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Published

Actions for Central Agencies 2018

Central Agencies 2018

Treasury
Premier and Cabinet
Finance
Financial reporting
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, released her report today on the results of the financial audits of NSW Government central agencies. The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet, and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters. While clear audit opinions were issued on all agency financial statements, the report notes that some complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in agency financial statements submitted for audit, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved. 

This report analyses the results of our audits of the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster agencies for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides parliament and other users of the NSW Government's central agencies and their cluster agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations
  • liquidity risk management
  • government financial services.

The central agencies and their key responsibilities are set out below.

Central agencies Key central agency responsibilities Cluster responsibilities
The Treasury
  • Financial and economic advisor to NSW Government
  • Manages the NSW Government’s financial resources.

The cluster:

  • provides investment and debt management services though TCorp
  • manages residual business arising from privatisation of government businesses
  • provides insurance and compensation cover, including workers compensation insurance
  • includes NSW Government superannuation funds.
Department of Premier and Cabinet
  • Drives NSW Government’s objectives and sets targets
  • Works with clusters to coordinate policy and achieve NSW Government priorities.

The cluster:

  • includes integrity agencies, such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption, Audit Office of NSW and Ombudsman’s Office
  • other agencies, such as Barangaroo Delivery Authority and Infrastructure NSW.
Department of Finance, Services and Innovation
  • Supports agency service delivery in relation to the key enabling functions of NSW Government, including procurement, property and asset management, ICT and digital innovation.

The cluster:

  • is responsible for state revenue and rental bond administration
  • regulates statutory insurance schemes, workplace safety and consumer protection
  • provides access to a range of NSW Government services via Service NSW
  • manages the NSW Government communications network.
Public Service Commission
  • Works to promote and maintain a strong ethical culture across the government sector and improve the capabilities, performance and configuration of the sector’s workforce to deliver better services to the public.
  • The Public Service Commission is an independent agency within the Premier and Cabinet cluster.

Note: The Audit Office of NSW is an independent agency included in the Premier and Cabinet cluster for administrative purposes, but not commented on in this report.


A full list of agencies that this report covers by relevant cluster is included in Appendix three.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation clusters for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements submitted to the Audit Office.

Complex accounting requirements caused significant errors in some agency financial statements, which were corrected before the financial statements were approved.
Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
Recommendation: Agencies should respond to key accounting issues when they are identified by preparing accounting papers and engaging with Treasury, the Audit Office and their Audit and Risk Committee when these matters are identified.
2.2 Timeliness of financial reporting
Most agencies complied with the statutory timeframe for completion of early close procedures, 48 agencies in the Treasury cluster did not comply with the statutory requirement to prepare financial statements, and the audits of nine agencies in the Treasury cluster were not completed within the statutory timeframe.
All financial statement information of the 48 agencies that did not prepare financial statements has been captured in the consolidated financial statements of their parent entity, which was subject to audit.
Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the audit process. The timeliness of financial reporting can be improved by performing more robust early close procedures.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury, Premier and Cabinet and Finance, Services and Innovation cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office work program.

The Audit Office work program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls
The 2017–18 audits found one high risk issue and 83 moderate risk issues across the agencies. Nineteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues. Agencies should focus on rectifying repeat issues.
The high risk issue at Service NSW related to several deficiencies in procurement and contract management processes. Service NSW may not be achieving value-for-money
from their procurement and contract management activities. The high risk issue should be rectified as a matter of priority. This includes updating and implementing its procurement, vendor and contract management frameworks and delivering training to key staff involved in procurement and contract management activities.
Property NSW has implemented several controls during the year to rectify the high risk issue identified last year related to its transition to a new property and facility management service provider. However, the service providers performance remains below expectations and there are further opportunities to improve oversight and lift performance. Property NSW can better define roles and accountabilities with the service provider and formalise policies and processes associated with its monitoring and oversight of the service provider.

Implementing relevant KPIs, receiving timely reports and providing timely review and feedback to the service provider may help to lift performance.
GovConnect received unqualified opinions from their service auditor on all business process controls, except for information technology controls provided by Unisys, where a qualified opinion was received from the service auditor. A qualified opinion was received because of several deficiencies in user access controls. These internal control deficiencies increase the risk of unauthorised access to key business systems, and increase audit effort and costs associated with addressing the risks arising from the deficiencies.
3.2 Audit Office annual work program

Remediation of the Barangaroo site is now estimated to cost the Barangaroo Delivery Authority in excess of net $400 million.
 
