What this report is about

Results of the Regional NSW financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed audits in the Regional NSW portfolio agencies.

The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits increased from 28 in 2021–22 to 30 in 2022–23.

What the key issues were

Effective 1 July 2023, staff employed in the Northern Rivers Reconstruction Corporation Division of the Department of Regional NSW transferred to the NSW Reconstruction Authority Staff Agency.

The Regional NSW portfolio agencies were migrated into a new government wide enterprise resourcing planning system.

The total number of audit management letter findings across the portfolio of agencies decreased from 36 to 23.

A high risk matter was raised for the NSW Food Authority to improve the internal controls in the information technology environment including monitoring and managing privilege user access.

What we recommended

Local Land Services should prioritise completing all mandatory early close procedures.

Portfolio agencies should:

• ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards
• prioritise and address internal control deficiencies identified in audit management letters.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Regional NSW portfolio of agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Regional NSW portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Regional NSW portfolio.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

Result of the Customer Service portfolio agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed 30 June 2023 financial statements audits of Customer Service portfolio agencies. Two audits are ongoing.

What the key issues were

The total number of misstatements in the financial statements and findings reported to management decreased compared to the prior year.

For the first time since its establishment in 2015, GovConnect NSW received unqualified audit opinions for business process internal controls and information technology general controls managed by service providers.

The department controls Finance Co Trust (Fin Co), a special purpose trust created as part of its project to replace flammable cladding for eligible residential apartment buildings. Fin Co did not prepare financial statements which is a breach of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act).

The department's land titling database was overstated by $42.5 million due to errors in the valuation model.

The New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority corrected a prior period error of $10.2 million overstatement of property, plant and equipment.

A high-risk finding was reported to Service NSW regarding gaps in policies, systems and processes for administering and financial reporting on grant programs.

Recommendations were made to address these deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Customer Service portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Customer Service portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Customer Service portfolio.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit 

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What the report is about

Effective radio communications are crucial to NSW's emergency services organisations.

The Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP) aims to deliver an enhanced public safety radio network to serve the five emergency services organisations (ESOs), as well as a range of other users.

This report assesses whether the NSW Telco Authority is effectively managing the CCEP.

What we found

Where it has already been delivered (about 50% of the state), the enhanced network meets most of the requirements of ESOs.

The CCEP will provide additional infrastructure for public safety radio coverage in existing buildings agreed to with ESOs. However, radio coverage inside buildings constructed after the CCEP concludes will be at risk because building and fire regulations do not address the need for in-building public safety radio coverage.

Around 98% of radios connected to the network can be authenticated to protect against cloning, though only 42% are.

The NSW Telco Authority has not settled with ESOs on how call encryption will be used across the network. This creates the risk that radio interoperability between ESOs will not be maximised.

When completed, the public safety radio network will be the only mission critical radio network for ESOs. It is unclear whether governance for the ongoing running of the network will allow ESOs to participate in future network operational decisions.

The current estimated capital cost for the NSW Telco Authority to complete the CCEP is $1.293 billion. This is up from an estimated cost of $400 million in 2016. The estimated capital cost was not publicly disclosed until $1.325 billion was shown in the 2021–22 NSW Budget Papers.

We estimate that the full cost to government, including costs to the ESOs, of implementing the enhanced network is likely to exceed $2 billion.

We made recommendations about

• The governance of the enhanced Public Safety Network (PSN) to support agency relationships.
• The need to finalise a Traffic Mitigation Plan for when the network is congested.
• The need to provide advice to the NSW Government about the regulatory gap for ensuring adequate network reach in future buildings.
• The need to clarify how encryption and interoperability will work on the enhanced network.
• The need for the NSW Telco Authority to comply with its policy on Infrastructure Capacity Reservation.
• Expediting measures to protect against the risk of cloning by unauthenticated radios.

Public safety radio networks are critical for operational communications among Emergency Services Organisations (ESOs), which in New South Wales include:

• NSW Ambulance
• Fire and Rescue NSW
• NSW Police Force
• NSW Rural Fire Service
• NSW State Emergency Service.¹

Since 1993, these five ESOs have had access to a NSW Government owned and operated radio communications network, the Public Safety Network (PSN), to support their operational communications. Around 60 to 70 other entities also have access to this network, including other NSW government entities, Commonwealth government entities, local councils, community organisations, and utility companies.

Pursuant to the Government Telecommunications Act 2018 ('the Act'), the New South Wales Government Telecommunications Authority ('NSW Telco Authority') is responsible for the establishment, control, management, maintenance and operation of the PSN.²

Separate to the PSN, all ESOs and other government entities have historically maintained their own radio communication capabilities and networks. Accordingly, the PSN has been a supplementary source of operational radio communications for these entities.

These other radio networks maintained by ESOs and other entities are of varying size and capability, with many ageing and nearing their end-of-life. There was generally little or no interoperability between networks, infrastructure was often co-located and duplicative, and there were large gaps in geographic coverage.

In 2016, the NSW Telco Authority received dedicated NSW Government funding to commence the Critical Communications Enhancement Program (CCEP).

According to NSW Telco Authority's 2021–22 annual report, the CCEP is a transformation program for operational communications for NSW government agencies. The CCEP '…aims to deliver greater access to public safety standard radio communications for the State’s first responders and essential service agencies'. The objective of CCEP is to consolidate the large number of separate radio networks that are owned and operated by various NSW government entities and to enhance the state’s existing shared PSN. The program also aims to deliver increased PSN coverage throughout New South Wales.

The former NSW Government intended that as the enhanced PSN was progressively rolled-out across NSW, ESOs would migrate their radio communications to the enhanced network, before closing and decommissioning their own networks.

About this Audit

This audit assessed whether the CCEP is being effectively managed by the NSW Telco Authority to deliver an enhanced PSN that meets ESOs' requirements for operational communications.

We addressed the audit objective by answering the following two questions:

1. Have agreed ESO user requirements for the enhanced PSN been met under day-to-day and emergency operational conditions?
2. Has there been adequate transparency to the NSW Government and other stakeholders regarding whole-of-government costs related to the CCEP?

In answering the first question, we also considered how the agreed user requirements were determined. This included whether they were supported by evidence, whether they were sufficient to meet the intent of the CCEP (including in considering any role for new or alternative technologies), and whether they met any relevant technical standards and compliance obligations (including for cyber security resilience).

While other NSW government agencies and entities use the PSN, we focused on the experience of the five primary ESOs because these will be the largest users of the enhanced PSN.

Both the cost and time required to complete the CCEP roll-out have increased since 2016. While it was originally intended to be completed in 2020, this is now forecast to be 2027. Infrastructure NSW has previously assessed the reasons for the increases in time and cost. A summary of the findings made by Infrastructure NSW is presented in Chapter 1 of this report. Accordingly, as these matters had already been assessed, we did not re-examine them in this performance audit.

