Reports
Actions for Flood housing response
Flood housing response
What this report is about
Extreme rainfall across eastern Australia in 2021 and 2022 led to a series of major flood events in New South Wales.
This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government provided emergency accommodation and temporary housing in response to the early 2022 Northern Rivers and late 2022 Central West flood events.
Responsible agencies included in this audit were the Department of Communities and Justice, NSW Reconstruction Authority, the former Department of Planning and Environment, the Department of Regional NSW and the Premier’s Department.
Findings
The Department of Communities and Justice rapidly provided emergency accommodation to displaced persons immediately following these flood events.
There was no plan in place to guide a temporary housing response and agencies did not have agency-level plans for implementing their responsibilities.
The NSW Government rapidly procured and constructed temporary housing villages. However, the amount of temporary housing provided did not meet the demand.
There is an extensive waitlist for temporary housing and the remaining demand in the Northern Rivers is unlikely to be met. The NSW Reconstruction Authority has not reviewed this list to confirm its accuracy.
Demobilisation plans for the temporary housing villages have been developed, but there are no long-term plans in place for the transition of tenants out of the temporary housing.
Agencies are in the process of evaluating the provision of emergency accommodation and temporary housing.
The findings from the 2022 State-wide lessons process largely relate to response activities.
Audit recommendations
The NSW Reconstruction Authority should:
- Develop a plan for the provision of temporary housing.
- Review the temporary housing waitlist.
- Determine a timeline for demobilising the temporary housing villages.
- Develop a strategy to manage the transition of people into long-term accommodation.
- Develop a process for state-wide recovery lessons learned.
All audited agencies should:
- Finalise evaluations of their role in the provision of emergency accommodation and temporary housing.
- Develop internal plans for implementing their roles under state-wide plans.
Read the PDF report
Parliamentary reference - Report number #389 - released 22 February 2024
Actions for Stronger Communities 2023
Stronger Communities 2023
What this report is about
Results of the Stronger Communities financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.
What we found
Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed Stronger Communities portfolio agencies.
Machinery of government changes during the year returned the sports-related agencies to the Stronger Communities portfolio.
Resilience NSW was abolished on 16 December 2022 with most of its functions transferred to the newly created NSW Reconstruction Authority.
The Trustee for the First Australian Mortgage Acceptance Corporation (FANMAC) is a prescribed entity under the Government Sector Finance Regulation 2018. The Trustee should have presented the FANMAC's financial statements for audit after it became a GSF agency on 1 July 2020.
The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits decreased from 42 in 2021–22 to 29 in 2022–23.
What the key issues were
In 2022–23, agencies in the portfolio recorded net revaluation uplifts to land and buildings totalling $643 million.
Out of home care and permanency support grant expenditure has increased by 27% since 2019–20. An upcoming performance audit report will focus on the timeliness and quality of the child protection services provided by the department and its non-government service providers.
A high-risk matter was raised for the department over segregation of duties deficiencies in the Justice Link system.
Four high-risk matters reported in 2021–22 have been resolved.
Thirty-three agencies were onboarded into a new government-wide enterprise resource planning system. Additional agencies will be onboarded in three tranches from April 2024 through to October 2024.
What we recommended
Portfolio agencies should:
- ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their financial statement impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards
- prioritise and address internal control deficiencies identified in our management letters.
This report provides Parliament and other users of the Stronger Communities portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed 30 June 2023 financial statements audits of portfolio agencies, including the audit of the Crown Solicitor's Office's Trust Account for compliance with clause 14 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Regulation 2015.
- The financial statement audits of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Common Funds (the common funds) – year ended 30 June 2022 were certified by management on 6 December 2022 and independent auditor's reports issued 21 December 2022. The 30 June 2023 financial statements audits of the common funds are ongoing.
- A variation to an agreement between the Commonwealth Attorney-General and the Legal Aid Commission of New South Wales for legal services to support the Royal Commission into Violence, Neglect and Exploitation of people with disability program extended the reporting period from 30 June 2023 to 29 September 2023 – the conclusion of the Royal Commission. The audit of the financial report acquitting expenditure under the agreement is expected to be completed before 28 February 2024.
- The audit of the Home Purchase Assistance Fund's (the fund) 30 June 2022 financial statements remains incomplete. Those charged with governance of the fund have not provided sufficient and appropriate evidence to support the carrying value of material investments reported in the fund's financial statements. The financial audit of the fund's 2023 financial statements remain incomplete as a result.
- The Trustee for the First Australian Mortgage Acceptance Corporation Master and Pooled Super Trusts had not prepared general purpose financial statements since 30 June 2021 when the financial reporting provisions of the Government Finance Sector Act 2018 were enacted and the Trustee was prescribed as a GSF agency under the regulations. The audits of these financial statements are ongoing.
- Reported corrected misstatements decreased from 28 in 2021–22 to six with a gross value of $8.8 million in 2022–23 ($277 million in 2021–22).
- Portfolio agencies met the statutory deadline for submitting their 2022–23 early close financial statements and other mandatory procedures.
- In 2022–23, portfolio agencies collectively recorded net revaluation uplifts to the carrying values of land and buildings totalling $643 million (2021–22: $993 million) initiated through a combination of comprehensive and desktop valuations.
- The Department of Communities and Justice (the department) had previously deferred performing a comprehensive revaluation of its land and building portfolio relating to the Corrective Services and Youth Justice functions. The deferral was due to the challenges in providing valuers sufficient access to the facilities due to the pandemic. The department is scheduled to perform a comprehensive revaluation of its full land and building portfolio in 2023–24.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities portfolio.
Section highlights
- The number of findings reported to management has decreased from 142 in 2021–22, to 71 in 2022–23, and 35% were repeat issues (36% in 2021–22). Repeat issues related to non-compliance with key legislation and/or agency policies, information technology and internal control deficiencies.
- A long-standing issue about segregation of duties over the JusticeLink system managed by the department has been elevated from moderate to high risk.
- Four out of six high-risk issues reported in the prior year have been addressed.
- Of the 15 newly identified moderate risk issues, 11 related to information technology and internal control deficiencies.
Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit
Appendix two – Early close procedures
Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting
Appendix four – Financial data
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Actions for Planning and managing bushfire equipment
Planning and managing bushfire equipment
What the report is about
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) and local councils in planning and managing equipment for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression.
What we found
The RFS has focused its fleet development activity on modernising and improving the safety of its firefighting fleet, and on the purchase of new firefighting aircraft.
There is limited evidence that the RFS has undertaken strategic fleet planning or assessment of the capability of the firefighting fleet to respond to current bushfire events or emerging fire risks.
The RFS does not have an overarching strategy to guide its planning, procurement, or distribution of the firefighting fleet.
The RFS does not have effective oversight of fleet maintenance activity across the State, and is not ensuring the accuracy of District Service Agreements with local councils, where maintenance responsibilities are described.
What we recommended
- Develop a fleet enhancement framework and strategy that is informed by an assessment of current fleet capability, and research into appropriate technologies to respond to emerging fire risks.
- Develop performance measures to assess the performance and capabilities of the fleet in each RFS District by recording and publicly reporting on fire response times, fire response outcomes, and completions of fire hazard reduction works.
- Report annually on fleet allocations to RFS Districts, and identify the ways in which fleet resources align with district-level fire risks.
- Develop a strategy to ensure that local brigade volunteers are adequate in numbers and appropriately trained to operate fleet appliances in RFS Districts where they are required.
- Establish a fleet maintenance framework to ensure regular update of District Service Agreements with local councils.
- Review and improve processes for timely recording of fleet asset movements, locations, and maintenance status.
This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Rural Fire Service (the RFS) plans and manages the firefighting equipment needed to prevent, mitigate, and suppress bushfires. This audit also examined the role of local councils in managing bushfire equipment fleet assets. Local councils have vested legal ownership of the majority of the land-based firefighting fleet, including a range of legislated responsibilities to carry out fleet maintenance and repairs. The RFS has responsibilities to plan and purchase firefighting fleet assets, and ensure they are ready for use in response to fires and other emergencies.
This report describes the challenges in planning and managing the firefighting fleet, including a confusion of roles and responsibilities between the RFS and local councils in relation to managing certain land-based rural firefighting fleet – a point that has been made in our Local Government financial audits over several years. This role confusion is further demonstrated in the responses of the RFS and local councils to this audit report – included at Appendix one.
The lack of cohesion in roles and responsibilities for managing rural firefighting vehicles increases the risk that these firefighting assets are not properly maintained and managed, and introduces a risk that this could affect their readiness to be mobilised when needed.
While the audit findings and recommendations address some of the operational and organisational inefficiencies in relation to rural firefighting equipment management, they do not question the legislative arrangements that govern them. This is a matter for the NSW Government to consider in ensuring the fleet arrangements are fit for purpose, and are clearly understood by the relevant agencies.
The NSW Rural Fire Service (hereafter the RFS) is the lead combat agency for bushfires in New South Wales, and has the power to take charge of bushfire prevention and response operations anywhere in the State. The RFS has responsibilities to prevent, mitigate and suppress bushfires across 95% of the State, predominantly in the non-metropolitan areas of New South Wales. Fire and Rescue NSW is responsible for fire response activity in the cities and large townships that make up the remaining five per cent of the State.
The RFS bushfire fleet is an integral part of the agency's overall bushfire risk management. The RFS also uses this fleet to respond to other emergencies such as floods and storms, motor vehicle accidents, and structural fires. Fleet planning and management is one of a number of activities that is necessary for fire mitigation and suppression.
