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Actions for Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity

Design and implementation of the Transport Asset Holding Entity

Transport
Treasury
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

The Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) is the State's custodian of rail assets. It is a state owned corporation and commenced operating on 1 July 2020.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. We audited TAHE, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and NSW Treasury.

Separate and related audits on TAHE are reported in 'State Finances 2022', 'State Finances 2021' and 'Transport and Infrastructure 2022' reports.

What we found

The design and implementation of TAHE, which spanned seven years, was not effective.

The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to support an accounting treatment to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments.

The benefits of TAHE were claimed in the 2015–16 NSW Budget before the enabling legislation was passed by Parliament in 2017. This committed the agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, regardless of any challenges that arose.

Rail safety arrangements were a priority throughout TAHE's design and implementation, and risks were raised and addressed.

Agencies relied heavily on consultants on matters related to the creation of TAHE, but failed to effectively manage these engagements. Agencies failed to ensure that consultancies delivered independent advice as an input to decision-making. A small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on the same topic. The final cost of TAHE-related consultancies was $22.6 million compared to the initial estimated cost of $12.9 million.

What we recommended

We recommended that the audited agencies should:

  • improve accountability and transparency for major new fiscal transformation initiatives
  • ensure entities do not reflect the financial impact of significant initiatives in the Budget when there is uncertainty, or it creates perverse incentives
  • review record keeping practices, systems and policies to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998, and the NSW Government Information Classification, Labelling and Handling Guidelines
  • review procurement policies to ensure that consultant use complies with all NSW Government policy requirements.

The NSW Government established the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE), a statutory State Owned Corporation (SOC), on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner – RailCorp. It is the State's custodian of rail network assets, including rail tracks and other infrastructure, rolling stock, land, train stations and facilities, retail space, and signal and power systems, within metropolitan and regional New South Wales. It is responsible for $2.8 billion of major capital projects in 2022–23.

TAHE was established under Part 2 of the Transport Administration Act 1988 and is governed by a decision-making board. The Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Employee Relations are the Shareholding Ministers of TAHE, and they annually agree performance expectations articulated in a Statement of Corporate Intent.

Whereas TAHE is the custodian of rail assets, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains operate public rail services. TAHE does not have responsibility for the operation of the heavy rail network or train services, nor does it have network control functions. TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster in the public sector (formerly the Transport cluster and renamed in April 2022), which also includes Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW (TfNSW).

TfNSW leads the Transport and Infrastructure cluster. Its role is to set the strategic direction for transport across the State. This involves the shaping of planning, policy, strategy, regulation, resource allocation and other service and non-service delivery functions for all modes of transport.

TAHE's Operating Licence is granted by the Portfolio Minister and authorises the entity to perform the functions required to acquire, develop, finance, divest and hold assets, pursuant to the Transport Administration Act 1988. The Portfolio Minister also issues a Statement of Expectations which outlines the government’s expectation for the business for the next three to five years.

TAHE's original Portfolio Minister was the Minister for Transport who approved, on 30 June 2020, the issuing of an interim 12-month Operating Licence to enable TAHE to commence operating on 1 July 2020. The Portfolio Minister then granted TAHE's current Operating Licence in 2021. After TAHE requested a 12-month extension to its current Operating Licence, its next Operating Licence is due on 1 July 2024. The current Portfolio Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure, Cities and Active Transport.

About this audit

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. In making this assessment, we considered whether: 

  • the process of designing and implementing TAHE was cohesive and transparent, and delivered an effective outcome
  • agencies' roles and responsibilities were clear in the planning of TAHE
  • agencies effectively identified and managed certain risks.

Conclusion

The design and implementation of TAHE was not effective. The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments to sustain TAHE through continuing investment, and funding of the state owned rail operators. The ineffective process to design TAHE delivered a model that entails significant uncertainty as to whether the anticipated longer-term financial improvements to the Budget position can be achieved or sustained.

NSW Treasury and TfNSW had different objectives for TAHE

Up to June 2013, RailCorp had been the owner and operator of rail services and maintainer of the metropolitan rail network for almost a decade. It had been operating as a not-for-profit Public Non-Financial Corporation (PNFC).

In 2012, NSW Treasury (hereafter Treasury) decided there was a risk that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) would reclassify RailCorp to the General Government Sector (GGS), meaning depreciation expenses of approximately $870 million would be reflected in the GGS Budget. Treasury wanted to avoid this impact on the GGS Budget, and considered the establishment of a transport asset holding entity as a means to do so. Capital grants to RailCorp were being treated as an expense to the GGS Budget.

TfNSW also wanted an asset holding entity – but one that would be a non-trading ‘shell’ company with no staff that would hold and manage all public transport assets. TfNSW's concept envisaged the entity would have a structure that would enable future public transport reforms and strategic directions while ensuring vertical integration of operations between asset owners and the rail operators to maintain rail safety.

However, Treasury pursued its objective to improve the GGS Budget result, and sought to expand on TfNSW's 'shell' asset holding entity concept. Treasury wanted an entity that could generate a return on investment, as this meant that government investment in transport assets could be treated as equity investments, rather than a Budget expense, and in turn improve the GGS Budget position. As an example of the potential impact of creating this new entity, capital grants of $2.3 billion were paid to RailCorp in 2013–14. If Treasury's objective was met, grants of this significance would then be treated as an equity investment, rather than an expense in the GGS Budget.

In 2017, Treasury's preferred option was progressed through legislation, but both agencies' central objectives for the proposed asset holding entity would continue to prove difficult to reconcile. To achieve Treasury's objective to improve the Budget result, the entity would need to generate a return on investment (this is further discussed below). However, TfNSW expressed concerns that the prioritisation of rail safety, and the effective management of governance, regulation and operations would be more complex in an entity with commercial imperatives.

Asset holding entities are a common approach to the management of transport assets in Australia and internationally, and there are a range of approaches to how they are structured and used. Such structures should be driven by the goal of improved asset management. Ultimately, TfNSW's objectives could have been delivered through a simpler entity structure. However, reconciling TfNSW's objectives with Treasury's imperative to deliver and justify a Budget improvement in the short-term resulted in an overly lengthy process and an unnecessarily complex outcome that places an obligation on future governments to sustain. There is still significant uncertainty as to whether the short-term improvements to the Budget can continue to be realised in the longer-term.

The Budget benefits of TAHE were claimed before the entity was legislated, committing the agencies to deliver, regardless of the complexities that subsequently arose

The 2015–16 GGS Budget treated the government's investment in TAHE (still known at this time as RailCorp) as an equity contribution. This had the immediate impact of improving the Budget result by $1.8 billion per annum. However, the legislation to enable the establishment of TAHE had not yet been passed by Parliament, key elements of the operating model were still under development, and imminent changes in accounting standards had the potential to impact TAHE's financial model. The decision to book the benefits in the Budget early committed the involved agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, irrespective of the challenges that arose. 

TAHE's financial structure requires circular government investment to work

For the NSW Government to continue to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution, rather than an expense to the Budget, there must be a reasonable expectation that TAHE will generate a sufficient rate of return as required by the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) framework. In doing so, it needs to recover a revaluation loss created by a $20.3 billion reduction in the value of its assets which was incurred in its first full year of operation. This loss occurred as a result of a revaluation of TAHE's assets when RailCorp (a not-for profit entity) became TAHE (a for-profit commercial entity) – and is discussed further in the 'Key findings' below.

TAHE generates a small portion of its income from transactions with the private sector but, as noted in our report 'State Finances 2021', TAHE receives the majority of its revenue (more than 80%) from access and licence fee agreements with Sydney Trains and NSW Trains. Both of these entities are funded by grants (a Budget expense) to TfNSW from the GGS Budget.

Based on Treasury’s correspondence with the ABS in 2015, TAHE was initially expected to pay a return on equity of 7% in 2016–17. The assumption of a 7% return persisted through to 2018, after the legislation enabling the establishment of TAHE was passed by Parliament. However, when the initial access and licence fees were agreed on 1 July 2020, this figure had been revised to an expected rate of return of 1.5% excluding the revaluation loss. This was below the long-term inflation target and did not include the recovery of the revaluation loss – risking the government's ability to treat its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution. Importantly, as TAHE is primarily reliant on fees paid by the state owned rail operators that, in turn, are funded by the GGS Budget (as an expense), the decision to change the returns model from 7% to 1.5% would in its own right have had a positive impact on the GGS Budget. However, the decision to use a 1.5% return would ultimately be problematic as it made it difficult to treat the government's contributions to TAHE as an equity investment, as discussed below.