The auditee for this performance audit is the NSW Telco Authority, which is a statutory authority within the Department of Customer Service portfolio.

In addition to being responsible for the operation of the PSN, section 5 of the Act also prescribes that the NSW Telco Authority is:

• to identify, develop and deliver upgrades and enhancements to the government telecommunications network to improve operational communications for government sector agencies
• to develop policies, standards and guidelines for operational communications using telecommunications networks.

The NSW Telco Authority Advisory Board is established under section 10 of the Act. The role of the board is to advise the NSW Telco Authority and the minister on any matter relating to the telecommunications requirements of government sector agencies and on any other matter relating to the functions of the Authority. As of 2 June 2023, the responsible minister is the Minister for Customer Service and Digital Government.

The five identified ESOs are critical stakeholders of the CCEP and therefore they were consulted during this audit. However, the ESOs were not auditees for this performance audit.

The NSW Telco Authority established and tracked its own costs for the CCEP

Over the course of the program from 2016, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a series of business cases and program reviews that estimated its cost of implementing the program in full, including those shown in Exhibit 6 below.

In response to the 2016 CCEP business case, the then NSW Government approved the NSW Telco Authority implementing the CCEP in full, with funding provided in stages. The NSW Telco Authority tracked its costs against approved funding, with monthly reports provided to the multi-agency Program Steering Committee

Throughout the program, the NSW Government was informed of increasing costs being incurred by the NSW Telco Authority for the CCEP

The various business cases, program updates, and program reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority were provided to the NSW Government through the required Cabinet process when seeking approval for the program proceeding and requests for both capital and operational funding. These provided clear indication of the changing overall cost of the CCEP to the NSW Telco Authority, as well as the delays that were being experienced.

There was no transparency to the Parliament and community about changes in the capital cost of the CCEP until the 2021–22 NSW Budget

As the business cases for the CCEP were not publicly available, the only sources of information about capital cost were NSW Budget papers and media releases. The information provided in the annual Budget papers prior to the 2021–22 NSW Budget provided no visibility of the estimated full capital cost to complete all stages of the CCEP. As shown in Exhibit 7 below, this information was fragmented and complex.

Media releases about the progress of the CCEP did not provide the estimated total cost to the NSW Telco Authority of $1.325 billion to complete all stages of the CCEP until June 2021. Prior to this date, media releases only provided funding for the initial stages of the program or for the stages subject to a funding announcement.

Even during the September 2019 and March 2020 Parliamentary Estimate Committee hearings where the costings and delays to the CCEP were raised, the estimated full cost of the CCEP was not revealed.

The original business case for the CCEP included estimated ESO costs, though these costs were not tracked throughout the program

Estimates for ESO costs for operating and maintaining their own radio networks over the four years from 2016–17 were included in the original March 2016 business case. They included $75.2 million for capital expenditure and $95 million for one-off operating costs. These costs, as well as costs incurred by ESOs due to the delay in the program, were not subsequently tracked by the NSW Telco Authority.

In January 2017, Infrastructure NSW reviewed the CCEP business case of March 2016. In this review, Infrastructure NSW recommended that the NSW Telco Authority identify combined and apportioned costs and cashflow for all ESOs over the CCEP funding period reflecting all associated costs to deliver the CCEP. These to include additional incidental capital costs accruing to ESOs, transition and migration to the new network and the cost (capital and operational) of maintaining existing networks. This recommendation was implemented in the November 2017 program review, with ESO capital costs estimated as $183 million.

In 2019, Infrastructure NSW conducted a Deep Dive Review on the progress of the CCEP. In this review, Infrastructure NSW made what it described as a 'critical recommendation' that the NSW Telco Authority:

It should be noted that the delay to CCEP completion now is seven years and that further ‘operational bridging solutions’ have been needed by the ESOs.

'Stay Safe and Keep Operational' costs incurred by ESOs will be significantly higher than originally estimated

Stay Safe and Keep Operational (SSKO) funding was established to provide funding to ESOs to maintain their legacy networks while the CCEP was refreshing and enhancing the PSN. This recognised that much of the network infrastructure relied on by ESOs had reached – or was reaching – obsolescence and would either require extensive maintenance or replacement before the PSN was available for ESOs to migrate to it. ESOs may apply to NSW Treasury for SSKO funding, with their specific proposals being reviewed (and endorsed, where appropriate) by the NSW Telco Authority. Accordingly, SSKO expenditure does not fall within the CCEP budget allocation.

As shown in the table below, extracted from the March 2016 CCEP business case, the total expected cost for SSKO purposes over the course of the CCEP was originally $40 million, assuming the enhanced PSN would be fully available by 2020.

In October 2022, the expected completion date for the CCEP was re-baselined to August 2027. Accordingly, ESOs will be required to continue to maintain their radio networks using legacy equipment for seven years longer than the original 2020 forecast. This will likely become progressively more expensive and require additional SSKO funding. For example, NSW Telco Authority endorsed SSKO bids for 2022–23 exceeded $35 million for that year alone.

Compared to the original forecast made in the March 2016 CCEP business case of $40 million, we found ESOs had estimated SSKO spending to 2027 will be $292.5 million.

A refresh of paging network used by ESOs and the decommissioning of redundant sites were both removed from the original 2016 scope of the CCEP

Paging

A paging network is considered an important user requirement by the Fire and Rescue NSW, NSW Rural Fire Service, and NSW State Emergency Service. The 2016 CCEP business case included a paging network refresh within the program scope of works. This was reiterated in the November 2017 internal review of the program. These documents did not estimate a cost for this refresh. The March 2020 and October 2020 business cases excluded paging from the program scope. The audit is unable to identify when, why or by whom the decision was made to remove paging from the program scope, something that was also not well communicated to the affected ESOs.

In 2021, after representations from the affected ESOs, the NSW Telco Authority prepared a separate business case for a refresh of the paging network at an estimated capital cost of $60.31 million. This program was subsequently approved by the NSW Government and included in the 2022–23 NSW Budget.

In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of delivering the enhanced PSN, we have included the budgeted cost of the paging network refresh on the basis that:

• it was expressly included in the original approved March 2016 business case
• the capability is deemed essential to the needs of three ESOs.

Decommissioning costs

The 2016 CCEP business case included cost estimates for decommissioning surplus sites (whether ‘old’ GRN sites or sites belonging to ESOs’ own networks). These estimates were provided for both the NSW Telco Authority ($38 million) and for the ESOs ($55 million). However, while these estimates were described, they were not included as part of the NSW Telco Authority's estimated capital cost ($400 million) or (more relevantly) operating cost ($37.3 million) for the CCEP. This is despite decommissioning being included as one of eight planned activities for the rollout of the program.

