Refine search Expand filter

Reports

Published

Actions for Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents

Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents

Finance
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Workforce and capability

A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, found there is no whole-of-government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is very limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some agencies have poor detection and response practices and procedures.

The NSW Government relies on digital technology to deliver services, organise and store information, manage business processes, and control critical infrastructure. The increasing global interconnectivity between computer networks has dramatically increased the risk of cyber security incidents. Such incidents can harm government service delivery and may include the theft of information, denial of access to critical technology, or even the hijacking of systems for profit or malicious intent.

This audit examined cyber security incident detection and response in the NSW public sector. It focused on the role of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation (DFSI), which oversees the Information Security Community of Practice, the Information Security Event Reporting Protocol, and the Digital Information Security Policy (the Policy).

The audit also examined ten case study agencies to develop a perspective on how they detect and respond to incidents. We chose agencies that are collectively responsible for personal data, critical infrastructure, financial information and intellectual property.

Conclusion
There is no whole‑of‑government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some of the agencies we reviewed have poor detection and response practices and procedures. There is a risk that incidents will go undetected longer than they should, and opportunities to contain and restrict the damage may be lost.
Given current weaknesses, the NSW public sector’s ability to detect and respond to incidents needs to improve significantly and quickly. DFSI has started to address this by appointing a Government Chief Information Security Officer (GCISO) to improve cyber security capability across the public sector. Her role includes coordinating efforts to increase the NSW Government’s ability to respond to and recover from whole‑of‑government threats and attacks.

Some of our case study agencies had strong processes for detection and response to cyber security incidents but others had a low capability to detect and respond in a timely way.

Most agencies have access to an automated tool for analysing logs generated by their IT systems. However, coverage of these tools varies. Some agencies do not have an automated tool and only review logs periodically or on an ad hoc basis, meaning they are less likely to detect incidents.

Few agencies have contractual arrangements in place for IT service providers to report incidents to them. If a service provider elects to not report an incident, it will delay the agency’s response and may result in increased damage.

Most case study agencies had procedures for responding to incidents, although some lack guidance on who to notify and when. Some agencies do not have response procedures, limiting their ability to minimise the business damage that may flow from a cyber security incident. Few agencies could demonstrate that they have trained their staff on either incident detection or response procedures and could provide little information on the role requirements and responsibilities of their staff in doing so.

Most agencies’ incident procedures contain limited information on how to report an incident, who to report it to, when this should occur and what information should be provided. None of our case study agencies’ procedures mentioned reporting to DFSI, highlighting that even though reporting is mandatory for most agencies their procedures do not require it.

Case study agencies provided little evidence to indicate they are learning from incidents, meaning that opportunities to better manage future incidents may be lost.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • assist agencies by providing:
    • better practice guidelines for incident detection, response and reporting to help agencies develop their own practices and procedures
    • training and awareness programs, including tailored programs for a range of audiences such as cyber professionals, finance staff, and audit and risk committees
    • role requirements and responsibilities for cyber security across government, relevant to size and complexity of each agency
    • a support model for agencies that have limited detection and response capabilities
       
  • revise the Digital Information Security Policy and Information Security Event Reporting Protocol by
    • clarifying what security incidents must be reported to DFSI and when
    • extending mandatory reporting requirements to those NSW Government agencies not currently covered by the policy and protocol, including State owned corporations.

DFSI lacks a clear mandate or capability to provide effective detection and response support to agencies, and there is limited sharing of information on cyber security incidents.

DFSI does not currently have a clear mandate and the necessary resources and systems to detect, receive, share and respond to cyber security incidents across the NSW public sector. It does not have a clear mandate to assess whether agencies have an acceptable detection and response capability. It is aware of deficiencies in agencies and across whole‑of‑government, and has begun to conduct research into this capability.

Intelligence gathering across the public sector is also limited, meaning agencies may not respond to threats in a timely manner. DFSI has not allocated resources for gathering of threat intelligence and communicating it across government, although it has begun to build this capacity.

