This report covers the findings and recommendations from the 2018–19 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector. The 40 agencies selected for this report constitute around 84 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

The report provides insights into the effectiveness of controls and governance processes across the NSW public sector. It evaluates how agencies identify, mitigate and manage risks related to:

• financial controls
• information technology controls
• gifts and benefits
• internal audit
• contingent labour
• sensitive data.

The Auditor-General recommended that agencies do more to prioritise and address vulnerabilities in their internal controls and governance. The Auditor-General also recommended agencies increase the transparency of their management of gifts and benefits by publishing their registers on their websites.

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of 40 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector for the year ended 30 June 2019.

1. Internal control trends

2. Information technology controls

3. Gifts and benefits

4. Internal audit

5. Managing contingent labour

6. Managing sensitive data

This report covers the findings and recommendations from our 2018–19 financial audits that relate to internal controls and governance at 40 of the largest agencies (refer to Appendix three) in the NSW public sector. The 40 agencies selected for this volume constitute around 84 per cent of total expenditure for all NSW public sector agencies.

Although the report includes several agencies that have changed as a result of the Machinery of Government changes that were effective from 1 July 2019, its focus on sector wide issues and insights means that its findings remain relevant to NSW public sector agencies, including newly formed agencies that have assumed the functions of abolished agencies.

This report offers insights into internal controls and governance in the NSW public sector

This is the third report dedicated to internal controls and governance at NSW State Government agencies. The report provides insights into the effectiveness of controls and governance processes in the NSW public sector by:

• highlighting the potential risks posed by weaknesses in controls and governance processes
• helping agencies benchmark the adequacy of their processes against their peers
• focusing on new and emerging risks, and the internal controls and governance processes that might address those risks.

Without strong governance systems and internal controls, agencies increase the risks associated with effectively managing their finances and delivering services to citizens. For example, if they do not have strong information technology controls, sensitive information may be at risk of unauthorised access and misuse.

Areas of specific focus of the report have changed since last year

Last year's report topics included transparency and performance reporting, management of purchasing cards and taxi use, and fraud and corruption control. We are reporting on new topics this year and re-visiting agency management of gifts and benefits, which we first covered in our 2017 report. Re-visiting topics from prior years provides a baseline to show the NSW public sectors’ progress implementing appropriate internal controls and governance processes to mitigate existing, new and emerging risks in the public sector.

Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. We select a range of measures and report on those that present heightened risks for agencies to mitigate. This year the report focusses on:

• internal control trends
• information technology controls, including access to agency systems
• protecting sensitive information held within agencies
• managing large and diverse workforces (controls around employing and managing contingent workers)
• maintaining an ethical culture (management of gifts and benefits)
• effectiveness of internal audit function and its oversight by Audit and Risk Committees.

The findings in this report should not be used to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of individual agency control environments and governance arrangements. Specific financial reporting, internal controls and audit observations are included in the individual 2019 cluster financial audit reports, which will be tabled in parliament from November to December 2019.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

• operate effectively and efficiently
• produce reliable financial reports
• comply with laws and regulations
• support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this report presents this year’s controls and governance findings in more detail.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to manage gifts and benefits. 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency internal audit functions.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of agency controls to on-board, manage and off-board contingent labour.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations, arising from our review of governance and processes in relation to the management of sensitive data.

Appendix one – List of 2019 recommendations 

Appendix two – Status of 2018 recommendations

Appendix three – In-scope agencies

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford, has released her report on the State Finances for the year ended 30 June 2019.

‘I am pleased to once again report that I issued an unmodified audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements,’ the Auditor-General said.

The report acknowledges NSW Treasury and agency efforts to reduce the number and value of errors compared with the previous year. ‘Strong financial management and transparent reporting are key elements of our system of government. Treasury and agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions at the time of their execution. This will ensure agencies assess the accounting implications earlier and support accurate financial statements being presented for audit on a timely basis,’ said the Auditor-General.

The report summarises the financial audit result of the Total State Sector Accounts. The Total State Sector comprises 304 entities controlled by the NSW Government with total assets of $468 billion and total liabilities of $218 billion.

The General Government sector comprises 212 entities that provide goods and services that are funded centrally by the State. General Government expenditure grew by 5.5 per cent in 2018-19, which was below the long-term revenue growth of 5.6 per cent target established by the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012.

Download PDF of State Finances 2019 report

Pursuant to the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983, I present my Report on State Finances 2019.

Strong financial management and transparent reporting are key elements of our system of government.

I am pleased to once again report that I issued an unmodified audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements. 

The number of errors in agencies’ 2018–19 financial statements fell to six compared to the 23 recorded in 2017–18. This reflects Treasury’s focus on early close and the resolution of complex accounting matters before submission. Agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions and commercial transactions to assess their accounting impacts at the time of their execution, rather than at the end of a financial year. This would improve the quality of financial reporting and avoid the need for extensions for agencies to submit their financial statements for audit.

To further increase transparency, a Key Audit Matters section was included in my Independent Auditor Report on the Total State Sector Accounts this year. This explains those matters considered most significant to the conduct of the audit and requiring significant management judgement.

Looking forward, certain factors have the potential to impact the accuracy and completeness of the Total State Sector Accounts in coming years. First, three new accounting standards are effective from 1 July 2019 and a fourth from 1 July 2020. Transitioning to new standards requires significant planning and resources to ensure the impacts are appropriately assessed and accounted for. Second, the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 will be implemented in stages over three years to 2020–21. This Act is intended to focus on performance, transparency, accountability, and efficiency of financial management in the government sector. I encourage agencies to build their awareness of this important reform and ensure their alignment with the principles of the Act. 

I want to thank Treasury staff for the way they engaged with my staff in the conduct of the audit. Our partnership is critical to ensuring the quality of financial management and reporting.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General, 10 October 2019

Our audit opinion on the State’s 2018–19 financial statements was unmodified. There were fewer reported errors but earlier resolution of accounting matters is still required.

Our audit opinion on the State’s 2018–19 financial statements was unmodified.

This year, six errors exceeding $20 million were found in agencies’ 2018–19 financial statements that make up the State’s consolidated financial statements. The total value of these errors was $927 million compared to $3.8 billion in 2017–18. The errors identified in 2018–19 resulted from:

• incorrectly applying Australian Accounting Standards and Treasury Policies
• using inappropriate assumptions and inaccurate data
• incorrectly assessing the fair value of non-current physical assets.

The introduction of mandatory ‘early close procedures’ in 2011–12, saw the number of errors in agencies’ financial statements fall progressively, to a low of five in 2015–16.

In 2016–17, Treasury narrowed the scope of its mandatory early close procedures to focus on non-current physical asset valuations and pro-forma financial statements. Following this, the number of significant errors increased to 23 in 2017–18, the

highest number in six years and similar to the numbers identified before mandatory early close procedures were introduced.