The increase in the estimate over the last five years is mainly due to the extent of remediation required, as more evidence of contamination has become known.

Measuring the remaining costs to remediate requires the use of estimation techniques and judgements, making the actual outcome inherently uncertain. We reviewed evidence to support the provision for remediation, including future costs estimates and this evidence supported management’s estimate.
The State Insurance Regulatory Authority have administered the refund of $138 million in Green slip refunds to policy holders through Service NSW during 2017–18. At 30 June 2018, $112 million in refunds are yet to be claimed.
 
We reviewed the systems and processes supporting the refund process. While we found that this supports the disbursement of refunds to policyholders there were some deficiencies in Service NSW’s project controls when the program was being developed.

 
Service NSW should apply the lessons learnt from this program to other programs it is delivering or will be delivering for agencies.
Revenue NSW recorded $30.4 billion from taxes, fines and fees in 2017–18 ($30.0 billion in 2016–17) to support the State’s finances. 
 
Crown revenue has steadily increased over the last five years predominately driven by rises in payroll tax and land tax and responsibility for collection of the Emergency Services Levy transferring to Revenue NSW under the Emergency Services Levy Act 2017 effective from July 2017. 
3.3 Managing maintenance
Place Management NSW manages significant commercial and retail leases and maintains public domain spaces and other assets around the harbour foreshore. It has consistently underspent its asset maintenance budget. In 2017–18, asset maintenance expenses were only 34 per cent of budgeted maintenance expense.

Currently, Place Management NSW does not use any ratios or benchmarks to determine the adequacy of its maintenance spend or to monitor whether it is achieving its budgeted maintenance program. 
This may be contributing to a high proportion of unplanned maintenance, which Place Management NSW reports was 38 per cent of total maintenance expense in 2017–18.

Place Management NSW is outsourcing its property and facilities management function from 1 December 2018 to an external service provider. 
 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations specific to NSW Government agencies providing financial services.

Observation Conclusions and recommendation
5.1 Superannuation funds
The SAS Trustee Corporation (STC) Pooled Fund and the Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation (PCS) Fund are not required to comply with the prudential and reporting standards issued by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). 
However, legislation allows the responsible Minister to prescribe prudential standards, reporting and audit requirements. 
Structured and comprehensive prudential oversight of these Funds is important as they operate in a volatile financial sector, have 103,000 members and manage investments of $43.3 billion.
Recommendation: Treasury should consult with the Trustees of the STC Pooled Fund and PCS Fund to prescribe appropriate prudential standards and requirements, including oversight arrangements.
5.2 Insurance and compensation
Nominal Insurer and NSW Self Insurance Corporation investment performance marginally exceeded benchmark over the past five years. Investment returns can impact on the premiums required to maintain an adequate funding ratio in addition to other factors such as claims experience and discount rates.
The Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer (Nominal Insurer) and NSW Self Insurance Corporation's net collected premiums and contributions decreased over the past five years.  The insurance schemes' investment performance and stable claim payments have enabled less reliance on net collected premiums and contributions as a source of funding, over the past five years. 
Reforms were introduced to manage the Home Warranty Scheme's financial sustainability risks.  The Home Warranty Scheme has not collected sufficient premiums to fund expected claims costs, since commencing operations in 2011. In 2017–18, the Crown contributed $181 million for historical shortfalls. New reforms started on 1 January 2018 enabling the Scheme to price premiums based on risk. 

Published

Actions for Transport 2018

Transport 2018

Transport
Asset valuation
Compliance
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

The Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford released her report today on key observations and findings from the 30 June 2018 financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster. Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements. However, assessing the fair value of the broad range of transport related assets creates challenges.

This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the Transport cluster for the year ended 30 June 2018. The table below summarises our key observations.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, our observations, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018.

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
2.1 Quality of financial reporting
Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' financial statements Sufficient audit evidence was obtained to conclude the financial statements were free of material misstatement.
2.2 Key accounting issues
Valuation of assets continues to create challenges. Although agencies complied with the requirements of the accounting standards and Treasury policies on valuations, we identified some opportunities for improvements at RMS.

