What this report is about

Extreme rainfall across eastern Australia in 2021 and 2022 led to a series of major flood events in New South Wales.

This audit assessed how effectively the NSW Government provided emergency accommodation and temporary housing in response to the early 2022 Northern Rivers and late 2022 Central West flood events.

Responsible agencies included in this audit were the Department of Communities and Justice, NSW Reconstruction Authority, the former Department of Planning and Environment, the Department of Regional NSW and the Premier’s Department.

Findings

The Department of Communities and Justice rapidly provided emergency accommodation to displaced persons immediately following these flood events.

There was no plan in place to guide a temporary housing response and agencies did not have agency-level plans for implementing their responsibilities.

The NSW Government rapidly procured and constructed temporary housing villages. However, the amount of temporary housing provided did not meet the demand.

There is an extensive waitlist for temporary housing and the remaining demand in the Northern Rivers is unlikely to be met. The NSW Reconstruction Authority has not reviewed this list to confirm its accuracy.

Demobilisation plans for the temporary housing villages have been developed, but there are no long-term plans in place for the transition of tenants out of the temporary housing.

Agencies are in the process of evaluating the provision of emergency accommodation and temporary housing.

The findings from the 2022 State-wide lessons process largely relate to response activities.

Audit recommendations

The NSW Reconstruction Authority should:

• Develop a plan for the provision of temporary housing.
• Review the temporary housing waitlist.
• Determine a timeline for demobilising the temporary housing villages.
• Develop a strategy to manage the transition of people into long-term accommodation.
• Develop a process for state-wide recovery lessons learned.

All audited agencies should:

• Finalise evaluations of their role in the provision of emergency accommodation and temporary housing.
• Develop internal plans for implementing their roles under state-wide plans.

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Parliamentary reference - Report number #389 - released 22 February 2024

What this report is about

Transport for NSW (TfNSW) uses the Driver vehicle System (DRIVES) to support its regulatory functions. The system covers over 6.2 million driver licences and over seven million vehicle registrations.

DRIVES first went live in 1991 and has been significantly extended and updated since, though is still based around the same core system. The system is at end of life but has become an important service for Service NSW and the NSW Police Force.

DRIVES now includes some services to other parts of government and non-government entities which have little or no connection to transport. There are 141 users of DRIVES in total, including commercial insurers, national regulators, and individual citizens.

This audit assessed whether TfNSW is effectively managing DRIVES and planning to transition it to a modernised system.

Audit findings

TfNSW has not effectively planned the replacement of DRIVES.

It is now working on its third business case for a replacement system but has failed to learn lessons from its past attempts.

In the meantime, TfNSW has not taken a strategic approach to managing DRIVES’ growth.

TfNSW has been slow to reduce the risk of misuse of personal information held in DRIVES. With its delivery partner Service NSW, TfNSW has also been slow to develop and implement automatic monitoring of access.

TfNSW uses recognised processes for managing most aspects of DRIVES, but has not kept the system consistently available for users. TfNSW has lacked accurate service availability information since June 2022, when it changed its technology support provider.

TfNSW needs to significantly prioritise cyber security improvements to DRIVES. TfNSW is seeking to lift DRIVES’ cyber defences, but it will not achieve its stated target safeguard level until December 2025.

Even then, one of the target safeguards will not be achieved in full until DRIVES is modernised.

Audit recommendations

TfNSW should:

• implement a service management framework including insight into the views of DRIVES users, and ensuring users can influence the service
• ensure it can accurately and cost effectively calculate when DRIVES is unavailable due to unplanned downtime
• ensure implementation of a capability to automatically detect anomalous patterns of access to DRIVES
• ensure that DRIVES has appropriate cyber security and resilience safeguards in place as a matter of priority
• develop a clear statement of the future role in whole of government service delivery for the system
• resolve key issues currently faced by the DRIVES replacement program including by:
  • clearly setting out a strategy and design for the replacement
  • preparing a specific business case for replacement.

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Parliamentary reference - Report number #388 - released 20 February 2024

What this report is about

Result of the Treasury portfolio of agencies’ financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

The results of the audit of the NSW Government’s consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which are prepared by NSW Treasury, will be reported separately in our report on ‘State Finances 2023’.

The audit found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all general purpose financial statement audits.

Qualified audit opinions were issued on two of the 24 other engagements prepared by portfolio agencies. These related to payments made from Special Deposit Accounts that did not comply with the relevant legislation.

The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits increased from 29 in 2021–22 to 39 in 2022–23.

The new parental leave policy impacted agencies across all portfolios. NSW Treasury should perform annual assessments to identify changes in legislation and regulation and provide timely guidance to the sector.

Transport for NSW and Sydney Metro have capitalised over $300 million of tender bid costs paid to unsuccessful tender bidders relating to significant infrastructure projects. Whilst NSW Treasury policy provides clarity on the reimbursement of unsuccessful bidders’ costs, clearer guidance on how to account for these costs in agencies’ financial statements is required.

The key audit issues were

Five high-risk issues were reported in 2022–23. Three were new findings on contract management, accounting treatments for workers compensation renewal premium adjustments and the management and oversight of a Special Deposit Account. Two repeat issues referred to the need to improve quality review processes over financial reporting and the timely approval of administration costs.

Portfolio agencies should prioritise and action recommendations to address internal control deficiencies.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Treasury portfolio of agencies’ financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury portfolio.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Acquittals and other opinions

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

Results of the Regional NSW financial statements audits for the year ended 30 June 2023.

What we found

Unqualified audit opinions were issued on all completed audits in the Regional NSW portfolio agencies.

The number of monetary misstatements identified in our audits increased from 28 in 2021–22 to 30 in 2022–23.

What the key issues were

Effective 1 July 2023, staff employed in the Northern Rivers Reconstruction Corporation Division of the Department of Regional NSW transferred to the NSW Reconstruction Authority Staff Agency.

The Regional NSW portfolio agencies were migrated into a new government wide enterprise resourcing planning system.

The total number of audit management letter findings across the portfolio of agencies decreased from 36 to 23.

A high risk matter was raised for the NSW Food Authority to improve the internal controls in the information technology environment including monitoring and managing privilege user access.

What we recommended

Local Land Services should prioritise completing all mandatory early close procedures.

Portfolio agencies should:

• ensure any changes to employee entitlements are assessed for their potential financial statements impact under the relevant Australian Accounting Standards
• prioritise and address internal control deficiencies identified in audit management letters.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Regional NSW portfolio of agencies financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Regional NSW portfolio of agencies (the portfolio) for 2023.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision-making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Regional NSW portfolio.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What this report is about

This report draws together the financial impact of natural disasters on agencies integral to the response and impact of natural disasters during 2021–22.

