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Actions for Ensuring contract management capability in government - HealthShare NSW

Ensuring contract management capability in government - HealthShare NSW

Health
Management and administration
Procurement
Project management

This report examined whether HealthShare NSW, a part of NSW Health, has the required contract management capability to effectively manage goods and services contracts valued over $250,000. 

The report found that HealthShare has a procurement framework that should support effective contract management, but it is not applying it consistently. In particular, the audit found that HealthShare was not applying key contract management elements to over 80 per cent of the high-value contracts it manages. The audit also found that HealthShare’s contract management practices were limited by inadequate performance monitoring.

'Effective contract management is essential to ensure the contracts HealthShare enters into are delivering as expected and ensuring value for money,' said the Auditor-General. 'Without this, the value for money or savings HealthShare achieves when it negotiates these contracts is at risk of being eroded over the life of the contract.'

The report recommends that NSW Health develop a performance improvement plan to ensure HealthShare is fully compliant with procurement policies and that NSW Health meets its obligations under the Government's Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement.

HealthShare is a NSW Health entity responsible for providing shared services, including procurement, to support the delivery of patient care within the NSW health system. In 2018, HealthShare procured high value goods and services contracts with an annual estimated total spend of around $1.8 billion, with most of the contracts of long duration.

NSW Government agencies are increasingly delivering services and projects through contracts with third parties. These contracts can be complex and governments face challenges in negotiating and implementing them effectively. A robust contract management framework helps ensure all parties meet their obligations, contractual relationships are well managed, agencies achieve value for money, and deliverables meet the required standards and agreed timeframes.

Contract management capability is a broad term, which can include aspects of individual staff capability (such as staff knowledge, skills and experience) as well as organisational capability (such as policies, frameworks and processes).

The NSW Procurement Board is responsible for overseeing the Government's procurement system, setting policy and ensuring compliance. It has accredited the Health Administration Corporation (HAC) to procure goods and services with no upper financial limit. Under the terms of this accreditation, the Secretary, NSW Health (as head of HAC) has delegated the procurement of high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts within NSW Health to only the Ministry of Health and HealthShare NSW (HealthShare).

HealthShare NSW (HealthShare) is a NSW Health entity responsible for providing shared services, including procurement, to support the delivery of patient care within the NSW health system. In 2018, HealthShare procured high-value goods and services contracts with an annual estimated total spend of around $1.8 billion, with most of the contracts of long duration.

HealthShare’s Contract Management Guide states that, without rigorous contract management, 75 per cent of projected sourcing savings can disappear within 18 months of the contract starting.

This audit examined whether HealthShare has the required capability to effectively manage high-value goods and services contracts. Contracts we examined included critical items such as food services in hospitals, patient transport services, intravenous equipment and kidney dialysis services, where risks include patient safety as well as value for money. We did not examine infrastructure, construction or information communication and technology contracts. We also did not examine HealthShare’s sourcing processes, including identifying business needs, tendering and contract award.

We assessed HealthShare against the following criteria:

  1. HealthShare's systems, policies and procedures support effective contract management and are consistent with relevant frameworks, policies and guidelines.
  2. HealthShare has capable personnel to effectively conduct the monitoring activities throughout the life of the contract.

We included the NSW Public Service Commission and NSW Treasury, through NSW Procurement, as auditees because they administer policies which directly affect contract management capability. These include:

  • NSW Procurement Board Directions and policies
  • NSW Government Procurement Policy Framework
  • Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement
  • the NSW Public Sector Capability Framework.

NSW Procurement was transferred to NSW Treasury from the former Department of Finance, Services and Innovation on 1 July 2019 as part of changes to government administrative arrangements.

Conclusion
HealthShare is not applying the capability needed to effectively manage high-value (over $250,000) goods and services contracts. HealthShare's procurement framework includes elements that should support effective contract management, and it has a systematic approach to managing staff contract management capability. That said, HealthShare is not implementing key contract management elements of its own framework. As such, the value for money or savings it achieves when it negotiates contracts is at risk of being eroded over the life of these contracts.
Effective contract management is essential for HealthShare to ensure contracts it enters into are delivering the goods and services expected and achieving value for money, safety and quality. The Ministry of Health and HealthShare have invested in developing and implementing systems and tools to support effective contract management. In line with its obligations under the Agency Accreditation Program for Goods and Services Procurement (accreditation program), the Ministry of Health mandates the use of contract management plans for high-value contracts. The Ministry of Health also requires that all health entities use the PROcure contract management system for ongoing management of contracts with a value over $150,000. HealthShare is not complying with these directions for over 80 per cent of the contracts it manages.
In the absence of HealthShare following its framework, and the Ministry of Health’s directions, we looked for other evidence that HealthShare was effectively managing high-value contracts. We found that HealthShare’s contract management practices were limited by inadequate performance monitoring.
When Local Health Districts (LHDs) need to procure high-value goods and services, the Ministry of Health’s procurement policy requires that they use HealthShare to source and manage the procurement. This is to manage risk and provide oversight of procurement and contracts across the NSW health system. Despite this policy, HealthShare was only managing the sourcing stage of the procurement and transferring responsibility for contract management to the relevant LHD.

Appendix one – Response from agencies

Appendix two – Contract performance management summary

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

© Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #328 - released 31 October 2019

Published

Actions for State Finances 2019

State Finances 2019

Education
Finance
Community Services
Health
Justice
Industry
Planning
Premier and Cabinet
Transport
Treasury
Whole of Government
Financial reporting

The Auditor-General, Margaret Crawford, has released her report on the State Finances for the year ended 30 June 2019.

‘I am pleased to once again report that I issued an unmodified audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements,’ the Auditor-General said.

The report acknowledges NSW Treasury and agency efforts to reduce the number and value of errors compared with the previous year. ‘Strong financial management and transparent reporting are key elements of our system of government. Treasury and agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions at the time of their execution. This will ensure agencies assess the accounting implications earlier and support accurate financial statements being presented for audit on a timely basis,’ said the Auditor-General.

The report summarises the financial audit result of the Total State Sector Accounts. The Total State Sector comprises 304 entities controlled by the NSW Government with total assets of $468 billion and total liabilities of $218 billion.

The General Government sector comprises 212 entities that provide goods and services that are funded centrally by the State. General Government expenditure grew by 5.5 per cent in 2018-19, which was below the long-term revenue growth of 5.6 per cent target established by the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012.

Download PDF of State Finances 2019 report

Pursuant to the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983, I present my Report on State Finances 2019.

Strong financial management and transparent reporting are key elements of our system of government.

I am pleased to once again report that I issued an unmodified audit opinion on the State’s consolidated financial statements. 