RMS incorporated data from its asset condition assessments for the first time in the valuation methodology which improved the valuation outcome. Overall, we were satisfied with the valuation methodology and key assumptions, but we noted some deficiencies in the asset data in relation to asset component unit rates and old condition data for some components of assets. 

Also, a bypass and tunnel were incorrectly excluded from RMS records and valuation process since 2013. This resulted in an increase for these assets’ value by $133 million.

The valuation inputs for Wetlands and Moorings were revised this year to better reflect the assets' characteristics resulting in a $98.0 million increase.

2.3 Timeliness of financial reporting
Residual Transport Corporation did not submit its financial statements by the statutory reporting deadline. Residual Transport Corporation remained a dormant entity with no transactions for the year ended 30 June 2018.
With the exception of Residual Transport Corporation, all agencies completed early close procedures and submitted financial statements within statutory timeframes. Early close procedures allow financial reporting issues and risks to be addressed early in the reporting and audit process.
2.4 Financial sustainability
NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations reported negative net assets of $75.7 million and $89,000 respectively at 30 June 2018.  NSW Trains and the Chief Investigator of the Office of Transport Safety Investigations continue to require letters of financial support to confirm their ability to pay liabilities as they fall due. 
2.5 Passenger revenue and patronage
Transport agencies revenue growth increased at a higher rate than patronage. Public transport passenger revenue increased by $114 million (8.3 per cent) in 2017–18, and patronage increased by 37.1 million (5.1 per cent) across all modes of transport based on data provided by TfNSW. 
Negative balance Opal Cards resulted in $3.8 million in revenue not collected in 2017–18 and $7.8 million since the introduction of Opal. A total of 1.1 million Opal cards issued since its introduction have negative balances. Transport for NSW advised it is liaising with the ticketing vendor to implement system changes and are investigating other ways to reduce the occurrences.
2.6 Cost recovery from public transport users
Overall cost recovery from users has decreased. Overall cost recovery from public transport users (on rail and bus services by STA) decreased from 23.2 per cent to 22.4 per cent between 2016–17 and 2017–18. The main reason for the decrease is due to expenditure increasing at a faster rate than revenue in 2017–18.


 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from:

  • our financial statement audits of agencies in the Transport cluster for 2018
  • the areas of focus identified in the Audit Office annual work program.

The Audit Office Annual Work Program provides a summary of all audits to be conducted within the proposed time period as well as detailed information on the areas of focus for each of the NSW Government clusters. 

Observation Conclusions and recommendations
3.1 Internal controls 
There was an increase in findings on internal controls across the Transport cluster. Key themes related to information technology, employee leave entitlements and asset management. Eighteen per cent of all issues were repeat issues.
3.2 Audit Office Annual work program
The Transport cluster wrote-off over $200 million of assets which were replaced by new assets or technology.

Majority of this write-off was recognised by RMS, with $199 million relating to the write-off of existing assets which have been replaced during the year. 

RailCorp is expected to convert to TAHE from 1 July 2019. Several working groups are considering different aspects of the TAHE transition including its status as a for-profit Public Trading Enterprise and which assets to transfer to TAHE. We will continue to monitor developments on TAHE for any impact to the financial statements.
RMS' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 of $3.4 billion is lower than last year. Sydney Trains' estimated maintenance backlog at 30 June 2018 increased by 20.6 per cent to $434 million. TfNSW does not quantify its backlog maintenance. TfNSW advised it is liaising with Infrastructure NSW to develop a consistent definition of maintenance backlog across all transport service providers. 
Not all agencies monitor unplanned maintenance across the Transport cluster. Unplanned maintenance can be more expensive than planned maintenance. TfNSW should develop a consistent approach to define, monitor and track unplanned maintenance across the cluster.

This chapter outlines certain service delivery outcomes for 2017–18. The data on activity levels and performance is provided by Cluster agencies. The Audit Office does not have a specific mandate to audit performance information. Accordingly, the information in this chapter is unaudited. 

We report this information on service delivery to provide additional context to understand the operations of the Transport cluster and to collate and present service information for different modes of transport in one report. 

In our recent performance audit, Progress and measurement of Premier's Priorities, we identified 12 limitations of performance measurement and performance data. We recommended that the Department of Premier and Cabinet ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources.