In the October 2020 business case, an estimate of $201 million was included for decommissioning agency networks based on a model whereby:

• funding would be coordinated by the NSW Telco Authority
• scheduling and reporting through an inter-agency working group and
• where appropriate, agencies would be appointed as the most appropriate decommissioning party.

This estimated cost is not included in the CCEP budget.

In determining an estimated full whole-of-government cost of the enhanced PSN, we have included the estimated cost of decommissioning on the basis that:

• decommissioning was included in the 2016 CCEP business case as one of eight 'planned activities for the rollout of the program'
• effective decommissioning of surplus sites and equipment (including as described in the business case as incorporating asset decommissioning, asset re-use, and site make-good) is an inherent part of the program management for an enhanced PSN
• costs incurred in decommissioning are entirely a consequence of the CCEP program.

The estimated minimum cost of building an enhanced PSN consistent with the original proposal is over $2 billion

We have derived two estimated minimum whole-of-government costs for delivering an enhanced PSN. These are:

• $2.04 billion when calculated from NSW Telco Authority data – shown as estimate A in Exhibit 9 below.
• $2.26 billion when calculated from ESO supplied data – shown as estimate B in Exhibit 9.

Both totals include:

• budgeted amounts for both CCEP capital expenditure ($1,292.8 million) and operating expenditure ($139 million)
• the NSW Telco Authority's 2020 estimated cost for decommissioning ($201 million)
• the NSW Telco Authority's approved funding for paging refresh ($60.3 million).

The two estimated totals primarily vary around the capital expenditure of ESOs (particularly SSKO funding). To determine these costs, we used ESO provided actual SSKO costs to date, as well as their estimates for maintaining their legacy radio networks through to 2027.

The equivalent cost estimates from the NSW Telco Authority were sourced from the November 2017 internal review and the October 2020 business case for CCEP. It should be noted that the amounts for both estimates are not audited, or verified, but do provide an indication of how whole-of-government costs have grown over the course of the program.

The increase in and reasons for the increase in total CCEP costs (capital and one-off operating) incurred or forecast by the NSW Telco Authority (from $437.3 million in 2016 to $1,431.8 million in 2022) have been provided to the NSW Government through various business cases and reviews prepared by the NSW Telco Authority, as well as by reviews conducted by Infrastructure NSW as part of its project assurance responsibilities.

However, the growth in ESO costs and other consequential costs, such as paging and decommissioning, from around $263 million in the 2016 CCEP business case to between $600 million and $800 million, has to a large degree remained invisible and unexplained to the NSW Government and other stakeholders

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Trunked public safety radio networks

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #383 - released 23 June 2023

What this report is about

The Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) is a state-owned corporation that manages over two million hectares of public native forests and plantations supplying timber to sawmills across NSW.

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) is responsible for regulating the native forestry industry in NSW.

FCNSW must comply with Integrated Forestry Operations Approvals (IFOAs), which set out rules for how timber harvesting may occur.

Most harvesting is undertaken under the Coastal IFOA, which commenced in 2018.

This audit assessed how effectively Forestry Corporation of NSW manages its public native forestry activities to ensure compliance, and how effectively the Environment Protection Authority regulates these activities.

What we found

Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) clearly articulates its compliance obligations.

While FCNSW undertakes monitoring of its contractors, it does not do so consistently and does not target its monitoring activities on a risk basis.

FCNSW has largely fulfilled mandatory Coastal IFOA training requirements, but has not yet trained other staff who would also benefit from the training.

Contractor compliance appears to be improving, but there are gaps and inconsistencies in FCNSW's documentation of this.

FCNSW is not measuring its overall compliance to determine how it is tracking against its target.

The EPA undertakes proactive inspections of Coastal IFOA harvesting operations on a risk basis. However, it does not assess the risk at harvest sites covered by other IFOAs.

Most EPA compliance staff have received basic training, but few have received more advanced training required to effectively undertake forestry inspections.

Some EPA offices do not have the necessary equipment to undertake forestry inspections.

The EPA and FCNSW are not implementing all elements of a Memorandum of Understanding that aims to promote a cooperative relationship between the agencies.

What we recommended

The report made recommendations to FCNSW which aim to improve:

• staff training
• consistency of compliance reviews and data capture
• targeting of compliance activities
• measurement of performance.

The report made recommendations to the EPA which aim to improve:

• risk-assessments
• staff training
• staff equipment.

The report also recommended that FCNSW and EPA should fully implement their Memorandum of Understanding.

The Forestry Corporation of NSW (FCNSW) is a state-owned corporation that supplies timber to sawmills in New South Wales, including timber harvested from public native forests. FCNSW is responsible for the management of around two million hectares of public native forests and plantations. Around half the area of native forests is permanently set aside for conservation.

Public native forestry is regulated through the Forestry Act 2012, Biodiversity Conservation Act 2016, Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1997 and associated regulations. Under the Forestry Act 2012, the objectives of FCNSW include, where its activities affect the environment, to conduct its operations in compliance with the principles of ecologically sustainable development contained in section 6(2) of the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991. This involves the integration of social, economic and environmental considerations in decision-making processes.

In undertaking its native forestry operations, FCNSW must comply with Integrated Forestry Operations Approvals (IFOA), issued jointly by the Minister for the Environment and the Minister for Agriculture, which set out rules to protect species and ecosystems where timber harvesting is occurring, and aim to ensure forests are managed in an ecologically sustainable way. FCNSW must also ensure that its contractors undertake forestry operations in line with IFOAs. The Coastal IFOA, developed in 2018, consolidated the four IFOAs for the Eden, Southern, Upper and Lower North East coastal regions of New South Wales into a single IFOA. The other three current IFOAs are Brigalow Nandewar, South Western Cypress and Riverina Redgum (the Western IFOAs).

The NSW Environment Protection Authority (EPA) is responsible for regulating native forestry in New South Wales. Under the Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991, one of the objectives of the EPA is to protect, restore and enhance the quality of the environment in New South Wales, having regard to the need to maintain ecologically sustainable development. This includes monitoring FCNSW’s compliance with IFOA conditions, including by maintaining and enforcing a compliance program.

The Coastal IFOA also introduced a new structure and regulatory approach for IFOAs, establishing outcomes, conditions and protocols. The conditions set mandatory actions and controls intended to protect threatened plants, animals, habitats, soils and water. The protocols, referenced in the conditions, set out additional enforceable actions and controls intended to support the effective implementation of the conditions.

Public native forestry is the largest component of hardwood supply in New South Wales. The 2019–20 bushfires had a major impact on regional communities, and large areas of native forest. This heightened environmental risks and challenges in public native forestry. Five million hectares of New South Wales was impacted, including more than 890,000 hectares of native State Forests. This is over 40% of the coastal and tablelands native State Forests in New South Wales.

