Reports
Mobile speed cameras
The primary goal of speed cameras is to reduce speeding and make the roads safer. Our 2011 performance audit on speed cameras found that, in general, speed cameras change driver behaviour and have a positive impact on road safety.
Transport for NSW published the NSW Speed Camera Strategy in June 2012 in response to our audit. According to the Strategy, the main purpose of mobile speed cameras is to reduce speeding across the road network by providing a general deterrence through anywhere, anytime enforcement and by creating a perceived risk of detection across the road network. Fixed and red-light speed cameras aim to reduce speeding at specific locations.
Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW deploy mobile speed cameras (MSCs) in consultation with NSW Police. The cameras are operated by contractors authorised by Roads and Maritime Services. MSC locations are stretches of road that can be more than 20 kilometres long. MSC sites are specific places within these locations that meet the requirements for a MSC vehicle to be able to operate there.
This audit assessed whether the mobile speed camera program is effectively managed to maximise road safety benefits across the NSW road network.
The mobile speed camera program requires improvements to key aspects of its management to maximise road safety benefits. While camera locations have been selected based on crash history, the limited number of locations restricts network coverage. It also makes enforcement more predictable, reducing the ability to provide a general deterrence. Implementation of the program has been consistent with government decisions to limit its hours of operation and use multiple warning signs. These factors limit the ability of the mobile speed camera program to effectively deliver a broad general network deterrence from speeding.
Many locations are needed to enable network-wide coverage and ensure MSC sessions are randomised and not predictable. However, there are insufficient locations available to operate MSCs that meet strict criteria for crash history, operator safety, signage and technical requirements. MSC performance would be improved if there were more locations.
A scheduling system is meant to randomise MSC location visits to ensure they are not predictable. However, a relatively small number of locations have been visited many times making their deployment more predictable in these places. The allocation of MSCs across the time of day, day of week and across regions is prioritised based on crash history but the frequency of location visits does not correspond with the crash risk for each location.
There is evidence of a reduction in fatal and serious crashes at the 30 best-performing MSC locations. However, there is limited evidence that the current MSC program in NSW has led to a behavioural change in drivers by creating a general network deterrence. While the overall reduction in serious injuries on roads has continued, fatalities have started to climb again. Compliance with speed limits has improved at the sites and locations that MSCs operate, but the results of overall network speed surveys vary, with recent improvements in some speed zones but not others.
There is no supporting justification for the number of hours of operation for the program. The rate of MSC enforcement (hours per capita) in NSW is less than Queensland and Victoria. The government decision to use multiple warning signs has made it harder to identify and maintain suitable MSC locations, and impeded their use for enforcement in both traffic directions and in school zones.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #308 - released 18 October 2018
HealthRoster benefits realisation
The HealthRoster system is delivering some business benefits but Local Health Districts are yet to use all of its features, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. HealthRoster is an IT system designed to more effectively roster staff to meet the needs of Local Health Districts and other NSW health agencies.
The NSW public health system employs over 100,000 people in clinical and non-clinical roles across the state. With increasing demand for services, it is vital that NSW Health effectively rosters staff to ensure high quality and efficient patient care, while maintaining good workplace practices to support staff in demanding roles.
NSW Health is implementing HealthRoster as its single state-wide rostering system to more effectively roster staff according to the demands of each location. Between 2013–14 and 2016–17, our financial audits of individual LHDs had reported issues with rostering and payroll processes and systems.
NSW Health grouped all Local Health Districts (LHDs), and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters to manage the implementation of HealthRoster over four years. Refer to Exhibit 4 for a list of the NSW Health entities in each cluster.
- Cluster 1 implementation commenced in 2014–15 and was completed in 2015–16.
- Cluster 2 implementation commenced in 2015–16 and was completed in 2016–17.
- Cluster 3 began implementation in 2016–17 and was underway during the conduct of the audit.
- Cluster 4 began planning for implementation in 2017–18.
Full implementation, including capability for centralised data and reporting, is planned for completion in 2019.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the HealthRoster system in delivering business benefits. In making this assessment, we examined whether:
- expected business benefits of HealthRoster were well-defined
- HealthRoster is achieving business benefits where implemented.