On 14 December 2021, to avoid a qualified audit opinion, the NSW Government made the decision to increase TAHE's expected rate of return to 2.5%, equal to the Reserve Bank’s long-term inflation target.

In 2021-22, TAHE needed to start charging rail operators higher access and licence fees in order to generate a return of 2.5%, so as to support the government's treatment of its investment in TAHE as an equity contribution in the GGS Budget. This meant the government needed to provide additional grant (expense) funding to the state owned rail operators so they could pay the increased access and licence fees to TAHE. Based on current projections, TAHE is not expected to recover the revaluation loss until 2046.

There remains a risk that TAHE will not be able to generate a sufficient return on the NSW Government's investment without relying on increased funding to state owned rail operators so that they can in turn pay the higher access and licence fees. TAHE's ability to generate returns on government investment from other sources are uncertain and may not be achievable or sustainable. Current modelling highlights that TAHE remains largely reliant, through to 2046, on increasing fees (which are assumed to increase at 2.5% per annum from 2031 onwards when the current 10 year contracts with rail operators expire) paid by the state owned rail operators that remain principally reliant on GGS Budget grants.

The process of designing and implementing TAHE was not transparent to independent scrutiny

Our report 'State Finances 2021' commented that Treasury did not always provide this Office with information relating to TAHE on a timely basis. Similarly, during this performance audit, there were also multiple instances where auditees were unable to provide documentation regarding key activities in the process to deliver TAHE. Agencies also applied higher sensitivity classifications to large tranches of documents than was justified or required by policy. Of particular concern is the incorrect classification of documents as Cabinet sensitive information. The incorrect or over-classification of documentation as Cabinet sensitive delayed this Office's ability to provide scrutiny or independent assurance.

There was a lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of governance structures set up to oversee the design and implementation of TAHE

From 2014, multiple workstreams and advisory committees were established to progress the design and implementation of TAHE. For some of these committees and workstreams, there is limited information on what they were tasked to do and what they achieved. Most had ceased meeting by 2018, before significant work needed to deliver TAHE was completed.

The lack of clarity around the roles and responsibilities of these governance structures reduced opportunities for TfNSW and Treasury to reconcile their differing objectives for TAHE, and resolve key questions earlier in the process.

There was a heavy reliance on consulting firms throughout the process to establish TAHE, and the management of consultant engagements failed to ensure that agencies received independent advice to support objective decision-making

In 2020, Treasury and TfNSW failed to prevent, identify, or adequately manage a conflict of interest when they engaged the same 'Big 4' consulting firm to work on separate TAHE-related projects. Both agencies used the firm's work to further their respective views with regard to the financial implications of TAHE's operating model. At this time those views were still unreconciled.

Treasury engaged the firm to provide a fiscal risk management strategy and advice on the impact of changes to accounting standards. TfNSW engaged the same firm to develop operating and financial models for TAHE, which raised concerns regarding the viability of TAHE. Disputes arose around the findings of these reports. Treasury disagreed with some of the outcomes of the work commissioned by TfNSW, relating to accounting treatment and fiscal advice.

The management of this conflict (real or perceived) was left to the 'Big 4' consulting firm when it was more appropriate for it to be managed by Treasury and TfNSW. If these agencies had communicated more effectively, used available governance structures consistently, and shared information openly about their use of the firm and the nature of their respective engagements, these disputes might have been avoided. This issue, coupled with deficiencies in procurement by both agencies, reflected and further perpetuated the lack of cohesion in the design and implementation of TAHE.

More broadly, over the period 2014 – 2021, 16 separate consulting firms were employed to work on 36 contracts, valued at over $22.56 million, relating to TAHE ranging from accounting and legal advice, project management, and the provision of administrative support and secretariat services.

Consultants are legitimately used by agencies to provide advice on how to achieve the outcomes determined by government, including advising agencies on the risks and challenges in achieving those outcomes. Similarly, consultants can provide expert knowledge in the service of achieving those outcomes and managing the risks. However, the heavy reliance on consulting firms during the design and implementation of TAHE heightened the risk that agencies were not receiving value for money, were outsourcing tasks that should be performed by the public service, and did not mitigate the risk that the advice received was not objective and impartial. The risk that the role of consultants could have been blurred between providing independent advice to government on options and facilitating a pre-determined outcome was not effectively treated or mitigated. This risk was amplified because a small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on one topic. The effective procurement and management of consultants is an obligation of government agencies.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies, and Audit Office clarification of matters raised in the TAHE formal response 

Appendix two – Classification of government entities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #372 - released 24 January 2023

 

Published

Actions for State Finances 2022

State Finances 2022

Treasury
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Regulation
Risk

What the report is about

Results of the 2021–22 consolidated General Government Sector (GGS) and Total State Sector (TSS) financial statements audits.

What we found

The Independent Auditor’s Report on the 2021–22 GGS and TSS financial statements was modified with a limitation of scope and also contained an emphasis of matter.

The opinion in the TSS Independent Auditor’s Report was modified with a limitation of scope on certain balances consolidated in the TSS financial statements because the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) denied access to its management, books and records for the purpose of conducting a financial audit.

The Independent Auditor’s Report also includes an emphasis of matter drawing attention to the significant uncertainties associated with the GGS’s equity investment in Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE). The significant uncertainty relates to key assumptions and estimates used to forecast a 2.5% return from GGS investments into TAHE that supports the accounting treatment as an equity injection, including:

  • funding to support the Rail Operators to pay TAHE’s contracted and forecast access and licence fees up until 2045–46. The Rail Operators are dependent on funding from the GGS to pay access and licence fees. Forecast modelling notes a requirement of a further $10.2 billion in budget funding to pay TAHE to the end of the ten-year contract period in 2030–31, in addition to the $5.5 billion allocated in the forward estimates and up to $50.8 billion for the period 2032 to 2046
  • a significant portion of the projected returns are earnt outside of the ten-year contract period and there is a risk that TAHE may not be able to recontract fees at levels consistent with current projections.

What we recommended

The report includes a number of recommendations including:

  • continued monitoring that TAHE controls the reported assets ensuring the CMCT, Category 2 Statutory Land Managers (SLM) and Commons Trusts meet their statutory reporting obligations
  • ensuring accounting and audit position papers are sufficiently consulted with key stakeholders and are concluded on a timely basis
  • ensuring agencies support the timely conclusion of audits by bringing to the auditors' attention key Cabinet records and identifying references relating to accounting issues impacting the financial statements
  • for Special Deposit Accounts (SDA) responsible managers should ensure amounts appropriated under any Act or law for payment into the account are appropriately recorded, ensuring payments from SDAs are allowable and made in accordance with Treasurer's delegations and standing authorisation.
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Margaret Crawford, Auditor-General for New South Wales

Pursuant to section 52A of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 I am pleased to present my Auditor-General’s Report on State Finances 2022.

Once again this year has presented considerable challenges for the state sector and my Office as we collectively grapple with uncertainties related to COVID-19 and the disruption of emergency events impacting New South Wales. In addition, there were many recommendations arising from last year’s audit to be addressed.

While there is more to do to ensure good financial stewardship of the State, resolution of matters was helped by constructive engagement with the NSW Treasury at the most senior levels. Personally I wish to thank the Treasurer and Secretary for their commitment to instilling integrity in financial management systems and processes. The support Treasury provided for recent amendments to the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 to provide ‘follow the dollar’ powers and other changes recommended by the Public Accounts Committee quadrennial review of my Office is also acknowledged.

Finally I want to thank the teams that contributed to this year’s audit of the Total State Accounts for their diligence, professionalism and commitment. I am very proud of your work.

Margaret Crawford

Auditor-General for New South Wales

The Independent Auditor's Report was qualified and also included an emphasis of matter

The audit opinion on the State's 2021–22 financial statements was modified. The delayed signing of the NSW Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) by NSW Treasury was in order to resolve significant accounting issues that were material to the TSSA. The key areas requiring significant audit effort included reviewing the State's accounting for TCorp Investment Management (IM) Funds and responding to the risks related to the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) denying access to its management and books and records, which is detailed in this Report.

NSW Treasury aimed to sign the TSSA by 19 October 2022. This was delayed by nearly six weeks and the TSSA audit opinion was subsequently signed on the statutory deadline imposed on the Treasurer for tabling of the TSSA in the Legislative Assembly of 30 November 2022.