In 2018–19, Treasury and agencies’ refocused their efforts around early close procedures and other year-end processes resulting in this year’s lower error total of six.

Errors in agency financial statements exceeding $20m (2015–2019)

Correction of prior year’s reported values    

Correction of earthwork assets ($2.1 billion)

Some of the State’s earthworks were first valued in 2016–17. These included earth excavations and embankments for the Country Rail and Metropolitan Network created before the year 2000 and dating back to the early 1900s.

For many years, the State did not account for earthworks because it believed the value could not be reliably measured. In 2016–17, the State engaged an external valuer who identified a methodology showing the earthworks could be valued. That valuer performed a valuation using topography maps for the Country Rail Network (CRN) because information in this earthworks database was of poor quality and incomplete. The valuation resulted in the State recognising $7.5 billion of earthworks for the first time in 2016–17. This was disclosed as a prior period error.

Over the following years, the State improved the quality of the CRN earthworks database by engaging an engineering firm to perform more detailed earthworks surveys. The work involved the use of technology to survey most of the CRN lines.

In 2018–19, the State once again engaged an external valuer to assess the fair value of the CRN earthworks. The valuer determined that incorrect assumptions were used in the 2016–17 valuation. These primarily related to land elevations, which were corrected in the earthworks database and this resulted in a new fair value of $5.4 billion, $2.1 billion less than the previous valuation. The error reported in the 2017–18 value has been corrected in the 2018–2019 financial statements to reflect the revised value.

Previously reported value for earthworks reduced from $7.5 billion to $5.4 billion.

Correction of museum collection assets ($27 million)

The Australian Museum’s collection assets were restated by $27 million to $800 million in 2017–18.

After the 2017–18 financial statements were published, the Australian Museum identified additional collection assets that were not included in the original valuation. This resulted in a $27 million error relating to collection asset values. As last year’s valuation was based on an incomplete listing of collection assets, the 2017-18 value has been corrected in the 2018–19 financial statements to reflect the revised value.

Correction of lease liability ($46.2 million)

On 1 July 1995, the Department of Justice entered into a 25-year lease arrangement with an option to extend for a further 15 years.

The Department accounted for the arrangement as a finance lease by recognising a building asset and a corresponding finance lease liability for the period of 25 years. The Department depreciated the leased asset based on a useful life of 40 years.

As it was reasonably certain the Department would exercise the lease option at inception, it should have recognised a liability that reflected the entire 40 year lease period. To correct the prior year error and properly reflect the extended lease period, the Department of Justice increased the lease liability and decreased retained earnings by $46.2 million as at 1 July 2017.

Abuse Claims remain a significant contingent liability of the State

The State discloses a contingent liability in its financial statements when the possibility of settling the liability in the future is considered less than probable, but more likely than remote, or the amount of the obligation cannot be measured with sufficient reliability.

If the expected settlement subsequently becomes probable and reliably estimable, a provision is recognised.

The State has numerous contingent liabilities. Some are quantifiable while others are not. As contingent liabilities are potentially material future liabilities of the State, every effort should be made to quantify these as accurately as possible. They also need to be monitored closely to ensure that they are recognised and brought on balance sheet as they crystallise.

At 30 June 2019, NSW Self Insurance Corporation (SiCorp) could not reliably measure the claims liability arising from past incidences of abuse that occurred within NSW Government institutions which have not yet been reported. These are referred to as incurred but not reported claims (IBNR).

Since 1 July 2018, victims of child sexual abuse can opt to claim compensation through the National Redress Scheme, or to lodge a civil claim. Civil claims for incidents that occurred within NSW Government institutions may be covered by SiCorp. An estimate of an IBNR for child abuse claims within SiCorp will be impacted by the extent that victims claim compensation through redress as compared to civil claims.

Recent legislative changes have added further uncertainty to estimating the extent of IBNR claims. SiCorp requires more reliable data on the number of IBNR child abuse claims and the expected average size of the related payments. As such, the liabilities presented in the SiCorp and the State financial statements do not include an allowance for IBNR abuse claims.

As more information becomes available it may be possible for SiCorp to reasonably estimate the value of abuse claim liabilities. It is possible that such an estimate may be material to SiCorp and the State’s financial statements. 

TAFE update

In prior years we reported on information system limitations at TAFE NSW, specifically relating to its student administration system. TAFE NSW continues to implement additional processes to verify the accuracy and completeness of revenue from student fees for the 2018–19 financial year.

In 2017–18 TAFE NSW started implementing a new student management system. Significant delays have occurred in implementing this system, mainly due to the complexity of integrating the vendor solution with the requirements of TAFE. TAFE will now bring the final commissioning and operation of the system in house. Final project delivery timeframes and estimated completion costs are being reviewed. Costs incurred to date amount to $67 million. The original budget for this new system is $89.4 million.

Light Rail settlement

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a new twelve kilometre light rail network for Sydney, currently under construction. Passenger trips are set to begin on the light rail by December between Circular Quay and Randwick. The second stage from Randwick to Kingsford is planned to open in March 2020. The original budget for construction work of $1.6 billion was revised to $2.1 billion in 2014.

The State Government has been in dispute with the firm responsible for delivering and operating the CBD and South East light rail project. In May 2019, the parties reached a Settlement Arrangement resulting in the State agreeing to pay a settlement amount of $576 million, which is in addition to the revised budget. Transport has advised a final cost is still to be determined following project completion.

The Audit Office has commenced a follow up audit on the CBD South East Light Rail. This audit will consider whether recommendations of our previous audit have been implemented. We will also review the current status and budget of this project.

Sydney Metro Northwest project commissioning

The Sydney Metro North West officially opened in May 2019.

In constructing the metro, some assets were built to facilitate its operation. These included pavements, roadworks, and electricity
and water connections.

When the project was completed, the assets and the responsibility for maintaining them transferred to third parties, primarily Councils and utility providers. In 2018–19, the State expensed (derecognised) the assets, valued at $306 million, because it no longer controlled them.

Financial Reporting by Crown Land Reserve Trusts

Approximately 700 reserve trusts, managed by Trust Boards, did not prepare the financial statements at 30 June 2019 as required by the
Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

These Crown reserves contain showgrounds, cemeteries, racecourses, local parks, and other community facilities and public areas. Some of the Crown reserves have independent streams of revenue from user charges.

In 2016–17, Treasury determined that NSW cemetery trusts and a holiday park reserve trust were controlled entities of the State. As such, the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 requires them to prepare financial statements and have these audited by the Auditor-General.

In 2017–18, three reserve trusts accepted NSW Treasury’s view, prepared financial statements and had them audited by the Auditor-General.