The number of errors in agencies’ 2018–19 financial statements fell to six compared to the 23 recorded in 2017–18. This reflects Treasury’s focus on early close and the resolution of complex accounting matters before submission. Agency finance teams need to be consulted on major business decisions and commercial transactions to assess their accounting impacts at the time of their execution, rather than at the end of a financial year. This would improve the quality of financial reporting and avoid the need for extensions for agencies to submit their financial statements for audit.

To further increase transparency, a Key Audit Matters section was included in my Independent Auditor Report on the Total State Sector Accounts this year. This explains those matters considered most significant to the conduct of the audit and requiring significant management judgement.

Looking forward, certain factors have the potential to impact the accuracy and completeness of the Total State Sector Accounts in coming years. First, three new accounting standards are effective from 1 July 2019 and a fourth from 1 July 2020. Transitioning to new standards requires significant planning and resources to ensure the impacts are appropriately assessed and accounted for. Second, the Government Sector Finance Act 2018 will be implemented in stages over three years to 2020–21. This Act is intended to focus on performance, transparency, accountability, and efficiency of financial management in the government sector. I encourage agencies to build their awareness of this important reform and ensure their alignment with the principles of the Act. 

I want to thank Treasury staff for the way they engaged with my staff in the conduct of the audit. Our partnership is critical to ensuring the quality of financial management and reporting.

Margaret Crawford
Auditor-General, 10 October 2019

Our audit opinion on the State’s 2018–19 financial statements was unmodified. There were fewer reported errors but earlier resolution of accounting matters is still required.

Our audit opinion on the State’s 2018–19 financial statements was unmodified.

This year, six errors exceeding $20 million were found in agencies’ 2018–19 financial statements that make up the State’s consolidated financial statements. The total value of these errors was $927 million compared to $3.8 billion in 2017–18. The errors identified in 2018–19 resulted from:

  • incorrectly applying Australian Accounting Standards and Treasury Policies
  • using inappropriate assumptions and inaccurate data
  • incorrectly assessing the fair value of non-current physical assets.

The introduction of mandatory ‘early close procedures’ in 2011–12, saw the number of errors in agencies’ financial statements fall progressively, to a low of five in 2015–16.

In 2016–17, Treasury narrowed the scope of its mandatory early close procedures to focus on non-current physical asset valuations and pro-forma financial statements. Following this, the number of significant errors increased to 23 in 2017–18, the

highest number in six years and similar to the numbers identified before mandatory early close procedures were introduced.

In 2018–19, Treasury and agencies’ refocused their efforts around early close procedures and other year-end processes resulting in this year’s lower error total of six.

Errors in agency financial statements exceeding $20m (2015–2019)

Correction of prior year’s reported values    

Correction of earthwork assets ($2.1 billion)

Some of the State’s earthworks were first valued in 2016–17. These included earth excavations and embankments for the Country Rail and Metropolitan Network created before the year 2000 and dating back to the early 1900s.

For many years, the State did not account for earthworks because it believed the value could not be reliably measured. In 2016–17, the State engaged an external valuer who identified a methodology showing the earthworks could be valued. That valuer performed a valuation using topography maps for the Country Rail Network (CRN) because information in this earthworks database was of poor quality and incomplete. The valuation resulted in the State recognising $7.5 billion of earthworks for the first time in 2016–17. This was disclosed as a prior period error.

Over the following years, the State improved the quality of the CRN earthworks database by engaging an engineering firm to perform more detailed earthworks surveys. The work involved the use of technology to survey most of the CRN lines.

In 2018–19, the State once again engaged an external valuer to assess the fair value of the CRN earthworks. The valuer determined that incorrect assumptions were used in the 2016–17 valuation. These primarily related to land elevations, which were corrected in the earthworks database and this resulted in a new fair value of $5.4 billion, $2.1 billion less than the previous valuation. The error reported in the 2017–18 value has been corrected in the 2018–2019 financial statements to reflect the revised value.

Previously reported value for earthworks reduced from $7.5 billion to $5.4 billion.

Correction of museum collection assets ($27 million)

The Australian Museum’s collection assets were restated by $27 million to $800 million in 2017–18.

After the 2017–18 financial statements were published, the Australian Museum identified additional collection assets that were not included in the original valuation. This resulted in a $27 million error relating to collection asset values. As last year’s valuation was based on an incomplete listing of collection assets, the 2017-18 value has been corrected in the 2018–19 financial statements to reflect the revised value.

Correction of lease liability ($46.2 million)

On 1 July 1995, the Department of Justice entered into a 25-year lease arrangement with an option to extend for a further 15 years.

The Department accounted for the arrangement as a finance lease by recognising a building asset and a corresponding finance lease liability for the period of 25 years. The Department depreciated the leased asset based on a useful life of 40 years.

As it was reasonably certain the Department would exercise the lease option at inception, it should have recognised a liability that reflected the entire 40 year lease period. To correct the prior year error and properly reflect the extended lease period, the Department of Justice increased the lease liability and decreased retained earnings by $46.2 million as at 1 July 2017.

Abuse Claims remain a significant contingent liability of the State

The State discloses a contingent liability in its financial statements when the possibility of settling the liability in the future is considered less than probable, but more likely than remote, or the amount of the obligation cannot be measured with sufficient reliability.

If the expected settlement subsequently becomes probable and reliably estimable, a provision is recognised.

The State has numerous contingent liabilities. Some are quantifiable while others are not. As contingent liabilities are potentially material future liabilities of the State, every effort should be made to quantify these as accurately as possible. They also need to be monitored closely to ensure that they are recognised and brought on balance sheet as they crystallise.

At 30 June 2019, NSW Self Insurance Corporation (SiCorp) could not reliably measure the claims liability arising from past incidences of abuse that occurred within NSW Government institutions which have not yet been reported. These are referred to as incurred but not reported claims (IBNR).

Since 1 July 2018, victims of child sexual abuse can opt to claim compensation through the National Redress Scheme, or to lodge a civil claim. Civil claims for incidents that occurred within NSW Government institutions may be covered by SiCorp. An estimate of an IBNR for child abuse claims within SiCorp will be impacted by the extent that victims claim compensation through redress as compared to civil claims.

Recent legislative changes have added further uncertainty to estimating the extent of IBNR claims. SiCorp requires more reliable data on the number of IBNR child abuse claims and the expected average size of the related payments. As such, the liabilities presented in the SiCorp and the State financial statements do not include an allowance for IBNR abuse claims.

As more information becomes available it may be possible for SiCorp to reasonably estimate the value of abuse claim liabilities. It is possible that such an estimate may be material to SiCorp and the State’s financial statements. 

TAFE update

In prior years we reported on information system limitations at TAFE NSW, specifically relating to its student administration system. TAFE NSW continues to implement additional processes to verify the accuracy and completeness of revenue from student fees for the 2018–19 financial year.