Incident reporting to DFSI is mandatory for most agencies, however, most of our case study agencies do not report incidents to DFSI, reducing the likelihood of containing an incident if it spreads to other agencies. When incidents have been reported, DFSI has not provided dedicated resources to assess them and coordinate the public sector’s response. There are currently no formal requirements for DFSI to respond to incidents and no guidance on what it is meant to do if an incident is reported. The lack of central coordination in incident response risks delays and increased damage to multiple agencies.

DFSI's reporting protocol is weak and does not clearly specify what agencies should report and when. This makes agencies less likely to report incidents. The lack of a standard format for incident reporting and a consistent method for assessing an incident, including the level of risk associated with it, also make it difficult for DFSI to determine an appropriate response.

There are limited avenues for sharing information amongst agencies after incidents have been resolved, meaning the public sector may be losing valuable opportunities to improve its protection and response.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • develop whole‑of‑government procedure, protocol and supporting systems to effectively share reported threats and respond to cyber security incidents impacting multiple agencies, including follow-up and communicating lessons learnt
  • develop a means by which agencies can report incidents in a more effective manner, such as a secure online template, that allows for early warnings and standardised details of incidents and remedial advice
  • enhance NSW public sector threat intelligence gathering and sharing including formal links with Australian Government security agencies, other states and the private sector
  • direct agencies to include standard clauses in contracts requiring IT service providers report all cyber security incidents within a reasonable timeframe
  • provide assurance that agencies have appropriate reporting procedures and report to DFSI as required by the policy and protocol by:
    • extending the attestation requirement within the DISP to cover procedures and reporting
    • reviewing a sample of agencies' incident reporting procedures each year.

Published

Actions for Managing demand for ambulance services 2017

Managing demand for ambulance services 2017

Health
Information technology
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives over the past decade to better manage the number of unnecessary ambulance responses and transports to hospital emergency departments. However, there is no overall strategy to guide the development of these initiatives nor do NSW Ambulance's data systems properly monitor their impact. As a result, the Audit Office was unable to assess whether NSW Ambulance's approach to managing demand is improving the efficiency of ambulance services.

Demand for ambulance services is increasing. Demographic factors including population growth and ageing have contributed to this and ongoing growth in demand is likely. It is important that NSW Ambulance finds ways to respond to this demand more efficiently, while maintaining patient safety standards and meeting community expectations.

Most triple zero calls to NSW Ambulance do not involve medical issues that require an emergency response. NSW Ambulance has introduced a range of initiatives to change the way it manages these less urgent requests for assistance. Its major demand management initiatives include using a telephone advice line, referring some patients to services other than hospital emergency departments and using specialist paramedics to respond to less urgent cases.

The role of NSW Ambulance has changed in recent years. It is aiming to become a ‘mobile health service’ that identifies the needs of patients and provides or refers them to the most appropriate type of care. This change involves a significant expansion of the clinical decision-making role of paramedics. Considerable strategic and organisational efforts are required to make this work. The successful implementation of demand management initiatives is important to NSW Ambulance's ability to continue to meet demand for its services.

This audit assessed NSW Ambulance's major demand management initiatives that aim to reduce unnecessary demand for ambulance responses and unnecessary transport to hospital emergency departments. It aimed to assess the extent to which these initiatives have improved the efficiency of its services.

Conclusion

NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives that aim to manage demand for its services from less urgent cases more efficiently. There is no overall strategy for these initiatives and NSW Ambulance’s data systems do not measure their outputs or outcomes. As a result, we are unable to assess the impact of NSW Ambulance's demand management initiatives on the efficiency of ambulance services. More focus is needed to ensure these initiatives achieve the efficiency improvements necessary to help NSW Ambulance meet future increases in demand.

Increasing demand for ambulance services is a key issue for NSW Ambulance. Demand has increased at a faster rate than population growth in recent years and continued growth is expected. NSW Ambulance has introduced several initiatives that aim to manage demand for its services from people with less urgent medical issues more efficiently and align its approach with the rest of the health system in New South Wales.

