Demand for ambulance services is increasing. Demographic factors including population growth and ageing have contributed to this and ongoing growth in demand is likely. It is important that NSW Ambulance finds ways to respond to this demand more efficiently, while maintaining patient safety standards and meeting community expectations.

Most triple zero calls to NSW Ambulance do not involve medical issues that require an emergency response. NSW Ambulance has introduced a range of initiatives to change the way it manages these less urgent requests for assistance. Its major demand management initiatives include using a telephone advice line, referring some patients to services other than hospital emergency departments and using specialist paramedics to respond to less urgent cases.

The role of NSW Ambulance has changed in recent years. It is aiming to become a ‘mobile health service’ that identifies the needs of patients and provides or refers them to the most appropriate type of care. This change involves a significant expansion of the clinical decision-making role of paramedics. Considerable strategic and organisational efforts are required to make this work. The successful implementation of demand management initiatives is important to NSW Ambulance's ability to continue to meet demand for its services.

This audit assessed NSW Ambulance's major demand management initiatives that aim to reduce unnecessary demand for ambulance responses and unnecessary transport to hospital emergency departments. It aimed to assess the extent to which these initiatives have improved the efficiency of its services.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

Palliative care is an essential component of modern health care services and an increasingly important part of the wider health and social care systems. Palliative care is healthcare and support for people with a life-limiting illness, their families and carers. It is provided by, or informed by, professionals who specialise in palliative care. ‘End of life’ care is provided to people approaching the end of life by health professionals, who may work in the health, community or aged care systems. Not everyone receiving end of life care needs palliative care.

NSW Health has a policy and planning role in palliative and end-of-life care, and it coordinates a wide range of service providers. Local Health Districts (LHDs) provide care services in settings such as homes, hospitals and clinics to patients with varying needs. There are several care providers that can be involved.

Due to this shared nature of palliative care — where many people, services and settings are involved in delivering care to the patient — availability and communication of information is critical. For service planning, data and evidence must be drawn from various sources in a timely and efficient way.

This audit assessed whether NSW Health is effectively planning and evaluating palliative care services, in the context of rising demand, increasingly complex needs, and the diversity of service providers.

1. By July 2018, NSW Health should develop an integrated palliative and end-of-life care policy framework that:

• clearly articulates the interface between palliative and end of life care and outlines the priorities for the respective areas
• defines policy goals and objectives, and a performance and evaluation framework for palliative care service planning and delivery
• informs a related workforce plan which supports the policy framework and is linked to the Health Professional Workforce Plan 2012–2022
• reviews the funding allocation model to ensure future enhancement funds are distributed equitably and transparently based on the need and population of districts.

By December 2018, NSW Health should:

2. assess how the functionality provided in data collection programs such as the Palliative Care Outcomes Collaboration program can be provided across all palliative care services in NSW

3. complete its statewide review of systems and reporting for end of life management including specialist palliative care, and develop a business case to implement a more integrated set of solutions to:

• support providers delivering end of life and palliative care
• help monitor service quality and quantity
• provide comprehensive data for service planning

4. improve stakeholder engagement by:

• developing a statewide stakeholder engagement strategy that brings together current activity and good practice, and is transparent and publicly available
• defining accountability for overseeing and implementing the strategy at state and district levels.

1. Performance monitoring is inadequate

NSW Government policy on palliative care is outlined in the NSW Government Plan to Increase Access to Palliative Care 2012–2016 (the Plan). Under the Plan, the overarching policy is ‘to ensure that everyone has access to quality palliative care regardless of their economic or social circumstances, their geographical location or their medical condition.’ Some initiatives under the Plan are still being implemented.

NSW Health only has measures in place to assess some processes and activities for individual initiatives under the Plan. There is no tracking of outcomes relating to the policy goals set out in the Plan, such as increased choice to die at home or the location of the patient’s choice, and improved access to specialist palliative care services. NSW Health has not conducted an overall assessment of the Plan’s outcomes to guide future priorities.