In addition to effective compliance activities, the success of the regulatory approach to public native forestry operations depends on how wood supply yields are modelled, and ensuring that harvested volumes do not exceed these yields. This is of particular importance in areas where forests have been severely damaged by fire. This audit did not consider sustainable yields. Recent reviews of this include an independent review of the FCNSW sustainable yield model and a Natural Resources Commission review in 2021.

This audit assessed how effectively Forestry Corporation of NSW manages its public native forestry activities to ensure compliance, and how effectively the Environment Protection Authority regulates these activities.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #382 - released 22 June 2023

What this report is about

This report draws together the financial impact of natural disasters on agencies integral to the response and impact of natural disasters during 2021–22.

What we found

Over the 2021–22 financial year $1.4 billion from a budget of $1.9 billion was spent by the NSW Government in response to natural disasters.

Total expenses were less than the budget due to underspend in the following areas:

• clean-up assistance, including council grants
• anticipated temporary accommodation support
• payments relating to the Northern Rivers Business Support scheme for small businesses.

Natural disaster events damaged council assets such as roads, bridges, waste collection centres and other facilities used to provide essential services. Additional staff, contractors and experts were engaged to restore and repair damaged assets and minimise disruption to service delivery.

At 30 June 2022, the estimated damage to council infrastructure assets totalled $349 million.

Over the first half of the 2022–23 financial year, councils experienced further damage to infrastructure assets due to natural disasters. NSW Government spending on natural disasters continued with a further $1.1 billion spent over this period.

Thirty-six councils did not identify climate change or natural disaster as a strategic risk despite 22 of these having at least one natural disaster during 2021–22.

What the report is about

The Government Advertising Act 2011 requires the Auditor-General to undertake a performance audit on government advertising activities each financial year.

This audit examined whether TAFE NSW's annual advertising campaign in 2021–22:

1. was carried out effectively, economically, and efficiently
2. complied with regulatory requirements and the Government Advertising Guidelines.

What we found

TAFE NSW complied with Section 6 of the Act, prohibiting political content.

It also complied with most other advertising requirements.
 
An important exception was that the Managing Director certified that the campaign complied with regulatory requirements and was an efficient and cost-effective means of achieving its public purpose, before a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was completed.

We have found issues with agencies complying with CBA requirements in previous government advertising audits. This includes the failure to complete them before signing compliance certificates.

The policy owner, the Department of Customer Service (DCS), does not consider oversight of CBAs to be within the scope of their peer review process.  

TAFE NSW evaluated this advertising campaign by surveying a population significantly broader than the target audience. As such, survey results may not accurately reflect the views of the intended audience.

What we recommended

By 30 June 2023, TAFE NSW should:

1. implement processes that ensure:
   1. CBAs are completed before the launch of campaigns over $1 million
   2. compliance certificates are completed only after all regulatory requirements are met
2. consider adding to its current evaluation methods by surveying a population which closely reflects the age profile of its intended target audience.

By June 2023, DCS should:

3. improve whole‑of‑government reporting and monitoring processes to provide the NSW Government with a central view of compliance, including the completion of CBAs by agencies.

The Government Advertising Act 2011 (the Act) sets out requirements that must be followed by a government agency when it carries out a government advertising campaign. The requirements include an explicit prohibition on political advertising, as well as a need to complete a peer review and cost-benefit analysis before the campaign commences. The accompanying Government Advertising Regulation 2018 (the Regulation) and Government Advertising Guidelines (the Guidelines) address further matters of detail.

The Act also requires the Auditor-General to conduct a performance audit on the activities of one or more government agencies in relation to government advertising campaigns in each financial year. The performance audit must assess whether a government agency (or agencies) has carried out activities in relation to government advertising campaigns in an effective, economical and efficient manner. It also assesses compliance with the Act, the Regulation, other laws and the Guidelines.

This audit examined TAFE NSW's advertising campaign for the 2021–22 financial year. TAFE NSW is the NSW Government's public provider of vocational education and training. TAFE NSW carries out an advertising campaign every year. In 2021–22, it spent $15.16 million on developing and implementing advertising. TAFE NSW used channels such as television, radio, internet and social media, press, and out of home advertising in public settings such as bus stops. The advertising aimed to increase the percentage of people considering TAFE NSW for training or education, grow the percentage of people who consider TAFE NSW to be the preferred education provider in NSW, and maintain the proportion of people who are aware of TAFE NSW more generally.

There are a range of private service providers helping to deliver vocational education and training in NSW.

This part of the report sets out key aspects of TAFE NSW's compliance with the government advertising regulatory framework. It considers whether TAFE NSW complied with the:

• Government Advertising Act 2011
• Government Advertising Regulation 2018
• NSW Government Advertising Guidelines 2012 and other relevant policy.

This part of the report considers whether TAFE NSW's advertising program for 2021–22 was carried out in an effective, efficient, and economical manner.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the campaign

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #377 - released 28 February 2023

What the report is about

Sydney Metro is Australia’s largest public transport project. It requires the acquisition of many private properties, including residential and business properties.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the acquisition of private properties for the Sydney Metro project. The audited agencies were Sydney Metro, the Department of Planning and Environment (Valuer General NSW) and Transport for NSW (the Centre for Property Acquisition).

The audit assessed agencies against the framework for property acquisitions in New South Wales. It did not re-perform the valuations done for individual properties that were acquired by Sydney Metro.

What we found

Acquisitions of private property for the Sydney Metro project were mostly effective in the sample of acquisitions we assessed. We found Sydney Metro:

• complied with legislative and policy requirements for compensation and communication with people subject to property acquisitions
• kept accurate records of its acquisitions and applied probity controls consistently
• did not complete detailed plans or negotiation strategies for the high-risk and high-value acquisitions we reviewed
• did not comply with legislative timelines for most compulsory acquisitions because of delays in receiving the required information from the Valuer General in these cases.

The Centre for Property Acquisition has overseen the implementation of reforms to residential acquisition processes, but its assessment of the effectiveness of these reforms has not been comprehensive.

What we recommended

The audit made four recommendations to the audited agencies to improve:

• plans and strategies for the acquisition of high-risk and high-value properties
• timeliness of issuing compensation determinations for compulsory acquisitions
• data quality on the experience of people subject to property acquisitions.

The NSW Government has the power to acquire land that is owned or leased by individuals or businesses, if it is needed for a public purpose. The power arises from the Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (the Just Terms Act). Government agencies that have the power to compulsorily acquire private property are referred to as ‘acquiring authorities’. People who are subject to acquisitions are referred to as ‘affected parties’ and include property owners (business or residential), businesses with a commercial lease on a property, or individuals with residential tenancy leases. In recent years, the vast majority of acquisitions by the NSW Government have been for public transport or road projects.