In 2017–18 TAFE NSW started implementing a new student management system. Significant delays have occurred in implementing this system, mainly due to the complexity of integrating the vendor solution with the requirements of TAFE. TAFE will now bring the final commissioning and operation of the system in house. Final project delivery timeframes and estimated completion costs are being reviewed. Costs incurred to date amount to $67 million. The original budget for this new system is $89.4 million.

Light Rail settlement

The CBD and South East Light Rail is a new twelve kilometre light rail network for Sydney, currently under construction. Passenger trips are set to begin on the light rail by December between Circular Quay and Randwick. The second stage from Randwick to Kingsford is planned to open in March 2020. The original budget for construction work of $1.6 billion was revised to $2.1 billion in 2014.

The State Government has been in dispute with the firm responsible for delivering and operating the CBD and South East light rail project. In May 2019, the parties reached a Settlement Arrangement resulting in the State agreeing to pay a settlement amount of $576 million, which is in addition to the revised budget. Transport has advised a final cost is still to be determined following project completion.

The Audit Office has commenced a follow up audit on the CBD South East Light Rail. This audit will consider whether recommendations of our previous audit have been implemented. We will also review the current status and budget of this project.

Sydney Metro Northwest project commissioning

The Sydney Metro North West officially opened in May 2019.

In constructing the metro, some assets were built to facilitate its operation. These included pavements, roadworks, and electricity
and water connections.

When the project was completed, the assets and the responsibility for maintaining them transferred to third parties, primarily Councils and utility providers. In 2018–19, the State expensed (derecognised) the assets, valued at $306 million, because it no longer controlled them.

Financial Reporting by Crown Land Reserve Trusts

Approximately 700 reserve trusts, managed by Trust Boards, did not prepare the financial statements at 30 June 2019 as required by the
Public Finance and Audit Act 1983.

These Crown reserves contain showgrounds, cemeteries, racecourses, local parks, and other community facilities and public areas. Some of the Crown reserves have independent streams of revenue from user charges.

In 2016–17, Treasury determined that NSW cemetery trusts and a holiday park reserve trust were controlled entities of the State. As such, the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 requires them to prepare financial statements and have these audited by the Auditor-General.

In 2017–18, three reserve trusts accepted NSW Treasury’s view, prepared financial statements and had them audited by the Auditor-General.

However, three cemetery reserve trusts continue to maintain they are not controlled by the State and therefore their financial statements are not audited by the Audit Office. These cemeteries shared their unaudited financial statements with Treasury so they could be incorporated into the State’s financial statements. At 30 June 2019, the value of their combined assets and liabilities, which are not audited by the Audit Office, was $564 million.

The State included an additional $319 million in assets that relate to Crown land values of approximately 700 reserve trusts that did not prepare or submit financial statements.

We performed additional audit procedures to obtain some assurance over the value of these crown lands. The nature and extent of the limitations to the scope of these procedures was not significant enough to impact our audit opinion. Treasury should ensure these trusts comply with the requirements of the Public Finance and Audit Act.

Derecognition of investment in City West Housing

In 2017–18, the State had an equity investment of $680 million in a community housing provider, City West Housing Pty Limited (CWH).

During 2018–19, CWH amended its constitution to ensure alignment with its charitable status. The unintended impact of this change was that on windup the net assets would not be distributed to the State. The accounting implications to the State’s investment was not considered by Treasury at the time of approving the amended constitution. Consequently, the State wrote off its $680 million investment in CWH in 2018–19.

It is important that accounting impacts of such changes are discussed and agreed upon early. At the time of approving the decision to change the constitution, all accounting implications should be made available and understood. Such information is relevant when approving decisions. The theme of what is relevant
information will be explored further in our Performance Audit of ‘Advice on Major Decisions’.

Machinery of government (MoG) changes refers to how the government reorganises agency structures and functions and realigns ministerial responsibilities.

Cluster changes

On 2 April 2019, the Government reorganised public sector agencies into eight clusters (ten in 2017–18) with effect from 1 July 2019.

Prior to 30 June 2019, two subsequent administrative arrangement orders were made to amend and finalise the MoG changes.

The key MoG changes included:

  • abolishing the following five departments:
    • Finance, Services and Innovation
    • Industry
    • Planning and Environment
    • Family and Communities
    • Justice
  • transferring their functions into three new departments:
    • Department of Customer Service
    • Department of Planning, Industry and Environment
    • Department of Communities and Justice
The State’s consolidated financial statements at 30 June 2019 were not impacted by the changes, as they were effective from 1 July 2019.

The chart below shows the cluster arrangements before and after the MoG changes to the General Government Sector. It compares total budgeted expenses presented in the 2018–19 and 2019–20 Budget Papers (1).

Each cluster’s share of the General Government Sector’s (GGS) total expenditure remains relatively unchanged after the MoG changes. Further details on other functions transferred between clusters are detailed in the 2019–20 Budget Papers.

Of the clusters, Education is affected most by the MoG changes from the perspective of increased expenditure in the 2019–20 budget. This is because the TAFE Commission transferred into this cluster from the former Department of Industry on 1 July 2019, resulting in a corresponding decrease in the new Planning, Industry and Environment cluster’s expenditure.

(1) The 2018–19 Budget Paper 3 (unaudited) and 2019–20 Budget Paper 3 (unaudited).

Cluster expenses

2018-19
Before MoG Changes

2019-20
After MoG Changes

Industry 6% Planning, Industry and Environment 7%
Planning and Environment 4%
Education 18% Education 21%
Premier and Cabinet 1% Premier and Cabinet 2%
Finance, Service and Innovation 4% Customer Service 3%
Family and Community Services 8% Stronger Communities 18%
Justice 10%
Transport 9% Transport 9%
Treasury 14% Treasury 14%
Health 26% Health 26%

 

$1.2 billion surplus, $0.2 billion below 2018–19 budget of $1.4 billion

The Total State Sector comprises 304 entities controlled by the NSW Government.

The General Government Sector, which comprises 212 entities, generally provides goods and services funded centrally by the State.
The non-General Government Sector, which comprises 92 Government businesses, generally provides goods and services, such as water, electricity and financial services that consumers pay for directly.

A principal measure of a Government’s overall performance is its Net Operating Balance (Budget Result). This is the difference
between the cost of General Government service delivery and the revenue earned to fund these sectors.

What changed from 2018 to 2019?

The State maintained its AAA credit rating.

The object of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 is to maintain the State’s AAA credit rating.

The Government manages NSW’s finances in accordance with the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 (the Act).

The Act establishes the framework for fiscal responsibility and the strategy to protect the State’s AAA credit rating and service delivery to the people of New South Wales.

The legislation sets out targets and principles for financial management to achieve this.

New South Wales has credit ratings of AAA/Stable from Standard & Poor’s and Aaa/Stable from Moody’s Investors Service.