However, three cemetery reserve trusts continue to maintain they are not controlled by the State and therefore their financial statements are not audited by the Audit Office. These cemeteries shared their unaudited financial statements with Treasury so they could be incorporated into the State’s financial statements. At 30 June 2019, the value of their combined assets and liabilities, which are not audited by the Audit Office, was $564 million.

The State included an additional $319 million in assets that relate to Crown land values of approximately 700 reserve trusts that did not prepare or submit financial statements.

We performed additional audit procedures to obtain some assurance over the value of these crown lands. The nature and extent of the limitations to the scope of these procedures was not significant enough to impact our audit opinion. Treasury should ensure these trusts comply with the requirements of the Public Finance and Audit Act.

Derecognition of investment in City West Housing

In 2017–18, the State had an equity investment of $680 million in a community housing provider, City West Housing Pty Limited (CWH).

During 2018–19, CWH amended its constitution to ensure alignment with its charitable status. The unintended impact of this change was that on windup the net assets would not be distributed to the State. The accounting implications to the State’s investment was not considered by Treasury at the time of approving the amended constitution. Consequently, the State wrote off its $680 million investment in CWH in 2018–19.

It is important that accounting impacts of such changes are discussed and agreed upon early. At the time of approving the decision to change the constitution, all accounting implications should be made available and understood. Such information is relevant when approving decisions. The theme of what is relevant
information will be explored further in our Performance Audit of ‘Advice on Major Decisions’.

Machinery of government (MoG) changes refers to how the government reorganises agency structures and functions and realigns ministerial responsibilities.

Cluster changes

On 2 April 2019, the Government reorganised public sector agencies into eight clusters (ten in 2017–18) with effect from 1 July 2019.

Prior to 30 June 2019, two subsequent administrative arrangement orders were made to amend and finalise the MoG changes.

The key MoG changes included:

• abolishing the following five departments:
  • Finance, Services and Innovation
  • Industry
  • Planning and Environment
  • Family and Communities
  • Justice
• transferring their functions into three new departments:
  • Department of Customer Service
  • Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
  • Department of Communities and Justice

The State’s consolidated financial statements at 30 June 2019 were not impacted by the changes, as they were effective from 1 July 2019.

The chart below shows the cluster arrangements before and after the MoG changes to the General Government Sector. It compares total budgeted expenses presented in the 2018–19 and 2019–20 Budget Papers (1).

Each cluster’s share of the General Government Sector’s (GGS) total expenditure remains relatively unchanged after the MoG changes. Further details on other functions transferred between clusters are detailed in the 2019–20 Budget Papers.

Of the clusters, Education is affected most by the MoG changes from the perspective of increased expenditure in the 2019–20 budget. This is because the TAFE Commission transferred into this cluster from the former Department of Industry on 1 July 2019, resulting in a corresponding decrease in the new Planning, Industry and Environment cluster’s expenditure.

Cluster expenses

$1.2 billion surplus, $0.2 billion below 2018–19 budget of $1.4 billion

The Total State Sector comprises 304 entities controlled by the NSW Government.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 212 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.
The non-General Government Sector, which comprises 92 Government businesses, generally provides goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services that consumers pay for directly.

A principal measure of a Government’s overall performance is its Net Operating Balance (Budget Result). This is the difference
between the cost of General Government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

What changed from 2018 to 2019?

The State maintained its AAA credit rating.

The object of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 is to maintain the State’s AAA credit rating.

The Government manages NSW’s finances in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (the Act).

The Act establishes the framework for fiscal responsibility and the strategy to protect the State’s AAA credit rating and service delivery to the people of New South Wales.

The legislation sets out targets and principles for financial management to achieve this.

New South Wales has credit ratings of AAA/Stable from Standard & Poor’s and Aaa/Stable from Moody’s Investors Service.

The fiscal targets for achieving this objective are:

General Government annual expenditure growth is lower than long term average revenue growth.

General Government expenditure grew by 5.5 per cent in 2018–19 (5.1 per cent in 2017–18 based on restated balances). This was slightly below the long-term revenue growth rate of 5.6 per cent.

Eliminating unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.

The Act sets a target to eliminate unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.

The State’s funding plan is to contribute amounts escalated by five per cent each year so the schemes will be fully funded by 2030. In 2018–19, the State made employer contributions of $1.73 billion ($1.67 billion in 2017–18), an increase of $64 million or 3.8 per cent ($52 million or 3.2 per cent in 2017–18). This was under the five per cent target by $19.5 million.

For fiscal responsibility purposes, the State uses AASB 1056: Superannuation Entities. This accounting standard discounts superannuation liabilities using the expected return from the assets backing the liability.

Using this method, the State’s unfunded superannuation liability was $13.2 billion at 30 June 2019 ($14.0 billion).

Superannuation funding position since inception of the Act - AASB 1056 Valuation

State revenues fell $604 million to $86.1 billion in 2018–19    

In the prior years, revenue growth was underpinned by cyclical increases in land tax, payroll tax and one-off large stamp duty receipts from the lease of the State’s electricity network assets. In 2018–19, the State’s revenue fell by $604 million to $86.1 billion ($86.7 million in 2017–18).

Taxation revenue remained relatively stable

Taxation revenue only grew slightly, mainly due to:

• a $517 million increase in payroll tax from NSW wages growth
• a $469 million increase in land tax from growth in land values
• offset by a $1.2 billion decrease in stamp duty due to lower than expected growth in the property market. This decrease would have been higher had the State not received $555 million in stamp duty from the new 51 per cent owner of WestConnex.

The gap between payroll tax and stamp duty reduced significantly in 2018–19. Stamp duty still remains the largest source of revenue for the State at $9.2 billion, only $42 million above payroll tax.

Australian Government grants and subsidies

The State received $31.8 billion in grants and subsidies from the Australian Government, $158 million less than the previous year. This was due to falls in other grants and subsidies of $98 million and GST revenues of $48 million.

GST revenues fell due to weaker growth in national consumption expenditure and a smaller GST pool. The GST pool represents funds made available by the Commonwealth for transfer to the States as untied financial assistance. The allocation of GST is determined by the Commonwealth, not the State.

A $392 million decrease in National Partnership Payments was offset by a $380 million increase in Specific Purpose Payments.
 
In 2018–19, sales of goods and services fell $395 million mainly due to the sale of WestConnex.

Other dividends and distributions fell by $122 million due to lower distributions from associates. This reflected weaker performance in the electricity sector (Ausgrid and Endeavour) resulting in lower distributions paid to the State following changes in the Electricity Network Service Providers regulatory environment and the sale of Snowy Hydro Pty Ltd in 2017–18.

Fines, regulatory fees and other revenues increased by $242 million largely from mineral royalties. The increase was attributed to strong demand across Asian markets for coal exports, which the State expects will continue to experience steady growth.