The Rural Fires Act 1997 (Rural Fires Act) imposes obligations on all landowners and land managers to prevent the occurrence of bushfires and reduce the risk of bushfires from spreading. Local councils have fire prevention responsibilities within their local government areas, principally to reduce fire hazards near council owned or managed assets, and minor roads.
The RFS is led by a Commissioner and is comprised of both paid employees and volunteer rural firefighters. Its functions are prescribed in the Rural Fires Act and related legislation such as the State Emergency Rescue Management Act 1989. The RFS functions are also described in Bush Fire Risk Management Plans, the State Emergency Management Plan, District Service Agreements, and RFS procedural documents. Some of the core responsibilities of the RFS include:
- preventing, mitigating, and suppressing fires across New South Wales
- recruiting and managing volunteer firefighters in rural fire brigades
- purchasing and allocating firefighting fleet assets to local councils
- establishing District Service Agreements with local councils to give the RFS permissions to use the fleet assets that are vested with local councils
- carrying out fleet maintenance and repairs when authorised to do so by local councils
- inspecting the firefighting fleet
- supporting land managers and private property owners with fire prevention activity.
In order to carry out its legislated firefighting functions, the RFS relies on land-based vehicles, marine craft, and aircraft. These different firefighting appliance types are referred to in this report as the firefighting fleet or fleet assets.
RFS records show that in 2021 there were 6,345 firefighting fleet assets across NSW. Most of the land-based appliances commonly associated with firefighting, such as water pumpers and water tankers, are purchased by the RFS and vested with local councils under the Rural Fires Act. The vesting of firefighting assets with local councils means that the assets are legally owned by the council for which the asset has been purchased. The RFS is able to use the firefighting assets through District Service Agreements with local councils or groups of councils.
In addition to the land-based firefighting fleet, the RFS owns a fleet of aircraft with capabilities for fire mitigation, suppression, and reconnaissance during fire events. The RFS hires a fleet of different appliances to assist with fire prevention and hazard reduction works. These include aircraft for firefighting and fire reconnaissance, and heavy plant equipment such as graders and bulldozers for hazard reduction. Hazard reduction works include the clearance of bush and grasslands around major roads and protected assets, and the creation and maintenance of fire trails and fire corridors to assist with fire response activity.
The RFS is organised into 44 RFS Districts and seven Area Commands. The RFS relies on volunteer firefighters to assist in carrying out most of its firefighting functions. These functions may include the operation of the fleet during fire response activities and training exercises, and the routine inspection of the fleet to ensure it is maintained according to fleet service standards. Volunteer fleet inspections are supervised by the RFS Fire Control Officer.
In 2021 there were approximately 73,000 volunteers located in 1,993 rural fire brigades across the State, making the RFS the largest volunteer fire emergency service in Australia. In addition to brigade volunteers, the RFS has approximately 1,100 salaried staff who occupy leadership and administrative roles at RFS headquarters and in the 44 RFS Districts.
Local councils have legislative responsibilities relating to bushfire planning and management. Some of the core responsibilities of local councils include:
- establishing and equipping rural fire brigades
- contributing to the Rural Fire Fighting Fund
- vested ownership of land-based rural firefighting equipment
- carrying out firefighting fleet maintenance and repairs
- conducting bushfire prevention and hazard reduction activity.
The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the RFS and local councils in planning and managing equipment for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression. From the period of 2017 to 2022 inclusive, we addressed the audit objective by examining whether the NSW RFS and local councils effectively:
- plan for current and future bushfire fleet requirements
- manage and maintain the fleet required to prevent, mitigate, and suppress bushfires in NSW.
This audit did not assess:
- the operational effectiveness of the RFS bushfire response
- the effectiveness of personal protective equipment and clothing
- the process of vesting of rural firefighting equipment with local councils
- activities of any other statutory authorities responsible for managing bushfires in NSW.
As the lead combat agency for the bushfire response in NSW, the RFS has primary responsibility for bushfire prevention, mitigation, and suppression.
Three local councils were selected as case studies for this audit, Hawkesbury City Council, Wagga Wagga City Council and Uralla Shire Council. These case studies highlight the ways in which the RFS and local councils collaborate and communicate in rural fire districts.
Conclusion
The RFS has focused its fleet development activity on modernising and improving the safety of its land-based firefighting fleet, and on the purchase of new firefighting aircraft
The RFS has reduced the average age of the firefighting fleet from approximately 21 years in 2017, to approximately 16 years in 2022. The RFS has also enhanced the aerial fleet with the addition of six new aircraft to add to the existing three aircraft.
Recommendations from inquiries into the 2019–20 bushfires have driven significant levels of fleet improvement activity, mainly focused on the addition of safety features to existing fleet appliances. The RFS has dedicated most of its efforts to purchasing and refurbishing firefighting appliances of the same type and in the same volumes year on year.
However, the RFS is unable to demonstrate how the composition, size, or the locations of the NSW firefighting fleet is linked to current fire prevention, mitigation, and suppression requirements, or future fire risks.
There is limited evidence that the RFS has undertaken strategic fleet planning or assessment of the capability of the firefighting fleet to respond to current bushfire events or emerging fire risks
The RFS has not established a methodology to assess the composition or volumes of the firefighting fleet against fire activity and fire risks in the 44 NSW Rural Fire Districts. The RFS has not developed performance measures or targets to assess or report on fire response times in each of its districts, nor has it developed measures to assess the effectiveness of responses according to fire sizes and fire types. Similarly, the RFS has limited performance measures to assess fire prevention activity, or to assess fuel load reduction works, so it is not possible to assess whether its fleet capabilities are fit for these purposes.
The RFS does not have an overarching strategy to guide its planning, procurement, or distribution of the firefighting fleet
RFS fleet planning and fleet allocations are based on historical fleet sizes and compositions, and distributed to locations where there are appropriately trained brigade volunteers.
The RFS takes an asset protection approach to bushfire prevention and planning that is based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management. This approach requires that the RFS identify assets at risk of fire, and develop treatment plans to protect these assets. However, fleet requirements are not linked to NSW asset protection plans, meaning that fleet is not allocated according to the identified risks in these plans. Further, the RFS does not develop fire prevention plans for areas where there are no identified assets.
The RFS has not conducted future-focused fleet research or planning into technologies that match fleet capabilities to emerging or future fire risks. Since the significant fire events of 2019–2020, the RFS has not changed its approach to planning for, or assessing, the operational capabilities of the fleet. The RFS advises it is scoping a project to match resources to risk, which it plans to commence in 2023.
The RFS does not have effective oversight of fleet maintenance activity across the State, and is not ensuring the accuracy of District Service Agreements where maintenance responsibilities are described
The RFS does not have a framework to ensure that District Service Agreements with local councils are accurate. Almost two thirds of service agreements have not been reviewed in the last ten years, and some do not reflect actual maintenance practices. There is no formalised process to ensure communication occurs between the RFS and local councils for fleet management and maintenance.
RFS fleet management systems at the central level are not integrated with RFS district-level databases to indicate when fleet assets are in workshops being maintained and serviced. The RFS has a new centralised Computer Aided Dispatch System that relies on accurate fleet locations and fleet condition information in order to dispatch vehicles to incidents and fires. A lack of interface between the district-level fleet systems and the centralised RFS fleet dispatch system, may impact on operational responses to bushfires.
The RFS has not made significant changes to the size or composition of the firefighting fleet in the past five years and does not have an overarching strategy to drive fleet development
Since 2017, the RFS has made minimal changes to its firefighting fleet volumes or vehicle types. The RFS is taking a fleet renewal approach to fleet planning, with a focus on refurbishing and replacing ageing firefighting assets with newer appliances and vehicles of the same classification and type. While the RFS has adopted a fleet renewal approach, driven by its Appliance Replacement Program Guide, it does not have a strategy or framework to guide its future-focused fleet development. There is no document that identifies and analyses bushfire events and risks in NSW, and matches fleet resources and fleet technologies to meet those risks. The RFS does not have fleet performance measures or targets to assess whether the size and composition of the fleet is meeting current or emerging bushfire climate hazards, or fuel load risks across its 44 NSW Fire Districts.
The RFS fleet currently comprises approximately 4,000 frontline, operational firefighting assets such as tankers, pumpers, and air and marine craft, and approximately 2,300 logistical vehicles, such as personnel transport vehicles and specialist support vehicles. Of the land-based firefighting vehicles, the RFS has maintained a steady number of approximately 3,800 tankers and 65 pumpers, year on year, for the past five years. This appliance type is an essential component of the RFS land-based, firefighting fleet with capabilities to suppress and extinguish fires.
Since 2017, most RFS fleet enhancement activity has been directed to upgrades and the modernisation of older fleet assets with new safety features. There is limited evidence of research into new fleet technologies for modern firefighting. The RFS fleet volumes and fleet types have remained relatively static since 2017, with the exception of the aerial firefighting fleet. Since 2017, the RFS has planned for, and purchased, six additional aircraft to add to the existing three aircraft in its permanent fleet.
While the RFS has made minimal changes to its fleet since 2017, in 2016 it reduced the overall number of smaller transport vehicles, by purchasing larger vehicles with increased capacity for personnel transport. The consolidation of logistical and transport vehicles accounts for an attrition in fleet numbers from 7,058 in 2016, to 6,315 in 2017 as shown in Exhibit 2.