The fiscal targets for achieving this objective are:

General Government annual expenditure growth is lower than long term average revenue growth.

General Government expenditure grew by 5.5 per cent in 2018–19 (5.1 per cent in 2017–18 based on restated balances). This was slightly below the long-term revenue growth rate of 5.6 per cent.

Eliminating unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.

The Act sets a target to eliminate unfunded superannuation liabilities by 2030.

The State’s funding plan is to contribute amounts escalated by five per cent each year so the schemes will be fully funded by 2030. In 2018–19, the State made employer contributions of $1.73 billion ($1.67 billion in 2017–18), an increase of $64 million or 3.8 per cent ($52 million or 3.2 per cent in 2017–18). This was under the five per cent target by $19.5 million.

For fiscal responsibility purposes, the State uses AASB 1056: Superannuation Entities. This accounting standard discounts superannuation liabilities using the expected return from the assets backing the liability.

Using this method, the State’s unfunded superannuation liability was $13.2 billion at 30 June 2019 ($14.0 billion).

Superannuation funding position since inception of the Act - AASB 1056 Valuation

State revenues fell $604 million to $86.1 billion in 2018–19    

In the prior years, revenue growth was underpinned by cyclical increases in land tax, payroll tax and one-off large stamp duty receipts from the lease of the State’s electricity network assets. In 2018–19, the State’s revenue fell by $604 million to $86.1 billion ($86.7 million in 2017–18).

Taxation revenue remained relatively stable

Taxation revenue only grew slightly, mainly due to:

  • a $517 million increase in payroll tax from NSW wages growth
  • a $469 million increase in land tax from growth in land values
  • offset by a $1.2 billion decrease in stamp duty due to lower than expected growth in the property market. This decrease would have been higher had the State not received $555 million in stamp duty from the new 51 per cent owner of WestConnex.

The gap between payroll tax and stamp duty reduced significantly in 2018–19. Stamp duty still remains the largest source of revenue for the State at $9.2 billion, only $42 million above payroll tax.

Australian Government grants and subsidies

The State received $31.8 billion in grants and subsidies from the Australian Government, $158 million less than the previous year. This was due to falls in other grants and subsidies of $98 million and GST revenues of $48 million.

GST revenues fell due to weaker growth in national consumption expenditure and a smaller GST pool. The GST pool represents funds made available by the Commonwealth for transfer to the States as untied financial assistance. The allocation of GST is determined by the Commonwealth, not the State.

A $392 million decrease in National Partnership Payments was offset by a $380 million increase in Specific Purpose Payments.
 
In 2018–19, sales of goods and services fell $395 million mainly due to the sale of WestConnex.

Other dividends and distributions fell by $122 million due to lower distributions from associates. This reflected weaker performance in the electricity sector (Ausgrid and Endeavour) resulting in lower distributions paid to the State following changes in the Electricity Network Service Providers regulatory environment and the sale of Snowy Hydro Pty Ltd in 2017–18.

Fines, regulatory fees and other revenues increased by $242 million largely from mineral royalties. The increase was attributed to strong demand across Asian markets for coal exports, which the State expects will continue to experience steady growth.

Expenses increased $4 billion to $87.9 billion in 2018–19    

Overall, the State’s expenses increased 4.8 per cent in 2018–19 compared to 2017–18. Most of the increase was due to higher employee expenses, operating costs and grants and subsidies.

Employee expenses, including superannuation, increased by 3.9 per cent to $40.3 billion.

Salaries and wages increased to $40.3 billion in 2018–19 from $38.8 billion 2017–18. This was mainly due to salary and wage increases. The Government wages policy aims to limit growth in employee remuneration and other employee related costs to no more than 2.5 per cent per annum.

Operating expenses increased 6.1 per cent from 2017–18.

Within operating expenses, payments for supplies, services and other expenses increased due to:

  • increased operating costs associated with the commencement of the new Sydney Metro
  • higher operating activity levels experienced in the Health sector resulting in higher visiting medical officer costs, surgical supplies and information management costs
  • higher school operating expenses in Education, mainly relating to teaching cloud tools and purchase of computer equipment.
Health costs remain the highest expense of the State.

The following clusters have the highest expenses as a percentage of total government expenses:

  • Health - 25.8 per cent (24.6 per cent in 2017–18)
  • Education - 20 per cent (18.5 per cent)
  • Transport - 14.7 per cent (17.6 per cent).

Other, mainly relates to Economic Affairs, Housing and Community, Recreation and Culture functions of the State.

Transport expenses have decreased in 2018–19 mainly due to the sale of WestConnex. This is partially offset by costs associated with the new Sydney Metro, which commenced operations from 1 July 2018. The graph highlights annual expenditure by function in 2018–19 compared to 2017–18.

Grants and subsidies increased by $782 million to $11.7 billion.

This was mainly due to:

  • the $239 million Emergency Drought Relief Package
  • a $226 million increase in funding to the Human Services sector to deliver key election commitments, including 5,000 more nurses and midwives
  • $123 million in funding for sporting facilities and creating NSW Centre's of Excellence.

Assets grew by $26.7 billion to $468 billion in 2018–19    

Overall, the States total assets increased by $26.7 billion to $468 billion in 2018–19. This is a six per cent increase compared to 2017–18. Most of this was due to increases in carrying value of the State’s physical assets and investments.

Valuing the State's physical assets

The State’s physical assets were valued at $352 billion at 30 June 2019.

The State’s physical assets include land and buildings ($166 billion) and infrastructure ($168 billion). The value of the State’s physical assets at 30 June 2018 was restated from $339 billion to $337 billion. The restatement was required to correct errors in the fair value of earthworks previously reported at $7.5 billion and subsequently corrected to $5.4 billion.

Our audits assess the reasonableness and appropriateness of assumptions used to value physical assets. This includes
obtaining an understanding of the valuation methodologies used and judgements made. We also review the completeness of asset registers and the mathematical accuracy of valuation models.

Net movements between years include additions, disposals, depreciation and valuations. The State’s physical assets increased by $15.2 billion compared with 2017–18.

Movement in the State's physical assets

Liabilities increased $28.6 billion to $217.5 billion in 2018–19    

The State relies on actuarial assessments to value its liabilities

Nearly half of the State’s liabilities relate to its employees. They include unfunded superannuation and employee benefits, such as long service and recreation leave.

Valuing these obligations involves complex estimation techniques and significant judgements. Small changes in assumptions can materially impact balances in the financial statements, such as a lower discount rate.

Superannuation obligations rose by $14.3 billion.

The State’s $70.7 billion unfunded superannuation liability represents obligations to past and present employees less the value of assets set aside to meet those obligations. The unfunded superannuation liability rose by $14.3 billion from $56.4 billion at 30 June 2018 to $70.7 billion at 30 June 2019. This was mainly due to a lower discount rate.