Published

Actions for Mobile speed cameras

Mobile speed cameras

Transport
Compliance
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Service delivery

Key aspects of the state’s mobile speed camera program need to be improved to maximise road safety benefits, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. Mobile speed cameras are deployed in a limited number of locations with a small number of these being used frequently. This, along with decisions to limit the hours that mobile speed cameras operate, and to use multiple warning signs, have reduced the broad deterrence of speeding across the general network - the main policy objective of the mobile speed camera program.

The primary goal of speed cameras is to reduce speeding and make the roads safer. Our 2011 performance audit on speed cameras found that, in general, speed cameras change driver behaviour and have a positive impact on road safety.

Transport for NSW published the NSW Speed Camera Strategy in June 2012 in response to our audit. According to the Strategy, the main purpose of mobile speed cameras is to reduce speeding across the road network by providing a general deterrence through anywhere, anytime enforcement and by creating a perceived risk of detection across the road network. Fixed and red-light speed cameras aim to reduce speeding at specific locations.

Roads and Maritime Services and Transport for NSW deploy mobile speed cameras (MSCs) in consultation with NSW Police. The cameras are operated by contractors authorised by Roads and Maritime Services. MSC locations are stretches of road that can be more than 20 kilometres long. MSC sites are specific places within these locations that meet the requirements for a MSC vehicle to be able to operate there.

This audit assessed whether the mobile speed camera program is effectively managed to maximise road safety benefits across the NSW road network.

Conclusion

The mobile speed camera program requires improvements to key aspects of its management to maximise road safety benefits. While camera locations have been selected based on crash history, the limited number of locations restricts network coverage. It also makes enforcement more predictable, reducing the ability to provide a general deterrence. Implementation of the program has been consistent with government decisions to limit its hours of operation and use multiple warning signs. These factors limit the ability of the mobile speed camera program to effectively deliver a broad general network deterrence from speeding.

Many locations are needed to enable network-wide coverage and ensure MSC sessions are randomised and not predictable. However, there are insufficient locations available to operate MSCs that meet strict criteria for crash history, operator safety, signage and technical requirements. MSC performance would be improved if there were more locations.

A scheduling system is meant to randomise MSC location visits to ensure they are not predictable. However, a relatively small number of locations have been visited many times making their deployment more predictable in these places. The allocation of MSCs across the time of day, day of week and across regions is prioritised based on crash history but the frequency of location visits does not correspond with the crash risk for each location.

There is evidence of a reduction in fatal and serious crashes at the 30 best-performing MSC locations. However, there is limited evidence that the current MSC program in NSW has led to a behavioural change in drivers by creating a general network deterrence. While the overall reduction in serious injuries on roads has continued, fatalities have started to climb again. Compliance with speed limits has improved at the sites and locations that MSCs operate, but the results of overall network speed surveys vary, with recent improvements in some speed zones but not others.
There is no supporting justification for the number of hours of operation for the program. The rate of MSC enforcement (hours per capita) in NSW is less than Queensland and Victoria. The government decision to use multiple warning signs has made it harder to identify and maintain suitable MSC locations, and impeded their use for enforcement in both traffic directions and in school zones. 

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #308 - released 18 October 2018

Published

Actions for HealthRoster benefits realisation

HealthRoster benefits realisation

Health
Compliance
Information technology
Management and administration
Project management
Workforce and capability

The HealthRoster system is delivering some business benefits but Local Health Districts are yet to use all of its features, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales,  Margaret Crawford. HealthRoster is an IT system designed to more effectively roster staff to meet the needs of Local Health Districts and other NSW health agencies.

The NSW public health system employs over 100,000 people in clinical and non-clinical roles across the state. With increasing demand for services, it is vital that NSW Health effectively rosters staff to ensure high quality and efficient patient care, while maintaining good workplace practices to support staff in demanding roles.

NSW Health is implementing HealthRoster as its single state-wide rostering system to more effectively roster staff according to the demands of each location. Between 2013–14 and 2016–17, our financial audits of individual LHDs had reported issues with rostering and payroll processes and systems.

NSW Health grouped all Local Health Districts (LHDs), and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters to manage the implementation of HealthRoster over four years. Refer to Exhibit 4 for a list of the NSW Health entities in each cluster.

  • Cluster 1 implementation commenced in 2014–15 and was completed in 2015–16.
  • Cluster 2 implementation commenced in 2015–16 and was completed in 2016–17.
  • Cluster 3 began implementation in 2016–17 and was underway during the conduct of the audit.
  • Cluster 4 began planning for implementation in 2017–18.