What we found

Over the 2021–22 financial year $1.4 billion from a budget of $1.9 billion was spent by the NSW Government in response to natural disasters.

Total expenses were less than the budget due to underspend in the following areas:

• clean-up assistance, including council grants
• anticipated temporary accommodation support
• payments relating to the Northern Rivers Business Support scheme for small businesses.

Natural disaster events damaged council assets such as roads, bridges, waste collection centres and other facilities used to provide essential services. Additional staff, contractors and experts were engaged to restore and repair damaged assets and minimise disruption to service delivery.

At 30 June 2022, the estimated damage to council infrastructure assets totalled $349 million.

Over the first half of the 2022–23 financial year, councils experienced further damage to infrastructure assets due to natural disasters. NSW Government spending on natural disasters continued with a further $1.1 billion spent over this period.

Thirty-six councils did not identify climate change or natural disaster as a strategic risk despite 22 of these having at least one natural disaster during 2021–22.

Click here for the Easy English version of the report highlights

The Easy English version of the report highlights is intended to meet the needs of some people with lower literacy skills, some people with an intellectual disability, and some people from different cultural backgrounds.

The Easy English document is not the final audit report that has been prepared and tabled in NSW Parliament under s.38EB and s.38EC of the Government Sector Audit Act 1983. It should not be relied on or quoted from as the final audit report.

What this report is about

This audit assessed whether NSW Trustee and Guardian is effectively delivering public guardianship and financial management services in line with legislative requirements and standards.

What we found

NSW Trustee and Guardian is delivering guardianship and financial management services in line with its broad legal authority.

However, NSW Trustee and Guardian does not have sufficient oversight to ensure that its services are consistent with legislative principles which aim to promote positive client outcomes.

The agency's governance and practices could be better supported by relevant training and guidance to account for the diversity of its clients.

It does not track the actual costs of service delivery, the quality of services or client experiences and key findings from previous reviews remain unresolved.

Government funding for public guardianship services and direct financial management services for low-wealth clients has not kept pace with the growth in clients.

There is a risk that some fee-paying clients are unknowingly subsidising others.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has applied additional funding to increase frontline staff, but gaps in monitoring and IT system constraints create a risk that it will not address service quality issues, nor be able to demonstrate the impact of this new funding.

What we recommended

We recommended that NSW Trustee and Guardian:

• Broaden governance arrangements to enable input to key decisions from people with lived experience, relevant peak bodies and representatives of diverse communities.
• Implement mechanisms to seek feedback on the effectiveness and quality of services from clients under orders.
• Assess staff competency and implement regular training in effectively serving clients with disability, dementia, mental illness, cognitive impairments and other factors relevant to decision-making incapacity.
• Implement a risk-based quality framework to assess whether public guardian and financial management decisions are in line with policy and the legislative principles.
• Improve data collection and monitoring to track performance, the costs to serve, and client outcomes and report on these publicly.

NSW Trustee and Guardian is a NSW Government agency in the Stronger Communities cluster. It supports the NSW Trustee and the Public Guardian in the exercise of their statutory functions. It is accountable to the relevant Minister, the Attorney General.

The legislative responsibilities for the Public Guardian and the NSW Trustee are provided in separate statutes (NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 and Guardianship Act 1987). Together, these establish a number of functions and services that NSW Trustee and Guardian as an agency is expected to deliver, including:

• acting as executor and administrator of deceased estates
• acting as a trustee responsible for managing trust property on behalf of another person or organisation in line with the trust terms
• drafting Will, Power of Attorney and Enduring Guardianship instruments, and educating the community about the importance of having these documents in place
• making decisions on behalf of people under guardianship or financial management orders as a guardian or a financial manager 'of last resort', or overseeing and assisting private financial managers.

This audit focuses on the last of these - NSW Trustee and Guardian's financial management and guardianship services.

The NSW Trustee and the Public Guardian are appointed to provide direct financial management and/or guardianship services (respectively) to over 13,300 people (as at 30 June 2022) who are deemed by a court or tribunal unable to manage their own affairs. This involves making decisions for people under a relevant court or tribunal order, within the terms of the order. The court or tribunal order enables the appointed guardian or financial manager to make decisions on behalf of the person for whom the order is made. The legislation allows the financial manager or guardian to exercise all the functions of the person under management has or would have were they not incapable of managing for themselves. From a legal perspective, these 'substitute decisions' have the same effect as if the person had made the decision themselves. While the legal presumption is that a person has capacity to care for themselves and manage their own affairs, a financial manager or guardian can be appointed without the person's consent if the court or tribunal finds the person does not have relevant decision-making capacity.

There can be a range of factors that impact on a person's decision-making capacity, including cognitive impairment, intellectual disability, dementia, mental illness and addiction. Guardianship (of both the person and their estate) developed as a response, through European and English law over hundreds of years. In Australia, it was a function of the Supreme Court of NSW before the establishment of government agencies. What is now known as substitute decision-making can sometimes be referred to as a 'protective' function because:

• it relates to decisions or actions that need to be taken, which the person under an order cannot take because they are incapable of managing their own affairs
• due to this lack of competence, the person may be disadvantaged in the conduct of their affairs (for example, their money or property may be dissipated or lost, they may enter agreements unwisely or they may be at risk of abuse or exploitation)
• substitute decisions must be made in the best interests of the person on whose behalf they are made.

An alternative model is 'supported decision-making'. This refers to processes and approaches that assist people with impaired decision-making capacity to exercise their autonomy and legal capacity by supporting them to make decisions. This approach seeks to give effect to the will and preferences of the person requiring decision-making support wherever possible, including decisions involving risk. There has been a longstanding legal and community push for Australian guardianship and administration systems to move from substituted to supported decision-making. However, the legislation in New South Wales provides for 'best interests' substitute decision-making and this is the framework against which we have audited NSW Trustee and Guardian.

The Public Guardian and the NSW Trustee may be appointed as substitute decision makers by the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) and the Supreme Court. The NSW Trustee may also be appointed by the Mental Health Review Tribunal for financial management orders only.¹ They are intended to be appointed as a 'last resort' when there is no one willing or suitable to fill the role, or there is significant family conflict regarding decision-making for the person. The Public Guardian and the NSW Trustee cannot refuse to accept a court or tribunal appointment to administer an order for guardianship or financial management.

Public Guardian decisions cover healthcare, lifestyle, accommodation and/or medical decisions such as where a person should live (for example: at home, in an aged care facility or disability group home), what disability or other support services they receive, who can have access to them (for example: through establishing visiting schedules between conflicting family members) and consent to the use of restrictive practices on the advice of independent experts (for example: seclusion, chemical restraint such as anti-psychotic medication, environmental restraints such as limiting access to knives).