Expenses increased $4 billion to $87.9 billion in 2018–19    

Overall, the State’s expenses increased 4.8 per cent in 2018–19 compared to 2017–18. Most of the increase was due to higher employee expenses, operating costs and grants and subsidies.

Employee expenses, including superannuation, increased by 3.9 per cent to $40.3 billion.

Salaries and wages increased to $40.3 billion in 2018–19 from $38.8 billion 2017–18. This was mainly due to salary and wage increases. The Government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Operating expenses increased 6.1 per cent from 2017–18.

Within operating expenses, payments for supplies, services and other expenses increased due to:

• increased operating costs associated with the commencement of the new Sydney Metro
• higher operating activity levels experienced in the Health sector resulting in higher visiting medical officer costs, surgical supplies and information management costs
• higher school operating expenses in Education, mainly relating to teaching cloud tools and purchase of computer equipment.

Health costs remain the highest expense of the State.

The following clusters have the highest expenses as a percentage of total government expenses:

• Health - 25.8 per cent (24.6 per cent in 2017–18)
• Education - 20 per cent (18.5 per cent)
• Transport - 14.7 per cent (17.6 per cent).

Other, mainly relates to Economic Affairs, Housing and Community, Recreation and Culture functions of the State.

Transport expenses have decreased in 2018–19 mainly due to the sale of WestConnex. This is partially offset by costs associated with the new Sydney Metro, which commenced operations from 1 July 2018. The graph highlights annual expenditure by function in 2018–19 compared to 2017–18.

Grants and subsidies increased by $782 million to $11.7 billion.

This was mainly due to:

• the $239 million Emergency Drought Relief Package
• a $226 million increase in funding to the Human Services sector to deliver key election commitments, including 5,000 more nurses and midwives
• $123 million in funding for sporting facilities and creating NSW Centre's of Excellence.

Assets grew by $26.7 billion to $468 billion in 2018–19    

Overall, the States total assets increased by $26.7 billion to $468 billion in 2018–19. This is a six per cent increase compared to 2017–18. Most of this was due to increases in carrying value of the State’s physical assets and investments.

Valuing the State's physical assets

The State’s physical assets were valued at $352 billion at 30 June 2019.

The State’s physical assets include land and buildings ($166 billion) and infrastructure ($168 billion). The value of the State’s physical assets at 30 June 2018 was restated from $339 billion to $337 billion. The restatement was required to correct errors in the fair value of earthworks previously reported at $7.5 billion and subsequently corrected to $5.4 billion.

Our audits assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of assumptions used to value physical assets. This includes
obtaining an understanding of the valuation methodologies used and judgements made. We also review the completeness of asset registers and the mathematical accuracy of valuation models.

Net movements between years include additions, disposals, depreciation and valuations. The State’s physical assets increased by $15.2 billion compared with 2017–18.

Movement in the State's physical assets

Liabilities increased $28.6 billion to $217.5 billion in 2018–19    

The State relies on actuarial assessments to value its liabilities

Nearly half of the State’s liabilities relate to its employees. They include unfunded superannuation and employee benefits, such as long service and recreation leave.

Valuing these obligations involves complex estimation techniques and significant judgements. Small changes in assumptions can materially impact balances in the financial statements, such as a lower discount rate.

Superannuation obligations rose by $14.3 billion.

The State’s $70.7 billion unfunded superannuation liability represents obligations to past and present employees less the value of assets set aside to meet those obligations. The unfunded superannuation liability rose by $14.3 billion from $56.4 billion at 30 June 2018 to $70.7 billion at 30 June 2019. This was mainly due to a lower discount rate.

Borrowings totalled $79.9 billion at 30 June 2019.

The State’s borrowings of $79.9 billion at 30 June 2019 were $8.6 billion higher than they were at 30 June 2018.

TCorp issues bonds to raise funds for NSW Government agencies. These are actively traded in financial markets, which provides price transparency and liquidity to public sector borrowers and institutional investors. All TCorp bonds are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

The Government manages its debt liabilities through its balance sheet management strategy. The strategy extends to TCorp, which applies an active risk management strategy to the Government’s debt portfolio.

General Government Sector debt has been restructured by replacing shorter-term debt with longer-term debt. This lengthens the portfolio to match liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.

Implementing the requirements of new accounting standards will be challenging

Risks to the quality and timeliness of financial reporting

The State and its agencies will be implementing the requirements of new accounting standards shortly. These are likely to have a major impact on the financial positions and operating results of agencies across the sector.

Accounting standards require agencies to assess and disclose where possible, the impact of the new standards in their 2018–19 financial statements.

Our review found agencies needed to do more work on their impact assessments to minimise the risk of errors in the financial statement disclosures. Some agencies disclosed that the new standards would not have a material impact on their reported financial position and performance, but had little evidence to support this.

Each agency is unique and implementing the new standards is not straight forward as many new principles apply. Management judgement is needed to interpret how the principles apply to each agency. As a result, agencies face the following risks and challenges:

• having the required technical skills in house
• having accurate data to assess the impacts
• correctly and consistently interpreting the new requirements
• adequately planning and preparing for their application
• implementing new systems to capture the information needed to meet the new reporting obligations.

To help agencies implement the new standards consistently across the sector, Treasury:

• issued guidance to agencies
• prepared position papers on proposed accounting treatments
• provided briefing sessions to agencies
• mandated which option in the new standards agencies had to adopt on transition.

Key dates

Section 45 of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 requires the Auditor-General to perform audits of the financial statements of entities prescribed for the purposes of that section.
The following were prescribed entities as at 30 June 2019:

Three key agencies are not fully complying with the NSW Procurement Board’s Direction for engaging probity practitioners, according to a report released today by the Acting Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin. They also do not have effective processes to achieve compliance or assure that probity engagements achieved value for money.

Probity is defined as the quality of having strong moral principles, honesty and decency. Probity is important for NSW Government agencies as it helps ensure decisions are made with integrity, fairness and accountability, while attaining value for money.

Probity advisers provide guidance on issues concerning integrity, fairness and accountability that may arise throughout asset procurement and disposal processes. Probity auditors verify that agencies' processes are consistent with government laws and legislation, guidelines and best practice principles. 

According to the NSW State Infrastructure Strategy 2018-2038, New South Wales has more infrastructure projects underway than any state or territory in Australia. The scale of the spend on procuring and constructing new public transport networks, roads, schools and hospitals, the complexity of these projects and public scrutiny of aspects of their delivery has increased the focus on probity in the public sector. 

A Procurement Board Direction, 'PBD-2013-05 Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors' (the Direction), sets out the requirements for NSW Government agencies' use and engagement of probity practitioners. It confirms agencies should routinely take into account probity considerations in their procurement. The Direction also specifies that NSW Government agencies can use probity advisers and probity auditors (probity practitioners) when making decisions on procuring and disposing of assets, but that agencies:

• should use external probity practitioners as the exception rather than the rule
• should not use external probity practitioners as an 'insurance policy'
• must be accountable for decisions made
• cannot substitute the use of probity practitioners for good management practices
• not engage the same probity practitioner on an ongoing basis, and ensure the relationship remains robustly independent. 