These individual initiatives lack a broader strategy to guide their development. NSW Ambulance’s demand management initiatives also lack clear goals and performance targets, with insufficient organisational resources allocated to support their implementation. NSW Ambulance does not have a data system that allows it to conduct accurate routine monitoring of the activity and performance of these initiatives.

More effort is required to make demand management initiatives a core part of NSW Ambulance's work. Key relationships with other health services to support demand management initiatives have only recently been established. NSW Ambulance has not communicated proactively with the public about its demand management initiatives. To ensure paramedics are as well prepared as possible for their expanded roles, they need better professional development and up to date technology.

Demand for ambulance services in New South Wales is increasing steadily. Forecast future increases in demand due to population growth and ageing mean that NSW Ambulance must improve its efficiency to maintain its performance.

Demand for ambulance services is growing at a rate higher than population growth. The increase in demand is likely to continue as the population continues to grow and age. NSW Ambulance has made several recent changes to remove large parts of demand for its services, including moving non-emergency patient transport to a separate government agency and changing the way triple zero calls are categorised.

These changes were expected to improve emergency response time performance, but the anticipated improvements have not been achieved. If demand continues to increase as forecast, NSW Ambulance will need to find more efficient ways to manage demand to maintain its performance.

NSW Ambulance has introduced initiatives to change the way it manages demand from patients who have less urgent medical issues. These have the potential to achieve positive results, but we were unable to fully assess their impact because of weaknesses in data systems and monitoring. More needs to be done to demonstrate progress toward the efficiency improvements required.

NSW Ambulance uses a telephone referral system to manage triple zero calls from people with medical issues that do not require an ambulance. This has the potential to achieve efficiency improvements but there are weaknesses in NSW Ambulance's use and monitoring of this system. Paramedics are now able to make decisions about whether patients need transport to a hospital emergency department. NSW Ambulance does not routinely measure or monitor the decisions paramedics make, so it does not know whether these decisions are improving efficiency. Extended Care Paramedics who have additional skills in diagnosing and treating patients with less urgent medical issues were introduced in 2007. NSW Ambulance analysis indicates that these paramedics have the potential to improve efficiency, but have not been used as effectively as possible.

Our 2013 audit of NSW Ambulance found that accurate monitoring of activity and performance was not being conducted. More than four years later, this remains the case. 

NSW Ambulance has recognised the need to change the way it manages demand and has developed initiatives that have the potential to improve efficiency. However, there are significant weaknesses in the strategy for and implementation of its demand management initiatives.

NSW Ambulance has identified the goal of moving from an emergency transport provider to a mobile health service and developed several initiatives to support this. Its demand management initiatives have the potential to contribute to the broader policy directions for the health system in New South Wales. However, there is no clear overall strategy guiding these initiatives and their implementation has been poor.

NSW Ambulance's reasons for changing its approach to demand management have not been communicated proactively to the community. Demand management initiatives that have been operating for over a decade still do not have clear performance measures or targets. Project management of new initiatives has been inadequate, with insufficient organisational resources to oversee them and inadequate engagement with other healthcare providers.

NSW Ambulance uses an in-house Vocational Education and Training course to recruit some paramedics, as well as recruiting paramedics who have completed a university degree. No other Australian ambulance services continue to provide their own Vocational Education and Training qualifications. Paramedics will need more support in several key areas to be able to fulfil their expanded roles in providing a mobile health service. Performance and development systems for paramedics are not used effectively. Up to date technology would help paramedics make better decisions and improve NSW Ambulance's ability to monitor demand management activity.

There are gaps in NSW Ambulance's oversight of the risks of some of the initiatives it has introduced, particularly its lack of information on the outcomes for patients who are not transported to hospital. Weaknesses in the way NSW Ambulance uses its data limit its ability to properly assess the risks of the demand management initiatives it has introduced.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #295 - released 13 December 2017

Published

Actions for Passenger Rail Punctuality

Passenger Rail Punctuality

Transport
Information technology
Infrastructure
Service delivery

Rail agencies are well placed to manage the forecast increase in passengers up to 2019, including joining the Sydney Metro Northwest to the network at Chatswood. Their plans and strategies are evidence-based, and mechanisms to assure effective implementation are sound.