Sydney Metro is a NSW Government agency with responsibility for building the Sydney Metro railway project. Sydney Metro is Australia’s largest public transport project. The project requires the acquisition of a large number of private properties. Sydney Metro has been one of the largest acquirers of private property in recent years, completing over 500 acquisitions between 2020 and mid-2022, with a total acquisition value of over $2 billion. Other agencies and statutory officers involved in the acquisition of property for the Sydney Metro project include:

• the Department of Planning and Environment (DPE), which supports the minister responsible for the Just Terms Act. DPE also provides staff to the Valuer General of NSW
• the Valuer General of NSW, an independent statutory officer that determines compensation in cases where the acquiring authority and the affected party cannot agree on compensation for property that has been acquired
• Transport for NSW, which includes the Centre for Property Acquisition (CPA). The CPA does not have a direct role in acquiring properties, but its responsibilities include developing guidance for acquiring agencies and monitoring and reporting on their activities.

About this audit

The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of acquisitions of private properties for Sydney Metro projects. The audit assessed agencies against the legislative and policy requirements in place for government acquisitions of private property in New South Wales. In line with the Audit Office's legislative mandate, the audit does not comment on the merits of the policy objectives reflected in the Just Terms Act.

The audit examined a sample of 20 property acquisitions. This was not a statistically representative sample. While our report provides comments on Sydney Metro’s overall acquisition processes, it does not provide assurance regarding the acquisitions that were not examined for this audit.

The audit did not re-perform the valuations done for individual properties that were acquired by Sydney Metro. Affected parties who disagree with the valuation of their property have the right to seek independent assessment of this via the Valuer General and the Land and Environment Court.

This chapter presents our findings on Sydney Metro's acquisition of industrial and commercial properties. Industrial properties include construction businesses and manufacturing facilities. Commercial properties were mostly properties such as shopping centres and office towers. Many of these acquisitions involve businesses and properties that are relatively complex and have high values. This means the valuation process can require multiple experts and can be lengthy and contested. Adherence to governance and probity requirements is important for these acquisitions in order to demonstrate that the acquiring authority has achieved value for money.

This chapter presents our findings on Sydney Metro's acquisition of residential properties, which include apartments and houses, and small business leases, which mostly affected businesses in small shopping centres or arcades. Most of these acquisitions were lower value compared to industrial and commercial property acquisitions and did not require as much expert advice on complex technical issues. However, residential property acquisitions can be personally distressing for the affected parties and require staff from the acquiring authority to provide support and show empathy while ensuring legislative compliance and value for money.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – About the audit 

Appendix three – Performance auditing 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #375 - released 9 February 2023

What the report is about

Cyber Security NSW is part of the Department of Customer Service, and aims to provide the NSW Government with an integrated approach to preventing and responding to cyber security threats.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of Cyber Security NSW's arrangements in contributing to the NSW Government's commitments under the NSW Cyber Security Strategy, in particular, increasing the NSW Government's cyber resiliency. The audit asked:

• Are internal planning and governance processes in place to support Cyber Security NSW meet its objectives? 
• Are Cyber Security NSW's roles and responsibilities defined and understood across the public sector?

What we found

Cyber Security NSW has a clear purpose that is in line with wider government policy and objectives. However, it does not clearly and consistently communicate its key objectives, with too few reliable and meaningful ways of measuring progress toward those objectives.

Cyber Security NSW does not provide adequate assurance of the cyber security maturity self assessments performed by NSW Government agencies. Department heads are accountable for ensuring their agency's compliance with NSW government policy.

Cyber Security NSW has a remit to assist local government to improve cyber resilience. However, it cannot mandate action and does not have a strategic approach guiding its efforts.

What we recommended

By 30 June 2023 the Department of Customer Service should:

1. implement an approach that provides reasonable assurance that NSW government agencies are assessing and reporting their compliance with the NSW Government Cyber Security Policy in a manner that is consistent and accurate
2. ensure that Cyber Security NSW has a strategic plan that clearly demonstrates how the functions and services provided by Cyber Security NSW contribute to meeting its purpose and achieving NSW government outcomes
3. ensure that Cyber Security NSW has a detailed, complete and accessible catalogue of services available to agencies and councils
4. develop a comprehensive engagement strategy and plan for the local government sector, including councils, government bodies, and other relevant stakeholders. 

The NSW Cyber Security Strategy details a vision for ‘…NSW to become a world leader in cyber security, protecting, growing, and advancing our digital economy’. Cyber Security NSW, located within the Department of Customer Service, has lead responsibility for one of the four commitments in the strategy: to increase the NSW Government’s cyber resilience.

Cyber Security NSW ‘aims to provide the NSW Government with an integrated approach to preventing and responding to cyber security threats’. It does not provide broader consumer-focused services.

In August 2020, the NSW Government approved a business case to enhance the funding and remit of Cyber Security NSW to include a broader range of services and functions. As a result, Cyber Security NSW is receiving $60 million in funding from 2020–21 to 2022–23, an increase from its previous funding of around $5 million per year (which had been sourced from contributions from each NSW Government department).

The objective of this performance audit was to assess the effectiveness of Cyber Security NSW’s arrangements in contributing to the NSW Government’s commitments under the NSW Cyber Security Strategy, in particular, to increase the NSW Government’s cyber resilience.

We assessed this objective through two lines of inquiry:

1. Are internal planning and governance processes in place to support Cyber Security NSW meet its objectives?
2. Are Cyber Security NSW roles and responsibilities defined and understood across the public sector?

The Audit Office of New South Wales has reported on the topic of cyber security previously. Most recently, the Internal Controls and Governance 2022 report included findings and recommendations relating to cyber security internal controls and governance at 25 of the largest agencies in the NSW public sector. While that report is multi-agency and sought to assess the level of cyber security attained in selected agencies, this current performance audit report focuses specifically on Cyber Security NSW and how well-equipped it is to meet its whole-of-government cyber security leadership and coordination roles.

Cyber security is an evolving landscape where the nature and scale of threats are increasing. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Australian Government lead agency for cyber security, reported in its in 2020–21 annual report that it received over 67,500 cybercrime reports, equating to one report of a cyber attack every eight minutes, with no sector of the economy or type of government agency immune.

Citizens of NSW are increasingly accessing online government services in this context, providing different types of sensitive personal information. This reliance and transition to digital services has increased in recent times, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. The NSW Legislative Council’s Portfolio Committee (the Committee) noted in the March 2021 inquiry report into cyber security in NSW that ‘a failure to get cyber security right in New South Wales represents a significant risk to the State’s economy, business and community, and will affect public trust in government’.

The Committee noted that sound cyber security practices across NSW Government agencies, which Cyber Security NSW was established to drive, will enable the State and community to leverage opportunities from the digital world. Indeed, NSW aims to become a world leader in cyber security by protecting, growing and advancing the digital economy.