Borrowings totalled $79.9 billion at 30 June 2019.

The State’s borrowings of $79.9 billion at 30 June 2019 were $8.6 billion higher than they were at 30 June 2018.

TCorp issues bonds to raise funds for NSW Government agencies. These are actively traded in financial markets, which provides price transparency and liquidity to public sector borrowers and institutional investors. All TCorp bonds are guaranteed by the NSW Government.

The Government manages its debt liabilities through its balance sheet management strategy. The strategy extends to TCorp, which applies an active risk management strategy to the Government’s debt portfolio.

General Government Sector debt has been restructured by replacing shorter-term debt with longer-term debt. This lengthens the portfolio to match liabilities with the funding requirements for infrastructure assets.

Implementing the requirements of new accounting standards will be challenging

Risks to the quality and timeliness of financial reporting

The State and its agencies will be implementing the requirements of new accounting standards shortly. These are likely to have a major impact on the financial positions and operating results of agencies across the sector.

Accounting standards require agencies to assess and disclose where possible, the impact of the new standards in their 2018–19 financial statements.

Our review found agencies needed to do more work on their impact assessments to minimise the risk of errors in the financial statement disclosures. Some agencies disclosed that the new standards would not have a material impact on their reported financial position and performance, but had little evidence to support this.

Each agency is unique and implementing the new standards is not straight forward as many new principles apply. Management judgement is needed to interpret how the principles apply to each agency. As a result, agencies face the following risks and challenges:

  • having the required technical skills in house
  • having accurate data to assess the impacts
  • correctly and consistently interpreting the new requirements
  • adequately planning and preparing for their application
  • implementing new systems to capture the information needed to meet the new reporting obligations.

To help agencies implement the new standards consistently across the sector, Treasury:

  • issued guidance to agencies
  • prepared position papers on proposed accounting treatments
  • provided briefing sessions to agencies
  • mandated which option in the new standards agencies had to adopt on transition.

Key dates

Section 45 of the Public Finance and Audit Act 1983 requires the Auditor-General to perform audits of the financial statements of entities prescribed for the purposes of that section.
The following were prescribed entities as at 30 June 2019:

Entity/Fund Latest financial statements audited Type of audit opinion issued
Agricultural Scientific Collections Trust 30 June 2019 Unmodified
AustLII Foundation Limited 31 December 2018 Unmodified
Belgenny Farm Agricultural Heritage Centre Trust 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The Brett Whiteley Foundation 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Buroba Pty Ltd 30 June 2018* Unmodified
C. B. Alexander Foundation 30 June 2018 Unmodified
City West Housing Pty Ltd 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The Commissioner for Uniform Legal Services Regulation 30 June 2019 N/A (a)
Cowra Japanese Garden Maintenance Foundation Limited 31 March 2019 Unmodified
Cowra Japanese Garden Trust 31 March 2019 Unmodified
Crown Employees (NSW Fire Brigades Firefighting Staff Death and Disability) Superannuation Fund 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Eif Pty Limited 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Energy Investment Fund 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Central Coast Council Water Supply Authority (formerly Gosford City and Wyong City Council Water Supply Authorities) 30 June 2018 Unmodified
Home Building Compensation Fund 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The funds for the time being under the management of the New South Wales Treasury Corporation, as trustee 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The Illawarra Health and Medical Research Institute Limited 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The Legal Services Council 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Macquarie University Professorial Superannuation Scheme 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Planning Ministerial Corporation 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Corporation Sole 'Minister administering the Heritage Act 1977' (a corporation) 30 June 2019 Unmodified
National Art School 31 December 2018 Unmodified
NSW Fire Brigades Superannuation Pty Limited 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Parliamentary Contributory Superannuation Fund 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Sydney Education Broadcasting Limited 31 December 2018 Unmodified
The superannuation fund amalgamated under the Superannuation Administration Act 1991 and continued to be amalgamated under the Superannuation Administration 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Act 1996 (known as the SAS Trustee Corporation Pooled Fund) 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The trustees for the time being of each superannuation scheme established by a trust deed as referred to in section 127 of the Superannuation Administration Act 1996 30 June 2019 Unmodified
The Art Gallery of New South Wales Foundation 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Trustee of the Home Purchase Assistance Fund 30 June 2019 Unmodified
Trustees of the Farrer Memorial Research Scholarship Fund 31 December 2018 Unmodified
United States Studies Centre 31 December 2018 Unmodified
Universities Admissions Centre (NSW and ACT) Pty Limited 30 June 2018 Unmodified
University of Sydney Professorial Superannuation System 31 December 2018 Unmodified
Valley Commerce Pty Ltd 30 June 2018* Unmodified
     
(a) Included as part of the Legal Services Council.
*Entities exempt from preparing financial statements at 30 June 2019.
aa


 

Published

Actions for Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales

Mental health service planning for Aboriginal people in New South Wales

Health
Management and administration
Project management
Service delivery
Workforce and capability

A report released by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford, has found that NSW Health is not forming effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver appropriate mental health services. There is limited evidence that NSW Health is using the knowledge and expertise of Aboriginal communities to guide how mental health care is structured and delivered.

Mental illness (including substance use disorders) is the main contributor to lower life expectancy and increased mortality in the Aboriginal population of New South Wales. It contributes to a higher burden of disease and premature death at rates that are 40 per cent higher than the next highest chronic disease group, cardiovascular disease.1 

Aboriginal people have significantly higher rates of mental illness than non Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They are more likely to present at emergency departments in crisis or acute phases of mental illness than the rest of the population and are more likely to be admitted to hospital for mental health treatments.2 

In acknowledgement of the significant health disparities between Aboriginal and non Aboriginal people, NSW Health implemented the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan 2013 2023 (the Aboriginal Health Plan). The overarching message of the Aboriginal Health Plan is ‘to build respectful, trusting and effective partnerships with Aboriginal communities’ and to implement ‘integrated planning and service delivery’ with sector partners. Through the Plan, NSW Health commits to providing culturally appropriate and ‘holistic approaches to the health of Aboriginal people'.

The mental health sector is complex, involving Commonwealth, state and non government service providers. In broad terms, NSW Health has responsibility to support patients requiring higher levels of clinical support for mental illnesses, while the Commonwealth and non government organisations offer non acute care such as assessments, referrals and early intervention treatments.

The NSW Health network includes 15 Local Health Districts and the Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Network that provide care to patients during acute and severe phases of mental illness in hospitals, prisons and community service environments. This includes care to Aboriginal patients in the community at rates that are more than four times higher than the non Aboriginal population. Community services are usually provided as follow up after acute admissions or interactions with hospital services. The environments where NSW Health delivers mental health care include:

  • hospital emergency departments, for short term assessment and referral
  • inpatient hospital care for patients in acute and sub acute phases of mental illness
  • mental health outpatient services in the community, such as support with medications
  • custodial mental health services in adult prisons and juvenile justice centres.