Based on forecast patronage increases, the rail agencies will find it hard to maintain punctuality after 2019 unless the capacity of the network to carry trains and people is increased significantly. If recent higher than forecast patronage growth continues, the network may struggle to maintain punctuality before 2019.

A NSW Government priority is to ‘maintain or improve reliability of public transport services over the next four years’. Punctuality is a key element of reliability, and the level of patronage is a critical factor in the ability to maintain punctuality. Increasing patronage places pressure on the length of time trains need to wait at stations to load and offload passengers which can lead to delays. The NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan forecasts that rail patronage could increase by 26 per cent between 2012 and 2031.  

Passenger rail services in NSW are provided under a purchaser-provider model. Transport for NSW enters contracts with:

  • Sydney Trains for Sydney suburban passenger rail services
  • NSW Trains for services that commence or terminate outside Sydney, including intercity services that operate between Central station and the South Coast, Southern Highlands, Blue Mountains and Central Coast and Newcastle.

Transport for NSW sets performance targets and standards for these services, develops the timetables, procures trains for the service providers, and is responsible for long term planning.

This audit assessed whether these rail agencies have plans and strategies to maintain or improve performance in getting the growing number of suburban and intercity rail passengers to their destinations on time.

Conclusion:

Rail agencies are well placed to manage the forecast increase in passengers up to 2019, including joining the Sydney Metro Northwest to the network at Chatswood. Their plans and strategies are evidence-based, and mechanisms to assure effective implementation are sound.

Based on forecast patronage increases, the rail agencies will find it hard to maintain punctuality after 2019 unless the capacity of the network to carry trains and people is increased significantly. If recent higher than forecast patronage growth continues, the network may struggle to maintain punctuality before 2019.

Transport for NSW has undertaken considerable work on developing strategies to increase capacity and maintain punctuality after 2019, but remains some way from putting a costed plan to the government. There is a significant risk that investments will not be made soon enough to handle future patronage levels. Ideally, planning and investment decisions should have been made already.

Punctuality measurement is satisfactory, but agencies could publish more information

Passenger rail punctuality indicators adopted in NSW are good practice. The key train punctuality indicator is better than indicators used by many other rail operators. It is also better than the on-time-running indicator that it replaced. Unlike the on-time-running indicator, the punctuality indicator classifies trains that have been cancelled or skipped stations as late and results are not adjusted to take account of delays caused by factors such as extreme weather or police operations.

NSW also has a customer delay measure which represents good practice. Work has started on refining and embedding customer delay as a key performance measure for the planned new Rail Operations Centre.

As train frequency approaches a ‘turn up and go’ level of service, rather than running to a timetable, more emphasis will need to be placed on excess waiting time and customer delay when assessing performance.

Measurement of punctuality is reasonably precise. There are some measurement inaccuracies which should be addressed, such as the estimated arrival time of a train being incorrect at some destination stations, but these do not affect punctuality results materially.  

Train punctuality is reported publicly, but not to the detail of the indicators in the contracts between Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. There is very limited public reporting of customer delay.

Overall punctuality is good, but some services are relatively poor

System-wide train punctuality has usually exceeded target since 2005, but some services suffer from poor punctuality compared to the rest of the network.  

The part of the network around North Sydney is creating problems for the punctuality of afternoon peak services heading through it and out to Western Sydney and to Hornsby via Strathfield. Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains are well advanced with strategies to address this up to 2019.  

The East Hills express trains in the afternoon peak also performed well below target. The rail agencies recently analysed this issue and believe it relates to the train timetable and signalling which restricts how close trains can run behind each other into Campbelltown. It further advises that this will be corrected over the next three years.  