The HealthRoster project has a timespan from 2009 to 2019. We examined the HealthRoster implementation in LHDs, and other NSW Health organisations, focusing on the period from 2014, when eHealth assumed responsibility for project implementation, to early 2018.
Business benefits identified for HealthRoster accurately reflect business needs.
NSW Health has a good understanding of the issues in previous rostering systems and has designed HealthRoster to adequately address these issues. Interviews with frontline staff indicate that HealthRoster facilitates rostering which complies with industrial awards. This is a key business benefit that supports the provision of quality patient care. We saw no evidence that any major business needs or issues with the previous rostering systems are not being addressed by HealthRoster.
In the period examined in this audit since 2015, NSW Health has applied appropriate project management and governance structures to ensure that risks and issues are well managed during HealthRoster implementation.
HealthRoster has had two changes to its budget and timeline. Overall, the capital cost for the project has increased from $88.6 million to $125.6 million (42 per cent) and has delayed expected project completion by four years from 2015 to 2019. NSW Health attributes the increased cost and extended time frame to the large scale and complexity of the full implementation of HealthRoster.
NSW Health has established appropriate governance arrangements to ensure that HealthRoster is successfully implemented and that it will achieve business benefits in the long term. During implementation, local steering committees monitor risks and resolve implementation issues. Risks or issues that cannot be resolved locally are escalated to the state-wide steering committee.
NSW Health has grouped local health districts, and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters for implementation. This has enabled NSW Health to apply lessons learnt from each implementation to improve future implementations.
NSW Health has a benefits realisation framework, but it is not fully applied to HealthRoster.
NSW Health can demonstrate that HealthRoster has delivered some functional business benefits, including rosters that comply with a wide variety of employment awards.
NSW Health is not yet measuring and tracking the value of business benefits achieved. NSW Health did not have benefits realisation plans with baseline measures defined for LHDs in cluster 1 and 2 before implementation. Without baseline measures NSW Health is unable to quantify business benefits achieved. However, analysis of post-implementation reviews and interviews with frontline staff indicate that benefits are being achieved. As a result, NSW Health now includes defining baseline measures and setting targets as part of LHD implementation planning. It has created a benefits realisation toolkit to assist this process from cluster 3 implementations onwards.
NSW Health conducted post-implementation reviews for clusters 1 and 2 and found that LHDs in these clusters were not using HealthRoster to realise all the benefits that HealthRoster could deliver.
By September 2018, NSW Health should:
- Ensure that Local Health Districts undertake benefits realisation planning according to the NSW Health benefits realisation framework
- Regularly measure benefits realised, at state and local health district levels, from the statewide implementation of HealthRoster
- Review the use of HealthRoster in Local Health Districts in clusters 1 and 2 and assist them to improve their HealthRoster related processes and practices.
By June 2019, NSW Health should:
- Ensure that all Local Health Districts are effectively using demand based rostering.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - About the audit
Appendix three - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #301 - released 7 June 2018
Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability
The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.
We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.
Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.
This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:
- agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
- information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
- agencies are building risk management capabilities.
The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.
In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:
Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)
In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.
That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.
For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.
Employee perceptions of risk management
Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.
Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making
We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.
Support and guidance to help staff manage risks
Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.
Recommendation
By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:
- Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.
Appendix one - Response from agencies
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #298 - released 23 April 2018
Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents
A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, found there is no whole-of-government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is very limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some agencies have poor detection and response practices and procedures.
The NSW Government relies on digital technology to deliver services, organise and store information, manage business processes, and control critical infrastructure. The increasing global interconnectivity between computer networks has dramatically increased the risk of cyber security incidents. Such incidents can harm government service delivery and may include the theft of information, denial of access to critical technology, or even the hijacking of systems for profit or malicious intent.
This audit examined cyber security incident detection and response in the NSW public sector. It focused on the role of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation (DFSI), which oversees the Information Security Community of Practice, the Information Security Event Reporting Protocol, and the Digital Information Security Policy (the Policy).
The audit also examined ten case study agencies to develop a perspective on how they detect and respond to incidents. We chose agencies that are collectively responsible for personal data, critical infrastructure, financial information and intellectual property.
Some of our case study agencies had strong processes for detection and response to cyber security incidents but others had a low capability to detect and respond in a timely way.