The NSW Government is reforming its mental health funding model to incrementally shift the balance from hospital care to enhanced community care. In 2018–19, the NSW Government committed $400 million over four years into early intervention and specialist community mental health teams.

This audit assessed the effectiveness of NSW Health’s planning and coordination of mental health services and service pathways for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. We addressed the audit objective by answering three questions: 

  1. Is NSW Health using evidence to plan and inform the availability of mental health services for Aboriginal people in New South Wales?
  2. Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to create accessible mental health service pathways for Aboriginal people?
  3. Is NSW Health collaborating with partners to ensure the appropriateness and quality of mental health services for Aboriginal people?
Conclusion

NSW Health is not meeting the objectives of the NSW Aboriginal Health Plan, to form effective partnerships with Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services and Aboriginal communities to plan, design and deliver mental health services.

There is limited evidence that existing partnerships between NSW Health and Aboriginal communities meet its own commitment to use the ‘knowledge and expertise of the Aboriginal community (to) guide the health system at every level, including (for) the identification of key issues, the development of policy solutions, the structuring and delivery of services' 3 and the development of culturally appropriate models of mental health care.

NSW Health is planning and coordinating its resources to support Aboriginal people in acute phases of mental illness in hospital environments. However, it is not effectively planning for the supply and delivery of sufficient mental health services to assist Aboriginal patients to manage mental illness in community environments. Existing planning approaches, data and systems are insufficient to guide the $400 million investment into community mental health services announced in the 2018–19 Budget.

NSW Health is not consistently forming partnerships to ensure coordinated care for patients as they move between mental health services. There is no policy to guide this process and practices are not systematised or widespread.

In this report, the term ‘Aboriginal people’ is used to describe both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The Audit Office of NSW acknowledges the diversity of traditional countries and Aboriginal language groups across the state of New South Wales.


1 Australian Burden of Disease Study: Impact and causes of illness and death in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 2011 (unaudited).
2 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare data 2016–17 (unaudited).
3 NSW Health, The Aboriginal Health Plan 2013-2023.

In May 2019, the Audit Office of New South Wales invited Aboriginal mental health clinicians and policy experts from government and non-government organisations to attend a one-day workshop. Workshop attendees advised on factors that improve the quality and appropriateness of mental health care for Aboriginal people in New South Wales. They described appropriate mental health care as:

  • culturally safe, allowing Aboriginal people to draw strength in their identity, culture and community
  • person centred and focussed on individual needs
  • delivered by culturally competent staff with no bias
  • holistic, trauma-informed and focussed on early intervention where possible
  • delivered in places that are appropriate including outreach to homes and communities
  • welcoming of the involvement of local Aboriginal community and connected to local knowledge and expertise including totems and kinship structures. 

The definition of 'appropriate' mental health care for Aboriginal people throughout this report is based on this advice.

Aboriginal people access emergency services at much higher rates than non-Aboriginal people

The choices that people make in relation to health service options provide some insight into the suitability and appropriateness of the service to their needs.

Aboriginal people have different mental health service use patterns than non-Aboriginal people. Aboriginal people are much more likely to be in a crisis situation before receiving mental health services, usually in an emergency department of a hospital.

Aboriginal people make up three per cent of the total New South Wales population, but they constitute 11 per cent of emergency department presentations for mental health treatments. In regional areas, Aboriginal people make up 20.5 per cent of presentations at emergency departments for mental health reasons. 

A number of factors help to explain Aboriginal mental health service usage patterns. According to government and non-government mental health organisations:

  • emergency department services are better known to Aboriginal people than other mental health services
  • community-based models of care are not appropriate for Aboriginal people
  • Aboriginal people are reluctant to access community-based mental health services to prevent crisis situations
  • community mental health services are not available for Aboriginal people after hours and during the weekend, so emergency services are the only option.

The statewide proportions of Aboriginal people presenting at emergency departments for mental health treatments has been increasing over time (Exhibit 6).

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – The NSW Aboriginal Health Plan

Appendix three – About the audit

Appendix four – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #326 - released 29 August 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Contracting non-government organisations

Contracting non-government organisations

Community Services
Compliance
Fraud
Management and administration
Procurement
Regulation
Service delivery

This report found the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS) needs to do more to demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services in the Permanency Support Program (a component of out-of-home-care services) and Specialist Homelessness Services. It notes that FACS is moving to an outcomes-based commissioning model and recommends this be escalated consistent with government policy.

Government agencies, such as the Department of Family and Community Services (FACS), are increasingly contracting non-government organisations (NGOs) to deliver human services in New South Wales. In doing so, agencies are responsible for ensuring these services are achieving expected outcomes. Since the introduction of the Commissioning and Contestability Policy in 2016, all NSW Government agencies are expected to include plans for customer and community outcomes and look for ways to use contestability to raise standards.

Two of the areas receiving the greatest funding from FACS are the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services. In the financial year 2017–18, nearly 500 organisations received $784 million for out-of-home care programs, including the Permanency Support Program. Across New South Wales, specialist homelessness providers assist more than 54,000 people each year and in the financial year 2017–18, 145 organisations received $243 million for providing short term accommodation and homelessness support, including Specialist Homelessness Services.

In the financial year 2017–18, FACS entered into 230 contracts for out-of-home care, of which 49 were for the Permanency Support Program, representing $322 million. FACS also entered into 157 contracts for the provision of Specialist Homelessness Services which totalled $170 million. We reviewed the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services for this audit.

This audit assessed how effectively and efficiently FACS contracts NGOs to deliver community services. The audit could not assess how NGOs used the funds they received from FACS as the Audit Office does not have a mandate that could provide direct assurance that NGOs are using government funds effectively.