Under a financial management order where the NSW Trustee is appointed as financial manager, the NSW Trustee carries out such functions as securing and collecting assets, income and entitlements, paying expenses, debts and designing budgets, investing financial assets, lodging tax returns and paying maintenance for dependents, taking or defending legal proceedings and managing other financial and legal affairs for the person. This is referred to as direct financial management.

A court or tribunal may appoint a private financial manager, such as a family member, friend, private trustee company or other commercial provider. Where a private manager is appointed, the NSW Trustee provides authorisation and directions to the private manager and oversees their performance. As at 30 June 2022, over 6,200 people had private managers.

As an agency, the majority of NSW Trustee and Guardian's overall revenue is from fees (including for services outside the scope of the audit, such as will preparation) and investments. The remainder is from the NSW Government as funding for non-commercial services including guardianship services and subsidised financial management services for low-wealth clients. Public guardian clients do not pay fees. Financial management clients pay fees, but these are subsidised where the client does not have capacity to pay full fees. NSW Trustee and Guardian is considered a self-funded agency by NSW Treasury definitions.

Demand for financial management and guardianship services, and the complexity of clients' circumstances for these services, has grown over the last decade. In November 2020, NSW Trustee and Guardian advised the Attorney General that it had run an operating deficit in 2019–20 driven by an increase in non/low fee paying customers and an increase in the complexity of matters. NSW Trustee and Guardian advised the Attorney General that government funding was no longer meeting the full cost of guardianship services, and of direct financial management services for people with low balances. NSW Trustee and Guardian's analysis had identified a shortfall in government funding of $8.4 million in 2019–20 that was expected to increase over the forward estimates. A working group was established with officers from NSW Trustee and Guardian, NSW Treasury and the Department of Communities and Justice to advise the government on options for improving the financial sustainability of NSW Trustee and Guardian overall.

NSW Trustee and Guardian subsequently received a funding boost of $41.5 million across four years in the 2021–22 State Budget. NSW Trustee and Guardian applied the majority of the budget enhancement to recruit approximately 120 new roles mostly in financial management and guardianship services.

The objective of this audit was to assess whether NSW Trustee and Guardian is effectively delivering guardianship and financial management services in line with legislative requirements and relevant non-legislative standards. These include a legislative duty to observe certain principles when exercising the relevant legislative functions, including to: give primary consideration to clients’ welfare and interests, restrict their freedom of decision and action as little as possible, take account of their views, and encourage their self-reliance.

The audit was guided by three questions:

• Does NSW Trustee and Guardian align its service delivery with its legislative functions and principles, and relevant standards?
• Does NSW Trustee and Guardian drive and monitor performance to give effect to its legislative functions and principles, and relevant standards?
• Has NSW Trustee and Guardian effectively planned the use of additional funding to improve service delivery and adherence to its legislative functions and principles, and relevant standards?

The audit review period was the five years between 1 July 2017 - 30 June 2022.

Throughout this report:

• 'client' refers to a person who is under a guardianship order and/or whose estate is under financial management, for whom the Public Guardian and/or the NSW Trustee is appointed to act or responsible to oversee their private financial manager
• 'financial management' refers to clients under financial management orders (direct and private financial management) and/or the services provided by NSW Trustee and Guardian to these clients or their private managers
• 'guardianship' refers to clients under guardianship orders where the Public Guardian is appointed, and/or the services provided by the Public Guardian to these clients
• 'frontline staff' refers to the staff responsible for engagement with, and decision-making for, clients and private managers (titled client service officers, senior client service officers and principal client service officers in NSW Trustee and Guardian)
• Aboriginal refers to the First Nations peoples of the land and waters now called Australia and includes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has only recently identified measures to track the performance of its financial management and guardianship services

Between 2021 and 2022, NSW Trustee and Guardian developed new divisional key performance indicators which aim to track the quality of services delivered to people under financial management and guardianship orders. These measures are reported quarterly to the organisation's executive leadership team. The divisions have started measuring some of these new performance indicators, but many will require changes to consumer engagement processes and IT legacy systems to collect additional data. At this stage it is unclear when these necessary changes will occur, and when relevant data will begin to be collected and analysed.

Before 2021, NSW Trustee and Guardian measured the performance of some of its financial management and guardianship operational processes. While these operational measures identify whether it is fulfilling some of its legislative functions, they are predominantly activity measures and do not inform on the quality of decision-making for direct financial management or guardianship clients, or on client experiences and outcomes.

Operational performance targets and measures have only recently been developed and used to centrally track the time elapsed between requests for certain decisions and the decisions made or relevant actions taken by relevant frontline staff. Baseline data for these measures show that target timeframes are not close to being met for minor medical decisions for people under guardianship orders, or for first customer payment, and redirection of income for people who are directly financially managed.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has proactively developed a benefits realisation framework to monitor the expected benefits from the additional funding received in 2021–22

NSW Trustee and Guardian has developed a benefits realisation framework to monitor the expected benefits from the additional funding (and other elements of the budget bid including increased fees and business improvements for efficiencies). This is not a requirement imposed by NSW Treasury, but a proactive step taken by NSW Trustee and Guardian to account for the use of the additional funding and to attempt to identify its impacts.

The benefits realisation framework includes interim and preferred measures, which reflect the things that can be tracked with existing data, and those that require new data collection, respectively. The measures are underpinned by separate program logics for direct and private financial management, and guardianship, and an overall investment logic. 'Logics' articulate the inputs, outputs and short/medium/long term outcomes expected from a project, program or investment, as well as the underpinning assumptions about how desired changes will occur (the 'mechanism' or 'theory' of change).

The targets and measures for NSW Trustee and Guardian's benefits realisation framework are the responsibility of the organisational divisions delivering guardianship and financial management services. The baseline data against which change will be measured is 30 June 2021, as the budget enhancement funds were allocated from 1 July 2021. The audit has been provided with baseline data, but not first year results (covering 2021–22) and as such, cannot assess whether any progress has been made towards the targets.

The benefits realisation framework may not provide the information needed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the budget enhancement

A lack of available data and limited measures in the benefits realisation framework may mean NSW Trustee and Guardian will not be able to meaningfully assess the impact of the additional funding.

The 22 measures in the benefits realisation framework across guardianship and financial management functions are predominantly monitoring activity and outputs which seek to track staff caseloads, the number of decisions made, the timeliness of key actions/tasks, and annual consumer engagements.