Most agencies have access to an automated tool for analysing logs generated by their IT systems. However, coverage of these tools varies. Some agencies do not have an automated tool and only review logs periodically or on an ad hoc basis, meaning they are less likely to detect incidents.
Few agencies have contractual arrangements in place for IT service providers to report incidents to them. If a service provider elects to not report an incident, it will delay the agency’s response and may result in increased damage.
Most case study agencies had procedures for responding to incidents, although some lack guidance on who to notify and when. Some agencies do not have response procedures, limiting their ability to minimise the business damage that may flow from a cyber security incident. Few agencies could demonstrate that they have trained their staff on either incident detection or response procedures and could provide little information on the role requirements and responsibilities of their staff in doing so.
Most agencies’ incident procedures contain limited information on how to report an incident, who to report it to, when this should occur and what information should be provided. None of our case study agencies’ procedures mentioned reporting to DFSI, highlighting that even though reporting is mandatory for most agencies their procedures do not require it.
Case study agencies provided little evidence to indicate they are learning from incidents, meaning that opportunities to better manage future incidents may be lost.
Recommendations
The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:
- assist agencies by providing:
- better practice guidelines for incident detection, response and reporting to help agencies develop their own practices and procedures
- training and awareness programs, including tailored programs for a range of audiences such as cyber professionals, finance staff, and audit and risk committees
- role requirements and responsibilities for cyber security across government, relevant to size and complexity of each agency
- a support model for agencies that have limited detection and response capabilities
- revise the Digital Information Security Policy and Information Security Event Reporting Protocol by
- clarifying what security incidents must be reported to DFSI and when
- extending mandatory reporting requirements to those NSW Government agencies not currently covered by the policy and protocol, including State owned corporations.
DFSI lacks a clear mandate or capability to provide effective detection and response support to agencies, and there is limited sharing of information on cyber security incidents.
DFSI does not currently have a clear mandate and the necessary resources and systems to detect, receive, share and respond to cyber security incidents across the NSW public sector. It does not have a clear mandate to assess whether agencies have an acceptable detection and response capability. It is aware of deficiencies in agencies and across whole‑of‑government, and has begun to conduct research into this capability.
Intelligence gathering across the public sector is also limited, meaning agencies may not respond to threats in a timely manner. DFSI has not allocated resources for gathering of threat intelligence and communicating it across government, although it has begun to build this capacity.
Incident reporting to DFSI is mandatory for most agencies, however, most of our case study agencies do not report incidents to DFSI, reducing the likelihood of containing an incident if it spreads to other agencies. When incidents have been reported, DFSI has not provided dedicated resources to assess them and coordinate the public sector’s response. There are currently no formal requirements for DFSI to respond to incidents and no guidance on what it is meant to do if an incident is reported. The lack of central coordination in incident response risks delays and increased damage to multiple agencies.
DFSI's reporting protocol is weak and does not clearly specify what agencies should report and when. This makes agencies less likely to report incidents. The lack of a standard format for incident reporting and a consistent method for assessing an incident, including the level of risk associated with it, also make it difficult for DFSI to determine an appropriate response.
There are limited avenues for sharing information amongst agencies after incidents have been resolved, meaning the public sector may be losing valuable opportunities to improve its protection and response.
