Unqualified audit opinions were issued on the above corporations’ 30 June 2013 financial statements. During the year, Treasury issued TC 13/01 ‘Mandatory early close procedures for 2013’. This Circular aimed to improve the quality and timeliness of agencies’ annual financial statements. In 2012-13, application of the circular was made mandatory for State owned corporations. As a result, the port corporations were required to perform the early close procedures. All the port corporations were successful in performing the procedures, which helped them submit financial statements by an earlier due date. The early close procedures also resulted in general improvements to the quality of most financial statements.

The report recommends all transport entities should do more to reduce excessive annual leave balances to ensure they will comply with new targets set by the Premier, RailCorp, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains should minimise the amount of overtime bonuses paid to train drivers and that Transport for NSW should set targets to measure the overall satisfaction of train users.

Overall, the audited entities are managing some aspects of gifts and benefits effectively but other aspects require improvement. We found that all five entities had gifts and benefits policies that addressed some but not all of the attributes of a sound policy. All five have communicated their gifts and benefits policies to staff and external stakeholders, although in each case we identified opportunities to better communicate their policies.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #228 - released 27 March 2013

The Audit Office is of the opinion that there are several features of the current Senior Executive Service (SES) model, or its application, which hinder the capacity of the SES to operate effectively in line with the Government’s stated objectives. The ultimate effect of these features is to reduce the capacity or perceived capacity of the SES to meet the Government’s objectives for the operation of the SES.

Taken overall, difficulties in the SES identified by the audit included: uncertainty caused by the way some contracts have been applied in practice, removal for reasons other than poor performance, informal strategies such as using restructuring to “terminate contracts and to move people in and out of positions regardless of their formal reported performance” (Section 5.4), inconsistently applied rules about selection/recruitment, appointment and removal of the SES, an imbalance between CES responsibility to the Minister as the employer/reviewer with their responsibility not to act in a political or partial manner, apparent lack of rigour in, value of and Ministerial accountability for CES performance review processes and failure to implement an adequate system of rewards and sanctions related to performance.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.1 - released 17 December 1998

This Performance Audit Report, prepared by the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) on behalf of The Audit Office of New South Wales (NSW), is a study of the NSW Senior Executive Service (SES).

It found the dissonance between where optimal executive performance might take place on a performance spectrum, encompassing the formal SES and less formal political arenas, is canvassed. The critical point here is that this arena, between the informal political actions and the application of formal SES structures, where much of the important decision making takes place, will always be difficult to manage. Transparency in decision making processes where non partisan and partisan actions are clearly defined seems a primary essential element of performance if the integrity of the NSW SES is to be maintained.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #59.2 - released 17 December 1998

At the request of the Department of Gaming and Racing, the audit reviewed the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation and management of casino surveillance undertaken pursuant to the Casino Control Act, 1992 (the Act).

Implicitly the Act requires an effective level of cooperation and coordination between the agencies to achieve their statutory roles and responsibilities. However, The Audit Office is of the opinion that this has not been achieved. As a consequence, the efficiency and effectiveness of the surveillance roles and processes carried out under the Act can be improved.

Revision is required to the surveillance methodology and its implementation, to the skills base within Director of Casino Surveillance (DCS) and the underlying working and to organisational arrangements between and within DCS and the New South Wales Casino Control Authority. Until such revision has been finalised, it is not possible to determine the level of resources or type of surveillance that needs to be undertaken and funded.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #50 - released 10 June 1998