Establishment of Cyber Security NSW

Prior to the establishment of Cyber Security NSW, the Office of the Government Chief Information Security Officer was responsible for cyber security across the NSW government sector. This role was announced in March 2017 and was tasked with ‘identifying areas of high risk of attack, and working across NSW agencies to share intelligence, facilitate minimum security standards, and ultimately ensure that citizens can trust in the NSW Government’s delivery of digital transformation’. At the time of this appointment, the Minister for Customer Service and Digital Government stated that ‘cyber security and risk has emerged as one of the most high-profile, borderless and rapidly evolving risks facing government’.

The Office of the Government Chief Information Security Officer was renamed on 20 May 2019 to Cyber Security NSW. Governance updates at the time note that this was undertaken to ‘better reflect the leadership and coordination role required to uplift cyber security and decision-making across NSW Government’. The establishment of Cyber Security NSW was also partly in response to the Audit Office of New South Wales 2018 performance audit report on ‘Detecting and Responding to Cyber Security Incidents’. That audit found that there was no whole-of-government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. Cyber Security NSW is relatively new and is established as a branch within the Department of Customer Service (DCS).

The Office of the Government Chief Information Security Officer, and subsequently Cyber Security NSW, was initially funded through a levy imposed on clusters. Funding arrangements for Cyber Security NSW changed with the announcement in August 2020 of $240 million over three years for the stated purpose of bolstering the NSW Government’s cyber security capability and creating a world leading cyber industry. This funding included direct investment of $60 million from 2020–21 to 2022–23 for Cyber Security NSW to increase its capability and capacity, with the size of the team at the time expected to grow from 25 to 100 staff. In announcing this funding, the Minister for Customer Service and Digital Government stated that ‘…this is the biggest single cyber security investment in national history and will strengthen the government's capacity to detect and respond to the fast-moving cyber threat landscape’.

Cyber Security NSW is divided into two directorates, with one directorate having a focus on operations, and the other on policy and awareness. In turn, there are seven teams within the two directorates. As at March 2022, Cyber Security NSW had 76 ongoing positions filled, five contractors and 22 vacancies.

Cyber Security NSW states that its aim ‘…is to provide the NSW Government with an integrated approach to preventing and responding to cyber security threats. By building a stronger cyber resilience across whole-of-government, Cyber Security NSW is able to support the economic growth prosperity and efficiency of NSW’.

NSW Government Cyber Security Strategy

The NSW Government Cyber Security Strategy was released in September 2018 to ‘…guide and inform the safe management of government’s growing cyber footprint’. The 2018 Cyber Security Strategy also set out an action plan with success criteria against each of the six themes of the NSW cyber security framework. Based on a framework from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), these themes are:

• lead
• prepare
• prevent
• detect 
• respond 
• recover.

The Strategy was revised in 2021 and combined with the Cyber Security Industry Development Strategy. The aim of this current strategy is to ‘…outline the key strategic objectives, guiding principles, and high-level focus areas that the NSW Government will use to align existing and future programs of work’. The strategy includes four NSW Government commitments to:

• increase NSW Government cyber resiliency
• help NSW cyber security businesses grow
• enhance cyber security skills and workforce 
• support cyber security research and innovation.

Cyber Security NSW has responsibility as ‘lead agency’ on the first commitment. This role requires it to set commitment objectives and focus areas for the strategy and provide central leadership and coordination of programs and initiatives.

NSW Government Cyber Security Policy

The NSW Government’s Cyber Security Policy was released in February 2019, replacing the former Digital Information Security Policy. All NSW Government agencies must comply with the Cyber Security Policy, and it was recommended for adoption by State Owned Corporations (SOC), local councils, and universities.

The current version of the Cyber Security Policy sets out a range of mandatory requirements for agencies, including: 

• annual reporting of their self-assessed levels of maturity against all the mandatory requirements of the Policy and the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s ‘Essential Eight’ requirements 
• that agencies must provide a list of their ‘crown jewels’ and high and extreme risks to their cluster Chief Information Security Officer (CISO).

The Policy sets out that Cyber Security NSW:

• may assist agencies with their implementation of the Policy with an FAQ document and guidelines on several cyber security topics
• will summarise the maturity reports provided by agencies and provide the results to the relevant governance bodies including the Cyber Security Steering Group, Secretaries’ Board, relevant committees of Cabinet, Cyber Security Senior Officers’ Group, and the ICT and Digital Leadership Group, as well as use these reports to identify common themes and areas for improvement across NSW Government.

As discussed further in Chapter 3, a mandatory guideline issued by the Secretary of the Department of Customer Service in 2020 established that departments and agencies will be subject to audits by Cyber Security NSW. This is to test compliance with the Cyber Security Policy and report these outcomes to the Secretaries’ Board.

This chapter considers whether the Department of Customer Service has a strategic plan for Cyber Security NSW that includes a consistent hierarchy of priorities, which are then reflected in workplans, and inform decisions about specific functions and activities. It also considers whether:

• there was a sound, evidence-based rationale for why Cyber Security NSW was established
• the specific services and functions Cyber Security NSW provides are adequately targeted to agency and council needs
•  there is adequate performance assessment of how the services and functions performed by Cyber Security NSW contribute to uplifting cyber maturity and increasing cyber resilience.

This chapter considers the distribution of responsibility for cyber security in the NSW public sector, as well as whether the responsibilities and roles of Cyber Security NSW are clear and understood by agencies and councils. It also considers whether Cyber Security NSW has sufficient authority and mandate to fulfill its responsibilities for both NSW Government agencies and the local government sector.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #374 - released 8 February 2023

What the report is about

The Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program was created after the 2019–20 bushfires, and commits $541.8 million to bushfire affected areas in New South Wales. It is co-funded by the Commonwealth and NSW governments.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Regional NSW (the department) and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the BLER program. These rounds were:

• Round one: early co-funding, split between two streams:
  • ­Fast-Tracked projects 
  • ­Sector Development Grants (SDG)
• Round two: open round.

What we found

The Department of Regional NSW did not effectively administer the Fast-Tracked stream of the BLER. 

The administration process lacked integrity, given it did not have sufficiently detailed guidelines and the assessment process for projects lacked transparency and consistency. 

At the request of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million threshold was applied, below which projects were not approved for funding. The department advises that some of the projects excluded were subsequently funded from other programs. 

This threshold resulted in a number of shortlisted projects in areas highly impacted by the bushfires being excluded, including all shortlisted projects located in Labor Party-held electorates.

The department's administration of the SDG stream had a detailed and transparent assessment process. However, conflicts of interest were not effectively managed. 

The department's administration of the open round included a clearly documented, detailed and transparent assessment framework. Some weaknesses in the approach to conflicts of interest remained.