There is one service quality outcome measure: that customers, family and carers report an improved experience. The metrics for this measure will initially be monitored using the whole-of-government customer satisfaction measurement survey administered by the Department of Customer Service, until such time as other additional sources are developed. The whole-of-government survey is built around six core customer commitments relating to respondents' experiences with government services and staff - that they are: 'easy to access, act with empathy, respect my time, explain what to expect, resolve the situation and engage the community'. It is not clear whether or how the whole-of-government survey targets and engages people with impaired decision-making capacity or accessible communication needs.

Some measures in the NSW Trustee and Guardian benefits realisation framework do not yet have targets set, such as the ratio of the number of clients to the number of guardians or financial managers. Many relate to compliance with internal operational policies.

One interim measure for a direct financial management service indicator is 'increased personalised face-to-face consultations by phone or virtually'. It is intended to be replaced with the preferred measure 'ensure the client’s story is understood by staff and systems by consulting stakeholders and adding to the client’s story in the IT system'. However, the interim measure would better align with the national standards regarding regular and accessible engagement (discussed above).

A lack of availability of key data to track the preferred measures was identified by NSW Trustee and Guardian as an enterprise risk, and issues with existing data collected were identified early on, including that:

• data can be entered into systems inconsistently by staff
• current systems mask some issues – for example, a task can be completed within internal timeframes but not reflect the actual waiting time of consumers
• current systems cater to measuring outputs rather than service quality.

IT system improvements are slated in order to allow data to be collected to inform on preferred measures, but these depend on capital funding that has not yet been secured. At the time of writing, data sources were yet to be identified for three of the 22 measures, and NSW Trustee and Guardian did not have staff trained and available to run and analyse data for the benefits realisation framework.

The mechanisms of change and the underlying assumptions in the program and investment logics are also not clearly articulated in the benefits realisation framework, and nor is the underpinning evidence (such as from earlier reviews, research or pilots, or experiences elsewhere). Identifying and evidencing these would give some confidence that the assumptions are sound and that the mechanisms of change will operate as expected (for example, that a decline in frontline staff caseloads will translate into more time spent on individual matters, and improved service quality).

Given these limitations in measures, data collection and logics, there is a risk that the benefits realisation framework may not provide the performance and impact evidence necessary to assess the effectiveness of the budget enhancement, or to justify further additional funding in the future.

NSW Trustee and Guardian cannot track its financial management and guardianship service performance over time

NSW Trustee and Guardian's operational performance activity measures have changed over the audit review period, which limits NSW Trustee and Guardian’s ability to identify whether it has sustained or improved performance in its guardianship and financial management services over time.

NSW Trustee and Guardian has consistently tracked the number and themes of complaints about financial management and guardianship services, which do provide some insight into service quality and experiences. However, this is an incomplete measure as people under financial management and guardianship orders are a more vulnerable cohort than other NSW Trustee and Guardian customers and may require support to make a complaint. There is also a structural power imbalance between clients and their guardian or financial manager which may dissuade clients and their stakeholders from raising concerns. Therefore, it is not clear whether the numbers and themes in complaints received are representative of broader experiences.

Appendix one – Response

Appendix two – Client characteristics

Appendix three – Easy English, Easy Read and Plain English formats

Appendix four – Financial management fees

Appendix five – NSW Trustee and Guardian Common Funds

Appendix six – About the audit

Appendix seven – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #379 - released 18 May 2023

What the report is about

The Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program was created after the 2019–20 bushfires, and commits $541.8 million to bushfire affected areas in New South Wales. It is co-funded by the Commonwealth and NSW governments.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Regional NSW (the department) and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the BLER program. These rounds were:

• Round one: early co-funding, split between two streams:
  • ­Fast-Tracked projects 
  • ­Sector Development Grants (SDG)
• Round two: open round.

What we found

The Department of Regional NSW did not effectively administer the Fast-Tracked stream of the BLER. 

The administration process lacked integrity, given it did not have sufficiently detailed guidelines and the assessment process for projects lacked transparency and consistency. 

At the request of the Deputy Premier's office, a $1 million threshold was applied, below which projects were not approved for funding. The department advises that some of the projects excluded were subsequently funded from other programs. 

This threshold resulted in a number of shortlisted projects in areas highly impacted by the bushfires being excluded, including all shortlisted projects located in Labor Party-held electorates.

The department's administration of the SDG stream had a detailed and transparent assessment process. However, conflicts of interest were not effectively managed. 

The department's administration of the open round included a clearly documented, detailed and transparent assessment framework. Some weaknesses in the approach to conflicts of interest remained.

What we recommended

The Department of Regional NSW should ensure that for all future grant programs it:

1. establishes and follows guidelines that align with relevant good practice guidance 
2. ensures a communications plan is in place, including the communication of guidelines to potential applicants
3. ensures staff declare conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of a grants stream, and that these conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
4. ensures regular monitoring is in place as part of funding deeds 
5. documents all key decisions and approvals in line with record keeping obligations.

This audit assessed how effectively the Department of Regional NSW and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program.

As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was involved in the set-up and ongoing administration and monitoring of the BLER program. During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with working with the Department of Regional NSW to create program objectives, guidelines and criteria. Their role also involved liaising with the Commonwealth Government, which provided co-funding for the program. Resilience NSW also had an ongoing role in quality assurance and compliance to ensure agencies administering disaster assistance did so in accordance with relevant guidelines. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.

Our work for this performance audit was completed on 3 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the two audited agencies. The audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW. On 24 November 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.

During the 2019–20 bushfire season, New South Wales experienced 11,774 fire incidents, burning 5.5 million hectares of the state. There were 26 fatalities and 2,476 homes destroyed. The agriculture sector was heavily impacted with 601,858 hectares of pasture damaged.

Due to the widespread impacts of these fires on the state, the NSW and Commonwealth governments committed $4.4 billion toward bushfire response, recovery, and preparedness. This included the establishment of the Bushfire Local Economic Recovery (BLER) program, with $541.8 million committed to support job retention and creation in areas impacted by bushfires. The program also aims to strengthen community resilience and reduce the impact of future natural disasters. The BLER program is co-funded, with the Commonwealth and NSW governments funding 50% each.

The BLER program is comprised of three funding rounds:

• round one early co-funding, split between
  • Fast-Tracked projects
  • Sector Development Grants (SDG)
• round two: open round
• round three: final projects and initiatives.

Resilience NSW was involved in setting up the BLER program and the Department of Regional NSW (the department) is responsible for administering it. The Commonwealth National Recovery and Resilience Agency must also endorse any projects proposed by the NSW Government for funding as part of the funding agreement between the State and Commonwealth governments.