Conclusion
FACS cannot demonstrate it is effectively and efficiently contracting NGOs to deliver community services because it does not always use open tenders to test the market when contracting NGOs, and does not collect adequate performance data to ensure safe and quality services are being provided. While there are some valid reasons for using restricted tenders, it means that new service providers are excluded from consideration - limiting contestability. In the service delivery areas we assessed, FACS does not measure client outcomes as it has not yet moved to outcomes-based contracts. 
FACS' procurement approach sometimes restricts the selection of NGOs for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has a procurement policy and plan which it follows when contracting NGOs for the provision of human services. This includes the option to use restricted tenders, which FACS sometimes uses rather than opening the process to the market. The use of restricted tenders is consistent with its procurement plan where there is a limited number of possible providers and the services are highly specialised. However, this approach perpetuates existing arrangements and makes it very difficult for new service providers to enter the market. The recontracting of existing providers means FACS may miss the opportunity to benchmark existing providers against the whole market. 
FACS does not effectively use client data to monitor the performance of NGOs funded under the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS' contract management staff monitor individual NGO performance including safety, quality of services and compliance with contract requirements. Although FACS does provide training materials on its intranet, FACS does not provide these staff with sufficient training, support or guidance to monitor NGO performance efficiently or effectively. FACS also requires NGOs to self-report their financial performance and contract compliance annually. FACS verifies the accuracy of the financial data but conducts limited validation of client data reported by NGOs to verify its accuracy. Instead, FACS relies on contract management staff to identify errors or inaccurate reporting by NGOs.
FACS' ongoing monitoring of the performance of providers under the Permanency Support Program is particularly limited due to problems with timely data collection at the program level. This reduces FACS' ability to monitor and analyse NGO performance at the program level as it does not have access to ongoing performance data for monitoring service quality.
In the Specialist Homelessness Services program, FACS and NGOs both provide the data required for the National Minimum Data Set on homelessness and provide it to the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, as they are required to do. However, this data is not used for NGO performance monitoring or management.
FACS does not yet track outcomes for clients of NGOs
FACS began to develop an approach to outcomes-based contracting in 2015. Despite this, none of the contracts we reviewed are using outcomes as a measure of success. Currently, NGOs are required to demonstrate their performance is consistent with the measures stipulated in their contracts as part of an annual check of their contract compliance and financial accounts. NGOs report against activity-based measures (Key Performance Indicators) and not outcomes.
FACS advises that the transition to outcomes-based contracting will be made with the new rounds of funding which will take place in 2020–2021 for Specialist Homelessness Services and 2023 for the Permanency Support Program. Once these contracts are in place, FACS can transition NGOs to outcomes based reporting.
Incomplete data limits FACS' effectiveness in continuous improvement for the Permanency Support Program and Specialist Homelessness Services
FACS has policies and procedures in place to learn from past experiences and use this to inform future contracting decisions. However, FACS has limited client data related to the Permanency Support Program which restricts the amount of continuous improvement it can undertake. In the Specialist Homelessness Support Program data is collected to inform routine contract management discussions with service providers but FACS is not using this data for continuous improvement. 

Appendix one – Response from agency

Appendix two – About the audit

Appendix three – Performance auditing

 

Parliamentary Reference: Report number #323 - released 26 June 2019

Copyright reserved by the Audit Office of New South Wales. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without prior consent of the Audit Office of New South Wales. The Audit Office does not accept responsibility for loss or damage suffered by any person acting on or refraining from action as a result of any of this material.

Published

Actions for Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors

Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors

Transport
Education
Health
Compliance
Internal controls and governance
Procurement
Project management
Workforce and capability

Three key agencies are not fully complying with the NSW Procurement Board’s Direction for engaging probity practitioners, according to a report released today by the Acting Auditor-General for New South Wales, Ian Goodwin. They also do not have effective processes to achieve compliance or assure that probity engagements achieved value for money.

Probity is defined as the quality of having strong moral principles, honesty and decency. Probity is important for NSW Government agencies as it helps ensure decisions are made with integrity, fairness and accountability, while attaining value for money.

Probity advisers provide guidance on issues concerning integrity, fairness and accountability that may arise throughout asset procurement and disposal processes. Probity auditors verify that agencies' processes are consistent with government laws and legislation, guidelines and best practice principles. 

According to the NSW State Infrastructure Strategy 2018-2038, New South Wales has more infrastructure projects underway than any state or territory in Australia. The scale of the spend on procuring and constructing new public transport networks, roads, schools and hospitals, the complexity of these projects and public scrutiny of aspects of their delivery has increased the focus on probity in the public sector. 

A Procurement Board Direction, 'PBD-2013-05 Engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors' (the Direction), sets out the requirements for NSW Government agencies' use and engagement of probity practitioners. It confirms agencies should routinely take into account probity considerations in their procurement. The Direction also specifies that NSW Government agencies can use probity advisers and probity auditors (probity practitioners) when making decisions on procuring and disposing of assets, but that agencies:

  • should use external probity practitioners as the exception rather than the rule
  • should not use external probity practitioners as an 'insurance policy'
  • must be accountable for decisions made
  • cannot substitute the use of probity practitioners for good management practices
  • not engage the same probity practitioner on an ongoing basis, and ensure the relationship remains robustly independent. 

The scale of probity spend may be small in the context of the NSW Government's spend on projects. However, government agencies remain responsible for probity considerations whether they engage external probity practitioners or not.

The audit assessed whether Transport for NSW, the Department of Education and the Ministry of Health:

  • complied with the requirements of ‘PBD-2013-05 Engagement of Probity Advisers and Probity Auditors’
  • effectively ensured they achieved value for money when they used probity practitioners.

These entities are referred to as 'participating agencies' in this report.

We also surveyed 40 NSW Government agencies with the largest total expenditures (top 40 agencies) to get a cross sector view of their use of probity practitioners. These agencies are listed in Appendix two.

Conclusion

We found instances where each of the three participating agencies had not fully complied with the requirements of the NSW Procurement Board Direction ‘PBD-2013-05 Engagement of Probity Advisers and Probity Auditors’ when they engaged probity practitioners. We also found they did not have effective processes to achieve compliance or assure the engagements achieved value for money.

In the sample of engagements we selected, we found instances where the participating agencies did not always:

  • document detailed terms of reference
  • ensure the practitioner was sufficiently independent
  • manage probity practitioners' independence and conflict of interest issues transparently
  • provide practitioners with full access to records, people and meetings
  • establish independent reporting lines   reporting was limited to project managers
  • evaluate whether value for money was achieved.

We also found:

  • agencies tend to rely on only a limited number of probity service providers, sometimes using them on a continuous basis, which may threaten the actual or perceived independence of probity practitioners
  • the NSW Procurement Board does not effectively monitor agencies' compliance with the Direction's requirements. Our enquiries revealed that the Board has not asked any agency to report on its use of probity practitioners since the Direction's inception in 2013. 

There are no professional standards and capability requirements for probity practitioners

NSW Government agencies use probity practitioners to independently verify that their procurement and asset disposal processes are transparent, fair and accountable in the pursuit of value for money. 

Probity practitioners are not subject to regulations that require them to have professional qualifications, experience and capability. Government agencies in New South Wales have difficulty finding probity standards, regulations or best practice guides to reference, which may diminish the degree of reliance stakeholders can place on practitioners’ work.

The NSW Procurement Board provides direction for the use of probity practitioners

The NSW Procurement Board Direction 'PBD-2013-15 for engagement of probity advisers and probity auditors' outlines the requirements for agencies' use of probity practitioners in the New South Wales public sector. All NSW Government agencies, except local government, state owned corporations and universities, must comply with the Direction when engaging probity practitioners. This is illustrated in Exhibit 1 below.

