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Actions for Audit Insights 2018-2022

Audit Insights 2018-2022

Community Services
Education
Environment
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Cross-agency collaboration
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.

This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.

The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.

The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.

What we found

Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:

  • Integrity and transparency
  • Performance and monitoring
  • Governance and oversight
  • Cyber security and data
  • System planning for disruption
  • Resource management.

The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.

In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.

The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

Fast facts

  • 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
  • 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
  • 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.

picture of Margaret Crawford Auditor-General for New South Wales in black dress with city skyline as backgroundI am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.

The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.

While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales

Integrity and transparency Performance and monitoring Governance and oversight Cyber security and data System planning Resource management
Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest.
Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds.
Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office.
Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues.     Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need.
Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes.          
Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more

 

This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.

  • Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
  • Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
  • Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.

This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.

The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.

This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.

Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022

Appendix two – About this report

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

COVID-19: response, recovery and impact

Community Services
Education
Health
Justice
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Cross-agency collaboration
Financial reporting
Management and administration
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

This report draws together the financial impact of COVID-19 on the agencies integral to responses across the state government sector of New South Wales.

What we found

Since the COVID-19 pandemic hit NSW in January 2020, and until 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion was spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus. The response was largely funded by borrowings.

The key areas of spending since the start of COVID-19 in NSW to 30 June 2021 were:

  • direct health response measures – $2.2 billion
  • personal protective equipment – $1.4 billion
  • small business grants – $795 million
  • quarantine costs – $613 million
  • increases in employee expenses and cleaning costs across most agencies
  • vaccine distribution, including vaccination hubs – $71 million.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the financial performance and position of state government agencies.

Decreases in revenue from providing goods and services were offset by increases in appropriations, grants and contributions, for health and economic stimulus funding in response to the pandemic.

Most agencies had expense growth, due to additional operating requirements to manage and respond to the pandemic along with implementing new or expanded stimulus programs and initiatives.

Response measures for COVID-19 have meant the NSW Government is unlikely to meet targets in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 being:

  • annual expense growth kept below long-term average revenue growth
  • elimination of State’s unfunded superannuation liability by 2030.

 Fast facts

  • First COVID-19 case in NSW on 25 January 2020
  • COVID-19 vaccinations commenced on 21 February 2021
  • By 31 December 2021, 25.2 million PCR tests had been performed in NSW and 13.6 million vaccines administered, with 93.6% of the 16 and over population receiving two doses
  • During 2020–21, NSW Health employed an extra 4,893 full-time staff and incurred $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19
  • During 2020–21, $1.2 billion was spent on direct health COVID-19 response measures and $532 million was spent on quarantine for incoming international travellers

Section highlights

  • Up to 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion has been spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus.
  • Revenue increased for most agencies as falling revenue from providing goods and services was offset by additional funding from appropriations, grants and contributions.
  • Expenses increased as most agencies incurred additional costs to manage and respond to the pandemic along with delivering stimulus and support programs.
  • Borrowings of $7.5 billion over the last two years helped to fund the response to COVID-19.

Section highlights

  • NSW Government unlikely to meet targets in Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012.

Published

Actions for Transport 2021

Transport 2021

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance

What the report is about

The results of the Transport cluster agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified financial statement audit opinions were issued for all Transport cluster agencies. Resolution of issues delayed signing the Transport Asset Holding Entity of NSW (TAHE) until 24 December 2021. Matters relating to TAHE are also reported in the report on State Finances 2021.

Emphasis of Matter - TAHE

An Emphasis of Matter paragraph was included in TAHE's audit opinion to draw attention to uncertainty associated with:

  • future access and licence fees that are subject to re-signed agreements
  • an additional $4.1 billion of funding that is outside the forward estimates period
  • a significant portion of the fair value of TAHE’s non-financial assets is reflected in the terminal value, which is outside the ten-year contract period to 30 June 2031, and the risk that TAHE will not be able to negotiate contract terms to support current projections.

TAHE's transition from RailCorp also changed its valuation of assets to an income approach, resulting in a $20.3 billion decrease to the fair value. The fair value decrease was because the cash flows were not sufficient to support the previous recorded value.

TAHE corrected a misstatement of $1.2 billion relating to the valuation of its assets. This followed significant deliberation on key judgements and assumptions, with TAHE adopting risk assumptions in its valuation that were not in line with comparable benchmarks.

Emphasis of Matter - State Transit Authority of New South Wales

An Emphasis of Matter paragraph was included in the State Transit Authority of NSW's (the Authority) audit opinion to draw attention to the financial statements not prepared on a going concern basis. This was because the NSW Government put the Authority's bus contracts out to competitive tender and accordingly, management assessed the Authority's principal activities are not expected to operate for a full 12 months after 30 June 2021.

The implementation of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’ resulted in a net increase in assets of $23.5 billion across the Transport cluster.

The 2020–21 audits identified six high-risk and 45 moderate risk issues across the cluster. Fourteen of the moderate risk issues were repeat issues, including information technology controls around management of user access for key financial systems and payroll processes.

The high-risk issues, in addition to those related to TAHE and previously reported in the report on State Finances 2021, include:

  • absence of conflict of declarations related to land acquisition processes at Transport for NSW
  • no evidence of conflict of interest declarations obtained by TAHE from consultants and contractors regarding involvement in other engagements.

What we recommended

TAHE needs to:

  • finalise revised commercial agreements to reflect fees detailed in a Heads of Agreement signed on 18 December 2021
  • prepare robust projections and business plans to support the required rate of return.

NSW Treasury and TAHE should monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in the future.

Transport for NSW needs to significantly improve its processes to ensure all key information is identified and shared with the Audit Office.

Transport agencies should implement a process to ensure conflicts of interest declarations are completed for land acquisitions and applied consistently across the cluster.

Transport agencies should implement a process to capture all contracts and agreements entered to ensure:

  • agencies are aware of contractual obligations
  • financial reporting implications are assessed, particularly with respect to leases, revenue and service concession arrangements.

Fast facts

The Transport cluster plans and delivers infrastructure and integrated services across all modes of transport. This includes road, rail, bus, ferry, light rail, cycling and walking. There are 11 agencies in the cluster.

  • $128b road and maritime system infrastructure assets as at 30 June 2021
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 26 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • $24.9b rail systems infrastructure assets as at 30 June 2021
  • high-risk management letter findings were identified
  • 37% of reported issues were repeat issues

 

This report provides Parliament and other users of the transport cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the cluster for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Transport agencies' financial statements.
  • An 'Emphasis of Matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales' (TAHE) Independent Auditor's Report to draw attention to significant uncertainty associated with the judgements, estimates and assumptions supporting the valuation of TAHE’s property, plant and equipment (PPE) and intangible assets.
  • In 2020–21, the former RailCorp transitioned to TAHE, a for-profit state-owned corporation. When TAHE became a for-profit entity, it was required to change its valuation approach. The value of a for-profit entity's assets cannot exceed the cash flows they might realise either through their sale or continued use. This change in the basis of valuation resulted in a decrease of $20.3 billion in the fair value of the assets. The decrease in fair value was because the cash flows, which support measurement under the income approach, were insufficient to support the previous valuation based on the current replacement cost of those assets.
  • TAHE also corrected a misstatement of $1.2 billion relating to the valuation of its assets after significant deliberation on key judgements and assumptions, with TAHE adopting higher risk assumptions in its valuation when compared to the relevant market benchmarks.
  • On 18 December 2021, a Heads of Agreement (HoA) was signed between TAHE, Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. This HoA reflected TAHE's intention to negotiate higher access and licence fees in order to meet the shareholding ministers' revised expectation of a higher rate of return. This matter resolved the treatment of a significant accounting issue in the State’s consolidated (whole-of-government) financial statements. Refer to the Report on State Finances tabled on 9 February 2022. The expectation of an additional $5.2 billion in fees added to the valuation of TAHE's PPE and intangibles, with a final value of $17.15 billion.
  • The implementation of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’ resulted in a net increase in assets of $23.5 billion across the cluster. AASB 1059 had a significant impact on Transport for NSW, Sydney Metro, Sydney Ferries and TAHE's 2020–21 financial statements.
  • TAHE corrected a misstatement of $97.2 million relating to the application of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors' for the Airport Link Company Contract. 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management increased from 56 in 2019–20 to 73 in 2020–21.
  • Thirty-seven per cent were repeat findings. Many repeat issues related to information technology controls around user access management and payroll processes. These included deficiencies in the monitoring of privileged user access to key financial systems, review of user access to key financial systems and segregation of duties between preparer and reviewer for new employee hires.
  • Six new high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21, an increase of three compared to last year.
  • One high-risk issue related to conflicts of interests not being declared by all officers involved in the land acquisition process at Transport for NSW.
  • Five high-risk issues arose from the audit of TAHE, with respect to:
    • control over TAHE assets and operations
    • asset valuations
    • access price build up
    • detailed business modelling to support returns
    • conflict of interest management.
  • Based on the access and licence agreements signed at 30 June 2021 between TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, our review of the expected returns calculated by NSW Treasury did not support the assumption that there was a reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return could be achieved from the NSW Government's investment in TAHE.
  • On 14 December 2021 the shareholding ministers' increased their expectations as to TAHE's target average return from 1.5 per cent to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent.
  • On 18 December 2021 the revised shareholder expectations were confirmed in a signed Heads of Agreement. The Heads of Agreement will increase access fees paid by rail operators to TAHE by $5.2 billion.
  • TAHE's access and licence agreements specified fees that were well short of the IPART regulated maximum (ceiling price).
  • The finalisation of the access and licence agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains resulted in a significant write-down of TAHE's asset value by $20.3 billion. The revaluation loss will need to be recovered as part of the shareholders’ rate of return of 2.5 per cent in order to sustain the whole-of-government accounting treatment of cash contributions recorded as an equity contribution and not a grant expense.
  • There was a significant adjustment to TAHE’s valuation between the financial statements originally submitted for the audit and the final, signed financial statements due to differences in risk assumptions resulting in a correction of a $1.2 billion misstatement. 

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has increased, and 37 per cent of all issues were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 73 findings raised across the cluster (56 in 2019–20) and 37 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (43 per cent in 2019–20).

In view of the recent performance audit ‘Managing Cyber Risks’ and compliance audit ‘Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy’ involving the cluster, it is noted with concern that the most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration and password management. Moderate risk issues included completeness and accuracy of contract registers, accounting for assets and management of supplier and payroll masterfiles.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports, and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Control deficiencies may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation, and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating. 

Risk rating Issue
Information technology
Moderate: 7 new, 4 repeat**

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:

  • monitoring of privileged user access
  • user access management
  • password configuration management.
Low: 4 new, 1 repeat***
Internal control deficiencies or improvements
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified internal control deficiencies across key business processes, including:

  • declarations of conflicts of interest over land acquisitions (see further details below)
  • management of contracts and agreement register
  • accounting for assets
  • management of payroll and supplier masterfiles
  • payroll processes.
Moderate: 15 new, 8 repeat**
Low: 2 new, 5 repeat***
Financial reporting
High: 3 new*

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to strengthen financial reporting, including:

  • asset valuations (see further details below)
  • detailed business modelling to support returns (see further details below)
  • access price build-up (see further details below)
  • timely capitalisation of completed assets.
Moderate: 3 new, 1 repeat**
Low: 2 new***
Governance and oversight
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:

  • control over TAHE assets and operations
  • governance over Cyber Security.
Moderate: 2 new**
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
High: 1 new*

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve its compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, including:

  • conflict of interest (COI) management
  • outdated policies and procedures
  • incomplete probation procedures.
Moderate: 4 new, 1 repeat**
Low: 1 new, 7 repeat***

* High-risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
** Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
*** Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies.

2020–21 audits identified six high-risk findings

High-risk findings were reported at the following cluster agencies.

Agency Description
2020–21 findings
Transport for NSW (new finding)

Declaration of conflicts of interest in the land acquisition process

In 2021, we conducted a performance audit over the Acquisition of 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia which examined:

  • whether Transport for NSW conducted an effective process to purchase 4–6 Grand Avenue, Camellia
  • whether Transport for NSW has effective processes and procedures to identify and acquire property required to deliver the NSW Government’s major infrastructure projects.

The report made several recommendations over Transport for NSW’s internal policies and procedures to guide the land acquisition process. As part of the financial audit, we obtained an understanding of key controls and processes relating to the acquisition of land, relevant to the audit of the financial statements. We found that conflicts of interests were not always declared by all officers involved in the land acquisition process. Furthermore, processes for declaring conflicts of interests are not consistently applied across cluster agencies.

Out of a sample of 19 land acquisitions tested, we identified:

  • 14 instances where there was no evidence of declarations of conflicts of interests made by the team members involved in the acquisition process
  • 2 instances where conflicts of interest declarations were completed by key members of the acquisition team only at a project level
  • 1 instance where conflicts of interest declarations were only completed by the property negotiator and the valuer, but not the other members of the acquisition team.

Management advised that the land acquisition processes, at the time of the land acquisitions, did not require formal conflicts of interests to be declared as they believe that as per Transport for NSW code of conduct, declaration is only required where the staff member considers that a potential or perceived Conflict of Interest exists. However, Transport for NSW's Procurement Policy requires the documentation of formal declarations from all staff involved in procurement activities to formally disclose any conflicts of interest or state that they do not have a conflict of interest.

This matter has been included as a high-risk finding in the management letter as absence of rigorous and consistent management of conflicts of interests, and non-compliance with established policies increases the risk that Transport for NSW may be exposed to reputational damage or financial losses in relation to land acquisitions. Furthermore, this may result in lack of probity or value-for money considerations during the land acquisition process.

Further details are elaborated below under 'Land acquisitions'.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Control over TAHE assets and operations

The State-Owned Corporations Act 1989 maintains that all decisions relating to the operation of a statutory state-owned corporation (SOC) are to be made by or under the authority of the board. However, under the Transport Administration Act 1988 (TAA), the functions of TAHE may only be exercised under one or more operating licences issued by the portfolio minister. The current Operating Licence confers terms and conditions for TAHE to carry out its functions, and imposes constraints on TAHE, including (but not limited to):

  • railway operations not permitted
  • transport services not permitted
  • TAHE must not carry out maintenance of its assets.

Such operating licences are short term in nature, and the TAA allows the transport minister (portfolio minister) to grant one or more operating licences to TAHE and may amend, substitute, or impose, amend or revoke conditions of the operating licence.

For the current year, the legal form of the arrangements established in its first year of operation imply TAHE has control over the assets based on the Implementation Deed and the agreements signed with the public operators.

However, risks remain as TAHE is in its early stages, and the actual substance of operations will need to be observed and considered.

Given the restrictions that can be placed on the entity through the Operating Licence, and the ability to make further changes to the Operating Licence and Statement of Expectations set by the portfolio minister, there is a risk there could be limitations placed on the Board of Directors to operate with sufficient independence in its decision-making with respect to the operations of TAHE. Over time, this may further impact the degree of control required by TAHE to satisfy the recognition criteria over its assets. It may also fundamentally change the presentation of TAHE’s financial statements.

Future limitations to the degree of control TAHE, and its Board, can exercise over its functions may impact the degree of control TAHE has over its assets going forward. As part of the 2021–22 audit, we will monitor and assess whether, in substance, these assets continue to be controlled by TAHE and whether, in substance, TAHE can operate as an independent SOC. We require management continue to demonstrate that TAHE continues to maintain control over its assets and has the ability to operate as an independent SOC. Further details are described below under 'Transport Asset Holding Entity'.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Asset valuation

The final updated valuation was based on cash flows that were in a signed Heads of Agreement, which stated that it set out the proposed indicative future access and licence fees which will form the basis of the negotiations between TAHE, Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, who will work together to review access fees and licence fees payable under the agreements and to make all necessary changes to the Operating Agreements by 1 July 2022.

This adds uncertainty in the cash flows. It is crucial that TAHE formalises these updated fees in legally binding signed access and licence agreements with the relevant parties as soon as possible.

Refer below for further details on the Heads of Agreement.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Conflict of interest (COI) management

For procurement transactions through direct negotiation with single quotes, there was no evidence of COI declarations obtained from the consultants and contractors regarding involvement in other engagements. Contractors and consultants are required to declare actual COI. However, there was no requirement to confirm nil conflict of interest. In addition, there is a risk that perceived COI may not be adequately assessed or managed. TAHE is expected to operate as an independent SOC and would need to ensure any perceived or actual conflict of interest is adequately addressed.

Management should implement a process to:

  • ensure conflicts of interest declarations are completed when engaging all consultants and contractors (including involvement with other engagements and confirmation of nil conflicts of interests)
  • ensure probity is undertaken to identify any actual or perceived conflicts of interest.

The declarations should consider individuals and relationships that may create, or may be perceived to create, conflicts of interest.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Detailed business modelling to support returns

On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW, TAHE and the operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This HoA forms the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing 10-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders' expectation of a return of 2.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity, including recovering the revaluation loss incurred in 2020–21.

TAHE needs to revise its business plan and include detailed business modelling that supports the shareholding ministers' revised expectations of return (2.5 per cent return on the State’s equity injections and recovery of the write-down of assets over the average useful life of those assets) and align the business plan and Statement of Corporate Intent. This requires more detailed projections, estimates and plans that support how TAHE expects to recover the asset write-down and expected returns to government. The current modelling for ten years needs to be enhanced with modelling over the expected recovery period of approximately 33 years.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (new finding)

Access price build-up

Management explained that in determining access and licence fees for the agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, assets prior to the commencement of equity injections in 2015–16 were excluded from the calculations. Management explained the premise being that these assets were previously funded by government through capital grants. The replacement and refurbishment of these assets is expected to be through government funded maintenance performed through the public rail operators and/or the equity injections from NSW Treasury rather than through access and licence fees.


The number of moderate risk findings increased from prior year

Forty-five moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, representing a 73.1 per cent increase from 2019–20. Of these, 14 were repeat findings, and 31 were new issues. 

Key moderate risk findings related to:

  • weaknesses in user access management to key financial systems
  • management of contracts and agreements register
  • management of supplier and payroll masterfiles
  • accounting for assets
  • control deficiencies at service organisations
  • segregation of duties relating to the hiring of employees
  • conflict of interest management
  • annual leave management
  • review of internal audit charter
  • disaster recovery planning.

Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales

Background

The establishment of TAHE was originally announced by the NSW Government in the 2015–16 State Budget. On 1 July 2020, the former Rail Corporation New South Wales (RailCorp), a not-for-profit entity, transitioned to the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE), a for-profit statutory state-owned corporation under the Transport Administration Act 1988. There was no change in the structure of TAHE as a new entity was not created. Ownership remains fully with the government. TAHE, and the former RailCorp, were both classified as Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entities within the Total State Sector Accounts.

Prior to 1 July 2015, the government paid appropriations to Transport for NSW, a General Government Sector (GGS) agency, to construct transport assets. When completed, these assets were granted to the former RailCorp, a not for-profit entity within the PNFC sector. The grants to the former RailCorp were recorded as an expense in the State’s GGS budget result.

From 1 July 2015, the government announced the creation of TAHE (a dedicated asset manager). Funding for new capital projects was to be provided through equity injections and was no longer recorded as an expense to the GGS budget, even though the business model was yet to be determined. The change, as explained in the 2015–16 State Budget, was due to the expectation that the former RailCorp will transition to TAHE, which was intended, over time to provide a commercial return. That Budget also highlighted how the change, which was largely a change in the basis of accounting, was intended to improve the GGS budget result each year. In total, the GGS has contributed approximately $11.1 billion to TAHE since 2015–16. This includes the equity injections from the GGS to TAHE made in the current year of $2.4 billion.

NSW Treasury initially set a timetable for the stand-up of TAHE of 1 July 2019, which included finalising the business model, operating model and contracts for the use of TAHE's assets. The enactment of the Transport Administration Act 1988 resulted in RailCorp transitioning to TAHE on 1 July 2020, 12 months after its originally planned operational date. Contributions paid to the former RailCorp and subsequently to TAHE by the GGS were treated as equity investments from July 2015 forward. This treatment continued, despite delays in settling the business model. In 2020, the Audit Office raised a high-risk finding due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for NSW Treasury and TAHE.

The business model adopted and the flow of funds between transport agencies in the GGS and PNFC sectors is shown in the diagram below. For further details refer to the Report on State Finances 2021.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Financial data

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Treasury 2021

Treasury 2021

Treasury
Finance
Compliance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

What the report is about

The results of Treasury cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021. The results of the audit of the NSW Government's consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which are prepared by NSW Treasury, are reported separately in our report on State Finances 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Treasury cluster agencies.