Successful projects under the SDG stream were announced in September 2020 and projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream were announced in October 2020. Round two (the open round) was administered after these two streams and successful projects were announced in June 2021.

The Department of Premier and Cabinet established the 'Good Practice Guide to Grants Administration' (the Good Practice Guide) in 2010 to assist the NSW Government in ensuring grants administration was performed consistently across all NSW Government grants programs. Compliance with the Good Practice Guide was not compulsory, but provided an outline of best practice covering the entire lifecycle of a grants program. This guide was in place at the time these grants were designed and administered.

The design and delivery of round one of the program occurred quickly, as part of the response to the 2019–20 bushfires, and was responding to a request from the Commonwealth Government for rapid project identification.

The objective of this audit was to assess how effectively the Department of Regional NSW and Resilience NSW administered rounds one and two of the BLER program. Round three was excluded from this audit because it had not been announced at the time of the audit.

We addressed this objective by examining whether the audited agencies:

• effectively planned administration of the BLER program and established appropriate guidelines
• implemented an effective assessment process for the BLER program
• are effectively monitoring implementation of projects and program outcomes.

1. Recommendations

To promote integrity and transparency, the Department of Regional NSW should ensure that for all future grant programs it:

1. establishes and follows guidelines that align with relevant good practice guidance including accountabilities, key assessment steps and clear assessment criteria
2. ensures a communications plan is in place, including the communication of guidelines to potential applicants
3. ensures staff declare conflicts of interest prior to the commencement of a grants stream, and that these conflicts of interest are recorded and managed
4. ensures regular monitoring is in place as part of funding deeds
5. documents all key decisions and approvals in line with record keeping obligations.

Stage one of the BLER program consisted of early co-funded projects valued at a total of $180 million. This included 22 Fast-Tracked priority projects valued at a total of $107.8 million. The purpose of these projects was to deliver immediate and significant economic impacts to high and moderate bushfire-impacted areas.

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 5.

Fifty-two projects worth a total of $73.2 million were funded through the SDG stream. One grantee withdrew their project from the stream in early 2021, leaving a total of 51 projects (of which 49 are co-funded with the Commonwealth Government).

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 9.

The department distributed $283 million to 195 successful projects as part of the open round of the BLER program.

A timeline of key dates may be found at Exhibit 11.

The department entered into funding deeds with successful applicants

The Good Practice Guide advises that the agency administering a grant should enter into a formal agreement with each grant recipient which sets out the arrangements under which a grant is provided, received, managed and acquitted. Across all three streams, the department sent out a letter of offer to successful project managers to let them know that they had been successful in receiving funding, and then entered into funding deeds with grantees. The one exception was the project that RNSW managed, discussed below.

The reviewed funding deeds were signed by department staff with the appropriate level of delegation. They contained an appropriate level of information and key clauses that would allow the department to monitor the progress of the grant to ensure its completion as agreed with the grantee. The reviewed funding deeds contained key information, including:

• total value of the grant
• key deliverables at each milestone
• expected completion date of both the overall project and each milestone
• reporting requirements, including provisions to allow the department to request relevant information
• variation procedures.

The department only makes payments after confirming that milestones have been reached

The department has provided payments to grantees only after they could demonstrate that they had completed the agreed milestone. To ensure each milestone has been completed, the department requires grantees to provide evidence that they have fulfilled the milestone. Types of evidence provided includes photographs and invoices. Where the grantee provides insufficient evidence to the department, the department follows-up with the grantee to ensure that enough information is provided to justify the milestone payment.

The department also plans to undertake site visits of projects at select milestones and at the completion of most projects. The department has undertaken a risk assessment of each SDG and open round project, and uses this risk assessment to determine the number of milestones for the project, as well as the number of site visits that the department will undertake. Fast-Tracked projects all had PWA providing either project management or assurance and as such oversight is being provided through that mechanism. The milestones and site visits at each level of risk can be seen in Exhibit 15 for SDG and Exhibit 16 for open round.

The department does not monitor quarterly progress for SDG grants

As part of the LER framework, the department reports to the Commonwealth every quarter on the status and financials of each project, including whether there are any risks to project delivery and the mitigations in place for those risks. For projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream and the open round, the department collects quarterly progress reports from the grantees. These progress reports allow the department to determine if there are project risks, which can then be reported to the Commonwealth. The progress reports also allow the department to determine if a milestone is likely to be met within the next quarter or whether a project variation may be needed.

While the department monitors projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream and the open round on a quarterly basis, there is no quarterly monitoring of progress for projects funded through the SDG stream. The SDG funding deeds do not include a provision to require quarterly reporting to the department. The department only collects progress reports from grantees when the grantee reports that it has completed a milestone. Quarterly monitoring of the SDG stream would allow the department to determine if projects require corrective action.

Resilience NSW is not collecting quarterly reports for the Fast-Tracked grant it is responsible for administering

One of the projects funded through the Fast-Tracked stream was the rebuilding of three local halls across two LGAs, for a total value of $3 million. RNSW is responsible for managing this grant and entered into funding deeds with the relevant councils. It is not documented why RNSW is responsible for these funding deeds rather than the department, which is the signatory for all of the other Fast-Tracked stream funding deeds. RNSW advised it was due to the responsible RNSW Director having a strong working relationship with the relevant councils.

The funding deeds which RNSW signed with the relevant councils set out a requirement that the councils would report on this project to RNSW every quarter. The second milestone of each of these projects involved the submission of a quarterly report. However, RNSW was unable to provide evidence that it carried out this monitoring of the project. At the time of the audit, no second milestone payment had been made. Undertaking quarterly monitoring would provide RNSW with assurance that the money is being expended for the proper purpose and whether the projects will be completed by the target date.

RNSW and the relevant councils developed project control groups for each project, which allows it to monitor the implementation of the projects. PWA is also represented on these project control groups and provides an advisory role in the implementation of the projects.

RNSW and the department advised that responsibility for this project will be transitioned to the department and it will be monitored on a quarterly basis, in line with the other Fast-Tracked projects.

The department has a consistent approach to validating variations

The department's funding deeds with grantees allow for the variation of contracts at the department's discretion after the grantee has written to the department. It is important for the department to consider the impact of any project variation request on the overall program objectives, because a project which costs more than was originally planned or which takes additional time may put at risk the objectives of the BLER program. To ensure that requests for variation are handled consistently and appropriately, the department's Grants Management Office (GMO) has developed a process document which applies to variation requests across the BLER program.