The scale of probity spend may be small in the context of the NSW Government's spend on projects. However, government agencies remain responsible for probity considerations whether they engage external probity practitioners or not.

The audit assessed whether Transport for NSW, the Department of Education and the Ministry of Health:

• complied with the requirements of ‘PBD-2013-05 Engagement of Probity Advisers and Probity Auditors’
• effectively ensured they achieved value for money when they used probity practitioners.

These entities are referred to as 'participating agencies' in this report.

We also surveyed 40 NSW Government agencies with the largest total expenditures (top 40 agencies) to get a cross sector view of their use of probity practitioners. These agencies are listed in Appendix two.

There are no professional standards and capability requirements for probity practitioners

NSW Government agencies use probity practitioners to independently verify that their procurement and asset disposal processes are transparent, fair and accountable in the pursuit of value for money. 

Probity practitioners are not subject to regulations that require them to have professional qualifications, experience and capability. Government agencies in New South Wales have difficulty finding probity standards, regulations or best practice guides to reference, which may diminish the degree of reliance stakeholders can place on practitioners’ work.

The NSW Procurement Board provides direction for the use of probity practitioners

The NSW Procurement Board Direction 'PBD-2013-15 for engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors' outlines the requirements for agencies' use of probity practitioners in the New South Wales public sector. All NSW Government agencies, except local government, state owned corporations and universities, must comply with the Direction when engaging probity practitioners. This is illustrated in Exhibit 1 below.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – List of selected agencies

Appendix three – About the audit

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford, today released a report on the annual review of additional entitlements claimed by Members of the New South Wales Parliament under the Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal’s Determination. The review analysed all claims made by Members and tested a sample of claims paid for the year ended 30 June 2018 in more detail.

The review found one Member of Parliament did not materially comply with the Determination. The Member made two unsupported claims for the Electorate to Sydney Travel allowance during the year ended 30 June 2018. The Department of Parliamentary Services has asked the Member to repay these amounts. 

A further 20 departures from the administrative requirements of the Determination were identified, all relating to the timing of Members’ claims. 

The Auditor-General recommended the Department work with the Tribunal to provide more detailed guidance on the activities that meet the definition of 'parliamentary duties' and the documents Members should retain to comply with the Determination.

The Auditor General has reviewed the compliance of the Members of the NSW Parliament (Members) with certain requirements outlined in the Parliamentary Remuneration Tribunal's Determination (the Determination) for the year ended 30 June 2018.

The Auditor General's review is designed to provide Parliament with limited assurance about Members' compliance with the Determination. We analysed all claims made by Members during the 2017-18 financial year and tested a sample of transactions that we identified as having a greater risk of non compliance in more detail. Our sample included claims submitted by 60 of the 140 Members.

Appendix one - Response from Department of Parliamentary Services

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the Local Government sector. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the 2017-18 financial audits of 135 councils in New South Wales and the 2016-17 audit of Bayside Council. The report also includes commentary on three performance audits published in 2018.

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the 2017-18 financial statements of 135 councils. The audit opinion for Bayside Council’s 2016–17 financial statements was disclaimed as management were unable to confirm that the financial statements present fairly the performance and position of the Council. A further 24 councils required material adjustments to correct errors in previous audited financial statements. Three audits are still in progress and will be included in next year’s report.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of local councils for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations and recommendations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in Local Government decision making is enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our financial reporting audit observations across councils for 2018.

Strong governance systems and internal controls reduce risks associated with managing finances, compliance and delivering services to ratepayers.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for council controls and governance issues, including the number of findings, level of risk and the most common deficiencies. Our audits do not review all aspects of internal controls and governance every year. We select a range of measures, and report on those that present heightened risks for councils to address.

Councils increasingly rely on information technology (IT) to deliver services and manage information. While IT delivers considerable benefits, it also presents risks that council needs to address.

Our audits reviewed whether councils have effective governance and controls in place to manage key financial systems and IT service providers. This chapter summarises the following IT findings:

• governance
• IT general controls
• managing service providers.

Councils are responsible for planning and managing a significant range of assets on behalf of the community. This chapter outlines our asset management observations across councils for 2018.

Asset overview

Councils own and manage a diverse range of assets to deliver services to the community. As at 30 June 2018, the combined carrying value of NSW council assets was $140 billion.

Strong and sustainable financial performance provides the platform for councils to deliver services and respond to community needs.

This chapter outlines our audit observations on the performance of councils against the Office of Local Government's (OLG) performance indicators.

Each local council has unique characteristics such as its size, location and services provided to their communities. These differences may affect the nature of each council's assets and liabilities, revenue and expenses,and in turn the financial performance measures against which it reports.

The Office of Local Government prescribes performance indicators for council reporting.

The analysis in this chapter is based on performance measures prescribed in OLG’s Code of Accounting Practice and Financial Reporting (the Code).

Council’s audited financial statements report performance against six financial sustainability measures.

Operating performance and revenue measures

Liquidity and working capital measures

Each audited measure and three of the four unaudited measures has a prescribed benchmark.

Appendix one - Response from the Office of Local Government

Appendix two - List of 2018 recommendations

Appendix three - Status of 2017 recommendations

Appendix four - Sources of information and council classifications

Appendix five - Financial data

Appendix six - Status of audits

Appendix seven - List of Joint Organisations and their member councils

Appendix eight - Council spending by function - Definitions from the Local Government Code of Accounting Practice and Financial Reporting

Appendix nine - OLG’s performance indicators from the audited financial statement - Descriptions

Appendix ten - OLG’s performance indicators from the unaudited Special Schedule 7 - Descriptions

Appendix eleven - OLG’s performance indicators

Appendix twelve - NSW Crown Solicitor’s advice

Click here to access the Local Government Interactive Data Tool

Auditor‑General’s Report to Parliament
Report on Local Government 2018

15 April 2019

Executive Summary

The second point ‘Governance’ under point 3 ‘Governance and internal controls’ on page 2 should read:

There has been an increase in the number of councils with an audit, risk and improvement committee or an internal audit function compared with the prior year. Seventy per cent of councils have an audit, risk and improvement committee (62 per cent at 30 June 2017) and 67 per cent of councils have an internal audit function (62 per cent at 30 June 2017).

Chapter 3 Governance and Internal Controls

The two observations under 3.2 Governance on page 21 should read:

Ninety-seven councils have an audit, risk and improvement committee (85 at 30 June 2017).

Ninety-two councils have an internal audit function (86 at 30 June 2017).

Section 3.2 Governance on page 26 should read:

Twelve more councils established audit, risk and improvement committees during 2017–18 resulting in 97 councils having committees.