The Independent Auditor’s Report was modified due to a limitation of scope on the balances consolidated in the TSSA relating to the CMCT

The opinion in the Independent Auditor’s Report was modified with a limitation of scope due to the inability to access management, books and records of a controlled entity, the CMCT.

This year, NSW Treasury, after reconsidering all facts and the perspectives of the CMCT, reconfirmed that the CMCT is a controlled entity of the State for financial reporting purposes. This means CMCT is a GSF agency under the provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act). As such NSW Treasury is required by Australian Accounting Standards to consolidate the CMCT into the Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA). The value of assets and liabilities of CMCT consolidated into the TSSA is $310.3 million and $15.1 million, respectively, and the loss of CMCT consolidated into the TSSA for the year is $2.4 million.

To date, CMCT has not met its statutory obligations to prepare financial statements under the GSF Act and give them to the Auditor-General. CMCT has not submitted its financial statements to the Auditor-General for audit as required despite repeated requests and has not provided access to its books and records for the purposes of a financial audit. The Secretary of the Department of Planning and Environment wrote to CMCT to request it work with, and offer full assistance to, the Auditor-General in the exercise of her duties.

NSW Treasury has met with and considered CMCT's perspectives. NSW Treasury’s position remains that CMCT is a controlled entity of the State for financial reporting purposes. Consequently, CMCT has not met its statutory obligations as a controlled entity to submit its financial statements for audit and provide access to its books and records. Therefore, the Audit Office was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the carrying amount of assets and liabilities consolidated into the Total State Sector Accounts as at 30 June 2022 and of the amount of income and expenses for the year then ended. Accordingly a modified audit opinion was issued on the NSW Government's 2021–22 consolidated financial statements.

Section 3 of this report titled 'Limitation of Scope relating to CMCT' discusses this matter in further detail.

An emphasis of matter drawing attention to uncertainty relating to the General Government Sector's investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) remains

The Independent Auditor’s Report also includes an emphasis of matter, drawing attention to the significant uncertainties associated with the General Government Sector's (GGS) equity investment in TAHE. The significant uncertainty relates to key assumptions used to forecast returns from investments into TAHE in order to support the recognition of the government's funding of TAHE as an equity injection.

At the time of signing the Independent Auditor's Report, there was significant uncertainty with regards to assumptions and estimates used to forecast a return from the GGS investment into TAHE, which supports the recognition of an equity injection. There is significant uncertainty relating to:

  • the 2022–23 Budget committed $5.5 billion to fund TAHE's key customers, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains (the operators), to support their payment of access and licence fees agreed on 23 June 2022. However, this funding only extends out to the end of the forward estimates period in 2025–26, which falls short of the ten-year contractual periods to 2030–31 and the projected period to 2045–46 to achieve a 2.5% return from the government's equity investment. The government will need to fund the operators an additional $10.2 billion in Budget funding so that they can meet their contractual obligations to TAHE from 2026–27 to 2030–31, and a further projected funding of $50.8 billion from 2031 to 2046. This additional funding is not within the government's published Budget figures, leading to uncertainty on whether the government-funded operators can pay access and licence fees beyond the forward estimates period of 2025–26
  • a significant portion of the projected returns are earnt outside the ten-year contract period (terminating 30 June 2031) and there is a risk that TAHE will not be able to recontract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections. There is also a risk that funding for TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections.

The 'State Finances 2021' report made recommendations regarding the significant accounting issues relating to TAHE. The State's response to these recommendations are detailed in Section 4 of this report titled ‘Investment in the Transport Asset Holding Entity’. Other significant matters related to the TSSA audit are covered in Section 8 titled ‘Key audit findings’.

Other financial reporting matters

All government agencies were granted an extra week to submit financial statements for audit

A one-week extension provided agencies across the sector with additional time to resolve key accounting issues and submit financial statements for audit by 1 August 2022.

Further extensions were approved for the following seven agencies (ten in 2020–21):

  • State Insurance Regulatory Authority (3 August 2022)
  • Dams Safety NSW (8 August 2022)
  • Jenolan Caves Reserve Trust (8 August 2022)
  • Transport for NSW (8 August 2022)
  • Department of Enterprise, Investment and Trade (22 August 2022)
  • Transport Asset Holding Entity (22 August 2022)
  • Department of Transport (26 August 2022).

Additional extensions provided agencies with more time to complete:

  • asset valuations
  • valuations of actuarially assessed liabilities.

An initial draft of the TSSA was provided to audit on 15 September 2022. This version was incomplete and excluded the impact of consolidating the State's TCorp IM funds under the correct Australian Accounting Standards. An additional three versions of the draft TSSA were provided to audit progressively to update the TCorp IM fund consolidated balances. The final complete version of the TSSA was submitted on 27 October 2022 which included all adjustments relating to the TCorp IM fund consolidation. Refer to section 8.1 for more details on the material restatements relating to the consolidation of the TCorp IM funds.

In 2021–22, agency financial statements presented for audit contained 20 errors exceeding $20 million (24 in 2020–21). The total value of these errors was $973 million, a decrease from the previous year ($6.6 billion in 2020–21).

The graph below shows the number of reported errors exceeding $20 million over the past five years in agencies’ financial statements presented for audit.

The errors resulted from:

  • incorrect application of Australian Accounting Standards and NSW Treasury policies
  • incorrect judgements and assumptions when valuing non-current physical assets and liabilities.

NSW Treasury concluded CMCT is a controlled entity of the State

In response to our recommendation in the ‘State Finances 2021’ report, NSW Treasury reconfirmed that the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (CMCT) is a controlled entity of the State. The Audit Office accepted the position of NSW Treasury.

The reaffirmation of this position means CMCT is a GSF agency under the provisions of the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 (GSF Act). Section 7.6 of the GSF Act places an obligation on CMCT to prepare financial statements and give them to the Auditor-General. Further, section 34 of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983 (the GSA Act) requires the Auditor-General to furnish an audit report on these financial statements.

To date, CMCT has not met its statutory obligations to prepare financial statements under the GSF Act and give them to the Auditor-General. CMCT has not submitted their financial statements to the Auditor-General for audit despite repeated requests and has not provided access to its books and records for the purposes of a financial audit. There was extensive correspondence between the Audit Office of NSW, CMCT, NSW Treasury and the Department of Planning and Environment in 2022 regarding this matter.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury and the Department of Planning and Environment should ensure the Catholic Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust meets its statutory reporting obligations.

In addition, on 10 December 2021, the then Minister for Water, Property and Housing wrote to the Auditor-General requesting a financial and performance audit be performed pursuant to section 27B(3)(c) of the GSA Act. The audit would cover the financial affairs of CMCT, including whether funds have been used for the proper purpose. The Audit Office of New South Wales has written to CMCT on a number of occasions to request the provision of documentation and access to management in order to conduct the performance audit. CMCT has not provided the Audit Office of New South Wales access to its management, books and records for the purpose of the required performance audit.

NSW Treasury has met with and considered CMCT's perspectives. NSW Treasury’s position remains that CMCT is a controlled entity of the State for financial reporting purposes. Consequently, CMCT did not meet its statutory obligations as a controlled entity to submit its financial statements for audit and provide access to its books and records.

The TSSA audit opinion included a limitation of scope

The opinion in the TSSA Independent Auditor’s Report was modified with a limitation of scope due to an inability to access management and the books and records of CMCT. This limitation was appropriately disclosed in Note 1 'Statement of Significant Accounting Policies' of the TSSA. The Statement of Compliance signed by the Secretary of Treasury and the Treasurer on 29 November 2022 was also updated to acknowledge the disclosure in Note 1 regarding CMCT.

The Audit Office was unable to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the carrying amount of assets and liabilities consolidated into the Total State Sector Accounts as at 30 June 2022 and of the amount of income and expenses for the year then ended. Accordingly a modified audit opinion was issued on the NSW Government's 2021–22 consolidated financial statements.

The process of information sharing by NSW Treasury continues to require improvement

In last year’s ‘State Finances 2021’ report an extreme risk management letter finding was reported for NSW Treasury to ensure it significantly improve its processes so that all relevant information is identified and shared with the Audit Office to support material transactions and balances of the State.

A number of events reconfirmed that NSW Treasury needs to continue improving its process with respect to information sharing with the Audit Office. Notably, NSW Treasury’s finance team had not demonstrated that all available information (on their systems) was considered by them when assessing the State’s control over CMCT.