The number of identified monetary misstatements increased from 16 in 2019–20 to 24 in 2020–21.

Reported corrected monetary misstatements decreased from 15 in 2019–20 to seven with a gross value of $1.1 billion in 2020–21.

The largest corrected misstatement was in NSW Treasury's financial statements and was a $1 billion correction to administered borrowings.

Reported uncorrected monetary misstatements increased from one in 2019–20 to 17 with a gross value of $168 million in 2020–21.

Seven of the 2020–21 uncorrected misstatements related to one common decision relating to investment management funds terminated during the year by the NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp).

All agencies submitted their 2020–21 financial statements within NSW Treasury's reporting deadlines.

What the key issues were

Significant audit findings were identified with respect to NSW Treasury's processes to prepare the NSW Government's consolidated TSSA (whole of government accounts). This included one extreme finding and several high-risk findings related to NSW Treasury processes. These are reported in our report on State Finances 2021.

Two high-risk issues raised in 2019–20 were also not addressed by NSW Treasury during the year and were repeat issues reported to management. These related to the appropriations framework and resolution of cross cluster payments, and instances where some agencies spent deemed appropriations money without an authorised delegation.

A number of previously reported audit findings and recommendations with respect to icare continue to be ongoing issues, namely:

  • The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer continues to hold less assets than the estimated present value of its future payment obligations.
  • The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer's four week return-to-work rate fell from 68% to 64%. This is below icare's 70% target. Contributing factors include COVID-19 lockdowns which have impacted claims handling processes, and increased barriers to claimants returning to work.
  • Instances were noted where inadequate documentation was kept on file to support claims, including pre-injury average weekly earnings (PIAWE) calculations.

The Workers Compensation (Dust Diseases) Authority increased its outstanding claims liability by $93.9 million, which included $39.3 million to remediate historical underpayments, resulting from workers not being paid the rate required by existing legislation.

The icare Board approved a new approach for remediating PIAWE underpayments on 24 September 2021, the date the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer’s financial statements were approved for issue. The impact of the decision on the financial statements was not discussed with the Audit Office and assessed as an ‘after balance date event’.

What we recommended

Our report on State Finances 2021 made several recommendations to improve NSW Treasury processes. These included:

  • improve processes to ensure information is shared with audit on a timely basis
  • seek legislative amendments to resolve statutory inconsistencies relating to statutory reporting time frames
  • implement effective quality review processes over key accounting information
  • establish a policy to determine the minimum expected rate of return on equity injections in other public sector entities
  • prepare robust financial projections to support accounting decisions
  • re-confirm sector classifications of TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains
  • ensure sufficient oversight of its use of consultants and assess the risk of an overdependence on consultants at the cost of internal capability
  • improve disclosures of equity injections invested in other public sector entities
  • determine a state-wide policy on when borrowings are recognised in agency financial statements
  • make legislative amendments to ensure expenditure incurred across financial years does not exceed the appropriation authority and assess the financial reporting impact
  • improve the guidance provided to agencies to ensure expenditure of public money is properly supported by authorised delegations.

We also recommended icare should ensure:

  • it has sufficient controls over claim payments including an effective quality assurance program, to minimise claim payment errors
  • that documentation to support injured worker benefit calculations is appropriately maintained, and the documentation requirements are set out in a policy
  • the impact of ‘after balance date events’ on financial statements is appropriately assessed
  • its operational practices are improved to ensure the correct payment of claims in compliance with legislative requirements. icare also needs to act on a timely basis on received legal advice and amend operational practices to ensure correct payments are made.

Fast facts 

NSW Treasury notes that it is the Government's principal financial and economic adviser to guide the State’s growth for the benefit of the people who live, work and study in NSW.

  • $111b funds under management as at 30 June 2021
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies’ 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 24 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • $17b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21
  • 12 extreme and high-risk findings were identified
  • 30% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report focuses on agencies within the Treasury cluster and provides parliament and other users of the Treasury cluster's financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

NSW Treasury also prepares the consolidated NSW whole of government financial statements (the Total State Sector Accounts), which is reported in the report on State Finances 2021.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unmodified audit opinions were issued on all the cluster agencies 2020–21 financial statements.
  • The number of identified monetary misstatements increased from 16 in 2019–20 to 24 in 2020–21.
  • Reported corrected monetary misstatements decreased from 15 in 2019–20 to seven with a gross value of $1.1 billion in 2020–21. The largest corrected misstatement was in NSW Treasury's financial statements resulting in a $1 billion correction to its administered borrowings. The correction was to address an understatement by NSW Treasury which did not recognise a liability for funds raised by NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp) on its behalf as it applied settlement date accounting rather than trade date when recognising these borrowings. A corresponding receivable from TCorp was also recognised to reflect that funds were to be received on 1 July 2021.
  • The number of uncorrected misstatements increased from one in 2019–20 to 17 in 2020–21. Two of the misstatements above $5 million related to investment valuations within the SAS Trustee Corporation Pooled Fund, two related to premium income overstatements within the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer, and one related to NSW Treasury administered liabilities and expenses where it recognised a provision for remediation costs when it had no present obligation. A further seven related to investment management funds that were terminated during the year by TCorp.
  • Nine agencies that were required to perform early close procedures did not complete a total of 25 mandatory procedures. The most common incomplete early close procedures include inter and intra (cluster) agency balances and transactions not confirmed with the counterparty agency and significant management judgements and assumptions made when estimating transactions and balances not documented.
  • To ensure compliance with Australian Accounting Standards, transactions and balances that were formerly reported in the Crown Entity’s financial statements are now reported by NSW Treasury as it primarily controls or administers the transactions and balances on behalf of the State.
  • icare changed the risk margin applied to measure the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer's outstanding claims liability. If the risk margin used when valuing its 2019–20 outstanding claims liability had been retained, its net asset deficiency would have worsened compared to the prior year. The change in risk margin aligns the Nominal Insurer’s ‘probability of adequacy’ with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s minimum reporting requirements for general insurers.
  • The icare Board approved a new approach for remediating pre-injury average weekly earnings underpayments (subject to legal advice, and assessment by a wage remediation expert), on 24 September 2021 and announced on 11 November 2021. The impact of the decision on the Nominal Insurer's financial statements was not assessed by icare as an ‘after balance date event’ and was not raised with the Audit Office prior to icare finalising its 2021 financial statements on 24 September 2021.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2020–21 audits identified one new Extreme Risk and 11 High Risk findings. The extreme risk finding related to the incomplete provision and timely access to information to the Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) audit and the accounting for the General Government Sector's investment in TAHE. Findings related to the TSSA audit are reported in the report on State Finances 2021. Of the 11 high risk findings, two were repeat findings relating to cross cluster payments and authorisation to spend deemed funds. High risk repeat findings need to be addressed with greater priority.
  • There were 21 moderate risk findings reported to management in 2020–21, ten of which were repeat findings. The most common repeat finding related to claims processing, information technology user access administration. Repeat findings, particularly those that relate to data protection, need greater prioritisation and should be implemented on a timely basis.
  • icare is in the process of implementing organisational reform in response to findings in recent external reviews. These reviews identified 151 recommendations for icare to improve in the areas of risk and governance, performance, and culture and accountability. All of the recommendations were accepted by icare and are expected to be addressed through their ‘Improvement Program’. A number of the observations referred to in this report were also identified in the external reviews.
  • The Nominal Insurer's four week return-to-work rate fell from 68% at 30 June 2020 to 64% at 30 June 2021 and was at 63% at 30 September 2021. This is below icare's target of 70%.
  • The Nominal Insurer overpaid, and underpaid claims to policyholders due to claims processing weaknesses. There was also insufficient documentation to support key inputs to weekly benefit payments, thereby further increasing the risk of claims being overpaid, and underpaid.
  • The Home Building Compensation Fund's net liability position reduced from $746 million at 30 June 2020 to $534 million at 30 June 2021 due to increases in premium rates and increased building activity from stimulus measures.
  • The Nominal Insurer's provision for errors in pre-injury average weekly earnings decreased from $21 million to 30 June 2020, to $11.6 million at 30 June 2021. The provision was not reassessed for icare’s decision to proactively remediate PIAWE underpayments.
  • The NSW Self Insurance Corporation also recognised a $12.8 million provision at 30 June 2021 to remediate past underpayments.

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has decreased, but 30% of all issues were repeat issues and these need greater focus and prioritisation

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 57 findings raised across the cluster (71 in 2019–20), 30% of which were repeat issues (32% in 2019–20).

The most common repeat issues related to claims processing and information technology user access administration.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

Moderate2
4 new
2 repeat

Low1
6 new
4 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:
  • poor user access administration and monitoring of privileged user activities
  • lack of disaster recovery planning.
Internal control deficiencies or improvements

High3
1 repeat

Moderate2
5 new
7 repeat

Low1
9 new
 

 

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes, including:
  • lack of controls to ensure cluster expenditure does not exceed a minister's appropriation authority received under the annual Appropriations Act and the GSF Act
  • inadequate procurement controls including purchase orders not being used and policy documents not stipulating thresholds which require minimum quotations or tenders
  • inadequate claim processing controls leading to documentation not kept to support claims, and errors in payments.
High risk issues are discussed later in this chapter.
Financial reporting

High3
2 new

Moderate2
2 new
1 repeat

Low1
2 new 

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to strengthen financial reporting, including:
  • need to review significant judgements, and continue to assess whether assets are controlled
  • grants being incorrectly accounted for leading to errors
  • provisions not including costs to settle the obligation and errors in the accuracy and completeness of underlying data used in valuations.
High risk issues are discussed later in this chapter.
Governance and oversight

Extreme4
1 new

High3
7 new

Low1
1 new
 

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:
  • documentation was inadequate and key documents were either not provided to the Audit Office, or were not provided on a timely basis, or their existence was not made known to the Audit Office
  • inconsistencies in the GSF Act and GSA Act relating to statutory timeframes
  • numerous versions of working papers were submitted all of which contained errors, omissions and/or poor logic
  • no formal policy or benchmark on expected investment returns from other government sectors
  • addressing significant uncertainty relating to access fees to be paid by rail operators raised in the Total State Sector Accounts audit opinion
  • the sector classification of certain Public Non-Financial Corporations needs to be confirmed with the Australian Bureau of Statistics
  • external consultants were used extensively to advise government agencies on matters related to TAHE
  • there is no state-wide policy about borrowings which provides guidance around performance obligations arising under trades between government agencies.
Extreme and high risk issues are discussed later in this chapter and in the report on State Finances 2021.
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies

High3
1 repeat

Low1
1 new
1 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve its compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, including:
  • non-compliance with the GSA Act and expenditure of public monies not supported by authorised delegations or spent for an authorised and valid purpose
  • input tax credits were not always claimed correctly.
High risk issues are discussed later in this chapter.

 Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.

 Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.

The number of moderate risk findings decreased from prior year

There were 21 moderate risk findings reported in 2020–21, representing a 30% decrease from 2019–20. Of these, ten were repeat findings, and 11 were new issues.

Moderate risk repeat findings include:

  • claims processing weaknesses including claim payment errors, and inadequate documentation to support calculations and evidence claims were reviewed by someone with appropriate delegation
  • inadequate review of user access and higher risks of unintended or unauthorised system access
  • controls assurance reports from an outsourced service provider did not cover the services it provided to the government agency
  • failure to review procurement contracts register to ensure it is accurate and complete
  • ongoing control deficiencies with grant application and approval processes
  • key policies including delegations not being reviewed in a number of years and do not incorporate new requirements from more recent legislation
  • quality review processes failing to identify material classification errors associated with grant funding.

NSW Treasury related matters

Accounting for the Government's investment in Transport Asset Holding Entity

A total of seven recommendations were made with respect to NSW Treasury's processes to prepare the NSW Government's consolidated whole of government accounts (the TSSA). This included one extreme risk finding and six high risk findings. The extreme finding related to NSW Treasury needing to significantly improve its processes to ensure all key information is identified and shared with the Audit Office on a timely basis. Other high-risk findings were identified which resulted in the following recommendations for NSW Treasury:

  • establishing a policy to determine the minimum expected rate of return on the GGS equity injections in other public sectors entities and report on the performance of these GGS investments in the TSSA, including how much and what type of returns the government is obtaining from its investments compared to its targeted return
  • facilitate revised commercial agreements to reflect access and license fees that were agreed in the 18 December 2021 Heads of Agreement between Transport for NSW, TAHE and the operators Sydney Trains and NSW Trains
  • with TAHE, prepare robust projections and business plans to support GGS investment returns beyond FY2031.
  • liaising with the ABS to re-confirm the classification of TAHE, NSW Trains and Sydney Trains as entities within the PNFC sector
  • monitoring the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in future reporting periods and the implications on the TSSA
  • consider whether there is sufficient competent oversight of its use of consultants and assess the risk of an over dependence on consultants at the cost of internal capability.

More details on the recommendations to NSW Treasury relating to its accounting for the GGS investment in TAHE are included on pages 7 to 24 of the State Finances 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament. 

Borrowings of $1 billion were understated by NSW Treasury

NSW Treasury, a GGS agency, made agreements to borrow $1 billion from New South Wales Treasury Corporation (TCorp), a PFC sector agency. Some of these agreements were entered as early as 17 May 2021 and all agreements for borrowings were entered into before 30 June 2021. However, NSW Treasury requested that settlement of those additional borrowings be deferred until 1 July 2021.

As TCorp raised the funds before 30 June 2021, it recognised a financial asset and liability to NSW Treasury on 30 June 2021. Despite TCorp having raised the funds by 30 June 2021 under the mutually agreed trade deal, NSW Treasury did not recognise any borrowings at year end on the basis that it requested the settlement date and receipt of cash to be deferred to past the balance sheet date. This led to an understatement of debt liabilities of $1 billion by NSW Treasury, and an inconsistent accounting treatment between the two agencies. NSW Treasury subsequently corrected the misstatement after the matter was raised by the audit, resulting in the GGS recognising $1 billion in financial assets and borrowings at 30 June 2021.

More detail on these inconsistencies is on page 37 of the State Finances 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament. We recommended NSW Treasury seek develop a state-wide accounting policy for borrowings which ensure correct and consistent accounting treatment between agencies and sectors.

Inconsistencies exist in the GSF Act and GSA Act related to key statutory timeframes

There are inconsistencies between key statutory reporting timeframes imposed on the Treasurer and Auditor-General for the Consolidated State Financial Statements (the Statements) in the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) and Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (GSA Act). Ambiguity in the statutory reporting timeframes could impact on the future timely provision of this information to Parliament. More detail on these inconsistencies is on page 54 of the State Finances 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament. We recommended NSW Treasury seek legislative amendments in Parliament to resolve these inconsistencies.

NSW Treasury lacks a framework to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that they are in compliance with their appropriation authority

In July 2021, NSW Treasury highlighted a potential issue associated with certain cross-cluster payments which was based on advice received from the Crown Solicitor in January 2021. After being made aware of the issue, the Audit Office obtained its own advice on matters related to the appropriations framework under relevant state legislation. In the advice to the Audit Office, the Crown Solicitor advised that an agency is not subject to its own legally appropriated expenditure limit (assuming it is not subject to any annual spending limit imposed through an instrument of delegation or a budget control authority issued by the Treasurer under section 5.1 of the GSF Act). In effect, because responsible ministers are given appropriations, these legal expenditure limits, rest in aggregate, with the principal department and agencies the minister is responsible for. It is not possible for an individual agency to monitor or determine at what ‘point in time’ expenditure has been incurred in excess of the minister’s appropriation authority and there is currently no framework to monitor this.

Further detail on this matter is on pages 54 to 56 of the State Finances 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament. In this report, we recommended that NSW Treasury:

  • ensure a framework exists to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that expenditure incurred across a financial year by agencies under the relevant minister's coordination does not exceed the appropriation authority conferred by the annual Appropriations Act and the GSF Act
  • assess how the requirement to prepare a Summary of Compliance under Australian Accounting Standards impacts relevant principal departments and cluster agencies financial statement disclosures.

Agencies have again spent monies without an authorised delegation

In the State Finances NSW Auditor-General's Report to Parliament for 2020 and 2021 we reported instances where agencies spent money received from an annual appropriation and/or deemed appropriation money without an authorised delegation from the relevant minister(s) as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act. Further detail on this matter is on pages 56 to 57 of the State Finances 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament. In this report, we recommended NSW Treasury promptly improve the guidance it provides agencies to ensure that expenditure of public monies is properly supported by authorised delegations.

Control deficiencies at NSW Treasury's service providers

NSW Treasury's business processes and information technology services were provided by Infosys, Unisys and the Department of Customer Service during 2020–21. Together this constitutes the GovConnect environment.

The GovConnect information technology general controls (ITGC) were qualified in 2020–21. The key controls over user access, system changes and batch process failed in all ITGC reports. Most of these deviations were not mitigated or sufficiently mitigated to address the risk of unauthorised user access.

In response to the internal control qualifications, the audit teams performed data analytics over payroll and accounts payable to obtain reasonable assurance that these control deficiencies did not materially impact on relevant agencies' financial statements.

Refer to the Customer Service 2021 NSW Auditor-General’s Report to Parliament for further details.

Insurance related matters

icare is in the process of implementing organisational reform in response to findings in recent external reviews. These reviews have identified 151 recommendations for icare to improve in the areas of risk and governance, performance, and culture and accountability. The reviews include the April 2021 McDougall Review, and the February 2021 ‘Independent Review of icare governance, accountability and culture’ which was recommended by SIRA in the Dore Report.

All of these recommendations were accepted by icare and are expected to be addressed through their ‘Improvement Program’. As at February 2022, icare report that 21 have been addressed, 139 are in progress, and 15 still to commence.

A number of the observations referred to in this report were also identified in the above reviews and are expected to be actioned as part of the improvement program.

Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (the Nominal Insurer)

The Nominal Insurer’s net asset deficiency at 30 June 2021

Last year's Central Agencies Report to Parliament reported that the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (the Nominal Insurer), the NSW Self Insurance Corporation and the Lifetime Care and Support Authority of New South Wales all had negative net assets at 30 June 2020. After strong investment returns in 2020–21, only the Nominal Insurer continued to have negative net assets at 30 June 2021.

The Nominal Insurer's negative net assets of $252.9 million at 30 June 2021 ($316.2 million at 30 June 2020) means that it still does not hold sufficient capital to meet the estimated present value of its future payment obligations, when measured in accordance with the accounting framework. The financial statements continued to be prepared on a going concern basis because the future payment obligations are not all due for settlement within the next 12 months.

As noted in section 2.4 ‘Key accounting issues’, icare changed from an 'Accounting Ratio', to an 'Insurance Ratio', to assess the Nominal Insurer’s capital position from 2020–21. The insurance ratio uses a (higher) discount rate based on the expected earnings rate on the Nominal Insurer’s assets, rather the ‘risk free’ rate which is used for financial reporting.

Last year's Report to Parliament also noted that the deterioration in the value of the Nominal Insurer’s net assets has resulted in its funding ratio at 30 June 2020 being outside of the ‘target operating zone’ set by the Board of icare. The Insurance Ratio at 30 June 2021 is 122%, which is less than icare's target operating zone of over 130%.

icare is assessing how it can increase the Nominal Insurer’s funding ratio, and advises that actions taken to date include the execution of the Nominal Insurer Improvement Program (the Improvement Program) and an increase in premium rates.

icare were given approval by the State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) to increase workers compensation premium rates from 1.4% to 1.44%  of wages (2.9%) for the 2021–22 policy year. icare advises that their pricing strategy for workers compensation premiums is for ‘modest increases over the medium term’.

Return-to-work rates have worsened

Last year's Central Agencies Report to Parliament noted that the Nominal Insurer has experienced deteriorating return-to-work rates since late 2017. According to data published by SIRA, the Nominal Insurer’s monthly four week return-to-work rate has continued to decline, falling from 68% at 30 June 2020 to 64% at 30 June 2021, and down to 63% at 30 September 2021.

A key assumption when measuring the Nominal Insurer’s outstanding claims liability, is the amount of time that injured workers will remain on benefits (i.e. continuance rates). This assumption is significantly aligned with return-to-work rate measures. At 30 June 2021, the liability was increased by $296 million due to changes in continuance rate assumptions, with workers expected to remain on benefits longer. This change is consistent with the fall in four week return-to-work rates.

The four week return-to-work rate trend since August 2017 is shown in the graph below.