Six more councils established an internal audit function during 2017–18 resulting in 92 councils having an internal audit function.

Appendix three: Status of 2017 recommendations

Under the heading ‘Governance and internal controls’ on page 62, the two points in the right-hand column should read:

Twelve more councils established audit, risk and improvement committees during 2017–18 resulting in 97 councils having committees. Please refer to Section 5.2 for more details.

Six more councils established an internal audit function during 2017–18 resulting in 92 councils having an internal audit function.

The above changes are reflected on the Audit Office website, and should be considered the true and accurate version.

The State Insurance Regulatory Authority’s (SIRA) ‘green slip refund’ campaign, and the TAFE semester one 2018 student recruitment campaign, complied with most requirements of the Government Advertising Act 2011 and the Government Advertising Guidelines, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit assesses whether a government agency or agencies has carried out activities in relation to government advertising in an effective, economical and efficient manner and in compliance with the Act, the regulations, other laws and the Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines).

This audit examined two campaigns conducted in 2017–18:

• the 'Green slip refund' campaign run by the State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA)
• the semester one component of the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' run by the NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE).

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising. Under this section, material that is part of a government advertising campaign must not contain the name, voice or image of a minister, member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament or the name, logo or any slogan of a political party. Further, a campaign must not be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party.

The State Insurance Regulatory Authority (SIRA) conducted the 'Green slip refund' campaign between March and June 2018. SIRA ran this campaign to raise awareness of the Compulsory Third Party (CTP) refunds and reforms after the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 commenced in December 2017. SIRA's view is that the reforms include a reduced cost for CTP insurance, benefits for at-fault drivers, reduced opportunity for fraud and attempts to lower insurance company profits. Green slip holders are also able to claim partial refunds on their 2017 green slip insurance premium. The campaign aimed to make green slip holders aware of the refunds available, encourage them to claim online and to inform people about the changes to the green slip scheme. The campaign focused on the first two of these objectives. The total cost of the campaign was $1.9 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.

Campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

• be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
• contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
• contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.
 
Before the start of the campaign, SIRA conducted a survey which asked people whether they agreed ‘that the NSW Government is helping to reduce the cost of living by making positive reforms to:

• reduce the cost of green slips
• reduce the cost of health insurance
• increase the number of jobs
• increase investment in the state.'

SIRA's initial submission to peer review listed one of the campaign objectives as improving the perception of the government as a positive reformer. DPC advised SIRA that this should not be included. SIRA removed this objective.

Even though SIRA appropriately removed this objective, the post-campaign evaluation still measured agreement with the above statements, three of which did not relate to this campaign or SIRA's responsibilities. SIRA advised that these three additional statements were included to provide a broader context for any change in the green slip campaign survey results. For example, if all four measures reported an increase in positive responses of roughly the same size, then the increase may have been due to factors other than the advertising campaign.

This is not an appropriate use of the post-campaign evaluation, which should measure the success of the campaign against its stated objectives. The Guidelines list the purposes that government advertising may serve and none of these relate to improving the perception of the government. The inclusion of the above questions in SIRA's post-campaign evaluation creates a risk that the results may be used for party political purposes.

The campaign met most targets, however some were not challenging to achieve

The post-campaign evaluation demonstrated that the campaign met the targets for 12 of its 13 objectives including the targets relating to raising awareness of the refunds and the proportion of people claiming their refunds online. A fourteenth objective, the percentage of people aware that they should contact SIRA after a road accident injury, did not have a target set, meaning that it is not possible to say whether the campaign had the desired impact in this case.

In August 2017, before the campaign commenced, SIRA conducted a survey to determine the baselines for some of its objectives. This is a good practice to support an effective post campaign evaluation process. The survey found that 20 per cent of people were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA's objective was to raise this to 25 per cent, which represents a small gain relative to the proposed campaign expenditure. The campaign aimed for 40 per cent of motorists to be aware of refunds, which is very low given that this was the primary focus of the campaign. SIRA followed the advice of its survey provider when setting these targets. 

In the survey carried out after the campaign, 66 per cent of people were aware of the availability of green slip refunds for most motorists. The campaign also aimed to get 83 per cent of motorists to claim their refunds via online channels. It met this target, with a total of 84 per cent. Finally, 62 per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. This result is discussed further below.

The overall target for total number of refunds claimed is 85 per cent of eligible drivers, that is to say CTP holders. SIRA will evaluate the results of this objective after the conclusion of the refund period in June 2019.

The campaign did little to inform the public about the broader green slip reforms

One objective of the green slip refund campaign was to inform the public about the green slip reforms. The final campaign creative material focused almost entirely on the green slip refunds rather than the range of other reforms. This was because the peer review raised concerns that the creative material was attempting to deliver too many messages. 
 
The campaign submission stated that the advertising campaign would raise awareness of the broader reforms to the CTP scheme, citing several examples such as reduced opportunities for fraud and reduced insurer profits. SIRA also advised the Minister for Finance, Services and Property that secondary messaging in the campaign would benefit public understanding of the reforms.

Some of the television and radio advertisements referred to ‘more protection’ or ‘better protection’ for people injured on New South Wales roads, however advertisements did not refer to other elements of the reforms. Other campaign creative materials contained messages solely relating to the green slip refund and made no further reference to the broader reforms. SIRA used other communication channels, such as giving wallet cards to health service providers, to spread these messages to people, particularly those who had been injured.

Sixty two per cent of people in the post-campaign survey were aware of the green slip reforms. SIRA asked these people which benefits they associated with the reforms. The results of this survey are in Exhibit 4. Seventy-one per cent of this sample identified the reduced costs of green slips as one of the changes, but awareness of other elements of the reforms remains low. Though 29 per cent of people perceive the reforms to make the green slip scheme ‘fairer’, no more than 15 per cent of people could list a specific benefit which did not relate to insurance prices.

Another campaign target was to ensure that people understood that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury. None of the campaign creative materials contained this information. SIRA did some limited work to inform the public about this through its social media channels. One of the pieces of creative material directed the reader to SIRA's website for further information on the reforms, which contained this information. During the campaign period, there was an increase in the number of calls received by SIRA's CTP Assist phone line. However, in the post-campaign evaluation, only two per cent of surveyed people identified that they should contact SIRA in case of an injury.

The media plan allowed sufficient time for cost-efficient media placement

During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance.

SIRA allowed sufficient time between the completion of the peer review process and the commencement of the first advertising. SIRA signed the agreement with the approved Media Agency Services provider eight weeks before the campaign started, meaning that it could achieve cost-efficient media placement for all types of media used in this campaign.

SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier, making it difficult to demonstrate value for money

SIRA directly negotiated with a single supplier to procure the campaign's creative material. A direct negotiation occurs when an agency negotiates with a proponent without first undergoing a competitive process. It is difficult to demonstrate value for money using direct negotiation due to the lack of competition. 