Further, there is no overall performance and reporting framework for palliative and end of life care, meaning there is no monitoring of performance of palliative care services for NSW as a whole. This lack of evaluation and performance measurement impacts on NSW Health's ability to monitor progress and achievements, address gaps in service, and plan for future service enhancement. 

2. Statewide planning and evaluation lacks coordination

Currently, palliative care services are complex to plan and evaluate. Many policies, strategies, guidelines, directives and data collections currently inform services. Even definitions of services vary. The split of policy functions for palliative care and end-of-life care between different branches within NSW Health adds further complexity. These arrangements create the risk of confusion, gaps in advice and support for LHDs.

Consistency is needed in the use of terminology and planning to achieve an integrated approach at all levels, including:

• standard definitions of palliative care and end-of-life care
• planning within a single structured policy framework to help clarify what services are to be delivered, who is accountable for delivering them and how to measure their outcomes.

Workforce planning is also affected. While NSW Health has identified significant gaps in the specialist palliative care workforce (especially in regional and remote areas) and it previously made workforce capacity one of its priorities, limited work has been undertaken in producing a statewide strategy to reduce these gaps.

3. District planning is not systematic and some external providers are poorly managed

An integrated approach would inform district-level service planning for palliative care. Planning in the districts we visited was sometimes ad hoc and accountability for performance unclear. Districts would benefit from:

• better integrating data collection systems with planning
• clearer guidelines, easy-to-use tools, monitoring and accountability systems.

The recently developed guide – A Blueprint for Improvement, from the Agency for Clinical Innovation – should help districts plan more effectively and consistently as it rolls out more widely in 2017. This takes an integrated approach to palliative and end-of-life care. Only one district we visited has finalised a comprehensive plan using the Blueprint.

Issues with district planning extend to external agreements with service providers, as these are sometimes poorly managed and do not support improved patient outcomes. Examples we reviewed showed a significant reporting burden with process-focused reporting. We also found little evidence of monitoring or action as a result of these reports.

4. Diverse information systems mean data collection and use are inconsistent

NSW Health gathers a broad range of data from many collection points and systems to inform palliative care services at hospital, ward or unit level, and community teams. However, the current data is limited because: 

• activity is under-reported, particularly in community-based services
• collection is not universal across districts and services.

Districts also struggle with evidence-based planning and service delivery because multiple information systems mean data may be incomplete or inaccurate. Too often, clinicians and service managers rely on manual collection and paper-based systems. 

eHealth, which coordinates information communication technology (ICT) for the state’s healthcare, is planning a statewide approach to capture information and report on all palliative care activity. The current plans of eHealth to review and improve systems should make data more complete, robust and accessible for quality improvement and planning.

5. An overarching stakeholder strategy would strengthen engagement

Just as data is central to effective planning and evaluation, so too is stakeholder engagement. However, there is currently no explicit stakeholder strategy, which means consultation is inconsistent across the state and not systematic at a district level.

While NSW Health uses a range of platforms to consult, the purpose and value is often not clear to stakeholders. Individual districts have some good practices, but there are limited mechanisms to identify and share these with other areas. A state-wide strategy would improve the quality and consistency of engagement, which will in turn inform service planning and delivery.

A stakeholder engagement strategy would integrate current initiatives, such as the two major networks that consult with health planning staff and clinicians. But it will also need to extend the feedback gathered from families, carers and volunteers, and from the peak bodies that represent them. 

Appendix one - Response from the Agency

Appendix two -  National and NSW data on palliative care activity and outcomes

Appendix three -  About the audit

RMS’ SMC contract management includes most elements of good practice, including governance and dispute resolution mechanisms. However, key elements are missing which reduces its effectiveness.

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is responsible for the Sydney region State roads network This includes over 2,800 kilometres of roads and associated road corridor infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and drainage structures. RMS divides the network into three geographical areas: south, west and north zones.