Appendix one - Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Acquittals and other opinions

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Published

Actions for State Finances 2021

State Finances 2021

Whole of Government
Finance
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

What the report is about

The results of the consolidated General Government Sector (GGS) and Total State Sector (TSS) financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

The Independent Auditor’s Report on the 2020–21 GGS and TSS financial statements was unqualified but contained an emphasis of matter. The resolution of significant issues delayed signing until 24 December 2021.

The emphasis of matter draws attention to significant uncertainties associated with key assumptions related to the recognition by the GGS of a $2.4 billion investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).

The Audit Office advised NSW Treasury that it intended to issue a qualified audit opinion, but actions by the NSW Government avoided this outcome. All evidence provided prior to 14 December indicated that the GGS’s return on the $2.4 billion cash contributed to TAHE was insufficient to support accounting for it as an investment. Projected returns were below the long term inflation rate and were insufficient to recover:

  • TAHE's revaluation loss of $20.3 billion in 2020–21
  • an average rate of return of at least 2.5 per cent of equity invested in TAHE.

In these circumstances, the $2.4 billion contributed to TAHE should have been expensed. This could have impacted the GGS’s budget result.

The NSW Government’s actions to avoid a qualified audit opinion included:

  • a government decision made on 14 December approving TAHE’s shareholding ministers communicating that their expectation of a return had increased to 2.5 per cent
  • reflecting the revised shareholding ministers’ expectations in the 2021–22 ‘NSW Half-Yearly Review’ on 16 December. The NSW Government provided an additional $1.1 billion to fund increased access and license fees to TAHE from the public sector operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains)
  • signing a Heads of Agreement (HoA) on 18 December between Transport for NSW (TfNSW),TAHE and the public sector operators. The HoA reflected the parties’ intent to renegotiate contracts to increase TAHE’s licence and access fees by $5.2 billion.

The uncertainty raised in our emphasis of matter relates to:

  • TAHE’s future estimated access and licence fees, which remain subject to re-negotiation and must meet or exceed the indicative future access and licence fees set out in the HoA
  • continued funding for TAHE's key customers (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to meet the price increases outlined in the HoA
  • the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review', which provides for $1.1 billion of the additional funding over the forward estimates period to 2024–25. A further $4.1 billion is required over the following six years (2026–31), which are outside the forward estimates period
  • further significant cash flows required to support the funding model are outside the 10-year contract period. That is, beyond 30 June 2031.

There remains a risk that:

  • TAHE will not be able to re-contract with the rail operators for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • future government's funding to TAHE’s key customers, the rail operators, may not be consistent with the current shareholding ministers’ expectations
  • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

The audit found a risk of undue reliance on consultants, a need to improve quality controls on materials submitted to audit and an extreme risk finding raised with respect to providing key information on a timely basis.

The GGS Budget Result for the 2020–21 financial year was a deficit of $7.1 billion compared to an original forecast budget deficit of $16 billion.

The State did not achieve its fiscal target of maintaining annual expenditure growth below the long-term revenue growth target of 5.6 per cent. In 2020–21, the GGS expenditure grew by 6.9 per cent mainly due to grants and subsidies paid from the COVID-19 stimulus packages received from the Commonwealth.

What we recommended

Significant matters concerning TAHE

We recommend NSW Treasury:

  • implement effective quality review processes over key accounting information
  • establish a policy to determine the minimum expected rate of return on its equity injections into public sector entities
  • report on the performance of investments in TAHE and all other public sector entities
  • ensure the revised commercial agreements between TAHE and NSW rail operators reflect access and licence fees set out in the Heads of Agreement
  • with TAHE, prepare robust projections and business plans to support returns beyond FY2031
  • liaise with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and reconfirm the sector classifications of TAHE, NSW Trains and Sydney Trains
  • with TAHE, monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in future reporting periods
  • significantly improve its processes to ensure all key information is identified and shared on a timely basis
  • consider whether there is sufficient competent oversight of its use of consultants and assess the risk of an overdependence on consultants at the cost of internal capability.

A number of other non-TAHE related recommendations have been raised in Section 6 ‘Key Audit Findings’.

Fast facts 

The Total State Sector comprises the General Government Sector, the Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) Sector and the Public Financial Corporation (PFC) Sector.

The 2020–21 consolidated financial statements of the General Government and Total State Sectors provide the financial performance and position of the NSW Government.

  • $391b government property, plant and equipment in the Total State Sector as at 30 June 2021
  • $3.3b government net contributions to other public sectors in 2020–21. $2.4 billion was contributed to TAHE
  • $19.3b net holding losses from the GGS's investment in other public sector entities recognised outside of the 2020–21 budget result
  • $7.1b budget deficit of the General Government Sector in 2021
  • 7 - six high risk and one extreme risk management letter findings related to the General Government Sector's investment into TAHE
  • 24 monetary misstatements exceeding $20 million were identified in agencies financial statements in 2020–21
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Margaret Crawford, Auditor-General for New South Wales

Pursuant to the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 I present my report on State Finances 2021. My independent auditor’s opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements, albeit delayed, is unqualified. My independent auditor’s report however, does include an emphasis of matter drawing attention to significant uncertainties remaining in relation to the State’s equity investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).

The 2020–21 year was challenging from many perspectives, not least being the continuing impact of and response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Once again, NSW Treasury provided government agencies extensions of time to submit financial statements for audit. Finance staff and management right across government must be congratulated for their responsiveness in meeting their financial reporting obligations in such challenging circumstances.

The General Government’s 2020–21 budget result, reflected within the Total State Sector Accounts, was a deficit of $7.1 billion. This compares with the original budgeted deficit of $16 billion. The factors that contributed to this outcome are presented in this Report to Parliament along with other significant matters related to the audit of the Total State Sector Accounts.

One section of my report is dedicated to issues related to the accounting for TAHE. This year’s audit was significantly delayed by protracted disagreement over the treatment of the government’s cash contribution to TAHE. This matter was further frustrated by the fact that information was withheld and not shared with my Office on a timely basis. This has warranted an extreme risk finding for NSW Treasury to significantly improve governance processes to ensure complete and timely sharing of information. This is key to preserving trust, which is one of the foundations that underpins my Office’s engagement with agencies in the conduct of their audits.

The challenges encountered in completing this year’s audit were extraordinary and tested the constructive partnership between the Audit Office and NSW Treasury. I want to acknowledge the enormous efforts of staff of both agencies to correct material errors and ultimately achieve my unmodified audit opinion. I saw first-hand the professionalism, resilience and dedication of my staff. A commitment to accurate and transparent financial reporting is a key basis upon which confidence in the financial management of New South Wales’ resources can be assured.

Margaret Crawford

Auditor-General for New South Wales

9 February 2022

The Independent Auditor's Report, which includes an emphasis of matter was issued on 24 December 2021

While the audit opinion on the State's 2020–21 financial statements was ultimately unmodified, NSW Treasury delayed signing the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) in order to resolve significant accounting issues that were material to the TSSA, in particular the treatment of the General Government Sector's (GGS) investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) during 2020–21.

The Treasurer and NSW Treasury signed the consolidated financial statements on 24 December 2021, eleven weeks later than the 2018–19 pre-pandemic timetable.

The Audit Office advised NSW Treasury that the 2020–21 TSSA would be qualified with respect to TAHE

Our review of all evidence received prior to 14 December indicated the GGS's expected returns were below the long-term inflation rate and that there was no expectation it should recover a significant asset revaluation loss. The levels of projected returns did not support the accounting treatment of the GGS's cash contribution of $2.4 billion to TAHE as an equity injection.

The TSSA are prepared in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards and particularly AASB 1049 ‘Whole-of-Government and General Government Sector Financial Reporting’. This standard requires contributions from owners to comply with the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Government Finance Statistics Manual 20151 (GFSM) where it would not conflict with Australian Accounting Standards.

The ABS GFSM states that an equity contribution is recognised unless there is no reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return can be generated by that investment, in which case the transfer is expensed. A realistic rate of return is defined in the ABS GFSM as the intention to earn a rate of return that is sufficient to generate dividends (including income tax equivalents) and holding gains or losses at a later date. Holding losses include the final asset revaluation decrement of $20.3 billion, which TAHE incurred on its property plant and equipment assets when it became a for-profit entity and was required to value its assets on the basis of the cash flows they are expected to generate. The lower the commercial returns (cashflows), the greater the potential valuation losses of a for-profit entity's assets. This $20.3 billion valuation loss is disclosed within notes 1 'Significant Accounting policies - TAHE Reform in 2020–21', Note 11 'Equity Investments in Other Public Sector Entities' and Note 14 'Property, Plant & Equipment of the Total State Sector and GGS' financial statements.

Multiple versions of models estimating the GGS's expected rate of return were submitted to the Audit Office by NSW Treasury attempting to demonstrate the commerciality of the GGS's investment in TAHE. Until 14 December 2021, our review of all calculations indicated the existing access and licence fees set up under commercial arrangements effective 1 July 2021 did not support a reasonable expectation that a sufficient rate of return would be earned on the equity injections to TAHE. The existing revenue arrangements reflected a shareholders' expected rate of return of only 1.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity and did not include recovery of the revaluation loss of $20.3 billion incurred in 2020–21.

Having reviewed all evidence provided, the Audit Office communicated to NSW Treasury that unless corrected, the State's accounts would be qualified as the $2.4 billion transfer made by the GGS to TAHE should have been reported as a grant expense instead of an investment. The GGS's estimated rate of return was not sufficient to cover:

  • TAHE's final revaluation loss of $20.3 billion in 2020–21
  • a dollar value equal to, or exceeding a 2.5 per cent rate of return on the equity invested in TAHE (ie: at least equal to the long term inflation rate).

Action was required by the NSW Government to avoid a qualified audit opinion

NSW Government actions avoided a qualified audit opinion related to the GGS’s cash contribution of $2.4 billion to TAHE. To support the TAHE structure as a commercial arrangement earning a sufficient rate of return, the NSW Government agreed to provide additional future funding to TAHE's key government customers (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to support increases in access and licence fees to be paid to TAHE.

Shareholding ministers increased their expectations as to TAHE's target average return to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent

On 14 December 2021, a government decision was made resulting in the TAHE shareholding ministers requesting that TAHE re-negotiate the access fees and license fees payable under the Operating Agreements between TAHE and the public operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains). The renegotiation was to target an average return to the GGS of 2.5 per cent on the equity contributed. TAHE's existing ten year agreements with the operators provide a mechanism by which the parties meet annually and consult in order to determine the amount of the access fees and licence fees that will be payable in the following financial year.

The revised shareholder expectations for TAHE were published in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' on 16 December 2021. The revised expectations changed the basis of the expected returns on equity from the 10-year Commonwealth bond rate of only 1.5 per cent, to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5 per cent. This is consistent with the Reserve Bank's target band and the Commonwealth's Department of Finance's expected return on government investments in other sectors.

The revised shareholder expectations were confirmed in a signed Heads of Agreement

On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW (TfNSW), TAHE and the operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This HoA forms the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing 10-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders' expectation of a return of 2.5 per cent per annum of contributed equity. This revised return includes:

  • income earned over the estimated weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE’s assets
  • recovery of the revaluation losses in 2020–21 on TAHE’s property, plant and equipment assets incurred when TAHE commenced operations as a for-profit entity, albeit the recovery of the revaluation loss is projected to take up to 2052.

The HoA reflects an intention between all parties to revise the contractual agreements to increase future access and license fees by $5.2 billion. This included $1.1 billion for the period FY2023–25, which is reflected in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review'. Further detail on the HoA is reported in Section 3 of this report ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’.

NSW Treasury revised its calculations to reflect the increased future returns

Following these changes, NSW Treasury revised its calculations of estimated returns to reflect a cumulative return equivalent to the expected long-term inflation rate, and recovery of the 2021 valuation loss by 2052. The rate of return period is consistent with the weighted average remaining useful life of TAHE's assets. The changes supported the financial reporting treatment of the $2.4 billion transfer from the GGS to TAHE as an investment rather than an expense, even though TAHE is currently heavily reliant on revenues from the public rail operators, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. If the cash contribution had to be treated as a capital grant expense, it would have reduced the GGS's budget result by $2.4 billion.

The Independent Auditor’s Report includes an emphasis of matter drawing attention to uncertainty relating to the General Government Sector's investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE)

Despite the investment in TAHE being better supported, and the independent auditor's opinion being unqualified, the Independent Auditor’s Report includes an emphasis of matter, which draws attention to the significant uncertainties remaining in relation to the GGS’s equity investment in TAHE. The significant uncertainty is associated with key assumptions that support the recognition by the GGS of its $2.4 billion investment in TAHE during 2020–21.

As at the time of signing the Independent Auditor's Report, there was significant uncertainty with regards to judgements around the commerciality of TAHE's operations because:

  • TAHE’s future estimated access and licence fees, which are critical to its ability to earn a realistic rate of return, remain subject to re-negotiation and re-signing of the current access agreements. The proposed indicative future access and licence fees, which are set out in the HoA are intended to form the basis of the re-negotiation.
  • $1.1 billion in additional funding for TAHE's key customers, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, was provided in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' consistent with the terms in the HoA. However, this funding only extends to the end of the forward estimates period in 2024–25. There is an additional $4.1 billion required over the following six years, which falls outside of the forward estimates period (up to the end of the 10-year contract period). While this has been communicated to the government's Expenditure Review Committee, it is yet to be provided for in government's budget figures. As TAHE's projections are currently highly dependent on its government customers, it is critical that the government continue to provide sufficient funding to the GGS to support increases in the prices government customers will pay for access to TAHE's assets.
  • A further significant portion of the required returns is earned outside of the 10-year contract period (terminating 30 June 2031). NSW Treasury has estimated $37.9 billion in returns from its investment in TAHE over the period from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2052, but has not identified the source or means of these returns beyond 2031. Currently, TAHE derives the majority of its revenue from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW trains, who in turn are both funded by grants to Transport for NSW from the GGS. The projected returns calculated by NSW Treasury beyond 2031 are calculated by assuming a 2.5 per cent growth rate. About 87 per cent of these estimated returns are being earned beyond the ten years, with $32.9 billion estimated over the period 2032–52. There remains risk that:
    • TAHE will not be able to re-contract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
    • future governments' funding to TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
    • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

Significant accounting issues relating to TAHE are detailed in Section 3 to this report titled ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’. Other significant matters related to the TSSA audit are covered in section 6 to this report titled ‘Key Audit findings’.

Other financial reporting matters

The State extended the date for submission of agency financial statements for audit to provide relief to agencies impacted by the New South Wales' COVID-19 lockdowns

All agencies were given a one-week extension (two weeks in 2019–20) to prepare their financial statements and submit them for audit by 2 August 2021. Further extensions were subsequently approved for the following ten agencies and funds (11 in 2019–20) to submit completed financial statements for audit:

  • Department of Communities and Justice (9 August 2021 for disclosures related to cloud computing costs)
  • Investment NSW (13 August 2021)
  • Jobs for NSW (13 August 2021)
  • TCorp IM Funds (19 August 2021)
  • Lord Howe Island Board (22 October 2021)
  • Department of Customer Service (31 August 2021 for disclosures related to AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors')
  • Department of Transport (20 August 2021)
  • Sydney Olympic Park Authority (12 August 2021)
  • Planning Ministerial Corporation (12 August 2021)
  • Transport Asset Holding Entity (16 August 2021).

Additional extensions provided agencies with more time to resolve accounting issues relating to:

  • asset valuations
  • first time implementation of AASB 1059
  • asset transfers and treatment of software as service costs.

The extensions outlined above resulted in a two-week delay submitting the State’s draft consolidated financial statements for audit.

In 2020–21, agency financial statements presented for audit contained 24 errors exceeding $20 million (19 in 2019–20). The total value of these errors was $6.6 billion, a significant increase from the previous year ($1.4 billion in 2019–20)

The graph below shows the number of reported errors exceeding $20 million over the past five years in agencies’ financial statements presented for audit.

The errors resulted from:

  • incorrect application of Australian Accounting Standards and NSW Treasury Policies
  • incorrect judgements and assumptions when valuing non-current physical assets and liabilities
  • human error or lack of oversight.

The completion of the 2020–21 Total State Sector Accounts was significantly delayed as material accounting issues were resolved. These issues related to how the General Government Sector’s (GGS)2 investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity was accounted for. The key areas of audit concern, which required considerable effort to satisfactorily resolve, included our assessment of:

  • the accounting treatment of funds transferred to TAHE from the GGS, specifically:
    • whether funds transferred to TAHE from the GGS should be considered an equity investment or capital grant expense, with the latter having implication to the presentation of the NSW Government Budget positions. Funds are expensed unless, as an investment, there is a reasonable expectation to generate a sufficient rate of return
    • forming a view as to what a ‘reasonable expectation of a sufficient rate of return on investment3’ should be with respect to the Australian Bureau of Statistics' Government Finance Statistics Manual 2015 (GFSM)
    • the valuation of TAHE’s property, plant and equipment at 30 June 2021
  • whether TAHE was correctly classified as a Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entity
  • whether, under the agreements in place for the use and price of TAHE's assets, TAHE controlled its property, plant and equipment.

Our assessments were hindered by errors and omissions in information and models provided by NSW Treasury to demonstrate expected returns from TAHE, as well as a lack of timeliness and completeness in their responses to requests for documentation to support NSW Treasury's proposed accounting of government's contributions to TAHE.

Up until 13 December 2021, evidence provided by NSW Treasury to support the treatment of a $2.4 billion equity transfer from the GGS to TAHE did not demonstrate a sufficient rate of return on the State's investment. Instead, the evidence suggested the transfer was of the nature of a capital grant expense, which would impact the GGS budget result. Unless corrected, by either reversing the equity investment to a capital grant expense (impacting the GGS budget result) or providing additional resources to the rail operators to support additional TAHE access and licence fees (adding additional expenses to future GGS budget results), this matter would have caused the State's accounts to have been qualified.

After the Audit Office communicated the likely audit outcome to NSW Treasury, significant changes were made by government from 14 December 2021. Government decisions that avoided qualification of the TSSA included:

  • On 14 December, a government decision approved communicating revised shareholders' expectations of rate of return of 2.5 per cent being the long-term inflation rate, and increased grants to Transport for NSW for the rail operators to pay increased access and licence fees to TAHE to support of the new rate of return (previously 1.5 per cent).
  • On 16 December, the 2021–22 'NSW Budget Half Yearly Review' included an increase in expected returns to be derived through higher access and license fees charged by TAHE. To facilitate these returns, an increased allocation of funds of $1.1 billion was made to Transport for NSW (TfNSW) from 1 July 2022 as part of the forward estimates for the period 2022–25. This was to pay for the proposed increased access and licence fees the operators would be required to pay TAHE.
  • On 18 December, TfNSW, TAHE and the operators Sydney Trains and NSW Trains signed a Heads of Agreement (HoA) forming the basis of negotiations to revise annual operating agreements to facilitate the shareholders’ expected returns of 2.5 per cent of contributed equity. The HoA included indicative access and licence charges to be used as a basis of renegotiation, increasing access fees and licence fees to be paid by Sydney Trains and NSW Trains over the 10-year period from 2022–2031 by a further $5.2 billion. Most of this increase occurs outside the forward estimates. The majority of the additional funding may need to be funded by future governments.

NSW Treasury has projected returns to be earned to 2052 (a period covering the weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE's assets) as sufficient to recover the revaluation loss of $20.3 billion which arose when TAHE revalued its assets under the income approach. These assets were valued on a discounted cash flow basis as at 30 June 2021.

These key decisions and the circumstances leading up to these changes are detailed later in this section.

Background

On 1 July 2020, the former Rail Corporation of New South Wales (RailCorp), a not-for-profit entity, was renamed the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales (TAHE) transitioning to a for-profit statutory State-Owned Corporation under the Transport Administration Act 1988. There was no change in the structure of TAHE as a new entity was not created. Ownership remains fully with the government. TAHE, and the former RailCorp, were both classified as Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC) entities within the Total State Sector Accounts. TAHE was not a newly created entity, nor was it the result of a change in administrative re-arrangements (such as Machinery of Government change).

Prior to 1 July 2015, the government paid appropriations to TfNSW, a GGS agency, to construct transport assets. When completed, these assets were granted to RailCorp, a not for-profit entity within the PNFC sector. The grants to RailCorp were recorded as an expense in the State’s GGS budget result and in the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA).