For the grants reviewed as part of this audit, the GMO applied this variation process consistently and has documented the outcomes. Larger variations are reviewed at a higher level of delegation and sign-off. To determine whether a variation is accepted, the GMO considers the following factors:

• consistency with BLER program objectives
• delivery within the timeframes of the BLER program
• eligibility under the BLER program guidelines
• financial viability to deliver within the requested budget.

The department is preparing multiple evaluations, but it has delayed its process evaluation

When developing round one of the BLER program, the department developed an evaluation plan. A total of $1.1 million has been reserved for conducting process, outcome, and economic evaluations of the BLER program and two other bushfire recovery grant programs.

To assist with evaluating program outcomes and economic impact, the department is planning a post-completion survey in 2023–24. This timeline will allow most projects to be completed and enough time for project outcomes to be realised. The department advised that the data collected through this survey would allow the department to determine whether the BLER program has achieved its objectives, as it includes information such as the number of jobs created through each project.

The process evaluation was initially planned for March to June 2021. This would have aligned with the announcement of the open round funding and would have allowed for the learnings from rounds one and two of the BLER program to be applied to the development of round three. However, the department did not conduct this evaluation in a timely way. The department advised that this was because funding deed negotiations were still ongoing, and the department was waiting for 50% of funding deeds to be signed. Given this, the department was not in a position to commence its process evaluation. In December 2021, the department revised its evaluation plan and advised that it commenced its process evaluation in April 2022. It is unlikely that this will allow time for the department to apply learnings to round three, which is currently underway.

Appendix one – Responses from agencies

Appendix two – BLER program distribution

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #373 - released 2 February 2023

What the report is about

The Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE) is the State's custodian of rail assets. It is a state owned corporation and commenced operating on 1 July 2020.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. We audited TAHE, Transport for NSW (TfNSW) and NSW Treasury.

Separate and related audits on TAHE are reported in 'State Finances 2022', 'State Finances 2021' and 'Transport and Infrastructure 2022' reports.

What we found

The design and implementation of TAHE, which spanned seven years, was not effective.

The process was not cohesive or transparent. It delivered an outcome that is unnecessarily complex in order to support an accounting treatment to meet the NSW Government's short-term Budget objectives, while creating an obligation for future governments.

The benefits of TAHE were claimed in the 2015–16 NSW Budget before the enabling legislation was passed by Parliament in 2017. This committed the agencies to implement a solution that justified the 2015–16 Budget impacts, regardless of any challenges that arose.

Rail safety arrangements were a priority throughout TAHE's design and implementation, and risks were raised and addressed.

Agencies relied heavily on consultants on matters related to the creation of TAHE, but failed to effectively manage these engagements. Agencies failed to ensure that consultancies delivered independent advice as an input to decision-making. A small number of firms were used repeatedly to provide advice on the same topic. The final cost of TAHE-related consultancies was $22.6 million compared to the initial estimated cost of $12.9 million.

What we recommended

We recommended that the audited agencies should:

• improve accountability and transparency for major new fiscal transformation initiatives
• ensure entities do not reflect the financial impact of significant initiatives in the Budget when there is uncertainty, or it creates perverse incentives
• review record keeping practices, systems and policies to ensure compliance with the State Records Act 1998, and the NSW Government Information Classification, Labelling and Handling Guidelines
• review procurement policies to ensure that consultant use complies with all NSW Government policy requirements.

The NSW Government established the Transport Asset Holding Entity (TAHE), a statutory State Owned Corporation (SOC), on 1 July 2020 to replace the former rail infrastructure owner – RailCorp. It is the State's custodian of rail network assets, including rail tracks and other infrastructure, rolling stock, land, train stations and facilities, retail space, and signal and power systems, within metropolitan and regional New South Wales. It is responsible for $2.8 billion of major capital projects in 2022–23.

TAHE was established under Part 2 of the Transport Administration Act 1988 and is governed by a decision-making board. The Treasurer and the Minister for Finance and Employee Relations are the Shareholding Ministers of TAHE, and they annually agree performance expectations articulated in a Statement of Corporate Intent.

Whereas TAHE is the custodian of rail assets, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains operate public rail services. TAHE does not have responsibility for the operation of the heavy rail network or train services, nor does it have network control functions. TAHE, Sydney Trains and NSW Trains are in the Transport and Infrastructure cluster in the public sector (formerly the Transport cluster and renamed in April 2022), which also includes Sydney Metro and Transport for NSW (TfNSW).

TfNSW leads the Transport and Infrastructure cluster. Its role is to set the strategic direction for transport across the State. This involves the shaping of planning, policy, strategy, regulation, resource allocation and other service and non-service delivery functions for all modes of transport.

TAHE's Operating Licence is granted by the Portfolio Minister and authorises the entity to perform the functions required to acquire, develop, finance, divest and hold assets, pursuant to the Transport Administration Act 1988. The Portfolio Minister also issues a Statement of Expectations which outlines the government’s expectation for the business for the next three to five years.

TAHE's original Portfolio Minister was the Minister for Transport who approved, on 30 June 2020, the issuing of an interim 12-month Operating Licence to enable TAHE to commence operating on 1 July 2020. The Portfolio Minister then granted TAHE's current Operating Licence in 2021. After TAHE requested a 12-month extension to its current Operating Licence, its next Operating Licence is due on 1 July 2024. The current Portfolio Minister is the Minister for Infrastructure, Cities and Active Transport.

About this audit

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies' design and implementation of TAHE. In making this assessment, we considered whether: 

• the process of designing and implementing TAHE was cohesive and transparent, and delivered an effective outcome
• agencies' roles and responsibilities were clear in the planning of TAHE
• agencies effectively identified and managed certain risks.

Appendix one – Responses from audited agencies, and Audit Office clarification of matters raised in the TAHE formal response 

Appendix two – Classification of government entities 

Appendix three – About the audit 

Appendix four – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #372 - released 24 January 2023

What the report is about

Results of the Treasury cluster agencies' financial statement audits for the year ended 30 June 2022.

The results of the audit of the NSW Government's consolidated Total State Sector Accounts (TSSA), which is prepared by NSW Treasury, are reported separately in our report on 'State Finances 2022'.

What we found

Unmodified audit opinions were issued on all 30 June 2022 general purpose financial statement audits.

Qualified audit opinions were issued on three of the 25 other engagements prepared by cluster agencies. These related to payments made from Special Deposit Accounts (SDA) that did not comply with the relevant legislation.

What the key issues were

Commercial agreements were signed between TAHE, the operators and Transport for NSW in June 2022, which reflected an expected rate of return of 2.5% on contributed equity. However, it remains critical that the government continue to provide sufficient funding to the operators so they can pay for access and use TAHE assets. These findings are reported in our report on 'State Finances 2022'.