Full implementation, including capability for centralised data and reporting, is planned for completion in 2019.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the HealthRoster system in delivering business benefits. In making this assessment, we examined whether:

  • expected business benefits of HealthRoster were well-defined
  • HealthRoster is achieving business benefits where implemented.

The HealthRoster project has a timespan from 2009 to 2019. We examined the HealthRoster implementation in LHDs, and other NSW Health organisations, focusing on the period from 2014, when eHealth assumed responsibility for project implementation, to early 2018.

Conclusion
The HealthRoster system is realising functional business benefits in the LHDs where it has been implemented. In these LHDs, financial control of payroll expenditure and rostering compliance with employment award conditions has improved. However, these LHDs are not measuring the value of broader benefits such as better management of staff leave and overtime.
NSW Health has addressed the lessons learned from earlier implementations to improve later implementations. Business benefits identified in the business case were well defined and are consistent with business needs identified by NSW Health. Three of four cluster 1 LHDs have been able to reduce the number of issues with rostering and payroll processes. LHDs in earlier implementations need to use HealthRoster more effectively to ensure they are getting all available benefits from it.
HealthRoster is taking six years longer, and costing $37.2 million more, to fully implement than originally planned. NSW Health attributes the increased cost and extended timeframe to the large scale and complexity of the full implementation of HealthRoster.

Business benefits identified for HealthRoster accurately reflect business needs.

NSW Health has a good understanding of the issues in previous rostering systems and has designed HealthRoster to adequately address these issues. Interviews with frontline staff indicate that HealthRoster facilitates rostering which complies with industrial awards. This is a key business benefit that supports the provision of quality patient care. We saw no evidence that any major business needs or issues with the previous rostering systems are not being addressed by HealthRoster.

In the period examined in this audit since 2015, NSW Health has applied appropriate project management and governance structures to ensure that risks and issues are well managed during HealthRoster implementation.

HealthRoster has had two changes to its budget and timeline. Overall, the capital cost for the project has increased from $88.6 million to $125.6 million (42 per cent) and has delayed expected project completion by four years from 2015 to 2019. NSW Health attributes the increased cost and extended time frame to the large scale and complexity of the full implementation of HealthRoster.

NSW Health has established appropriate governance arrangements to ensure that HealthRoster is successfully implemented and that it will achieve business benefits in the long term. During implementation, local steering committees monitor risks and resolve implementation issues. Risks or issues that cannot be resolved locally are escalated to the state-wide steering committee.

NSW Health has grouped local health districts, and other NSW Health organisations, into four clusters for implementation. This has enabled NSW Health to apply lessons learnt from each implementation to improve future implementations.

NSW Health has a benefits realisation framework, but it is not fully applied to HealthRoster.

NSW Health can demonstrate that HealthRoster has delivered some functional business benefits, including rosters that comply with a wide variety of employment awards.

NSW Health is not yet measuring and tracking the value of business benefits achieved. NSW Health did not have benefits realisation plans with baseline measures defined for LHDs in cluster 1 and 2 before implementation. Without baseline measures NSW Health is unable to quantify business benefits achieved. However, analysis of post-implementation reviews and interviews with frontline staff indicate that benefits are being achieved. As a result, NSW Health now includes defining baseline measures and setting targets as part of LHD implementation planning. It has created a benefits realisation toolkit to assist this process from cluster 3 implementations onwards.

NSW Health conducted post-implementation reviews for clusters 1 and 2 and found that LHDs in these clusters were not using HealthRoster to realise all the benefits that HealthRoster could deliver.

By September 2018, NSW Health should:

  1. Ensure that Local Health Districts undertake benefits realisation planning according to the NSW Health benefits realisation framework
  2. Regularly measure benefits realised, at state and local health district levels, from the statewide implementation of HealthRoster
  3. Review the use of HealthRoster in Local Health Districts in clusters 1 and 2 and assist them to improve their HealthRoster related processes and practices.

By June 2019, NSW Health should:

  1. Ensure that all Local Health Districts are effectively using demand based rostering.

Appendix one - Response from agency

Appendix two - About the audit

Appendix three - Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #301 - released 7 June 2018

Published

Actions for Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Managing risks in the NSW public sector: risk culture and capability

Finance
Health
Justice
Treasury
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Risk
Workforce and capability

The Ministry of Health, NSW Fair Trading, NSW Police Force, and NSW Treasury Corporation are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford. 'Senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff, and there are many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities', the Auditor-General said.