Published

Actions for Governance of Local Health Districts

Governance of Local Health Districts

Health
Internal controls and governance
Management and administration

The main roles, responsibilities and relationships between Local Health Districts (LHDs), their Boards and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, according to a report released today by the Auditor-General for New South Wales, Margaret Crawford. However, there are opportunities to achieve further maturity in the system of governance and the audit report recommended a series of actions to further strengthen governance arrangements.

Fifteen Local Health Districts (LHDs) are responsible for providing public hospital and related health services in NSW. LHDs are:

  • established as statutory corporations under the Health Services Act 1997 to manage public hospitals and provide health services within defined geographical areas
  • governed by boards of between six and 13 people appointed by the Minister for Health
  • managed by a chief executive who is appointed by the board with the concurrence of the Secretary of NSW Health
  • accountable for meeting commitments made in annual service agreements with the NSW Ministry of Health.

The NSW Ministry of Health (the Ministry) is the policy agency for the NSW public health system, providing regulatory functions, public health policy, as well as managing the health system, including monitoring the performance of hospitals and health services.

The current roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry, along with other agencies in NSW Health, were established in 2011 following a series of reforms to the structure and governance of the system. These reforms began with the report of the 'Special Commission of Inquiry into Acute Care Services in NSW Public Hospitals' ('the Garling Inquiry'), which was released in 2008, and were followed by reforms announced by the incoming coalition government in 2011.

These reforms were intended to deliver greater local decision making, including better engagement with clinicians, consumers, local communities, and other stakeholders in the primary care (such as general practitioners) and non-government sectors.

The reforms empowered LHDs by devolving some management and accountability from the Ministry for the delivery of health services in their area. LHDs were made accountable for meeting annual obligations under service agreements.

This audit assessed the efficiency and effectiveness of the governance arrangements for LHDs. We answered two questions:

  • Are there clear roles, responsibilities and relationships between the Ministry of Health and LHDs and within LHDs?
  • Does the NSW Health Performance Framework establish and maintain accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs?
Conclusion
Main roles, responsibilities and relationships between LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry of Health are clear and understood, though there is opportunity to achieve further maturity in the system of governance for LHDs.
Main roles and responsibilities are clear and understood by local health district (LHD) board members and staff, Ministry of Health executive staff, and key stakeholders. However, there is some ambiguity for more complex and nuanced functions. A statement of principles to support decision making in a devolved system would help to ensuring that neither LHDs or the Ministry 'over-reach' into areas that are more appropriately the other's responsibility.
Better clinician engagement in LHD decision making was a key driver for devolution. This engagement has not met the expectations of devolution and requires attention as a priority.
Relationships between system participants are collaborative, though the opportunity should be taken to further embed this in the system structures and processes and complement existing interpersonal relationships and leadership styles.
Accountability and oversight mechanisms, including the Health Performance Framework and Service Agreements, have been effective in establishing accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs.
The Health Performance Framework and Service Agreements have underpinned a cultural shift toward greater accountability and oversight. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.
There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:
  • continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome, and quality and safety measures
  • improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
  • greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
  • including governance-related performance measures
  • more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, including consumer and community engagement
  • ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution. 
There is clear understanding of the main roles and responsibilities of LHDs and the Ministry of Health under the structural and governance reforms introduced in 2011. Strongly collaborative relationships provide a good foundation on which governance arrangements can continue to mature, though there is a need to better ensure that clinicians are involved in LHD decision making.

NSW Health is large and complex system, operating in a dynamic environment. The governance reforms introduced in 2011 were significant and it is reasonable that they take time to mature.

The main roles of LHDs and the Ministry are clear and well-understood, and there is good collaboration between different parts of the system. This provides a sound foundation on which to further mature the governance arrangements of LHDs.

While the broad roles of LHDs, their boards, and the Ministry are well understood by stakeholders in the system, there are matters of detail and complexity that create ambiguity and uncertainty, including:

  • the roles and relationships between the LHDs and the Pillars
  • to what extent LHDs have discretion to pursue innovation
  • individual responsibility and obligations between chairs, boards, executive staff, and the Ministry.

These should be addressed collaboratively between boards, their executives, and the Ministry, and should be informed by a statement of principles that guides how devolved decision making should be implemented.

Better clinician engagement in health service decision making was a key policy driver for devolution. Priority should be given by LHDs and the Ministry to ensuring that clinicians are adequately engaged in LHD decision making. It appears that in many cases they are not, and this needs to be addressed.

The quality of board decision making depends on the information they are provided and their capacity to absorb and analyse that information. More can be done to promote good decision making by improving the papers that go to boards, and by ensuring that board members are well positioned to absorb the information provided. This includes ensuring that the right type and volume of information are provided to boards, and that members and executive managers have adequate data literacy skills to understand the information.

Recommendations

  1. By December 2019, the Ministry of Health should:
     
    1. work with LHDs to identify and overcome barriers that are limiting the appropriate engagement of clinicians in decision making in LHDs
    2. develop a statement of principles to guide decision making in a devolved system
    3. provide clarity on the relationship of the Agency for Clinical Innovation and the Clinical Excellence Commission to the roles and responsibilities of LHDs.
       
  2. By June 2020, LHDs boards, supported where appropriate by the Ministry of Health, should address the findings of this performance audit to ensure that local practices and processes support good governance, including:
     
    1. providing timely and consistent induction; training; and reviews of boards, members and charters
    2. ensuring that each board's governance and oversight of service agreements is consistent with their legislative functions
    3. improving the use of performance information to support decision making by boards and executive managers.
Accountability and oversight mechanisms, including the Health Performance Framework and service agreements, have been effective in establishing accountability, oversight and strategic guidance for LHDs. They have done this by driving a cultural shift that supports LHDs being accountable for meeting their obligations. These accountablity and oversight mechanisms must continue to evolve and be improved.

This cultural shift has achieved greater recognition of the importance of transparency in how well LHDs perform. However, as NSW Health is a large, complex and dynamic system, it is important that these accountability and oversight mechanisms continue to evolve to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to support good governance.

There are areas where accountability and oversight can be improved including:

  • continued progress in moving toward patient experience, outcome and value-based measures
  • improving the Health Performance Framework document to ensure it is comprehensive, clear and specifies decision makers
  • greater clarity in the nexus between underperformance and escalation decisions
  • by adding governance-related performance measures to service agreements
  • more rigour in accountability for non-service activity functions, such as consumer and community engagement
  • ensuring that performance monitoring and intervention is consistent with the intent of devolution.

Recommendations

3.    By June 2020, the Ministry of Health should improve accountability and oversight mechanisms by:

a)    revising the Health Performance Framework so that it is a cohesive and comprehensive document
b)    clarifying processes and decision making for managing performance concerns
c)    developing a mechanism to adequately hold LHDs accountable for non-service activity functions
d)    reconciling performance monitoring and intervention with the policy intent of devolution.