Eight high-risk issues were raised in 2021–22, of which five relate to NSW Treasury.

A number of previously reported audit findings and recommendations with respect to icare continue to be ongoing issues. This includes the Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer continuing to hold less assets than the estimated present value of its future payment obligations, when measured in accordance with the accounting framework.

What we recommended

Our report on 'State Finances 2022' made several recommendations to improve NSW Treasury's processes.

In this report, we recommended icare should ensure:

• it has sufficient controls in place over claim payments, including an effective quality assurance program, to minimise claim payment errors
• that documentation to support PIAWE calculations is appropriately maintained, and that the minimum documentation requirements are set out in a policy.

This report provides Parliament and other users of the Treasury cluster’s financial statements with the results of our audits, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the following areas:

• financial reporting
• audit observations.

Financial reporting is an important element of good governance. Confidence and transparency in public sector decision-making are enhanced when financial reporting is accurate and timely.

This chapter outlines our audit observations related to the financial reporting of agencies in the Treasury cluster (the cluster) for 2022.

Appropriate financial controls help ensure the efficient and effective use of resources and administration of agency policies. They are essential for quality and timely decision making.

This chapter outlines our observations and insights from our financial statement audits of agencies in the Treasury cluster.

Appendix one – Misstatements in financial statements submitted for audit

Appendix two – Early close procedures

Appendix three – Timeliness of financial reporting

Appendix four – Financial data

Appendix five – Acquittals and other opinions

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

What the report is about

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination of the response to COVID-19, with a focus on the Delta variant outbreak in the Dubbo and Fairfield Local Government Areas (LGA) between June and November 2021. We audited five agencies - the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service.

The audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

What we found

Prior to Delta, agencies developed capability to respond to COVID-19 related challenges.

However, lessons learned from prior reviews of emergency management arrangements, and from other jurisdictions, had not been implemented when Delta emerged in June 2021. As a result, agencies were not as fully prepared as they could have been to respond to the additional challenges presented by Delta.

Gaps in emergency management plans affected agencies' ability to support individuals, families and businesses impacted by restrictions to movement and gathering such as stay-at-home orders. In LGAs of concern, modest delays of a few days had a significant impact on people, especially those most vulnerable.

On 23 July 2021, the NSW Government established a cross-government coordinating approach, the Delta Microstrategy, which complemented existing emergency management arrangements, improved coordination between NSW Government agencies and led to more effective local responses.

Where possible, advice provided to government was supported by cross-government consultation, up-to-date evidence and insights. Public Health Orders were updated as the response to Delta intensified or to address unintended consequences of previous orders. The frequency of changes hampered agencies' ability to effectively communicate changes to frontline staff and the community in a rapidly evolving situation.

The NSW Government could provide greater transparency and accountability over decisions to apply Public Health Orders during a pandemic.

What we recommended

The audit made seven recommendations intended to improve transparency, accountability and preparedness for future emergency events.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) between June and November 2021.

As noted in this report, Resilience NSW was responsible for the coordination of welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements. On 16 December 2022, the NSW Government abolished Resilience NSW.

During the audited period, Resilience NSW was tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions and it provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC was, and remains, responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness.

Our work for this performance audit was completed on 15 November 2022, when we issued the final report to the five audited agencies. While the audit report does not make specific recommendations to Resilience NSW, it does include five recommendations to the State Emergency Management Committee. On 8 December 2022, the then Commissioner of Resilience NSW provided a response to the final report, which we include as it is the formal response from the audited entity at the time the audit was conducted.

The community of New South Wales has experienced significant emergency events during the past three years. COVID-19 first emerged in New South Wales after bushfire and flooding emergencies in 2019–20. The pandemic is now into its third year, and there have been further extreme weather and flooding events during 2021 and 2022.

Lessons taken from the experience of these events are important to informing future responses and reducing future risks to the community from emergencies.

This audit focuses on the NSW Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in particular, the Delta variant (Delta) that occurred between June and November 2021. The response to the Delta represents six months of heightened challenges for the NSW Government.

Government responses to emergencies are guided by legislation. The State Emergency and Rescue Management Act 1989 (SERM Act) establishes emergency management arrangements in New South Wales and covers:

• coordination at state, regional and local levels through emergency management committees
• emergency management plans, supporting plans and functional areas including the State Emergency Management Plan (EMPLAN)
• operations centres and controllers at state, regional and local levels.

This audit focuses on the activities of five agencies during the audit period:

• The NSW Police Force led the emergency management response and was responsible for coordinating agencies across government in providing the tactical and operational elements that supported and enhanced the health response to the pandemic. The NSW Police Force also led the compliance response which enforced Public Health Orders and included household checks on those required to isolate at home after testing positive to COVID-19. In some parts of NSW, they were supported by the Australian Defence Force in this role.
• NSW Health was responsible for leading the health response which coordinated all parts of the health system, initially to prevent, and then to manage, the pandemic.
• Resilience NSW coordinated welfare services as part of the emergency management arrangements and provided secretariat support to the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). The SEMC is responsible for the coordination and oversight of emergency management policy and preparedness. Resilience NSW was also tasked with supporting the needs of communities subject to stay-at-home orders or stricter restrictions.
• The Department of Customer Service (DCS) was responsible for the statewide strategic communications response.
• The Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPC) held a key role in providing policy and legal services, as well as supporting the coordination of activity across a range of functional areas and decision-making by our State’s leaders.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Government agencies’ coordination (focused on the Department of Premier and Cabinet, NSW Health, the NSW Police Force, Resilience NSW and the Department of Customer Service) of the COVID-19 response in selected Local Government Areas (LGA) (Fairfield City Council and Dubbo Regional Council) after June 2021.

The audit investigated whether:

• government decisions to apply LGA-specific Public Health Orders were supported by effective crisis management governance and planning frameworks
• agencies effectively coordinated in the communication (and enforcement) of Public Health Orders.

While focusing on the coordination of NSW Government agencies’ response to the Delta variant in June through to November 2021, the audit also considered relevant planning and preparation activities that occurred prior to June 2021 to examine how emergency management and public health responses learned from previous events.

This audit does not assess the effectiveness of other specific COVID-19 responses such as business support. It refers to the preparedness, planning and delivery of these activities in the context of supporting communities in selected LGAs. NSW Health's contribution to the Australian COVID-19 vaccine rollout was also subject to a separate audit titled 'New South Wales COVID-19 vaccine rollout' tabled in NSW Parliament on 7 December 2022. 

