Reports
Unsolicited proposal process for the lease of Ausgrid
In October 2016, the NSW Government accepted an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The deal followed the Federal Government’s rejection of two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons.
A performance audit of the lease of Ausgrid has found shortcomings in the unsolicited proposal process. Releasing the audit findings today, the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford said ‘this transaction involved a $20 billion asset owned by the people of New South Wales. As such, it warranted strict adherence to established guidelines’.
Ausgrid is a distributor of electricity to eastern parts of Sydney, the Central Coast, Newcastle and the Hunter Region.
In June 2014, the then government announced its commitment to lease components of the state's electricity network as part of the Rebuilding NSW plan. Implementation of the policy began after the government was re-elected in 2015. Between November 2015 and August 2016, the NSW Government held a competitive tender process to lease 50.4 per cent of Ausgrid for 99 years. The NSW Government abandoned the process on 19 August 2016 after the Australian Treasurer rejected two bids from foreign investors, for national security reasons. That day, the Premier and Treasurer released a media statement clarifying the government's objective to complete the transaction via a competitive process in time to include the proceeds in the 2017–18 budget.
On 31 August 2016, the state received an unsolicited proposal from IFM Investors and AustralianSuper to acquire an interest in Ausgrid under the same terms proposed by the state during the tender process. In October 2016, the government accepted the unsolicited proposal.
This audit examined whether the unsolicited proposal process for the partial long-term lease of Ausgrid was effectively conducted and in compliance with the government’s 2014 Unsolicited Proposals: Guide for Submission and Assessment (Unsolicited Proposals Guide or the Guide).
The audit focused on how the government-appointed Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee assessed key requirements in the Guide that unsolicited proposals must be demonstrably unique and represent value for money.
The evidence available does not conclusively demonstrate the unsolicited proposal was unique, and there were some shortcomings in the negotiation process, documentation and segregation of duties. That said, before the final commitment to proceed with the lease, the state obtained assurance that the proposal delivered value for money.
It is particularly important to demonstrate unsolicited proposals are unique, in order to justify the departure from other transaction processes that offer greater competition, transparency and certainty about value for money.
The Assessment Panel and the Proposal Specific Steering Committee determined the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal was unique, primarily on the basis that the proponent did not require foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and the lease transaction could be concluded earlier than through a second tender process. However, the evidence that persuaded the Panel and Committee did not demonstrate that no other proponent could conclude the transaction in time to meet the government’s deadline.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. It also does not demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
The Panel, Committee and financial advisers determined that the final price represented value for money, and that retendering offered a material risk of a worse financial outcome. However, an acceptable price was revealed early in the negotiation process, and doing so made it highly unlikely that the proponent would offer a higher price than that disclosed. The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, bargaining strategy or similar which put the negotiations in context. It is not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance.
Key aspects of governance recommended by the Guide were in place. Some shortcomings relating to role segregation, record keeping and probity assurance weakened the effectiveness of the unsolicited proposal process adopted for Ausgrid.
The reasons for accepting that the proposal and proponent were unique are not compelling.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says the 'unique benefits of the proposal and the unique ability of the proponent to deliver the proposal' must be demonstrated.
The conclusion reached by the Panel and Committee that the proposal offered a ‘unique ability to deliver (a) strategic outcome’ was primarily based on the proponent not requiring foreign investment approval from the Australian Treasurer, and allowing the government to complete the lease transaction earlier than by going through a second tender process.
It is not appropriate to determine an unsolicited proposal is unique because it delivers an earlier outcome than possible through a tender process. The Panel and Committee did not contend, and it is not evident, that the unsolicited proposal was the only way to meet the government’s transaction deadline.
The evidence does not demonstrate that the proponent was the only party that would not have needed foreign investment approval to participate in the transaction. Nor does it demonstrate that the requirement for foreign investment approval would have reduced the pool of foreign buyers to the degree that it would be reasonable to assume none would emerge.
That said, the Australian Treasurer’s decision to reject the two bids from the previous tender process created uncertainty about the conditions under which he would approve international bids. The financial advisers engaged for the Ausgrid transaction informed the Panel and Committee that:
- it was not likely another viable proponent would emerge soon enough to meet the government’s transaction deadline
- the market would be unlikely to deliver a better result than offered by the proponent
- going to tender presented a material risk of a worse financial result.
The Unsolicited Proposals Guide says that a proposal to directly purchase or acquire a government-owned entity or property will generally not be unique. The Ausgrid unsolicited proposal fell into this category.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- recognise that when considering uniqueness they should:
- require very strong evidence to decide that both the proponent and proposal are the only ones of their kind that could meet the government’s objectives
- give thorough consideration to any reasonable counter-arguments against uniqueness.