We did find that three of the agencies we examined could strengthen their culture so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.

Effective risk management is essential to good governance, and supports staff at all levels to make informed judgements and decisions. At a time when government is encouraging innovation and exploring new service delivery models, effective risk management is about seizing opportunities as well as managing threats.

Over the past decade, governments and regulators around the world have increasingly turned their attention to risk culture. It is now widely accepted that organisational culture is a key element of risk management because it influences how people recognise and engage with risk. Neglecting this ‘soft’ side of risk management can prevent institutions from managing risks that threaten their success and lead to missed opportunities for change, improvement or innovation.

This audit assessed how effectively NSW Government agencies are building risk management capabilities and embedding a sound risk culture throughout their organisations. To do this we examined whether:

  • agencies can demonstrate that senior management is committed to risk management
  • information about risk is communicated effectively throughout agencies
  • agencies are building risk management capabilities.

The audit examined four agencies: the Ministry of Health, the NSW Fair Trading function within the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation, NSW Police Force and NSW Treasury Corporation (TCorp). NSW Treasury was also included as the agency responsible for the NSW Government's risk management framework.

Conclusion
All four agencies examined in the audit are taking steps to strengthen their risk culture. In these agencies, senior management communicates the importance of managing risk to their staff. They have risk management policies and funded central functions to oversee risk management. We also found many examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities.
That said, three of the four case study agencies could do more to understand their existing risk culture. As good practice, agencies should monitor their employees’ attitude to risk. Without a clear understanding of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult to tell whether the 'tone' set by the executive and management is aligned with employee behaviours.
Our survey of risk culture found that three agencies could strengthen a culture of open communication, so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. To support innovation, senior management could also do better at communicating to their staff the levels of risk they are willing to accept.
Some agencies are performing better than others in building their risk capabilities. Three case study agencies have reviewed the risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps the review identified. In three agencies, staff also need more practical guidance on how to manage risks that are relevant to their day-to-day responsibilities.
NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. Its principles-based approach to risk management is consistent with better practice. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to develop additional practical guidance and tools to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector. NSW Treasury should encourage agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes. 

In assessing an agency’s risk culture, we focused on four key areas:

Executive sponsorship (tone at the top)

In the four agencies we reviewed, senior management is communicating the importance of managing risk. They have endorsed risk management frameworks and funded central functions tasked with overseeing risk management within their agencies.

That said, we found that three case study agencies do not measure their existing risk culture. Without clear measures of how employees identify and engage with risk, it is difficult for agencies to tell whether employee's behaviours are aligned with the 'tone' set by the executive and management.

For example, in some agencies we examined we found a disconnect between risk tolerances espoused by senior management and how these concepts were understood by staff.

Employee perceptions of risk management

Our survey of staff indicated that while senior leaders have communicated the importance of managing risk, more could be done to strengthen a culture of open communication so that all employees feel comfortable speaking openly about risks. We found that senior management could better communicate to their staff the levels of risk they should be willing to accept.

Integration of risk management into daily activities and links to decision-making

We found examples of risk management being integrated into daily activities. On the other hand, we also identified areas where risk management deviated from good practice. For example, we found that corporate risk registers are not consistently used as a tool to support decision-making.

Support and guidance to help staff manage risks

Most case study agencies are monitoring risk-related skills and knowledge of their workforce, but only one agency has addressed the gaps it identified. While agencies are providing risk management training, surveyed staff in three case study agencies reported that risk management training is not adequate.

NSW Treasury provides agencies with direction and guidance on risk management through policy and guidelines. In line with better practice, NSW Treasury's principles-based policy acknowledges that individual agencies are in a better position to understand their own risks and design risk management frameworks that address those risks. Nevertheless, there is scope for NSW Treasury to refine its guidance material to support a better risk culture in the NSW public sector.

Recommendation

By May 2019, NSW Treasury should:

  • Review the scope of its risk management guidance, and identify additional guidance, training or activities to improve risk culture across the NSW public sector. This should focus on encouraging agency heads to form a view on the current risk culture in their agencies, identify desirable changes to that risk culture, and take steps to address those changes.