ICAC's 'Guidelines for managing risks in direct negotiations' (ICAC Guidelines) provide guidance on how to undertake direct negotiations. SIRA has a direct negotiation checklist that aligns to the ICAC Guidelines. The SIRA checklist advises that staff should confirm that existing New South Wales prequalification schemes cannot provide the procurement before undertaking a direct negotiation. SIRA did not do this.

To procure creative materials, agencies can access the Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme (the prequalification scheme). Using the prequalification scheme allows agencies to quickly seek quotes from suppliers who have a demonstrated track record and expertise. While agencies are not required to use the prequalification scheme, the NSW Procurement Board advises that agencies should use prequalification schemes where they are available to promote competition. 

By using direct negotiation when the prequalification scheme was available, and by not seeking quotes from other suppliers, SIRA was acting in a way that reduced competition. This increases the risk that SIRA did not achieve value for money in its procurement of creative materials.

SIRA advised that it sought to ensure value for money by comparing the quote from its selected supplier with the amount spent on creative materials in other campaigns of similar size. SIRA did not document this analysis at the time or include it as part of the briefing note staff used to seek approval for undertaking direct negotiation. As a result, decision-makers were not fully informed when approving this engagement. 

SIRA reported in a briefing note that it engaged in direct negotiations because:

• it believed that the original timeframe did not allow for a competitive tender process
• the supplier had done previous work on a related campaign for SIRA
• the supplier provided sample work which received positive feedback from focus groups.

In July 2017, when peer review commenced, SIRA planned to launch the campaign in November 2017 to coincide with the beginning of the green slip reforms. SIRA believed that this timeframe was narrow enough to warrant entering direct negotiations. The ICAC Guidelines advise that a narrow timeframe is not a valid reason to enter into a direct negotiation. In late October 2017, the campaign launch was delayed until March 2018 to stagger the demand on the resources of Service NSW, which is administering the refund. 

The ICAC Guidelines also advise against re-appointing a supplier because it has performed previous work. Instead, agencies could consider previous experience as one of several factors when deciding between quotes. In cases where an agency asks a supplier to provide sample work, the ICAC Guidelines advise that agencies should request sample work from multiple potential suppliers to promote competition.

The campaign's cost benefit analysis complied with the Act and Guidelines 

The Act requires a cost benefit analysis (CBA) for any government advertising campaign likely to exceed $1.0 million in value. Section six of the Guidelines set out the requirements for a government advertising CBA. The campaign's CBA complied with the requirements of the Act and the Guidelines.

The campaign CBA could have demonstrated further cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.

The cluster Secretary signed the compliance certificate instead of the head of SIRA

The Act requires the head of the agency running the campaign to sign a compliance certificate. 

The Secretary of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, the cluster to which SIRA belongs, signed the campaign's compliance certificate. However, section 17(2) of the State Insurance and Care Governance Act 2015 states that SIRA is ‘for the purposes of any Act, a NSW Government agency.’ Given this, the Chief Executive of SIRA was responsible for signing the compliance certificate for this campaign.

This is a minor non-compliance with the Act because the Chief Executive had reviewed the campaign and recommended that the Secretary sign the compliance certificate.  

The NSW TAFE Commission (TAFE) ran the 'TAFE NSW 2018 Student Recruitment Annual Campaign Program' from November 2017 to September 2018. The aim of the campaign was to assist TAFE in achieving its 2018 student enrolment target by improving the perception of TAFE's brand and generating student enquiries. This is the first state-wide campaign run by TAFE operating under the One TAFE model. Previously, each TAFE Institute ran its own campaigns. The total budget of the campaign was $19.5 million. This audit examined only the semester one 2018 component of the campaign, which ran from November 2017 to April 2018 at a total cost of $9.5 million. See Appendix two for more details on this campaign.

The campaign materials we reviewed did not breach section 6 of the Act

Section 6 of the Act prohibits political advertising as part of a government advertising campaign. A government advertising campaign must not:

• be designed to influence (directly or indirectly) support for a political party
• contain the name, voice or image of a minister, a member of parliament or a candidate nominated for election to parliament
• contain the name, logo, slogan or any other reference to a political party.

The audit team found no breaches of section 6 of the Act in the campaign material we reviewed.

The campaign achieved 16 of 24 objectives, but did not reach its enrolment target

The campaign had 24 objectives which had a target for semester one. TAFE set these targets using a combination of previous experience, corporate objectives and brand surveys.

The overall objective of the combined semester one and two campaigns was to support TAFE achieving its 2018 total enrolment target of 549,636. TAFE's semester one target was 361,350, which it did not achieve. This indicates that the campaign was not fully effective.

The campaign achieved 11 of its 16 output objectives. The output targets related to TAFE's media placements and ability to reach an audience efficiently. TAFE tracked progress against many of the campaign's output objectives daily. TAFE altered its media channels throughout the campaign meaning that some of the output objectives were not met because TAFE decided to focus on alternative media channels. The campaign also achieved all seven of its outcome objectives. The outcome objectives related to changing the public perception of TAFE.

TAFE's initial media plan allowed for efficient media placement

During the peer review process, DPC provides advice to agencies about the time they should allow to ensure cost-efficient media placement. For example, DPC advise that agencies book television advertising six to 12 weeks in advance and that agencies book radio advertising two to eight weeks in advance. 

While TAFE's initial media plan allowed sufficient time between the approval of the campaign and its launch, a delay in receiving final approval for the campaign meant TAFE could not purchase media placements until two months later than planned. Most purchases still remained within DPC's recommended timeframes, but Indigenous television advertisements and metropolitan out of home advertisements both fell outside DPC's recommended time periods by one week. These delays did not impact on TAFE's efficiency.

TAFE re-used many creative materials, achieving some cost-savings

Rather than commissioning new creative materials, TAFE re-used many creative materials from the previous campaign and supplemented these with a selection of new creative materials. TAFE advised that this led to a cost saving of approximately $130,000.
TAFE sought quotes from suppliers on the government's Advertising and Digital Communication Services prequalification scheme for two creative material contracts. These contracts covered updates to existing materials and a selection of new materials.

The campaign's cost-benefit analysis did not comply with three requirements of the Guidelines

The Act requires an agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) if the cost of an advertising campaign is likely to exceed $1.0 million. The Guidelines set out the requirements of this CBA. TAFE did not comply with three of these requirements, outlined in Exhibit 5.

In this circumstance, section 6.2 of the Guidelines required the CBA to identify the number of enrolments TAFE would expect if it did not advertise. TAFE advised us that it is not possible to say what this scenario would look like because there had always been some degree of advertising, however, this argument is not reflected in the CBA. 