In 1995, RMS first outsourced road corridor infrastructure maintenance for the north zone through a Performance Specified Maintenance Contract (PSMC). The current 10-year PSMC for the north zone will expire in October 2018. Prior to November 2013, RMS maintained roads in the south and west zones through its Road and Fleet Services unit. 

In November 2013, RMS outsourced road maintenance services for the south and west zones using Stewardship Maintenance Contracts (SMC). The contracts run for seven years with an option for a further three years at RMS’ discretion. RMS estimated that the annual cost of these contracts was around $240 million in total. In March 2018, the contract prices are due to be reset by negotiation to reflect the contractors’ experience with, and better information about, the road networks and routine maintenance requirements. 

The SMC model adopted stewardship principles to improve value for money. RMS defined stewardship principles as a broad set of values, attitudes and behaviours, required of the contractor to effectively manage the assets on behalf of RMS. The SMC also includes commercial principles, such as linking risk to reward, and a performance framework where outcomes drive performance.

This audit assessed whether RMS had effectively managed the outsourcing of road maintenance in the Sydney region south and west zones. In making this assessment, we answered the following questions:

1. Did RMS justify the decision to adopt the SMC model?
2. Do SMCs include key performance indicators (KPIs) and incentives which promote efficiency and effectiveness? 
3. Does RMS collect high quality information on contractor performance and take action to correct performance deficiencies?
4. Are the expected benefits being achieved?

The Stewardship Maintenance Contract

RMS justified adopting the SMC model and included KPIs to drive efficiency and effectiveness

The SMC model includes features that RMS had not previously used for road maintenance contracts. These included adopting stewardship principles and transferring price risk to the contractor over time as the contractor becomes familiar with the assets being maintained.

The SMC model meets RMS’ requirements for flexibility in pricing models, the need for collaboration in asset maintenance planning, promoting innovation and effective performance management.

RMS used many good practices to develop the SMC model, including:

• preparing a robust business case comparing the SMC model to RMS maintaining the road network itself, as well as assessing whether two other contracting models
  (traditional and alliance) would meet its requirements
• assessing experiences with similar arrangements in other jurisdictions and identifying elements that worked to get the best outcomes
• developing a robust performance framework, which included a mix of efficiency and effectiveness KPIs that reflected NSW Government policy and RMS priorities
• incorporating risk and reward incentives delivered through cost sharing arrangements which change as the contract matures
• using a contract duration that supports RMS priorities and provides an incentive for better quality outcomes.

RMS uses data provided by the contractor to measure performance and calculate payments to the contractor. The SMC includes a specific sanction if RMS finds that the contractor provided incorrect performance data, but no specific sanction if the contractor provides incorrect financial data. If RMS finds that the contactor provided incorrect performance or financial data, RMS can only recover over-payments which may have been made using the incorrect data.  

To provide a stronger incentive for the contractor to ensure data it provides is accurate, RMS should consider whether to incorporate stronger sanctions when negotiating the commercial reset due in mid-2018 for south and west zones. RMS should also consider this for the new contract for the north zone when the current PSMC contract expires in October 2018.

RMS' contract management approach and benefits realization

RMS can improve the effectiveness of its oversight and management of the SMC

RMS does not have SMC specific contract procedures to guide its contract managers. Consequently, RMS has not exercised several significant SMC requirements, such as having the contractors account for an efficiency dividend in their pricing at the start of each three-year works period. Effective contract management should be supported by contract specific procedures, with explanations of, and allocation of responsibility for, the various interventions that RMS may be required to exercise in the SMC.

Performance and financial reporting under the SMC is based on a mix of RMS and contractor provided data. While there are a range of audits of contractor provided performance and financial data that RMS can conduct each year under the SMC, it does not have a schedule of audits it will conduct and when.  
During the first year of the SMC, RMS commissioned some limited audits of financial data. In the first three years of the SMC, RMS did not conduct any audits of performance data. Had there been SMC specific procedures in place, this would have reduced the risk of RMS not implementing a systematic audit program to give it reasonable assurance on the quality of the data that the contractor has provided. This is important because the data is used to measure performance and calculate contractor payments.