- rigorously consider all elements of the Unsolicited Proposals Guide when determining whether a proposal should be dealt with as an unsolicited proposal, and document these deliberations and all relevant evidence
- do not use speed of transaction compared to a market process as justification for uniqueness.
The Panel and Committee concluded the price represented value for money, based on peer-reviewed advice from their financial advisers and knowledge acquired from previous tenders. The financial advisers also told the Panel and Committee that there was a material risk the state would receive a lower price than offered by the unsolicited proposal if it immediately proceeded with a second market transaction.
The state commenced negotiations on price earlier than the Guide says they should have. Early disclosure of a price that the state would accept reduced the likelihood of achieving a price greater than this. DPC says the intent of this meeting was to quickly establish whether the proponents could meet the state’s benchmark rather than spending more time and resources on a proposal which had no prospect of proceeding.
DPC and NSW Treasury were not able to provide a documented reserve price, negotiation strategy or similar which put the negotiations and price achieved in context. It was not evident that the Panel or Committee authorised, justified or endorsed negotiations in advance. However, the Panel and Committee endorsed the outcomes of the negotiations.
The negotiations were informed by the range of prices achieved for similar assets and the specific bids for Ausgrid from the earlier market process.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government business or asset:
- document a minimum acceptable price, and a negotiating strategy designed to maximise price, before commencing negotiations
- do not communicate an acceptable price to the proponent, before the negotiation stage of the process, and then only as part of a documented bargaining strategy.
The state established a governance structure in accordance with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide, including an Assessment Panel and Proposal Specific Steering Committee. The members of the Panel and Steering Committee were senior and experienced officers, as befitted the size and nature of the unsolicited proposal.
The separation of negotiation, assessment and review envisaged by the Guide was not maintained fully. The Chair of the Assessment Panel and a member of the Steering Committee were involved in negotiations with the proponent.
DPC could not provide comprehensive records of some key interactions with the proponent or a documented negotiation strategy. The absence of such records means the Department cannot demonstrate engagement and negotiation processes were authorised and rigorous.
The probity adviser reported there were no material probity issues with the transaction. The probity adviser also provided audit services. This is not good practice. The same party should not provide both advisory and audit services on the same transaction.
Recommendations:
DPC should ensure any future Assessment Panels and Steering Committees considering a proposal to acquire a government entity or asset:
• maintain separation between negotiation, assessment and review in line with the Unsolicited Proposals Guide
• keep an auditable trail of documentation relating to the negotiation process
• maintain separation between any probity audit services engaged and the probity advisory and reporting services recommended in the current Guide.
Appendix one - Response from agency
Appendix two - NSW Government’s summary of assessment of the Ausgrid unsolicited proposal
Appendix three - The definition and nature of unsolicited proposals
Appendix four - Ausgrid unsolicited proposal process
Appendix five - About the audit
Appendix six - Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #309 - released 11 December 2018
Progress and measurement of the Premier's Priorities
The Premier’s Implementation Unit uses a systematic approach to measuring and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities performance targets, but public reporting needed to improve, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General of NSW, Margaret Crawford.
The Premier of New South Wales has established 12 Premier’s Priorities. These are key performance targets for government.
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Source: Department of Premier and Cabinet, Premier’s Priorities website.
Each Premier’s Priority has a lead agency and minister responsible for achieving the performance target.
The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) was established within the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) in 2015. The PIU is a delivery unit that supports agencies to measure and monitor performance, make progress toward the Premier’s Priorities targets, and report progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public.
This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government is progressing and reporting on the Premier's Priorities.
The Premier’s Implementation Unit (PIU) is effective in assisting agencies to make progress against the Premier’s Priorities targets. Progress reporting is regular but transparency to the public is weakened by the lack of information about specific measurement limitations and lack of clarity about the relationship of the targets to broader government objectives.The PIU promotes a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier’s Priorities’ performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives.
The PIU provides a systematic approach to measuring performance and reporting progress towards the Premier's Priorities performance targets. Public reporting would be improved with additional information about the rationale for choosing specific targets to report on broader government objectives. The data used to measure the Premier’s Priorities comes from a variety of government and external datasets, some of which have known limitations. These limitations are not revealed in public reporting, and only some are revealed in progress reported to the Premier and ministers. This limits the transparency of reporting.
The PIU assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising particular performance measures over other areas of activity. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach to assisting agencies to analyse performance using data, and helping them work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.