From 1 July 2015, the government announced the creation of TAHE (a dedicated asset manager). Funding for new capital projects was to be provided through equity injections, even though the business model was yet to be determined. NSW Treasury initially set a timetable for finalising the business model, operating model and contracts for the use of TAHE's assets of 1 July 2019.

Contributions paid to TAHE by the GGS were treated as equity investments from July 2015 forward. This treatment continued, despite delays in settling the business model. In 2020, the Audit Office raised a high risk finding due to the significance of the financial reporting impacts and business risks for NSW Treasury and TAHE.

The business model eventually adopted was one whereby:

  • The GGS invests in TAHE with an expectation of a sufficient rate of return.
  • TAHE charges the operators (predominantly Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) to use network and rolling stock to deliver services. The operators remain responsible for both the delivery of the services and the maintenance and safe operation of the assets. The operators are primarily funded by TfNSW through grants.
  • The GGS grants funds to operators, which allows them to pay access fees to TAHE. The amount of these grants impacts the budget result.
  • TAHE pays a return back to GGS by way of dividends and tax equivalents. The return may also include holding gains and losses on the fair value of the net assets of TAHE.

TAHE earns relatively small amounts of income from transactions with the private sector. While the TAHE Board envisages that, over time, they will enhance the commerciality of TAHE’s operations, it is currently highly dependent on revenues from government contracts (over 80 per cent). The circularity in flow of funds between transport agencies in the GGS and PNFC sectors is shown in the diagram below:

The government continues to respond to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on New South Wales through its economic stimulus measures

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to significantly impact the State’s finances, reducing revenue and increasing expenses especially in sectors directly responsible for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Health. Over 2020–21, the government allocated an additional $5.6 billion to agencies as part of its economic stimulus and pandemic response. Measures included:

  • $1.8 billion in health measures including essential medical equipment purchases, vaccine distribution, quarantine, contract tracing and maintaining clinical health capacity (such as intensive care units)
  • $508 million in additional cleaning services primarily to the Department of Education and Transport for NSW
  • $500 million as part of the ‘Dine & Discovery NSW’ voucher program to the Department of Customer Service
  • $350 million in combined land tax relief and small business recovery grants to Department of Customer Service and NSW Treasury respectively.

Around $4.5 billion of this package was spent in 2020–21, leaving $1.1 billion unspent and carried forward into 2021–22. The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster for 2021 compared to their target spend.

Deficit of $7.1 billion compared with a budgeted deficit of $16 billion

The outcomes of the government’s overall activity and policies are reflected its net operating balance (Budget Result). This is the difference between the cost of general government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 204 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.

In addition to the 204 entities within the General Government Sector, a further 98 government controlled businesses are included within the consolidated Total State Sector financial statements. These businesses generally provide goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services for which consumers pay for directly.

The Budget Result for the 2020–21 financial year was a deficit of $7.1 billion compared to an original forecast of a budget deficit of $16 billion.

Revenues increased $5.6 billion to $91.8 billion

In 2020–21, the State’s total revenues increased by $5.6 billion to $91.8 billion, 6.5 per cent higher than previous year. A decrease of 0.3 per cent was recorded in 2019–20. The main contributors to the increase in the State's revenues were an increase in taxation revenue of $4.6 billion and an increase in grants and subsidies of $1.4 billion when compared to the prior financial year.

Taxation revenue increased by 15.3 per cent

Taxation revenue increased by $4.6 billion, mainly due to:

  • $2.9 billion higher stamp duties collected from property sales driven by:
    • $2.7 billion increase in contracts and conveyance duties (transfer duties) from both higher transaction volumes and strong property price growth during 2020–21
    • $200 million increase in motor vehicle registration duty driven by increases in new vehicle sales
  • $520 million higher Gambling and Betting Taxes was earned as 2019–20. The previous year's revenues were impacted by club and hotel closures due to COVID-19. The operation of these venues in 2020–21 returned to normal for most of the year resulting in higher club gaming tax revenue of $216 million and hotel gaming taxes of $265 million
  • $439 million higher collections of payroll taxes. The previous year's revenues were impacted by tax relief measures implemented by the government in response to COVID-19. Lower payroll tax was collected in 2019–20 as employment levels dropped during the State’s first lock down
  • $416 million higher land tax revenues, driven by an average 3.2 per cent increase in valuer general land values, which are the basis for determining land tax values.

Stamp duties of $11.7 billion remains the largest source of taxation revenue, $2.9 billion higher than payroll tax of $8.8 billion, the second-largest source of taxation revenue.

Expenses increased $4.1 billion to $101 billion

The State’s expenses increased 4.3 per cent compared with 2019–20. Most of the increase was due to higher employee expenses, depreciation and amortisation, other operating costs and grants and subsidies expense.

Employee expenses, including superannuation, increased 3.6 per cent to $44.1 billion

Salaries and wages increased to $36.3 billion ($34.8 billion in 2019–20). This was mainly due to increases in staff numbers and an average increase of approximately three per cent in the cost of NSW's employees across the sector. Salaries and wages for the Education and Health sectors increased by $511 million and $619 million respectively.

The Health sector employed an additional 4,893 full time staff in 2020–21 (2,763 in 2019–20) and incurred an extra $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19. Education increased staff numbers by 2,418 full time equivalents in 2020–21 (4,866 in 2019–20). This year, the health and education sectors received a 0.3 per cent award increase in pay rates.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) noted in the ‘State of the NSW Public Sector Report, 2021’ that the government sector senior executive headcount increased by 347 to 3,680 (3,333 in 2019–20). The Transport cluster represented the majority of the increase in the government sector's senior executive headcount, with an increase of 182. The PSC report noted the increase was due to the growing portfolio of major transport infrastructure projects.

Historically, the government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Depreciation and amortisation expense increased 7.6 per cent to $10.3 billion

Depreciation and amortisation increased to $10.3 billion in 2020–21 ($9.6 billion in 2019–20). This increase was mainly driven by the depreciation of completed infrastructure projects including the State’s WestConnex M8 and M5 East Motorways, and other road projects such as Woolgoolga to Ballina project. This year also includes twelve months of depreciation relating to the CBD and South-East Light Rail versus six months in the previous financial year.

Furthermore, the first time adoption of AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements’ resulted in the State recognising $45.4 billion of service concession assets in its capacity as grantor under arrangements with operators. More than 87 per cent of this balance was recognised by the Transport cluster. These assets are valued at current replacement cost and are depreciated on an annual basis. A service concession arrangement is an arrangement whereby the government as grantor, contracts with an operator to develop (or upgrade), operate and maintain the grantor's public service assets such as roads, bridges or hospitals. The grantor controls or regulates what services the operator must provide using the assets, to whom, and at what price. The grantor also retains any significant residual interest in the assets at the end of the arrangement. Further details about AASB 1059 are included in the ‘Implementation of new accounting standards’ section of this report.

Grants and subsidies increased $1.5 billion to $15.6 billion

The increase in grants and subsidies is due to payments made by the State in supporting businesses and local communities in response to COVID-19. These mainly included $240 million in Dine & Discover voucher payments, $156 million in land tax relief assistance, $160 million increase in grants to non-government schools (including $31 million to support Covid intensive learning support programs), and $109 million relating to small business grant payments.

The State also transferred $592 million in newly constructed assets to local councils. These mainly related to $378 million in assets transferred following completion of WestConnex stage 2 and $180 million from Northern Roads.

Other operating expenses increased two per cent to $27.5 billion

Operating expenses increased to $27.5 billion in 2020–21 ($26.9 billion in 2019–20) due to higher operating activities as agencies responded to the pandemic.

Supplies and Other Services increased by $1.7 billion. This was mainly due to funding of $533 million in hotel quarantine and associated services, and $495 million in medical equipment for the health sector.

Inventories consumed increased by $266 million. This included $217 million in COVID-19 medical equipment that was written off because it had expired or did not meet the TGA regulatory standards. Contractor expenses increased by $306 million because of increased capital works activity, primarily in the Transport sector.

The increase was offset by $1.6 billion in lower insurance claims expense. In 2019–20 financial year, higher claims were made in respect to natural disaster events, including bush fires.

Health costs remain the State’s highest expense

Total expenses of the State were $101 billion ($96.4 billion in 2019–20). In 2020–21, Health remains the highest contributor of expenses for the State with $25.7 billion ($24.2 billion in 2019–20). Education remains the second highest contributor of expenses reporting $18.4 billion in 2020–21 ($17.5 billion in 2019–20).

The following sectors have the highest expenses as a percentage of total State expenses:

  • Health – 25.6 per cent (25.1 per cent in 2019–20)
  • Education – 18.3 per cent (18.2 per cent in 2019–20)
  • Transport – 14.5 per cent (13.3 per cent in 2019–20).

Assets grew by $12.3 billion to $526 billion

The State’s assets include physical assets such as land, buildings and infrastructure, and financial assets such as cash, and other financial instruments and equity investments. The value of total assets increased by $12.3 billion to $526 billion. This was a 2.4 per cent increase compared with 2019–20, mostly due to changes in asset carrying values.

Valuing the State’s physical assets

State’s physical assets valued at $391 billion

The value of the State’s physical assets increased by $1.7 billion to $391 billion in 2020–21 ($37.9 billion increase in 2019–20). The State’s physical assets include land and buildings ($172 billion), infrastructure systems ($202 billion) and plant and equipment ($16.7 billion).

The movement in physical asset values between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuation adjustments. Other movements include assets reclassified to held for sale and other opening balance adjustments.

Liabilities increased $16.4 billion to $291 billion

The State borrowed additional funds in response to COVID-19

The State’s borrowings rose by $15.8 billion to $134 billion at 30 June 2021. This accounted for most of the increase in the State’s total liabilities.

The value of TCorp bonds on issue increased by $16.8 billion to $114 billion, which largely funded the State's capital expenditure and response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

TCorp bonds are traded in financial markets and are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

Over 2020–21, TCorp continued to take advantage of lower interest rates, buying back short-term bonds and replacing them with longer dated debt. This lengthens the portfolio matching liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.

The State’s fiscal objective published in the 2021–22 Budget Papers is to repair the operating position by returning the budget to surplus by 2024–25 and rebuilding balance sheet capacity by bringing net debt down towards seven per cent of Gross State Product (GSP) over the medium-term. The State measures net debt as the sum of deposits held, government securities, loans payable and other borrowings, less the sum of cash and deposits, advances paid and investments, loans receivable and placements.

The chart below shows the actual net debt to GSP for NSW compared to the Commonwealth net debt to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the past six years. The trend shows an increase in net debt, particularly in the past two years, which is mainly driven by additional borrowings needed to fund stimulus measures when responding to COVID-19 and natural disaster relief.

GSF Act and GSF Regulation

Financial reporting provisions in the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act) have now commenced

From 1 July 2021, the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (PF&A Act) financial reporting provisions were repealed. Agencies prepared their 2020–21 financial statements under Part 7 of the GSF Act. They were audited under the Government Sector Audit Act (GSA Act). The GSF Act requires the timeframe for annual financial statement submission be specified in the Treasurer’s Directions.

Under the GSF Act, all reporting GSF agencies are required to prepare annual financial statements, unless exempt from the definition of a reporting agency under the Government Sector Finance Regulation 2018 (GSF Regulation). Those agencies exempt from preparing financial statements include certain small agencies, Crown Land Managers, special purpose staff agencies and retained State interests. These agencies must meet prescribed requirements or thresholds and self-assess each year to determine whether they remain exempt against the criteria in the GSF Regulation.

Most of the financial reporting provisions of the GSF Act have now commenced except for requirements concerning special deposit accounts (SDA) and special purpose financial reports, which are scheduled to commence on 1 July 2023, subject to approval from the Governor.

The GSF Act now includes most of the provisions applicable to GSF agencies, as requirements for appropriations, expenditure, financial services, and other matters were enacted on 1 December 2018 and 1 July 2019.

Once fully commenced, the GSF Act will consolidate and replace reporting provisions of four Acts:

  • PF&A Act
  • Public Authorities (Financial Arrangements) Act 1987
  • Annual Reports (Departments) Act 1985
  • Annual Reports (Statutory Bodies) Act 1984.

GSA Act and GSA Regulation

The PF&A Act was renamed the GSA Act on 1 July 2021 and now only contains provisions relating to the Auditor-General and the Audit Office, the audit of government sector finances and governance of the Public Accounts Committee.

Of note in the renamed GSA Act is that:

  • a new principal object was added that specifically provides the Auditor-General is an independent and accountable statutory officer
  • the previous financial reporting provisions in the PF&A Act were repealed as the financial reporting provisions are contained in Part 7 of the GSF Act. As a result, there are no longer financial reporting provisions in the GSA Act
  • a new section 34 was added, which contains the requirements for the audit of State sector agencies’ financial statements. These were previously contained in two separate sections.

The GSA Regulation commenced on 1 July 2021, replacing the Public Finance and Audit Regulation 2015 (PF & A Regulation). The GSA Regulation contains the list of entities, funds and accounts prescribed for the purpose of audits under the GSA Act.

Inconsistencies exist in the GSF Act and GSA Act related to key statutory timeframes

There are inconsistencies between key statutory timeframes imposed on the Treasurer and Auditor-General in the GSF Act and GSA Act which has been brought to the attention of NSW Treasury. The inconsistencies identified include:

  • Section 34(3)(a) of the GSA Act defines the audit period for the Statements be as soon as practicable after the Auditor-General is given the Statements. This appears to be inconsistent with section 49(3) of the GSA Act, which requires that the Auditor-General, on or before 22 October transmit the Statements and audit report to the Treasurer. Neither provision is a paramount provision.
  • Section 49(3) of the GSA Act also appears to be inconsistent with section 52(1) of the GSA Act which provides that the Statements are to be given to the Auditor-General in accordance with section 7.17 of the GSF Act. Section 7.17 of the GSF Act requires that the Statements are to be prepared and given to the Auditor-General by an agreed date to enable the audit of the Statements. Part 7 of the GSF Act is a paramount provision under section 1.8 of the GSF Act, which means the requirements in section 7.17 of the GSF Act prevail.

There are also inconsistencies in key statutory reporting timeframes imposed on the Treasurer under the GSF Act.

The audited Statements are a key accountability mechanism that provides information on the State’s financial performance and position. Ambiguity in the statutory reporting timeframes could impact on the future timely provision of this information to Parliament. As noted at the beginning of this report, the delay in issuing the audit report for the 30 June 2021 Statements was due to NSW Treasury’s resolution of accounting issues that were material to the Statements, in particular the treatment of the General Government Sectors investment in TAHE during 2020–21. NSW Treasury's management letter will include a high risk finding with regards to the inconsistencies between the GSF Act and GSA Act.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should seek legislative amendments in Parliament to resolve the inconsistencies in the GSF Act and GSA Act relating to key statutory reporting time frames.

Appropriations framework

NSW Treasury lacks a framework to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that they are in compliance with their appropriation authority

The GSF Act requires that money not be paid out of the Consolidated Fund except under the authority of an Act, such as the annual Appropriation Act or GSF Act. This means a minister is only authorised to spend out of the Consolidated Fund the amount they have been appropriated by the relevant Act(s).

Generally, money is authorised to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund either through:

  • The Annual Appropriation Act - this is an act to appropriate out of the Consolidated Fund sums for the services of the government for the relevant financial year. These appropriations are made to the responsible ministers of principal departments, Special Offices and certain SDAs.
  • The GSF Act - this act allows the responsible minister of a GSF agency to be given an appropriation out of the Consolidated Fund, at the time the agency receives or recovers any deemed appropriation money. Deemed appropriation money is defined in section 4.7(3) of the GSF Act.

Ministers can delegate and sub-delegate appropriation expenditure functions to accountable authorities and officers of GSF agencies. Any spending by accountable authorities and officers of GSF agencies in excess of the amount appropriated to their relevant minister would be made contrary to section 4.6(1) of the GSF Act.

The Budget Papers are an additional mechanism by which the government controls the level of expenditure by agencies both at the individual and departmental administrative cluster level. The Budget Papers set an administrative limit imposed by the government. Separately, the Treasurer can issue a Budget control authority under section 5.1 of the GSF Act. A Budget control authority can regulate expenditure of money by GSF agencies in a variety of ways, as set out in section 5.1(2) of the GSF Act.

In July 2021, NSW Treasury advised the Audit Office that it had received advice from the Crown Solicitor's Office, in January 2021, that payments between agencies in different administrative clusters would not meet the definition of a 'deemed appropriation' under the GSF Act by the receiving agency. This applies to money paid and received by two agencies across different administrative clusters that continue to hold the money in the Consolidated Fund. These intra-government receipts increase the amount an agency has available to spend, without there being a corresponding increase in the responsible minister’s appropriated expenditure limits, thus increasing the risk an agency’s expenditure could cause a minister to exceed their appropriated expenditure authority.

After being made aware of the issue, the Audit Office worked with NSW Treasury officers to clarify potential implications. The Audit Office also obtained further advice from the Crown Solicitor’s Office to clarify certain aspects of the appropriations framework more broadly. In the advice to the Audit Office, the Crown Solicitor advised that an agency is not subject to its own legally appropriated expenditure limit (assuming it is not subject to any annual spending limit imposed through an instrument of delegation or a budget control authority issued by the Treasurer under section 5.1 of the GSF Act). In effect, because responsible ministers are given appropriations, these legal expenditure limits, rest in aggregate, with the principal department and agencies the minister is responsible for. The advice also confirmed:

  • a deemed appropriation for the services of an agency would ordinarily be available for the services of other agencies, if the officers of the other agencies had a delegation from the minister(s) to expend the deemed appropriation and funds remained available under those deemed appropriations
  • that the ‘exhaustion’ of a minister’s appropriation may be precipitated by one agency’s level of expenditure in the financial year, but the effect is that the relevant appropriation is exhausted for all agencies (and their officers) that may otherwise rely on it
  • whether expenditure by an agency occurred beyond the scope of its authority would require a progressive examination of the total amounts expended from the minister’s appropriation
  • amounts expended from the Consolidated Fund without the authority of an appropriation are spent contrary to section 4.6(1) of the GSF Act
  • a minister is responsible to Parliament for (i) the manner in which appropriations are expended, and (ii) any ‘overspends’ (that is, expenditure without authority) by agencies for which they are responsible.

Determining whether expenditure has occurred without the authority of an appropriation is complex and it is not possible for an individual agency to monitor or determine at what ‘point in time’ expenditure has been incurred in excess of the minister’s appropriation authority. As noted earlier, there are mechanisms in place to manage agencies' administrative expenditure limits set by the Budget Papers, but there is no mechanism in place to ensure expenditure by agencies does not exceed a minister’s appropriation authority received under the annual Appropriations Act and GSF Act.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should ensure a framework exists to monitor and provide assurance to ministers that expenditure incurred across a financial year by agencies under the relevant minister’s coordination does not exceed the appropriation authority conferred by the annual Appropriation Act and the GSF Act.

In addition, principal departments and agencies that hold money in the Consolidated Fund are required by Australian Accounting Standard AASB 1058 'Income of Not-for-Profit Entities' and NSW Treasury Circular TC20/08 'Mandates of options and major policy decisions under Australian Accounting Standards' to prepare a Summary of Compliance in their financial statements. The Summary of Compliance applies to agencies that obtain part or all of their spending authority from a Parliamentary appropriation. It is intended to provide information on the amounts appropriated or authorised for an agency’s use and whether those expenditures were authorised. There remains uncertainty around how the Crown Solicitor’s Office advice received by the Audit Office impacts these disclosures, as the total spending authority given by Parliamentary appropriations and expenditure against these appropriations cannot generally be attributed to an individual agency. Such a scenario is not contemplated by the relevant Australian Accounting Standard. NSW Treasury's management letter will include high risk findings about improving mechanisms in place to manage agencies administrative expenditure limits, uncertainties related to appropriation spending authority on agencies summary of compliance disclosures.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should assess how the requirement to prepare a Summary of Compliance under Australian Accounting Standards impacts relevant principal departments and agencies' financial statement disclosures.

Delegations to incur expenditure

Further to last year's reporting, some agencies have again spent monies without an authorised delegation

The delegation to incur expenditure is an important accountability mechanism of responsible government.

Last year’s Report on State Finances reported instances where government agencies did not understand or correctly apply the requirements of the GSF Act for deemed appropriations, resulting in some agencies spending deemed appropriations money without an authorised delegation from the relevant minister(s) as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.

