fraud control framework. The kit is divided into ten attributes. Three key attributes have been assessed below; prevention, detection and notification systems.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency fraud and corruption controls for 2017–18.

Appendix one - List of 2018 recommendations

Appendix two - Status of 2017 recommendations

Appendix three - Cluster agencies

The primary goal of speed cameras is to reduce speeding and make the roads safer. Our 2011 performance audit on speed cameras found that, in general, speed cameras change driver behaviour and have a positive impact on road safety.

Transport for NSW published the NSW Speed Camera Strategy in June 2012 in response to our audit. According to the Strategy, the main purpose of mobile speed cameras is to reduce speeding across the road network by providing a general deterrence through anywhere, anytime enforcement and by creating a perceived risk of detection across the road network. Fixed and red-light speed cameras aim to reduce speeding at specific locations.

Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW deploy mobile speed cameras (MSCs) in consultation with NSW Police. The cameras are operated by contractors authorised by Roads and Maritime Services. MSC locations are stretches of road that can be more than 20 kilometres long. MSC sites are specific places within these locations that meet the requirements for a MSC vehicle to be able to operate there.

This audit assessed whether the mobile speed camera program is effectively managed to maximise road safety benefits across the NSW road network.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #308 - released 18 October 2018

NSW Government agencies engage consultants to provide professional advice to inform their decision‑making. The spend on consultants is measured and reported in different ways for different purposes and the absence of a consistently applied definition makes quantification difficult.

The NSW Government’s procurement principles aim to help agencies obtain value for money and be fair, ethical and transparent in their procurement activities. All NSW Government agencies, with the exception of State Owned Corporations, must comply with the NSW Procurement Board’s Direction when engaging suppliers of business advisory services. Business advisory services include consultancy services. NSW Government agencies must disclose certain information about their use of consultants in their annual reports. The table below illustrates the detailed procurement and reporting requirements.

We examined how 12 agencies complied with their procurement and reporting obligations for consultancy services between 1 July 2016 and 31 March 2018. Participating agencies are listed in Appendix two. We also examined how NSW Procurement supports the functions of the NSW Procurement Board within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation.

This audit assessed:

• agency compliance with relevant procurement requirements for their use of consultants
• agency compliance with disclosure requirements about consultancy expenditure in their annual reports 
• the effectiveness of the NSW Procurement Board (the Board) in fulfilling its functions to oversee and support agency procurement of consultancy services. 

Appendix one - Response from agencies

Appendix two - List of selected agencies

Appendix three - Performance auditing

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford released her report today on the results of financial audits of NSW universities for the year ended 31 December 2017. No qualified audit opinions were issued for any university and the quality and timeliness of financial reporting continues to improve.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the ten NSW universities and their controlled entities for the year ended 31 December 2017. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report focuses on our observations on the common issues identified in our audits of the financial statements of the ten NSW universities and their controlled entities in 2017. The universities and controlled entities are listed in Appendix three and four respectively.

The report provides our analysis of universities’ results and findings in the following areas:

• Financial reporting and performance
• Teaching and research
• Financial controls and governance.

Accurate and timely financial reporting is important for universities to make efficient and effective economic decisions. Sound financial performance provides the platform for universities to deliver high quality teaching and research outcomes. 

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial reporting and performance of NSW universities for 2017.

Teaching and research are key objectives of universities and they invest most of their resources in achieving high quality academic and research outcomes to maintain or advance their reputations and rankings in Australia and abroad. Universities have also committed to achieving certain government objectives.

This chapter outlines teaching and research outcomes for NSW universities for 2017.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure efficient and effective use of resources, and the implementation and monitoring of university policies. Governance consists of frameworks, processes and behaviours that enable the universities to operate effectively and comply with relevant laws and policies.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the financial control and governance of NSW universities for 2017.

Appendix one - 2017 recommendations

Appendix two - Status of 2016 recommendations

Appendix three - NSW universities

Appendix four - Controlled entities

Appendix five - Financial data

The HealthRoster system is delivering some business benefits but Local Health Districts are yet to use all of its features, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales,  Margaret Crawford. HealthRoster is an IT system designed to more effectively roster staff to meet the needs of Local Health Districts and other NSW health agencies.

The NSW public health system employs over 100,000 people in clinical and non-clinical roles across the state. With increasing demand for services, it is vital that NSW Health effectively rosters staff to ensure high quality and efficient patient care, while maintaining good workplace practices to support staff in demanding roles.

NSW Health is implementing HealthRoster as its single state-wide rostering system to more effectively roster staff according to the demands of each location. Between 2013–14 and 2016–17, our financial audits of individual LHDs had reported issues with rostering and payroll processes and systems.

NSW Health grouped all Local Health Districts (LHDs), and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters to manage the implementation of HealthRoster over four years. Refer to Exhibit 4 for a list of the NSW Health entities in each cluster.

• Cluster 1 implementation commenced in 2014–15 and was completed in 2015–16.
• Cluster 2 implementation commenced in 2015–16 and was completed in 2016–17.
• Cluster 3 began implementation in 2016–17 and was underway during the conduct of the audit.
• Cluster 4 began planning for implementation in 2017–18.

Full implementation, including capability for centralised data and reporting, is planned for completion in 2019.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the HealthRoster system in delivering business benefits. In making this assessment, we examined whether:

• expected business benefits of HealthRoster were well-defined
• HealthRoster is achieving business benefits where implemented.

The HealthRoster project has a timespan from 2009 to 2019. We examined the HealthRoster implementation in LHDs, and other NSW Health organisations, focusing on the period from 2014, when eHealth assumed responsibility for project implementation, to early 2018.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #301 - released 7 June 2018

This report includes comments on financial audits of government agencies in the Health sector. In 2010-11, Ambulance Officers spent an extra 77,200 hours waiting at emergency departments for patients to transfer to hospital care. In 2010-11, only 66 per cent of patients were moved from the emergency department to an inpatient bed within eight hours of their arrival. This is significantly down on last year’s 73 per cent and well below the 80 per cent target.