Critical information relating to CMCT was in the possession of NSW Treasury since late October 2021 but not considered when reconfirming their accounting position on the State's control of CMCT this year. A further reconfirmation of the State's control over CMCT was needed by NSW Treasury to ensure this information was considered in their accounting assessment.

The above demonstrates that more effective consultation is required by NSW Treasury with key stakeholders to ensure all information relevant to forming an accounting position relating to the TSSA is captured. This will ensure new information is not identified late in the audit process and NSW Treasury considers all information when concluding on the accounting position of the State.

Recommendation

NSW Treasury should ensure when drafting position papers and concluding on accounting issues impacting the State, these are provided to audit on a timely basis and reflect a complete and accurate understanding of the key public sector issues being considered.

Last year's report highlighted that NSW Government actions avoided a qualified opinion in 2020–21 relating to the General Government Sector's $2.4 billion cash contribution to Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE). These actions included the NSW Government agreeing to provide additional future funding to TAHE's key government customers Sydney Trains and NSW Trains (the operators) to support increases in access and licence fees to be paid to TAHE.

The additional funding by the government was necessary to demonstrate that a reasonable expectation of a sufficient rate of return would be earned on its equity invested in TAHE. Last year, there was no government policy on what the minimum return should be on investments in other public sector entities, so the long-term inflation rate was used as a benchmark. A recommendation was made in last year's State Finances report that NSW Treasury establish a policy on the minimum expected return from its investments.

On 6 September 2022, NSW Treasury finalised its policy relating to the government’s returns on equity investments. The application of this policy is limited to State Owned Corporations and similar to the Commonwealth framework for commercial businesses, which requires the expected return be at least equal to the long-term inflation rate.

The government's commitment to additional funding was conveyed last year through revised shareholder expectations being published in the 2021–22 'NSW Budget-Half yearly Review' on 16 December 2021, increasing the expected returns on equity from 1.5% to the expected long-term inflation rate of 2.5%. On 18 December 2021, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and the operators entered into a Heads of Agreement (HoA). This formed the basis of negotiations to revise the pricing within the existing ten-year contracts and deliver upon the shareholders’ expected return of 2.5% on contributed equity to be earned over the estimated weighted average remaining useful lives of TAHE's assets.

Further information on last year's audit of the government’s investment in TAHE can be found in our 'State Finances 2021' report.

Ten-year commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, operators and TfNSW

Last year's State Finances report recommended that NSW Treasury facilitate revised commercial agreements to reflect the access and licence fees detailed in the HoA. As these agreements were not executed by 30 June 2021, last year's audit opinion of the Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA) included an Emphasis of Matter drawing attention to the uncertainty that existed at balance date as these agreements were not finalised.

On 23 June 2022, commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, the operators and Transport for NSW through a deed of variation. The revised access and licence fees for the ten-year period 2021–22 to 2030–31 was $16.6 billion, which is $520 million less than the HoA fees of $17.1 billion.

Comparison FY22
$m
FY23
$m
FY24
$m
FY25
$m
FY26
$m
FY27
$m
FY28
$m
FY29
$m
FY30
$m
FY31
$m
Total
$m
Revised commercial agreements 641.1 911.8 1,298.1 1,585 1,807.3 1,921.8 1,992 2,065.4 2,139.1 2,252.8 16,614.4
HoA 679.9 1,081.4 1,236 1,398.9 1,645.8 1,826.1 2,023.3 2,209.4 2,404.5 2,629.2 17,134.6
Difference (38.8) (169.6) 62.1 186.1 161.5 95.7 (31.3) (144) (265.4) (376.4) (520.2)

TAHE's main customers principally rely on government funding to pay access and licence fees

Whilst TAHE has agreed ten-year access and licence fees of $16.6 billion with its two main customers Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, these two operators significantly rely on government funding when making these payments to TAHE. At 30 June 2022, TAHE's expected return of 2.5% is contingent upon the GGS funding the operators to support their payment of access and licence fees that have been agreed with TAHE for the ten-year contracted period and for non-contracted periods from 2031–32 to 2045–46.

The 2022–23 NSW Budget has allocated $5.5 billion to fund the operators, to support their payment of access and licence fees. However, this funding extends to the end of the forward estimates period in 2025–26, which falls short of the ten-year contractual period to 2030–2031 and the projected period to 2045–46 to achieve the 2.5% return.

  2022–261
$b
2027–20312
$b
2032–46
$b
Total
$b
Access and licence fees3 5.5 10.2 50.8 66.5

1 Represents the 2022–23 Budget year and three-year forward estimates which includes: FY2024–26.
2 Whilst excluded from the 2022–23 NSW Budget, these access and licence fees are included in the ten-year commercial agreement between TAHE, operators and TfNSW.
3 Represents cumulative access and licence fees for the period stated.

The government will need to fund the operators an additional $10.2 billion in budget funding to meet their contractual obligations to TAHE from 2026–27 to 2030–2031, and a further projected funding of $50.8 billion from 2032 to 2046. This is needed to ensure the government continues to demonstrate its expected return on investment of 2.5%. This additional funding is not within the government's published 2022–23 NSW Budget figures, leading to uncertainty on whether the government funded operators can pay access and licence fees beyond the forward estimate period of 2025–26.

Significant funding uncertainties remain

While the ten-year access and licence fee agreements were communicated to the NSW Government's Expenditure Review Committee, it is yet to be fully provided for in the government's budget figures. As TAHE's projections are highly dependent on the operators as its key customers, it remains critical that the government continue to provide sufficient funding to the operators so they can pay for access and use of TAHE assets. This means the significant funding uncertainties reported in last year's TSSA audit opinion remain for 2021–22.

The government has estimated $37.9 billion in returns (equivalent to 2.5% on contributed equity) is to be earned from its investment in TAHE over the period from 1 July 2022 to 30 June 2046. As previously reported, TAHE derives most of its revenue from access and licence fee agreements from the operators, who in turn are both funded by grants through TfNSW from the GGS. More than 95% of these returns are estimated to be earned outside of the ten-year contract period (terminating 30 June 2031).

  2022–261
$b
2027–20312
$b
2032–46
$b
Total
$b
Returns to GGS 1.8 4.7 31.5 37.9

1 Represents the 2022–23 budget year and three-year forward estimates which includes: 2023–24, 2024–25 and 2025–26.
2 Whilst excluded from the 2022–23 NSW Budget, these access and licence fees are included in the ten-year commercial agreement between TAHE, operators and TfNSW.

There remains risk that:

  • TAHE will not be able to recontract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • future governments' funding to TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

This significant funding uncertainty was also reported in last year's TSSA audit opinion and will remain for 2021–22.

In 2021–22, TAHE and NSW Treasury prepared further modelling to support the Government's intent to earn a 2.5% return inclusive of recovering the holding (revaluation) loss of $20.3 billion on its investment in TAHE

Last year's State Finances report highlighted that NSW Treasury, with TAHE, should prepare robust projections and business plans to support the expected returns forecast beyond FY2031.

This year TAHE engaged an expert to help develop a model demonstrating the government's expected returns from its investment in TAHE. The model mathematically forecasts that returns of 2.5% will be achieved by 2046 and this will include recovery of the revaluation losses of $20.3 billion relating to 2020–21.

The current model includes some key assumptions:

  • The main source of revenue is the access and licence fees expected from the two public rail operators (Sydney Trains and NSW Trains) contributing to more than 80% of TAHE's projected revenue. The rail operators are largely funded by the government when paying access and licence fees to TAHE.
  • For the first ten years, the access and licence fees are based on the signed agreements between TAHE and the public rail operators.
  • Beyond the ten-year contracted period, the model assumes existing contractual terms for access and licence fees will continue unchanged allowing for an annual rise for inflation (2.5% per annum), and increased fees to enable a 7.62% return for renewed assets.
  • The capital expenditure included in the model is only the amounts approved by the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) as part of the ten-year forecast. The model beyond ten years includes expected investment in renewed and replacement assets but excludes any forecasts relating to growth capex that is not approved by the ERC, and any related depreciation expenses for growth capex.

While management has developed a 35-year long term financial model to support the returns, we note this will need to be refined over the next few years. Furthermore, these are forecasted figures and we have not seen sufficient evidence of whether this reflects reality (that is, the achievement of dividends representing a return on equity) as it is still very early. Therefore, this will remain a high-risk matter until we have seen sufficient evidence of reality to the forecasted figures.