TAFE used 2017 as the baseline in the CBA. In 2017, TAFE spent $13.2 million on advertising. As such, the CBA was only able to isolate the impact of the increased expenditure rather than the impact of the campaign's entire $19.5 million expenditure. TAFE advised that 2017 had the most reliable state-wide data and this contributed to the decision to use it as the baseline.

During the audit, TAFE sought advice from NSW Treasury regarding whether a 2017 baseline was appropriate and NSW Treasury advised that it was. Regardless, TAFE did not receive this advice prior to writing the CBA and did not put commentary around this in the CBA. This would also not be sufficient for fulfilling the requirements of the Guidelines.

The CBA did not comply with sections 6.3 and 6.4 of the Guidelines. The CBA briefly considered the impact of spending the campaign budget directly on new training courses, however there was no sustained analysis of this option. TAFE staff advised that there are no realistic alternatives to advertising for achieving the campaign's objectives. However we did not see analysis to support this conclusion in documents provided to us. 

The campaign CBA could have better demonstrated cost effectiveness if it considered alternative media mixes as outlined in NSW Treasury's 'Cost Benefit Analysis Framework for Government Advertising and Information Campaigns'. This would also have been consistent with the Handbook.

TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second

The Guidelines set out rules regarding the content of a government advertising campaign. Exhibit 6 sets out one of the principles with which agencies must comply.

TAFE made one inaccurate claim in its advertising and overstated a second.

In some campaign creative material, TAFE claimed that 78 per cent of its own graduates are employed after training (Exhibit 15 in Appendix 2). According to the National Centre for Vocational Education Research, 78 per cent of New South Wales Vocational Education and Training (VET) graduates (i.e. from all training providers) are employed after training. The result for TAFE graduates is 70.4 per cent.

One of the campaign's television advertisements refers to TAFE as ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’. This statement referred to a survey of current TAFE students who were asked where they would consider studying in future: TAFE, University or a private college. The current TAFE students selected TAFE by a large margin. The limited scope of TAFE's student survey and its results do not support the claim that it is ‘Australia's most reputable education provider’.

DPC did not consistently communicate the transitional arrangements for the Brand Guidelines and as such much of TAFE's creative material did not comply at campaign launch

On 7 August 2017, the government released the NSW Government Brand Guidelines (Brand Guidelines), setting out how agencies use the NSW Government logo. The Brand Guidelines replaced the Branding Style Guide which had been in place since September 2015. Some agencies were exempt from using the Branding Style Guide and the introduction of the new Brand Guidelines required these agencies to apply for a new exemption.

TAFE had recently commenced the peer review process for this campaign when the Brand Guidelines were released. TAFE was exempt from the requirements of the Branding Style Guide and as such the material which TAFE was planning to re-use in the new campaign did not contain the NSW Government logo.

Communication about how long agencies had to make themselves compliant with the Brand Guidelines was unclear. On 11 August 2017, the Chair of the Cabinet Standing Committee on Communication and Government Advertising (the Committee) sent a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Industry informing him that the Department must update all its material to be compliant with the Brand Guidelines ‘as soon as practicable within an 18-month transition period’. The Department of Industry advised TAFE that new advertising would need to be immediately compliant, however it was not clear if this included materials which agencies were re-using from previous campaigns. DPC advised the audit team that it expected re-used materials to be compliant when agencies launched new campaigns. DPC provided this advice to some agencies but did not communicate it more broadly. We could not source evidence that DPC provided this advice to TAFE.

DPC ran workshops to explain the transitional arrangements in September 2017 for the changes in the Brand Guidelines, however these did not specifically address the transitional timeframes for new advertising campaigns.

The Department of Industry, on behalf of TAFE, applied to the Committee for approval to co-brand the TAFE logo with the NSW Government logo. This was approved in October 2017. The requirements for co-branding are in Exhibit 7.

Appendix one - Responses from agencies 

Appendix two - About the campaigns

Appendix three - About the audit

Appendix four - Performance auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #311 - released 18 December 2018

The urban renewal projects on former railway land in the Newcastle city centre are well targeted to support the objectives of the Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program), according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. The planned uses of the former railway land achieve a balance between the economic and social objectives of the Program at a reasonable cost to the government. However, the evidence that the cost of the light rail will be justified by its contribution to the Program is not convincing.

The Newcastle Urban Transformation and Transport Program (the Program) is an urban renewal and transport program in the Newcastle city centre. The Hunter and Central Coast Development Corporation (HCCDC) has led the Program since 2017. UrbanGrowth NSW led the Program from 2014 until 2017. Transport for NSW has been responsible for delivering the transport parts of the Program since the Program commenced. All references to HCCDC in this report relate to both HCCDC and its predecessor, the Hunter Development Corporation. All references to UrbanGrowth NSW in this report relate only to its Newcastle office from 2014 to 2017.

This audit had two objectives:

1. To assess the economy of the approach chosen to achieve the objectives of the Program.
2. To assess the effectiveness of the consultation and oversight of the Program.

We addressed the audit objectives by answering the following questions:

a) Was the decision to build light rail an economical option for achieving Program objectives?
b) Has the best value been obtained for the use of the former railway land?
c) Was good practice used in consultation on key Program decisions?
d) Did governance arrangements support delivery of the program?

Appendix one - Response from agencies    

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

Parliamentary reference - Report number #310 - released 12 December 2018

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford, released a report today on the New South Wales Health Cluster. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of thirty health entities in New South Wales. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all health entities’ financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of health entities’ property, plant and equipment created challenges, particularly for local health districts.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Health cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the Health cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster for 2018.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

• our financial statement audits of agencies in the Health cluster for 2018
• the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Appendix one - List of 2018 recommendations   

Appendix two - Status of 2017 recommendations  

Appendix three - Cluster agencies: Timeliness of financial and audit reporting

Appendix four - Financial data   

Appendix five - Analysis of financial indicators    

Appendix six - Analysis of performance against budget    

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters. While clear audit opinions were issued on all agency financial statements, the report notes that some complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in agency financial statements submitted for audit, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved. 

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations
• liquidity risk management
• government financial services.

The central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.

A full list of agencies that this report covers by relevant cluster is included in Appendix three.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters for 2018.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

• our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster for 2018
• the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.

Appendix one - List of 2018 recommendations

Appendix two - Status of 2017 recommendations

Appendix three - Cluster agencies

Appendix four - Timeliness of financial reporting and audit reporting

Appendix five - Management letter findings by risk rating

Appendix six – Financial data

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on key observations and findings from the 30 June 2018 financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of the broad range of transport related assets creates challenges.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

• our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018
• the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters. 

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Transport cluster and to collate and present service information for different modes of transport in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Appendix one - Status of 2016 and 2017 recommendations

Appendix two - Cluster agencies 

Appendix three - Financial data 

Appendix four - Bus contracts regions