The firefighting fleet management system is not always updated in a timely manner due to insufficient RFS personnel with permissions to make changes in the system
The RFS uses a fleet management system known as SAP EAM to record the location and status of firefighting fleet assets. The system holds information about the condition of the firefighting fleet, the home location of each fleet asset, and the maintenance, servicing, and inspection records of all assets. The RFS uses the system for almost all functions related to the firefighting fleet, including the location of vehicles so that they can be dispatched during operational exercises or fire responses.
Staff at RFS Headquarters are responsible for creating and maintaining asset records in the fleet management system. RFS District staff have limited permissions in relation to SAP EAM. They are able to raise work orders for repairs and maintenance, upload evidence to show that work has been done, and close actions in the system.
RFS District staff are not able to enter or update some fleet information in the system, such as the location of vehicles. When an RFS District receives a fleet appliance, it cannot be allocated to a brigade until the location of the asset is accurately recorded in the system. The location of the asset must be updated in the SAP EAM system by staff at RFS Headquarters. District staff can request system support from staff at RFS Headquarters to enter this information. At the time of writing, the position responsible for updating the fleet management system at RFS Headquarters was vacant, and RFS District personnel reported significant wait times in response to their service requests.
The RFS conducts annual audits of SAP EAM system information to ensure data is accurate and complete. RFS staff are currently doing data cleansing work to ensure that fleet allocations are recorded correctly in the system.
Communication between brigades, local councils and the RFS needs improvement to ensure that fleet information is promptly updated in the fleet management system
RFS brigade volunteers do not have access to the fleet management system. When fleet assets are used or moved, volunteers report information about the location and condition of the fleet to RFS District staff using a paper-based form, or by email or phone. Information such as vehicle mileage, engine hours, and defects are all captured by volunteers in a logbook which is scanned and sent to RFS District staff. RFS District staff then enter the relevant information into the fleet management system, or raise a service ticket with RFS Headquarters to enter the information.
Brigade volunteers move fleet assets for a range of reasons, including for fire practice exercises. If volunteers are unable to report the movement of assets to RFS District staff in a timely manner, this can lead to system inaccuracies. Lapses and backlogs in record keeping can occur when RFS staff at district offices or at Headquarters are not available to update records at the times that volunteers report information. A lack of accurate record keeping can potentially impact on RFS operational activities, including fire response activity.
Brigade volunteers notify RFS District staff when fleet appliances are defective, or if they have not been repaired properly. District staff then enter the information into the fleet management system. The inability of volunteers to enter information into the system means they have no visibility over their requests, including whether they have been approved, actioned, or rejected.
Local councils are responsible for servicing and maintaining the firefighting fleet according to the Rural Fires Act, but this responsibility can be transferred to the RFS through arrangements described in local service agreements. Council staff record all fleet servicing and maintenance information in their local systems. The types of fleet information that is captured in local council records can vary between councils. RFS staff described the level of council reporting, and the effectiveness of this process, as 'mixed'.
Councils use different databases and systems to record fleet assets, and some councils are better resourced for this activity than others
Firefighting fleet information is recorded in different asset management systems across NSW. Each council uses its own asset management system to record details about the vested fleet assets. All three councils that were interviewed for this audit had different systems to record information about the fleet. In addition, the type of information captured by the three councils was varied.
System | Hawkesbury City Council | Uralla Shire Council | Wagga Wagga City Council |
---|---|---|---|
Financial asset management system | TechnologyOne | Civica | Assetic |
Asset management system | TechnologyOne | Manual | MEX |
Local councils have varying levels of resources and capabilities to manage the administrative tasks associated with the firefighting fleet. Some of the factors that impact on the ability of councils to manage administrative tasks include: the size of the council; the capabilities of the information management systems, the size of the staff team, and the levels of staff training in asset management.
Uralla Shire Council is a small rural council in northern NSW. This council uses financial software to record information about the firefighting fleet. While staff record information about the condition of the asset, its replacement value, and its depreciation, staff do not record the age of the asset, or its location. Staff manually enter fleet maintenance information into their systems. Uralla Shire Council would like to purchase asset maintenance software that generates work orders for fleet repairs and maintenance. However, the council does not have trained staff in the use of asset management software, and the small size of the fleet may not make it financially worthwhile.
The Hawkesbury City Council uses a single system to capture financial and asset information associated with the firefighting fleet. Hawkesbury is a large metropolitan council located north-west of Sydney, with a relatively large staff team in comparison with Uralla Shire Council. The Hawkesbury City Council has given RFS District staff access to their fleet information system. RFS District staff can directly raise work orders for fleet repairs and maintenance through the council system, and receive automated notifications when the work is complete.
Two of the three audited councils report that they conduct annual reviews of fleet assets to assess whether the information they hold is accurate and up-to-date.
More than half of the fleet maintenance service agreements between the RFS and local councils have not been reviewed in ten years, and some do not reflect local practices
Local councils have a legislated responsibility to service, repair, and maintain the firefighting fleet to service standards set by the RFS. Councils may transfer this responsibility to the RFS through District Service Agreements. The RFS Districts are responsible for ensuring that the service agreements are current and effective.
The RFS does not have monitoring and quality control processes to ensure that service agreements with local councils are reviewed regularly. The RFS has 73 service agreements with local councils or groups of councils. Sixty-three per cent of service agreements had not been reviewed in the last ten years. Only four service agreements specify an end date and, of those, one agreement expired in 2010 and had not been reviewed at the time of this audit.
The RFS does not have a framework to ensure that service agreements with local councils reflect actual practices. Of the three councils selected for audit, one agreement does not describe the actual arrangements for fleet maintenance practices in RFS Districts. The service agreement with Hawkesbury City Council specifies that the RFS will maintain the firefighting fleet on behalf of council when, in fact, council maintains the firefighting fleet. The current agreement commenced in 2012, and at the time of writing had not been updated to reflect local maintenance practices.
When District Service Agreements are not reviewed periodically, there is a risk that neither local councils nor the RFS have clear oversight of the status of fleet servicing, maintenance, and repairs.
RFS District Service Agreements set out a requirement that RFS and local councils establish a liaison committee. Liaison committees typically include council staff, RFS District staff, and RFS brigade volunteers. While service agreements state that liaison committees must meet periodically to monitor and review the performance of the service agreement, committee members determine when and how often the committee meets.
RFS District staff and staff at the three audited councils are not meeting routinely to review or update their service agreements. At Wagga Wagga City Council, staff meet with RFS District staff each year to report on activity to fulfil service agreement requirements. Uralla Shire Council staff did not meet routinely with RFS District staff before 2021. When liaison committees do not meet regularly, there is a risk that the RFS and local councils have incorrect or outdated information about the location, status, or condition of the firefighting fleet. Given that councils lack systems to track and monitor fleet locations, regular communication between the RFS and local councils is essential.
The RFS has not established processes to ensure that local councils and RFS District personnel meet and exchange information about the fleet. Of the three councils selected for this audit, one council had not received information about the number, type, or status of the fleet for at least five years, and did not receive an updated list of appliances until there was a change in RFS District personnel. This has impacted on the accuracy of council record keeping. Councils do not always receive notification about new assets or information about the location of assets from the RFS, and therefore cannot reflect this information in their accounting and reporting.
RFS area commands audit system records to ensure fleet inspections occur as planned, but central systems are not always updated, creating operational risks
RFS District staff are required by the Rural Fires Act to ensure the firefighting fleet is inspected at least once a year. Regular inspections of the fleet are vital to ensure that vehicles are fit-for-purpose and safe for brigade volunteers. Inspections are also fundamental to the operational readiness and capability of RFS to respond to fire incidents.
RFS Area Command personnel conduct audits of fleet maintenance data to ensure that fleet inspections are occurring as planned. These inspections provide the RFS with assurance that the fleet is being maintained and serviced by local council workshops, or third-party maintenance contractors.
Some RFS Districts run their own fleet management systems outside of the central management system. They do this to manage their fleet inspection activity effectively. Annual fleet inspection dates are programmed by staff at RFS Headquarters. Most of the inspection dates generated by RFS Headquarters are clustered together and RFS Districts need to separate inspection times to manage workloads over the year. Spreading inspection dates is necessary to avoid exceeding the capacity of local council workshops or third party contractors, and to ensure that fleet are available during the bushfire season.
The fleet inspection records at RFS Headquarters are not always updated in a timely manner to reflect actual inspection and service dates of vehicles. District staff are not able to change fleet inspection and service dates in the central management system because they do not have the necessary permissions to access the system. The usual practice is for RFS District staff to notify staff at RFS Headquarters, and ask them to retrospectively update the system. As there is a lag in updating the central database, at a point in time, the actual inspection and service dates of vehicles can be different to the dates entered in the central fleet management system.
Fleet inspection and maintenance records must be accurately recorded in the central RFS management system for operational reasons. RFS Headquarters personnel need to know the location and maintenance status of fleet vehicles at all times in order to dispatch vehicles to incidents and fires. The RFS fleet management system is integrated with a new Computer Aided Dispatch System. The Computer Aided Dispatch System assigns the nearest and most appropriate vehicles to fire incidents. The system relies on accurate fleet locations and fleet condition information in order to dispatch these vehicles.