There is negative net impact on the budget after 2024–25 and this will grow in the future

There are some key points to highlight with this modelling and these are best conveyed with the graph below. This graph shows total cash injections made by the GGS since the government first announced the creation of TAHE as a for-profit entity in the 2015–16 NSW Budget. It also conveys the forecast returns from TAHE to the GGS and the level of funding operators will need from the GGS to pay TAHE's access and licence fees over the 30-year period. These cash flows are key inputs used in the modelling which calculates a 2.5% return from TAHE inclusive of recovering the holding (revaluation) loss of $20.3 billion.

The government continues to respond to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on New South Wales through its economic stimulus measures

The COVID-19 pandemic continued to significantly impact the State’s finances, reducing revenue and increasing expenses especially in sectors directly responsible for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as Health. In October 2021, the government announced through the 'COVID-19 Economic Recovery Strategy' an additional $2.8 billion in economic stimulus and response measures following the conclusion of the three-month lockdown due to the Delta COVID-19 outbreak. Measures included:

  • $739 million in household and social support, including housing support for Aboriginal communities and survivors of domestic violence, and vouchers to thank parents for their efforts to support learning from home
  • $500 million to consumers and businesses including expansion of the 'Dine & Discover' and 'Stay & Rediscover' voucher programs
  • $495 million in education support addressing learning gaps for children and helping schools prepare for future learning disruptions
  • $487 million in combined funding for tourism, events, sports, and recreation throughout New South Wales
  • $130 million to fund mental health services for individuals whose mental health was impacted by the pandemic.

The 2021–22 financial year included $21.9 billion for pandemic response and economic stimulus measures. Of this, $17.9 billion was spent in 2021–22 while a further $1 billion of the budgeted amount from 2021–22 was carried forward into 2022–23. The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster for 2022 compared to target spend.

There were 14 natural disaster declarations including four severe weather events in 2021–22

Natural disasters such as bushfires, storms, floods, and other adverse weather events can have a significant impact on the State's finances. Costs associated with natural disasters include direct response costs such as clean-up and recovery, temporary accommodation, and as well as financial assistance provided to impacted communities such as recovery and business support grants.

The NSW Government can make a natural disaster declaration allowing eligible individuals and communities from impacted Local Government Areas access to a range of special financial assistance measures.

In 2021–22, there were 14 natural disaster declarations announced comparable to 14 in the previous year. These natural disaster declarations largely related to storms and floods throughout the State. In 2021–22, there was a larger number of 'severe weather' events declared, with four in 2021–22 (nil in 2020–21).

Natural disaster expenses increased 143% to $1.4 billion in 2021–22, up from $569 million last year

Over 2021–22, the budgeted cost for declared natural disasters was $1.9 billion ($725 million in 2020–21). Actual expenditure by the State on disaster response increased by $815 million to $1.4 billion. The graph below shows the total allocation and spend by cluster for 2022 compared to their budget spend.

Deficit of $15.3 billion compared with a budgeted deficit of $8.6 billion

The outcomes of the government’s overall activity and policies are reflected in its net operating balance (budget result). This is the difference between the cost of general government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 196 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.

In addition to the 196 entities within the General Government Sector, a further 85 government controlled businesses are included within the consolidated Total State Sector financial statements. These businesses generally provide goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services for which consumers pay for directly, and form part of the PNFC (31) and PFC (54) sectors.

The budget result for the 2021–22 financial year was a deficit of $15.3 billion compared to an original forecast of a budget deficit of $8.6 billion.

Revenues increased $16.1 billion to $106.7 billion

The State’s total revenues increased $16.1 billion to $106.7 billion, an increase of 17.8% compared to the previous year. Total revenue growth in 2020–21 was 5.1%. The State's increase in revenue was mostly from $9.2 billion in grants and subsidies and $4.6 billion in taxation.

Taxation revenue increased by 13.3%

Taxation revenue increased by $4.6 billion, mainly due to the net of:

  • $4.9 billion higher stamp duties collected from property sales driven by growth in property transaction volumes and prices during 2021–22. This was growth was experienced across residential and commercial property markets
  • $296 million lower gambling and betting taxes compared to 2020–21. Decrease was primarily attributed to the ongoing effects of COVID-19 restrictions and venue closures within the first half of 2021–22.

Stamp duties of $16.6 billion remains the largest source of taxation revenue, $7.7 billion higher than payroll tax of $8.9 billion, the second-largest source of taxation revenue.

Assets grew by $53 billion to $571 billion

The State’s assets include physical assets such as land, buildings and infrastructure, and financial assets such as cash, and other financial instruments and equity investments. The value of total assets increased by $53.2 billion or 10.3% to $571 billion. The increase was largely due to increases in the carrying value of land, buildings and infrastructure systems.

Valuing the State’s physical assets

State’s physical assets valued at $437 billion

The value of the State’s physical assets increased by $46.8 billion to $437 billion in 2021–22 ($724 million increase in 2020–21). The State’s physical assets include land and buildings ($198 billion), infrastructure systems ($221 billion), and plant and equipment ($18 billion).

The movement in physical asset values between years includes additions, disposals, depreciation and valuation adjustments. Other movements include assets reclassified to held for sale and other opening balance adjustments.

Appendix one – Prescribed entities

Appendix two – Legal opinions

Appendix three – TSS sectors and entities

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Transport and Infrastructure 2022

Transport and Infrastructure 2022

Transport
Asset valuation
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Management and administration
Procurement

What the report is about

Result of the Transport and Infrastructure cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Transport and Infrastructure cluster agencies' financial statements.

An 'other matter' paragraph was included in TAHE's Independent Auditor's Report for its 30 June 2022 financial statements which draws attention to Transport and Asset Holding Entity's (TAHE) reliance on government-funded customers.

We included an ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraph in the Independent Auditor’s Report for State Transit Authority of New South Wales’ (the authority) 30 June 2022 financial statements, which draws attention to the financial statements being prepared on a liquidation basis as the authority’s principal activities ceased operations on 3 April 2022.

What the key issues were

The 2021–22 audits identified five high-risk findings:

  • detailed business modelling to support returns from TAHE
  • valuation of assets at TAHE
  • control of assets at TAHE
  • accounting and valuation of tree assets at Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust and Parramatta Park Trust.

Access and licence fees - TAHE

Revised commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, the operators and Transport for NSW on 23 June 2022 to reflect increased access and licence fees detailed in the 18 December 2021 Heads of Agreement.

TAHE’s ability to generate the expected return of 2.5% based on the current modelling is heavily reliant on the government funding the public rail operators (TAHE's customers).

There are risks that:

  • TAHE will not be able to recontract for access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • future governments' funding to TAHE's key customers will not be sufficient to fund payment of access and licence fees at a level that is consistent with current projections
  • TAHE will be unable to grow its non-government revenues.

Valuation of assets - TAHE

Although TAHE's selected valuation of assets falls within an acceptable range, there remains a significant gap between what has been assessed as an acceptable range and TAHE's range.

What we recommended

Control of assets - TAHE

While we accepted TAHE’s position on control for the current year, NSW Treasury and TAHE should continue to monitor the risk that control of TAHE assets could change in future reporting periods. TAHE must continue to demonstrate control of its assets or the current accounting presentation would need to be reconsidered.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Transport and Infrastructure cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all Transport and Infrastructure cluster agencies' financial statements.
  • An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Transport Asset Holding Entity of New South Wales' (TAHE) Independent Auditor's Report to draw attention to TAHE's reliance on government-funded customers.
  •  An 'Emphasis of Matter' paragraph was included in the State Transit Authority of New South Wales' (the authority) Independent Auditor's Report to draw attention to management’s disclosures that State Transit Authority of New South Wales' financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2022 were prepared on a liquidation basis as the authority’s principal activities ceased operations on 3 April 2022.
  • While TAHE's valuation of assets at 30 June 2022 was within an acceptable range of valuation outcomes, there remained significant differences in assumptions used when compared with relevant market benchmarks.
  • Sydney Metro corrected two prior period errors of $1.5 billion and $51 million in accounting and valuation of assets, and double counting of assets capitalised in infrastructure as well as assets under construction respectively.

 

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.