What we recommended

The Department of Regional NSW should ensure that for all future grant programs it:

1. establishes and follows guidelines that align with relevant good practice guidance 
2. ensures a communications plan is in place, including the communication of guidelines to potential applicants
3. ensures staff declare conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of a grants stream, and that these conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
4. ensures regular monitoring is in place as part of funding deeds 
5. documents all key decisions and approvals in line with record keeping obligations.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Regional NSW and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program.

As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was involved in the set-up and ongoing administration and monitoring of the BLER program. During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with working with the Department of Regional NSW to create program objectives, guidelines and criteria. Their role also involved liaising with the Commonwealth Government, which provided co-funding for the program. Resilience NSW also had an ongoing role in quality assurance and compliance to ensure agencies administering disaster assistance did so in accordance with relevant guidelines. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.

Our work for this performance audit was completed on 3 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the two audited agencies. The audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW. On 24 November 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.

During the 2019–20 bushfire season, New South Wales experienced 11,774 fire incidents, burning 5.5 million hectares of the state. There were 26 fatalities and 2,476 homes destroyed. The agriculture sector was heavily impacted with 601,858 hectares of pasture damaged.

Due to the widespread impacts of these fires on the state, the NSW and Commonwealth governments committed $4.4 billion toward bushfire response, recovery, and preparedness. This included the establishment of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program, with $541.8 million committed to support job retention and creation in areas impacted by bushfires. The program also aims to strengthen community resilience and reduce the impact of future natural disasters. The BLER program is co-funded, with the Commonwealth and NSW governments funding 50% each.

The BLER program is comprised of three funding rounds:

• round one early co-funding, split between
  • Fast-Tracked projects
  • Sector Development Grants (SDG)
• round two: open round
• round three: final projects and initiatives.

Resilience NSW was involved in setting up the BLER program and the Department of Regional NSW (the department) is responsible for administering it. The Commonwealth National Recovery and Resilience Agency must also endorse any projects proposed by the NSW Government for funding as part of the funding agreement between the State and Commonwealth governments.

Successful projects under the SDG stream were announced in September 2020 and projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream were announced in October 2020. Round two (the open round) was administered after these two streams and successful projects were announced in June 2021.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet established the 'Good Practice Guide to Grants Administration' (the Good Practice Guide) in 2010 to assist the NSW Government in ensuring grants administration was performed consistently across all NSW Government grants programs. Compliance with the Good Practice Guide was not compulsory, but provided an outline of best practice covering the entire lifecycle of a grants program. This guide was in place at the time these grants were designed and administered.

The design and delivery of round one of the program occurred quickly, as part of the response to the 2019–20 bushfires, and was responding to a request from the Commonwealth Government for rapid project identification.

The objective of this audit was to assess how effectively the Department of Regional NSW and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the BLER program. Round three was excluded from this audit because it had not been announced at the time of the audit.

We addressed this objective by examining whether the audited agencies:

• effectively planned administration of the BLER program and established appropriate guidelines
• implemented an effective assessment process for the BLER program
• are effectively monitoring implementation of projects and program outcomes.

1. Recommendations

To promote integrity and transparency, the Department of Regional NSW should ensure that for all future grant programs it:

1. establishes and follows guidelines that align with relevant good practice guidance including accountabilities, key assessment steps and clear assessment criteria
2. ensures a communications plan is in place, including the communication of guidelines to potential applicants
3. ensures staff declare conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of a grants stream, and that these conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
4. ensures regular monitoring is in place as part of funding deeds
5. documents all key decisions and approvals in line with record keeping obligations.

Stage one of the BLER program consisted of early co-funded projects valued at a total of $180 million. This included 22 Fast-Tracked priority projects valued at a total of $107.8 million. The purpose of these projects was to deliver immediate and significant economic impacts to high and moderate bushfire-impacted areas.

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 5.

Fifty-two projects worth a total of $73.2 million were funded through the SDG stream. One grantee withdrew their project from the stream in early 2021, leaving a total of 51 projects (of which 49 are co-funded with the Commonwealth Government).

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 9.

The department distributed $283 million to 195 successful projects as part of the open round of the BLER program.

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 11.

The department entered into funding deeds with successful applicants

The Good Practice Guide advises that the agency administering a grant should enter into a formal agreement with each grant recipient which sets out the arrangements under which a grant is provided, received, managed and acquitted. Across all three streams, the department sent out a letter of offer to successful project managers to let them know that they had been successful in receiving funding, and then entered into funding deeds with grantees. The one exception was the project that RNSW managed, discussed below.

The reviewed funding deeds were signed by department staff with the appropriate level of delegation. They contained an appropriate level of information and key clauses that would allow the department to monitor the progress of the grant to ensure its completion as agreed with the grantee. The reviewed funding deeds contained key information, including:

• total value of the grant
• key deliverables at each milestone
• expected completion date of both the overall project and each milestone
• reporting requirements, including provisions to allow the department to request relevant information
• variation procedures.

The department only makes payments after confirming that milestones have been reached

The department has provided payments to grantees only after they could demonstrate that they had completed the agreed milestone. To ensure each milestone has been completed, the department requires grantees to provide evidence that they have fulfilled the milestone. Types of evidence provided includes photographs and invoices. Where the grantee provides insufficient evidence to the department, the department follows-up with the grantee to ensure that enough information is provided to justify the milestone payment.

The department also plans to undertake site visits of projects at select milestones and at the completion of most projects. The department has undertaken a risk assessment of each SDG and open round project, and uses this risk assessment to determine the number of milestones for the project, as well as the number of site visits that the department will undertake. Fast-Tracked projects all had PWA providing either project management or assurance and as such oversight is being provided through that mechanism. The milestones and site visits at each level of risk can be seen in Exhibit 15 for SDG and Exhibit 16 for open round.

The department does not monitor quarterly progress for SDG grants

As part of the LER framework, the department reports to the Commonwealth every quarter on the status and financials of each project, including whether there are any risks to project delivery and the mitigations in place for those risks. For projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream and the open round, the department collects quarterly progress reports from the grantees. These progress reports allow the department to determine if there are project risks, which can then be reported to the Commonwealth. The progress reports also allow the department to determine if a milestone is likely to be met within the next quarter or whether a project variation may be needed.

While the department monitors projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream and the open round on a quarterly basis, there is no quarterly monitoring of progress for projects funded through the SDG stream. The SDG funding deeds do not include a provision to require quarterly reporting to the department. The department only collects progress reports from grantees when the grantee reports that it has completed a milestone. Quarterly monitoring of the SDG stream would allow the department to determine if projects require corrective action.