RMS has been aware of data quality issues since 2015. While RMS advised that it commenced addressing some data quality issues in response to a series of reviews conducted in 2015, a recent internal audit report indicates that RMS has not resolved the data quality issues.  

RMS achieved benefits in the first year, but has not tracked benefits since

As part of the business case, RMS agreed to implement a benefits realisation strategy, including a benefits tracking tool. RMS commenced tracking benefits, but did not establish a comparative baseline pre-SMC on non-financial benefits, and has not tracked benefits past year one.

In 2015, a benchmarking study commissioned by RMS found that it had achieved 80 per cent of the expected recurrent cost savings and other benefits, such as improved workplace safety, in the first full year of the SMC. However, there was no clear baseline to measure
non-financial performance. The study was qualified due to gaps in available data. The study also did not reconcile the actual one-off transition costs to the business case estimate.

During the course of the audit, RMS advised that it intends to repeat this type of study to determine whether it has achieved all expected benefits (and their value), and that it would use the results to inform its negotiation with the SMC contractors as part of the commercial reset due in mid-2018.

Roads and Maritime Services is responsible for the State Roads network in the Sydney region

Roads and Maritime Services (RMS) is responsible for the Sydney region State roads network. This includes over 2,800 kilometres of roads and associated road corridor infrastructure such as bridges, tunnels and drainage structures. The network is divided into three geographical areas: south, west and north zones. Prior to November 2013, RMS maintained roads in the Sydney region south and west zones through its Road and Fleet Services unit.  

In 1995, RMS first outsourced road corridor infrastructure maintenance for the north zone through a Performance Specified Maintenance Contract (PSMC). The current 10-year PSMC for the north zone will expire in October 2018. This contract is worth around $35 million per annum.  

NSW Government priorities and road maintenance

Efficient and effective road maintenance contributes to the following NSW Government priorities:

• improving road travel reliability
• ensuring on-time running of public transport
• reducing road fatalities
• improving government services
• keeping our environment clean.

The NSW Commission of Audit recommended outsourcing the maintenance of State roads

The NSW Commission of Audit in its Final Report on Government Expenditure (May 2012) recommended contestability as an appropriate strategy to consider for improving road maintenance service delivery for State roads.  

The Commission benchmarked RMS’ road surface quality and cost per lane kilometre against those of Western Australia, Victoria, and Queensland. This showed that New South Wales lagged the other states on both these measures.  

The Commission noted that RMS had conducted two independent reviews to examine the potential for extending road maintenance contestability. The Commission found that there was inadequate and inconclusive benchmarking to establish the efficiency of RMS’ Road and Fleet Services unit when compared to outsourcing. It recommended that RMS bring forward a proposal to conduct a competitive tender for the road maintenance of the Sydney region south zone road network to inform the feasibility of a progressive rollout of road maintenance contestability across other areas of the State. In August 2012, the NSW Government adopted the Commission’s recommendation.

The NSW Government introduced road maintenance contestability through Stewardship Maintenance Contracts

In April 2013, the NSW Government announced that it would introduce road maintenance contestability across the Sydney region, using a Stewardship Maintenance Contract (SMC) model to improve value for money. In doing so, it excluded RMS’ Road and Fleet Services unit from tendering.  

The SMC model is based on the following key commercial and performance principles set by RMS:

• performance driven by outcomes
• flexible and adaptable
• transparent and measurable
• linking risk to reward
• continuous improvement
• criteria for selection of, and transition to, different payment models.

The following key stewardship principles underpin the SMC’s broad set of values, attitudes and behaviours, which are required of the contractor to effectively manage the assets on behalf of RMS:

• putting RMS’ customers (road users and the general public) first and being responsive to them
• being responsible and accountable for the outcomes resulting from the management of the assets
• managing the assets diligently, efficiently and effectively with limited direction from RMS
• working collaboratively with RMS to deliver services that are tailored to meet RMS’ evolving needs
• acting with integrity and transparency in performing the services
• performing the services in the best interests of RMS and asset users.