Intercity train punctuality is below that of suburban trains and there was an extended period of declining punctuality between 2011 and 2014. Transport for NSW suggested that the old age of trains is a factor, and the recently announced intercity fleet acquisition may help address this. Apart from ensuring that train crew and station staff are available and perform their duties adequately, NSW Trains can do little to impact the punctuality of its intercity services directly. Train maintenance, track and signal maintenance, and management of trains on the rail network are performed by Sydney Trains. NSW Trains’ ability to influence improvement is hampered by key indicators in some contracts being undefined. Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are now working collaboratively to make improvements to the contracts.

Initiatives are in place or are planned to deliver good punctuality until 2019

Patronage increases, which can lead to overcrowding and trains having to wait longer at stations, are likely to present a significant challenge to maintaining punctuality into the future.

Based on patronage projections, the rail agencies have strategies to maintain punctuality up to and including joining the Sydney Metro Northwest to the network at Chatswood in 2019. These include improving infrastructure at particular parts of the network, increasing staff training, reducing the number of speed restrictions, and a new Rail Operations Centre. The projects are being managed by experienced staff, with good governance arrangements, quality assurance processes and planning systems in place. New timetables should provide more services and cater for more passengers, including off peak. They should increase network efficiency through better utilisation of capacity, but some passengers may face longer journey times and more may need to change trains mid-journey.  

The planned Rail Operations Centre has the potential to make operational decision-making more customer-focussed, by placing more emphasis on minimising customer delay during disruptions. If implemented well, it will also generate information to help agencies better identify the root cause of incidents that delay trains and improve communication with passengers so they can make better real-time travel decisions.

Predicted passenger growth presents a risk to punctuality after 2019

The rail system will struggle to maintain punctuality much beyond 2019 based on current patronage forecasts and system limitations.

From 2024, the Sydney Metro City and Southwest will help by extending the metro network from Chatswood under Sydney Harbour, through the city and out to Bankstown. Announced fleet upgrades will also help. Transport for NSW advises that it is also working with the Greater Sydney Commission to ensure network capacity constraints are considered in future urban planning.

In addition to investment in new metro networks, sustained and substantial investment needs to be made into the existing heavy rail network to meet demand and ensure its ongoing reliability. Transport for NSW has been developing strategies for this purpose, including an Advanced Train Control system. Its aim is to put a costed plan to the government by the third quarter of this (2017) calendar year. Given the likely lead times involved with major infrastructure projects, there remains a significant risk of poor punctuality after 2019.

Punctuality could be at risk sooner if recent patronage growth continues

If patronage continues to increase at a faster rate than forecast, particularly during the morning peak, the network will struggle to cope before 2019. Transport for NSW forecast that between 2011 and 2026 morning peak rail patronage would increase each year by approximately 3.3 per cent. Between 2011 and 2016 the number of passengers travelling to the city during the morning peak grew by an average of 4.4 per cent each year, including annual growth of 6.6 per cent since May 2014.

A good understanding of patronage levels, trends and drivers is critical to effective planning. The audit identified some shortcomings in measurement of peak passenger loads. Transport for NSW advised that measurement approaches have been improved recently, and this will soon flow into improved data quality.  

Given the increasing flexibility in work practices available to many city workers, the relatively new field of behavioural insights may offer opportunities to ‘nudge’ some passengers away from travelling at the height of the peak with benefits for them and the network.

  1. Transport for NSW should ensure that programs to address rail patronage growth over the next five to ten years are provided to the government for Cabinet consideration as soon as possible.
     
  2. Sydney Trains and Transport for NSW should:
    a) maintain effective oversight and resourcing for all strategies designed to address rail patronage growth
    b) adjust strategies for any patronage growth above projection.
     
  3. Sydney Trains, NSW Trains and Transport for NSW should publish Customer Delay results by June 2018.
     
  4. Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains should agree by December 2017:
    a) specific performance requirements for intercity train, track and signal availability and reliability
    b) guidelines for train priorities during disruptions and indicators of control centre performance in implementing these guidelines.
     