Resilience NSW is not collecting quarterly reports for the Fast-Tracked grant it is responsible for administering

One of the projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream was the rebuilding of three local halls across two LGAs, for a total value of $3 million. RNSW is responsible for managing this grant and entered into funding deeds with the relevant councils. It is not documented why RNSW is responsible for these funding deeds rather than the department, which is the signatory for all of the other Fast-Tracked stream funding deeds. RNSW advised it was due to the responsible RNSW Director having a strong working relationship with the relevant councils.

The funding deeds which RNSW signed with the relevant councils set out a requirement that the councils would report on this project to RNSW every quarter. The second milestone of each of these projects involved the submission of a quarterly report. However, RNSW was unable to provide evidence that it carried out this monitoring of the project. At the time of the audit, no second milestone payment had been made. Undertaking quarterly monitoring would provide RNSW with assurance that the money is being expended for the proper purpose and whether the projects will be completed by the target date.

RNSW and the relevant councils developed project control groups for each project, which allows it to monitor the implementation of the projects. PWA is also represented on these project control groups and provides an advisory role in the implementation of the projects.

RNSW and the department advised that responsibility for this project will be transitioned to the department and it will be monitored on a quarterly basis, in line with the other Fast-Tracked projects.

The department has a consistent approach to validating variations

The department's funding deeds with grantees allow for the variation of contracts at the department's discretion after the grantee has written to the department. It is important for the department to consider the impact of any project variation request on the overall program objectives, because a project which costs more than was originally planned or which takes additional time may put at risk the objectives of the BLER program. To ensure that requests for variation are handled consistently and appropriately, the department's Grants Management Office (GMO) has developed a process document which applies to variation requests across the BLER program.

For the grants reviewed as part of this audit, the GMO applied this variation process consistently and has documented the outcomes. Larger variations are reviewed at a higher level of delegation and sign-off. To determine whether a variation is accepted, the GMO considers the following factors:

• consistency with BLER program objectives
• delivery within the timeframes of the BLER program
• eligibility under the BLER program guidelines
• financial viability to deliver within the requested budget.

The department is preparing multiple evaluations, but it has delayed its process evaluation

When developing round one of the BLER program, the department developed an evaluation plan. A total of $1.1 million has been reserved for conducting process, outcome, and economic evaluations of the BLER program and two other bushfire recovery grant programs.

To assist with evaluating program outcomes and economic impact, the department is planning a post-completion survey in 2023–24. This timeline will allow most projects to be completed and enough time for project outcomes to be realised. The department advised that the data collected through this survey would allow the department to determine whether the BLER program has achieved its objectives, as it includes information such as the number of jobs created through each project.

The process evaluation was initially planned for March to June 2021. This would have aligned with the announcement of the open round funding and would have allowed for the learnings from rounds one and two of the BLER program to be applied to the development of round three. However, the department did not conduct this evaluation in a timely way. The department advised that this was because funding deed negotiations were still ongoing, and the department was waiting for 50% of funding deeds to be signed. Given this, the department was not in a position to commence its process evaluation. In December 2021, the department revised its evaluation plan and advised that it commenced its process evaluation in April 2022. It is unlikely that this will allow time for the department to apply learnings to round three, which is currently underway.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – BLER program distribution

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #373 - released 2 February 2023

What the report is about

The Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) is the State's custodian of rail assets. It is a state owned corporation and commenced operating on 1 July 2020.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. We audited TAHE, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and NSW Treasury.

Separate and related audits on TAHE are reported in 'State Finances 2022', 'State Finances 2021' and 'Transport and Infrastructure 2022' reports.

What we found

The design and implementation of TAHE, which spanned seven years, was not effective.

The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to support an accounting treatment to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments.

The benefits of TAHE were claimed in the 2015–16 NSW Budget before the enabling legislation was passed by Parliament in 2017. This committed the agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, regardless of any challenges that arose.

Rail safety arrangements were a priority throughout TAHE's design and implementation, and risks were raised and addressed.

Agencies relied heavily on consultants on matters related to the creation of TAHE, but failed to effectively manage these engagements. Agencies failed to ensure that consultancies delivered independent advice as an input to decision-making. A small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on the same topic. The final cost of TAHE-related consultancies was $22.6 million compared to the initial estimated cost of $12.9 million.

What we recommended

We recommended that the audited agencies should:

• improve accountability and transparency for major new fiscal transformation initiatives
• ensure entities do not reflect the financial impact of significant initiatives in the Budget when there is uncertainty, or it creates perverse incentives
• review record keeping practices, systems and policies to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998, and the NSW Government Information Classification, Labelling and Handling Guidelines
• review procurement policies to ensure that consultant use complies with all NSW Government policy requirements.

The NSW Government established the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE), a statutory State Owned Corporation (SOC), on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner – RailCorp. It is the State's custodian of rail network assets, including rail tracks and other infrastructure, rolling stock, land, train stations and facilities, retail space, and signal and power systems, within metropolitan and regional New South Wales. It is responsible for $2.8 billion of major capital projects in 2022–23.

TAHE was established under Part 2 of the Transport Administration Act 1988 and is governed by a decision-making board. The Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Employee Relations are the Shareholding Ministers of TAHE, and they annually agree performance expectations articulated in a Statement of Corporate Intent.

Whereas TAHE is the custodian of rail assets, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains operate public rail services. TAHE does not have responsibility for the operation of the heavy rail network or train services, nor does it have network control functions. TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster in the public sector (formerly the Transport cluster and renamed in April 2022), which also includes Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW (TfNSW).

TfNSW leads the Transport and Infrastructure cluster. Its role is to set the strategic direction for transport across the State. This involves the shaping of planning, policy, strategy, regulation, resource allocation and other service and non-service delivery functions for all modes of transport.

TAHE's Operating Licence is granted by the Portfolio Minister and authorises the entity to perform the functions required to acquire, develop, finance, divest and hold assets, pursuant to the Transport Administration Act 1988. The Portfolio Minister also issues a Statement of Expectations which outlines the government’s expectation for the business for the next three to five years.

TAHE's original Portfolio Minister was the Minister for Transport who approved, on 30 June 2020, the issuing of an interim 12-month Operating Licence to enable TAHE to commence operating on 1 July 2020. The Portfolio Minister then granted TAHE's current Operating Licence in 2021. After TAHE requested a 12-month extension to its current Operating Licence, its next Operating Licence is due on 1 July 2024. The current Portfolio Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure, Cities and Active Transport.

About this audit

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. In making this assessment, we considered whether: 

• the process of designing and implementing TAHE was cohesive and transparent, and delivered an effective outcome
• agencies' roles and responsibilities were clear in the planning of TAHE
• agencies effectively identified and managed certain risks.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies, and Audit Office clarification of matters raised in the TAHE formal response 

Appendix two – Classification of government entities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #372 - released 24 January 2023