There is a risk that RFS Headquarters' systems do not contain accurate information about the location and status of vehicles. Some may be in workshops for servicing and repair, while the system may record them as available for dispatch. As there are many thousands of fleet vehicles, all requiring an annual service and inspection, a lack of accurate record keeping has wide implications for State fire operations.
RFS is currently exploring ways to improve the ways in which fleet inspections are programmed into the fleet management system.
RFS provides funds to councils to assist with maintaining the firefighting fleet, but does not receive fleet maintenance cost information from all local councils
Each year the RFS provides local councils with a lump sum to assist with the cost of repairing and maintaining the firefighting fleet. This lump sum funding is also used for meeting the costs of maintaining brigade stations, utilities, and other miscellaneous matters associated with RFS business.
In 2020–21, the RFS provided NSW local councils with approximately $23 million for maintenance and repairs of appliances, buildings, and utilities. Ninety councils were provided with lump sum funding in 2021, receiving on average $257,000. The amounts received by individual councils ranged from $56,200 to $1,029,884.
Some councils provide itemised repairs and maintenance reports to RFS District staff, showing the work completed and the cost of that work. However, not all councils collect this information or provide it to the RFS. Local councils collect fleet maintenance information in their local council systems. In some cases, the responsibility for fleet maintenance is shared across a group of councils, and not all councils have oversight of this process.
The RFS has not taken steps to require local councils to provide itemised maintenance costings for the firefighting fleet. Thus, the RFS does not have a clear understanding of how local councils are spending their annual fleet maintenance funding allocations. The RFS does not know if the funding allocations are keeping pace with the actual cost of repairing and maintaining the fleet.
RFS District staff report that funding shortfalls are impacting on the prioritisation of fleet servicing and maintenance works in some council areas. When fleet servicing and maintenance is not completed routinely or effectively, there is a risk that it can negatively impact the overall condition and lifespan of the vehicle. Poor processes in relation to fleet maintenance and repair risk impacting on the operational capabilities of the fleet during fire events.
The timeliness and effectiveness of fleet servicing and maintenance is affected by resource levels in RFS Districts and local councils
Local councils have a legislated responsibility to service and maintain the firefighting fleet to the service standards set by the RFS. Fleet maintenance is usually done by the entity with the appropriate workshops and resources, and the maintenance arrangements are described in District Service Agreements. RFS District staff conduct annual inspections to ensure that the firefighting fleet has been serviced and maintained appropriately, and is safe for use by brigade volunteers. If the fleet has not been maintained to RFS service standards or timelines, RFS District staff may work with local councils to support or remediate these works.
The effectiveness of this quality control activity is dependent on relationships and communication between the RFS Districts and local councils. While some RFS staff reported having positive relationships with local councils, others said they struggled to get fleet maintenance work done in a timely manner. Some councils reported that funding shortfalls for fleet maintenance activity was impacting on the prioritisation of RFS fleet maintenance works. When fleet maintenance work is not completed routinely or effectively, it can negatively impact on the overall condition and lifespan of the vehicle. It can also reduce the capacity of the RFS to respond to fire events.
Fleet quality control activities are carried out by RFS District staff. In some of the smaller RFS Districts, one person is responsible for liaising with local councils and brigade volunteers about fleet maintenance and repairs. In the regions where resources are limited, there is less ability to maintain ongoing communication. This is impacting on fleet service and maintenance timelines and the timeliness of fleet monitoring activity.
The RFS has mutual support arrangements with agencies in NSW and interstate, though shared fleet levels are yet to be quantified
The RFS has arrangements with state, federal, and international fire authorities to provide mutual support during fire incidents. In NSW, the RFS has agreements with the three statutory authorities – Fire and Rescue NSW, the Forestry Corporation of NSW, and the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service. The agreement with Fire and Rescue NSW provides a framework for cooperation and joint operations between the agencies. The agreements with the Forestry Corporation of NSW and the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service describe the control and coordination arrangements for bush and grass fires across NSW. These arrangements are set out in legislation and incorporated into local Bush Fire Risk Management Plans.
The RFS has agreements with fire authorities in three of the four Australian states and territories that share a border with NSW – the Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, and South Australia. Each agreement sets out the arrangements for mutual assistance and joint operations, including arrangements for sharing aircraft. The agreement between the RFS and Victoria had lapsed. The RFS told the NSW Bushfire Inquiry that the agreement with Victoria would be finalised by June 2020. In June 2022, the RFS reported that the agreement was in the process of being finalised.
The arrangements for mutual aid from Western Australia, Northern Territory and Tasmania, are managed by the National Resource Sharing Centre. These agreements set out the arrangements for interstate assistance between Australian fire services, emergency services, and land management agencies in those states and territories.
These mutual support arrangements may assist during state-based fire events. However, when there are competing demands for resources, such as during the bushfires of 2019–2020, there can be limits on fleet availability. During the 2019–2020 fires, resources were stretched in all jurisdictions as these fires affected NSW, Victoria, and Queensland.
There are opportunities for the RFS and other NSW agencies to quantify fleet resources across the State and identify assets that can be mobilised for different fire activities. This form of fleet planning may be used to enhance surge capabilities during times of high fire activity. There are also opportunities for the RFS and other agencies to match the levels of shared assets to projected bushfire risks.
Appendix one – Responses from agencies
Appendix two – About the audit
Appendix three – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #376 - released 27 February 2023
Actions for Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)
Coordination of the response to COVID-19 (June to November 2021)
What the report is about
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination of the response to COVID-19, with a focus on the Delta variant outbreak in the Dubbo and Fairfield Local Government Areas (LGA) between June and November 2021. We audited five agencies - the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service.
The audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.
What we found
Prior to Delta, agencies developed capability to respond to COVID-19 related challenges.
However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.
Gaps in emergency management plans affected agencies' ability to support individuals, families and businesses impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering such as stay-at-home orders. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.
On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government established a cross-government coordinating approach, the Delta Microstrategy, which complemented existing emergency management arrangements, improved coordination between NSW Government agencies and led to more effective local responses.
Where possible, advice provided to government was supported by cross-government consultation, up-to-date evidence and insights. Public Health Orders were updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.
The NSW Government could provide greater transparency and accountability over decisions to apply Public Health Orders during a pandemic.
What we recommended
The audit made seven recommendations intended to improve transparency, accountability and preparedness for future emergency events.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) between June and November 2021.
As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was responsible for the coordination of welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.
During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions and it provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC was, and remains, responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness.
Our work for this performance audit was completed on 15 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the five audited agencies. While the audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW, it does include five recommendations to the State Emergency Management Committee. On 8 December 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.
The community of New South Wales has experienced significant emergency events during the past three years. COVID-19 first emerged in New South Wales after bushfire and flooding emergencies in 2019–20. The pandemic is now into its third year, and there have been further extreme weather and flooding events during 2021 and 2022.
Lessons taken from the experience of these events are important to informing future responses and reducing future risks to the community from emergencies.
This audit focuses on the NSW Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular, the Delta variant (Delta) that occurred between June and November 2021. The response to the Delta represents six months of heightened challenges for the NSW Government.
Government responses to emergencies are guided by legislation. The State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act) establishes emergency management arrangements in New South Wales and covers:
- coordination at state, regional and local levels through emergency management committees
- emergency management plans, supporting plans and functional areas including the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN)
- operations centres and controllers at state, regional and local levels.
This audit focuses on the activities of five agencies during the audit period:
- The NSW Police Force led the emergency management response and was responsible for coordinating agencies across government in providing the tactical and operational elements that supported and enhanced the health response to the pandemic. The NSW Police Force also led the compliance response which enforced Public Health Orders and included household checks on those required to isolate at home after testing positive to COVID-19. In some parts of NSW, they were supported by the Australian Defence Force in this role.
- NSW Health was responsible for leading the health response which coordinated all parts of the health system, initially to prevent, and then to manage, the pandemic.
- Resilience NSW coordinated welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements and provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC is responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness. Resilience NSW was also tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions.
- The Department of Customer Service (DCS) was responsible for the statewide strategic communications response.
- The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) held a key role in providing policy and legal services, as well as supporting the coordination of activity across a range of functional areas and decision-making by our State’s leaders.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (LGA) (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) after June 2021.
The audit investigated whether:
- government decisions to apply LGA-specific Public Health Orders were supported by effective crisis management governance and planning frameworks
- agencies effectively coordinated in the communication (and enforcement) of Public Health Orders.
While focusing on the coordination of NSW Government agencies’ response to the Delta variant in June through to November 2021, the audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.
This audit does not assess the effectiveness of other specific COVID-19 responses such as business support. It refers to the preparedness, planning and delivery of these activities in the context of supporting communities in selected LGAs. NSW Health's contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout was also subject to a separate audit titled 'New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout' tabled in NSW Parliament on 7 December 2022.
This audit is part of a series of audits which have been completed, or are in progress, regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. The Audit Office of New South Wales '2022–2025 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.
In this document Aboriginal refers to the First Nations peoples of the land and waters now called Australia, and includes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.
Conclusion
Prior to June 2021, agencies worked effectively together to adapt and refine pre-existing emergency management arrangements to respond to COVID-19. However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.
In the period March 2020 to June 2021, the State's Emergency Management (EM) arrangements coordinated the New South Wales emergency response to COVID-19 with support from the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) which led the cross-government COVID-19 Taskforce. NSW Government agencies enhanced the EM arrangements, which until then had typically been activated in response to natural disasters, to meet the specific circumstances of the pandemic.