Data used to measure progress for some of the Premier’s Priorities has limitations which are not made clear when progress is reported. This reduces transparency about the reported progress. Public reporting would also be improved with additional information about the relationship between specific performance measures and broader government objectives.
The PIU is responsible for reporting progress to the Premier, key ministers and the public. Agencies provide performance data and some play a role in preparing progress reports for the Premier and ministers. For 11 of the Premier's Priorities, progress is reported against measurable and time-related performance targets. For the infrastructure priority, progress is reported against project milestones.
Progress of some Priorities is measured using data that has known limitations, which should be noted wherever progress is reported. For example, the data used to report on housing completions does not take housing demolitions into account, and is therefore overstating the contribution of this performance measure to housing supply. This known limitation is not explained in progress reports or on the public website.
Data used to measure progress is sourced from a mix of government and external datasets. Updated progress data for most Premier’s Priorities is published on the Premier’s Priorities website annually, although reported to the Premier and key ministers more frequently. The PIU reviews the data and validates it through fieldwork with front line agencies. The PIU also assists agencies to avoid unintended outcomes that can arise from prioritising single performance measures. Most, but not all, agencies use additional indicators to check for misuse of data or perverse outcomes.
We examined the reporting processes and controls for five of the Premier’s Priorities. We found that there is insufficient assurance over the accuracy of the data on housing approvals.
The relationships between performance measures and broader government objectives is not always clearly explained on the Premier’s Priority website, which is the key source of public information about the Premier’s Priorities. For example, the Premier’s Priority to reduce litter volumes is communicated as “Keeping our Environment Clean.” While the website explains why reducing litter is important, it does not clearly explain why that particular target has been chosen to measure progress in keeping the environment clean.
By December 2018, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:
- improve transparency of public reporting by:
- providing information about limitations of reported data and associated performance
- clarifying the relationship between the Premier’s Priorities performance targets and broader government objectives.
- ensure that processes to check and verify data are in place for all agency data sources
- encourage agencies to develop and implement additional supporting indicators for all Premier’s Priority performance measures to prevent and detect unintended consequences or misuse of data.
The Premier's Implementation Unit is effective in supporting agencies to deliver progress towards the Premier’s Priority targets.
The PIU promotes a systematic approach to monitoring and reporting progress against a target, based on a methodology used in delivery units elsewhere in the world. The PIU undertakes internal self-evaluation, and commissions regular reviews of methodology implementation from the consultancy that owns the methodology and helped to establish the PIU. However, the unit lacks periodic independent reviews of their overall effectiveness. The PIU has adopted a collaborative approach and assists agencies to analyse performance using data, and work across organisational silos to achieve the Premier’s Priorities targets.
Agency representatives recognise the benefits of being responsible for a Premier's Priority and speak of the value of being held to account and having the attention of the Premier and senior ministers.
By June 2019, the Department of Premier and Cabinet should:
- establish routine collection of feedback about PIU performance including:
- independent assurance of PIU performance
- opportunity for agencies to provide confidential feedback.
Appendix one: Response from agency
Appendix three: About the audit
Appendix four: Performance auditing
Parliamentary reference - Report number #307 - released 13 September 2018
Building the readiness of the non-government sector for the NDIS
The Department of Family and Community Services has managed the risks of the transition to the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in New South Wales effectively by increasing the overall capacity of the non-government sector and investing in provider capability.
The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is a major reform that aims to change the way disability support is provided and received. Responsibility for overseeing the system to support people with disability in New South Wales will transfer from the NSW Government to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. Eligible people with disability will receive individual funding from the NDIA and purchase support from their chosen service providers, rather than being referred to services funded or provided by government. The NSW Government will transfer all disability services it currently provides to the non-government sector.
Approximately 78,000 people received NSW Government-funded disability support in 2015–16 at a cost of around $3.3 billion. An estimated 142,000 people will have an individual NDIS support plan in New South Wales, with total funding rising to around $6.8 billion in 2018–19. NDIS trials began in New South Wales in 2013. The full scheme was introduced in July 2016 and is scheduled to be operating across the state by July 2018.
This audit assessed the effectiveness of the NSW Department of Family and Community Services' (the Department's) management of the risks of the NDIS transition in New South Wales. It focused on the Department's work to build the readiness of the non-government sector for the NDIS. To make this assessment, we asked whether:
- the Department supported the non-government sector to build capacity to meet the expected increase in demand under the NDIS
- the Department supported disability service providers in NSW to improve their capability to deliver NDIS services
- the Department's work to prepare for the NDIS has been coordinated with the Australian Government's NDIS readiness work.