This audit is part of a series of audits which have been completed, or are in progress, regarding the New South Wales COVID-19 emergency response. The Audit Office of New South Wales '2022–2025 Annual Work Program' details the ongoing focus our audits will have on providing assurance on the effectiveness of emergency responses.

In this document Aboriginal refers to the First Nations peoples of the land and waters now called Australia, and includes Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.

The COVID-19 pandemic arrived in Australia in late January 2020 as the bushfire and localised flooding emergencies were in their final stages. Between 2020 and mid-2021, agencies responded to the initial variants of COVID-19, managed a border closure with Victoria that lasted nearly four months and dealt with localised ‘flare-ups’ that required postcode-based restrictions on mobility in northern parts of Sydney and regional New South Wales. During this period, New South Wales had the opportunity to learn from events in Victoria which imposed strict restrictions on mobility across the State and the growing emergence of the Delta variant (Delta) across the Asia Pacific.

This section of the report assesses how emergency management and public health responses adapted to these lessons and determined preparedness for, and responses to, widespread community transmission of Delta in New South Wales.

The previous chapter discusses how agencies had refined the existing emergency management arrangements to suit the needs of a pandemic and describes some gaps that were not addressed. This chapter explores the first month of Delta (mid-June to mid-July 2021). It explores the areas where agencies were prepared and responses in place for the outbreak. It also discusses the impact of the gaps that were not addressed in the period prior to Delta and other issues that emerged.

NSW Health provided advice on the removal of restrictions based on up-to-date advice

The NSW Government discussed the gradual process for removing restrictions using the Doherty Institute modelling provided to National Cabinet on 10 August 2021. NSW Health highlighted the importance of maintaining a level of public health and safety measure bundles to further suppress case numbers. This was based on additional modelling from the Doherty Institute.

The Department of Regional NSW led discussion and planning around reopening with a range of proposal through August and September 2021. The Department of Premier and Cabinet and NSW Health jointly developed a paper to provide options on the restrictions when the State reached a level of 70% double dose vaccinations.

The roadmap to reopening was originally published on 9 September 2021. However, by 11 October 2021, the restrictions were relaxed when the 70% double dose threshold was reached to allow:

• up to ten fully vaccinated visitors to a home (increased from five)
• up to 30 fully vaccinated people attending outdoor gatherings (increased from 20)
• weddings and funerals limits increased to 100 people (from 50)
• the reopening of indoor pools for training, exercise and learning purposes only.

On the same day, the NSW Government announced further relaxation of restrictions once the 80% double dose threshold was reached. These restrictions were further relaxed on 8 November 2021. This included the removal of capacity restrictions to the number of visitors to a private residence, indoor pools to reopen for all purposes and density limits of one person for every two square metres, dancing allowed in nightclubs and 100% capacity in major stadia.

The NSW Government allowed workers in regional areas who received one vaccination dose to return to their workplace from 11 October 2021.

The Premier extended the date of easing of restrictions for unvaccinated people aged over 16 from 1 December to 15 December 2021.

Many agencies have undertaken reviews of their response to the Delta outbreak but a whole-of-government review has yet to be conducted

Various agencies and entities associated with the response to the Delta outbreak conducted after-action review processes. These processes assessed the achievements delivered, lessons learned and opportunities for improvement. However, a whole-of-government level review has not been conducted. This limits the New South Wales public service's ability to improve how it coordinates responses in future emergencies.

The agencies/entities that conducted reviews included:

• South West Metropolitan region, Western NSW region, Fairfield Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC), Dubbo Local Emergency Operations Controller (LEOCON), which were collated centrally by the State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC)
• Aboriginal Affairs NSW assessed representation and relevance of the emergency management arrangements for Aboriginal communities following the 2019 bushfires
• Resilience NSW developed case studies to capture improved practice with regard to food security and supply chains
• a community support and empowerment-focused after-action review undertaken by the Pillar 5 workstream of the Microstrategy.

Key lessons collated from the after-action reviews include:

• the impact of variation in capability across agencies on the management of key aspects of the response including welfare support and logistics
• issues with boundary differences between NSW Police Force regions, local government areas (LGA and local health districts (LHD) caused issues in delivering and coordinating services in an emergency situation 
• the need to improve relationships between state and local Government outside of acute emergency responses to improve service delivery 
• issues arising from impediments to information sharing between agencies and jurisdictions, such as:
  • timeliness and accuracy of data used to direct compliance activities
  • the impact of insufficient advance notice on changes to Public Health Orders
  • timely access to data across public sector agencies and other jurisdictions to inform decision-making, analysis and communications
  • gaps in data around ethnicity, geolocation of recent positive cases and infection/vaccination rates in Aboriginal communities.
• the lack of Aboriginal community representation on many LEMCs
• compared with the response to COVID-19 in 2020, improved coordination of communications with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) populations with a reduction in overlapping messages and over-communication
• improved attendance from agency representatives in LEMCs, and regional emergency operations centres (REOC) to improve interagency communications, planning, capability development and community engagement issues
• deficiencies in succession planning and fatigue management practices
• the potential for REOC Welfare/Well-being subgroups to be included as part of the wider efforts to community needs during emergencies.

NSW Health commenced a whole of system review of its COVID-19 response in May 2022. At the time of writing, the completion due date for the debrief is 7 November 2022. This debrief is expected to explore:

• governance
• engagement 
• innovation and technology 
• community impact 
• workforce impact
• system impact and performance.

NSW Health is also undertaking a parallel Intra-Action Review that is focused on the public health aspects of the response with finalisation estimated for the end of November 2022. At the time of completing this performance audit report, NSW Health had not finalised these reviews and, as a result, we cannot validate their findings against our own observations.

Recent inquiries are likely to impact the governance of emergency management in New South Wales

In March 2022, the NSW Government established an independent inquiry to examine and report on the causes of, preparedness for, response to and recovery from the 2022 floods. The Flood Inquiry report made 28 recommendations, which the NSW Government supported in full or in principle. Some of the recommendations relate directly to the governance and leadership of emergency management arrangements in New South Wales. 

The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) will likely be involved in, and impacted by, the recommendations arising from the Flood Inquiry with potential changes to its membership and reshaping of functional areas and agencies. At the same time, the SEMC may have a role in overseeing the changes that emerge from the SEOC consolidated after-action reviews. This can also extend to ensuring local and regional bodies have incorporated the required actions. There is a risk that the recommendations from the pandemic-based after-action reviews may not be considered due to the priority of action resulting from the Flood Inquiry.

Furthermore, there is potential for the SEMC to work with NSW Health during its system-wide review. Such an approach is likely to improve preparedness for future events.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Chronology 2020–2021

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

Copyright notice

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary reference - Report number #371 - released 20 December 2022