However, the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC), supported by Resilience NSW, did not address relevant recommendations arising from the 2020 Bushfires Inquiry before June 2021 and agencies did not always integrate lessons learned from other jurisdictions or scenario training exercises into emergency management plans or strategies before Delta. As a result, deficiencies in the EM arrangements, including representation of vulnerable communities on EM bodies, well-being support for multicultural communities in locked down environments and cross-agency information sharing, persisted when Delta emerged in June 2021.
It should be noted that for the purposes of this audit there is no benchmark, informed by precedent, that articulates what level of preparation would have been sufficient or proportionate. However, the steps required to address these gaps were reasonable and achievable, and the failure to do so meant that agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been for the scale and escalation of Delta’s spread across the State.
The Delta Microstrategy complemented the EM arrangements to support greater coordination and agencies are working to improve their capability for future events
The Delta Microstrategy (the Microstrategy) led to innovations in information sharing and collaboration across the public service. Agencies involved in the response have completed, or are completing, reviews of their contribution to the response. That said, none of these reviews includes a focus on whole-of-government coordination.
On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government approved the establishment of the Microstrategy to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta including the need to support communities most impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering in the LGAs of concern. An extensive range of government agencies were represented across eight Microstrategy workstreams, which coordinated with the existing EM arrangements to deliver targeted strategies to communities in high-risk locations and improve data and information sharing across government. This enhanced the public health, compliance, income and food support, communications and community engagement aspects of the response.
Agencies also leveraged learnings from early weeks of the Delta wave and were able to replicate those lessons in other locations. The use of pre-staging hubs in Fairfield to support food and personal hamper distribution was used a month later in Dubbo which acted as a central hub for more remote parts of the State.
Emergency management plans did not enable government to respond immediately to support vulnerable communities in high-risk LGAs or regional NSW
There are gaps in the emergency management plans relating to the support for individuals, families and businesses impacted by the stay-at-home orders and other restrictions to movement and gathering. These gaps affected agencies' ability to respond immediately when the need arose during Delta.
Emergency management plans and supporting instruments did not include provision for immediate relief for households, which meant arrangements for isolation income support and food security measures had to be designed in the early stages of Delta before it could be approved and deployed.
There were delays – sometimes only days, on occasion, weeks - in providing support to affected communities. In particular, there were delays to the provision of income support and in scaling up efforts to coordinate food and grocery hampers to households in isolation. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.
Although government issued stricter restrictions for workers in the Fairfield LGA on 14 July 2021, it only approved targeted income support for people in LGAs of concern on 16 August 2021.
Overall, agencies coordinated effectively to provide advice to government but there are opportunities to learn lessons to improve preparedness for future events
Agencies coordinated in providing advice to government. The advice was supported by timely public health information, although this was in the context of a pandemic, where data and information about the virus and its variants was changing regularly. However, agencies did not always consider the impact on key industries or supply chains when they provided advice to government, which meant that Public Health Orders would sometimes need to be corrected.
Public Health Orders were also updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.
The audit identified several occasions where there were delays, ranging from three to 21 days, between the provision of advice to government and subsequent decision-making (which we have not detailed due to the confidentiality of Cabinet deliberations). Agency officers advised of instances where they were not provided sufficient notice of changes to Public Health Orders to organise local infrastructure (such as traffic support for testing clinics) to support compliance with new requirements.
The COVID-19 pandemic arrived in Australia in late January 2020 as the bushfire and localised flooding emergencies were in their final stages. Between 2020 and mid-2021, agencies responded to the initial variants of COVID-19, managed a border closure with Victoria that lasted nearly four months and dealt with localised ‘flare-ups’ that required postcode-based restrictions on mobility in northern parts of Sydney and regional New South Wales. During this period, New South Wales had the opportunity to learn from events in Victoria which imposed strict restrictions on mobility across the State and the growing emergence of the Delta variant (Delta) across the Asia Pacific.
This section of the report assesses how emergency management and public health responses adapted to these lessons and determined preparedness for, and responses to, widespread community transmission of Delta in New South Wales.
The previous chapter discusses how agencies had refined the existing emergency management arrangements to suit the needs of a pandemic and describes some gaps that were not addressed. This chapter explores the first month of Delta (mid-June to mid-July 2021). It explores the areas where agencies were prepared and responses in place for the outbreak. It also discusses the impact of the gaps that were not addressed in the period prior to Delta and other issues that emerged.
NSW Health provided advice on the removal of restrictions based on up-to-date advice
The NSW Government discussed the gradual process for removing restrictions using the Doherty Institute modelling provided to National Cabinet on 10 August 2021. NSW Health highlighted the importance of maintaining a level of public health and safety measure bundles to further suppress case numbers. This was based on additional modelling from the Doherty Institute.
The Department of Regional NSW led discussion and planning around reopening with a range of proposal through August and September 2021. The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Health jointly developed a paper to provide options on the restrictions when the State reached a level of 70% double dose vaccinations.
The roadmap to reopening was originally published on 9 September 2021. However, by 11 October 2021, the restrictions were relaxed when the 70% double dose threshold was reached to allow:
- up to ten fully vaccinated visitors to a home (increased from five)
- up to 30 fully vaccinated people attending outdoor gatherings (increased from 20)
- weddings and funerals limits increased to 100 people (from 50)
- the reopening of indoor pools for training, exercise and learning purposes only.
On the same day, the NSW Government announced further relaxation of restrictions once the 80% double dose threshold was reached. These restrictions were further relaxed on 8 November 2021. This included the removal of capacity restrictions to the number of visitors to a private residence, indoor pools to reopen for all purposes and density limits of one person for every two square metres, dancing allowed in nightclubs and 100% capacity in major stadia.
The NSW Government allowed workers in regional areas who received one vaccination dose to return to their workplace from 11 October 2021.
The Premier extended the date of easing of restrictions for unvaccinated people aged over 16 from 1 December to 15 December 2021.
Many agencies have undertaken reviews of their response to the Delta outbreak but a whole-of-government review has yet to be conducted
Various agencies and entities associated with the response to the Delta outbreak conducted after-action review processes. These processes assessed the achievements delivered, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement. However, a whole-of-government level review has not been conducted. This limits the New South Wales public service's ability to improve how it coordinates responses in future emergencies.
The agencies/entities that conducted reviews included:
- South West Metropolitan region, Western NSW region, Fairfield Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC), Dubbo Local Emergency Operations Controller (LEOCON), which were collated centrally by the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC)
- Aboriginal Affairs NSW assessed representation and relevance of the emergency management arrangements for Aboriginal communities following the 2019 bushfires
- Resilience NSW developed case studies to capture improved practice with regard to food security and supply chains
- a community support and empowerment-focused after-action review undertaken by the Pillar 5 workstream of the Microstrategy.
Key lessons collated from the after-action reviews include:
- the impact of variation in capability across agencies on the management of key aspects of the response including welfare support and logistics
- issues with boundary differences between NSW Police Force regions, local government areas (LGA and local health districts (LHD) caused issues in delivering and coordinating services in an emergency situation
- the need to improve relationships between state and local Government outside of acute emergency responses to improve service delivery
- issues arising from impediments to information sharing between agencies and jurisdictions, such as:
- timeliness and accuracy of data used to direct compliance activities
- the impact of insufficient advance notice on changes to Public Health Orders
- timely access to data across public sector agencies and other jurisdictions to inform decision-making, analysis and communications
- gaps in data around ethnicity, geolocation of recent positive cases and infection/vaccination rates in Aboriginal communities.
- the lack of Aboriginal community representation on many LEMCs
- compared with the response to COVID-19 in 2020, improved coordination of communications with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) populations with a reduction in overlapping messages and over-communication
- improved attendance from agency representatives in LEMCs, and regional emergency operations centres (REOC) to improve interagency communications, planning, capability development and community engagement issues
- deficiencies in succession planning and fatigue management practices
- the potential for REOC Welfare/Well-being subgroups to be included as part of the wider efforts to community needs during emergencies.
NSW Health commenced a whole of system review of its COVID-19 response in May 2022. At the time of writing, the completion due date for the debrief is 7 November 2022. This debrief is expected to explore:
- governance
- engagement
- innovation and technology
- community impact
- workforce impact
- system impact and performance.
NSW Health is also undertaking a parallel Intra-Action Review that is focused on the public health aspects of the response with finalisation estimated for the end of November 2022. At the time of completing this performance audit report, NSW Health had not finalised these reviews and, as a result, we cannot validate their findings against our own observations.
Recent inquiries are likely to impact the governance of emergency management in New South Wales
In March 2022, the NSW Government established an independent inquiry to examine and report on the causes of, preparedness for, response to and recovery from the 2022 floods. The Flood Inquiry report made 28 recommendations, which the NSW Government supported in full or in principle. Some of the recommendations relate directly to the governance and leadership of emergency management arrangements in New South Wales.
The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) will likely be involved in, and impacted by, the recommendations arising from the Flood Inquiry with potential changes to its membership and reshaping of functional areas and agencies. At the same time, the SEMC may have a role in overseeing the changes that emerge from the SEOC consolidated after-action reviews. This can also extend to ensuring local and regional bodies have incorporated the required actions. There is a risk that the recommendations from the pandemic-based after-action reviews may not be considered due to the priority of action resulting from the Flood Inquiry.
Furthermore, there is potential for the SEMC to work with NSW Health during its system-wide review. Such an approach is likely to improve preparedness for future events.