Published

Actions for Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents

Detecting and responding to cyber security incidents

Finance
Cyber security
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Workforce and capability

A report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, found there is no whole-of-government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is very limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some agencies have poor detection and response practices and procedures.

The NSW Government relies on digital technology to deliver services, organise and store information, manage business processes, and control critical infrastructure. The increasing global interconnectivity between computer networks has dramatically increased the risk of cyber security incidents. Such incidents can harm government service delivery and may include the theft of information, denial of access to critical technology, or even the hijacking of systems for profit or malicious intent.

This audit examined cyber security incident detection and response in the NSW public sector. It focused on the role of the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation (DFSI), which oversees the Information Security Community of Practice, the Information Security Event Reporting Protocol, and the Digital Information Security Policy (the Policy).

The audit also examined ten case study agencies to develop a perspective on how they detect and respond to incidents. We chose agencies that are collectively responsible for personal data, critical infrastructure, financial information and intellectual property.

Conclusion
There is no whole‑of‑government capability to detect and respond effectively to cyber security incidents. There is limited sharing of information on incidents amongst agencies, and some of the agencies we reviewed have poor detection and response practices and procedures. There is a risk that incidents will go undetected longer than they should, and opportunities to contain and restrict the damage may be lost.
Given current weaknesses, the NSW public sector’s ability to detect and respond to incidents needs to improve significantly and quickly. DFSI has started to address this by appointing a Government Chief Information Security Officer (GCISO) to improve cyber security capability across the public sector. Her role includes coordinating efforts to increase the NSW Government’s ability to respond to and recover from whole‑of‑government threats and attacks.

Some of our case study agencies had strong processes for detection and response to cyber security incidents but others had a low capability to detect and respond in a timely way.

Most agencies have access to an automated tool for analysing logs generated by their IT systems. However, coverage of these tools varies. Some agencies do not have an automated tool and only review logs periodically or on an ad hoc basis, meaning they are less likely to detect incidents.

Few agencies have contractual arrangements in place for IT service providers to report incidents to them. If a service provider elects to not report an incident, it will delay the agency’s response and may result in increased damage.

Most case study agencies had procedures for responding to incidents, although some lack guidance on who to notify and when. Some agencies do not have response procedures, limiting their ability to minimise the business damage that may flow from a cyber security incident. Few agencies could demonstrate that they have trained their staff on either incident detection or response procedures and could provide little information on the role requirements and responsibilities of their staff in doing so.

Most agencies’ incident procedures contain limited information on how to report an incident, who to report it to, when this should occur and what information should be provided. None of our case study agencies’ procedures mentioned reporting to DFSI, highlighting that even though reporting is mandatory for most agencies their procedures do not require it.

Case study agencies provided little evidence to indicate they are learning from incidents, meaning that opportunities to better manage future incidents may be lost.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • assist agencies by providing:
    • better practice guidelines for incident detection, response and reporting to help agencies develop their own practices and procedures
    • training and awareness programs, including tailored programs for a range of audiences such as cyber professionals, finance staff, and audit and risk committees
    • role requirements and responsibilities for cyber security across government, relevant to size and complexity of each agency
    • a support model for agencies that have limited detection and response capabilities
       
  • revise the Digital Information Security Policy and Information Security Event Reporting Protocol by
    • clarifying what security incidents must be reported to DFSI and when
    • extending mandatory reporting requirements to those NSW Government agencies not currently covered by the policy and protocol, including State owned corporations.

DFSI lacks a clear mandate or capability to provide effective detection and response support to agencies, and there is limited sharing of information on cyber security incidents.

DFSI does not currently have a clear mandate and the necessary resources and systems to detect, receive, share and respond to cyber security incidents across the NSW public sector. It does not have a clear mandate to assess whether agencies have an acceptable detection and response capability. It is aware of deficiencies in agencies and across whole‑of‑government, and has begun to conduct research into this capability.

Intelligence gathering across the public sector is also limited, meaning agencies may not respond to threats in a timely manner. DFSI has not allocated resources for gathering of threat intelligence and communicating it across government, although it has begun to build this capacity.

Incident reporting to DFSI is mandatory for most agencies, however, most of our case study agencies do not report incidents to DFSI, reducing the likelihood of containing an incident if it spreads to other agencies. When incidents have been reported, DFSI has not provided dedicated resources to assess them and coordinate the public sector’s response. There are currently no formal requirements for DFSI to respond to incidents and no guidance on what it is meant to do if an incident is reported. The lack of central coordination in incident response risks delays and increased damage to multiple agencies.