This year’s financial audits identified that further agencies: TAFE Commission, Multicultural NSW and the Office of the Ageing and Disability Commissioner spent money received from an annual Appropriation and/or deemed appropriation money without an authorised delegation from the relevant minister(s), as required by sections 4.6(1) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act. NSW Treasury's management letter will include high risk issues about improving mechanisms in place to ensure agencies have appropriate delegations in place to spend Appropriation and/or deemed appropriation money.

In addition, the audit of the Jobs for NSW Fund (the Fund) special purpose statements identified that five payments from the Fund were authorised by an officer without the necessary delegation from the minister as required by section 14 of the Jobs for NSW Act 2015 and sections 5.5(2) and 5.5(3) of the GSF Act.

Recommendation

Given the continued instances of non-compliance, NSW Treasury needs to promptly improve the guidance it provides agencies to ensure that expenditure of public monies is properly supported by authorised delegations.

Implementation of new accounting standards

This year, the State implemented the requirements of AASB 1059

AASB 1059 ‘Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors’

AASB 1059 is an Australian Accounting Standard that requires public sector entities (grantors) that enter service concession arrangements with private sector operators for the delivery of public services recognise service concession assets and liabilities in their financial statements. The standard was effective from 1 July 2020.

AASB 1059 requires a grantor to:

  • recognise an asset provided by the operator as a service concession asset if the grantor controls the asset
  • initially measure the service concession asset at current replacement cost (CRC) in accordance with AASB 13 ‘Fair Value Measurement’
  • recognise a corresponding liability measured initially at the fair value (CRC) of the service concession asset, adjusted for any consideration between the grantor and the operator
  • make sufficient disclosure in the financial statements so that users can understand the nature, amount and timing of assets, liabilities, revenue and cash flows arising from these.

The adoption of AASB 1059 increased the State’s total assets and liabilities by $19.5 billion and $19.6 billion respectively, with net worth reducing by $131 million at 1 July 2019

The State adopted a modified retrospective approach when adopting AASB 1059 and recognised and measured service concession assets and liabilities at the date of initial application of 1 July 2019, with any net adjustments recognised in accumulated funds at that date. This means comparatives were restated to reflect the impact of AASB 1059.

Most of the service concession assets recognised by the State related to Property, Plant & Equipment, in particular infrastructure assets.

Agencies had to devote significant effort to implement AASB 1059 and ensure their 2020–21 financial statements materially complied with the standard's requirements. Last year, the Audit Office highlighted advance preparation was key to ensuring agencies effectively transitioning to this new standard. Despite the new standard being issued well in advance of its commencement date, Sydney Water Corporation, Department of Customer Service, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and TAHE did not prepare sufficiently for their respective implementations.

Whilst most agencies in 2019–20 had commenced assessing their existing commercial arrangements to determine whether they were within the scope of AASB 1059, calculating and posting the accounting entries to support the implementation of this standard was delayed for TfNSW. TfNSW had not finalised its opening balance adjustments in time for the Audit Office’s early close review. Critical assessments of AASB 1059 to identify the accounting implications for the Transport sector, in particular TfNSW and TAHE were still being considered as late as 30 September 2021.

Restart NSW

Restart NSW was established in 2011 to fund the State’s major infrastructure projects

Restart NSW funds Rebuilding NSW, the government’s 10-year plan to invest $23 billion in new infrastructure. Its infrastructure projects, including Sydney Metro West and Parramatta Light Rail, are primarily funded by proceeds from the government’s asset recycling program. The Restart Fund had a balance of $12.4 billion at 30 June 2021 ($15 billion in 2019–20).

The Fund paid $3.8 billion for infrastructure projects in 2020–21 ($4.3 billion in 2020–21). The largest payments were for transport projects, including Sydney Metro West, Parramatta Light Rail, and contributed $319 million of the $2.4 billion equity contribution to the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE).

The funds are invested in the NSW Infrastructure Future Fund (NIFF), which is allowed under the Restart NSW Fund Act 2011 (Restart Act). The NIFF is an investment vehicle for the fund to help the NSW Government meet its infrastructure objectives and this fund is managed by TCorp. In 2020–21, the fund earned a net return of 7.9 per cent, higher than its annual benchmark return of 4.2 per cent, benefiting from improved returns in financial markets over 2020–21.

The fund directed 30.1 per cent of its payments towards rural and regional infrastructure projects in 2020–21

The Restart Act requires the fund to report on the percentage of payments directed to rural and regional infrastructure projects and whether this represents at least 30 per cent of the total payments from the fund. The Restart NSW Fund Amendment (Rural and Regional Infrastructure Funding) Bill 2020 introduced in Parliament in 2020 would amend the Restart Act by requiring at least 30 per cent of the total payments each financial year and for the life of the Restart NSW Fund be made on infrastructure projects in rural and regional areas.

This year the fund exceeded its target of directing at least 30 per cent of funding towards rural and regional infrastructure projects. However, since the funds’ commencement, only 23 per cent of total payments went towards rural and regional infrastructure projects. Current projections for the life of the fund indicate only 27.5 per cent of funding will be spent on rural and regional projects, which is below the funds target of 30 per cent target for the life of the fund.

Audit Office’s work plan for 2021–22

The Audit Office’s 2021–22 work plan focuses on the State’s response, recovery and impact from the COVID-19 pandemic and natural disaster emergencies

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on the people and the public sector of New South Wales. Government continues to assist communities in their recovery from the 2019–20 bushfires and subsequent flooding. The scale of government responses to these events has been significant and has required a wide-ranging response involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

Significant resources have been directed toward these responses, and in assisting rebuilding and economic recovery. Some systems and processes have changed to reflect the need for quick responses to immediate needs. The increasing and changing risk environment presented by these events has meant that we have recalibrated and focused our efforts on providing assurance on how effectively aspects of these emergency responses have been delivered. This includes financial and governance risks arising from the scale and complexity of government responses to these events.

While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. We will take a phased approach to ensuring that our work addresses the following elements of the emergencies and government responses:

Appendix one – Prescribed entities

Appendix two – Legal opinions

Appendix three – TSS sectors and entities
 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Planning, Industry and Environment 2021

Planning, Industry and Environment 2021

Environment
Industry
Local Government
Planning
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Risk

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Three audits are ongoing.

An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Independent Planning Commission's (the IPC) audit opinion because the prior year comparative figures were not audited. Prior to 2020–21, the IPC was not required to prepare separate financial statements under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 (PF&A Act). The financial reporting provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 now require the IPC to prepare financial statements.

The number of identified misstatements increased from 51 in 2019–20 to 54 in 2020–21.

The 2010–11 to 2019–20 audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s (the Corporation) financial statements are incomplete due to insufficient records and evidence to support the transactions of the Corporation, particularly for the earlier years. Management has commenced actions to improve the governance and financial management of the Corporation. These audits are currently in progress and the 2020–21 audit will commence shortly.

There are 609 State controlled Crown land managers (CLMs) across New South Wales that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land.

Eight CLMs prepared and submitted 2019–20 financial statements by the revised deadline of 30 June 2021. A further 24 CLMs did not prepare financial statements in accordance with the PF&A Act. The remaining CLMs were not required to prepare 2019–20 financial statements as they met NSW Treasury's financial reporting exemption criteria.

The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment's (the department) preliminary assessment indicates that 60 CLMs are required to prepare financial statements in 2020–21. To date, no CLMs have prepared and submitted financial statements for audit in 2020–21.

There are also 120 common trusts that have never submitted financial statements for audit. Common trusts are responsible for the care, control and management of land that has been set aside for specific use in a certain locality, such as grazing, camping or bushwalking.

What the key issues were

The number of matters we reported to management increased from 135 in 2019–20 to 180 in 2020–21, of which 40 per cent were repeat findings.

Seven high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21:

  • system control deficiencies at the department relating to user access to HR and payroll management systems, vendor master data management and journal processing, which require manual reviews to mitigate risks
  • deficiencies related to the Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
  • the Lord Howe Island Board did not regularly review and monitor privileged user access rights to key information systems
  • the Natural Resources Access Regulator identified and adjusted three prior period errors retrospectively, which indicate deficiencies within the financial reporting processes
  • deficiencies relating to the Parramatta Park Trust's tree assets valuation methodology
  • lease arrangements have not been confirmed between the Planning Ministerial Corporation and Office of Sport regarding the Sydney International Regatta Centre
  • the Wentworth Park Sporting Complex land manager (the land manager) has a $6.5 million loan with Greyhound Racing NSW (GRNSW). GRNSW requested the land manager to repay the loan. However, the land manager subsequently requested GRNSW to convert the loan to a grant. Should this request be denied, the land manager would not be able to continue as a going concern without financial support. This matter remains unresolved for many years.

There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department uses the Crown Land Information Database (CLID) to record key information relating to Crown land in New South Wales that are managed and controlled by the department and land managers (including councils and land managers controlled by the state). The CLID system was not designed to facilitate financial reporting and the department is required to conduct extensive adjustments and reconciliations to produce accurate information for the financial statements.

The department is implementing a new system to record Crown land (the CrownTracker project). The department advised that the project completion date will be confirmed by June 2022.

What we recommended

The department should ensure CLMs and common trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations.

Cluster agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies, with a focus on addressing high-risk and repeat issues.

The department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate. This will allow the department and CLMs to be better informed about the Crown land they control.

Fast facts

The Planning, Industry and Environment cluster aims to make the lives of people in New South Wales better by developing well-connected communities, preserving the environment, supporting industries and contributing to a strong economy.

There are 54 agencies, 609 State controlled Crown land managers that predominantly manage small parcels of Crown land and 120 common trusts in the cluster.

  • 42% of the area of NSW is Crown land
  • $33.2b water and electricity infrastructure as at 30 June 2021
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits
  • 7 high-risk management letter findings were identified
  • 54 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 40% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report provides parliament and other users of the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2021 financial statements audits of cluster agencies. Three audits are ongoing.
  • An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Independent Planning Commission’s (the IPC) audit opinion because the prior year comparative figures were not audited. Prior to 2020–21, the IPC was not required to prepare separate financial statements under the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. From 2020–21, the IPC is required to prepare financial statements under the Government Sector Finance Act 2018.
  • The 2010–11 to 2019–20 audits of the Water Administration Ministerial Corporation’s (the Corporation) financial statements were incomplete due to insufficient records and evidence to support the transactions of the Corporation, particularly for the earlier years. These audits are currently underway, and the 2020–21 audit will commence shortly.
  • The Department of Planning, Industry and Environment's (the department) preliminary assessment indicates that 60 State controlled Crown land managers (CLMs) are required to prepare financial statements in 2020–21. To date, no CLMs have prepared and submitted financial statements for audit in 2020–21. All 120 common trusts have never submitted their financial statements for audit. The department needs to do more to ensure that the CLMs and common trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations.
  • Nine agencies that were required to perform early close procedures did not complete a total of 20 mandatory procedures. The most common incomplete early close procedures include the revaluation of property, plant and equipment, documenting all significant management judgments and assumptions, and the implementation of new and updated accounting standards.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statements audits of agencies in the Planning, Industry and Environment cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management has increased from 135 in 2019–20 to 180 in 2020–21, and 40 per cent were repeat issues.
  • Seven high-risk issues were identified in 2020–21, and three high-risk findings were repeat issues.
  • There continues to be significant deficiencies in Crown land records. The department should prioritise action to ensure the Crown land database is complete and accurate.

Appendix one - Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Customer Service 2021

Customer Service 2021

Finance
Asset valuation
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Shared services and collaboration

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Customer Service cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the ‘Report on State Finances’ focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the ‘Report on State Finances’ has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Customer Service cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of Customer Service cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Customer Service cluster agencies.

The number of monetary misstatements decreased from 48 in 2019–20 to 46 in 2020–21.

Seven out of eight agencies did not complete all mandatory early close procedures.

What the key issues were

Upon the implementation of AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors', the Department of Customer Service (the department) recognised a service concession asset, the land titling database, totalling $845 million for the first time at 1 July 2019.

The department reported several retrospective corrections of prior period errors.

The 2020–21 audits identified three high-risk and 59 moderate risk issues across the cluster. The high-risk issues were related to:

  • the Department of Customer Service – internal control qualifications and control deviations in GovConnect service providers
  • the Department of Customer Service – significant control deficiencies in information technology change management controls
  • Rental Bond Board – uncertainties in the accounting treatment of rental bonds.

The percentage of repeat issues we report to management and those charged with governance in management letters increased from 29 per cent in prior year to 42 per cent in 2020–21 while the number of items decreased from 94 to 93.

The magnitude and number of internal control exceptions in GovConnect service providers increased resulting in additional audit procedures to address the risks of fraud and errors in the financial statements.

What we recommended

The department should improve the validation process of key valuation assumptions and inputs provided by the private operator NSW Land Registry Services. It should revisit its accounting treatment of new land titling records.

The department should ensure GovConnect service providers prioritise the remediation of control deficiencies in information technology services.

The department should continue to improve controls in cyber security management.

Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency.

The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority should improve its fixed assets management and financial reporting process to accommodate its growing fixed assets profile.

Fast facts

The Customer Service cluster aims to plan, prioritise, fund and drive digital transformation and customer service across every cluster in the NSW Government.

  • $3.9b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21 
  • $34.1b total administered income managed on behalf of the NSW Government in 2020–21
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies' 30 June 2021 financial statements 
  • 3 high-risk management letter findings were identified
  • 46 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • 42% of reported issues were repeat issues.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Customer Service cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Customer Service cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of cluster agencies.
  • The number of reported misstatements has decreased from 48 in 2019–20 to 46 in 2020–21.
  • Agencies could do more work to improve the quality and timeliness of completing mandatory early close procedures.
  • The Department of Customer Service implemented the new accounting standard AASB 1059 'Service Concession Arrangements: Grantors', which resulted in recognition of a service concession asset of $845 million at 1 July 2019. The valuation of land titling database requires significant judgements and estimations.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Customer Service.

Section highlights

  • The 2020–21 audits identified three high-risk and 59 moderate risk issues across the cluster. Twenty-six moderate risk issues were repeat issues. The most common repeat issues related to information technology controls around user access management.
  • The magnitude and number of internal control qualification issues from GovConnect service providers have increased. Ineffective controls at service providers increase the risk of fraud, error and security to data. Urgent attention is required to remediate the internal control exceptions in information and technology services.
  • The NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs urgent attention. Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency.

Findings reported to management

Forty-two per cent of findings reported to management were repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of agencies. The Audit Office does this through management letters, which include observations, related implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 93 findings raised across the cluster (94 in 2019–20). Forty-two per cent of all issues were repeat issues (29 per cent in 2019–20).

The most common repeat issues related to weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration.

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating. 

Risk rating Issue
Information technology
High3
1 new,
1 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:

  • internal control exceptions in information and technology services provided by GovConnect service providers
  • inadequate change management controls
  • poor user access administration and no monitoring of privileged user activities
  • insufficient cybersecurity controls and processes.

High-risk issues are discussed later in the chapter.

Moderate2
5 new,
8 repeat

Low1
7 new,
5 repeat

Internal control deficiencies or improvements

Moderate2
5 new,
3 repeat

The financial audits identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes, including:

  • lack of documentation support for payroll transactions
  • untimely removal of unused transaction negotiation authority facility and old bank signatories
  • inadequate fixed asset management controls including timely capitalisation of project overhead costs.

 Low1
3 new,
2 repeat

Financial reporting

High3
1 new

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to strengthen financial reporting, including:

  • uncertainties in legislation to support accounting of rental bonds as funds held in trust
  • improvements required in lease accounting including the review of extension options, assessing indicators of impairment and reviewing the lease reports for completeness and accuracy 
  • the removal of fully depreciated assets in the fixed asset register was not timely
  • the quality and timeliness of completing early close procedures required improvement.

High-risk issues are discussed later in the chapter.

Moderate2
9 new,
8 repeat

Low1
7 new,
3 repeat

Governance and oversight
Moderate2
10 new,
3 repeat

The financial audits identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:

  • renewing or finalising service arrangement agreements between agencies were required 
  • lack of formalised documentation regarding arrangements with external providers for leasing and use of assets.
Low1
3 new
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
Moderate2
4 new,
4 repeat

The financial audits identified the need for agencies to improve its compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, including:

  • non-compliance with contract and procurement management policy, including the use of purchasing cards
  • non-compliance with TC 21-02 'Statutory Act of Grace Payments'
  • annual leave in excess of 30 days where Circular 2020-12 requires agency heads to reduce employee recreation leave balances to 30 days or less.
Low1
1 repeat

4 Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High-risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
Note: Management letter findings are based on management letters issued to agencies.

2020–21 audits identified three high-risk findings

High-risk findings, including repeat findings, were reported at the following cluster agencies. One of the 2019–20 high-risk findings were not resolved.

Agency Description
2020–21 findings  
Department of Customer Service
Repeat finding:
Qualifications and control deviations in GovConnect NSW controls assurance reports

The GovConnect information technology general controls (ITGC) provided by the department, Infosys and Unisys were qualified in 2020–21. The key controls over user access, system changes and batch process failed in all ITGC reports. Most of these deviations were not mitigated or sufficiently mitigated to address the risk of unauthorised user access.

The control deficiencies in ITGC increase:

  • the risk of unauthorised transactions, system and configuration changes (workflow approvals, three-way match etc.) and modifications to the system reports
  • incomplete, invalid and inappropriate system access, segregation of duties controls and system reports for the customers using the SAPConnect.

The role of the department has changed significantly from a coordinating agency on behalf of GovConnect customers to a GovConnect IT service provider. It is leading a new IT operating model called ‘Service Integration and Application Management’ (SIAM) to strengthen governance and improve performance of GovConnect service providers. The Department is responsible for the remediation of control deficiencies and continuous improvement in the GovConnect environment.

This matter was assessed as high-risk, if not adequately addressed, it had the potential to result in material fraud and error in the department's financial statements and reputation damages.

This issue is further discussed later in this chapter.

2020–21 findings  
Department of Customer Service
New finding:
Change management significant control deficiencies

Revenue NSW, a division of the department has a key role in managing the State’s finances. It administers State taxes, manages fines, recovers State debt and administers grants and subsidies.

The audit team found significant control deficiencies in change management controls:

  •  appropriate system controls were not in place to restrict developers from releasing changes to the live business systems
  • 8 developers had direct access to the business application servers used for calculating and administering State taxes.

We have included this matter as a high-risk management letter finding, as the audit team could not identify mitigating controls. The system activity of these developers was also not being independently logged and monitored. This increases the risk of unauthorised system change. This can significantly affect the integrity of tax calculation, business process approvals, invalid changes to bank accounts, unauthorised refunds and write-offs. The audit team conducted a risk analysis over the relevant business processes affected by this issue and performed additional audit procedures to address the audit risk.

Rental Bond Board
Repeat finding: Accounting treatment of rental bonds held in trust

The Rental Bond Board (the Board) holds rental bonds totalling $1.7 billion at 30 June 2021. The Board treated the rental bonds off-balance sheet and disclosed the rental bonds as ‘trust funds’. This treatment is based on management’s judgement that the Board does not have control of these funds.

Previously the Board obtained advices from the Crown Solicitors who stated that in their view the rental bond funds held in the rental bond account were not moneys held in trust and the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (the Act) should be reviewed and amended to better support its accounting treatment of rental bonds. The Board has initiated the need to amend the Act, however the implementation of the legislative amendments is still pending.

This matter was assessed as high-risk, if not adequately supported, it had the potential to result in material misstatements in the Board's financial statements.


The number of moderate risk findings increased from prior year

Fifty-nine moderate risk findings were reported in 2020–21, which was a 11.3 per cent increase from 2019–20. Of these, 26 were repeat findings, and 33 were new issues.

Moderate risk findings include:

  • weaknesses in user access management, such as untimely access removal for terminated staff, and a lack of periodic user access review
  • accounting for leases such as the review of extension options, assessing indicators of impairment and reviewing the lease reports for completeness and accuracy
  • formalising arrangements between agencies including corporate service arrangements, funding arrangements, leases, use of SAP system and computer assets
  • use of purchasing cards where our data analytics performed indicated potential gaps and controls and non-compliance with government policies.

The magnitude and number of internal control exceptions in GovConnect service providers have increased

In 2015, the NSW Government selected Unisys Australia Pty Limited’s (Unisys) as an information technology (IT) outsourced service provider and Infosys Limited (Infosys) as a business process outsourced service provider. The outsourced services arrangement was branded GovConnect NSW (GovConnect). The Department of Customer Service (the department) is the contract authority for the NSW Government. In 2019, the NSW Government transitioned a number of Unisys’ IT services progressively to the department and ceased all Unisys's IT services in May 2021. In 2020-21, Infosys, Unisys and the Department were co-providers of business processes and information technology services that constitute the GovConnect environment.