Section highlights

  • The number of findings reported to management decreased from 87 in 2020–21 to 59 in 2021–22.
  • Repeat findings accounted for 54.2% of management letter points. Many repeat findings related to controls over payroll, including management of annual leave and processing of timesheets, management of conflicts of interests, weaknesses in controls over information technology user access administration and password management.
  • One new high-risk issue was identified in 2020–21, and four high-risk repeat issues remained.
  • The five high-risk issues arose from the audit in the cluster, with respect to:
    • control over TAHE assets and operations (repeat)
    • TAHE detailed business modelling to support returns (repeat)
    • valuation of trees (repeat for Parramatta Park Trust and Centennial Park and Moore Park Trust)
    • TAHE asset valuations.

 

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Internal controls and governance 2022

Internal controls and governance 2022

Whole of Government
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Risk

What the report is about

This report analyses the internal controls and governance of the 25 largest agencies in the NSW public sector, excluding state-owned corporations and public financial corporations, for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Internal control trends

The proportion of control deficiencies identified as high-risk this year increased to 8.2% (5.9% in 2020–21). Sixteen of the 23 high-risk findings related to financial controls while seven related to IT controls.

Repeat findings of control deficiencies now represent 48% of all findings (47% in 2020–21).

Information technology

There continues to be a high number of deficiencies relating to IT general controls, particularly around user access reviews, which affected 56% of agencies.

Cyber security

Agencies' self-assessed maturity levels against the NSW Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements are lower than target levels. Overall, maturity levels against the Australian Cyber Security Centre's Essential Eight controls have not improved since last year.

Management of cyber risks relating to third party IT service providers should be improved. IT service providers may pose risks to the agency if the provider's cyber security controls have weaknesses.

Consultants and contractors

Agencies risk over-reliance on the same consultants and contractors. A quarter of agencies have re-engaged the same contractor over the past five years.

Employment screening Twenty-four per cent of agencies have not complied with the employment screening requirements of the Government Sector Employment Act 2013 with regard to citizenship or residency. Screening and induction practices for non-permanent workers are often less stringent than for permanent employees. This can pose increased risks to an entity of not detecting applicants with false credentials or a history of corrupt conduct.

Contract management

Half of all agencies' procurement contract registers are incomplete, which is non-compliant with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009.

What we recommended

Agencies should:

  • prioritise actions to address repeat control deficiencies
  • prioritise improvements to their cyber security and resilience
  • reinforce mandatory cyber training to all staff and improve completion rates
  • ensure that contractor engagements that have been renewed over multiple years are periodically reassessed against the market.

Internal controls are processes, policies and procedures that help agencies to:

  • operate effectively and efficiently
  • produce reliable financial reports
  • comply with laws and regulations
  • support ethical government.

This chapter outlines the overall trends for agency controls and governance issues, including the number of audit findings, the degree of risk those deficiencies pose to the agency, and a summary of the most common deficiencies we found across agencies. The rest of this report presents this year's controls and governance findings in more detail.

For consistency and comparability, we have adjusted the 2021 results to incorporate additional audit findings that were reported after the date of the 'Internal controls and governance 2021' report. Therefore, the 2021 figures will not necessarily align with those reported in our 2021 report.

This section also covers how agencies have complied with TD 21-04 during 2021–22.

Section highlights

We identified 23 high-risk findings, compared to 20 last year, with ten repeated from last year. Sixteen of the 23 findings related to financial controls and seven related to IT controls.

  • The proportion of repeat deficiencies has increased from 47% in 2020–21 to 48% in 2021–22.
  • We identified a low level of compliance with TD 21-04 during 2021–22. Most agencies do not have a policy on gifts of government property, and did not annually certify their register of gifts of government property or attest that the agency has not made any gifts.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agency controls to manage key financial systems.

Section highlights

  • We continue to see a high number of deficiencies related to IT General Controls, particularly those related to user access administration and privileged user access.
  • We identified deficiencies within IT governance related to IT policies and procedures not effective in managing IT risks. We also identified weaknesses in arrangements with third-party IT service providers which can increase cyber security risk.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' cyber security planning and governance arrangements.

Section highlights

  • Only 80% of agencies specify how they monitor or ensure that third-party IT service providers comply with the agencies' cyber security policies. IT service providers may pose certain risks to the agency if the provider's cyber security controls have weaknesses.
  • There are inconsistent practices and definitions of cyber security incidents across agencies with respect to maintaining incident registers. Five agencies reported nil incidents in their registers for 2021–22, while other agencies recorded up to 1,913 incidents.
  • Agencies' self-assessed maturity levels against the NSW Cyber Security Policy mandatory requirements are lower than their target levels in at least one requirement. Maturity levels against the Australian Cyber Security Centre's Essential Eight controls have not improved since last year. 

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' practices in engaging external experts, such as consultants and contractors.

Section highlights

  • Agencies risk over-reliance on the same consultants, as some firms continue to be the highest paid consultants at 60% of agencies for at least three of the past five years.
  • Agencies could improve their policies on engaging consultants to include consideration of:
    • probity requirements/conflict of interests
    • rotation of independent consultants from time-to-time
    • additional review where multiple consultants are engaged on the same topic to address the risk of opinion shopping.
  • A quarter of agencies have re-engaged the same contractor over the past five years, with one contractor engaged for 19 years. Long-term engagements without reassessment against market increase the risk of dependency on the contractor.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' employment screening practices.

Section highlights

  • We identified that most agencies do not include the risk of employment application fraud in their risk registers.
    Post-employment screening has an important role in preventing fraud and managing risk as roles often change and the initial employment screening procedures may not be sufficient to control risk over time. Only 57% of agencies that have an employment screening policy include post-employment screening guidance.
  • Screening and induction practices for non-permanent workers are often less stringent than for permanent employees. There is an increased risk that agencies will:
    • fail to identify an applicant with a past history of corrupt or criminal conduct
    • not identify applications with false credentials
    • hire a worker with unsuitable qualifications, skills or experience.

This chapter outlines our audit observations, conclusions and recommendations arising from our review of agencies' contract management processes.

Section highlights

  • All agencies maintain a central contract register but 40% are incomplete, risking non-compliance with the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA Act).
  • The contract renewal process could be improved. We identified only 76% of agencies assessed value for money before deciding to renew/extend the contract.
  • Most agencies provide some training and support to staff on procurement procedures. Ongoing training and awareness programs allow agencies to communicate to all staff their responsibilities and obligations in relation to procurement activities. 

Published

Actions for Enterprise, Investment and Trade 2022

Enterprise, Investment and Trade 2022

Finance
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Risk

What the report is about

Result of the Enterprise, Investment and Trade cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

The Machinery of Government changes within the Enterprise, Investment and Trade cluster resulted in the creation of the Department of Enterprise, Investment and Trade and the transfer of $1.0 billion of net assets into the new department.

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all completed cluster agencies' 2021–22 financial statements audits. Two audits are ongoing.

An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the audit opinion for the Jobs for NSW Fund's 30 June 2021 financial report to reflect the non-compliance with the Jobs for NSW Act 2015 (the Act) and Government Sector Finance Act 2018. The Act requires the board to consist of seven members that include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Department of Premier and Cabinet, and five ministerial appointments. The board has consisted of two secretaries since 24 May 2019 when the independent members resigned. The remaining five members have not been appointed by the ministers as required by section 5(2) of the Act.

Three cluster agencies accepted changes to their office leasing arrangements managed by Property NSW. This has resulted in the collective derecognition of $24.8 million of right-of-use assets and $26.7 million in lease liabilities, and recognition of $1.9 million of other gains.

What the key issues were

The number of issues we reported to management decreased from 108 in 2020–21 to 103 in 2021–22. Thirty per cent of issues were repeated from the prior year.

Six high-risk issues were identified across the cluster related to the quality and timeliness of financial reporting, governance processes and internal controls.

Recommendations were made to address these deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Enterprise, Investment and Trade cluster's financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Enterprise, Investment and Trade cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all completed cluster agencies 2021–22 financial statements audits. The Jobs for NSW Fund and Responsible Gambling Fund audits are ongoing.
  • An 'Emphasis of Matter' paragraph was included in the Australian Institute of Asian Culture and Visual Arts Limited's 30 June 2022 financial statements to draw attention to management’s disclosures that the entity's financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2022 were prepared on a non-going concern basis following cessation of its operations and resolution by the directors in October 2021 to deregister the entity.
  • An 'Other Matter' paragraph was included in the Jobs for NSW Fund's 30 June 2021 financial report to reflect the non-compliance with the Jobs for NSW Act 2015 and Government Sector Finance Act 2018.
    The Act requires the board to consist of seven members that include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Department of Premier and Cabinet (or their nominees) and five ministerial appointments, one of whom is to be appointed as Chair of the board. The board has consisted of the two secretaries since 24 May 2019 when the independent members resigned. The remaining five members have not been appointed by the ministers as required by section 5(2) of the Act.
  • An 'Emphasis of Matter' paragraph was included in the Jobs for NSW Fund's 30 June 2021 financial report to draw attention to the financial report being prepared for the purpose of fulfilling the Jobs for NSW Fund's financial reporting responsibilities as requested by the Treasurer's delegate.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Enterprise, Investment and Trade cluster.