Appendix one – Response from agencies
Appendix two – Chronology 2020–2021
Appendix three – About the audit
Appendix four – Performance auditing
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #371 - released 20 December 2022
Actions for Audit Insights 2018-2022
Audit Insights 2018-2022
What the report is about
In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our audit reports over the past four years.
This analysis includes financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits of state and local government entities that were tabled in NSW Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022.
The report is framed by recognition that the past four years have seen significant challenges and emergency events.
The scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging, involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy.
The report is a resource to support public sector agencies and local government to improve future programs and activities.
What we found
Our analysis of findings and recommendations is structured around six key themes:
- Integrity and transparency
- Performance and monitoring
- Governance and oversight
- Cyber security and data
- System planning for disruption
- Resource management.
The report draws from this analysis to present recommendations for elements of good practice that government agencies should consider in relation to these themes. It also includes relevant examples from recent audit reports.
In this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements.
The report highlights the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit.
A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.
Fast facts
- 72 audits included in the Audit Insights 2018–2022 analysis
- 4 years of audits tabled by the Auditor-General for New South Wales
- 6 key themes for Audit Insights 2018–2022.
I am pleased to present the Audit Insights 2018–2022 report. This report describes key findings, trends and lessons learned from the last four years of audit. It seeks to inform the New South Wales Parliament of key risks identified and to provide insights and suggestions to the agencies we audit to improve performance across the public sector.
The report is framed by a very clear recognition that governments have been responding to significant events, in number, character and scale, over recent years. Further, it acknowledges that public servants at both state and council levels generally bring their best selves to work and diligently strive to deliver great outcomes for citizens and communities. The role of audit in this context is to provide necessary assurance over government spending, programs and services, and make suggestions for continuous improvement.
A number of the matters highlighted in this report are similar to those described in our previous Insights Report, (Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018) specifically in relation to cyber and information security, to performance measurement, reporting and evaluation, and system and workforce planning and capability.
However, in this report we particularly call out threats to the integrity of government systems, processes and governance arrangements. We highlight the need for balanced advice to government on options and risks, for transparent documentation and reporting of directions and decisions, and for early and open sharing of information with integrity bodies and audit. Arguably, these considerations are never more important than in an increasingly complex environment and in the face of significant emergency events and they will be key areas of focus in our future audit program.
While we have acknowledged the challenges of the last few years have required rapid responses to address the short-term impacts of emergency events, there is much to be learned to improve future programs. I trust that the insights developed in this report provide a helpful resource to public sector agencies and local government across New South Wales. I would be pleased to receive any feedback you may wish to offer.
Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General for New South Wales
Integrity and transparency | Performance and monitoring | Governance and oversight | Cyber security and data | System planning | Resource management |
Insufficient documentation of decisions reduces the ability to identify, or rule out, misconduct or corruption. | Failure to apply lessons learned risks mistakes being repeated and undermines future decisions on the use of public funds. | The control environment should be risk-based and keep pace with changes in the quantum and diversity of agency work. | Building effective cyber resilience requires leadership and committed executive management, along with dedicated resourcing to build improvements in cyber security and culture. | Priorities to meet forecast demand should incorporate regular assessment of need and any emerging risks or trends. Absence of an overarching strategy to guide decision-making results in project-by-project decisions lacking coordination. | Governments must weigh up the cost of reliance on consultants at the expense of internal capability, and actively manage contracts and conflicts of interest. |
Government entities should report to the public at both system and project level for transparency and accountability. | Government activities benefit from a clear statement of objectives and associated performance measures to support systematic monitoring and reporting on outcomes and impact. | Management of risk should include mechanisms to escalate risks, and action plans to mitigate risks with effective controls. | In implementing strategies to mitigate cyber risk, agencies must set target cyber maturity levels, and document their acceptance of cyber risks consistent with their risk appetite. | Service planning should establish future service offerings and service levels relative to current capacity, address risks to avoid or mitigate disruption of business and service delivery, and coordinate across other relevant plans and stakeholders. | Negotiations on outsourced services and major transactions must maintain focus on integrity and seeking value for public funds. |
Entities must provide balanced advice to decision-makers on the benefits and risks of investments. | Benefits realisation should identify responsibility for benefits management, set baselines and targets for benefits, review during delivery, and evaluate costs and benefits post-delivery. | Active review of policies and procedures in line with current business activities supports more effective risk management. | Governments hold repositories of valuable data and data capabilities that should be leveraged and shared across government and non-government entities to improve strategic planning and forecasting. | Formal structures and systems to facilitate coordination between agencies is critical to more efficient allocation of resources and to facilitate a timely response to unexpected events. | Transformation programs can be improved by resourcing a program management office. |
Clear guidelines and transparency of decisions are critical in distributing grant funding. | Quality assurance should underpin key inputs that support performance monitoring and accounting judgements. | Governance arrangements can enable input into key decisions from both government and non-government partners, and those with direct experience of complex issues. | Workforce planning should consider service continuity and ensure that specialist and targeted roles can be resourced and allocated to meet community need. | ||
Governments must ensure timely and complete provision of information to support governance, integrity and audit processes. | |||||
Read more | Read more | Read more | Read more | Read more | Read more |
This report brings together a summary of key findings arising from NSW Audit Office reports tabled in the New South Wales Parliament between July 2018 and February 2022. This includes analysis of financial audits, performance audits, and compliance audits tabled over this period.
- Financial audits provide an independent opinion on the financial statements of NSW Government entities, universities and councils and identify whether they comply with accounting standards, relevant laws, regulations, and government directions.
- Performance audits determine whether government entities carry out their activities effectively, are doing so economically and efficiently, and in accordance with relevant laws. The activities examined by a performance audit may include a selected program or service, all or part of an entity, or more than one government entity. Performance audits can consider issues which affect the whole state and/or the local government sectors.
- Compliance audits and other assurance reviews are audits that assess whether specific legislation, directions, and regulations have been adhered to.
This report follows our earlier edition titled 'Performance Audit Insights: key findings from 2014–2018'. That report sought to highlight issues and themes emerging from performance audit findings, and to share lessons common across government. In this report, we have analysed the key findings and recommendations from our reports over the past four years. The full list of reports is included in Appendix 1. The analysis included findings and recommendations from 58 performance audits, as well as selected financial and compliance reports tabled between July 2018 and February 2022. The number of recommendations and key findings made across different areas of activity and the top issues are summarised at Exhibit 1.
The past four years have seen unprecedented challenges and several emergency events, and the scale of government responses to these events has been wide-ranging involving emergency response coordination, service delivery, governance and policy. While these emergencies are having a significant impact today, they are also likely to continue to have an impact into the future. There is much to learn from the response to those events that will help the government sector to prepare for and respond to future disruption. The following chapters bring together our recommendations for core elements of good practice across a number of areas of government activity, along with relevant examples from recent audit reports.
This 'Audit Insights 2018–2022' report does not make comparative analysis of trends in public sector performance since our 2018 Insights report, but instead highlights areas where government continues to face challenges, as well as new issues that our audits have identified since our 2018 report. We will continue to use the findings of our Insights analysis to shape our future audit priorities, in line with our purpose to help Parliament hold government accountable for its use of public resources in New South Wales.
Appendix one – Included reports, 2018–2022
Appendix two – About this report
Copyright notice
© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.
Actions for COVID-19: response, recovery and impact
COVID-19: response, recovery and impact
What the report is about
This report draws together the financial impact of COVID-19 on the agencies integral to responses across the state government sector of New South Wales.
What we found
Since the COVID-19 pandemic hit NSW in January 2020, and until 30 June 2021, $7.5 billion was spent by state government agencies for health and economic stimulus. The response was largely funded by borrowings.
The key areas of spending since the start of COVID-19 in NSW to 30 June 2021 were:
- direct health response measures – $2.2 billion
- personal protective equipment – $1.4 billion
- small business grants – $795 million
- quarantine costs – $613 million
- increases in employee expenses and cleaning costs across most agencies
- vaccine distribution, including vaccination hubs – $71 million.
The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the financial performance and position of state government agencies.
Decreases in revenue from providing goods and services were offset by increases in appropriations, grants and contributions, for health and economic stimulus funding in response to the pandemic.
Most agencies had expense growth, due to additional operating requirements to manage and respond to the pandemic along with implementing new or expanded stimulus programs and initiatives.
Response measures for COVID-19 have meant the NSW Government is unlikely to meet targets in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 being:
- annual expense growth kept below long-term average revenue growth
- elimination of State’s unfunded superannuation liability by 2030.
Fast facts
- First COVID-19 case in NSW on 25 January 2020
- COVID-19 vaccinations commenced on 21 February 2021
- By 31 December 2021, 25.2 million PCR tests had been performed in NSW and 13.6 million vaccines administered, with 93.6% of the 16 and over population receiving two doses
- During 2020–21, NSW Health employed an extra 4,893 full-time staff and incurred $28 million in overtime mainly in response to COVID-19
- During 2020–21, $1.2 billion was spent on direct health COVID-19 response measures and $532 million was spent on quarantine for incoming international travellers
Section highlights
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Section highlights
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Actions for Stronger Communities 2019
Stronger Communities 2019
A report has been released on the NSW Stronger Communities cluster.
From 1 July 2019, the functions of the former Department of Justice, the former Department of Family and Community Services and many of the cluster agencies moved to the new Stronger Communities cluster. The Department of Communities and Justice is the principal agency in the new Stronger Communities cluster.