The role of the department has changed significantly from a coordinating agency on behalf of GovConnect customers to a GovConnect IT service provider. The department is responsible for the remediation of control deficiencies and continuous improvement in GovConnect internal control environment.

The department leads the project management of GovConnect services, including the arrangement to provide internal control assurance reports to customers in 2020–21. It engages an independent service auditor (service auditor) from the private sector to perform annual assurance reviews of controls at GovConnect service providers in accordance with Australian Standard on Assurance Engagements 3402 'Assurance Reports on Controls at a Service Organisation' (ASAE 3402). The service auditor reports on the internal controls at a service organisation, which are relevant to a user entity's internal control environment.

The service auditor issued eight ASAE 3402 reports covering business processes controls and information technology general controls (ITGC) provided by the service providers. Four out of eight reports were qualified, a significant increase from previous years.

The table below shows the service auditor's ASAE 3402 opinions issued in various business processes and information technology services provided by service providers for the last five years.

ASAE 3402 controls report# 2015–16^ 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21
Infosys Accounts receivable Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Qualified
Infosys Accounts payable Qualified Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified
Infosys Fixed assets Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified
Infosys General ledger Qualified Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified
Infosys Payroll Adverse Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified
Infosys ITGC Qualified Qualified Unqualified Unqualified Unqualified Qualified
Unisys ITGC Qualified Unqualified Qualified Qualified Unqualified Qualified
The department ITGC* -- -- -- -- Qualified Qualified
ServiceFirst** Disclaimer -- -- -- -- --

# The ASAE 3402 controls reports were issued by an independent private sector service auditor appointed by the Department of Customer Service.
* Information technology services were transitioned from Unisys to the department in phases from 2019–20 to 2020–21.
** ServiceFirst was the shared service centre and its last reporting period was from 1 July 2015 to 13 December 2015.
^ GovConnect first reporting period from 14 December 2015 to 30 June 2016.

In 2020–21, the information technology services controls reports issued to the department, Infosys and Unisys were qualified. Infosys' accounts receivable business process controls report was also qualified. The audit qualifications were because:

  • the service auditor did not get access to the complete set of records processed during the financial year for several ITGC controls. The system that stored these records was hosted at Unisys. From December 2019 to 28 May 2021, the services at Unisys were progressively migrated to the department's IT environment but this system could not be migrated to the department in the required format, resulting in audit scope limitation for service auditors
  • of the deviations identified during sample testing of ITGC controls
  • the monthly follow up of outstanding receivables was not performed regularly, which was the only key control to address the timely collection of accounts receivable.

Internal control exceptions in GovConnect information and technology services require urgent remediations

The relevant controls over user access, system changes and password controls failed in all three ASAE 3402 GovConnect ITGC reports. These control failures can lead to unauthorised system access, system and configuration changes (workflow approvals, three-way match, etc.) and modifications to key reports. It increases the risk of:

  • fraud and error in the financial statements
  • ineffective segregation of duties controls
  • accuracy and completeness of system generated reports for the agencies using the SAPConnect system.

The table shows the number of ITGC control deviations compared to prior year:

Year ended 30 June 2021 2020
  Total controls tested Total number of control deviations and findings Total controls tested Total number of control deviations and findings
Infosys ITGC 41 16 35 8
Unisys ITGC 25 11 33 4
DCS ITGC 31 9 10 5

Most of these deviations were not mitigated or sufficiently mitigated to address the risk of unauthorised user access.

The service auditor identified significant areas for remediation:

  • governance arrangement of the IT services
  • user access management controls
  • SAP database controls
  • logical access
  • incident management.

In response to the internal control qualifications, the audit teams performed data analytics over payroll and accounts payable. The data analytics identified several terminated employees that were paid long after their termination dates which resulted in salary overpayments during 2020–21. While management had put processes in place to recover these overpayments, the payroll processing controls need to be improved to prevent such overpayments.

The Department of Customer Service advised that it established a ‘Control Reframe Project’ (the project) to address the internal control exceptions at GovConnect service providers. The objective of the project is to ensure the GovConnect assurance model is aligned with clear lines of responsibility and remediation actions are in place to support the delivery of services and achieve an improved outcome for future years.

Recommendation

We recommend the Department of Customer Service:

  • improve governance and internal control environment over the information technology services
  • ensure GovConnect service providers prioritise remediation actions to address internal control exceptions
  • perform a post-implementation review of the transition of the Unisys arrangement to identify lessons learnt and continuous improvement
  • develop data analytics to help analyse and identify high-risk patterns and anomalies in GovConnect key transaction systems, augmenting their existing monitoring and detective controls.

The NSW Public Sector's cyber security resilience needs urgent attention

The 2020 'Central Agencies' Report to Parliament highlighted the need for Cyber Security NSW, a business unit within the Department of Customer Service, and NSW Government agencies to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency. A status update of the 2020 recommendation is included in Appendix five of this report.

The Audit Office's Annual Work Program identifies cyber security as a focus area for the Audit Office in 2021–24. It outlines a three-pronged approach to auditing cyber security in this period:

  • considering how agencies are responding to the risks associated with cyber security across our financial audits across the NSW public sector
  • examining the effectiveness of cyber security planning and governance arrangements for large NSW state government agencies for our Internal Controls and Governance report
  • conducting deep-dive performance audits of the effectiveness of specific agency activities in preparing for, and responding to cyber security risks.

A performance audit 'Managing cyber risks' was tabled in Parliament in July 2021. The audit made several recommendations to audited agencies to uplift their cyber security management. It also recommended the Department of Customer Service to:

  • clarify the requirement of the NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) reporting to all systems
  • require agencies to report the target level of maturity for each mandatory requirement.

A compliance audit 'Compliance with the NSW Cyber Security Policy' was tabled in October 2021. The audit examined whether agencies are complying with the NSW Cyber Security Policy to ensure all NSW Government departments and public service agencies are managing cyber security risks to their information and systems.

The report found that key elements to strengthen cyber security governance, controls and culture are not sufficiently robust and not consistently applied. There has been insufficient progress to improve cyber security safeguards across NSW Government agencies. The poor levels of cyber security maturity are a significant concern. Improvement requires dedicated leadership and resourcing. To comply with some elements of the government’s policy agencies will have to invest in technical uplift and some measures may take time to implement. However, other elements of the policy do not require any investment in technology. They simply require leadership and management commitment to improve cyber literacy and culture. And they require accountability and transparency. Transparent reporting of performance is a key means to improve performance.

The report noted that the CSP was not achieving the objective of improved cyber governance, controls and culture. The compliance audit made several recommendations to Cyber Security NSW and other NSW Government agencies.

The 2021 maturity self-assessment results against the Australian Cyber Security Centre Essential 8 for the 25 largest NSW State Government agencies are reported in the 2021 'Internal Control and Governance' Report to Parliament.

Repeat recommendation

Cyber Security NSW and NSW Government agencies need to prioritise improvements to their cyber security resilience as a matter of urgency.

Management of cyber security risk

Our 2020-21 financial audit assessed whether cyber security risks represent a risk of material misstatement to the department's own financial statements. A request performance audit 'Service NSW's handling of personal information' was tabled on 18 December 2020. The audit followed two cyber security incidents that resulted in data breaches of customer information. As part of our audit procedures, we obtained an understanding of the controls the department has in place to address the risk of cyber security incidents and respond to any incidences which may have occurred during the year, including its impact on the audit.

Our assessment of the department’s own cyber risk management shows that:

  • an approved security incident response plan was not in place during the reporting period. There was a lack of testing over incident detection and monitoring process
  • a formal process over patch management that includes assessment, determining relevance and priority, timely rollout and escalation and reporting of long outstanding patches to senior management is being established.

The department provides information security services including cyber security management to cluster agencies. We found that there were insufficient communications within the Customer Service cluster over the controls and assurance over cyber security risk management. Some cluster agencies had put in place limited controls over cyber security risk management.

Recommendation

We recommend the Department of Customer Service:

  • establish an approved security incident response plan and formal process over patch management
  • improve communications with cluster agencies over the controls and assurance in cyber security management.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Status of 2020 recommendations

 

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Published

Actions for Health 2021

Health 2021

Health
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Procurement

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Health cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2021.

Our preferred approach is to table the ‘Report on State Finances’ in Parliament before any other cluster report. This is because the 'Report on State Finances' focuses on the audit results and observations relating to the Total State Sector Accounts, in effect a consolidation of all government agencies. This year the 'Report on State Finances' has been delayed due to significant accounting issues being considered in the Total State Sector Accounts and which may impact the Treasury and Transport clusters.

As there are no outstanding matters relating to audits in the Health cluster impacting the Total State Sector Accounts we have decided to break with normal practice and table this cluster report ahead of the ‘Report on State Finances’.

What the report is about

The results of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2021.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for the financial statements of all Health cluster agencies.

The COVID-19 pandemic increased the complexity and number of accounting matters faced by the cluster. The total gross value of corrected misstatements in 2020–21 was $250.2 million, of which $226.0 million were pandemic related.

A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Annual Prudential Compliance Statement. The basis of the qualification related to 19 instances (18 in 2018–19) of non-compliance relating to three of the 20 prudential requirements across five aged care facilities.

What the key issues were

The total number of matters we reported to management across the cluster increased from 112 in 2019–20 to 116 in 2020–21. Of the 116 issues raised in 2020–21, three were high risk (one in 2019–20) and 57 were moderate risk (47 in 2019–20). Nearly one half of the issues were repeat issues.

The three new high-risk issues identified were:

Hotel Quarantine (HQ) fees

The absence of a tailored debt recovery strategy, data integrity issues and uncertainties around future HQ arrangements increased risks around the recoverability of HQ fees from travellers.

COVID-19 inventories

Data errors and anomalies in the impairment model and difficulties forecasting key factors impacting the management of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) increased uncertainty associated with the valuation and impairment of COVID-19 inventories.

COVID-19 vaccines

The Commonwealth did not provide information about the cost of vaccines provided to NSW free of charge, which required the performance of internal valuations to reflect the consumption of vaccines in the financial statements.

What we recommended

Hotel Quarantine (HQ) fees

Develop a tailored assessment methodology to estimate recoverability of HQ fees and work with Revenue NSW to develop a tailored debt recovery strategy.

COVID-19 inventories

Review the current stocktaking and impairment methodology to incorporate validation of data key to the management of COVID-19 related PPE.

COVID-19 vaccines

Work with the Commonwealth to obtain primary price information on COVID-19 vaccines.

Fast facts

The Health cluster, comprising 15 local health districts, five pillars agencies, two specialty health networks and six shared state-wise services agencies, deliver health services to the people of New South Wales.

  • 100% unqualified audit opinions were issued on agencies' 30 June 2021 financial statements
  • 24 monetary misstatements were reported in 2020–21
  • high risk management letter findings were identified
  • 47.4% of reported issues were repeat issues
  • $23.5b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2021
  • $26.8b total expenditure incurred in 2020–21

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely. This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster (the cluster) for 2021.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies required to prepare general-purpose financial statements.

  • The total gross value of all corrected monetary misstatements for 2020–21 was $250.2 million, of which $226.0 million were related to complexities arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

  • A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Ministry's Annual Prudential Compliance Statement.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making. This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster.

Section highlights

  • The total number of internal control deficiencies has increased from 112 issues in 2019–20 to 116 in 2020–21. Of the 116 issues raised in 2020–21, three were high (one in 2019–20) and 57 were moderate (47 in 2019–20); with nearly one half of all control deficiencies reported in 2020–21 being repeat issues.
  • The complexities arising from accounting for agreements between governments to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic presented three new high risk audit findings with respect to the:
    • expected rate of recoverability of outstanding Hotel Quarantine fees
    • procurement, stocktaking and impairment of COVID-19 inventories
    • valuation and recognition of COVID-19 vaccines received from the Commonwealth Government.
  • Management of excessive leave balances and poor quality or lack of documentation supporting key agreements were amongst the repeat issues observed again in the 2020–21 financial reporting period.

Findings reported to management

The number of findings reported to management has increased, with 47.4 per cent of all issues being repeat issues

Breakdowns and weaknesses in internal controls increase the risk of fraud and error. Deficiencies in internal controls, matters of governance interest and unresolved issues were reported to management and those charged with governance of cluster agencies. The Audit Office does this through our management letters, which include observations, implications, recommendations and risk ratings.

In 2020–21, there were 116 findings raised across the cluster (112 in 2019–20). 47.4 per cent of all issues were repeat issues (38.4 per cent in 2019–20).

A delay in implementing audit recommendations increases the risk of intentional and accidental errors in processing information, producing management reports and generating financial statements. This can impair decision-making, affect service delivery and expose agencies to fraud, financial loss and reputational damage. Poor controls may also mean agency staff are less likely to follow internal policies, inadvertently causing the agency not to comply with legislation, regulation and central agency policies.

The table below describes the common issues identified across the cluster by category and risk rating.

Risk rating Issue
Information technology

Moderate2
7 new,
3 repeat

We identified the need for agencies to improve information technology processes and controls that support the integrity of financial data used to prepare agencies' financial statements. Of particular concern are issues associated with:

  • lack of reviews of user access and privileged user access for
  • HealthRoster
  • Assets and Facilities Management Online
  • vMoney Powerhouse
  • Patient Billing and Revenue Collection system.

Repeat issues included:

  • deficient password controls
  • no independent review for data integrity of any changes made to HealthRoster
  • incomplete reviews of StaffLink User Access.

Low1
4 new,
5 repeat

Internal control deficiencies or improvements

High3

1 new, 

0 repeat

We identified internal control weaknesses across key business processes, including new issues relating to:

  • procurement, stocktaking and impairment of COVID-19 inventories (personal protective equipment)
  • instances where employees' timesheets were approved in advance
  •  monthly reconciliations not reviewed in a timely manner
  • asset revaluation processes at Illawarra Shoalhaven Local Health District.
     

Repeat issues included:

  • forced finalisation of rosters in order to finalise processing of payroll
  • partial repeat issue relating to HealthShare NSW's stocktake process, refer to details in the following section of this report.

Moderate2
6 new,
12 repeat

 Low1
10 new,
4 repeat

Financial reporting

High3

2 new, 
0 repeat

We identified weaknesses with respect to financial reporting in relation to the:

  • expected rate of recoverability of outstanding Hotel Quarantine fees
  • valuation and recognition of COVID-19 vaccines received from the Commonwealth Government
  • application of AASB 16 'Leases'
  • improvement in health agencies' grant register to better support management's accounting treatment under the applicable revenue accounting standards.

Moderate2
6 new,
1 repeat

Low1
8 new,
3 repeat

Governance and oversight
Moderate2
9 new,
5 repeat

We identified opportunities for agencies to improve governance and oversight processes, including:

  • ensure better documentation around governance arrangements for major health capital works delivered by Health Infrastructure
  • absence of documented practices at health agencies level relating to Visiting Medical Officer claims.
     

Repeat issues include:

  • delegations manual for Health Infrastructure remains in draft and has done so since 2017.
Low1
2 new,
2 repeat
Non-compliance with key legislation and/or central agency policies
Moderate2
1 new,
7 repeat

We identified the need for agencies to improve compliance with key legislation and central agency policies, with new findings including:

  • bank signatories list not updated to remove terminated employees
  • subsequent changes made to Junior Medical Officers' approved rosters not approved by an authorised delegate.
     

Repeat issues include:

  • management of excessive annual leave
  • non-compliance with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA Act) by Ambulance NSW.
Low1
5 new,
13 repeat

4Extreme risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
3 High risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
2 Moderate risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.
1 Low risk from the consequence and/or likelihood of an event that has had, or may have a negative impact on the entity.

Note: Management letter findings are based either on final management letters issued to agencies, or draft letters where findings have been agreed with management.

Complexities arising from the COVID-19 response

The 2020–21 audit identified three new high-risk findings

COVID-19 has presented the cluster with several new accounting challenges. New and evolving matters arose from changes to operating conditions, which characterised the 2020–21 financial reporting period. Issues with a high degree of estimation uncertainty will require ongoing attention as the strategies employed to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic evolve.

Expected rate of recovery of outstanding Hotel Quarantine invoices

The estimation of the amount likely to be recovered is complicated not only by the uncertainties that exist regarding the assumptions those estimations rely upon, but also the debt collection processes and strategies put into place to manage the accumulated debtors' balance. Debt collection is not administered by the cluster, but rather Revenue NSW. We observed an absence of a methodology to assess the likelihood of recovery. Instead, Sydney Local Health District was relying on Revenue NSW to develop and execute on a collection strategy. Sydney Local Health District was using the same approach to hotel quarantine debts as it did to other Health receivables. As the approach to managing international borders evolves over time, so too will the cluster's need to develop robust estimation models to assess the likely collectability of debtors. 

Procurement, management and impairment of COVID-19 inventories

$656.2 million of COVID-19 inventories were procured in 2020–21, with $220.2 million consumed; $558.7 million impaired and a further $217.1 million written off. Estimates of the degree to which inventories are expired, not fit for purpose or are faulty is often based on management judgement at all stages in the procurement cycle.

With respect to the stocktaking methodology applied, the following issues were identified:

  • discrepancies noted in the stock bin listing provided for audit
  • discrepancies in the recount sheet generated
  • inconsistent application of the stocktake methodology
  • inconsistent labelling of quarantined stock
  • a lack of an approach for validating stock expiry dates, which is a key input to the impairment calculations.

Although management had developed processes and a methodology to count as well as to assess the level of inventory that was not fit for purpose, ongoing attention to the operating environment that emerges post pandemic will be important in assessing the degree to which existing COVID-19 inventories can be integrated into a ‘business as usual’ model going forward. Further refinement of the key elements of the stocktaking methodology will also be required to ensure that key inputs upon which management relies to calculate the year-end inventory impairment provision can be appropriately validated.

Valuation and recognition of COVID-19 vaccines received from the Commonwealth Government

The 2020–21 financial reporting period saw the Commonwealth acquire COVID-19 vaccines and provide these to state jurisdictions to dispense to their communities. The vaccines, although provided free of charge require recognition. However, Health entities were not responsible for acquiring the vaccines and data on the vaccines' cost was not shared by the Commonwealth. Management undertook a valuation using publicly available data to estimate the value to attribute to the vaccine inventory; developed new systems and leveraged existing pharmacy systems to track physical quantities received from the Commonwealth and ultimately distributed to NSW citizens. As the response to the pandemic evolves, larger quantities, and new lines of vaccine stock will be dealt with, and policy settings will need to adapt when patterns of distribution of those vaccines (e.g., timing of third booster shots) emerge. The Ministry of Health will need to ensure that the valuations applied to the prices of inventory distributed and held in stock are as accurate as possible. This can be done through further refinement of the existing valuation methodology, obtaining price information from the Commonwealth and engaging specialist pharmaceutical valuers.

Emerging trends

Recognition of provisions without sufficient support

Several NSW Health entities raised accruals and provisions in 2020–21, which did not have an appropriate basis for recognition. Liabilities can only be recognised where there is a present obligation to make a payment arising from a past event. A number of these errors remain uncorrected in the financial statements of those entities as they are not material, individually or in aggregate to the financial statements as a whole. Increased training and guidance are required to ensure that treatment within the cluster is consistent and reflects events that have occurred and give rise to obligations.

Treatment of Commonwealth funding

In the 2020–21 and 2019–20 financial reporting periods, we observed prior period errors arising from the treatment of Commonwealth funding. These errors related to recognising revenue under funding agreements entered into with the Commonwealth in the incorrect period. The conditions of these funding arrangements, the transactional information requiring validation and the circumstances when revenue should be recognised are not always clear and can be complex. Early and continuous engagement with the Commonwealth is required to ensure that revenue recognition principles are consistently applied across the cluster.

Key repeat issues

Management of excessive annual leave

NSW Treasury guidelines stipulate annual leave balances exceeding 30 days are considered excess annual leave balances. Managing excess annual leave balances has been reported as an issue for the cluster for more than five years, with the average percentage of employees with excessive leave balances over the last five years being 36.1 per cent (35.5 per cent over five years covering 2015–16 to 2019–20).

The operational demands required to manage the COVID-19 pandemic have presented new challenges for the cluster in trying to manage its excessive leave balances. 39.2 per cent of employees now have excess leave balances at 30 June 2021 (35.4 per cent at 30 June 2020).

