Reports
Actions for Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing
Managing Antisocial behaviour in public housing
The Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing according to a report released today by the Deputy Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin.
In recent decades, policy makers and legislators in Australian states and territories have developed and implemented initiatives to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing environments. All jurisdictions now have some form of legislation or policy to encourage public housing tenants to comply with rules and obligations of ‘good neighbourliness’. In November 2015, the NSW Parliament changed legislation to introduce a new approach to manage antisocial behaviour in public housing. This approach is commonly described as the ‘strikes’ approach.
When introduced in the NSW Parliament, the ‘strikes’ approach was described as a means to:
- improve the behaviour of a minority of tenants engaging in antisocial behaviour
- create better, safer communities for law abiding tenants, including those who are ageing and vulnerable.
FACS has a number of tasks as a landlord, including a responsibility to collect rent and organise housing maintenance. FACS also has a role to support tenants with complex needs and manage antisocial behaviour. These roles have some inherent tensions. The FACS antisocial behaviour management policy aims are:
to balance the responsibilities of tenants, the rights of their neighbours in social housing, private residents and the broader community with the need to support tenants to sustain their public housing tenancies.
This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the ‘strikes’ approach to managing antisocial behaviour in public housing environments.
We examined whether:
- the approach is being implemented as intended and leading to improved safety and security in social housing environments
- FACS and its partner agencies have the capability and capacity to implement the approach
- there are effective mechanisms to monitor, report and progressively improve the approach.
Conclusion
FACS has not adequately supported or resourced its staff to implement the antisocial behaviour policy. FACS antisocial behaviour data is incomplete and unreliable. Accordingly, there is insufficient data to determine the nature and extent of the problem and whether the implementation of the policy is leading to improved safety and security. FACS management of minor and moderate incidents of antisocial behaviour is poor. FACS has not dedicated sufficient training to equip frontline housing staff with the relevant skills to apply the antisocial behaviour management policy. At more than half of the housing offices we visited, staff had not been trained to:
When frontline housing staff are informed about serious and severe illegal antisocial behaviour incidents, they generally refer them to the FACS Legal Division. Staff in the Legal Division are trained and proficient in managing antisocial behaviour in compliance with the policy and therefore, the more serious incidents are managed effectively using HOMES ASB.
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Parliamentary reference - Report number #306 - released 10 August 2018
Actions for Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste
Regulation of water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal disposal of solid waste
There are important gaps in how the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) implements its regulatory framework for water pollution in drinking water catchments and illegal solid waste disposal. This limits the effectiveness of its regulatory responses, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford.
By 31 December 2018, to improve governance and oversight, the EPA should: | |
1. | implement a more effective performance framework with regular reports to the Chief Executive Officer and to the EPA Board on outcomes-based key result areas that assess its environmental and regulatory performance and trends over time |
By 30 June 2019, to improve consistency in its practices, the EPA should: | |
2. | progressively update and make accessible its policies and procedures for regulatory operations, and mandate procedures where necessary to ensure consistent application |
3. | implement internal controls to monitor the consistency and quality of its regulatory operations. |
By 30 June 2019, to address worsening water quality in Lake Burragorang, the EPA should: | |
4. | (a) review the impact of its licensed activities on water quality in Lake Burragorang, and |
(b) develop strategies relating to its licensed activities (in consultation with other relevant NSW Government agencies) to improve and maintain the lake's water quality. |
To improve compliance monitoring, the EPA should implement procedures to: | |
5. | by 30 June 2019, validate self-reported information, eliminate hardcopy submissions and require licensees to report on their breaches of the Act and associated regulations in their annual returns |
6. | by 31 December 2018, conduct mandatory site inspections under the risk-based licensing scheme to assess compliance with all regulatory requirements and licence conditions. |
By 31 December 2018 to improve enforcement, the EPA should: | |
7. | Implement procedures to systematically assess non-compliances with licence conditions and breaches of the Act and to implement appropriate and consistent regulatory actions. |
Appendix one – Response from agency
Appendix two – List of enforcement tools
Appendix three – The EPA's organisational structure
Appendix four – The EPA's regions and branches
Appendix five – About the audit
Appendix six – Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #304 - released 28 June 2018
Actions for Grants Administration
Grants Administration
We found no significant difference in the funding of government and opposition electorates. However, more money was given to electorates that were safely held by the major parties. These seats received $1.29 for every dollar given to marginal and independent seats with government marginals getting the least. Electorates also receive different levels of funding according to which region they are in. Such variations may reflect valid agency objectives such as meeting State Plan targets or addressing socio-economic disadvantage.
But while agencies publish who gets what, they do not adequately evaluate or explain what grant programs have achieved. As a result, there is a risk that New South Wales may not get the best value for its spending. We recommend that agencies regularly evaluate their grant programs and publish the results.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #186 - released 6 May 2009