The report focuses on key observations and findings from the most recent financial audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster.
Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the financial statements for all agencies in the cluster.
There were 157 audit findings on internal controls. Two of these were high risk and 59 were repeat findings from previous financial audits. ‘Cluster agencies should prioritise actions to address internal control weaknesses promptly with particular focus given to issues that are assessed as high risk’, the Auditor-General said.
The report notes that the NSW Government’s new workers' compensation legislation, which gave eligible firefighters presumptive rights to workers' compensation, cost emergency services agencies $180 million in 2018–19, mostly in increased premiums.
This report analyses the results of our audits of financial statements of the agencies comprising the Stronger Communities cluster for the year ended 30 June 2019. The table below summarises our key observations.
This report provides parliament and other users of the financial statements of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster with the results of our audits, our observations, analyses, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:
- financial reporting
- audit observations.
This cluster was significantly impacted by the Machinery of Government (MoG) changes on 1 July 2019. This report focuses on the agencies that from 1 July 2019, comprised the Stronger Communities cluster. The MoG changes moved some agencies from the clusters to which they belonged in 2018–19 to the Stronger Communities cluster. Conversely, the MoG also moved some agencies formerly in the Family and Community Services cluster and Justice cluster elsewhere. Please refer to the section on Machinery of Government changes for more details.
The Department of Communities and Justice is the principal agency of the cluster. The newly created department combines functions of the former Department of Justice and the Department of Family and Community Services.
Machinery of Government (MoG) refers to how the government organises the structures and functions of the public service. MoG changes occur when the government reorganises these structures and functions and those changes are given effect by Administrative Orders.
The MoG changes announced following the NSW State election on 23 March 2019 significantly impacted the Stronger Communities cluster through Administrative Changes Orders issued on 2 April 2019 and 1 May 2019. These orders took effect on 1 July 2019.
Section highlights
The 2019 MoG changes significantly impacted the former Justice and Family and Community Services (FACS) departments and clusters.
- The Stronger Communities cluster combines most of the functions and agencies of the former Justice and FACS clusters from 1 July 2019.
- The Department of Communities and Justice is now the principal agency in the new cluster.
- The MoG changes bring new responsibilities, risks and challenges to the cluster.
- A temporary office has been established by the Department of Communities and Justice to support the cluster in the planning, delivery and reporting associated with implementing the changes.
Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.
This chapter outlines our audit observations relating to the financial reporting of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster for 2019.
Section highlights
- Unqualified audit opinions were issued for all agencies' 30 June 2019 financial statements. However, further actions can be taken by some cluster agencies to enhance the quality of their financial reporting.
- In November 2018, the Department of Justice implemented a new Victims Support Services system called VS Connect. Significant data quality issues arising from the VS Connect system implementation impacted the Department's ability to reliably estimate its Victims Support Scheme claims liabilities at 30 June 2019.
We recommend the Department of Communities and Justice resolves the data quality issues in the new VS Connect System before 30 June 2020 and capture and apply lessons learned from recent project implementations, including LifeLink, Justice SAP and VS Connect, in any relevant future implementations. - Our audits found some cluster agencies needed to do more work on their impact assessments and preparedness to implement the new accounting standards, to minimise the risk of errors in their 2019–20 financial statements.
- Cluster agencies with annual leave balances exceeding the State's target should further review their approach to managing leave balances.
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Stronger Communities cluster.
Section highlights
- Cluster agencies should action recommendations to address internal control weaknesses promptly. Particular focus should be given to prioritising high risk issues. The 2018–19 financial audits of cluster agencies identified 157 internal control issues. Of these, two were high risk and 37.6 per cent were repeat findings from previous audits.
- Data from the Department of Justice shows the inmate population reached a maximum of 13,798, compared to an operational capacity of 14,626 beds on 31 August 2019. This equates to an operational vacancy rate of 5.7 per cent, which is more than the recommended 5.0 per cent buffer. This is the first time the vacancy rate has exceeded the target over the last five years. Growth in the NSW prison population is being managed through the NSW Government's $3.8 billion Prison Bed Capacity Program.
- In September 2018, the NSW Government introduced new workers' compensation legislation, which gives eligible firefighters presumptive rights to workers' compensation when diagnosed with one of 12 prescribed cancers. The new legislation cost emergency services agencies $180 million in 2018–19, mainly through additional workers' compensation premiums.
Appendix one – Timeliness of financial reporting by agency
Appendix two – Management letter findings by agency
Appendix three – List of 2019 recommendations
Appendix four – Status of 2018 recommendations
Appendix five – Cluster agencies
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Actions for 2016 - An overview
2016 - An overview
This report focuses on key observations and findings from 2016 audits and highlights key areas of focus for financial and performance audits in 2017.
Financial reporting | |
Observation | Conclusion |
Only one qualified audit opinion was issued on the 2015–16 financial statements of NSW public sector agencies, compared to two in 2014–15. | The quality of financial reporting continued to improve across the NSW public sector. |
More 2015–16 financial statements and audit opinions were signed within three months of the year end. | Timely financial reporting was facilitated by more agencies resolving significant accounting issues early, completing asset valuations on time and compiling sufficient evidence to support financial statement balances. |
NSW Treasury’s early close procedures in 2015–16 were again successful in improving the quality and timeliness of financial reporting, largely facilitated by the early resolution of accounting issues. For 2016–17, NSW Treasury has narrowed the scope of mandatory early close procedures. |
The narrowed scope of mandatory early close procedures may diminish the good performance in ensuring the quality and timeliness of financial reporting achieved in recent years. To mitigate this risk, NSW Treasury has mandated that agencies perform non-financial asset valuations and prepare proforma financial statements in their early close procedures. It also encourages them to continue with the good practices embedded in recent years. |
Although most agencies complied with NSW Treasury’s early close asset revaluation procedures we identified areas where they can improve. | Asset revaluations need to commence early enough to ensure all assets are identified and the results are analysed, recorded and reflected accurately in the early close financial statements. |
Number of misstatements | |||||
Year ended 30 June | 2015-16 | 2014-15 | 2013-14 | 2012-13 | 2011-12 |
Total reported misstatements | 298 | 396 | 459 | 661 | 1,077 |
All material misstatements identified by agencies and audit teams were corrected before the financial statements and audit opinions were signed. A material misstatement relates to an incorrect amount, classification, presentation or disclosure in the financial statements that could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users.
Significant matters reported to the portfolio Minister, Treasurer and Agency Head
In 2015–16, we reported the following significant matters to the portfolio Minister, Treasurer and agency head in our Statutory Audit Reports:
Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and the implementation and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.
In 2015–16, our audit teams made the following key observations on the financial controls of NSW public sector agencies.
Financial controls | |
Observation | Conclusion |
More needs to be done to implement audit recommendations on a timely basis. We found 212 internal control issues identified in previous audits had not been adequately addressed by 30 June 2016. |
Delays in implementing audit recommendations can impact the quality of financial information and the effectiveness of decision making. Agencies need to ensure they have action plans, timeframes and assigned responsibilities to address recommendations in a timely manner. |
Agencies continue to face challenges managing information security. Most information technology issues we identified related to poor IT user administration in areas like password controls and inappropriate access. | Agencies should review the design and effectiveness of information security controls to ensure data is adequately protected. |
We found shared service provider agreements did not always adequately address information security requirements. |
Where agencies use shared service providers they should consider whether the service level arrangements adequately address information security. |
Thirteen of 108 agencies required to attest to having a minimum set of information security controls did not do so in their 2015 annual reports. | The 'NSW Government Digital Information Security Policy' recognises the growing need for effective information security. With cyber security threats continuing to increase as digital services expand we plan to look at cyber security as part of our 2017–18 performance audit program. |
We identified instances where service level agreements with shared service providers were outdated, signed too late or did not exist. | Corporate and shared service arrangements are more effective when service level arrangements are negotiated and signed in time, clearly detail rights and responsibilities and include meaningful KPIs, fee arrangements and dispute resolution processes. |
Internal controls at GovConnect, the private sector provider of transactional and information technology services to many NSW public sector agencies were ineffective in 2015–16. We found mitigating actions taken to manage transition risks from ServiceFirst to GovConnect were ineffective in ensuring effective control over client transactions and data. | The Department of Finance, Services and Innovation should ensure GovConnect addresses the control deficiencies. It should also examine the breakdowns in the transition of the shared service arrangements and apply the learnings to other services being transitioned to the private sector. |
Maintenance backlogs exist in several NSW public sector agencies, including Roads and Maritime Services, Sydney Trains, NSW Health, the Department of Education and the Department of Justice. | To address backlog maintenance it is important for agencies to have asset lifecycle planning strategies that ensure newly built and existing assets are funded and maintained to a desired service level. |
Actions for Building the readiness of the non-government sector for the NDIS
Building the readiness of the non-government sector for the NDIS
The Department of Family and Community Services has managed the risks of the transition to the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in New South Wales effectively by increasing the overall capacity of the non-government sector and investing in provider capability.
The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is a major reform that aims to change the way disability support is provided and received. Responsibility for overseeing the system to support people with disability in New South Wales will transfer from the NSW Government to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. Eligible people with disability will receive individual funding from the NDIA and purchase support from their chosen service providers, rather than being referred to services funded or provided by government. The NSW Government will transfer all disability services it currently provides to the non-government sector.