The state's leave policy C2020-12 Managing Accrued Recreation Leave Balances requires agencies to manage excessive leave balances to 30 days or less to maintain their workforces physical and mental health.

Accurate time recording

Forced-finalisation of time records by system administrators within HealthRoster remains an issue and we continue to observe time records forced-finalised by system administrators so pay runs can be finalised on a timely basis. During 2020–21, a total of two million (2.2 million in 2019–20) time records were force approved, which represents 5.7 per cent of total time records (6.9 per cent in 2019–20).

Existence, completeness and accuracy of key agreements

Delivery of major capital projects

Health Infrastructure (a division of the Health Administration Corporation) is responsible for the delivery of major capital projects with a budgeted spend of more than $10.0 million. Health Infrastructure oversee the planning, design, procurement, and construction phases. Capital works in progress are recognised in the financial statements of the health entity that intends to use those assets upon completion. The health entities recognise both the capital work in progress and the revenue associated with the capital funding from the Ministry for the construction of the assets. Capital funding is currently agreed with health entities as part of the annual Service Agreement. The assumption that the health entities control the assets during their construction is consistent with Health Infrastructure's role as an agent for the health entity and the Ministry's policy directive PD2020-033 'Management and control of Health Administration Corporation owned Real Property'.

We continued to observe a lack of clarity regarding agreements between Health Infrastructure, the Ministry and the cluster agency that will eventually receive the completed asset. This can lead to confusion and uncertainty around the rights and obligations of each party to the transaction.

Cross border patient funding arrangements

When patients require medical care in a jurisdiction where they are not generally domiciled, there are arrangements in place to provide funding to support cross border patient treatments. We have previously observed that agreements between NSW and other jurisdictions have not been finalised, and this continues to be the case. In the case of Victoria, no agreement has been finalised for the past seven years.

We continue to note that the cluster has long outstanding receivables and payables with other states. The absence of formal agreements between the states hampers the settlement of the debts relating to the treatment of cross border patients. The following table shows the status of Cross Border Agreements between NSW and other jurisdictions:

States 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21
Queensland Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised Not finalised
Victoria Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised Not finalised
Australian Capital Territory Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
South Australia Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
Tasmania Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
Northern Territory Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised
Western Australia Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Signed Not finalised

Albury Base Hospital

Albury Base hospital is located on the border of NSW and Victoria and services residents of both states. Documentation supporting the extension of the expired Intergovernmental Agreement 2009–2017 between NSW and Victoria in relation to the integration of health services in Wodonga and Albury could not be located.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Managing cyber risks

Managing cyber risks

Whole of Government
Transport
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Risk

What the report is about

This audit assessed how effectively Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Sydney Trains identify and manage their cyber security risks.

The NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP) sets out 25 mandatory requirements for agencies, including implementing the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s Essential 8 strategies to mitigate cyber security incidents, and identifying the agency’s most vital systems, their ‘crown jewels’. 

The audited agencies have requested that we do not disclose detail of the significant vulnerabilities detected during the audit, as these vulnerabilities are not yet remediated. We provided a detailed report to the agencies in December 2020 outlining significant issues identified in the audit. We have conceded to the agencies' request but it is disappointing that transparency to the Parliament and the public on issues that potentially directly affect them needs to be limited in this way.

What we found

TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks.

Both agencies have assessed their cyber security risks as unacceptably high and both agencies had not identified all of the risks we detected during this audit – some of which are significant.

Both agencies have cyber security plans in place that aim to address cyber security risks. TfNSW and Sydney Trains have combined this into the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program, part of the Cyber Defence Portfolio (CDP). 

However, neither agency has reached its target ratings for the CSP and the Essential 8 and maturity is low in relation to significant risks and vulnerabilities exposed.

Further, neither agency is fostering a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of decision-making.

TfNSW is not implementing cyber security training effectively across the cluster with only 7.2% of staff having completed basic cyber security training.

What we recommended

TfNSW and Sydney Trains should:

  • develop and implement a plan to uplift the Essential 8 controls to the agency's target state
  • as a matter of priority, address the vulnerabilities identified as part of this audit and previously described in a detailed Audit Office report provided to both agencies
  • ensure cyber security risk reporting to executives and the Audit and Risk Committee
  • collect supporting information for the CSP self assessments 
  • classify all information and systems according to importance and integrate this with the crown jewels identification process
  • require more rigorous analysis to re-prioritise CDP funding 
  • increase uptake of cyber security training.

TfNSW should assess the appropriateness of its target rating for each of the CSP mandatory requirements.

Department of Customer Service should:

  • clarify the requirement for the CSP reporting to apply to all systems
  • require agencies to report the target level of maturity for each mandatory requirement.

Fast facts

  • $42m Total value of the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program over three years.
  • 7.2% Percentage of staff across the Transport cluster who had completed introductory cyber security training

Response to requests by audited agencies to remove information from this report

In preparing this audit report, I have considered how best to balance the need to support public accountability and transparency with the need to avoid revealing information that could pose additional risk to agencies’ systems. This has involved an assessment of the appropriate level of detail to include in the report about the cyber security vulnerabilities identified in this audit.

In making this assessment, the audit team consulted with Transport for NSW (TfNSW), Sydney Trains, and Cyber Security NSW to identify content which could potentially pose a threat to the agencies’ cyber security.

In December 2020, my office also provided TfNSW and Sydney Trains with a detailed report of many of the significant vulnerabilities identified in this audit, to enable the agencies to address the cyber security risks identified. The detailed report was produced as a result of a 'red team' exercise, which was conducted with both agencies' knowledge and consent. The scope of this exercise reflected the significant input provided by both agencies. More information on this exercise is at page 12 of this report.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have advised that in the six months from December 2020 and at the time of tabling this audit report, they have not yet remediated all the vulnerabilities identified. As a result, they, along with Cyber Security NSW, have requested that we not disclose all information contained in this audit report to reduce the likelihood of an attack on their systems and resulting harm to the community. I have conceded to this request because the vulnerabilities identified have not yet been remediated and leave the agencies exposed to significant risk.

It should be stressed that the risks identified in the detailed report exist due to the continued presence of these previously identified vulnerabilities, rather than due to their potential publication. The audited agencies, alone, are accountable for remediating these vulnerabilities and addressing the risks they pose.

It is disappointing that transparency to the Parliament and the public on issues that potentially directly affect them needs to be limited in this way.

That said, the conclusions drawn in this report are significant in terms of risk and remain valid, and the recommendations should be acted upon with urgency.

Cyber security risk is an increasing area of concern for governments in Australia and around the world. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cyber security attacks on government entities in Australia, including in New South Wales. Malicious cyber activity in Australia is increasing in frequency, scale, and sophistication. The Audit Office of New South Wales is responding to these risks with a program of audits in this area, which aim to identify the effectiveness of particular agencies in managing cyber risks, as well as their compliance with relevant policy.

Cyber Security NSW, part of the Department of Customer Service (DCS) releases and manages the NSW Cyber Security Policy (CSP). The CSP sets out 25 mandatory requirements for agencies, including making it mandatory for agencies to implement the Australian Cyber Security Centre Essential 8 Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents (the Essential 8). The Essential 8 are key controls which serve as a baseline set of protections which agencies can put in place to make it more difficult for adversaries to compromise a system. Agencies are required to self-assess their maturity against the CSP and the Essential 8, and report that assessment to Cyber Security NSW annually.

The CSP makes agencies responsible for identifying and managing their cyber security risks. The CSP sets out responsibilities and governance regarding risk identification, including making agencies responsible for identifying their 'crown jewels', the agency's most valuable and operationally vital systems. Once these risks are identified, agencies are responsible for developing a cyber security plan to mitigate those risks.

This audit focussed on two agencies: Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and Sydney Trains. TfNSW is the lead agency for the Transport cluster and provides a number of IT services to the entire cluster, including Sydney Trains. This audit focussed on the activities of TfNSW's Transport IT function, which is responsible for providing cyber security across the cluster, as well as directly overseeing four of TfNSW's crown jewels. Sydney Trains is one of the agencies in the Transport cluster. While it receives some services from TfNSW, it is also responsible for implementing its own IT controls, as well as controls to protect its Operational Technology (OT) environment. This OT environment includes systems which are necessary for the operation and safety of the train network.

To test the mitigations in place and the effectiveness of controls, this audit involved a 'red team' simulated exercise. A red team involves authorised attackers seeking to achieve certain objectives within the target's environment. The red team simulated a determined external cyber threat actor seeking to gain access to TfNSW's systems. The red team also sought to test the physical security of some Sydney Trains' sites relevant to the agency's cyber security. The red team exercise was conducted with the knowledge of TfNSW and Sydney Trains.

This audit included the Department of Customer Service as an auditee, as they have ownership of the CSP through Cyber Security NSW. This audit did not examine the management of cyber risk in the Department of Customer Service.

This audit assessed how effectively selected agencies identify and manage their cyber security risks. The audit assessed this with the following criteria:

  • Are agencies effectively identifying and planning for their cyber security risks?
  • Are agencies effectively managing their cyber security risks?

Following this in-depth portfolio assessment, the Auditor-General for NSW will also table a report on NSW agencies' compliance with the CSP in the first quarter of 2021–22.

Conclusion

Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks. Significant weaknesses exist in their cyber security controls, and both agencies have assessed that their cyber risks are unacceptably high. Neither agency has reached its Essential 8 or Cyber Security Policy target levels. This low Essential 8 maturity exposes both agencies to significant risk. Both agencies are implementing cyber security plans to address identified cyber security risks.
This audit identified other weaknesses, such as low numbers of staff receiving basic cyber security awareness training. Cyber security training is important for building and supporting a cyber security culture. Not all of the weaknesses identified in this audit had previously been identified by the agencies, indicating that their cyber security risk identification is only partially effective.
Agency executives do not receive regular detailed information about cyber risks and how they are being managed, such as information on mitigations in place and the effectiveness of controls for cyber risk. As a result, neither agency is fostering a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of executive decision-making.
TfNSW and Sydney Trains are partially effective at identifying their cyber security risks and both agencies have cyber security plans in place

Both agencies regularly carry out risk assessments and have identified key cyber security risks, including risks that impact on the agencies' crown jewels. These risks have been incorporated into the overall enterprise risk process. However, neither agency regularly reports detailed cyber risk information to agency executives to adequately inform them about cyber risk. The Cyber Security Policy (CSP) requires agencies to foster a culture where cyber security risk management is an important and valued aspect of decision-making. By not informing agency executives in this way, TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not fulfilling this requirement.

Agencies' cyber security risk assessment processes are not sufficiently comprehensive to identify all potential risks. Not all of the weaknesses identified in this audit had previously been identified by the agencies.

To address identified cyber security risks, both agencies have received funding approval to implement cyber security plans. TfNSW first received approval for its cyber security plan in 2017. Sydney Trains received approval for its cyber security plan in February 2020. In 2020–21 TfNSW and Sydney Trains combined their plans into the Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program business case valued at $42.0 million over three years. This is governed as part of a broader Cyber Defence Portfolio (CDP). The CDP largely takes a risk-based approach to annual funding. The Cyber Defence Portfolio Steering Committee and Board can re-allocate funds from an approved project to a different project. This re-allocation process could be improved by making it more risk-based.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains are not effectively managing their cyber security risks

Neither agency has fully mitigated its cyber security risks. These risks are significant. Neither TfNSW nor Sydney Trains have reduced their cyber risk to levels acceptable to the agencies. Both agencies have set a risk tolerance for cyber security risks, and the identified enterprise-level cyber security risks remain above this rating. Both agencies' self-attested maturity against the Essential 8 remains low in comparison to the agencies' target levels, and in relation to the significant risks and vulnerabilities that are exposed. Little progress was made against the Essential 8 in 2020.

Neither agency has reached its target levels of maturity for the CSP mandatory requirements. Not reaching the target rating of the CSP mandatory requirements risks information and systems being managed inconsistently or not in alignment with good governance principles. The Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program has a KPI to achieve a target rating of three for all CSP requirements where business appropriate. TfNSW considers this target rating to be its target for all the CSP requirements. However TfNSW has not undertaken analysis to determine whether this target is appropriate to its business.

The CSP makes agencies accountable for the cyber risks of their ICT service providers. While both agencies usually included their cyber security expectations in contracts with third-party suppliers, neither agency was routinely conducting audits to ensure that these expectations were being met.

The CSP requires agencies to make staff aware of cyber security risks and deliver cyber security training. TfNSW is responsible for delivering cyber security training across the Transport cluster, including in Sydney Trains. TfNSW was not effectively delivering cyber security training across the cluster because training was not mandatory for all staff at the time of the audit and completion rates among those staff assigned the training was low. As such, only 7.2 per cent of staff across the Transport cluster had completed introductory cyber security training as at January 2021.

Agencies have assessed their cyber risks as being above acceptable levels

An agency's risk tolerance is the amount of risk which the agency will accept or tolerate without developing further strategies to modify the level of risk. Risks that are within an agency's risk tolerance may not require further mitigation and may be deemed acceptable, while risks which are above the agency's risk tolerance likely require further mitigation before they become acceptable to the agency.

Both agencies have defined their risk tolerance and have identified risks which are above this level, indicating that they are unacceptable to the agency. TfNSW has defined 'very high' risks as generally intolerable and 'high' risks as undesirable. Its risk tolerance is 'medium'. Sydney Trains has four classifications of risk: A, B, C and D. A and B risks are deemed 'unacceptable' and 'undesirable' respectively, while C risks are considered 'tolerable'. This aligns with the TfNSW definition of a medium risk tolerance.

Transport IT reported five enterprise-level cyber security risks through its enterprise risk reporting tool in September 2020, all of which relate to cyber security or have causes relating to cyber security. These risks are in aggregate form, rather than relating to specific vulnerabilities. At the time of the audit, one of these risks was rated as very high and the other four rated as high. At this time, Transport IT had identified a further seven divisional-level risks which were above the agency’s risk tolerance.

Similarly, Sydney Trains has identified one main cyber security risk in its IT enterprise-level risk register and another with a potential cyber cause. Both of these IT risks are deemed to have a residual risk of ‘unacceptable’.

Similarly, two cyber-related OT risks have been determined to be above the agency's risk tolerance. One risk is rated as 'unacceptable'. Another risk, while not entirely cyber rated, is rated 'undesirable' and is deemed to have some causes which may stem from a cyber-attack.

Agencies have assessed their current cyber risk mitigations as requiring improvement

In addition to the risk ratings stated above, at the time of the audit neither agency believed that its controls were operating effectively. Transport IT had rated the control environments for its cyber security enterprise risks as 'requires improvement'. Mitigations were listed in the risk register for these risks but, in some cases, they were unlikely to reduce the risk to the target state or by the target date. For example, one risk had actions listed as 'under review' and no further treatment actions listed, but a due date of July 2021, while another risk was being treated by the CDP with a due date of July 2021. The CDP identified in May 2020 that while the average risk identified as part of that program will be reduced to a medium level by this date, ten high risks will still remain. Given the delays in the program, this number may be higher. As such, it seems unlikely that the enterprise risk will be reduced to below a 'high' level by July 2021.

Sydney Trains’ IT and OT risk registers cross-reference controls and mitigations against the causes and consequences. The IT cyber security risk identified in the register had causes with no mitigations designed for them. Further, some of these causes did not have future mitigations designed for them. This risk also had controls in place which are identified as partially effective. For the unacceptable OT risk noted above, while there was a control designed for each of the potential causes, Sydney Trains had identified all of the controls in place as either partially effective or ineffective. This indicates that Sydney Trains was not effectively mitigating the causes of its cyber risks and, even where it had designed controls or mitigations, these were not always implemented to fully mitigate the cause of the risk.

Additional information on gaps in cyber mitigations which were exposed in the course of this audit has been detailed to both agencies. The Foreword of this report provides information about why this detail is not included here.

Essential 8 maturity is low across TfNSW and Sydney Trains and little progress was made in 2020

CSP mandatory requirement 3.2 states that agencies must implement the ACSC Essential 8. Agencies must also rate themselves against each of the Essential 8 on a maturity scale from zero to three and report this to Cyber Security NSW. A full list of the Essential 8 can be found in Exhibit 1. Both agencies have a low level of maturity against the Essential 8 not just in comparison to the targets they have set, but also in relation to the risks and vulnerabilities exposed. Both agencies have set target maturity ratings for the Essential 8 but none of the Essential 8 ratings across either agency are currently implemented to this level. Having a low level of Essential 8 maturity exposes both agencies to significant risks and vulnerabilities. Little progress was made between the 2019 and 2020 attestation periods.

Transport IT has set a target rating of three across all of the Essential 8. Sydney Trains has set a target rating of three for its IT systems. Sydney Trains had an interim target of two for its OT systems in 2020 and advised that this has since increased to three. It should be noted that not all the Essential 8 are applicable to OT systems.

None of the Essential 8 ratings across either agency are currently implemented to the target levels. Given that the Essential 8 provide the controls which are most commonly able to deter cyber-attacks, having maturity at a low level potentially exposes agencies to a cyber security attack.

Some work is underway across both TfNSW and Sydney Trains to improve the Essential 8 control ratings. The CDP provided some resources to the Essential 8 over 2019–20, with uplift focusing on specific systems. The CDP work in 2019 and 2020 relevant to the Essential 8 largely focussed on determining the current state of the Essential 8 and creating a target state roadmap. As a result, there was little improvement between the 2019 and 2020 attestation periods. The CDP has a workstream for the Essential 8 in its FY 2020–21 funding allocation, however as noted above in Exhibit 6 this was delayed as resources were redeployed to Project La Brea. Regardless, work on some specific aspects of the Essential 8 remain part of the 2020–21 CDP allocation, with workstreams allocated to improving three of the Essential 8. In addition, some work from Project La Brea should lead to an improvement in the Essential 8.

Sydney Trains' Cyber Uplift Program included a workstream which had in scope the uplift in the Essential 8 in IT. There were also other workstreams which aimed to improve some of the Essential 8 for OT systems. Work is also ongoing as part of the CDP to uplift these scores in Sydney Trains.

TfNSW and Sydney Trains have not reached their target maturity across the CSP mandatory requirements and TfNSW has not evaluated its cluster-wide target to ensure it is appropriate

Cyber Security NSW allows each agency to determine its target level of maturity for the first 20 CSP mandatory requirements. Agencies can tailor their target levels to their risk profile. Not reaching the target rating of the CSP mandatory requirements risks information and systems being managed inconsistently or not in alignment with good governance principles.

Sydney Trains has set its target level of maturity for IT and OT. All of Sydney Trains' target maturity levels are at least a three (defined), with a target of four (quantitatively managed) for many of the mandatory requirements. While Cyber Security NSW does not currently mandate a minimum level of maturity, in 2019 there was a requirement for each agency to target a minimum level of three.

Sydney Trains has not met its target ratings across the mandatory requirements.

The Transport Cyber Defence Rolling Program has a program KPI to ensure that the entire cluster reaches a minimum maturity level of three against all the CSP requirements by 2023. TfNSW has not reviewed its CSP mandatory requirement targets to determine if a three is desirable for all requirements or if a higher target level may be more appropriate. It is important for senior management to set cyber security objectives as a demonstration of leadership and a commitment to cyber security.

TfNSW has not met its target ratings across the mandatory requirements for its Group IT ISMS, which was the focus of this audit.

Both agencies claimed progress in their implementation of the mandatory requirements between 2019 and 2020. The audit did not seek to verify the self-assessed results from either agency.

Both agencies operate ISMS in line with the CSP

CSP mandatory requirement 3.1 requires agencies to implement an Information Security Management System (ISMS) or Cyber Security Framework (CSF), with scope at least covering systems identified as the agency's ‘crown jewels’. The ISMS or CSF should be compliant with, or modelled on, one or more recognised IT or OT standard. As noted in the introduction, an ISMS ‘consists of the policies, procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively managed by an organisation, in the pursuit of protecting its information assets.’ Both agencies operate an ISMS compliant with the CSP requirement.

As noted in the introduction, TfNSW operates four ISMS. The Transport IT ISMS is certified against ISO27001, the most common standard for ISMS certification. Three of TfNSW’s six crown jewels are managed within this ISMS. The other ISMS are not certified to relevant standards, though TfNSW claims that they align with relevant controls. This is sufficient for the purposes of the CSP.

Sydney Trains operates two ISMS, one for IT and another for OT. Neither of these are certified to relevant ISMS Standards, however there have been conformance reviews of both IT and OT with relevant standards. These ISMS cover all crown jewels in the agency.