  5. Sydney Trains, NSW Trains and Transport for NSW should by June 2018:
    a) improve the accuracy of patronage measurement and develop a better understanding of patronage growth trends
    b) address small errors in the adjustment factors used for determining a train’s punctuality status
    c) improve their understanding of the factors impacting on intercity punctuality.
     
  6. Transport for NSW should, commencing June 2017, explore the potential to use behavioural insights to encourage more passengers to travel outside the height of the morning peak (8 am to 9 am).

Published

Actions for CBD and South East Light Rail Project

CBD and South East Light Rail Project

Transport
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Risk

Transport for NSW did not effectively plan and procure the CBD and South East Light Rail (CSELR) project to achieve best value for money according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.

Transport for NSW is on track to deliver the project, but it will come at a higher cost with lower benefits than in the approved business case.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #278 - released 30 November 2016

Published

Actions for Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative

Implementation of the NSW Government’s program evaluation initiative

Industry
Justice
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Treasury
Environment
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

The NSW Government’s ‘program evaluation initiative’, introduced to assess whether service delivery programs achieve expected outcomes and value for money, is largely ineffective according to a report released today by NSW Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford.

Government services, in areas such as public order and safety, health and education, are delivered by agencies through a variety of programs. In 2016–17, the NSW Government estimates that it will spend over $73 billion on programs to deliver services.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #277 - released 3 November 2016

Published

Actions for Red tape reduction

Red tape reduction

Premier and Cabinet
Finance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Regulation
Shared services and collaboration

Overall, NSW Government initiatives and processes to prevent and reduce red tape were not effective, according to a report released today by the NSW Auditor-General.

In 2015, the Government reported that its red tape reduction initiatives, implemented between 2011 and 2015, had resulted in $896 million in savings. While these initiatives resulted in some savings, the total value of savings is unknown because estimates for some initiatives were based on unverified assumptions, cost transfers or unrealised projections.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #272 - released 25 August 2016

Published

Actions for Security of critical IT infrastructure

Security of critical IT infrastructure

Transport
Planning
Compliance
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk

Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW have deployed many controls to protect traffic management systems but these would have been only partially effective in detecting and preventing incidents and unlikely to support a timely response. There was a potential for unauthorised access to sensitive information and systems that could have disrupted traffic.
 
Until Roads and Maritime Services’ IT disaster recovery site is fully commissioned, a disaster involving the main data centre is likely to lead to higher congestion in the short-term as traffic controllers would be operating on a regional basis without the benefit of the Traffic Management Centre.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #248 - released 21 January 2015

Published

Actions for Managing IT Services Contracts

Managing IT Services Contracts

Finance
Health
Justice
Compliance
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Project management
Risk

Neither agency (NSW Ministry of Health and NSW Police Force) demonstrated that they continued to get value for money over the life of these long term contracts or that they had effectively managed all critical elements of the three contracts we reviewed post award. This is because both agencies treated contract extensions or renewals as simply continuing previous contractual arrangements, rather than as establishing a new contract and financial commitment. Consequently, there was not a robust analysis of the continuing need for the mix and quantity of services being provided or an assessment of value for money in terms of the prices being paid.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #220 - released 1 February 2012

Published

Actions for Government Licensing Project

Government Licensing Project

Finance
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Shared services and collaboration

The Government Licensing Project (GLP) is standardising and simplifying processes of agencies which issue licences. However, it is currently running over the original anticipated completion date, exceeding the original budget and expected to produce savings less than originally planned.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #192 - released 7 October 2009

Published

Actions for Signal failures on the metropolitan rail network

Signal failures on the metropolitan rail network

Transport
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

Between 2004 and 2006, the number of signalling failures, signalling downtime and the number of trains delayed as a result of signal failures all fell. RailCorp’s on-time running performance improved over the same period. The fall in failures is a clear indication of improved performance. Changes in the definition of on-time and to the timetable during 2005 and 2006 however make it difficult to determine whether improvements in response downtime and signalling delays are due to a true performance improvement. To build upon this strong base, RailCorp needs to determine with more confidence the number and duration of signalling failures the network can tolerate without impacting on service levels.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #170 - released 15 August 2007