Other key features of the SMC include:

• service requirements which describe the scope of the services, and the standards the contractor must meet
• a commercial framework which defines how payments are structured, how performance assessment will impact on payments and outlines the key commercial principles. SMCs primarily divide payments into two main mechanisms, these being the priced component (or fixed price) and the target cost calculated as follows:
  • fixed price – the contractor is paid a pre-agreed amount for specific services being provided, regardless of the actual costs incurred
  • target cost – RMS and the contractor agree on a target cost for a project, and any cost overruns or underruns are shared between them
• a performance framework which provides mechanisms for assessing contractor performance. This includes a comprehensive listing of the key result areas (KRAs) and key performance indicators (KPIs) against which RMS measures the contractor’s performance. The framework also outlines the scoring methodology that RMS uses to determine whether the contractor’s bid margin (profit and overheads) is reduced due to less than satisfactory performance or whether a bonus is paid if a threshold performance score is exceeded.

Road maintenance under SMCs for Sydney region south and west zones commenced in November 2013

In November 2013, RMS awarded SMCs to the Leighton Boral Amey consortium, now named Ventia Boral Amey (VBA), for the south zone and the DownerMouchel (DM) consortium for the west zone. The contracts run for seven years with an option for a further three years at RMS’ discretion. In April 2014, full services commenced following a four-month transition period. RMS estimated that the annual cost of these contracts was around $240 million in total. In March 2018, the contract prices are due to be reset by negotiation to reflect the contractors’ experience with, and better information about, the road networks and routine maintenance requirements. 

1. Roads and Maritime Services should consider whether to incorporate stronger sanctions in the Stewardship Maintenance Contract if the contractor provides incorrect performance or financial data to RMS, when:
    
   1. negotiating the commercial reset for the next works period with the Sydney region south and west zone contractors due in July 2018.
   2. finalising a new SMC contract for the Sydney region north zone, due to commence in October 2018.

Roads and Maritime Services should, by September 2017:

2.  Review its contract management framework for SMCs to ensure that all authorities and accountabilities of
     contract managers are clearly defined, including:

a) accountability and procedures for exercising all operational clauses in the SMC where RMS may opt to, or be required to intervene, or make a decision

b) authority to approve or initiate the interventions RMS is required to, or may, exercise under the SMC

c) the audits that RMS will conduct to systematically validate the performance and financial data that the SMC contractors provide

d) the accountabilities of RMS contract managers to systematically review audits and quality reviews that the SMC contractors must conduct to demonstrate compliance with their service plans

e) the accountabilities of RMS contract managers to check that the monthly and annual reports provided by SMC contractors do not contain errors, omissions or inaccuracies.

3.  Improve its management of benefits realisation by:

a) initiating a further benefits realisation review and record the benefits delivered against those
    estimated following the tender process, including the one-off transition costs

b) identify any benefits, including savings, not yet attained and develop strategies to address any short-falls

c) establish a tool to track the ongoing realisation of benefits.

Appendix One - Response from Roads and Maritime Services

Appendix Two - Better practice contract management framework

Appendix Three - About the audit

NorthConnex is a nine-kilometre tolled motorway tunnel between the M1 Pacific motorway at Wahroonga and the M2 Hills motorway at West Pennant Hills. The total cost for the project is $3.1 billion. NorthConnex will be funded through toll charges, and contributions from the NSW and Australian Governments of up to $405 million each. In January 2015, the NSW Roads Minister signed the final contracts for NorthConnex.

By December 2017, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:

1. publish an updated ‘Unsolicited Proposals – Guide for Submission and Assessment’ which clarifies obligations with requirements in other NSW Government policies such as the NSW PPP guideline and Infrastructure Investor Assurance Framework. The update should require:

a) a business case to be prepared, and a business case gateway review completed, as part of the assessment of the detailed proposal (currently stage 2)

b) probity reports must be completed and considered before the decision to proceed to the next stage.
 