Section highlights

  • In 2021–22, there were 103 findings raised across the cluster, a decrease from 2020–21.
  • In total, six high-risk findings were identified during 2021–22. Two related to 2021–22 whilst four were related to the audit of Jobs for NSW Fund's 30 June 2021 financial report.
  • Thirty per cent of all findings during 2021–22 were repeat issues. The most common repeat issues related to information technology controls and accounting for property plant and equipment notably fair value assessment and valuation.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit 

Appendix two – Early close procedures 

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting 

Appendix four – Financial data 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Health 2022

Health 2022

Health
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

Result of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for the financial statements for all Health cluster agencies.

The COVID-19 pandemic continued to increase the complexity and number of accounting matters faced by the cluster. The total gross value of corrected misstatements in 2021–22 was $353.3 million, of which $186.7 million related to an increase in the impairment provision for Rapid Antigen Tests (RATs).

A qualified audit opinion was issued on the Annual Prudential Compliance Statement related to five residential aged care facilities. There were 20 instances (19 in 2020–21) of non-compliance with the prudential responsibilities within the Aged Care Act 1997.

What the key issues were

The total number of matters we reported to management across the cluster decreased from 116 in 2020–21 to 67 in 2021–22. Of the 67 issues raised, four were high risk (three in 2020-21) and 37 were moderate risk (57 in 2020–21). Nearly half of all control deficiencies reported in 2021–22 were repeat issues.

Three unresolved high-risk issues were:

  • COVID-19 inventories impairment – we continued to identify issues relating to management’s impairment model which relies on anticipated future consumption patterns. RATs had not been assessed for impairment.

  • Asset capitalisation threshold – management has not reviewed the appropriateness of the asset capitalisation threshold since 2006.

  • Forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records – we continued to observe unapproved rosters being finalised by system administrators so payroll can be processed on time. 2.6 million time records were processed in this way in 2021–22.

What we recommended

  • COVID-19 inventories impairment – ensure consumption patterns are supported by relevant data and plans.

  • Assets capitalisation threshold – undertake further review of the appropriateness of applying a $10,000 threshold before capitalising expenditure on property, plant and equipment.

  • Forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records – develop a methodology to quantify the potential monetary value of unapproved rosters being finalised.

This report provides Parliament and other users of Health cluster (the cluster) agencies' financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting

  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Health cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all cluster agencies required to prepare general purpose financial statements.

  • The total gross value of corrected monetary misstatements for 2021–22 was $353.3 million, of which, $186.7 million related to an increase in the impairment provision for Rapid Antigen Tests.

  • A qualified audit opinion was issued on the ministry's Annual Prudential Compliance Statements.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the cluster.

Section highlights

  • The total number of internal control deficiencies has decreased from 116 in 2020–21 to 67 in 2021–22. Of the 67 issues raised in 2021–22, four were high (2020–21: 3) and 37 were moderate (2020–21: 57); with nearly half of all control deficiencies reported in 2021–22 being repeat issues.

  • The following four issues were reported in 2021–22 as high risk:

    • impairment of COVID-19 inventories

    • inadequate review over the appropriateness of asset capitalisation threshold

    • forced-finalisation of HealthRoster time records

    • COVID-19 vaccination inventories – data quality issue at 31 March 2022.

  • Management of excessive leave balances and poor quality or lack of documentation supporting key agreements continued to be the key repeat issues observed in the 2021–22 financial reporting period.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout

New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout

Health
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Project management
Risk
Service delivery

What the report is about

The Australian Government led and implemented the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout, with the support of state and territory governments. As part of the Australian Government's vaccine rollout, NSW Health launched its vaccination program on 22 February 2021, with responsibility for distributing and administering COVID-19 vaccine stock provided by the Australian Government.

This audit examined the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021 and focused on NSW Health's contribution to the Australian Government led vaccine roll out in four Local Health Districts (LHDs), in particular the administration of two doses of vaccine to people aged 16 and over.

What we found

On 16 October 2021, NSW Health, in partnership with the Australian Government's vaccination program, achieved its first objective to fully vaccinate 80% of people in NSW aged 16 and over. Demand for the vaccine reduced in December 2021, and NSW Health did not reach its target of 95% fully vaccinated for people aged 16 and over until June 2022.

Despite challenges such as uncertain supply and changes to clinical advice affecting vaccine eligibility, NSW Health's overall delivery of vaccination services was effective and efficient.

During the audit period, NSW Health implemented effective strategies to allocate vaccines and reduce wastage to optimise the number of vaccines available.

NSW Health implemented its own booking system after it identified that the Australian Government's system would not manage bookings. There were problems with NSW Health's interim vaccine booking system, and NSW Health fully resolved these issues by September 2021.

As at 19 October 2022, vaccination rates for Aboriginal peoples and culturally and linguistically diverse people remained below the 95% target.

What we recommended

By June 2023, NSW Health should conduct a comprehensive review of the COVID-19 vaccine rollout and incorporate lessons learned into pandemic response plans.

The first three cases of COVID-19 in New South Wales were diagnosed in January 2020. By 30 June 2021, 128 people were being treated in hospital and one person was in intensive care. By the end of December 2021, 187,504 total cases and 663 deaths were reported in New South Wales. As at 27 October 2022, NSW Health reported more than three million total cases and 5,430 deaths.

The COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on the people and the health sector of New South Wales. The Australian, state, territory, and local governments have directed significant resources towards health responses and economic recovery.

On 13 November 2020, National Cabinet (comprised of the Australian, state, and territory governments) endorsed the Australian COVID-19 Vaccination Policy. Australia's vaccination program was launched on 21 February 2021 with the goal of providing safe and effective vaccines to the people who most needed them as quickly as possible, to support the physical, mental and economic wellbeing of the nation.

The Australian Government led and implemented the Australian vaccine rollout, with the support of state and territory governments. As part of the Australian Government's vaccine rollout, NSW Health launched its vaccination program on 22 February 2021, with responsibility for distributing and administering COVID-19 vaccine stock provided by the Australian Government.

The overall objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of NSW Health’s contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout. It is important to note that in New South Wales, primary care providers (GPs and pharmacies) and aged care providers administered the majority of vaccines. Primary care providers and aged care providers are the responsibility of the Australian Government.

The audit had a particular focus on whether NSW Health:

  • set clear vaccination targets underpinned and/or guided by evidence
  • managed the rollout of the vaccination program effectively and efficiently
  • managed demand of vaccines effectively and efficiently.

The audit examined the period 1 January 2021 to 31 December 2021 and focused on NSW Health's contribution to the Australian Government led vaccine rollout in four Local Health Districts (LHDs), in particular the administration of two doses of vaccine to people aged 16 and over. We did not audit the subsequent rollout for ages five to 15, or the booster rollout (third and fourth doses) as these activities mostly occurred outside the date of our review.

This audit also did not assess the Australian Government’s allocation of vaccine supplies to New South Wales because we do not audit the Australian Government's activities. On 17 August 2022, the Australian National Audit Office completed a performance audit which assessed the Australian Department of Health and Aged Care's effectiveness in the planning and implementation of Australia's COVID-19 vaccine rollout.

This audit is one of a series of audits that have been completed or are in progress regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. This includes the planned performance audit ‘Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)’, and financial audit assurance activities focusing on Local Health District processes and controls to manage the receipt, distribution and inventory management of vaccine stock. The Audit Office New South Wales '2022–25 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.

Conclusion

By 12 December 2021, NSW Health had administered two doses of vaccines to one third of eligible people in New South Wales aged 16 and over – contributing significantly to the achievement of the NSW Government vaccination target of 80% fully vaccinated before 31 December 2021. Despite challenges such as uncertain supply and changes to clinical advice affecting vaccine eligibility, NSW Health's overall delivery of vaccination services was effective and efficient.