There are currently 11 ISMS in operation across the Transport cluster. TfNSW has proposed moving towards a holistic approach to these ISMS, with the CDP Board responsible for governing the available security controls and directing agency IT and OT teams to implement these.

Agencies are not routinely conducting audits of third-party suppliers to ensure compliance with contractual obligations

CSP mandatory requirement 1.5 makes agencies accountable for the cyber risks of their ICT service providers and ensuring that providers comply with the CSP and any other relevant agency security policies. The ACSC has provided advice on what organisations should do when managing third party suppliers of ICT. The ACSC advises that organisations should use contracts to define cyber security expectations and seek assurance to ensure that these contract expectations are being met. While both agencies usually include specific cyber security expectations in contracts, neither is routinely seeking assurance that these expectations are being met.

The NSW Government has mandated the use of the 'Core& One' contract template for low-value IT procurements and the Procure IT contract template for high-value IT procurements. Both of these contracts contain space for the procuring agency to include cyber security controls for the contractor to implement. The Procure IT contract template also includes a right-to-audit clause which allows agencies to receive assurance around the implementation of these controls. TfNSW and Sydney Trains used the mandated contracts for relevant contracts examined as part of this audit.

TfNSW included security controls in all the contracts examined as part of this audit. Compliance with ISO27001 was the most commonly stated security expectation. Of the contracts examined as part of this audit, only one contract did not have a right-to-audit clause. This contract was signed in October 2016. While these clauses are in place, TfNSW rarely conducted these audits on its third-party providers. Of the eight TfNSW contracts examined in detail, only two of these had been audited to confirm compliance with the stated security controls.

Sydney Trains included security controls in all but one of the contracts examined as part of this audit. Sydney Trains did not require contractors to be compliant with ISO27001, but only required compliance with whole-of-government policies. Sydney Trains does not routinely conduct audits of its third-party suppliers, however it did conduct deep-dive risk analyses of its top ten highest risk IT suppliers. This involved a detailed review of both the suppliers' security posture and also the contract underpinning the relationship with the supplier.

The CDP funding for 2020–21 includes a workstream for strategic third-party contract remediation. This funding is to conduct some foundational work which will allow the CDP to make further improvements in future years. While this funding will not address gaps in contract requirements or management across all contracts, this workstream aims to reduce the risks posed by strategic suppliers covering critical assets. Similarly, work is currently underway as part of the CDP to conduct OT risk assessments for key suppliers to Sydney Trains in a similar way to the work undertaken for IT suppliers.

Sydney Trains has risk assessed its third-party suppliers but TfNSW has not done so

It is important to conduct a risk assessment of suppliers to identify high-risk contractors. This allows agencies to identify those contractors who may require additional controls stated in the contract, those who require additional oversight, and also where auditing resources are best targeted.

Sydney Trains has risk assessed all its IT suppliers and, as noted above, has conducted a deep-dive risk analysis of its top ten highest risk suppliers. TfNSW has not undertaken similar analysis of its key suppliers, however it has identified risks attached to each of its strategic suppliers and has documented these. As a result of not risk assessing its suppliers, TfNSW cannot take a targeted approach to its contract management.

TfNSW demonstrated poor records handling relating to the contracts examined as part of this audit

TfNSW was not able to locate one of the contracts requested as part of the audit's sample. Other documentation, such as contract management plans, could not be located for many of the other contracts requested as part of this audit. These poor document handling practices limits TfNSW's ability to effectively oversee service providers and ensure that they are implementing agreed controls. It also limits public transparency on the effectiveness of these controls.

The Transport cluster is not effectively implementing cyber security awareness training

Agencies are responsible for implementing regular cyber security education for all employees and contractors under mandatory requirement 2.1 in the CSP. TfNSW is responsible for delivering this training to the whole Transport cluster, including Sydney Trains. The Transport cluster has basic cyber awareness training available for all staff. TfNSW also offers additional training provided by Cyber Security NSW targeted at executives and executive assistants. While TfNSW has training available to staff, it is not delivering this effectively. TfNSW does not make training mandatory for most staff nor does it require staff to repeat training regularly. Even among those staff who have been assigned the training, completion rates are low, meaning that delivery is not effectively monitored. Cyber security training is important for building and supporting a cyber security culture.

TfNSW is responsible for creating and rolling out all forms of training to agencies within the Transport cluster. Both TfNSW and Sydney Trains have the same mandatory cyber awareness training that is automatically assigned to new starters. At the time of the audit, this training was not mandatory for ongoing staff. TfNSW does make additional cyber security training available to staff who can choose to undertake the training themselves, or can be assigned the training by their manager. All TfNSW cyber security training is delivered via online modules and it is the responsibility of managers to ensure that it is completed.

Cyber security training completion rates for both TfNSW and Sydney Trains are low. Only 13.5 per cent of staff across the Transport cluster had been assigned the Cyber Safety for New Starters training as of January 2021. Although this course is mandatory for new starters, only 53 per cent of staff assigned the Cyber Safety for New Starters training module had completed the course by January 2021. As a result, only 7.2 per cent of staff across the entire Transport cluster had completed this training at that time. In Sydney Trains, less than one per cent of staff had completed this training as at January 2021 and a further 7.6 per cent of staff have completed the 'Cyber Security: Beyond the Basics' training. These low completion rates indicate that TfNSW is not effectively rolling out cyber security training across the cluster.

In October 2020, the Department of Customer Service released 'DCS-2020-05 Cyber Security NSW Directive - Practice Requirement for NSW Government', which made annual cyber security training mandatory for all staff from 2021. In line with this requirement, TfNSW has advised that it will be gradually implementing mandatory annual training from July 2021 for all staff.

The Transport cluster undertakes activities to build a cyber-aware culture in accordance with the CSP, but awareness remains low

Increasing staff awareness of cyber security risks and maintaining a cyber secure culture are both mandatory requirements of the CSP. While TfNSW does undertake some activities to build a cyber aware culture, awareness of cyber security risks remains low. This can be demonstrated by the low training rates outlined above, and the 'Spot the Scammer' exercise, described in Exhibit 7. TfNSW is responsible for delivering these awareness raising activities across the cluster.

TfNSW frequently communicates with staff across the Transport cluster about various cyber security risks through multiple avenues. Both agencies use the intranet, emails and other awareness raising activities to highlight the importance for staff to be aware of the seriousness of cyber risks. Advice given on the intranet includes tips for spotting scammers on mobile phones, promoting the cluster-wide training courses, as well as various advice that staff could use when dealing with cyber risks in the workplace.

In addition to these awareness raising activities, TfNSW has also undertaken a cluster-wide phishing email exercise called 'Spot the Scammer'. This is outlined in Exhibit 7. This exercise was carried out in 2019 and 2020 and allowed the Transport cluster to measure the degree to which staff were able to identify phishing emails. As can be seen in Exhibit 7, the results of this exercise indicate that staff awareness of phishing emails remains low.

Exhibit 7 - Spot the Scammer exercise
In both 2019 and 2020, TfNSW performed a ‘Spot the Scammer’ exercise in which they sent out over 25,000 emails to staff based on a real phishing attack in order to measure awareness and response. The exercise tested staff 'click through rate', the percentage of staff who clicked on the fake phishing link. In 2019, these results were then compared to industry benchmarks, with over a 20 per cent click through rate being considered 'very high'. Both TfNSW and Sydney Trains were considered to have a ‘very high’ click through rate in comparison to these benchmarks in both 2019 and 2020. This indicates that staff awareness of phishing emails was low. The click through rate for TfNSW was 24 per cent in 2020, an increase from 22 per cent in 2019. For Sydney Trains, the click through rate in 2020 was 32 per cent, which was a decrease from 40 per cent in 2019.
Source: Audit Office analysis of TfNSW documents.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #353 - released (13 July 2021).

Published

Actions for Service NSW's handling of personal information

Service NSW's handling of personal information

Premier and Cabinet
Finance
Cyber security
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released a report today examining the effectiveness of Service NSW’s handling of customers’ personal information to ensure its privacy.

The audit found that Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. Service NSW continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. This includes the routine emailing of personal information between Service NSW service centres and other agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the data breach earlier this year. The audit found that previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

The Auditor-General made eight recommendations aimed at ensuring improved processes, technologies, and governance arrangements for how Service NSW handles customers’ personal information.

The Hon. Victor Dominello, MP, Minister for Customer Service, requested this audit under section 27(B)(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 following public reports in May 2020 of a cyber security attack which had led to a breach of Service NSW customer information. This audit also included the Department of Customer Service which supports Service NSW with privacy, risk and governance functions.

Service NSW was established in 2013 with the intention that it would, over time, 'become the primary interaction point for customers accessing New South Wales Government transaction services'.

Service NSW's functions are set out in the Service NSW (One stop Access to Government Services) Act 2013. This legislation allows for other NSW Government agencies to delegate to and enter into agreements with the Chief Executive Officer of Service NSW in order for Service NSW to undertake service functions for the agency.

Service NSW now has agreements with 36 NSW Government client agencies to facilitate over 1,200 types of interactions and transactions for the community.

The nature of each agreement between Service NSW and its client agencies varies. Some client agencies have delegated authority to allow Service NSW staff to conduct transactions on their behalf in the agencies' systems. Other arrangements do not include the same degree of delegation. In these cases, Service NSW provides services such as responding to enquiries and validating documents.

In addition, Service NSW conducts transactions for its own programs, such as the Seniors Card. Personal information for these programs, as well as information for customers' MyServiceNSW accounts, are stored by Service NSW on its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system.

In March 2020, Service NSW suffered two cyber security attacks in short succession. Technical analysis undertaken by the Department of Customer Service (DCS) concluded that these attacks resulted from a phishing exercise through which external threat actors gained access to the email accounts of 47 staff members. These attacks resulted in the breach of a large amount of personal customer information that was contained in these email accounts. See Section 1.1 for further details.

This audit is being conducted in response to a request from the Hon. Victor Dominello, Minister for Customer Service, under section 27B(3)(c) of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983. Minister Dominello requested that the Auditor General conduct a performance audit in relation to Service NSW's handling of sensitive customer and business information.

This audit assessed how effectively Service NSW handles personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy.

It addressed the following:

  • Does Service NSW have processes and governance in place to identify and manage risks to the privacy of personal customer and business information?
  • Does Service NSW have policies, processes and systems in place that support the effective handling of personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy?
  • Has Service NSW effectively implemented its policies, processes and systems for managing personal customer and business information?

Conclusion

Service NSW is not effectively handling personal customer and business information to ensure its privacy. It continues to use business processes that pose a risk to the privacy of personal information. These include routinely emailing personal customer information to client agencies, which is one of the processes that contributed to the March 2020 data breach. Previously identified risks and recommended solutions had not been implemented on a timely basis.

Service NSW identifies privacy as a strategic risk in both its Risk Management Guideline and enterprise risk register and sets out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement. That said, the governance, policies, and processes established by Service NSW to mitigate privacy risk are not effective in ensuring the privacy of personal customer and business information. While Service NSW had risk identification and management processes in place at the time of the March 2020 data breach, these did not prevent the breach occurring.

Some of the practices that contributed to the data breach are still being followed by Service NSW staff. For example, business processes still require Service NSW staff to scan and email personal information to some client agencies.

The lack of multi factor authentication has been identified as another key contributing factor to the March 2020 data breach as this enabled the external threat actors to gain access to staff email accounts once they had obtained the user account details through a phishing exercise. Service NSW had identified the lack of multi factor authentication on its webmail platform as a risk more than a year prior to the breach and had committed to addressing this by June 2019. It was not implemented until after the breach occurred.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system, which holds the personal information of over four million NSW residents.

Internal audits carried out by Service NSW, including one completed in August 2020, have identified significant weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These include deficiencies in the management of role based access, monitoring and audit of user access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers held in the system.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are not clearly drawn between Service NSW and its client agencies.

Service NSW has agreements in place with client agencies. However, the agreements lack detail and clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the agencies in relation to the collection, storage and security of customer's personal information. This lack of clarity raises the risk that privacy obligations will become confused and missed between the agencies.

Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments for major new projects but does not routinely review existing processes and systems.

Service NSW carries out privacy impact assessments as part of its routine processes for implementing major new projects, ensuring that privacy management is considered as part of project design. Service NSW does not regularly undertake privacy impact assessments or reviews of existing or legacy processes and systems, which has resulted in some processes continuing despite posing significant risks to the privacy of personal information, such as the scanning, emailing, and storing of identification documents.

1. Key findings

Service NSW identifies privacy risks, but the controls and processes it put in place to mitigate these privacy risks were not adequate to prevent or limit the extent of the data breach that occurred in March 2020

Service NSW’s approach to risk management is framed by its Risk Management Guideline, which defines 'privacy and compliance' as one of the key types of risk for the agency. Service NSW's enterprise risk register identifies four strategic privacy related risks. Service NSW has set out a zero level appetite for privacy risk in its risk appetite statement.

Service NSW has assessed the adequacy of its controls for privacy risks as needing improvement. To be fully effective, the Risk Management Guideline says that these controls should have a focus that is ‘largely preventative and address the root causes’.

One of the business processes that was a key contributing factor to the data breach was the emailing of personal information by Service NSW staff to client agencies.

This process had been identified as a risk prior to the breach and some steps had been put in place to mitigate the risk. In particular, staff were required to manually delete emails that contained personal information. However, these measures were ineffective in preventing the breach, as the external threat actors still gained access to 47 staff email accounts that contained a large amount of personal information.

It is unclear why Service NSW did not effectively mitigate this risk prior to the breaches. However, Service NSW has advised that it implemented measures in June and October 2020 to automatically archive emails likely to contain personal information. This is expected to limit the quantity of information retained in email accounts for extended periods.

Service NSW has not put in place any technical or other solutions to avoid Service NSW staff having to scan and email personal information to some client agencies. Urgent action is needed to remove the requirement for staff to email personal information to client agencies, thereby mitigating the risk inherent in sending and storing this information using email.

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system, which holds the personal information of over four million customers

There are weaknesses in the general IT and security controls implemented by Service NSW over its Salesforce CRM system. These weaknesses include deficiencies in governance of role based access, monitoring and audit of staff access, and partitioning of program specific transaction information. These deficiencies create an increased risk of unauthorised access to the personal information of over four million customers which is stored in this system.

In addition, there is an absence of important controls to safeguard customers' privacy, such as multi factor authentication and reviewable logs of access history to their information. Such controls, when properly implemented, would enhance the control that customers are able to exercise over their personal information.

A privacy impact assessment conducted on Service NSW’s Salesforce CRM system in 2015 recommended that the system include the ability for customers to review access history to their personal information, as well as the option for customers to apply multi factor authentication to their accounts. While both these recommendations appeared positively received by Service NSW, neither have been implemented.

Since its inception, Service NSW’s use of Salesforce has extended to storing transaction data, particularly for transactions for which Service NSW is responsible, such as the Seniors Card. It also holds details of over four million MyServiceNSW account holders, including name, email address and phone number, and optional address details. It was not originally intended for the system to hold this volume and nature of customer information.

Lines of responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are unclear between Service NSW and its client agencies

Service NSW's privacy management plan does not clearly set out the privacy obligations of Service NSW and its client agencies. It sets out that 'compliance with the privacy principles will primarily be the responsibility of that [client] agency'. However, Service NSW has its own obligations under the security principles of the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (PPIP Act) to take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access to personal information, which is not made clear in the privacy management plan.

The agreements between Service NSW and client agencies reviewed for this audit only include general and high level references to privacy. Most do not include details of each parties' privacy responsibilities such as: which agency will provide the customer with a privacy notice explaining how their personal information will be handled, how personal information will be kept secure, how long Service NSW will retain information, what processes will be followed for internal reviews, and what specific planning is in place to respond to data breaches.

Service NSW's privacy management plan has not been updated to include new programs and governance changes

Service NSW's privacy management plan includes most of the matters required by law or good practice, with some exceptions. It does not explain any exemptions that the agency commonly relies on under the PPIP Act and does not address any health information that Service NSW may handle. It had also not been updated to reflect governance changes and the fact that, at the time this audit commenced, Service NSW was disclosing the content of internal review applications (the formal expression for 'complaints') to the Department of Customer Service (DCS). These governance changes were part of the centralisation of Service NSW's corporate support functions into DCS in late 2019, though internal review staff were seconded back into Service NSW during the course of this audit.

The current July 2019 privacy management plan has also not been updated since the rollout of a number of major new initiatives in 2020. These include 2019–20 bushfire emergency recovery initiatives (such as small business grants) and COVID 19 pandemic response initiatives (such as small business grants, border permits and the COVID safe check in app).

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for new initiatives, though privacy risks remain in legacy systems and processes

Service NSW routinely conducts privacy impact assessments for major new initiatives and the assessments reviewed for this audit largely accorded with good practice guidance.

Service NSW does not routinely review existing processes and systems to ensure that they are effective in ensuring the privacy of customer personal information. Business processes that create the highest risk to privacy, such as emailing of personal information, are more common in these longstanding legacy systems.

Service NSW's significant and rapid growth has outpaced the establishment of a robust control environment which has exacerbated privacy risks

Since it was established in 2013, Service NSW has experienced significant growth in the number and diversity of the types of transactions it provides, as well as the number of client agencies with which it works. The pace and extent of this growth has contributed to important controls not being properly implemented on a timely basis, which has heightened privacy risks, particularly in regard to existing, legacy systems and processes.

The pace of change and increasing demand for new program implementation has limited the opportunity for Service NSW, in collaboration with its client agencies, to revisit and redesign legacy business practices which pose a greater privacy risk. This includes the scanning and emailing of personal information.

While 2019–20 has seen additional demands placed on Service NSW in responding to the 2019–20 bushfire emergency and COVID 19 pandemic, it is the nature of the agency’s work that it operates in a fast paced and complex environment, where it is required to respond to multiple client agencies and stakeholders. Ensuring customer privacy should be integral to Service NSW’s business as usual operations.

2. Recommendations

Service NSW commissioned a number of external reviews and investigations stemming from the data breaches. The Auditor General's recommendations below have taken these other reviews into account. In order to offer assurance that it is appropriately protecting the privacy of its customers, Service NSW should address the full breadth of findings and recommendations made across all relevant reviews.

As a matter of urgency, Service NSW should:

1. in consultation with relevant client agencies and the Department of Customer Service, implement a solution for a secure method of transferring personal information between Service NSW and client agencies

2. review the need to store scanned copies of personal information and, if still required, implement a more secure method of storing this information and regular deletion of material.

By March 2021, Service NSW should:

3. ensure that all new agreements entered into with client agencies from 1 April 2021 address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

  • the content and provision of privacy collection notices
  • the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
  • steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
  • the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
  • how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

4. in collaboration with the Department of Customer Service, review its privacy management plan to address the deficiencies raised in this audit, including:

  • to clarify Service NSW's understanding of how responsibility for meeting privacy obligations are delineated between Service NSW and client agencies
  • to better reflect the full scope and complexity of personal information handled by Service NSW
  • to better explain how applications for internal review are handled between Service NSW and the Department of Customer Service
  • to ensure regular ongoing review, either according to a schedule or when Service NSW experiences substantial change to its programs and handling of personal information

5. in consultation with the Department of Customer Service, review its policies and processes for the management of privacy risks, including to:

  • ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms to escalate identified privacy risks from business units to the Executive Leadership Team
  • ensure that there are action plans to address strategic privacy risks that are assessed as having ineffective controls.
By June 2021, Service NSW should:

6. address deficiencies in the controls over, and security for, its Salesforce customer relationship management and related systems that hold customer personal information, including:

  • establish policies and processes for regular access reviews and monitoring of user activity in these systems, including for privileged users
  • enable partitioning and role based access restrictions to personal information collected for different programs
  • provide customers the choice to use multi factor authentication to further secure their MyServiceNSW accounts
  • enable customers to view the transaction history of their personal information to detect possible mishandling.
By December 2021, Service NSW should:

7. ensure that all existing agreements with client agencies address the deficiencies identified in this audit, including that they provide clarity on:

  • the content and provision of privacy collection notices
  • the terms by which personal information will be retained, stored, archived, and disposed of when no longer required
  • steps that will be taken by each agency to ensure that personal information is kept secure
  • the circumstances in which, and processes by which, applications for internal review will be referred by one agency to the other
  • how identified breaches of privacy will be handled between agencies

8. carry out a risk assessment of all processes, systems and transactions that involve the handling of personal information and undertake a privacy impact assessment for those that:

  • are identified as high risk and have not previously had a privacy impact assessment
  • have had major changes or updates since the privacy impact assessment was completed.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit

 

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