The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Treasury should immediately:

2. improve record keeping to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998 and the NSW Government Standard on Records Management.

Appendix One - Response from Agency

Appendix Two - Governance Arrangements for NorthConnex

Appendix Three - About the Audit

Based on forecast patronage increases, the rail agencies will find it hard to maintain punctuality after 2019 unless the capacity of the network to carry trains and people is increased significantly. If recent higher than forecast patronage growth continues, the network may struggle to maintain punctuality before 2019.

A NSW Government priority is to ‘maintain or improve reliability of public transport services over the next four years’. Punctuality is a key element of reliability, and the level of patronage is a critical factor in the ability to maintain punctuality. Increasing patronage places pressure on the length of time trains need to wait at stations to load and offload passengers which can lead to delays. The NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan forecasts that rail patronage could increase by 26 per cent between 2012 and 2031.  

Passenger rail services in NSW are provided under a purchaser-provider model. Transport for NSW enters contracts with:

• Sydney Trains for Sydney suburban passenger rail services
• NSW Trains for services that commence or terminate outside Sydney, including intercity services that operate between Central station and the South Coast, Southern Highlands, Blue Mountains and Central Coast and Newcastle.

Transport for NSW sets performance targets and standards for these services, develops the timetables, procures trains for the service providers, and is responsible for long term planning.

This audit assessed whether these rail agencies have plans and strategies to maintain or improve performance in getting the growing number of suburban and intercity rail passengers to their destinations on time.

Punctuality measurement is satisfactory, but agencies could publish more information

Passenger rail punctuality indicators adopted in NSW are good practice. The key train punctuality indicator is better than indicators used by many other rail operators. It is also better than the on-time-running indicator that it replaced. Unlike the on-time-running indicator, the punctuality indicator classifies trains that have been cancelled or skipped stations as late and results are not adjusted to take account of delays caused by factors such as extreme weather or police operations.

NSW also has a customer delay measure which represents good practice. Work has started on refining and embedding customer delay as a key performance measure for the planned new Rail Operations Centre.

As train frequency approaches a ‘turn up and go’ level of service, rather than running to a timetable, more emphasis will need to be placed on excess waiting time and customer delay when assessing performance.

Measurement of punctuality is reasonably precise. There are some measurement inaccuracies which should be addressed, such as the estimated arrival time of a train being incorrect at some destination stations, but these do not affect punctuality results materially.  

Train punctuality is reported publicly, but not to the detail of the indicators in the contracts between Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. There is very limited public reporting of customer delay.

Overall punctuality is good, but some services are relatively poor

System-wide train punctuality has usually exceeded target since 2005, but some services suffer from poor punctuality compared to the rest of the network.  

The part of the network around North Sydney is creating problems for the punctuality of afternoon peak services heading through it and out to Western Sydney and to Hornsby via Strathfield. Transport for NSW and Sydney Trains are well advanced with strategies to address this up to 2019.  

The East Hills express trains in the afternoon peak also performed well below target. The rail agencies recently analysed this issue and believe it relates to the train timetable and signalling which restricts how close trains can run behind each other into Campbelltown. It further advises that this will be corrected over the next three years.  

Intercity train punctuality is below that of suburban trains and there was an extended period of declining punctuality between 2011 and 2014. Transport for NSW suggested that the old age of trains is a factor, and the recently announced intercity fleet acquisition may help address this. Apart from ensuring that train crew and station staff are available and perform their duties adequately, NSW Trains can do little to impact the punctuality of its intercity services directly. Train maintenance, track and signal maintenance, and management of trains on the rail network are performed by Sydney Trains. NSW Trains’ ability to influence improvement is hampered by key indicators in some contracts being undefined. Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are now working collaboratively to make improvements to the contracts.