NSW Health implemented its own booking system after it identified that the Australian Government's system would not manage bookings. There were problems with NSW Health's interim vaccine booking system, and NSW Health fully resolved these issues by September 2021.

Vaccination levels in some vulnerable populations remain below the 95% double dose target currently in place. Access to quality data to regularly measure vaccination rates in some vulnerable populations remains an ongoing challenge for the NSW and Australian Governments. As a result, NSW Health is unable to fully ensure it has delivered on its shared responsibility with the Australian Government to vaccinate vulnerable people.

NSW Health managed challenges regarding the uncertain supply of vaccines from the Australian Government and filled gaps beyond its agreed responsibilities in the National Partnership on COVID-19 Response. During the Delta outbreak of the pandemic, NSW Health sought to achieve the best possible public health outcome from limited vaccine supply by opening up additional vaccination clinics in highly affected areas and redistributing vaccine supplies from areas with fewer cases to highly affected local government areas in south west Sydney.

During the audit period, NSW Health implemented effective strategies to allocate vaccines and reduce wastage to optimise the number of vaccines available. Our financial audit report, 'Health 2022', includes additional information on vaccine supply stock held by NSW Health.

NSW Health demonstrated agility by using a range of strategies to promote vaccination, including direct engagement with communities to develop culturally appropriate services such as pop-up clinics. NSW Heath recruited prominent community members, such as faith leaders, elders and sportspeople, to promote vaccination within their communities. However, at the date of this report, there are still vulnerable populations with vaccination rates lower than the current 95% double dose vaccination target. There is also a lack of regularly updated data for some cohorts which prevents NSW Health from accurately monitoring vaccination rates in some populations it has identified as vulnerable.

In March 2021, NSW Health identified that the booking system provided by the Australian Government was an online directory of vaccine clinics and would not manage bookings. To overcome this, NSW Health amended an internal-use system to be publicly facing. This solution was not user-friendly for staff or those seeking to make an appointment. Between June to September 2021, NSW Health progressively resolved booking system related issues, by developing and rolling out a new purpose-built booking solution for NSW Health vaccination clinics.

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – Australian audits on the vaccine rollouts

Appendix three – Committee members 

Appendix four – About the audit 

Appendix five – Performance auditing 

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

 

Parliamentary reference - Report number #369 - released 7 December 2022

Published

Actions for Customer Service 2022

Customer Service 2022

Finance
Asset valuation
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration

What the report is about

Result of the Customer Service cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for Customer Service cluster agencies.

What the key issues were

The number and size of Service NSW's administered grant programs have increased significantly in response to emergency events. Improvements are required to address gaps in Service NSW's policies, systems and processes in administering and financial reporting of grant programs.

The Department of Customer Service (the department) reported a retrospective correction of a prior period error of $33.3 million understatement of the land titling database, which is a service concession asset managed by a private operator.

The 2021–22 audits identified five high-risk issues across the cluster:

  • the department:
    • control weaknesses in user access to GovConnect systems
    • significant control deficiencies in information technology change management controls
  • Rental Bond Board:
    • legislation amendment required to better support the accounting treatment of rental bonds
    • no delegation instrument to government officers authorising them to approve expenditures
  • Service NSW:
    • improvements required in the timeliness and quality of grant administration revenue assessment and controls over the recovery of grant administration costs.

Recommendations were made to address these deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Customer Service cluster's financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Customer Service cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements of cluster agencies.
  • Reported corrected misstatements decreased from 33 in 2020–21 to 30 with a gross value of $406 million in 2021–22 ($418.9 million in 2020–21). Reported uncorrected misstatements decreased from 13 in 2020–21 to nine with a gross value of $31.8 million in 2021–22 ($78 million).
  • Seven of nine cluster agencies did not submit or complete certain mandatory early close procedures on time.
  • Service NSW's late resolution of the accounting of $256 million revenue from administering COVID-19 and flood grant programs resulted in misstatements and delays in financial reporting and audit.
  • The Department of Customer Service corrected prior period errors retrospectively related to the valuation of a service concession asset (land titling database) which reduced the prior year comparative for service concession asset by $33.3 million in the financial statements.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Customer Service cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2021–22 audits identified five high risks (three in 2020–21) and 36 moderate risk issues (59 in 2020–21) across the cluster. Fifty-three per cent of the issues (42% in 2020–21) were repeat issues. Many repeat issues related to information technology controls around user access management.
  • While improvement was noted in the number of control deficiencies in GovConnect ASAE 3402 controls assurance reports, internal control qualification and control deviation issues continued to occur in 2021–22. Ineffective controls at service providers increase the risk of fraud, error and security to data.
  • Cyber security governance and management requires improvement. The department is yet to fully implement Essential 8 Mitigation Strategies and the maturity level for several Essential 8 strategies is at Level Zero in the current maturity model. The department is in the process of completing the roll out of some long outstanding system patches.
  • Significant gaps were identified in Service NSW's policies, systems and processes in administering and financial reporting of grant programs.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit 

Appendix two – Early close procedures 

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting 

Appendix four – Financial data

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Premier and Cabinet 2022

Premier and Cabinet 2022

Whole of Government
Premier and Cabinet
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Information technology
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Risk

What the report is about

Result of the Premier and Cabinet cluster financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022. 

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued for all Premier and Cabinet cluster agencies.

The machinery of government changes within the Premier and Cabinet cluster resulted in the transfer of net assets of $1 billion from the Department of Premier and Cabinet.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet, Public Service Commission and Parliamentary Counsel's Office accepted changes to their office leasing arrangements managed by Property NSW. These changes resulted in the collective de-recognition of $167.3 million of right-of-use assets, $225.1 million in lease liabilities and recognition of $47.8 million of other gains/losses. 

What the key issues were

The number of issues we reported to management decreased. 

Forty per cent of issues were repeated from the prior year.

Four moderate risk issues were reported in the management letters for Department of Premier and Cabinet and New South Wales Electoral Commission. Three out of the four moderate risk issues were repeat issues. 

The repeat issues related to internal control deficiencies in agencies' including lack of updated procurement policies and procedures and information technology general controls.

Fast facts 

The Premier and Cabinet cluster comprises seven agencies, delivering the government's objectives and facilitating stewardship of the public service.

  • $0.2b property, plant and equipment as at 30 June 2022
  • $3b total expenditure incurred in 2021–22
  • 100% unqualified audit opinions issued on agencies’ 30 June 2022 financial statements
  • moderate risk findings identified
  • 15 monetary misstatements reported in 2021–22
  • 40% of reported issues were repeat issues

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Premier and Cabinet’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

  • financial reporting
  • audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster for 2022.

Section highlights

  • Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all the cluster agencies 2021–22 financial statements.
  • There were two corrected misstatements greater than $5 million.
  • Changes to accommodation arrangements managed by Property NSW on behalf of the department resulted in the collective derecognition of approximately $167.3 million in right of use assets and corresponding lease liabilities totalling $225.1 million from the balance sheets of these agencies.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Premier and Cabinet cluster.

Section highlights

  • The 2021–22 audits identified four moderate risk issues across the cluster.
  • Three out of the four moderate risk issues were repeat issues.
  • The repeat issues related to password and security configuration and a lack of updated procurement policies and procedures.

Appendix one – Early close procedures

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Audit Insights 2018-2022

Audit Insights 2018-2022

Community Services
Education
Environment
Finance
Health
Industry
Justice
Local Government
Premier and Cabinet
Planning
Transport
Treasury
Universities
Whole of Government
Asset valuation
Cross-agency collaboration
Compliance
Cyber security
Financial reporting
Fraud
Information technology
Infrastructure
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management
Regulation
Risk
Service delivery
Shared services and collaboration
Workforce and capability

What the report is about

In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.

This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.

The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.

The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.

The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.

What we found

Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:

  • Integrity and transparency
  • Performance and monitoring
  • Governance and oversight
  • Cyber security and data
  • System planning for disruption
  • Resource management.

The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.

In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.

The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

Fast facts

  • 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
  • 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
  • 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.

picture of Margaret Crawford Auditor-General for New South Wales in black dress with city skyline as backgroundI am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.

The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.

A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.

However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.

While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales

Integrity and transparency Performance and monitoring Governance and oversight Cyber security and data System planning Resource management
Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest.
Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds.
Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office.
Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues.     Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need.
Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes.          
Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more Read more

 

This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.

  • Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
  • Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
  • Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.

This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.

The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.

This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.

Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022

Appendix two – About this report

 

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.