Approximately 78,000 people received NSW Government-funded disability support in 2015–16 at a cost of around $3.3 billion. An estimated 142,000 people will have an individual NDIS support plan in New South Wales, with total funding rising to around $6.8 billion in 2018–19. NDIS trials began in New South Wales in 2013. The full scheme was introduced in July 2016 and is scheduled to be operating across the state by July 2018.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Department of Family and Community Services' (the Department's) management of the risks of the NDIS transition in New South Wales. It focused on the Department's work to build the readiness of the non-government sector for the NDIS. To make this assessment, we asked whether:
- the Department supported the non-government sector to build capacity to meet the expected increase in demand under the NDIS
- the Department supported disability service providers in NSW to improve their capability to deliver NDIS services
- the Department's work to prepare for the NDIS has been coordinated with the Australian Government's NDIS readiness work.
In addition to the audit questions above, this audit identified principles governments should consider when building the capacity and capability of the non-government sector to deliver human services.
Conclusion
The Department of Family and Community Services has managed the risks of the transition to the NDIS in New South Wales effectively by increasing the overall capacity of the sector and investing in provider capability building initiatives. More work is needed to build the sector's capacity to provide services to people with more complex support needs and to help existing providers complete the transition to the NDIS successfully.
The Department expanded the capacity of the non-government sector over the past decade in a way that was consistent with NDIS objectives. The development of a national market and workforce for the NDIS is an Australian Government responsibility and the Department has supported the Australian Government's work. More targeted work will be needed to build the capacity of the non-government sector to provide services to people with the most complex support and access needs.
The Department invested in provider capability building by funding programs that were delivered in partnership with sector peak bodies. The larger programs were evaluated and received positive feedback, but many providers will need more support to transition to the NDIS. The overall impact of the programs on provider readiness for the NDIS is not clear because baseline information on provider capability was not collected and targets for improvement were not set.
The Department managed the transition coordination risks by establishing comprehensive governance arrangements, contributing to the Australian Government's sector development work through national policy coordination forums and sharing lessons from New South Wales.
Building the capacity of the non-government sector
The Department supported an increase in the capacity of non-government providers
The Department started building the capacity of the non-government sector before the NDIS was developed. This included moving services provided by government into the non‑government sector, funding early intervention and community-based disability support, and introducing some individual support packages. The Department checks that the business and operational systems of non-government disability providers are adequate. However, its understanding of the outcomes for people using the services is limited.
Service gaps are possible for people with more complex support or access needs
There are risks to the supply of services to people who have more complex support or access needs, including people who need specialist clinical support, people in remote areas, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and culturally and linguistically diverse communities. The Department has supported the NDIA's initial market development work and funded some programs to help providers build their capacity to support these groups. However, there is a risk the market will not expand quickly enough to meet the increase in demand for services.
Sector sustainability depends on support from outside the disability services sector
The sustainability of funded disability services provided by the non-government sector depends on support from outside the sector. Most people with disability receive significant unpaid support from family members, so carers will play a key role in the sustainability of the NDIS. There are opportunities for organisations that do not provide specific disability services to contribute to sector sustainability by providing some NDIS services. To do this, many will need help to make their services more accessible and inclusive to people with disability.
Helping non-government providers develop their capability
The Department invested in capability building programs for providers
The Department has spent more than $30 million over six years on programs that aim to improve the capability of disability support providers. This work began before the NDIS was established and was adjusted to focus on NDIS readiness from December 2012. It was guided by an industry development strategy that was developed after consultation with the sector and delivered in partnership with sector peak bodies. This approach gave the sector some responsibility for developing its own capability, which is important because the sector will not receive support from the NSW Government after the transition to the NDIS.
The overall impact of the programs on the capability of providers is not clear
The overall effectiveness of the Department's spending on provider capability is not clear. The Department had some information on the general financial health and organisational capability of providers from previous industry development work. However, baseline information on provider capability was not collected before programs commenced and targets for improvements in provider capability were not set. Without this information, the Department cannot demonstrate clearly that the capability building programs it funded represent good value for money.
Most providers will need more support to transition to the NDIS effectively
In late 2015, the Department assessed the transition progress of providers in New South Wales. This assessment indicates almost one third of providers are highly likely to need additional assistance to transition to the NDIS successfully, with only 14 per cent unlikely to need further assistance. We conducted a survey of 299 providers in New South Wales in August 2016. Most reported that they feel they are on track to transition to the NDIS successfully. Sixty-two per cent said the Department-funded programs and resources they had used had improved their readiness for the NDIS. Fifty-four per cent said the changes made because of using these programs and resources had a lasting impact on their organisation.
Coordinating sector development
Governance systems and planning processes for the NDIS transition were established
The Department developed governance arrangements for the transition in New South Wales. It contributed actively to the development of national policy and strategy documents including a strategy for national market development.
The Department shared sector readiness lessons with the Australian Government
Two NDIS sector readiness programs funded by the NSW Government were later expanded to national programs through funding from the Australian Government. New South Wales only received around five per cent of the total Australian Government funding for NDIS sector readiness initiatives. A report by the Australian National Audit Office in 2016 found there was limited evidence of a strategic approach by the Australian Government when allocating this funding to states and territories.
The Department has monitored transition issues and mitigated these where possible
The Department has monitored administrative issues for providers, which have included the changes in funding arrangements and registering for the NDIS. It has taken action to mitigate these where possible, although some issues, such as the operation of NDIA administrative systems, are beyond its control.
The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS)
The NDIS is a fundamental change to the disability support system
The NDIS is a major reform that aims to make significant changes to the way disability support is provided and received. Under the NDIS, the administration of funding for disability support in New South Wales will transfer from the NSW Government to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. The NSW and Australian Governments will both contribute to funding the NDIS. The size of the disability services sector in New South Wales is expected to more than double when the NDIS is fully operational (Exhibit 1).
Measure of sector capacity | Pre-NDIS (2015-16) | NDIS (2018-19) |
---|---|---|
Funding for services | $3.3 billion | $6.8 billion |
People receiving support | 78,000 | 142,000 |
Workforce required | 25,000-30,000 | 48,000-59,000 |
Number of providers | 699 | Determined by the market |
One of the main objectives of the NDIS is to increase the choice and control that people with disability have over the support they receive. Under the NDIS, people with disability receive individual funding packages which they can use to pay their chosen providers for the support they need, instead of being referred to services that are deemed appropriate for their needs. This is a fundamental change to the nature of disability support. Before the NDIS, people with disability were moved around the system according to decisions made by government or other organisations providing disability support. Under the NDIS, the funding will move around the system based on the choices people with disability make. The development of the new market for NDIS disability services is expected to take up to ten years because the changes to the system are so extensive.
In addition to increasing choice and control for participants, the NDIS aims to:
- improve outcomes for people with disability by intervening early to help reduce the need for support later in life
- increase integration by helping people with disability access mainstream government services such as health and education
- increase the involvement of people with disability in the community by making it easier to access community services such as sports clubs and community groups.
The transition to the NDIS is underway
The transition to the NDIS is underway in most Australian states and territories, following trials over the last three years. In New South Wales, a trial site was established in the Hunter area in July 2013. Early roll out of the NDIS began in July 2015 for people aged under 18 in the Nepean Blue Mountains area. On 30 June 2016, about 7,800 people had an NDIS plan in the Hunter trial site and around 1,800 people had a plan in the Nepean Blue Mountains area.
The full roll out of the NDIS began in about half of New South Wales in July 2016. The NDIS will start operating in the rest of the state from July 2017 and the transition is scheduled to be completed by July 2018 (Exhibit 2).
For the rest of the transition, the Department of Family and Community Services should:
- Work with the Australian Government, NDIA and other NSW Government agencies to identify gaps and develop the capacity of specialist clinical services, focusing on regional and rural areas.
- Continue to implement projects to increase the number of organisations that can support Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and culturally and linguistically diverse communities.
- Target remaining capability building assistance to less prepared providers, including via one-to-one support and mentoring in identified areas of weakness.
- Continue working with the Australian Government and the NDIA to ensure lessons from sector capability programs are shared.
Principles for developing the non-government sector
- Commence work to increase the capacity of the non-government sector early to allow time for service capacity to be built in a sustainable way.
- Decide whether to increase the capacity of the sector by supporting existing providers to expand their operations, attracting new organisations from outside the existing provider group, or some combination of these.
- Tailor approaches to supporting groups that have additional support or access needs because of cultural or geographic factors.
- Define the desired outcomes for people using services and, where possible, include outcomes in service delivery contracts.
- Invest in the sector by partnering with sector peak bodies to deliver capability programs.
- Include one-to-one support and mentoring in capability building programs where possible to improve the targeting of support to the specific needs of providers.
- Collect baseline information on provider capability before commencing programs and build robust tracking and evaluation into their design.
- Establish whole-of-government governance arrangements to ensure roles, responsibilities and accountability for delivery are clear.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #280 - released 23 February 2017
Actions for Responding to homelessness
Responding to homelessness
Many projects, both Partnership Against Homelessness and by individual agencies, have shown good results or led to improvements. One example is helping mental health patients maintain stable housing. Another is providing street outreach services to homeless people in inner Sydney. Despite these efforts, we were unable to determine how well the government is responding to homelessness statewide. This is because there are no statewide performance measures or targets on homelessness. Also there is limited benchmarking, and no formal means of spreading information on homelessness initiatives and projects.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #165 - released 2 May 2007