In addition to the audit questions above, this audit identified principles governments should consider when building the capacity and capability of the non-government sector to deliver human services.
Conclusion
The Department of Family and Community Services has managed the risks of the transition to the NDIS in New South Wales effectively by increasing the overall capacity of the sector and investing in provider capability building initiatives. More work is needed to build the sector's capacity to provide services to people with more complex support needs and to help existing providers complete the transition to the NDIS successfully.
The Department expanded the capacity of the non-government sector over the past decade in a way that was consistent with NDIS objectives. The development of a national market and workforce for the NDIS is an Australian Government responsibility and the Department has supported the Australian Government's work. More targeted work will be needed to build the capacity of the non-government sector to provide services to people with the most complex support and access needs.
The Department invested in provider capability building by funding programs that were delivered in partnership with sector peak bodies. The larger programs were evaluated and received positive feedback, but many providers will need more support to transition to the NDIS. The overall impact of the programs on provider readiness for the NDIS is not clear because baseline information on provider capability was not collected and targets for improvement were not set.
The Department managed the transition coordination risks by establishing comprehensive governance arrangements, contributing to the Australian Government's sector development work through national policy coordination forums and sharing lessons from New South Wales.
Building the capacity of the non-government sector
The Department supported an increase in the capacity of non-government providers
The Department started building the capacity of the non-government sector before the NDIS was developed. This included moving services provided by government into the non‑government sector, funding early intervention and community-based disability support, and introducing some individual support packages. The Department checks that the business and operational systems of non-government disability providers are adequate. However, its understanding of the outcomes for people using the services is limited.
Service gaps are possible for people with more complex support or access needs
There are risks to the supply of services to people who have more complex support or access needs, including people who need specialist clinical support, people in remote areas, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and culturally and linguistically diverse communities. The Department has supported the NDIA's initial market development work and funded some programs to help providers build their capacity to support these groups. However, there is a risk the market will not expand quickly enough to meet the increase in demand for services.
Sector sustainability depends on support from outside the disability services sector
The sustainability of funded disability services provided by the non-government sector depends on support from outside the sector. Most people with disability receive significant unpaid support from family members, so carers will play a key role in the sustainability of the NDIS. There are opportunities for organisations that do not provide specific disability services to contribute to sector sustainability by providing some NDIS services. To do this, many will need help to make their services more accessible and inclusive to people with disability.
Helping non-government providers develop their capability
The Department invested in capability building programs for providers
The Department has spent more than $30 million over six years on programs that aim to improve the capability of disability support providers. This work began before the NDIS was established and was adjusted to focus on NDIS readiness from December 2012. It was guided by an industry development strategy that was developed after consultation with the sector and delivered in partnership with sector peak bodies. This approach gave the sector some responsibility for developing its own capability, which is important because the sector will not receive support from the NSW Government after the transition to the NDIS.
The overall impact of the programs on the capability of providers is not clear
The overall effectiveness of the Department's spending on provider capability is not clear. The Department had some information on the general financial health and organisational capability of providers from previous industry development work. However, baseline information on provider capability was not collected before programs commenced and targets for improvements in provider capability were not set. Without this information, the Department cannot demonstrate clearly that the capability building programs it funded represent good value for money.
Most providers will need more support to transition to the NDIS effectively
In late 2015, the Department assessed the transition progress of providers in New South Wales. This assessment indicates almost one third of providers are highly likely to need additional assistance to transition to the NDIS successfully, with only 14 per cent unlikely to need further assistance. We conducted a survey of 299 providers in New South Wales in August 2016. Most reported that they feel they are on track to transition to the NDIS successfully. Sixty-two per cent said the Department-funded programs and resources they had used had improved their readiness for the NDIS. Fifty-four per cent said the changes made because of using these programs and resources had a lasting impact on their organisation.
Coordinating sector development
Governance systems and planning processes for the NDIS transition were established
The Department developed governance arrangements for the transition in New South Wales. It contributed actively to the development of national policy and strategy documents including a strategy for national market development.
The Department shared sector readiness lessons with the Australian Government
Two NDIS sector readiness programs funded by the NSW Government were later expanded to national programs through funding from the Australian Government. New South Wales only received around five per cent of the total Australian Government funding for NDIS sector readiness initiatives. A report by the Australian National Audit Office in 2016 found there was limited evidence of a strategic approach by the Australian Government when allocating this funding to states and territories.