DFSI's reporting protocol is weak and does not clearly specify what agencies should report and when. This makes agencies less likely to report incidents. The lack of a standard format for incident reporting and a consistent method for assessing an incident, including the level of risk associated with it, also make it difficult for DFSI to determine an appropriate response.

There are limited avenues for sharing information amongst agencies after incidents have been resolved, meaning the public sector may be losing valuable opportunities to improve its protection and response.

Recommendations

The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should:

  • develop whole‑of‑government procedure, protocol and supporting systems to effectively share reported threats and respond to cyber security incidents impacting multiple agencies, including follow-up and communicating lessons learnt
  • develop a means by which agencies can report incidents in a more effective manner, such as a secure online template, that allows for early warnings and standardised details of incidents and remedial advice
  • enhance NSW public sector threat intelligence gathering and sharing including formal links with Australian Government security agencies, other states and the private sector
  • direct agencies to include standard clauses in contracts requiring IT service providers report all cyber security incidents within a reasonable timeframe
  • provide assurance that agencies have appropriate reporting procedures and report to DFSI as required by the policy and protocol by:
    • extending the attestation requirement within the DISP to cover procedures and reporting
    • reviewing a sample of agencies' incident reporting procedures each year.

Published

Actions for Volume Ten 2013 focusing on Health

Volume Ten 2013 focusing on Health

Health
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Shared services and collaboration

Unqualified opinions were issued for all agencies audited in the following report.

Some of the reports findings include:

  • Most cultural bodies rely heavily on government grants to fund services

  • The Sydney Opera House Trust earns most of its revenue from commercial operations

  • Less than half of the 2014-16 service agreements between HealthShare NSW and its customers have been signed. HealthShare NSW and health entities should finalise their 2014-2016 service agreements by no later than 31 January 2014

  • Five service level agreements with NSW Health Pathology for 2012-13 were never signed. NSW Health Pathology and local health districts/speciality networks should finalise their 2013-14 service agreements by no later than 31 December 2013

  • HealthShare NSW is committed to sharing internal audit findings across NSW Health

  • The Ministry has started a long-term project to review its policy directives

  • A recent review concluded the health sector has mature risk management practices

  • When changes to the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 occur, the Minister should identify and assess any risks from the changes and develop strategies to mitigate against them.

Published

Actions for Volume Eight 2013 focusing on Transport and Ports

Volume Eight 2013 focusing on Transport and Ports

Transport
Industry
Compliance
Financial reporting
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Workforce and capability

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the above corporations’ 30 June 2013 financial statements. During the year, Treasury issued TC 13/01 ‘Mandatory early close procedures for 2013’. This Circular aimed to improve the quality and timeliness of agencies’ annual financial statements. In 2012-13, application of the circular was made mandatory for State owned corporations. As a result, the port corporations were required to perform the early close procedures. All the port corporations were successful in performing the procedures, which helped them submit financial statements by an earlier due date. The early close procedures also resulted in general improvements to the quality of most financial statements.

The report recommends all transport entities should do more to reduce excessive annual leave balances to ensure they will comply with new targets set by the Premier, RailCorp, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains should minimise the amount of overtime bonuses paid to train drivers and that Transport for NSW should set targets to measure the overall satisfaction of train users.

Published

Actions for Reducing Ambulance Turnaround Time at Hospitals

Reducing Ambulance Turnaround Time at Hospitals

Health
Compliance
Management and administration
Service delivery

NSW Health has put in place initiatives to reduce the time ambulance crews have to wait at a hospital before they are able to leave and attend to other calls. Despite these actions, ambulance crews are waiting longer at NSW hospitals. Crews now wait on average nearly 32 minutes at a hospital before handing over a patient, up from about 24 minutes seven years ago.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #233 - released 24 July 2013

Published

Actions for Managing Operating Theatre Efficiency for Elective Surgery

Managing Operating Theatre Efficiency for Elective Surgery

Health
Compliance
Management and administration
Service delivery

Waiting times for elective surgery will continue to increase if NSW Health does not improve its management of operating theatres. On the positive side NSW public hospitals are performing more elective surgery than in previous years and are treating patients substantially within national clinical timeframes. However, more operations will be needed as targets are getting tighter and demand is growing.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #232 - released 17 July 2013