Recommendations
The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:
- develop whole‑of‑government procedure, protocol and supporting systems to effectively share reported threats and respond to cyber security incidents impacting multiple agencies, including follow-up and communicating lessons learnt
- develop a means by which agencies can report incidents in a more effective manner, such as a secure online template, that allows for early warnings and standardised details of incidents and remedial advice
- enhance NSW public sector threat intelligence gathering and sharing including formal links with Australian Government security agencies, other states and the private sector
- direct agencies to include standard clauses in contracts requiring IT service providers report all cyber security incidents within a reasonable timeframe
- provide assurance that agencies have appropriate reporting procedures and report to DFSI as required by the policy and protocol by:
- extending the attestation requirement within the DISP to cover procedures and reporting
- reviewing a sample of agencies' incident reporting procedures each year.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - ISMS maturity model
Appendix three - About the audit
Appendix four - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #297 - released 2 March 2018
Mental Health Workforce
Compared to the mental health workforce in most other Australian states and territories, the NSW workforce is more concentrated in acute hospitals for adult patients and is marginally smaller for its population. NSW Health increased its mental health workforce between 2006 and 2009. It has improved the geographical distribution of clinicians across the state to more closely match need. It has also increased the number of staff working with younger and older mental health patients. These are positive achievements in a time of financial stringency.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #210 - released 16 December 2010
Injury Management in the NSW Public Sector
We found that during Working Together, agencies reduced the impact of workplace injuries. Most of the results have been positive in both our sample agencies and the public sector, and savings have been achieved. Between 2005 and 2008, while the number of claims in the sample agencies remained at around 15,000, the average cost of claims reduced by around 22 per cent from $22,349 to $17,360. The incidence rate of claims for the sample agencies also decreased by nine per cent to 7.3 claims per 100 staff.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #199 - released 31 March 2010
Managing Forensic Analysis: Fingerprints and DNA
Fingerprints and DNA play a critical role in solving crime and serving justice, but DNA evidence can result in more arrests, more prosecutions and more convictions. We found that while police effectively prioritise fingerprint evidence, it could better manage the screening and analysis of both fingerprint and DNA evidence to reduce delays.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #195 - released 10 February 2010
Purchasing Hospital Supplies: Follow-up of 2002 Performance Audit
Periodically we review the extent to which agencies have changed their practices as a result of our audits. This gives Parliament and the public an update on the extent of progress made.
In this follow-up audit, we examine changes following our September 2002 report, to assess whether NSW Health has improved its buying of hospital supplies using electronic systems.
NSW Health spends over $1.3 billion on hospital supplies. It is the largest expenditure area after employee costs. Reform of this area has the potential to make significant savings that could be redirected to frontline services.
As part of our series of audits in the area of e-government, our previous audit looked closely at the extent to which technology was being used to deliver potentially major savings in purchasing hospital supplies. This is a key area of so-called “process re-engineering” in the “e” field, and NSW Health provided an ideal case study.
Whilst implementing large-scale e-procurement has many technical aspects, it is not chiefly a technical issue. The key requirements for success reside in effective change management, in particular being clear as to who has the authority to make change decisions and be held accountable.
This audit looks at NSW Health’s successes to date, and its frustrations and challenges in making further progress in this field. Many of the issues raised in this report may provide lessons for any agency that is seeking to drive a significant change program.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #145 - released 23 November 2005
Implementing Asset Management Reforms
Hospitals, schools, public housing, roads, bridges, buses and trains are just some of the assets used by government in providing services to citizens.
The NSW Government’s asset base is impressive in size - with a value of around $167 billion and with government plans to spend around $8 billion acquiring or replacing assets in the current year. Another $2 billion is spent each year on maintenance.
Good asset management is very important to government; even a small efficiency gain in this area can provide significant returns. Good practice by those responsible for managing assets can improve reliability, extend asset life, save on maintenance costs and aid in identifying and disposing of unnecessary or non-performing assets.
Improving the NSW public sector’s approach to asset management has been on the reform agenda for at least a decade. Changes in practice have been accelerated more recently by integrating asset management policy with the budget process.
In this audit we examined NSW Treasury’s efforts to improve asset management practices in the public sector and the progress made by 3 agencies - the Department of Corrective Services, NSW Fire Brigades and the Powerhouse Museum - towards better managing their asset portfolios.
This report informs Parliament and the community on progress to date and what more needs to be done to ensure that agencies manage assets effectively and achieve best value.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #143 - released 12 October 2005
In-year Monitoring of the State Budget
The annual Budget is one of the most important and visible statements about a government’s financial intentions.
Once a Budget is released, it is important to monitor variations from the projections it contains. This is done for two reasons -
- first, to ensure that individual agencies are properly managing their budget allocations and that any genuine emerging need for additional funding is met.
- second, to ensure that any changes to the State’s overall financial position are understood and corrective action is undertaken.
This audit dealt primarily with the second of these objectives.
Budget monitoring involves both agencies and Treasury working together to quickly identify factors that might impact the budget, to clearly understand the implications for their budget position and to take any remedial action needed.
Poor monitoring may reduce the confidence that stakeholders have in the government’s financial management. It may mean that government decisions made in- year or for the following budget (for example on tax measures or spending increases/savings) are based on an incorrect understanding of the State’s true financial position.
I hope that this Report provides some useful insights that will assist in better monitoring.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #141 - released 28 July 2005