The Department has monitored transition issues and mitigated these where possible
The Department has monitored administrative issues for providers, which have included the changes in funding arrangements and registering for the NDIS. It has taken action to mitigate these where possible, although some issues, such as the operation of NDIA administrative systems, are beyond its control.
The National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS)
The NDIS is a fundamental change to the disability support system
The NDIS is a major reform that aims to make significant changes to the way disability support is provided and received. Under the NDIS, the administration of funding for disability support in New South Wales will transfer from the NSW Government to the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government. The NSW and Australian Governments will both contribute to funding the NDIS. The size of the disability services sector in New South Wales is expected to more than double when the NDIS is fully operational (Exhibit 1).
| Measure of sector capacity | Pre-NDIS (2015-16) | NDIS (2018-19) |
|---|---|---|
| Funding for services | $3.3 billion | $6.8 billion |
| People receiving support | 78,000 | 142,000 |
| Workforce required | 25,000-30,000 | 48,000-59,000 |
| Number of providers | 699 | Determined by the market |
One of the main objectives of the NDIS is to increase the choice and control that people with disability have over the support they receive. Under the NDIS, people with disability receive individual funding packages which they can use to pay their chosen providers for the support they need, instead of being referred to services that are deemed appropriate for their needs. This is a fundamental change to the nature of disability support. Before the NDIS, people with disability were moved around the system according to decisions made by government or other organisations providing disability support. Under the NDIS, the funding will move around the system based on the choices people with disability make. The development of the new market for NDIS disability services is expected to take up to ten years because the changes to the system are so extensive.
In addition to increasing choice and control for participants, the NDIS aims to:
- improve outcomes for people with disability by intervening early to help reduce the need for support later in life
- increase integration by helping people with disability access mainstream government services such as health and education
- increase the involvement of people with disability in the community by making it easier to access community services such as sports clubs and community groups.
The transition to the NDIS is underway
The transition to the NDIS is underway in most Australian states and territories, following trials over the last three years. In New South Wales, a trial site was established in the Hunter area in July 2013. Early roll out of the NDIS began in July 2015 for people aged under 18 in the Nepean Blue Mountains area. On 30 June 2016, about 7,800 people had an NDIS plan in the Hunter trial site and around 1,800 people had a plan in the Nepean Blue Mountains area.
The full roll out of the NDIS began in about half of New South Wales in July 2016. The NDIS will start operating in the rest of the state from July 2017 and the transition is scheduled to be completed by July 2018 (Exhibit 2).
For the rest of the transition, the Department of Family and Community Services should:
- Work with the Australian Government, NDIA and other NSW Government agencies to identify gaps and develop the capacity of specialist clinical services, focusing on regional and rural areas.
- Continue to implement projects to increase the number of organisations that can support Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and culturally and linguistically diverse communities.
- Target remaining capability building assistance to less prepared providers, including via one-to-one support and mentoring in identified areas of weakness.
- Continue working with the Australian Government and the NDIA to ensure lessons from sector capability programs are shared.
Principles for developing the non-government sector
- Commence work to increase the capacity of the non-government sector early to allow time for service capacity to be built in a sustainable way.
- Decide whether to increase the capacity of the sector by supporting existing providers to expand their operations, attracting new organisations from outside the existing provider group, or some combination of these.
- Tailor approaches to supporting groups that have additional support or access needs because of cultural or geographic factors.
- Define the desired outcomes for people using services and, where possible, include outcomes in service delivery contracts.
- Invest in the sector by partnering with sector peak bodies to deliver capability programs.
- Include one-to-one support and mentoring in capability building programs where possible to improve the targeting of support to the specific needs of providers.
- Collect baseline information on provider capability before commencing programs and build robust tracking and evaluation into their design.
- Establish whole-of-government governance arrangements to ensure roles, responsibilities and accountability for delivery are clear.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #280 - released 23 February 2017
Helping older people access a residential aged care facility
Assessment processes for older people needing to go to an Residential Aged Care Facility (RACF) vary depending on the processes of the Aged Care Assessement Teams (ACAT) they see and whether or not they are in hospital. The data collected on ACAT performance was significantly revised during 2004 making comparisons with subsequent years problematic. ACATs have more responsibilities than assessing older people for residential care. It is not clear whether they have sufficient resources for this additional workload.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #160 - released 5 December 2006
Agencies working together to improve services
In the cases we examined, we found that agencies working together can improve services or results. However, the changes were not always as great as anticipated or had not reached maximum potential. Establishing the right governance framework and accountability requirements between partners at the start of the project is critical to success. And joint responsibility requires new funding and reporting arrangements to be developed.
Parliamentary reference - Report number #149 - released 22 March 2006