Initiatives are in place or are planned to deliver good punctuality until 2019

Patronage increases, which can lead to overcrowding and trains having to wait longer at stations, are likely to present a significant challenge to maintaining punctuality into the future.

Based on patronage projections, the rail agencies have strategies to maintain punctuality up to and including joining the Sydney Metro Northwest to the network at Chatswood in 2019. These include improving infrastructure at particular parts of the network, increasing staff training, reducing the number of speed restrictions, and a new Rail Operations Centre. The projects are being managed by experienced staff, with good governance arrangements, quality assurance processes and planning systems in place. New timetables should provide more services and cater for more passengers, including off peak. They should increase network efficiency through better utilisation of capacity, but some passengers may face longer journey times and more may need to change trains mid-journey.  

The planned Rail Operations Centre has the potential to make operational decision-making more customer-focussed, by placing more emphasis on minimising customer delay during disruptions. If implemented well, it will also generate information to help agencies better identify the root cause of incidents that delay trains and improve communication with passengers so they can make better real-time travel decisions.

Predicted passenger growth presents a risk to punctuality after 2019

The rail system will struggle to maintain punctuality much beyond 2019 based on current patronage forecasts and system limitations.

From 2024, the Sydney Metro City and Southwest will help by extending the metro network from Chatswood under Sydney Harbour, through the city and out to Bankstown. Announced fleet upgrades will also help. Transport for NSW advises that it is also working with the Greater Sydney Commission to ensure network capacity constraints are considered in future urban planning.

In addition to investment in new metro networks, sustained and substantial investment needs to be made into the existing heavy rail network to meet demand and ensure its ongoing reliability. Transport for NSW has been developing strategies for this purpose, including an Advanced Train Control system. Its aim is to put a costed plan to the government by the third quarter of this (2017) calendar year. Given the likely lead times involved with major infrastructure projects, there remains a significant risk of poor punctuality after 2019.

Punctuality could be at risk sooner if recent patronage growth continues

If patronage continues to increase at a faster rate than forecast, particularly during the morning peak, the network will struggle to cope before 2019. Transport for NSW forecast that between 2011 and 2026 morning peak rail patronage would increase each year by approximately 3.3 per cent. Between 2011 and 2016 the number of passengers travelling to the city during the morning peak grew by an average of 4.4 per cent each year, including annual growth of 6.6 per cent since May 2014.

A good understanding of patronage levels, trends and drivers is critical to effective planning. The audit identified some shortcomings in measurement of peak passenger loads. Transport for NSW advised that measurement approaches have been improved recently, and this will soon flow into improved data quality.  

Given the increasing flexibility in work practices available to many city workers, the relatively new field of behavioural insights may offer opportunities to ‘nudge’ some passengers away from travelling at the height of the peak with benefits for them and the network.

1. Transport for NSW should ensure that programs to address rail patronage growth over the next five to ten years are provided to the government for Cabinet consideration as soon as possible.
    
2. Sydney Trains and Transport for NSW should:
   a) maintain effective oversight and resourcing for all strategies designed to address rail patronage growth
   b) adjust strategies for any patronage growth above projection.
    
3. Sydney Trains, NSW Trains and Transport for NSW should publish Customer Delay results by June 2018.
    
4. Transport for NSW, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains should agree by December 2017:
   a) specific performance requirements for intercity train, track and signal availability and reliability
   b) guidelines for train priorities during disruptions and indicators of control centre performance in implementing these guidelines.
    
5. Sydney Trains, NSW Trains and Transport for NSW should by June 2018:
   a) improve the accuracy of patronage measurement and develop a better understanding of patronage growth trends
   b) address small errors in the adjustment factors used for determining a train’s punctuality status
   c) improve their understanding of the factors impacting on intercity punctuality.
    
6. Transport for NSW should, commencing June 2017, explore the potential to use behavioural insights to encourage more passengers to travel outside the height of the morning peak (8 am to 9 am).